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CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND IMPUTATION, CAPITAL GAINS TAX AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
by
Ervin L. Black*Assistant ProfessorJoseph Legoria**Assistant Professor
Keith F. Sellers*Associate Professor
*Department of AccountingCollege of Business
University of ArkansasFayetteville, AR 72701
(501) 575-6803email: [email protected]: [email protected]
**School of AccountancyCollege of Business and Industry
Mississippi State UniversityMississippi State, MS 39762-5661
(601) 325-1634email: [email protected]
This paper has benefited from comments of Terry Shevlin, David Burgstahler and other workshop participants at the University of Washington and participants at the Tenth Asian-Pacific Conference on International Accounting Issues.
CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND IMPUTATION, CAPITAL GAINS TAX AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
Abstract
We examine the effects of specific tax reforms on corporate capital investment in New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. The empirical findings indicate that: (1) tax reform in each of the three countries stimulated corporate capital investment, (2) tax reform altered how dividend payout ratios impacted capital investment in Canada but not in the other two countries, and (3) tax reform altered how capital intensity influenced investment in New Zealand and Australia but not Canada. Additional analyses are performed by dividing the samples into portfolios based on historical dividend payout policies and capital intensity. The findings indicate that tax reform impacted corporate investment differently depending on a firm’s dividend payout and capital intensity. In summary, we demonstrate the impact of specific tax reforms in three countries on corporate investment. Our findings suggest that policy makers can make more informed decisions regarding tax policy as it affects capital investment by examining the impact of tax reforms in other countries.
1
CAPITAL INVESTMENT EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND IMPUTATION, CAPITAL GAINS TAX AND THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
INTRODUCTION
Economic theory has long held that the level of business investment in fixed assets is a
critical determinant of business output and empirical research has clearly demonstrated this
relation.1 Based on this association, the stimulation of capital investment has been one of the
principal objectives of tax policy in the U.S. for decades. Historically, Congress has attempted
to stimulate capital investment through direct incentives such as the investment tax credit (ITC)
or generous accelerated depreciation allowances. Surprisingly, research has shown that these
incentives produce relatively small or no incremental increase in capital investment.
Macroeconomic theory asserts that tax policy should encourage investment in capital
assets if the tax system lowers the marginal cost of investment. This theory has been the
foundation of most investment incentives such as the ITC. For example, by directly lowering
the cost of a fixed asset, the ITC should result in more investment in fixed assets. One
weakness with such a targeted incentive is that all qualifying investment generates a credit, not
just incremental investments. Furthermore, it is clear that at least some targeted tax incentives
have led to sub-optimal investment decisions. An alternative method of lowering the cost of
capital and thus stimulating investment for businesses is to simply lower the overall tax burden
on business profits.
The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of specific income tax reforms on
corporate fixed investment. Specifically, we examine the incremental effects of dividend
imputation, capital gains taxes, and investment tax credits on investment. Evidence that these
specific tax reforms result in increased or decreased investment is relevant for future tax policy
1 See Shapiro (1986) for an excellent summary of this research.2
debates in the U.S. and elsewhere. Ongoing debates over the merits of alternative tax reforms,
such as capital gains tax preferences and dividend imputation, indicate that this is a timely and
relevant research topic.
In order to determine the relative and incremental effects of various tax rates and
incentives, tax policy changes in three countries are examined. In 1987, New Zealand adopted
dividend imputation and significantly lowered corporate tax rates. Dividend imputation has the
effect of eliminating the double tax on corporate profits. The second country examined in the
study is Australia. In 1987, Australia adopted a tax reform plan similar to New Zealand’s.
However, Australia also instituted for the first time a capital gains tax on sales of corporate
stocks. This has the effect of lowering the combined tax on corporate profits which were
distributed, but raising the combined rates on undistributed profit.
The third country to be examined is Canada. In 1972, Canada adopted a tax reform
package similar to the one described above for Australia. Specifically, Canada addressed the
double tax on dividends through a dividend-imputation plan while instituting a first time tax on
capital gains. However, Canada also simultaneously adopted an ITC. It is important to note that
all three countries were attempting to stimulate investment through their respective tax
reforms.2 While all three countries adopted similar forms of dividend imputation in an attempt
to eliminate the double taxation of distributed corporate profits they differed in their
2 The various dividend imputation plans adopted by New Zealand, Australia and Canada do not necessarily eliminate all income taxes on dividends, but are designed to eliminate or sharply reduce double taxation and resulting biases against corporate distributions and investment.
3
approaches on taxing capital gains and for providing direct investment incentives.
This combination of similar and different tax changes among the three countries offers
an ideal setting for our study. By treating the tax changes of these countries as experiments in
tax and investment policy, we can compare the relative and incremental effects of capital gain
taxes and investment tax credits in conjunction with the adoption of dividend imputation.
Economic conditions differed over time and among countries and general economic conditions
certainly impact investment in fixed assets. However, we control for various non-tax variables
that affect corporate investment in property, plant and equipment.
Our empirical findings indicate that: (1) tax reform in each of the three countries
stimulated corporate investment, (2) tax reform altered how dividend payout ratios impacted
investment in Canada but not in the other two countries, and (3) tax reform altered how capital
intensity influenced investment in New Zealand and Australia but not Canada. In summary, we
find evidence that specific tax reforms introduced in each of the three countries impacted
corporate investment. Thus, our findings suggest that policy makers can make more informed
decisions regarding tax policy as it affects capital investment by examining the impact of tax
reforms in other countries.
In the following sections we examine prior research, develop hypotheses, discuss
research design, provide results, and present conclusions and implications from our findings.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON TAXES AND INVESTMENT
Prior research on investment and taxes has generally relied on either the "user cost of
capital" approach developed by Jorgensen (1963) and Hall and Jorgensen (1967) or Tobin's
(1969) q-theory. However, researchers have had only limited success in linking tax changes to
4
changes in investment using these models.3 In fact, simple time series models or ad hoc models
using variables such as output, cash flow, profits, and sales tend to predict total investment
better than tax changes or their anticipated effects to cost of capital.4
Recently, studies utilizing firm specific panel data and/or specific tax reforms have
been more successful in demonstrating a shift in corporate investment in response to tax
changes. For example, Rosacher et al. (1993) examined how effective the ITC was over the
period from its original enactment in 1962 to its repeal in 1986. The authors divide their
sample into a test group consisting of firms qualifying for the ITC and a control group
consisting of firms that do not qualify for the ITC. Using a univariate Box-Jenkins interrupted
analysis, they find that ITC enactments and rate enhancements have a positive effect on
investment whereas repeals have a negative effect on investment. Ayres (1987) employed
financial capital markets research methodology in testing the effects of the ITC on security
returns. She finds a significant association between abnormal security prices and the amount of
ITC received (lost) do to changes in the ITC. Her results indicate that changes in the ITC result
in a reallocation of capital among firms.
Moore et al. (1987) test whether tax advantages offered by various states in the U.S. are
important in the decision of foreign corporations to invest in one state rather than another.
Their findings indicate that tax structures relying on the unitary method of accounting
3 For reviews of these models and empirical studies linking taxes to investment see Auerbach (1983) and Chirinko, (1986; 1993). Chirinko (1993) concludes that the evidence of such a link is weak at best.4 See, for example, Clark (1979; 1993), Bernanke et al. (1988), and Oliner et al. (1995).
5
significantly impact the amounts of investment while corporate tax rates do not.5 However, in a
subsequent article Swenson (1989) used an experimental economics approach to test whether
taxation impacted investment. He found that progressive tax regimes tend to decrease demand
for fixed assets while tax credits resulted in increased demand for those assets. In addition,
Vines et al. (1994) found that states with strong business interests (e.g. large number of firms
and high average business income per firm) tend to have lower state corporate tax rates.
Cassou (1997) studied the impact of tax policy on the flow of foreign investment between the
U.S and other countries. His findings indicate there is a significant negative relation between
U.S corporate tax rates and the level of foreign direct investment. These findings are
consistent with Moore et al. (1987) and provide further evidence that tax policy is an important
consideration for foreign firms when deciding where to invest.
