Cannae (Fields of Battle) - Adrian Goldsworthy

8/18/2019 Cannae (Fields of Battle) - Adrian Goldsworthy

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Foreword by Richard Ho lmes

Introduction

C RTH GE ROME AND THE PUNIC W RS

The Second Punic War

Hannibal Barca

Invasion 2 8 2 7 BC

The Delayer Summer to Autumn 2 7 BC

2 RIVAL ARMIES

The Roman Military System

The Carthaginian Military System and Hannibal s Army

3 THE CAMPAIGN OF 6 BC

The Leaders

The LedThe Plan

The Campaign

7

9

3

7

22

24

28

37

4

4

5

59

6

64

7

7 4


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NN E TH E BATTLE OF CANNAE AUGUST 6 BCLocating the Battlefield

Initial Deployment

The Battle

Opening Moves

The Cavalry Clash on the W ings

The Roman Cen tre Advances

The Ch arge t o Con tact

Enc irclement

Annihi lation

83

86

95

118

12 7

132

143

15

5 THE AFTERMATH 15 7

Mopping Up 15 7

How to Use a Victory 16

The Long St ruggle 216 2 1 BC 16 8

Cannae in History 17 6

Notes 18

Append ix : Numbers 188

Appendix 2: Casual ties 19 2

Glossary 195


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KNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many family members nd friends contributed to th e final form of this book

I must pay particular th nks once again to Ian Hughes who read n d

commented on successive versions of th e manuscript Others wh o greatly

enh nced the clarity of th e final text include Dr Hugh Deeks nd Averil

Goldsworthy Conversations over several years nd with m n y o th er people

have helped to modify nd refine my ideas ou t the battle itself nd then ture of com t in this period There are too m ny to mention them all ut

I ought to th nk in particular Professor Philip Sabin nd Dr Louis Rawlings

In addition I must th nk th e Series Editor Professor Richard Holmes for

his thought provoking comments on an earlier draft of the text Finally praise

should also go to Keith Lowe for his continued efforts


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FOR WOR

annae is more than just a battle. True , th e scale of its slaughter - Adrian

Goldsworthy is right to call it on e of th e bloodiest single day s fight ing in

history , when the Romans lost more men killed than th e British army on the

first day of the Somme in 1916 - and the brilliance of Hannibal s generalship

makes it a remarkable one. But its resonance spread far beyond classical Ita ly,

an d Carinae, th e supreme model of th e dest ruct ion of a superior force by an

inferior one , became an ideal striven after by many commanders. ount Alfred

vo n Schlieffen , chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906, argued

that if German y was to fight a two-front war ordinary victories were no help

to her: she ha d to win a battle of annihilation He was fascinated b y Cannae:

a collection of his writ ings was published under the title Cannae in 1925.

The Schlieffen plan strove to achieve th e strategic envelopment of th e

French , with th e armies of th e German right wing swinging round to snap in

behind their opponents If th e French persisted in attacking into the lost

provinces of Alsace and Lorraine just th e numericall y superior Roman

infantry bit deep into Hannibal s centre at annae ) the y would simpl y be doing

the Germans a kindly favour , an d make their own ultimate defeat more certain.

The battles of encirclement won by th e Germans on th e Eastern Front in 1941

were super-Cannaes on a shocking scale, and General Norman H . Schwarzkopf s

plan for th e 1990 -91 Gulf War was based on Hannibal s concept.

However, like so many batt les of ancient an d medieval history , where

sources are generally incomplete and archaeological evidence is often scanty,

Celtic warriors

depicted on th e

Gunderstrup

cauldron found

in Denmark and

dating to th e

f i rs t entury BC.

Each man blows

a t ll trumpet

carnyx) which

was said to

produce aparticularly

harsh noise. The

Gauls serving in

Hannibal s army

at Cannae

probably looked

l i t tle different tothese men and

almost ert inly

used th e carnyx.


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NN E

Cannae is a clash which has generated more than its fair share of speculation.

Adrian Goldsworthy has made a major contribution to our understanding in

three distinct respects. Firstly, by his description of the contending forces ,using original sources reinforced by the best of recent scholarship. For

example, he notes Polybius s comments on the use of heavy an d light pila the

Roman throwing spear ) but observes that archaeological evidence suggests

rather more variety. And he warns against fanciful descriptions of ho w Roman

infantry formations might have closed up from the relatively open quincunxpattern like the five on a die) just before contact , pointing ou t that there is

no t a shred of evidence from our sources to support them The same principle

- painstaking analysis of original sources weighed against military logic - also

inspires his careful discussion of the battlefield. Its exact location is a source

of controversy, an d his discussion of possible sites supports Peter Connolly ssuggestion t ha t t he fighting actually took place just north of th e hills around

th e town of Cannae.

Lastly, in his description of the combat Adrian Goldsworthy follows the

methodology of John Keegan s seminal work The Face of Battle , which was

applied to combat in classical Greece by Victor D . Hanson in The Western Wayof War , in a penetrating description of what really happened when men hewed

and stabbed at on e another in sweaty and breathless close combat . His analysis

of the Roman centre at Cannae, where an exceptionally large number of men

were formed up on a very narrow frontage , emphasises th e psychological

benefits conferred by such a formation , especially on inexperienced orpatchily-trained troops.

The Roman plan was simple an d unsubtle , bu t no t unreasonable or by any

means inevitably doomed to failure . It emphasised Roman affection for what

Polybius termed brute force and, because would rely on the flanking

cavalry holding on long enough for the infantry to win the battle in thecentre, it explains the fact that Varro an d Paullus, the Roman consuls, posi

tioned themselves with the cavalry on th e flanks. Roman generals tended to

station themselves wherever they could most influence the battle an d thus

FOR W OR


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usually where they anticipated its crisis to occur hence th e consuls presence

with the cavalry at Cannae. Hannibal s plan in contrast was complex nd

made heavy dem nds on his soldiers. Hannibal also positioned himself at

what he saw as the decisive point: in his centre where his Spaniards and Gauls

h d to h ng on to let th e cavalry on the wings complete th e encirclement of

th e Roman army.

