Capital Flows: Negotiating the Trilemma and Sequencing Openness

Capital Flows: Negotiating the Trilemmaand Sequencing Openness

Abhijit Sen Gupta

Senior Economics Officer,India Resident Mission,

Asian Development Bank

Financial Sector Developments, Issues and the Way Forward

Sen Gupta (ADB) Capital Flows 14th Dec 2011 1 / 45

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this presentation are the views of thespeaker and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies ofthe Asian Development Bank (ADB), or its Board of Governors,or the governments they represent. ADB does not guarantee theaccuracy of the data included in this paper and accepts noresponsibility for any consequence of their use. Terminologyused may not necessarily be consistent with ADB official terms.


Outline

Outline

1 Introduction & Motivation

2 India’s Approach to Capital Account OpennessEvolution of Various Flows

3 Extent of India’s Capital Account Openness

4 India’s Tryst with the TrilemmaQuantifying the TrilemmaIndian Experience

5 Conclusion


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5 Conclusion


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5 Conclusion


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5 Conclusion


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5 Conclusion


Introduction & Motivation


Emerging markets have experienced high volatility in capital flows,largely due to factors outside their control. Capital Flows

Such sharp swings create several problems for these countries, andhave rekindled the debate on management of international capital flows.

A country wants to actively manage international capital flows for twomain reasons.

Unbridled capital flows tend to exacerbate financial fragilities, whichcan lead to a crisis.Creates difficulties in macroeconomic management – “Trilemma”

To counter these issues a number of countries have introducedadditional measures regulating the flow of international capital.

In recent years even the IMF has also shown a shift in its doctrine. IMF
























































India’s Approach to Capital Account Openness

Sequencing of Capital Account Liberalization

In the neo classical framework, capital flows contribute to growth mainly bysupplementing domestic savings.In the endogenous growth framework, capital flows influence growth throughspillovers in the form of technology, skills, introduction of new products,increased efficiency of the domestic financial markets and improved resourceallocation.Since the spillovers and externalities associated with different forms of capitalflows would be different, a pecking order approach to the composition of capitalflows is required.

India prioritized certain kinds of flows and agents in the liberalization process.Shift away from debt to non-debt-creating flows.Use of multiple instruments, including quantitative limits, price based measures andadministrative measures.Restricting short-term debt for trade transactions.Avoiding excessive foreign currency borrowing by domestic entities.Prudential regulations to prevent dollarization of balance sheets of financial sectorintermediaries.Gradual liberalization of permissible avenues for outward investments.

Prioritization of certain flows helped in significantly altering India’s externalliabilities profile. Composition
























































India’s Approach to Capital Account Openness Evolution of Various Flows

Outline





5 Conclusion



Evolution of Various Flows

The policy for FDI inflows has been significantly liberalized over the past twodecades.

FDI inflows in India increased from $4.5 billion in 2003-04 to over $38.9 billion in2008-09. FDI Flows

India liberalized outbound FDI in an incremental manner and in recent yearsthere has been a jump in outbound FDI.

India has been more cautious in terms of liberalizing portfolio investment withseparate investment caps on sub accounts of FIIs, individual FII and aggregateFII investment in a company.

Portfolio investment has also witnessed a strong increase since 2004-05 andreached a peak in 2010-11. Portfolio Flows

India has been more conservative in terms of liberalizing debt flows with bothborrowers and lenders having to satisfy eligibility criteria, minimum maturityperiod, cap on all-in-cost payments and end use restrictions.

Despite these restrictions ECB inflows have increased from $5 billion in 2003-04to over $30 billion in 2007-08. ECBs






























































Extent of India’s Capital Account Openness


Given the cautious and calibrated approach, India’s extent ofliberalization has been relatively low compared to other emergingmarkets.

In terms of De Jure openness measures there has been a significantincrease among emerging markets but India has not kept pace with thisliberalization process. De Jure Openness

India has also been on the lower end of the spectrum when openness ismeasured according to the volume of capital flows. De Facto Openness

China, which started as lagging behind India in the 1980s, hasoutstripped India during the last two decades.

However, India’s ranking improves considerably when one looks at NonDebt creating flows. Non Debt


































India’s Tryst with the Trilemma


Definition (Trilemma)

A country can simultaneously achieve only two of the following three objectives: free capitalflows, an independent monetary policy and a fixed exchange rate.

