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Capabilities of an On-Site Inspection H Miley, D Haas Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Dr. Harry Miley Pacific Northwest National Laboratory P.O. Box 999, MSIN J4-65 Richland, WA 99354 (509) 375-1877 [email protected] PNNL-SA-110758 Capabilities of IFE14 5x20’ Connex & 4x ‘Flight Cans’ Survey NaI Flight systems 4,16*,60* liters Car systems 4,16* liters Backpack 0.3 liters x5 ORTEC Transpec* In Situ x3 Sampling Aerosol HVAS* and Dwarf x3 Soil jars*, swipes, sticky film Surface air (Poseidon) x2 Gas (Smart*/Manual* - x3/x4) 2x Geoprobe Laboratory Gamma lab 6x HPGe* + Lynx system 2x Pb shield* 1 Falcon* for hot samples TOSIL-A* MARDS (Ar-37)* TOSIL-B* OSI SAUNA (Xe)* XESPC (Xe)* *Contribution in kind (CiK) or European Union Joint Action (EU JA) The authors will sketch the radionuclide (RN) technical capabilities of a 10-person team operating a mobile lab and portable equipment against a nuclear anomaly that could be a contained underground nuclear explosion. Surveys, including flight, carborne, and backpack, help locate an area for investigation, then in-situ survey and sample collections can find isotopic anomalies in concentration, location, and ratio. Where surface radionuclides are not evident, sub-surface noble gas (Xe and Ar) collection and mobile lab measurement can detect leakage from even well-contained nuclear explosions. The authors will discuss the initial expectations vs. realities of a 4-week field exercise. Key Strategies Make sure no large area RN footprints exist Flight, and car gamma survey can definitively rule out hypotheses (1) and (2) and perhaps low values of (3) Investigate facilities and sites from initial inspection plan Operate survey backpack within 300m of visual anomaly Soil samples or survey to <10 Bq/m 2 , or 0.1 Bq/m 2 for specials Swipes or sticky film for special locations identified by Visual or CPT If the release hypothesis is (2) or (3) a negative local survey or suite of samples is sufficient to dismiss a location Extend this same investigation scheme to new locations identified during the Inspection by various survey methods Enter sub-surface-noble gas mode when underground structures or other possible sources of gas are observed. Use visual, ground penetrating radar (GPR), resistivity, etc. to find best locations Persistent sampling for days, weeks, months to establish or rule out anomalies Conclusion The technical integration, depth of practical testing, sophistication of detection, documentation, and data assessment of the teams lead to the conclusion that a positive step forward has been made towards readiness for on-site inspection, and that the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) was a success. But further, the authors conclude that the RN capability in survey, sampling, measurement sensitivity and throughput demonstrated by IFE14 would already be a formidable deterrent to treaty violation, and could be applied to a range of international problems in the present, should the need arise. Despite these conclusions, future refinement is warranted in many areas, especially noble gas methods and data management tools. Generic Hypotheses of RN Release Base of Operations: RN Facilities RN Laboratories - Two Noble Gas Labs - One Gamma Lab Office Premises - Planning Tools - Data Assessment Tools Geoprobe Poseidon WI DT CX Operational Realities 131 I Small Area Med Area Large Area 133 Xe Lab limit Lab limit Release (Bq) (3E+03 m 2) (1E+06 m 2 ) (1E+09 m 2 ) Release (Bq) (Bq/m 2 ) (Bq/m 2 ) No. Name Assumed source yield Fractional aerosol release Fractional xenon release Assumed release day near T 0 Aerosol Bq/m 2 Aerosol Bq/m 2 Aerosol Bq/m 2 near T 0 fast screen bulk Hypothesis Challenge Statement 1 Large Release 1 kt 10% 100% 0 3.00E+14 1.00E+11 3.00E+08 3.00E+05 1.00E+16 1 0.1 Large releases challenge OSI by requiring emphasis on overflight and hot samples 2 IMS Aerosol 1 kt 0.01% 100% 0 3.00E+11 1.00E+08 3.00E+05 3.00E+02 1.00E+16 1 0.1 Aerosol debris on the ground is the primary goal, known clearly in the IIP 3 IMS Xenon 1 kt 1.00E-10 0.10% 0 3.00E+05 1.00E+02 3.00E-01 3.00E-04 1.00E+13 1 0.1 With precise visual etc cues, aerosols excellent, known at time of IIP 4 IMS Seismic Only 1 kt 1.00E-12 1.00E-05 0-720 3.00E+03 1.00E+00 3.00E-03 3.00E-06 1.00E+11 1 0.1 If atm transport time is low, RN challenge is completely unknown. If transport time is sufficient but no signals, aerosols are slight possibility with visual etc cues 4b Delayed Release 1 kt 1.00E-05 50 0.00E+00 1.00E+11 1 0.1 IT may have interesting challenges with access to structures like tunnels The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government, the United States Department of Energy, or the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This work was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nuclear Verification.