Adrian Goldsworthy first considers the battle between the opposing skir -

mishers suggesting that as was so often th e case it inflicted relatively few

casualties although the superior quality of Hannibal s l ight troops balanced

Roman numerical superiority. He then goes on to examine th e cavalry battles

on the flanks where Hannibal s men had th e better of things especially on

th e Roman right where Hasdrubal quickly beat his opponents and was soon

ready to enter th e infantry battle. The Roman infantry at tack was prepared

by an exchange of missiles before th e ranks met with an audible clash. There

then followed a period with the two front ranks separated by a metre or so

prodding nd cutt ing at each other to produce the characteristic wound -

pattern of injuries to th e lower leg th e right arm and the left side of the head.

Once a m n was brought down he would be finished off with a heavy blow

to th e head. Despite th e brave performance of Hannibal s Gallic nd Spanish

infantry th e weight of numbers proved too much nd as they broke they

suffered heavy losses nd th e Romans their Tanks now disordered pressed

forward in pursuit.

But as Hannibal s centre at last collapsed he committed his fresh Libyan

infantry against both flanks of th e victorious Roman centre gripping it like a

vice while the Carthaginian cavalry swung in against the Roman rear. Most

accounts now conclude simply observing th t the encircled Romans were

annihilated. But Adrian Goldsworthy dissects this final phase of the battle as

well as he has its earlier elements reminding us of th e grinding physical effort

involved in h nd to h nd fighting with edged weapons nd pointing to the

sporadic nature th e battle with local lulls nd rallies. He points ou t th t the

cost of victory was heavy for Hannibal: fixing a determined opponent to allow


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NN E

t ime for decisive strikes to be mounte against his vulnerable points is often

an expensive business.

victory was expensive defeat was exorbitant : th e Romans lost around50 000 men killed. Hannibal did no t move rapidly on Rome af ter his victory

for a variety of reasons like exhaustion reluctance to embark u pon a lengthy

siege and most s ignificantly the expectation th t Rome wo uld behave like

most other city-states under such circumstances n sue for peace . She did

no t n although the balance of th e war was tilted in Hannibal s favourmost of southern Italy defected to him - he was never able to mint strategic

victory from his tactical success . Nor were so m ny of his subsequent imita

tors. For a victory like Cannae need no t prove conclusive provided the loser

retains the poli tical n popular resolve to fight on : th e dream of Cannae h as

too often become a nightmare .

RICHARD HOLMES


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INTRO U TION

On August 6B C th e Carthaginian General Hannibal won on e of th e most

complete battlefield victories in history . utnumbered nearly two to one, his

heterogeneous army of Africans , Spaniards and Celts not merely defeated , but

virtually destro yed the Roman army opposing them. By the end of th e day ,

nearl y 50 ,000 Roman an d Allied soldiers la y dead or were dying in an area of

a few square kilometres, whilst between ten and twenty thousand more were

prisoners . Less than 20 of on e of th e largest armies ever fielded by th e Roman

State survived to reform over the next few weeks . annae became th e yard-

stick by which th e Romans measured later catastrophes, but only on e or two

defeats in their history were ever judged to have been as bad. The scale of th e

losses at annae was unrivalled until the industrialised slaughter of the First

World War.

Most battles from th e Ancient World are now all but forgotten , for militaryas well as civil education has ceased to be based fundamentally on th e Classics.

Yet annae is still regularly referred to in th e training programmes of today s

army officers. Hannibal s tactics appear almost perfect , the classic example of

double envelopment , and ever since many commanders have attempted to

reproduce their essence an d thei r overwhelming success. Nearly all havefailed . annae was th e largest in a series of defeats Hannibal inflicted on the

Romans , but , though he never lost a major engagement in Italy , eventually

he was forced to evacuate his army and Carthage lost the war . The genius of

his tactics at annae should not obscure the stages of th e battle when things

could easily have gone th e other way an d a great Roman victor y resulted .


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Hannibal won the battle through not only his dyn mic leadership nd th e

high quality of his army bu t also because of a good deal of luck. nn e was

not an exercise in pure tactics but like all battles a product both of the mili-

tary doctrines nd technology of the time nd the peculiar circumstances of

a specific campaign.

The aim of this book is to place nn e firmly within the perspective of th e

Second Punic War nd the nature of warfare in the thi rd cen tury Be. The

events of this period are poorly recorded in comparison with more recent

conflicts nd no official documents survive from either side for the nn e

campaign . Instead we have the narratives of historians written nytime from

seventy to several hundred years after the events they describe . Frequently

these sources contradict on e another or fail to tell us things we would wish

to know nd so there are m ny aspects of the campaign nd battle which

c nnot be reconstructed with absolute certainty. Two accounts provide us wi th

the greater part of ou r inform tion nd it is worth briefly considering these.

The earliest nd best was written by the Greek historian Polybius in the

second half of the second century Be. Polybius was a on e of a group of hostagessent to Rome after th e Third Macedonian War 172-168B C . He became an inti-

mate of Scipio Aernilianus the gr ndson of on e of the Roman comm nders

at Carinae following him on c mp ign in the Third Punic War l49 6B C nd

witnessing the final destruction of Carthage. Polybius produced a Universal

stor y describing events throughout the Mediterranean down until his ow nday nd its m in theme was to explain for Greek audiences how Rome had

so quickly emerged as the domin nt world power. His narrative is ge nerally

sober nd analytical nd he provides us with by far the best description of the

Roman army. However whilst willing to criticise the Romans in general he is

invariably sympathetic to all of the ancestors by blood or doption of Scipio

Aemilianus. Polybius ccount survives intact for the battle itself but then

breaks off nd o nl y small fragments survive for th e remaining years of the war.

Th h i i tt i L ti b Li i th l t fi t

I N T R O U TION


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O U O

fie rcel y patriotic sty listically elega nt nd inte nsely dramatic but far less crit -

ically rigorous th n th t of Polybius vy u sed th e Greek historian as one of

his sources bu t als o drew upon a range of o ther tradit ions most ver yfavo urable to th e Romans nd m ny ce lebrating th e deeds of parti cular aris -

tocratic fam ilies He is useful because h e provides in formation a bout some thin gs

for i nstance Roman e lections and p olitics w hich are passed over very briefly

by Po lybius In ddition ivy s na rrative survives intact fo r the entire Secon d

Punic War making him our m in source for th e aftermath of t he b tt le

O ther sourc es provide som e additional information bu t all were wri tten

considerably later Appian wrote a Roman history round th e turn of th e first

nd second ce nturies AD but his acco unt o f nn e makes very lit tle sense

nd is of d ubious reliability Around t he same time P lutarch prod uced a co llec-

tion o f bi ogr ph ical v s some of w hich in clude acco u nts o f th e period S uch

late so urces n eed to be used with ex treme ca ution bu t it is possi ble t hat th ey

p reserved a few accura te details a bsent from th e surviving p or t ions o f o ur

ear lier sources


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nn e today: th e s tone ru ins here date to later period when th e town wa s rebuilt