India, as other countries, seeks to attain these three objectives with varying degrees.Capital flows aid growth by providing external capital to sustain an excess ofinvestment over domestic savings or by financing the current account deficit.A competitive exchange rate helps Indian exports, a large part of which is labourintensive.An independent monetary policy stabilizes the economy in the face of domestic andexogenous shocks.

Focus on this issue by following the methodology outlined in Aizenman et al. (2010).





































India’s Tryst with the Trilemma Quantifying the Trilemma

Outline





5 Conclusion



Quantifying the Trilemma

Monetary independence is measured as the inverse of the annualcorrelation of the monthly interest rates between India and the UnitedStates.

MI = 1 − corr(i , i∗) − (−1)

1 − (−1)(1)

The index for Exchange Rate Stability is calculated using the annualstandard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between India and theUnited States.

ERS =0.01

0.01 + σ(∆(ε))(2)




Monetary independence is measured as the inverse of the annualcorrelation of the monthly interest rates between India and the UnitedStates.

MI = 1 − corr(i , i∗) − (−1)

1 − (−1)(1)

The index for Exchange Rate Stability is calculated using the annualstandard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between India and theUnited States.

ERS =0.01

0.01 + σ(∆(ε))(2)




Aizenman et al (2010) use de Jure measure developed in Chinn and Ito (2008)to calculate the extent of capital account openness.

It is the actual quantum of flows that creates a conflict between monetaryindependence and exchange rate rigidity and not just the regulations.

We use the de facto measure based on the ratio of absolute value of net capitalflows to GDP.

CapOpen =|CapFlows|

GDP(3)

A possible way to manage the dichotomy between monetary independence andexchange rate stability, over the short-run, is by accumulating or decumulatingreserves.

∆Res =|Intervention|

GDP(4)

We use to diamond charts to look at the Trilemma and measure monetaryindependence, exchange rate rigidity, capital account openness and reserves onthe four vertices. Example







CapOpen =|CapFlows|

GDP(3)



GDP(4)








CapOpen =|CapFlows|

GDP(3)



GDP(4)








CapOpen =|CapFlows|

GDP(3)



GDP(4)








CapOpen =|CapFlows|

GDP(3)



GDP(4)



India’s Tryst with the Trilemma Indian Experience

Outline





5 Conclusion



The Early 1980s: Limited Openness

Limited extent of internationalcapital movement.

Allowed policymakers to retainboth monetary independenceand exchange rate stability.

Limited degree of internationalreserve accumulation.

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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1980-81

1981-82

1982-83

1983-84

1984-85







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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1980-81

1981-82

1982-83

1983-84

1984-85







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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1980-81

1981-82

1982-83

1983-84

1984-85



The Late 1980s: Deterioration in MacroeconomicHealth

The current account deficit increased dueto partial liberalization of imports, a spike inoil prices due to the Gulf crisis andeconomic deterioration in major exportmarkets.

Some of the capital controls were relaxed,and the current account deficit startedbeing financed by non-resident remittancesand borrowings at commercial terms.

While medium and long-term debts morethan quadrupled, short-term external debtincreased to $6 billion during this periodcompared to reserve holdings of only $2billion.

These steps did not prevent thedeterioration of the balance of paymentsand a full blown crisis broke out in 1991.

The crisis was resolved by a combinationof devaluation and borrowing from the IMF.India initiated a move towards a path ofeconomic reform.

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

1989-90









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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

1989-90









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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

1989-90









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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

1989-90









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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1985-86

1986-87

1987-88

1988-89

1989-90



1993 to 1995: Confronting the Trilemma

Both push and pull factors led to a surge incapital inflows.

Policymakers faced a choice of eitherallowing nominal exchange rate toappreciate or allowing the money supply tochange.

The Indian authorities chose exchange raterigidity over monetary independence.

The Rupee-Dollar exchange rate remainedsteady at Rs. 31.4 per dollar from Apr 1993to Aug 1995 leading to an ERS of 1.

The RBI intervened heavily causing NFA torise significantly reflected in ∆Res rising to0.48 in 1993-94 and 0.32 in1994-95. Trilemma

Due to paucity of instruments and anilliquid bond market, the RBI could notsterilize the foreign inflows and there was asharp increase in money supply.