Kern (1994) tested the impact of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 (ERTA) on
corporate investment. Under the ERTA, long-lived assets received greater benefits than
short-lived assets. Kern divided her sample into three portfolios based on the after-tax benefits
received from ERTA. The findings of her study indicate that firms receiving the greatest tax
benefits exhibited the largest change in investment patterns and suggest that tax policy can
have an effect on investment. However, Courtenay et al. (1989) found evidence that the ERTA
disturbed the degree of neutrality in the tax law existing between capital intensive and
non-capital intensive firms. More specifically, they found that only capital intensive firms
5 Moore et al. (1987, p. 673) define a unitary tax system as one that requires filing a consolidated corporate income tax return that includes affiliates considered to be part of the unitary business. They indicate that most foreign firms are treated as either a worldwide or domestic combination. Under a worldwide combination all of the foreign firm’s affiliates, both domestic and foreign, are included in the tax base. The domestic combination requires just the affiliates in the United States to be included in the tax base.
6
demonstrated significantly positive abnormal returns during their test period surrounding the
passage of ERTA. They concluded that all ERTA may have accomplished was a reallocation of
resources from non-capital intensive firms to capital intensive firms. In addition, Swenson
(1987) determined that the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) passed under ERTA
was non-neutral during periods of high inflation.6
In 1984, the United Kingdom passed tax reform legislation which reduced corporate tax
rates and lengthened the asset lives for many depreciable assets. Moon and Hodges (1989)
examined how the 1984 U.K. tax reform affected the after-tax cost of capital facing firms.
Their analysis indicates that the 1984 U.K. tax reform resulted in many investments in plant
and equipment becoming less attractive than they were before. Morgan (1992) surveyed the
largest U.K. firms to determine how sensitive these firms were to the 1984 U.K. tax reform. He
found that most of the firms sensitive to the 1984 tax changes (e.g. firms with high marginal
tax rates) would have scaled back their investment rather than have increased it.
In an examination of the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, Cummins and Hassett (1992)
find a significant relation between the cost of capital and the level of investment in equipment
and structures. Auerbach et al. (1991) find that the TRA of 1986 resulted in less investment
than what was predicted based on investment behavior from 1953 to 1985. Cummins et al.
(1994) found that after every tax reform enacted in the United States since 1962, the level of
investment changed. In a subsequent article, Cummins et al. (1996) examine various tax
6 The 1980s were a period of low inflation for the United States. To analyze the impact of inflation on ACRS, Swenson (1987) conducted a Monte Carlo simulation.
7
reforms in 14 countries and find evidence that taxes, in general, can be linked to changes in
investment.
Finally, Kinney and Trezevant (1993) analyzed whether taxes impact the timing of
capital expenditures. More specifically, they argue that the present value of investment-related
tax shields is greater if a depreciable asset is purchased and placed in service in the current year
compared to the subsequent year. As a result, they predict greater capital expenditures are
made in the fourth quarter of the current year, as opposed to the first of quarter of the
following year. They find support for this prediction as their results indicate firms make greater
capital expenditures in the fourth quarter of current year rather than first quarter of the next
year.
In summary, prior research has determined that the long suspected link between taxes
and investment does exist. Unfortunately, no previous research has successfully demonstrated
the investment effects of specific tax reforms such as reduction of corporate tax rates or
elimination of the double tax on dividends. Thus, while tax policy-makers know that their
decisions might impact the level of investment, they do not have information as to which
specific tax changes result in changes in actual investment behavior.
The objective of our research study is to increase understanding of the impact of
specific tax changes; i.e., changes in the structure of the tax system on distributed and
non-distributed corporate earnings and their effect on corporate investment behavior. By
examining the investment effects in countries that have implemented specific tax reforms, we
derive implications of the potential effects of similar changes in the U.S. and other countries.7
7 We provide an appendix that outlines the details of the tax reform acts in each of the three countries. See Appendix.
8
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Taxes, the Cost of Capital, and Capital Investment
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the various linkages between components
of a capital investment model and the various tax changes examined in this study. Firms should
accept additional investment opportunities if the net present value of the marginal investment is
positive. Assuming the firm has sufficient capital resources, it would invest if:
(1)
where: CFt = the net cash flows during period t, and
k = the investor’s required rate of return
Therefore, taxes and tax changes impact the investment decision to the extent that they
impact the timing of projected net cash flows (t), the amount of projected net cash flows (CF),
discount rates (k), or a combination of these factors. Corporate level taxes clearly affect the
timing and amount of cash flows. Shareholder level taxes affect corporate investment decisions
less directly, through their impact on the corporate cost of capital. In the absence of
shareholder level taxes, the corporate cost of equity is equal to the expected rate of return to
shareholders in the form of dividends and appreciation. When shareholder level taxes are
imposed, the corporate cost of equity capital and total shareholder return differ by the amount
of total shareholder level taxes. Assuming that a corporation’s risk adjusted required rate of
return on marginal investments is equal to the corporate cost of capital, the relationship
between individual shareholder taxes and the cost of capital under a classical double tax system
9
can be represented as:
(2)
where:
Ce = corporate cost of equity,
Ts = total shareholder level taxes,
Rs = total expected after-tax return to shareholders,
Rd = expected shareholder return in the form of dividends,
Td = marginal tax rates on dividend income, and
Rcg = expected shareholder return in the form of share appreciation (capital gain)
The corporation’s cost of equity capital differs from the shareholders’ after-tax return
by the amount of the shareholder-level tax, in this case equal to Rd*Td.8 Prior to the tax
reforms examined in this study, neither Australia, Canada nor New Zealand imposed a tax on
realized capital gains. Thus, Rcg is equal to a shareholder’s pre and post-tax return in the form
of share appreciation. It should be noted that, in most instances where statutory rates for Td are
non-zero, its marginal value is non-observable. Various tax clienteles will naturally concentrate
their investments in appropriate stocks based on their tax position and the expected amount and
form of the return. This clientele effect, combined with variations in the timing of dividend
distributions, make the present value of the tax impossible to estimate.
8 For purposes of brevity, equation (2) reflects the cost of capital for an unlevered corporation. Aside from the change in corporate tax rates, the major tax legislation examined in this study was generally designed to directly impact equity rather than debt financing by adding or removing biases against equity financing. Indirect effects to the cost of debt financing, arising from a change in equilibrium debt to equity ratios for firms, may have occurred.
10
New Zealand
Dividend imputation modifies the tax on dividends by attaching a credit, equal to the
taxes already paid by the corporation on behalf of the dividend, to dividend distributions. As
outlined in the appendix, if individual tax rates exceed corporate tax rates, the imputation credit
will only partially offset the individual level taxes. While some view this as only partially
reducing the classic double tax, the resulting cumulative tax burden on distributed corporate
earnings is equal to only the higher individual tax rate. In the case where the corporate tax rate
exceeds the tax rate of the recipient shareholder and the imputation credit can be fully utilized,
the resulting cumulative tax burden is once again equal to the individual shareholder’s marginal
tax rate. However, the after-tax dividend return, as viewed by the shareholder, is actually
higher than the pre-tax return. These conclusions are evident in the following when we add the
tax benefit of the imputation credit:
Rs = Rd – (Rdg * Td) + (Rdg * Tc) + Rcg (3)
where:
Rdg = the dividend return paid to shareholders, “grossed-up” by the amount of corporate level tax paid on account of the dividend, and
Tc = the corporate tax rate paid on the grossed-up distributed earnings.
Equation (3) captures the cost of capital in New Zealand after the tax reform and
accurately reflects the effects of the imputation credit when the shareholder has a positive tax
rate and sufficient income. If the recipient has insufficient income, some or all of the
imputation credit will be lost. Subtracting equation (2), which measures the after-tax return to
shareholders prior to dividend imputation from equation (3), the after-tax return after the tax
reform, reveals that shareholders’ after-tax return in New Zealand changed by an amount equal
11
to (Rdg * Tc) - (Rdg * Tc * Td). When shareholder tax rates (Td) fall between zero and 100
percent, this will result in a positive change in shareholder’s after-tax returns. Thus, the tax
reform in New Zealand clearly enhanced shareholder after-tax returns for non-tax exempt
shareholders.
Tax clientele theory, however, suggests that the higher rate of after-tax return arising
from lower explicit taxes will be offset by higher implicit taxes. Investors will bid the price of
dividend-paying stocks up until the after-tax return returns to its equilibrium state. This market
adjustment results in an unambiguous reduction in the corporate cost of additional equity
financing, and a corresponding reduction in required rates of return on corporate capital
investments.9 This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: The introduction of a dividend imputation tax system in New Zealand significantly
increased corporate capital investment.
Australia
In Australia, where the tax reform also included the imposition of a new tax on capital
gains, the effect on shareholder returns of the new tax is shown by modifying equation (3) as
follows:
Rs = Rd – (Rdg*Td) + (Rdg*Tc) + Rcg*(1-Tcg) (4)
where: Tcg = the tax rate on capital gains.