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At th e start of the third centur y BC th e Republic of Carthage was th e

wealthiest nd most powerful state in th e Western Mediterranean .

h d een founded probabl y in th e late e ig ht h ce nt ur y by

Phoenician settlers from Tyre on the coast of modern day Lebanon . The

Phoenicians were the great maritime traders of the ancient world the Romans

knew them as Poeni hence Punic nd eventually Carthage came to controltrade in the West domin t ing the coasts of Africa nd Spain as well as Sicily

Sardinia Corsica nd the lesser islands of th e region. The scientific exploita -

t io n of th e then fertile agricultural land of North Africa combined with the

profits of trade to make th e city fabulously rich. However this wealth was no t

evenly distributed nd remained a lmost entirely in the hands of th e small

num er of Carthaginian citizens nd especially the ari stocracy. Preserving

their Semitic language religion nd culture a nd je alously g uarding the

C RTH GE ROME

ND THE PUN

W RS

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View of th e

remains of great

Circular Harbourat Carthage. This

inner harbou r

was reserved

fo r military use

and includedramps fo r 8

quinqueremes

or fives th est andard warship

of th e third-

second

centuries BC .

privileges of citi zenship th e descendants of the Punic sett lers remained a

distinct eli te. In contrast th e indigenous population especially th e Libyans

were heavil y taxed exploited as agricultural labour n mili tary m npower

n h no real share in the profits of empire .

Until 265 Rome remained a purely Italian power n h by th is time

subjugated all of the Penins ula so uth of th e River Po . From very early in t heir

history th e Romans disp layed a remarkable t lent for absorbing o th e rs.

Enemies defea ted i n war became subordinate allies n in future s upp lied men

and materia l for t he next ge neration of Rome s wars. T he Romans w ere un ique

in th e ancie nt wor ld in t heir will ingness to gra nt citizens hip t o o utsiders.

Some former enemies beca me full ci tizens o r citi zens wi th limi ted rig hts

whilst others were gran ted t he lesser rig hts of Latins each gra de being a legal

CARTHAGE ROME AN D THE P UN I C WA R S


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Nextpage

The Mediterranean World

in 8 Be was dividedinto ma ny d ifferent s tates

a nd k ingdoms.ln th e West

Car thage s till controll ed

North Africa and parts of

S pa in although it had lostS icily Sardinia and Corsica

to Rome after the First

Puni c War . In Nor thern I tal y

S pain Gaul a nd IIlyricum

man y sma ll but war like

triba l groups fought ea ch

ot her and th eir neig hbours .The East ern Med iterran ea n

re flected th e fragmentation

of Alexander t he Gr eat s

va st Empir e with three mai n

Kingdoms emerg ing in

Syria Egypt and Maced onia

as we ll a s many smallercommunities . By t he midd le

of th e ne xt century the

e nt ire Me diterranean would

be do minated by Rome.

THE P C S

status , rat her th an reflecting act u al et hnic an d ling uist ic d istinctions. E ach

commun ity was ti ed directl y to Rome in a treat y whic h mad e cle ar both its

rights a nd it s obliga tion s. The a llies h elped to fig ht Rome s wars and shared,at least to a limit ed e xten t, in thei r profits . As Rome expande d its population

grew . The total lan d owned by Carthaginian an d Roman citi zens respectiv ely

in 265 BC was probabl y roughl y equivalent in size, bu t th e numbers of the

former were tiny in compar ison to the latter. The obligation of

all citi zensand

allie s possessing aminimum

propert y q ualifica-tion to serve in Rome s arm ies gave the Republic immense rese rve s

of m ilitar y man power. I

In 265 BC th e Ro mans for th e first ti me se nt Fn army ove r-

seas, w hen an exped ition responded to an appea l to in tervene

in th e affairs of a Sic ilian city . Cart hage, who had long possessed

a presence in the island , even if it ha d never managed to subju-

gate it comp letely, resented this intrusion and respon ded wi th

fo rce. The res ult was the Firs t Punic Wa r 264 241 BC), an

arduous struggle f ou gh t on a far bigger sca le th an eit her side

co u ld ha ve imagined w he n th ey so light ly e ntered th e co nflict .

The wa r w as m ainl y fo ugh t i n an d aro und Sicily, wi t h th e mos t

impor tant b attles occ urring at sea , w here fl eet s o f hun dreds of

oa red warships clas hed in co nfused , swirling m elees . In 56 th e

Romans invaded Africa and t hreatened Ca rth age it self , bu t the

initial willingness o f th e Punic au t horiti es to seek pea ce with-

ere d w he n faced wit h wh at th ey co nsidered t o be ex tremelyh arsh Rom an de ma nds . The C arthagi nians fought o n, and

m anaged to d estroy th e Rom an expe di tionary f orce in battl e,

w inning th ei r o nly ma jor victory o n land in th e entire war . In

th e na val wa r t he Puni c fleet pro ved u n abl e to t urn it s grea te r

ex perience to t angible a dvantage, l osin g a ll b ut on e o f th e ma jor batt les .Losses were appa lling o n b oth s ides, th e Romans l osing hundr ed s o f ships t o

ba d we ather , a lth o ugh r elat ively few to en em y action. In th e las t years of the