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1993-94

1994-95










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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1993-94

1994-95










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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1993-94

1994-95










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0.9

1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1993-94

1994-95










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0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1993-94

1994-95










0.0

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0.2

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0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1993-94

1994-95



Late 1990s: Moderation of Capital Flows

The situation reversed in the second half ofthe 1990s with a series of crisis in LatinAmerica and East Asia leading to areduction in capital inflows.

Domestic events also exacerbated thereduction in capital inflows.

These events led to sporadic downwardpressure on the Indian rupee during thisperiod, in response to which the RBIallowed the rupee to depreciate moderatelywith the ERS index indicating a relativelylow value during 1995-96 to 1998-99,ranging between 0.27 and 0.41.

Flexibility in the exchange rate and thelimited volume of capital flows allowed thepolicymaker to reassert monetaryindependence.

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99








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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99








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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99








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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

1998-99



Early 2000s: Signs of Capital Flows Revival

The decline in capital inflows continued inearly 2000s and showed signs of revivalonly in 2002-03.

The exchange rate was managed byengineering a moderate depreciation inthese years to achieve a competitiveREER. The ERS index ranged between0.57 and 0.79.

Revival of capital flows and a currentaccount surplus was countered by byactive intervention by the RBI in the foreignexchange market, as it accumulated $40billion of reserves.

Despite attempts to sterilize theseintervention by depleting stock of NDA,there was a steady increase in the growth

rate of reserve money. Management

Monetary Independence was relinquishedto a great extent.

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03










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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03










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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03










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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03










0.0

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0.9

1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

1999-00

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03



Surge in Capital Flows

The policy trade offs got exacerbated since2003 due to a surge in capital inflows withthe Cap Open index rising to 0.54 in2006-07 and 1 in 2007-08.

The RBI attempted to achieve an‘intermediate regime’, and to prevent theRupee from appreciating rapidly heavilyintervened in the foreign exchange marketresulting in the ∆Res index rising 0.43 in2006-07 and 1 in 2007-08.

While the RBI sterilized some of thisintervention, by end 2003 it ran out ofgovernment bonds, and in January 2004introduced a new instrument.

By August 2005, outstanding MSS bondsrose to Rs. 0.71 trillion, and doubled to Rs.1.4 trillion by December 2007.

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Cap Open

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08








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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08








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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08








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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08




The rising cost of sterilization forced RBI toincompletely sterilize the capital flows,which led to a rise in money supply growth

rate. Management

The RBI tried to control the growth inmoney supply through other instruments.

Measures restricting capital inflows andencouraging outflows were announced.

The Rupee was allowed to appreciate by18% between mid 2005 and end 2007.

Management

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MI

ERS

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Cap Open

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08





rate. Management




Management

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2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08





rate. Management




Management

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2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08





rate. Management




Management

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08



Global Financial Crisis and Subsequent Revival

The outbreak of the sub-prime crisis in theUS and the flight to safety, capital startedflowing out of the Indian economy sincelate 2007 with the Cap Open indexdropping to 0.04 in 2008-09.

Reserves were put into use to stem theoutflow and manage pressure on theexchange rate with ∆Res index being at0.42.

The Rupee was allowed to depreciate by21.2% resulting in the ERS index droppingto 0.27 in 2008-09.

Since mid 2009, resumption of capital flowspushed the Cap Open index to 0.43 during2009-10 and led to RBI imposing certainrestrictions on inflow of capital.

The Rupee was allowed to appreciate bynearly 17.5% between March 2009 andApril 2010 resulting in the ERS indexdropping to 0.35.

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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0.6

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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*




The RBI has refrained from intervening in

the forex market resulting in ∆Res ≈ 0.Prevent interest rate from risinggiven the borrowing requirementsof the government.Intervention and incompletesterilization could lead to a rise ininflationary pressures.Use a strong currency to curbinflationary pressures.

Domestic and external factors contributedto outflow of portfolio investment since May2011, though FDI and debt flows haveremained strong.

The Rupee depreciated by 7% during thefirst half of 2011-12 leading to an ERSindex of 0.29.

Owing to greater exchange rate flexibilitythe RBI was able to assert greatermonetary independence with a rise in theMI index to 0.78 in 2011-12.

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MI

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2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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MI

ERS

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Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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MI

ERS

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Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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0.5

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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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1.0

MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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MI

ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*









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ERS

∆ Res

Cap Open

2008-09

2009-10

2010-11

2011-12*



Policy Choices under the Trilemma

It is evident that India has juggled the various policy choices under thetrilemma according to the macroeconomic needs.