9 Empirical evidence of this anticipated market adjustment is reported by Amoako-Adu (1983). He reports that high-dividend paying stocks increased significantly in value as a result of the Canadian tax reform.
12
As with Td, the value for the capital gain tax rate (Tcg) is unobservable. Like the U.S.,
both Canada and Australia defer the tax on share appreciation until gains are realized by the
shareholder. The period of this deferral is determined by the shareholder, and can even extend
beyond the life of an individual shareholder. Once again, by subtracting equation (2) from
equation (4), one can determine that the after-tax return for shareholders in Australia increased
by an amount equal to (Rdg*Tc - Rdg*Td*Tc) - (Rcg*Tcg). Conclusions as to the net effect of
this tax reform on shareholder’s after-tax returns, and thus the cost of corporate equity capital,
are ambiguous. The change arising from dividend imputation (Rdg * Tc – Rdg * Td * Tc)
increased shareholder returns while the new capital gains tax reduced shareholder returns by an
amount equal to Rcg * Tcg. As we cannot observe values for the marginal shareholder-level tax
rates Td and Tcg, our hypothesis for Australia is non-directional. To determine the net impact
of dividend imputation and the imposition of the capital gains tax on shareholder after-tax
returns, and thus corporate cost of equity capital and corporate capital investment, we
empirically test the following:
H2: The introduction of a dividend imputation tax system and a capital gains tax
significantly impacted corporate capital investment in Australia.
Because of the counteracting effects of dividend imputation and capital gains tax we
cannot predict the directional impact on capital investment. Therefore, we formally test the
following hypotheses.
H2(a): if the positive effects of dividend imputation on shareholder returns exceeded the
negative effects of capital gains taxes on shareholder returns, corporate capital
investment in Australia increased after tax reform.
H2(b): if the negative effects of capital gains taxes on shareholder returns exceeded the
13
positive effects of dividend imputation on shareholder returns, corporate capital
investment in Australia decreased after tax reform.
H2(c): if the negative effects of capital gains taxes on shareholder returns equally offset the
positive effects of dividend imputation on shareholder returns, corporate capital
investment in Australia was unaffected after tax reform.
Canada
The Canadian tax reform examined in this study was similar to that of Australia’s in
that it implemented both dividend imputation and a new capital gains tax. For this study, a
critical difference between the Canadian tax reform and that of Australia is that the Canadian
tax act also provided a new investment tax credit. Unlike changes in shareholder level taxes,
investment tax credits directly influence corporate capital investment by enhancing net cash
flows from investments (CF in equation 1), rather than the cost of capital. Thus, as with
Australia, the Canadian tax reform introduced provisions with both positive and negative
implications for corporate capital investment. We examine the net effects of these various
provisions on capital investment by testing the following hypothesis:
H3: The introduction of a dividend imputation tax system, a capital gains tax and an
investment credit significantly impacted corporate capital investment in Canada.
As in Australia, because of the counteracting effects of dividend imputation, the capital
gains tax, and an investment tax credit, we cannot predict the direction of the impact on
investment in Canada. Thus, we formally test the following hypotheses.
14
H3(a): if the positive effects of dividend imputation and the investment tax credit exceeded
the negative effects of capital gains taxes, corporate capital investment in Canada
increased after tax reform.
H3(b): if the negative effects of capital gains taxes exceeded the positive effects of dividend
imputation and the investment credit, corporate capital investment in Canada
decreased after tax reform.
H3(c): if the negative effects of capital gains taxes equally offset the positive effects of
dividend imputation and the investment credit, corporate capital investment in Canada
is unaffected by tax reform.
Because we predict offsetting effects of the tax changes, examination of an aggregate
sample of Australian and Canadian corporations can only reveal the net impact, if any, of the
tax reforms of those countries. By segregating corporations by the form of return provided to
shareholders, it may be possible to draw inferences as to the effects of the specific tax changes,
individually and interactively. For example, assume Australian shareholders invested in a
corporation with the expectation of receiving returns solely in the form of dividends. In this
case, the change in shareholder returns, and thus the corporation’s cost of equity capital, would
only be impacted by dividend imputation. Expected after-tax returns in the form of share
appreciation remained zero and played no part in the market’s valuation of those shares. For a
portfolio of such firms, the effects of the capital gains tax are assumed to be zero and any
observed change in corporate investment could be attributable to dividend imputation.
Similarly, for Australian firms with expected returns solely in the form of share appreciation,
only the imposition of the new capital gains tax should impact the cost of equity.
15
In an effort to disaggregate the effects of dividend imputation from capital gains taxes
and investment tax credits, we divide the sample from each country into four portfolios based
on dividend payout policies and capital intensity.10 As shown in Table 1, the four portfolios, I,
II, III, and IV, include low dividend payout/low capital intensity, high dividend payout/low
capital intensity, low dividend payout/high capital intensity, and high dividend payout/high
capital intensity firms, respectively. These portfolios are partitioned based on the median
values of dividend payout and capital intensity ratios. Table 1 describes expectations of how
tax reform impacts each of the four portfolios in each of the three countries.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Variable Selection and Measurement
Dependent Variable
Investment (INV): An ideal measure of capital investment would be the amount of cash
spent on capital expenditures obtained from the cash flow or funds statement. While Canada
requires firms to disclose this information, this measure is not available to us for firms from
New Zealand and Australia. Thus, to measure investment consistently across the three
countries, we follow Kinney and Trezevant (1993) and measure capital investment as the
change in gross property, plant, and equipment (GPPE). In addition, we add a firm’s annual
R&D expenditures to its change in GPPE for each year. Most countries require firms to
10 While Canada enacted all three of these changes, Australia two, and New Zealand only one, all three samples are partitioned the same to provide comparability.
16
expense R&D in the current period because it is difficult to determine the future revenues that
will result from current R&D costs. However, Lev and Sougiannis (1996) find that the market
capitalizes R&D costs and this capitalization provides useful information about future earnings.
Therefore, we feel that a measure of investment that captures both a firm’s investment in fixed
assets and R&D more accurately reflects a company’s investment decisions.
We scale investment by total sales consistent with Kern (1994) to obtain a measure of
investment to control for inflation and growth. Therefore, our measure of investment is the
change in GPPE plus R&D divided by sales.11
Independent Variables
Independent variables for this study can be categorized as either tax variables or firm
specific variables. The tax variables represent the variables of interest for this study, and are
designed to capture the effects of the various tax changes. Firm specific variables are used to
control for other determinants of corporate capital investment behavior, primarily the firm’s
investment opportunities.
Tax Variables
A common problem in the analysis of tax law changes is that legislatures tend to make
many, often significant, tax changes simultaneously. Disentangling the effects of the various
changes presents a challenge
Tax Act (TREF): The variable of primary interest in this study indicates the effect of
tax reform in the various countries. Thus, TREF is set to zero in years preceding the effective
date of tax reform and one in years in which dividend imputation is in effect. In New Zealand,
this variable measures only the impact of dividend imputation. In Australia, this variable also
11 Prior research (Kinney and Trezevant 1993; Kern 1994) finds that various deflators have no impact on the results.
17
measures any impact of implementing capital gains taxes. Finally, in the Canadian sample this
variable will capture the effects of dividend imputation, the imposition of a capital gains tax,
and the implementation of an investment tax credit.
Statutory Tax Rate (RATE): During the years surrounding the adoption of reform, each
country significantly reduced corporate and individual income tax rates. Because both tax rates
theoretically impact corporations’ investment decisions, ideally, both individual and corporate
rates would be included in the model to account for these effects. However, individual and
corporate income tax rates exhibit a high empirical correlation over the sample period of this
study, and the presence of both variables would introduce multicollinearity into the model.
Thus, for this study RATE is defined as the maximum of either the federal corporate tax rate or
the individual tax rate, expressed as a percentage. Since RATE proxies for both individual and
corporate tax rates, the sign of its effect on capital investment is ambiguous.12
Firm Specific Variables
Net Operating Loss (DNOL): As a firm’s taxable income decreases, the possibility of
incurring a tax net operating loss (NOL) increases, resulting in a lower projected marginal tax
rate. Firms with relatively low taxable income may thus respond differently to tax reforms
such as dividend imputation and lower tax rates. For example, imputation credits may be
12 Corporate and individual tax rates could impact the investment equation in a number of ways. Corporate taxes clearly decrease the net after-tax cash flows from an investment. However, most capital investments provide attractive tax shields which increase net cash flows. Individual rates, as illustrated in the development of our hypotheses, affect corporate cost of capital.