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A I I a n e

o c e a n

G a u

l

r v e r n

C

•

i a

SicilySyrac

•Cam arir

•scu lum

r h n

S

• Rome

Ostia •

•Pisae

T y r

Drepa na •

Lilybaeum •

• Genoa

Cava les

Cors ica

Carthage · • Asp is•Ne apolis

• Massi lia

Arausio•

•Sa ldae

r r n

S

o l c e

M e d

B a le a r i c I s l n s

•Tar raco

• po riae

• Saguntum

Cartenna•

•Ca rthago Nova

a

Numantia•

e l t i b e r

s

Rusaddir

I b e r i

•

•Malaca

adalquidr •G . Baecula

lIipa

ll i l4

H

Tag us

Onoba•

•

N u m dTheveste •

aHadru me tum

NLeptis Mag na·

A f r c a


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oIo

1

1 2

2 Miles

Km

T he M editerranean Wo rld in 8

Ca rthaginian territory

Roman territory

a c k e

a t

e a c e d o n

T h r a c ea

P o n t u s

t h y n i a

Brundisium•• Tare ntum

• a clea

• Croton

• Loe ri=

iu m

•Apollonia

e t o l i aAthens•

r c a d i a

a a t i a

P h r y i a

P e rg a m u m

L y d i a S e e u c i m p i r €

a r i a

L y c i a

C hara x

•

M e d t r r n n

p

e a

Ale xandria

o m a g y p t

•

• Cairo

c

NN


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war both sides were close to utter exhaustion their treasuries drained by the

costs of maintaining the struggle. In 241 BC a Roman fleet paid for largely by

voluntary loans made by individuals to th e state defeated th e last Punic fleetat th e battle of th e Aegates Islands. Carthage no longer ha d the resources to

cont inue the struggle an d ha d no choice bu t to accept peace on terms d ictated

by Rome giving up her last territory and influence in Sicily an d paying a

heavy indemnity .

TH SE ON PUNI W R

The peace between Rome and Carthage lasted almost as long as the First War.

From th e very beginning some Carthaginians resented th e surrender an d

believed it to be unnecessary. Foremost amongst these was Hamilcar Barca the

commander of the army in Sicily who for near ly a decade ha d waged a warof skirmishes raid and ambush with the Romans . Hamilcar ha d never fought

a pitched battle and his victories over the Romans were small in scale but he

believed or affected to believe that he could have continued to fight for yea rs

and perhaps eventually worn t he e ne my down. Resigning h is command in a

public disp lay of disgust at th e surrender he left others to disband h is merce-nary army. The task was botched and the mercenaries first mutinied and then

rebelled taking much of th e Libyan populat ion with them for arthaginian

rule always harsh had become especially burdensome as they struggled to

fund th e war with Rome . The resulting Mercenary War was fought with

appalling cruelty by both sides an d came very close to destroying Car thage .In the end it was ruthlessly suppressed by Ham ilcar in a series of campaigns

which demonstrated his skill as a commander far more clearly than ha d the

fighting in Sicily during th e war with Rome.

The Romans honoured the treaty an d did not at first exploit the weakness

of their former enemy rejecting appeals for an alliance from Carthage s rebel-

lio us allies. However in th e closing stages of the rebellion they seized Sard inia

an d threatened a renewal of war if Car thage resis ted. The Roman ac tion was

bl t tl i l d h i d j t h f C th gi i h d RTH GE ROME N D TH PUNI W RS


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decl ined since their defeat . More th n nything else t his dded to th e de ep

se nse of hu miliation nd rese ntment fel t by m uch of t he population . In 237

Hamilcar Barca was g iven com ma nd of the Ca rthagin ian p rovin ce i n Spai nand imm ediately b egan a p ro gr mm e o f exp ansion. Some a reas espec ia lly

thos e co n ta ini ng v aluable m ine ral deposi ts were take n und er d irect r ule

w hilst o thers we re b rought un der Pun ic influence . All of th e campaigns a nd

dipl om acy we re carr ied o ut by m em bers of th e Barcid fa mily . Wh en Hamilcar

was kill ed in bat tle in 229 h e was succee ded by h is so n-in- law Hasdruba l who

in tu rn was followed by Hamilcar s son nnib l in 221. It is now h ard to

kno w h ow much independence the Barcids enjoyed in Spain so th t t hey

h ave bee n va riously depicted as loyal serva nts obeyi ng th e ins tructions of

th e Pun ic a uthor ities and as sem i-independent H elleni stic pr inces. Expansionin Sp ain b rou ght grea t wea lth - th e co ins mint ed in co nsiderable numb ers

by th e Barcids h ave an especia lly hi gh s ilver c ont ent - a n d in creased acce ss t o

th e fertil e recruit ing gro und o ffered by th e wa rlike Spa nis h t ribes. Th e

camp aigns t o ac h ieve th is ex pans ion h elped to crea te th e n ucl eu s o f a hi ghl y

efficient a rmy h ar den ed by long experie nce of fig h ting und er fam iliar

officers. Once again it is di fficult to k now to wh t ex te n t th ese be nefits were

to th e Rep ublic as a who le o r served to fur the r the mb itions of Ham ilcar nd

h is family.

The Romans viewed th e grow th o f Puni c power in Spa in with great suspici on .

In 226 BC a Rom an e mbassy f orced Hasdrubal to agree to a t reaty b arrin g C arthage

from ex panding b ey on d th e Rive r Ebro. The b ord er of th e Pun i c p rov in c e was

still so me wa y so uth of th e river and thu s th i s was n ot a n espe cia lly ha rsh

m easure bu t dem on strated th e Rom ans belief th at th ey were free to im p ose

res trictions on t heir former enemy whenever they wished . The t reaty p lacedno res triction at all on Roman activity . In 2 20 Hannibal supported on e of th e

t ribes a llied t o Car th age in a dispu te wi t h th e ci ty of Sag un tum . This was south

of th e Ebro bu t at so me p o int h ad become a n a lly of Rome to whom th e

NN E


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back d own as th e Ca rthag inians h ad a lways d on e in th e past . Han n ib al

continued th e assa ult and fina lly capture d Sagu ntum in 2 19 BC after an eig h

mo nth siege sacki ng it and enslaving th e popul ation. The Ro mans pro test ed t oCarthage and w he n the autho rities th ere re fused t o co ndemn an n ibal an d

hand h im ove r fo r p un i sh m ent d eclared wa r at th e beginnin g o f 2 18 Be

H NNI L RC

A bust which may bea representat ion of

Hannibal in l t er l if e

although there are no efinite images of him.