Did India faced trade-offs among the various policy choices?

The absence of a functional form of the nature of trade-offs under thetrilemma can be an obstacle.

Following Aizenman et al. (2010) we test the validity of the linearframework.

2 = αMIt + βERSt + γCapOpent (5)

A relatively high high goodness of fit indicates that the linearspecification explains well the trade-offs among the policy dimensions.

Policy Choices










Policy Choices










Policy Choices










Policy Choices










Policy Choices




The extent of the policy choice actually implemented by thepolicymakers is given by α̂MI, β̂ERS and γ̂CapOpen. Policy Choices

Monetary indepenendence was accorded the highest priority in early1980s followed by exchange rate stability.

However, rising capital flows and a preference for exchange rate stabilityled to a drop in monetary independence, which bottomed out in 1993-94.

There was a reversal of trend in the mid 1990s with a resurgence ofmonetary independence associated with a dip in exchange rate stability.

With the RBI targeting the REER, the late 1990s and the early 2000switnessed a secular decline in monetary independence.

The rise in net capital inflows from 2003-04 was initially associated witha decline in both monetary independence and exchange rate stability.

However, from 2007-08 onwards there has been a sharp increase inmonetary independence with an associated drop in exchange ratestability to manage capital flows.
































































The extent to which the Trilemma has been binding in the Indian contextcan be inferred from α̂MI+β̂ERS+γ̂CapOpen. Evolution

A linear specification entails that the cumulative sum can not exceed 2.

We do find that the sum of the predicted values lies below 2 throughmost of our period.


There have been periods when the Trilemma has been underutilized.The BOP crisis in 1991 resulted in a sharp drop in the predicted values in 1991-92and 1992-93 as there was a sharp drop in all the three indices.Reduced capital flows as well as lower level of monetary independence meant thatthe the trilemma was not binding for the Indian economy during the late 1990s andearly 2000s.


















































Conclusion

Conclusion

India has adopted a gradualist and calibrated approach towardsintegration with the global capital market.

In recent years, India has resorted to the multiple instrument approachwhile dealing with capital flows and adopted an intermediate regimejuggling capital flows, exchange rate stability and monetaryindependence.

This has helped India to manage the policy choices under Trilemma aswell as alter the composition of its liabilities.

This has suited India well as it has been able to maintain a healthygrowth rate, targeted monetary and credit growth rates, moderateinflation rate through most of the period and a sustainable currentaccount deficit.


Conclusion

Conclusion






Conclusion

Conclusion






Conclusion

Conclusion






Conclusion

THANK YOU !!


Appendix

Appendix Outline

6 AppendixGlobal Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies

FDI FlowsPortfolio FlowsECBsDe Jure Measures of OpennessDe Facto Measures of OpennessNon Debt Creating Flows

Composition of LiabilitiesTrinity

ExampleIntervention & SterilizationIntervention & SterilizationEvolution of Policy Choices under the Trilemma


Appendix Global Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies

Global Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

IIF RESEARCH NOTE page 3

Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies

IIF.com © Copyright 2011. The Institute of International Finance, Inc. All rights reserved.

billion, respectively. For China, inward direct investment inflows have now been far exceeded

by other flows from portfolio investors (both bond and equity investors) and banks.

Our sample of 30 major emerging economies remain significant net capital exporters,

however, reflecting their combined status as current account surplus economies. In

aggregate, net capital outflows from our sample of emerging economies will total about $1.4

trillion per year in 2011-12. Although official reserve accumulation continues to account for

the lion’s share of these flows, net private outflows are on the rise (especially FDI). The

significance of this development is that some net private capital outflows from emerging

economies are likely to end up as flows into other emerging economies, and will thus also

count as net inflows in our dataset, at least in principle. Chinese FDI outflows, for example,

will amount to around $85 billion, net, in 2011 and $105 billion, net, in 2012, and a

significant portion of this will be allocated to other emerging economies. This increasing

tendency for emerging economies to invest in each other is one factor that can explain why

some high frequency indicators of capital flows (such as illustrated in Chart 5, page 6) may

be understating overall inflows in 2011. These high frequency measures typically identify only

net flows from investors in mature economies to recipients in emerging economies.