18
unavailable if a company is not paying sufficient corporate level taxes, greatly diminishing any
impact of dividend imputation. Similarly, the incentives provided by traditional tax shields or
lower statutory rates decrease as a firm’s marginal tax rate decreases. In order to capture the
effects of low marginal tax rates, we use a dummy variable set equal to one if the firm is likely
to have a net operating loss, zero otherwise. A firm is deemed likely to have a net operating
loss if it has had one in the immediate past. We determine this by examining each of the last
five years. DNOL is equal to one if the firm had a net operating loss in any one of the five
years, zero otherwise.13
Book-to-Market Equity Ratio (BKMKT): Perhaps the most widely used estimate of a
firm’s investment opportunity set is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of
equity (and its inverse). Collins and Kothari (1989) assert that the market-to-book ratio
captures the difference between a firm’s return on both existing and future assets and its
required rate of return on equity. Thus, a lower ratio indicates greater investment opportunities
which are expected to yield returns in excess of the required rate of return.14 Since this is a
control variable, we also try other theoretically sound proxies of a firm’s investment
opportunities including the earnings to price ratio and measures of variability (as used by
Christie (1989) and Smith and Watts (1992).15
Debt to Equity Ratio (D/E): In an efficient market, is reasonable to assume that capital
is provided to firms with better investment opportunities. However, as discussed above, each of
13 Realizing that this is at best a proxy measure for low marginal tax rates, we also tested alternative classification schemes. Firms were alternatively classified as NOL firms if they had an NOL during the most recent year, a cumulative NOL during the past three years, or an NOL in the succeeding year. None of these alternative classification schemes changed the significance of the variables of interest.14 Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987) and Chung and Charoenwong (1991) also use this measure to control for growth opportunities.15 We do not use research intensity since R&D is incorporated in our measure of investment, the dependent variable.
19
our direct proxy measures of investment opportunity are sensitive to the capital structure of the
firm.
Cash Flow Ratio (CF): In addition to externally generated capital a firm generates
capital internally. The cash flow ratio, measured as operating cash flow divided by net sales, is
a measure of the firm’s ability to internally finance its capital expenditures/investments. A firm
with limited ability to internally fund investment opportunities is less likely to be able to
increase investment. Conversely, a firm with a large cash flow ratio would be able to increase
investment more easily.
Dividend Payout Ratio (DP): Shareholders receive returns on corporate investments in
the form of share appreciation and dividends. When these two forms of return are taxed
differentially, as they are in each of the tax systems examined in our study, shareholders are
attracted to appropriate clienteles as a means of maximizing their total after-tax return.
Dividend imputation is designed to eliminate the effects of the traditional double-tax on
corporate earnings. However, many firms never pay cash dividends and are thus not directly
affected by the double-tax system. It is anticipated that these firms will experience little or no
impact from dividend imputation while traditionally high-dividend paying firms will be more
strongly impacted. On the other hand, low dividend paying firms are more strongly impacted
by capital gains taxes. Thus, we expect some interaction between a firm’s dividend payout and
its response to a package of tax reform initiatives which include dividend imputation and a
capital gains tax. We test for the difference in the coefficient of this variable before and after
the tax reform acts.
Capital Intensity (CINT): The decision to invest in fixed assets (Property, Plant, and
Equipment) is dependent not only on the tax system, but also on the firm’s industry or type of
20
business. Firms in service industries that are not capital intensive would not be expected to
significantly adjust their investment based on tax effects. Therefore, it is expected that capital
investment by firms with high capital intensity are more affected by tax reforms than are firms
with relatively lower capital intensity. Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of fixed assets
to total assets. We test for the difference in the coefficient of this variable before and after the
tax reform acts.
Size: Size of the firm also affects its ability to finance additional investment and is used
as a control variable. Size is measured as the natural log of total assets.
Lagged Investment (LINV): Over time, the level of investment should tend to correlate
with certain industry characteristics. Also, firms in various life stages may be experiencing
relatively higher or lower levels of capital investment. In both cases, capital investment for a
firm in any year should be correlated with investment in the succeeding year. Thus, we
included a measure of capital investment for the prior year, scaled by total sales to be
consistent with our dependent variable. Because it is possible that capital investment might
display a cyclical nature, with large investments followed by periods of lower investment, we
do not predict a sign for this coefficient.
Data Selection
We examine pooled cross-section firm-year data from three countries that experienced
major tax reform believed to affect corporate capital investment: New Zealand, Australia, and
Canada. In 1987, New Zealand adopted dividend imputation and significantly lowered
corporate tax rates. Also in 1987, Australia adopted a dividend imputation plan similar to that
of New Zealand. However, Australia also instituted for the first time a capital gains tax on sales
21
of corporate stocks.16 The third country to be examined is Canada. In 1972, Canada adopted a
tax reform package similar to the one described above for Australia. However, Canada also
simultaneously adopted an ITC. The tax reform acts in each of these countries is summarized
in the Appendix.
Financial statement information for New Zealand and Australia is obtained from the
Compustat Global Vantage database for 1982 through 1991. The Canadian data is obtained
from Canadian Compustat for 1968-1977. Firm-year observations are deleted if the necessary
data to calculate regression variables are not available. These data allow us to observe several
years before and after tax reform in each country. After deleting observations due to lack of
data, the New Zealand sample consists of 158 firm-year observations, Australia has 1,010 firm-
year observations, and the Canadian sample has 1,776 observations.
Descriptive Statistics
Maximum corporate and individual tax rates in effect during the periods examined in
the study are shown in Table 2. Although there were annual variations, rates for both
individuals and corporations were generally lower in years after the tax reform in all three
countries. During the years preceding tax reform in New Zealand and Australia tax rates were
constant for both these countries. During 1987-88 rates initially went up at the corporate level
16 The capital gains tax went into effect in 1986. As a sensitivity test we also examine Australian data by removing this transition year, 1986. This did not qualitatively affect the results.
22
and down for individuals. Australian and New Zealand corporate and individual rates
decreased in 1989, but went down relatively farther in New Zealand. Corporate rates in New
Zealand went from 48 percent to 28 percent in 1989 (33 percent for 1990-92), while individual
rates settled to 33 percent by 1990, as well. Corporate rates went from 49 percent to 39 percent
in Australia in 1989, while individual tax rates did not go down until 1990 to 48 percent, and
then to 47 percent for 1991-92. In Canada, corporate rates increased in 1972 and 1973, then
dropped below pre-reform levels in 1974. Canadian individual rates dropped during the years
surrounding adoption of the tax reform, then rebounded partially in 1977.
Descriptive statistics, means and medians, are given in Table 3 for the dependent and
independent variables used in the regression model. The dependent investment measure is
similar in all three countries. The DNOL variable is similar in New Zealand and Australia,
slightly above 0.5 indicating that the majority of firms had an operating loss in the past five
years. This variable is less than 0.5 in Canada. The cash flow ratio is much higher in Australia
(0.48) than in either New Zealand (0.11) or Canada (0.22), although this appears to be skewed
as the medians are similar across countries. Book-to-market and debt-to-equity ratios are higher
in New Zealand than in Australia or Canada. The capital intensity and size variables are similar
across countries, although Canada has slightly smaller firms on average. In Australia, 53
percent of the observations are after the tax reform act in 1988; in New Zealand, 58 percent of
the observations are after tax reform; and in Canada 60 percent of the observations are after tax
reform.
Table 4 provides Pearson correlation coefficients of the dependent and independent
variables. Of particular note is the high negative correlation between the tax reform dummy
variable and the statutory tax rate variable in each of the countries. This high collinearity
23
makes it harder to find results on our specific variable of interest, TREF, which measures the
effect of the tax reform acts in our study countries. However, if we did not include the tax rate
variable we could not distinguish between the effects of the tax reforms and the effects of the
statutory tax rate changes. Other variables with significant partial correlations include capital
intensity (CINT) with size and lagged investment. To the extent there is multicollinearity it
should not bias the coefficients, but makes it less likely to reject the null hypothesis of no
significant relation with a firm’s investment.
Research Methodology
Regression analysis is used to test the effects of each country’s tax reform package on
investment. The major tax change that is consistent across all three countries, implementation
of a dividend imputation plan, was implemented in 1972 in Canada, 1988 in Australia and
during the second half of 1987 in New Zealand. These countries are fairly homogeneous in
their culture, tax and accounting systems.