At Cannae he was st ill

in his twent ies although

he had already lost th e

use of one eye. In th e

same way th t his

appearance is uncertain th e re i s much about

Hann ibal s character

which e ludes us and fo r all his achievements

h e remains an

Hann ibal was in his late twentiesw he n he led h is a rmy out fromh is base at New Ca rthage t o begi n th e Italian ex pedition in th e

spri ng of 2 18 Be. He was already a n expe rienced sol dier havin g

acco mpanie d the a rmy o n ca mpaign und er his fa ther an d

bro ther -in -law serving in a va riety of inc reasingly se nior rol es

as soo n as h e was o ld enough. Since hi s e lev ation t o t heco mmand in Spa in in 221 h e h ad a lready beg un t o d isplay th e

spee d of ac tion t actical geni us and insp ira tional l eadership

w hich we re subseq ue n tly t o dazz le h is Ro ma n opponents. Our

sources te ll us a goo d deal abou t what Ha nnibal actually d id

allowing us to apprecia te his ext raordinary t alent but provide

little reliable infor mation abo ut his charac ter. No so urce has

enigmatic figure. survive d w ritten fro m t he Car thagi nian pers pective a lthough

we k no w th at at least two G reek scho lars on e o f th em

Hannib al s tu t or th e Spa rtan Sosy lus acco mpanied his a rmy and recor ded it s

campaigns. Ha nniba l h ad so me know ledge of G reek culture and hi story bu t

is unclear how important a par t th is p layed in his life or to w ha t ex tent he

remained firml y the prod uct of his ow n Semitic cu lture.

The Roman an d Greek a uthors who wrote in a wor ld do minated b y Ro me

were sure that a deep ha tred of Ro me was f undamenta l t o Hann ibal s c har

ac ter t hro ughou t h is life. Po lybius t ells us t hat in th e 190s BC whilst an exi le

at th e co urt of th e Se leucid King Antioc hus III anniba l to ld th e m onarch

h ow his fa t her h ad taken hi m to sacrif ice at th e temple of Ba al Sh am in b efore


24/197

NN E


25/197

to co me with h im to Spain, a nd th en , w he n th e lad had eage rly b egged for

th e c ha nce t o go , led h im to th e a ltar and m ade h im swea r a so lemn oa th

neve r t o be a f riend t o th e The s tory reaches u s a t b est th ird h nd ,and was told by t he Car thaginian to reass ure Ant iochus tha t he was not sec retly

m eeting wi th Rom an agents . As a res ult it is now imposs ible t o k no w w hether

or n ot it is tru e, bu t th e Romans cer tainly believed t h t t he m ain ca use of the

Seco nd Punic War was th e enm ity of Hamilcar nd his s ons . O nly Hamilcar s

de th pr ev ent ed h im fro m co mpleting th e revival o f Carthage s m ilitary powe rand l un chin g a n in vasion of Italy fro m Spai n, but the pro ject co nt inued t o be

th e m ain ambiti on o f h is fa mil y and reac hed fulfilment un d er hi s e ldest so n .

Debate cont inues t o rage ove r th e real c auses of th e Seco nd Pun ic War , but

need not con cern us h ere. W hat i s clear is th t , wh eth er o r not th e war wa s

pr emeditated, nnib al h d develop ed a definite plan f or how to fight Rome nd h d sp ent yea rs pr eparing for th i s. In the spring of 218 B C h e wa s abl e to

lead o ut an eno r mous ar my, allegedly co nsisting o f 12,000 c avalry , 90,000

in f nt r y nd 37 e lepha nts, t o begi n a m arch w hich wo uld t ake h im ac ross th e

River Ebro , over th e Py renees , th rough Gau l an d finally across th e Alps in t o

Ital y. Th e First Puni c Wa r h d been fo ugh t l argely in Sicily a nd, altho ugh th ey

h d raided th e Italian coast , t he Car thagi nia ns h ad n ever s truck at th e e nemy s

h eartl nd as th e Romans h ad d on e w h en t he y invade d Africa i n 256 Be.

Thr o ugho ut th e co nflic t th e Cart hagi nia ns h ad rema ined r emarkably passive,

reacting to Rom an moves bu t se ldom ini tiati ng a m ajo r of fensive . Their

strateg y was based on e nduring th e Roman ons laughts , perseveri ng in th eir

resistan ce i n th e hope t ha t t he enemy wo uld become tire d and t hen e ither

withdraw or be vulne rable t o a ttack. This approach ha d wor ked in th e past ,

wearing d own s uccessive t yr nt s and m ercenary leaders hired b y th e Gree ks

o f Sicil y. It fail ed aga inst the Romans, who co nsis te n t ly r eturn ed to th e o ffen-

sive even after serious d efeats, nd wh o were both able nd willin g to de vote

massiv e resour ces to th e war.

Hannibal in t en d ed to figh t th e n ew wa r with Rom e in a far b older fashion

h i i i d d f h i h b C RTH GE ROME ND THE PUNIC W RS


26/197

an d Carthage s North African heartland against attack but the main effort

would be an offensive striking directly at the centre of Roman power in Italy

itself. This time the arthaginians would not attempt simply to endure enemy

attacks but would escalate the conflict and press for a decisive result . Carthage

still had a substantial navy although it ma y not have been as well trained as

it had been before 265 but it had lost its bases in Sicily Sardinia an d th e lesser

islands of the Mediterranean as a result of the earlier defeat. Oared warships

carried an exceptional ly large crew in proportion to their size and had little

space for provisions. As a result their operational range was small and without

the island bases it was impractical for annibal to launch and support an inva-

The Se cond

Punic War wasp rovoked b y

Hanniba l sc apture o f th e

c it y o f Sa guntum

after an eight ·month sie ge.

Saguntu m modern Sagu nto

in Spain ) wassubseq uentl y

rebuilt and flour -

ished during th e

Roman period

when this monu-

mental theatre

was constructed.The theatre an d

other parts of

th e Ancient

buildings were

later incorp o-

rated into th e

t own s medievaldefences.

N N E


27/197

have prevented a land ing in th e first place . Hannibal therefore adopted th e

logical a lternative of reaching Italy by marching overland from his base in

Spain . It was an exceptionally imaginative an d highly bold plan . It requiredthe army to force its way over great distances, past considerable geographical

obstacles, an d perhaps overcome the resistance of hosti le peoples, before it

was even in a position to strike at th e real enemy. Only then co uld Hannibal

begin the task of smashing Rome s armies, capturing he r towns and cities,

ravaging her fields, an d subverting her allies. The Roman Rep ublic ha dmanaged to endure huge losses during the First Punic War an d still continue

fighting , bu t then the disasters had always occurred at a dis tance. Now

Hannibal planned to inflict as great, if not heavier, defeats in Italy itself.