While we project broad stability in net flows amid a phase of growing global turbulence, we

have also entered a phase when investors are liable to begin to differentiate more between

emerging economies. Countries with more obvious risk characteristics are apt to come

under more pressure. For example, countries with high and rising external borrowing

requirements will probably find themselves unable to attract flows on quite the same

favorable terms as has been the case in recent years, extremely low rates in mature

economies notwithstanding. For example, Turkey’s current account deficit has approached

10% of GDP in recent months (see Chart 13, page 10), which will make it more challenging

for Turkey to attract the necessary net debt inflows without seeing a rise in yields, a weaker

currency or some combination of these two effects.

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011f

Chart 2Emerging Market Private Capital Inflows, Netpercent of GDP

Bank Lending

FDI

Nonbank Lending

Portfolio Equity

Official reserve

accumulation still accounts

for the lion’s share of

capital outflows, but private

outflows are on the rise

Source: Institute of International Finance Capital Flows



Coping with Surges in Capital Flows 7

IMF



FDI Flows

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07 2008-09 2010-11

Billio

n $

FDI Inflow

FDI Outflow

FDI Flows



Portfolio Flows

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07 2008-09 2010-11

Billio

n $

Portfolio Investment Inflow

Portfolio Investment Outflow

Portfolio Flows



ECBs

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2000-01 2002-03 2004-05 2006-07 2008-09 2010-11