The basic research model is the following:
(5)where,
INVit = measure of investment for firm i, at time t.
TREFt = dummy measure of whether the tax reform has become effective.
RATEt = the maximum of either the statutory corporate tax rate or the individual tax rate at time t.
24
DNOLit = measure of the likelihood of a net operating loss for firm i, at time t. If the firm has had a net operating loss in the last five years DNOL = 1, 0 otherwise.
BKMKTit = book-to-market ratio for firm i, at time t.
DEit = debt-to-equity ratio for firm i, at time t.
CFit = cash flow ratio for firm i, at time t.
PREDPit = interactive TREF dummy measure with the dividend payout ratio (DP) for firm i, at time t: (1-TREF)*DP. This measure yields the pre-tax reform coefficient.
PRECINTit = interactive TREF dummy measure with the capital intensity ratio (CINT) for firm i, at time t: (1-TREF)*CINT. This measure yields the pre-tax reform coefficient.
POSTDPit = interactive TREF dummy measure with the dividend payout ratio (DP) for firm i, at time t: TREF*DP. This measure yields the post-tax reform coefficient.
POSTCINTit = interactive TREF dummy measure with the capital intensity ratio (CINT) for firm i, at time t: TREF)*CINT. This measure yields the post-tax reform coefficient.
SIZEit = a measure of the size of firm i, at time t.
LINVit = lagged measure of investment for firm i, at time t-1.
This regression equation is estimated for each of the three countries to analyze effects
of different tax changes. The coefficient on TREF is expected to be significant if tax reform
affects investment, but may vary across country.
25
RESULTS
Regression Results by Country
Regression results for each country are reported in Table 5. By testing and comparing
tax reforms in the three countries, we provide evidence on the incremental and combined
effects of various reforms on corporate fixed investment.
New Zealand
In New Zealand, where the tax reform consisted primarily of the adoption of dividend
imputation,17 the positive relation which we observe between the TREF variable and corporate
investment supports our hypothesis, indicating that dividend imputation stimulated corporate
fixed investment in New Zealand. The other major tax change in New Zealand was a lowering
of statutory tax rates. Tax rates, indicated by the variable RATE, were insignificant indicating
that tax rates did not impact corporate investment. The negative relation between DNOL and
corporate investment indicates that a firm’s earnings status impacts its level of capital
investment. This negative relation could be due to the lack of benefits provided by dividend
imputation to corporations with low marginal tax rates.
The variable PREDP, which measures the pre-imputation dividend payout ratio, was
significant in New Zealand indicating that dividend payout ratio impacted corporate
investment.
17 The tax reform also resulted in reduced individual and corporate tax rates, but we control for this with the net operating loss dummy variable and the statutory tax rate variables. To test the sensitivity of these variables to our definition, we also test the model using dummy variables based on the most current year taxable income (negative = 1, 0 otherwise) and the next two years taxable income (negative =1, 0 otherwise) as a measure of net operating loss. These alternate forms did not affect the results; signs and significance of the test variables remained the same. To test the sensitivity of the results to the measure of the statutory tax rate, we used both the maximum corporate and maximum individual rates, rather than the maximum of either rate, with no effect to our results. We also used an estimate of firm specific marginal tax rates (Kinney and Trezevant 1993), which did not impact the results on TREF. In addition, we added a gross national product (GDP) variable, however this did not affect the model. Tax rates vary by year and are also a proxy for the macroeconomic environment in any given year.
26
After dividend imputation dividend payout ratio was no longer associated with corporate
investment as the coefficient on the variable POSTDP was not significant. Moreover, the F-
value testing this change (POSTDP-PREDP=0) is insignificant at 2.55. Thus, we cannot
conclude that dividend imputation significantly impacted this relation. PRECINT, which
measures the pre-imputation level of capital intensity, was significant at the 0.01 level
indicating that the level of capital intensity influenced corporate investment in New Zealand.
Conversely, after dividend-imputation, corporate investment is no longer influenced by the
level of capital intensity as the coefficient on POSTCINT is insignificant. The F-value of 7.50
obtained from testing whether the coefficient on POSTCINT is significantly different from the
coefficient on PRECINT (POSTCINT-PRECINT=0) is significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the
tax reform significantly changed the relation between capital intensity and capital investment.
Australia
In Australia, the coefficient on TREF is again positive (0.67) and is significant at the
0.01 level, supporting our hypothesis that Australia’s tax reform, consisting of dividend
imputation and the adoption of a capital gains tax, stimulated corporate capital investment. The
variables DNOL and RATE are insignificant indicating no relation between NOL status and
corporate tax rates and capital investment by Australian corporations.
For Australia, dividend payout ratios were not associated with corporate investment
either before or after tax reform as the coefficients on both PREDP and POSTDP were
insignificant. On the other hand, capital intensity influenced corporate investment before as
well as after tax reform as the coefficients on PRECINT and POSTCINT were both positive and
significant at the 0.01 level. However, the coefficient on POSTCINT is smaller than the
coefficient on PRECINT. The F-value testing whether this difference is significantly different
27
from zero (POSTCINT-PRECINT=0) is 23.38 and significant at the 0.01 level. Consistent with
our New Zealand results, this suggests that capital intensity does not influence corporate
investment as much after the tax reform as it did prior to the tax reform.
Canada
As in Australia, the Canadian tax reform package included dividend imputation and the
imposition of capital gains taxes, as well as an investment tax credit directly targeting capital
investment. As shown in table 5, the tax reform variable (TREF) is significant at the 0.10 level,
indicating that its passage had an impact on corporate capital investment in Canada. In
addition, the coefficient on RATE is positive (0.004) and significant at the 0.01 level indicating
that the higher the corporate tax rate the greater the level of corporate investment. The
coefficient on DNOL was not significant for the Canadian sample.
In Canada, dividend payout ratios impacted corporate investment both before and after
tax reform as the coefficients on PREDP and POSTDP were significant at the 0.01 level and
0.05 level, respectively. However, the tax reform significantly affected the magnitude of the
coefficients on dividend payout, indicating that the higher the dividend payout after tax reform
the lower is the firm’s capital investment. The F-value of the test in difference of the
coefficients on POSTDP and PREDP is 2.77 and is significant at the 0.10 level. The level of
capital intensity also influenced corporate investment both before tax reform and after tax
reform as the coefficients on PRECINT and POSTCINT were both significant at the 0.01 level.
The F-Value testing whether there is a significant difference between the coefficients on
POSTCINT and PRECINT is 0.84 and insignificant. Thus, we can conclude that the Canadian
tax reform did not impact how capital intensity influenced corporate investment.
28
Control Variables
With regards to the control variables, the variable CFO, which measures cash flow
ratio, had a significant positive impact on investment in all three countries while lagged capital
investment (LINV) was significantly and positively related to current capital investment in
Canada and New Zealand. Finally, the coefficients on the variables BKMKT and DE were
insignificant for all three countries while the coefficient on SIZE was negative and significant
in Canada and insignificant in the other two countries.
Portfolio Regression Results
We divide each of the three country samples into four portfolios based on dividend
payout policies and capital intensity. Results in Table 6 provide evidence that New Zealand
firms differed in their response to the tax legislation based on their historical dividend payout
ratio and capital intensity. For Portfolio IV, high dividend payout and high capital intensity
firms, the tax act variable (TREF) is significant and positive at the 0.10 level while for the
other three portfolios TREF is not significant. This finding supports our hypothesis; the
coefficient on PREDIV is positive and significant indicating that before tax reform, dividend
policy influenced corporate investment in New Zealand whereas after tax reform, dividend
policy no longer impacted investment as the variable POSTDIV was insignificant. The F-value
to test whether the coefficients on POSTDIV and PREDIV are equal is 4.7 and is significant
which indicates that post tax reform firms invest for economic reasons regardless of dividend
policy. In contrast to the overall results reported in Table 4, the effect of capital intensity on
investment was unaltered by tax reform in any of the four portfolios.
In Australia, a significant relationship between TREF and corporate investment
indicates that the tax reform was successful in stimulating investment in fixed assets. Since
29
Australia also adopted capital gains taxes for the first time, division of the Australian sample
into high and low dividend portfolios enables us to disaggregate the effects of dividend
imputation and capital gains taxes. Thus, by utilizing portfolios and variables measuring tax
rates, we can determine the separate and combined effects of lower tax rates, dividend
imputation and capital gains on fixed investment.