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Page 1: Capabilities of an On-Site Inspection

Capabilities of an On-Site Inspection H Miley, D Haas

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Dr. Harry Miley Pacific Northwest National Laboratory P.O. Box 999, MSIN J4-65 Richland, WA 99354 (509) 375-1877 [email protected]

PNN

L-SA

-110

758

Capabilities of IFE14 5x20’ Connex & 4x ‘Flight Cans’ ▶ Survey NaI

▪ Flight systems 4,16*,60* liters ▪ Car systems 4,16* liters ▪ Backpack 0.3 liters x5 ▪ ORTEC Transpec* In Situ x3

▶ Sampling ▪ Aerosol HVAS* and Dwarf x3 ▪ Soil jars*, swipes, sticky film ▪ Surface air (Poseidon) x2 ▪ Gas (Smart*/Manual* - x3/x4) ▪ 2x Geoprobe

▶ Laboratory ▪ Gamma lab

▪ 6x HPGe* + Lynx system ▪ 2x Pb shield* ▪ 1 Falcon* for hot samples

▪ TOSIL-A* ▪ MARDS (Ar-37)*

▪ TOSIL-B* ▪ OSI SAUNA (Xe)* ▪ XESPC (Xe)* *Contribution in kind (CiK) or European Union Joint Action (EU JA)

The authors will sketch the radionuclide (RN) technical capabilities of a 10-person team operating a mobile lab and portable equipment against a nuclear anomaly that could be a contained underground nuclear explosion. Surveys, including flight, carborne, and backpack, help locate an area for investigation, then in-situ survey and sample collections can find isotopic anomalies in concentration, location, and ratio. Where surface radionuclides are not evident, sub-surface noble gas (Xe and Ar) collection and mobile lab measurement can detect leakage from even well-contained nuclear explosions. The authors will discuss the initial expectations vs. realities of a 4-week field exercise.

Key Strategies ▶ Make sure no large area RN footprints exist

▪ Flight, and car gamma survey can definitively rule out hypotheses (1) and (2) and perhaps low values of (3)

▶ Investigate facilities and sites from initial inspection plan ▪ Operate survey backpack within 300m of visual anomaly ▪ Soil samples or survey to <10 Bq/m2, or 0.1 Bq/m2 for

specials ▪ Swipes or sticky film for special locations identified by

Visual or CPT ▪ If the release hypothesis is (2) or (3) a negative local

survey or suite of samples is sufficient to dismiss a location

▶ Extend this same investigation scheme to new locations

identified during the Inspection by various survey methods

▶ Enter sub-surface-noble gas mode when underground structures or other possible sources of gas are observed. ▪ Use visual, ground penetrating radar (GPR), resistivity,

etc. to find best locations ▪ Persistent sampling for days, weeks, months to establish

or rule out anomalies

Conclusion The technical integration, depth of practical testing, sophistication of detection, documentation, and data assessment of the teams lead to the conclusion that a positive step forward has been made towards readiness for on-site inspection, and that the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) was a success. But further, the authors conclude that the RN capability in survey, sampling, measurement sensitivity and throughput demonstrated by IFE14 would already be a formidable deterrent to treaty violation, and could be applied to a range of international problems in the present, should the need arise. Despite these conclusions, future refinement is warranted in many areas, especially noble gas methods and data management tools.

Generic Hypotheses of RN Release

Base of Operations: RN Facilities RN Laboratories - Two Noble Gas Labs - One Gamma Lab

Office Premises - Planning Tools - Data Assessment Tools

Geoprobe

Poseidon

WI

DT

CX

Operational Realities

131I Small Area Med Area Large Area 133Xe Lab limit Lab limit

Release (Bq) (3E+03 m2) (1E+06 m2) (1E+09 m2) Release

(Bq) (Bq/m2) (Bq/m2)

No. Name Assumed

source yield

Fractional aerosol release

Fractional xenon

release

Assumed release

day near T0

Aerosol Bq/m2

Aerosol Bq/m2

Aerosol Bq/m2 near T0 fast screen bulk Hypothesis Challenge Statement

1 Large Release 1 kt 10% 100% 0 3.00E+14 1.00E+11 3.00E+08 3.00E+05 1.00E+16 1 0.1 Large releases challenge OSI by requiring emphasis on

overflight and hot samples

2 IMS Aerosol 1 kt 0.01% 100% 0 3.00E+11 1.00E+08 3.00E+05 3.00E+02 1.00E+16 1 0.1 Aerosol debris on the ground is the primary goal, known

clearly in the IIP

3 IMS Xenon 1 kt 1.00E-10 0.10% 0 3.00E+05 1.00E+02 3.00E-01 3.00E-04 1.00E+13 1 0.1 With precise visual etc cues, aerosols excellent, known at time of IIP

4 IMS Seismic Only

1 kt 1.00E-12 1.00E-05 0-720 3.00E+03 1.00E+00 3.00E-03 3.00E-06 1.00E+11 1 0.1 If atm transport time is low, RN challenge is completely unknown. If transport time is sufficient but no signals, aerosols are slight possibility with visual etc cues

4b Delayed Release 1 kt 1.00E-05 50 0.00E+00 1.00E+11 1 0.1 IT may have interesting challenges with access to structures

like tunnels

The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government, the United States Department of Energy, or the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

This work was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nuclear Verification.