Hannibal s plan was bold and more characteristic of Roman tha n

Carthaginian military doctrine . Even the most pro -Roman of ou r sourcesrecognized his abili ty as a general , but also tended to depic t him as devious

an d treacherous, traits they considered to be characteristically Punic. Others,

including Polybius, repeated th e accusations that Hannibal was excessively

avaricious an d inhumanly cruel. The first charge ma y in part have reflected

his never-ending need for money to fund his campaign an d pay his soldiers.Polybius also suggested that some of the more brutal acts att ributed to th e

general were in fact the work of his namesake, Hannibal Monomac hus the

duellist), a vicious individual who was supposed to have suggested accus

toming the soldiers to eat human flesh to ease the problems of supplying the

army . The character of Hannibal remains surrounded by so much propaganda

a nd m yt h that it is impossible to separate fact from fiction an d say much about

the real man

INVASION

2 8 2 7 Be

The march to Italy was an epic in itself , but its details need no t concern us

here. When in November 218 th e tired and weary survivors of th e army came

down from the Alps somewhere near modern Turin, there were on ly 6,000

RTH GE ROME ND THE PUNI C W RS


28/197

Next page:Hannibal s march to Italy

was one of the grea t epics

of the anc ient worlds

rivalling the journeys and

labours of Hercules to

whom the Car thaginian

was sometimes c ompared

Even before he cou ld beg in

his campaign a gainst

Rome he had t o defea t

tribes in Spain an d Gaul as

well as crossing physical

obs tacles such as rive rsand mo unta ins H is losses

were hea vy but t he bestand most ex perie nce d

soldiers com plete d the

journey and prove d a fermi -

dable fighting force S omedetai ls of his route a nd in

pa rticu lar the p ass he t ook

across the Alps rema in

subjects of fierce disput e

possessed very limi ted lo ng dis tance intelligence a nd it was

so me t ime before the Romans fo und out wha t Ha nnibal was

doi ng. Scipio s expedit ion to Spain was de layed whe n some of

his fo rces were diverted to face th e Gallic rebels in t he Po valley

and others had to be recruited to replace them hen he finally

began to ship his army to its destina tion, he stopped at Massilia

mo dern Ma rseilles) , the Greek co lony in So u thern Ga ul which

was one of Ro me s o ldest allies , to gather supplies and inte lli

gence. The consul was shocked to discover that Hannibal s army

was no longer in Spain , bu t at th at m om en t crossing th e River Rhone. Acava lry force se nt out to reconnoitre bumped into a similar de tachme nt of

Num idia n lig h t cava lry f rom th e Pun ic ar my and b eat th em i n a bruta l skir

mish bu t fai led to discover m uch information about the enem y Scipio

of the army , veterans of years of hard f ighting in Spain, who were c onfident

in themselves an d their leaders . In time their n umbers would be swollen by

Ga llic warrio rs from th e a rea, whose tr ibes h ad alrea dy rise n in rebellionagainst the Roma ns tryi ng t o colonize t heir t erritory .

The Roman Senate ha d not dreamed t hat t he Carthaginians wo uld a ttempt

anything so rash as the invasion of Italy . Two senior magistrates , the cons uls ,

were elec ted each year to provide both civil an d mili tary lead-

ership for th e State, and w here th ese men were se nt a lwaysin d icated the Senate s priorities. In 218 one consu l, Ti tus

Sempronius Longus , was sent to Sicily to prepare an invasion of

Africa , whilst the o ther , Publius Cornelius Scipio , was to take an

army to Spain a nd confront Hannibal. In this way t he Romans

in ten ded to attack Carthage itself an d the Punic ge neral w ho

had started the war, putti ng maximu m pressure on t he enemy

in an effort to force a decisive result. The Senate does n ot appear

to have anticipated that the Carthaginians would do anything

other than defend themselves . Ancient s tates an d armies

N


29/197

tA t a II t

o c e a II

G a u

u s e tan

r r n n

e

t e

v 0 c a

r v e r n ... ,,,,,,

a le a ri c s la nd s

M e d

l I e r g e t e s

NewCarthage

A • ,

,

tf + ,

E d e t a n

ur r

S p a i

N e a r e

a n

..ron qisS p a i n

-_ .Numantia

,,C e 1 t b e r i,

,, a r p E

IIIIIII

Ore t a n

, Guada W . . lley OJ • IT

Bae cula•lIipa

F u r t h e r•Malaca

Va c c a e

Ta gus

Tu r d e t a n

Cartenna •Sald ae

• Rusadd ir

N u m d

o 100 20 0 Miles

o 100 200 Km Hann ibal s Ma rch to I ta ly


30/197

yand the mp ign in the P o Valley

- - - - Hasdrubal s pro bable r oute

Roman terr itory

Alpine Pa sses

~ ~ Hannibal s route

n

Bononia .

C e n 0• Placentia

XTrebia B 0

•Genoa

n u r r e s ;;

I\. :J r o g e s ...

s a I a s s i

r n Ubres, - r - . Ticinus

X

Ariminum•• la ssilia

Pisae • •rret ium

• Fanum Fort unae

X Lake Tra s im e ne

•erusia • As culum

Cors ica d r a t i c

• Crot on

Brundis ium•

e

Sal apia· X Ca nn ae

anusium

Heraclaa

•Nola

• Rome

Ost ia •

•e apol is

Drepana •

y r r h e n a n e a

Sard inia

Carthage ·

•

•ilybaeum

• AspisCamar ina

•• Syracuse

Neapolis

Tnev es te •

Hadrume tum • e d i t e r r a n e a n e

NN E


31/197

TheBattle of

Trebia was foughton this plain

within a day ortw o of th e wintersolstice in 8

Roman army

h al f t he s ize ofth e one which

would f ight at

Cannae was

destroyed here

he h d moved on some days before which was probably just as well as theRomans were significantly outnumbered He returned to the fleet sent a

report to th e Senate and after dispatching the bulk of his forces to Spain under

th e comm nd of his elder brother Cnaeus returned to Italy to take comm nd

of th e troops already fighting the Gauls in the Po valley .