Results from Table 7 provide evidence tax reform impacted Australian firms
differently. The coefficient on TREF was positive and significant for Portfolio III, while it was
insignificant for the other three portfolios. These findings suggest that firms in Portfolio III
were driving the results reported in Table 4. However, the predicted sign on TREF for
Portfolio III was negative. A possible explanation for this finding is that the median dividend
payout ratio for Australian firms (0.46) is still relatively high compared to the other two
countries. For Portfolio I, tax reform changed how capital intensity influenced investment as
the coefficient on POSTCINT is positive and significant. The F-value testing whether
POSTCINT equals PRECINT is 3.66 and is significant at the 0.05 level and indicates that tax
reform significantly altered how capital intensity impacted investment for firms in Portfolio I.
For firms in Portfolio II, dividend policy did not influence investment either before tax
reform or after tax reform as the coefficients on PREDP and POSTDP were both insignificant.
However, tax reform did significantly change how dividend policy influenced investment as
the F-value from testing POSTDP equals PREDP is 11.74 and significant at the 0.01 level.
This indicates that after tax reform, dividend policy has less influence on investment than
before tax reform. Capital intensity impacted investment both before and after tax reform, as
the coefficients on PRECINT and POSTCINT were both positive and significant at the 0.05
level. In addition, there was no change in how capital intensity impacted investment as the F-
30
value testing whether PRECINT equals POSTCINT was 0.12 and not significant.
For Australian firms in Portfolio III, dividend policy did not impact investment either
before or after tax reform as the coefficients on PREDIV and POSTDIV were insignificant.
However, tax reform in Australia altered how capital intensity influenced investment as the
coefficient on PRECINT was positive and significant at the 0.01 level while the coefficient on
POSTCINT was insignificant. In addition, the F-value which test whether PRECINT equals
POSTCINT was 18.25 and significant at 0.01 level indicating that tax reform in Australia
significantly impacted how capital intensity influenced investment.
Finally, for Australian firms in Portfolio IV dividend policy and capital intensity did
not impact investment either before tax reform or after as the coefficients on PREDIV,
POSTDIV, PRECINT and POSTCINT were all insignificant.
Table 8 provides the results for the portfolio regressions for Canada. The results
indicate that tax reform in Canada impacted the four Portfolios differently. For Portfolio IV,
the coefficient on TREF had the predicted sign and was positive and significant at the 0.05
level. This indicates that tax reform impacted the capital investment of high dividend
payout/high capital intensity firms and suggests dividend imputation and the ITC outweighed
the increase in the capital gains tax. The coefficient on TREF for firms in Portfolio II, and III
was insignificant while it was positive and significant for Portfolio I. However, the predicted
sign for Portfolio I was negative. A possible explanation for this finding is that these firms are
growing firms that expect to have a greater need for capital assets in the future. Thus, they used
the advantages of tax reform to make major capital investments.
In Portfolio I, capital intensity had an impact on investment before tax reform as the
coefficient on PRECINT was positive and significant while after tax reform, this was no longer
31
the case as POSTCINT was insignificant. However, the F-Value of 2.47 to test whether there
was a difference between POSTCINT and PRECINT was not significant. Also, for Portfolio 1
dividend policy did not influence investment either before or after tax reform.
For Portfolio II, dividend policy impacted investment before tax reform as the
coefficient on PREDIV was significant whereas the insignificant coefficient on POSTDIV
indicates that after tax reform, dividend policy no longer influenced investment. Conversely,
capital intensity did not impact investment before tax reform as the coefficient on PRECINT
was not significant while it did impact investment after tax reform as the coefficient on
POSTCINT was positive and significant. However, for both dividend policy and capital
intensity, the F-values to test whether POSTDIV equals PREDIV and POSCINT equals
PRECINT were both insignificant indicating that tax reform did not significantly alter the
influence dividend policy and capital intensity had on investment.
For Portfolio III, dividend policy had no impact on investment either before or after tax
reform. On the other hand, capital intensity impacted investment both before and after tax
reform as the coefficients on PRECINT and POSTCINT were both positive and significant. In
addition, the coefficients on PRECINT and POSTCINT were not significantly different as the
F-value to test whether there was a difference between the two was not significant.
For Portfolio IV, the coefficient on PREDIV was not significant and indicates that
dividend policy had no impact on investment before tax reform while after tax reform, the
coefficient on POSTDIV is negative and significant. The F-value to test whether PREDIV
equals POSTDIV is 4.92 and significant at the 0.05 level. This indicates that tax reform altered
how dividend policy influences the investment decisions of firms in Portfolio IV. The positive
and significant coefficients on PRECINT and POSTCINT indicate that capital intensity had an
32
impact on investment both before and after tax reform. In addition, tax reform did not
significantly change in how capital intensity impacted investment as the F-value to test whether
PRECINT equals POSTCINT was not significant.18
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The potential misallocation of economic resources has historically been a major
concern about the efficiency of traditional corporate tax systems. For example Harberger
(1962) demonstrates that the traditional double tax on corporate profits causes capital to flow
out of the corporate sector, artificially reducing capital investment by corporations. This bias
against capital investment in the corporate sector in turn results in inefficient pricing and
consumption of corporate products. Continuing research indicates that these distortions can
have significant macroeconomic economic effects, including lower growth of GNP.19 An
overriding objective of dividend imputation, the common tax reform enacted by New Zealand,
Australia and Canada and examined in this study, was to reduce biases against the corporate
form of business believed to be induced by traditional double tax systems.
By determining the impact of tax reforms on capital investment, policy-makers in the
U.S. and elsewhere can make more informed decisions regarding tax policy as it affects capital
investment. This study determines that dividend imputation resulted in increased corporate
capital investment in all three countries. Moreover, in Australia it appears that the stimulus to
corporate investment provided by dividend imputation overshadowed the possible negative
18 Sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment is examined by including a gross domestic product (GDP) variable is added to equation (1) to control for effects to the economy in general. Adding this variable does little to the explanatory power of the model. The variables’ coefficients and signs are unaffected.19 A more detailed discussion of this area of research is beyond the scope of this paper. However, Gravelle (1991) and Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) provide excellent summaries and discussions of the ongoing research into the macroeconomic effects of corporate taxation.
33
effects of new capital gains taxes. In Canada, where the tax reform also resulted in enhanced
capital investment, it is more difficult to disentangle the beneficial effects of dividend
imputation and the new ITC. However, the results indicate that tax reform packages that
combine various attributes including dividend imputation resulted in increased corporate
capital investment.
Our tests of portfolios are based on the assumption that each portfolio is composed of
firms which are completely unaffected by some aspect of its country’s tax reform. Obviously,
relatively few corporations will remain unaffected by tax reforms of this magnitude. Thus,
while only tentative conclusions can be drawn from our portfolio tests, the results support our
primary findings. Furthermore, the results from the portfolios clearly indicate that corporations
respond differently to tax reforms based on firm specific characteristics. Tax policy makers
need to be aware that tax reforms may result not only in increased or decreased capital
investment overall, but in a shifting of investment, with wealth effects, from one sector of the
economy to another.
This possible shifting of investment raises one limitation in the interpretation of our
results. The results indicate that capital investment by relatively large corporations was
enhanced through tax reform. However, data limitations restrict our ability to measure capital
investment within other sectors of the economy, and to control for non-tax influences on
investment within those sectors. Thus, part of the increased investment that we document could
represent a shift of investment from another economic sector rather than an outright increase.
Another limitation, common to all such studies, is that major tax reforms rarely
represent discrete events. Most major tax reforms are composed of numerous changes with
potentially offsetting effects. Moreover, time lags in the form of political debates and actual
34
implementation of enacted changes raise many timing and measurement issues. In response to
these issues, we have explored reasonable alternatives in how and when several variables are
measured. The consistency of our results indicate that these issues do not materially affect the
reliability of our findings, nor conclusions based upon them.
35
APPENDIX
This appendix outlines the basic mechanics of a typical dividend imputation plan and
provides details of the tax reforms studied in this paper. The objective of a dividend imputation
scheme is to levy only one level of tax on corporate income. It should be noted that this
objective is already achieved in the taxation of traditional “pass through” business entities such
as subchapter S corporations and partnerships. However, dividend imputation differs
fundamentally from those taxation schemes in that under dividend imputation the tax is levied
on the corporation, using corporate tax rates. At the corporate level a dividend imputation plan
is quite similar to the traditional double tax system currently used in the U.S. Thus, it is the
taxation of dividend distributions that sets dividend imputation plans apart from the traditional
corporate tax system. An example of a typical dividend distribution under an imputation
system clearly outlines these differences.