Bil

lio

n $

ECB Inflow

ECB Outflow

ECBs



Cross Country Comparison of De Jure Openness

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

ME

X

IDN

MY

S

IRN

TH

A

ISR

ZA

F

AR

G

KO

R

PH

L

JO

R

IND

PE

R

CH

L

TU

R

MA

R

BR

A

CO

L

EG

Y

Median Openness

(a) 1970s

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

IDN

MY

S

TH

A

ME

X

JO

R

PE

R

ISR

KO

R

AR

G

PH

L

IND

TU

R

IRN

PO

L

CH

L

CH

N

MA

R

HU

N

ZA

F

BR

A

CO

L

EG

Y

Median Openness

(b) 1980s

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

IDN

MY

S

PE

R

AR

G

ME

X

PH

L

JO

R

CZ

E

HU

N

TH

A

EG

Y

KO

R

TU

R

ISR

RU

S

MA

R

ZA

F

IND

PO

L

CH

N

CO

L

CH

L

BR

A

IRN

Median Openness

(c) 1990s

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

JO

R

PE

R

EG

Y

CH

L

CZ

E

ISR

HU

N

IDN

ME

X

BR

A

PH

L

PO

L

IRN

MY

S

KO

R

TH

A

RU

S

CO

L

AR

G

CH

N

ZA

F

IND

TU

R

MA

R

Median Openness

(d) 2000sComparison



Cross Country Comparison of De Facto Openness

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

ISR

JO

R

CH

L

ZA

F

MY

S

PE

R

TA

I

EG

Y

PH

L

KO

R

BR

A

IDN

MA

R

PO

L

CO

L

TH

A

IRN

ME

X

AR

G

TU

R

IND

Median Openness

(a) 1970s

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%

175%

JO

R

ISR

CH

L

MY

S

EG

Y

PH

L

MA

R

TA

I

PE

R

ME

X

AR

G

HU

N

ZA

F

PO

L

BR

A

KO

R

TH

A

IDN

CO

L

TU

R

IRN

IND

CH

N

Median Openness

(b) 1980s

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%

175%

200%

225%

JO

R

MY

S

CH

L

RU

S

PH

L

ISR

EG

Y

HU

N

TH

A

CZ

E

PE

R

MA

R

IDN

TA

I

AR

G

PO

L

ME

X

ZA

F

CO

L

BR

A

KO

R

CH

N

TU

R

IND

IRN

Median Openness

(c) 1990s

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%

175%

200%

225%

250%

275%

JO

R

HU

N

AR

G

ISR

MY

S

CH

L

CZ

E

RU

S

ZA

F

PH

L

TH

A

MA

R

EG

Y

PE

R

KO

R

PO

L

IDN

BR

A

CO

L

CH

N

TU

R

ME

X

IND

IRN

Median Openness

(d) 2000sComparison



Non Debt Creating Flows

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

MY

S

CH

L

TH

A

EG

Y

ME

X

PH

L

HU

N

ZA

F

AR

G

JO

R

ISL

BR

A

MA

R

CH

N

IDN

CO

L

PE

R

KO

R

TU

R

IRN

RU

S

IND

PO

L

(a) 1993

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

180%

HU

N

JO

R

MY

S

ZA

F

ISL

CH

L

TH

A

RU

S

MA

R

BR

A

PE

R

PO

L

KO

R

IND

ME

X

PH

L

EG

Y

TU

R

CH

N

IND

CO

L

AR

G

IRN

(b) 2007Comparison


Appendix Composition of Liabilities

Composition of Liabilities

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Portfolio FDI Debt

(a) India

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Portfolio FDI Debt

(b) Brazil

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Portfolio FDI Debt

(c) China

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Portfolio FDI Debt

(d) Chile

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Portfolio FDI Debt

(e) Korea

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Portfolio FDI Debt

(f) Malaysia

Composition


Appendix Trinity


0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Monetary Independence

Exchange Rate Rigidity

Reserve Accumulation

Capital Account

Openness

Trinity


Appendix Intervention & Sterilization

1993-1995: Intervention & Sterilization

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Nov-92 May-93 Nov-93 May-94 Nov-94 May-95 Nov-95 May-96 Nov-96

Rs. B

illio

n

Net Foreign Assets

Net Domestic Assets

Reserve Money Growth (Right Axis)

(a) Intervention & Sterilization

20

22

24

26

28

30

32

34

36

38

Nov-92 May-93 Nov-93 May-94 Nov-94 May-95 Nov-95 May-96 Nov-96

Ru

pee D

ollar

Rate

(b) Exchange RateTrilemma



2000-10: Intervention & Sterilization

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

-1000

-800

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

800

Ja

n'0

0

Ju

l'0

0

Ja

n'0

1

Ju

l'0

1

Ja

n'0

2

Ju

l'0

2

Ja

n'0

3

Ju

l'0

3

Ja

n'0

4

Ju

l'0

4

Ja

n'0

5

Ju

l'0

5

Ja

n'0

6

Ju

l'0

6

Ja

n'0

7

Ju

l'0

7

Ja

n'0

8

Ju

l'0

8

Ja

n'0

9

Ju

l'0

9

Ja

n'1

0

Rs. B

illio

n

Foreign Exchange Intervention

Net OMO and MSS Purchase

Reserve Money Growth (Right Axis)

(c) Intervention & Sterilization

38

40

42

44

46

48

50

52

Ja

n'0

0

Ju

l'0

0

Ja

n'0

1

Ju

l'0

1

Ja

n'0

2

Ju

l'0

2

Ja

n'0

3

Ju

l'0

3

Ja

n'0

4

Ju

l'0

4

Ja

n'0

5

Ju

l'0

5

Ja

n'0

6

Ju

l'0

6

Ja

n'0

7

Ju

l'0

7

Ja

n'0

8

Ju

l'0

8

Ja

n'0

9

Ju

l'0

9

Ja

n'1

0

Ru

pee

Do

lla

r R

ate

(d) Exchange Rate

Trilemma Trilemma Trilemma



Policy Choices

1980-81 1980-81 1992-93 1980-81 1998-99to to to to to

2011-12 1991-92 2011-12 1997-98 2011-12Monetary Independence 1.906*** 2.319** 2.013*** 2.829*** 1.439***

[6.860] [2.582] [4.881] [8.185] [4.402]Exchange Rate Stability 1.510*** 0.763* 1.517*** 0.224* 2.194***

[5.041] [1.616] [4.496] [1.642] [9.316]Capital Account Openness 0.986*** 1.961** 0.909** 1.731* 0.840**Adj R-squared 0.953 0.970 0.931 0.965 0.974Policy Choice


Appendix Evolution of Policy Choices under the Trilemma

Evolution of Policy Choices: Entire Period

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11

αMI

βERS

γCap Open

Policy Choices



Evolution of Policy Choices: BOP Crisis

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11

αMI

βERS

γCap Open

Policy Choices



Evolution of Policy Choices: Asian Crisis

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2

1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11

αMI

βERS

γCap Open

Policy Choices



Cumulative Policy Orientation under Trilemma

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11

Entire Period

BOP Crisis

Asian Financial Crisis

Trilemma


Documents

Capital Flows: Negotiating the Trilemma and Sequencing Openness