The news of Hannibal s march towards Italy s tunned the Senate nd imme-diately prompted a change in th e Roman plans. Sempronius Longus was

recalled from Sicily nd instructed to join forces with Scipio in Cisalpine Gaul

to confront the invader. It took time to carry out this move nd before this

Hannibal arrived. Scipio beh ved as aggressively as he h d on the Rhone nd

immediately moved to fight th e enemy in batt le bu t he was defeated in acavalry eng gement near the River Ticinus . Scipio s Roman Italian nd Gallic

cavalry were outnumbered nd enveloped by th e Punic horse . As his t roops

fled the consul was badly wounded nd only escaped capture when his RTH GE ROME ND T H PUNI W RS


32/197

teenage son, als o called Publius , led a od y of horsemen t o hi s rescue. The

Roman arm y retreated in some disorder , d estro ying th e bridge across th e

Ticinus n d moving back to a posi tion out side th e Roman colon y of Placentia

modern Piacen za) . In December Scipio was joined by Sempronius Longus ,

who soon afterwards wo n an action which h d escalated from a minor skir

mish . Polybius praised Hannibal for accepting this minor defeat instead of

feeding mo r e n d more troops into the fighting n d allowing a battle to

develop which was not under his control. Our sources now cla im th t there

was a disput e between th e tw o consuls , Scipio arguing for avoiding battle until

the Roman soldiers h d received more training , nd Longus for an immediate

battle. This c ution seems ou t of character with Scipio s earlier boldness on

the Rhone nd before Ticinus. Perhaps his wou nd h d depressed him, ut it

is more probable th t his alleged opposit ion to fight a battle was intended byPolybius to exonerate hi m from blame for th e subsequent defeat.

Sometime near the winter solstice , Sempronius was lured into fighting a

battle on th e open plain west of th e River Trebia. Hannibal s army h d grown

to 10 ,000 cavalry n d 28 ,000 inf ntry , n d thirty or so elephants . The Romans

mustered round 36,000-38,000 inf ntr y, ut only 4,000 cavalry, m n y ofthem demorali zed by their recent defeat at th e Ticinus. Hannibal h d ch o sen

the ground carefully , concealing 2,000 me n in a drainage ditch ehi nd t he

Roman line. The Carthaginian cavalry was divided equally be tween th e two

wings, outnum ering their Roman counterparts by more th n two to o ne. The

flanks of his inf ntry line were reinforced by th e elephants . In th e ensuingbattle the legi ons managed to punch through Hannibal s centre, ut first the

Roman cavalr y wings nd then the flanks of their inf ntry were overwhelmed

n d collapsed. The 10 ,000 Romans who h d led th e attack in th e centre were

able to escap e in good order, for Hannibal h d no reserves to send against

them , ut the rest were captured, killed or scattered. This first greatCarthaginian victory was a major s hock to th e Romans. Even more impor

t ntly it gave momentum to Hannibal s campaigns n d practical support as

more n d more Gauls joined his army or rought it suppli es

The Battle of Trebia D b 2 8 B

2 Milesi:.... Km


33/197

December 2 8 Be

Carthagin ians

Romans

t S ett im a

ampoS pio

C RTH GE ROME ND TH PUNIC W RS

Th i i g th f i t h th th d it


34/197

The attle of Trebia

was fought in December21 8 and was the f irst

time Hannibal faced a full

Roman army in bat tle

The battle was fought

on grou nd of his ownchoosing a nd h e was ab le

to co nceal 2 men

co mmanded by h is b rother

Mago in a d rainage ditch

behind the Roman lines

Having a significant numer-

ical advantage in cavalry he

further strengthened his

wings with war elep hants

Althou gh the Romans were

ab le to break throu gh h is

ce ntre a nd esca pe th eir

flanks co llapsed a nd

the bul k o f the army

was destroyed

The remaining months of winter, when the weather was poor nd it was

virtual ly impossible for armies to feed men nd horses in th e field , saw th e

usual period of inactivity as both sides prepa red for the sp ring campa ign. It

was clear to th e Sena te t h t Hannibal s rmy m ust go o ne of two ways, since

i t co uld n ot ig nore t he grea t barrier fo rmed b y th e Ape nnines. Therefore th e

tw o n ew co nsuls we re pos it ioned w ith t h eir ar m ies o n eit he r side of th ese

m oun tains . C n eus Servili us Ge mi nu s was sta tio ne d at

Arimin um modern Rimi ni) in case nnib l thrus t downalong the coastal plain of Eastern Italy, whilst Gaius Flaminius

force lay to the west of the mount ins at Arreti um in Et ruria.

Neither of the consuls was really strong enough to face

nn ibal on his own, nd it was intended th at th e two arm ies

wo u ld join forces as soo n as i t was clear w hich di recti on th e

ene my h ad taken . In the eve nt Hannibal m oved fas ter th an th e

Romans expec ted nd took an unortho dox ro ute . He crossed

the Apen nines q uickly, an d then forced his rmy th rough th e

difficult m rshy c ountry round the River Arno. Before

Flaminius was aware of his presence , Hannibal was past

Arret ium and he ding south. The consul sent word to his

co lleague and l ed his rmy in pursuit .

Flaminius was a new m an l V lIS llama , th e fi rst in h is

family to h ol d Ro m e s hi ghe st m agistracy, w hich was usu allyd ominated by a sma ll gro up of ar istocratic families. His ca reer

ha d been d istinguished, for h e h d already been cons ul o nce

before in 223, when he won a victory over the Gauls of t h e Po

valley . It h d also been highly unorthodox , nd had wo n h im m any e ne mies,

all ready to savage his reput tion after his de th . His d isrespect for conven -

tion and p roper ceremony was demons trated by his decision to begin his year

of o ffice in 2 17 n ot a t Ro m e, w here c on suls norm ally performed a ser ies of

NN E


35/197

Lake Trasimene

today On st

June 7

Hannibal

ambushed th e

army of CaiusFlaminius as it

marched alongth e narrow plain

beside th e shore

lmost th e

entire

army wasmassacred ortaken prisonerlater in th e day

Hannibal s rmy was no less bold th n th t displayed by first Scipio nd then

Sempronius Longus in th e previous campaign. Flaminius shared th e anger of

his me n as they passed devastated villages nd farms urnt by Punic soldiers.

Such devastation was normal in the wake of an invading r my ut Hannibal

h d ordered his me n to be especially brutal nd thorough in their depreda-

tions. Rome nd its allies were still fund ment lly agrarian societies nd the

laying waste of their farmland was a serious blow especially since an enemy s

freedom to cause such havoc suggested their own military weakness.

Flaminius urged his r my on to pursue ever more closely telling his me n th t

th e enemy s reluctance to face them was th e result of fear.