Assume a corporation earns $100 of taxable income and that the corporate tax rate is 35
percent. The corporation will pay $35 of tax on account of this income, leaving $65 available
for distribution to shareholders. Assume now that the corporation declares and pays all $65 as a
dividend to a noncorporate shareholder. That shareholder must include the amount of the
dividend in his taxable income. The amount that the shareholder includes, however, is “grossed
up” for the amount of tax that has been paid by the corporation and is attributable to the
dividend. Thus, the shareholder includes in taxable income the $65 cash distribution as well as
the $35 of taxes that the corporation paid.
At this point, it appears that the shareholder is worse off under dividend imputation
than with a traditional double tax system since his taxable income is $35 higher. However, the
tax relief takes the form of a tax credit that the shareholder now receives. The amount of the
36
credit is equal to the amount of tax that the corporation has paid on the grossed up dividend,
$35 in this example. Assuming that individual and corporate tax rates are identical at 35
percent, the shareholder will have a gross tax increase of $35 (35 percent of the grossed-up
dividend) and a perfectly offsetting tax credit of $35. In summary, the cash dividend has no net
tax effect on the shareholder and the income has been subjected to only one level of tax.
This example can be modified to illustrate the outcome of dividend imputation when
individual and corporate rates vary. Assume that the individual tax rate in the example above is
40 percent. As before, the shareholder will have to report grossed-up dividend income of $100.
However, the $35 imputation credit for taxes paid by the corporation will not entirely offset the
$40 of individual taxes due. As can be seen, an imputation system where individual tax rates
exceed corporate tax rates results in only partial elimination of double taxation.
In cases where the corporate tax rate exceeds individual tax rates, the results can be
more complex. Moreover, since most tax systems have graduated individual tax rates, this
situation can occur at almost any time even if maximum individual rates exceed maximum
corporate rates. Continuing the original example where a corporation distributes a $65 cash
dividend, now assume that the recipient is an individual shareholder in a 20 percent marginal
tax bracket. The shareholder includes the grossed-up dividend of $100 in taxable income,
which results in an increased tax due of $20. However, the dividend carries a $35 imputation
credit which, if fully allowed, will result in a total net tax of just $20, or 20 percent, on the
original corporate income. An individual shareholder under these circumstances would actually
reduce his tax liability whenever he receives a cash dividend.
In order to insure that all corporate income is subject to at least one level of tax,
corporations generally maintain a cumulative record of taxes paid. The balance of this account
37
represents the amount of tax credits available on future dividend distributions and is increased
when corporate income taxes are paid and reduced whenever the corporation makes a dividend
distribution. Once the account balance is zero, any additional dividend distributions will not
carry an imputation credit.
Under certain imputation systems, one possible result of this is that corporations may
find less incentive to make use of traditional tax shields. By using a tax shield, the corporation
can successfully reduce its corporate tax. However, this strategy also reduces the imputation
credits available to shareholders. If the corporation makes distributions in excess of taxable
income, shareholders will have to include the grossed-up dividend in their taxable income but
receive no offsetting imputation credit. In summary, an additional tax shield for a high-
dividend corporation may simply “shift” the tax burden from the corporation to the
shareholders.
Tax Reform in Australia
The dividend imputation plan enacted by Australia became effective on July 1, 1987,
and closely resembles the generic plan described above. It is important to note that excess
imputation credits are not refundable to any shareholder, including tax exempt shareholders.
This is not a major factor in Australia for superannuation funds since such funds have been
subject to a 15 percent tax rate since 1988. However, imputation credits on dividends paid to
tax exempt shareholders or shareholders with relatively low taxable income might be lost.
In addition to dividend imputation, the Australian government imposed a capital gains
tax on assets acquired after September 19, 1995.20 This had the effect of grandfathering not
20 Although dividend imputation and the capital gains tax had different effective dates, they were clearly part of a integrated package of tax reforms. Head (1993) states that “imputation … did in fact form part of a substantial package of income tax reforms which included the introduction of a new indexed realisations tax on capital gains and other base-broadening measures..”
38
only unrealized gains as of that date, but any additional gains on assets already held by
shareholders on September 19, 1995. Recognized capital gains receive no preference in the
form of lower rates in Australia. However, when determining the amount of gain to be
recognized on disposition of a capital asset, the owner’s basis is indexed for inflation.
Tax Reform in Canada
Canada’s dividend imputation scheme, which became effective in January of 1972,
differs from that of most countries in that there is no direct link between taxes paid at the
corporate level and the generation of imputation credits to shareholders. Shareholders receive a
credit based on grossed-up dividends regardless of the amount of taxes actually paid, or not
paid, by the distributing corporation. One effect of this is that traditional tax shields which
reduce corporate taxes will not limit dividend credits as they can in New Zealand and
Australia. Canadian corporations are also relieved of the burden of tracking the amount of
imputation credits available to shareholders. As with Australia and New Zealand, credits in
excess of pre-credit tax liability are not refundable.
Canada’s tax reform also imposed a capital gains tax on stock held for investment. One-
half of realized gains were taxes at ordinary income tax rates. This is similar to Australia’s
system, except there was no grandfathering of pre-existing gains and no indexing for inflation.
Finally, Canada instituted an ITC for investment in non-real estate business assets.
39
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43
Table 1Expected Relation of Tax Reform with Capital Expenditures
for New Zealand, Australia, and Canada
Portfolios Partitioned by Dividend Payout and Capital Intensity
A: New Zealand
C IA NP T I E LowT NA SL I T High Y
DIVIDEND PAYOUT
Low High
Insignificant TREFCoefficient
I
Significant Positive TREF Coefficient
IISignificant PositiveTREF Coefficient
III
Significant PositiveTREF Coefficient
IV
B: Australia
C IA NP T I E LowT NA SL I T High Y
DIVIDEND PAYOUT
Low High
Insignificant TREFCoefficient
I
Significant Positive TREF Coefficient
IISignificant Negative TREF
Coefficient
III
Significant Positive TREF Coefficient
IV
C: Canada
C IA NP T I E LowT NA SL I T High Y
DIVIDEND PAYOUT
Low High
Significant Negative TREFCoefficient
I
Significant Positive TREF Coefficient
II
?
III
Significant Positive TREF Coefficient
IV
44
Table 2
Descriptive Data on Tax Rates in Australia and New Zealand
New Zealand Australia Canada
YEARMaximumCorporate Tax Rate
MaximumIndividual Tax Rate
MaximumCorporate Tax Rate
MaximumIndividual Tax Rate
YEARMaximumCorporate Tax Rate
MaximumIndividual Tax Rate
1982 45% 60% 46% 60% 1968 51.4% 60%
1983 45% 66% 46% 60% 1969 51.4% 60%
1984 45% 66% 46% 60% 1970 46.7% 60%
1985 45% 66% 46% 60% 1971 46.5% 57.6%
1986 45% 66% 46% 60% 1972 49% 45.6%
1987 48% 57% 49% 57% 1973 50.6% 47%
1988 48% 48% 49% 49% 1974 48.2% 47%
1989 28% 40.5% 39% 49% 1975 46% 47%
1990 33% 33% 39% 48% 1976 46% 47%
1991 33% 33% 39% 47% 1977 46% 51.7%
45
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Regression VariablesMeans (Medians)
Variable New Zealand Australia Canada
Investment (INV) 0.15(0.04)
0.16(0.04)
0.15(0.04)
Tax Reform Dummy (TREF)
0.58(1.00)
0.53(1.00)
0.60(1.00)
Net Operating Loss Dummy (DNOL)
0.57(1.00)
0.56(1.00)
0.37(0)
Statutory Tax Rate (RATE)
0.49(0.48)
0.54(0.49)
0.53(0.51)
Book-to-Market Ratio (BKMKT)
5.15(1.52)
2.23(0.93)
0.95(0.61)
Debt-to-Equity Ratio (DE)
1.78(1.16)
1.01(1.05)
1.48(1.12)
Cash Flow Ratio (CF)
0.11(0.07)
0.48(0.10)
0.22(0.11)
Dividend Payout Ratio (DP)
0.31(0.42)
0.21(0.46)
0.48(0.28)
Capital Intensity Ratio (CINT)
0.40(0.35)
0.43(0.41)
0.45(0.42)
SIZE 5.75(5.57)
5.85(5.81)
3.81(4.07)
Lagged Investment (LINV)
0.19(0.05)
0.17(0.03)
0.15(0.04)
46
Definition of Variables:
INV = measure of investment for firm i, at time t.TREF = dummy measure of whether tax reform is available for firm i, at time t.DNOL = measure of the likelihood of a net operating loss for firm I, at time t. If the
firm has had a net operating loss in the last five years DNOL = 1, 0 otherwise.
RATE = the maximum of the statutory corporate tax rate or the individual tax rate at time t.
BKMKT = book-to-market ratio for firm i, at time t.DE = debt-to-equity ratio for firm i, at time t.CF = cash flow ratio for firm i, at time t.DP = dividend payout ratio for firm i, at time t.CINT = capital intensity ratio for firm i, at time t.SIZE = a measure of the size of firm i, at time t.LINV = lagged measure of investment for firm i, at time t-1.
47
Table 4Correlation Analysis
A: New Zealand – Pearson Correlation CoefficientsINV TREF DNOL RATE BKMKT DE CF DP CINT SIZE
TREF -0.221DNOL 0.097 -0.108RATE 0.227 -0.947 0.081BKMKT 0.006 -0.279 0.012 0.276DE 0.491 -0.110 0.075 0.096 -0.056CF 0.202 0.073 0.121 -0.060 -0.010 0.033DP 0.056 -0.031 0.064 -0.018 0.016 0.004 0.031CINT 0.399 -0.027 0.179 0.014 0.161 0.214 0.008 0.055SIZE 0.174 0.037 -0.228 -0.038 0.060 0.174 0.097 0.035 0.307LINV 0.639 -0.187 0.146 0.211 0.010 0.637 0.159 0.029 0.456 0.192
B: Australia – Pearson Correlation CoefficientsINV TREF DNOL RATE BKMKT DE CF DP CINT SIZE
TREF 0.075DNOL -0.229 -0.195RATE -0.094 -0.984 0.172BKMKT -0.094 -0.023 0.075 0.030DE -0.003 -0.037 -0.002 0.023 0.044CF 0.38 -0.062 0.054 0.067 -0.035 -0.006DP 0.002 -0.019 -0.031 0.018 0.012 -0.012 -0.001CINT 0.150 0.012 0.107 -0.026 0.067 -0.058 0.041 0.029SIZE 0.131 0.166 -0.273 -0.179 0.239 0.043 -0.161 0.010 -0.041LINV 0.168 0.127 -0.110 -0.148 -0.042 0.027 0.070 0.002 0.094 0.125
C: Canada – Pearson Correlation CoefficientsINV TREF DNOL RATE BKMKT DE CF DP CINT SIZE
TREF 0.043DNOL -0.019 -0.228RATE -0.060 -0.787 0.264BKMKT -0.063 0.103 -0.261 -0.084DE 0.102 0.061 0.038 -0.042 -0.062CF 0.175 -0.024 -0.005 0.022 0.020 -0.038DP -0.017 -0.022 0.029 0.019 -0.016 -0.013 0.334CINT 0.471 -0.063 0.016 0.061 -0.076 0.161 -0.025 -0.026SIZE 0.308 0.127 -0.382 -0.126 0.158 -0.0003 0.007 0.001 -0.177LINV 0.571 0.062 0.073 -0.092 -0.052 0.103 0.147 -0.014 0.468 -0.300
Bold indicates significant p-value < 0.05
48
Table 5Regression Results by Country
(5)
New ZealandN = 158
AustraliaN = 1,010
CanadaN = 1,776
Independent Variable
Expected Sign Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
Intercept ? -0.61 -2.45*** -0.21
TREF + 0.46** 0.67* 0.04***
RATE ? 0.003 .034 0.004*
DNOL - -0.11*** 0.01 -0.002
BKMKT - 0.004 -0.01 0.02
DE ? 0.03 -0.01 0.003
CF + 0.45* 0.002* 0.00004*
PREDP - 0.16** -0.01 -0.0001*
PRECINT + 1.21* 1.87* 0.43*
POSTDP - 0.006 0.0001 -0.02**
POSTCINT + -0.03 0.68* 0.39*
SIZE ? 0.003 -0.001 -0.02*
LINV + 0.31* 0.01 0.34*
Model F-Value 13.57* 27.94* 140.99*
Adjusted R-square 0.49 0.24 0.49TEST:
PREDP-POSTDP = 0F-Value
2.55 0.68 2.77***
TEST: PRECINT – POSTCINT = 0
F-Value7.50* 23.38* 0.84
*indicates significance at 0.01 level. **indicates significance at 0.05 level. ***indicates significance at 0.10 level.
49
Table 6New Zealand Portfolio Regression Results
(5)
IndependentVariables
ILow DP
Low CINTN = 42
IIHighDP
Low CINTN = 38
IIILow DP
High CINTN = 29
IVHigh DP
High CINTN = 49
Intercept -0.04 0.02 -1.30 -1.63
TREF -0.01 -0.11 0.86 1.37***
RATE 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.01
DNOL -0.06*** 0.04 -0.06 -0.05
BKMKT 0.0004 -0.001 0.01 0.01
DE 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.06
CF 0.09 -0.02 0.88** 2.35*
PREDP -0.03 -0.04 -0.17 0.50**
PRECINT 0.02 -0.44 1.81 0.65
POSTDP 0.004 -0.07 0.13 -0.18
POSTCINT -0.14 0.06 -0.20 -0.59
SIZE 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
LINV -0.21 0.23 0.13 0.48
Model F-Value 1.01 0.96 1.84 5.85*
Adjusted R-square 0.003 0.00 0.27 0.55TEST:
PREDP-POSTDP = 0F-Value
0.48 0.03 0.34 4.70**
TEST: PRECINT – POSTCINT = 0
F-Value0.06 0.23 1.69 0.52
*indicates significance at 0.01 level.**indicates significance at 0.05 level.***indicates significance at 0.10 level.
50
Table 7Australia Portfolio Regression Results
(5)
IndependentVariables
ILow DP
Low CINTN = 244
IIHighDP
Low CINTN = 256
IIILow DP
High CINTN =244
IVHigh DP
High CINTN = 265
Intercept -2.05 -0.07 -8.54 0.16
TREF -0.07 0.07 4.29* -0.20
RATE 0.03 -0.001 10.88 -0.14
DNOL -0.03 -0.003 -0.29 0.08**
BKMKT 0.0004 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
DE -0.002 0.05** -0.07 0.02
CF 0.001 0.06*** 0.002* 0.62*
PREDP -0.0002 -0.004 -0.87 -0.002
PRECINT 0.34 0.33*** 6.04* -0.16
POSTDP 0.0001 -0.16 -0.001 -0.01
POSTCINT 1.39* 0.44** -0.06 0.01
SIZE 0.04** 0.003 -0.04 0.01
LINV -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.06
Model F-Value 3.06* 5.72* 9.03* 7.33*
Adjusted R-square 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.22TEST:
PREDP-POSTDP = 0F-Value
0.003 11.74* 1.58 0.09
TEST: PRECINT – POSTCINT = 0
F-Value3.66** 0.12 18.26* 0.21
*indicates significance at 0.01 level.**indicates significance at 0.05 level.***indicates significance at 0.10 level.
51
Table 8Canada Portfolio Regression Results
(5)
IndependentVariables
ILow DP
Low CINTN = 509
IIHighDP
Low CINTN = 376
IIILow DP
High CINTN =411
IVHigh DP
High CINTN = 480
Intercept -0.23 0.07 -0.42 -0.35*
TREF 0.07*** -0.05 0.14 0.13**
RATE 0.004** 0.001 0.36 0.004***
DNOL 0.02 0.05 -0.10* 0.11*
BKMKT 0.02 -0.11 0.05 -0.17***
DE -0.003 -0.01*** -0.00001 0.01***
CF 0.000005* 0.000003* 0.00001* 0.00004*
PREDP 0.03*** -0.0001* -0.15 0.023
PRECINT 0.31* 0.03 0.76* 0.67*
POSTDP 0.02 0.004 -0.31 -0.05*
POSTCINT 0.07 0.17** 0.57* 0.59*
SIZE -0.01 -0.0013 -0.01 -0.02*
LINV 0.15* 0.33* 0.36* 0.25*
Model F-Value 5.89* 14.98* 13.80* 102.77*
Adjusted R-square 0.10 0.31 0.27 0.72TEST:
PREDP-POSTDP = 0F-Value
0.14 0.06 0.68 4.92**
TEST: PRECINT – POSTCINT = 0
F-Value2.47 1.23 0.77 0.74
*indicates significance at 0.01 level.**indicates significance at 0.05 level.***indicates significance at 0.10 level.
52