On th e shores of Lake Trasimene th e route ran through a narrow plain

between th e shore n d a line of hills. Hannibal s army marched along this with

CARTHAGE ROME AN D THE PUNIC W AR S

ambush posit ions parallel to the road The next day 21 June 21 7 BC th e


36/197

ambush posit ions parallel to the road. The next day 21 June 21 7 BC th e

Roman army left camp at dawn to follow the enemy . Thick mist common in

the area at this time of year added to th e confusion as the Roman column

was suddenly attacked in th e flanks an d rear which prevented th e creation of

anything like an organized fighting line. The Romans fought hard resist ing

for three hours b ut the issue was never in doubt . In the end they were killed

captured or drowned as they tried to swim to safety across th e lake. Flaminius

was cut down by a Insubrian horseman a representative of on e of the tribeshe ha d defeated in 223. Only the vanguard some 6 000 men failed to

encounter serious opposition an d escaped from th e trap but even these were

subsequently rounded up by the victorious Carthaginians . Flaminius army of

25 000 30 000 men had been effectively destroyed but the cost of

1 500 2 500 Punic casualties testified to th e struggle that some had managedto pu t up. The other consul Gerninus was hastening to join Flaminius an d

had sen t his cavalry on ahead. This force nearly 4 000 men commanded by

Gaius Centenius was ambushed an d killed or captured by t he enemy before

they learned of the disaster. Without its mounted arm th e second Roman

army was for t he m omen t crippled.

THE DELAYER SUMMER TO AUTUMN 2 7 Be

The fundamental principle of Roman government was that no one individual

should hold supreme power and that all power should be of a limited dura-

t ion normally a year of office. This was intended to prevent th e emergence

of a tyrant or king. Therefore there were two consuls in each year whose

power was absolutely equal. Only rarely was this principle abandoned for a

short time and the rare expedient taken of appointing a dictator with supreme

authority to direct the state. The dicta tor held office for six months an d had

not a colleague but a junior assistant known as th e Master of Horse agister

quitumi W hen th e office of dictator ha d been created in the archaic period

it was considered important that he should fight with the infantr y of th e

NN E


37/197

and so he was prohibited from riding a horse leaving his deputy to comm nd the

cavalry. Such a restriction was no longer appropriate for the task of comm nding

th e m uch larger nd more sophisticated armies of th e late third century BC and on e of the first actions of th e newly ppointed dictator uintus Fabius

Max imus was to gain special permission from th e Senate to ride a horse.

Fabius was now 58 rather old for a Roman general nd h d served as a

yo ut h in th e First Punic War subsequently being twice elected to th e consul-

ship. Aided by his Master of Horse Marcus Minucius Rufus himself a former

co nsul the dictator threw himself into reorganizing Rome s defences . Soldiers

were enrolled nd organi zed into new units and once he h d taken over

Servilius Geminus army Fabius h d an rmy of four legions perhaps 40 000

m en at his disposal. It was weak in cavalry nd cont ined a mixture of recent

re cruits with little training nd more experienced men still dismayed by th e

rece n t defeats but th e creation of such a large field rmy in such a short time

wa s an impressive achievement. Flaminius defeat was blamed upon his failure

to observe the prop er religious rites nd Fabius ordered th t these now be most

sc rupulously performed .Hannibal h d moved east after Trasimene crossing th e Apennines again nd

marching i nto the coastal plain of Picenum where he rested th e rmy for its

health h d still no t fully recovered from th e exertions of th e last twelve

mo nths. For the first t ime since leaving Spain Hannibal was able to send a

m essage to Carthage reporting his achievements nd requesting support . Heremained highly confident nd when Fabius advanced nd c mped nearby

th e Carthaginian immediatel y deployed his rmy to offer battle . Fabius

de clined keepin g his army on th e high ground just outside th e r mp rt of his

ca m p an d in such a strong position th t Hannibal did not w nt to risk

at tac king. Battles in this peri od apart from such rare ambushes as Trasimene

us ually occurred b y mutu l consent nd even th e most gifted comm nders

co uld rarel y forc e an unwilling enemy to fight . Hannibal told his men th t

RT H G E R O M E N D TH P U N I W R S

i ld h R ili il k bl i


38/197

it would demonstrate that Rom e was militarily weak an d un able to protect i ts

ow n or its alli es fields. From th e beginning of th e Italian invasion Hanni bal

had made great efforts to persuade Rome s a llies to d efect treating allied pris -oners ve ry well and co n ti nua lly ass uring them of h is good inte ntions . As yet

apart from a few i ndividuals an d th e Ga llic t ribes of th e No rth thi s po licy had

no t b orn e fr uit .

Fabi us continued to avoid batt l e bu t shadowed the enemy sticking to th e

hig h ground and always adopting ver y strong positions. The Romans tried toambush Hannibal s raidin g and foraging parties inflictin g some loss bu t

could no t prevent t he e ne m y from moving at will. Hannib al ma d e another of

his sudden unexpec ted moves swoop ing down into the ager lernus th e rich

plain o f ampania . Fabi us co untered b y occ upyi ng a h ill ove rloo king th e pass

w hich H ann ibal was m ost likely to cross o nce h e h ad f inished plund erin g .

Hanni bal t ricked h im aga in d rawing off th e ga rrison ac tually guarding th e

pass by dr iving a mass of cat tle u p t he pat h. It was n ight and w ith naming

torches t ied to t heir horns th e animals looked like a marching co lumn In th e

confusion th e main arm y escaped without loss an d even wiped o ut th e small

Roman garrison whilst Fabius army remained in camp and did nothi ng. From

th e beg inning th e d icta to r s stra tegy of avoidi ng bat tle was unp opular with

th e a rmy an d th e populat ion in ge nera l. H e wa s nickn amed Hann ibal s paedo-

gogus after th e s lave wh o followed a Roman sch oo lboy carrying hi s books.T he

humil iati on of wa tching as a n ene my d evastated th e Italian co untryside was

deep ly fe lt. Most Romans of a ll soc ial classes co n ti n ued t o believe th at bo ld

action was th e proper way to fight desiri ng open battle where Roman courage

wou ld prove victorious as it had so often in the past . Fabius u npopularity

grew and in an u tterly unprecedented move Minuci us was vo ted eq ual power

with the dic tator. The Master o f Horse took over ha lf th e army but was soonlur ed in t o battle by Hannib al a mbushed and badl y m auled . Another d isaster

was o nly p rev ent ed by th e a rriva l o f Fabius m en w ho covered t he retreat.

Mi nuci us vol untari ly r eturn ed to hi s subordinate ra nk and th e remaind er of NN E

po licy of avoiding battle. In th e lat e a utum n t he di ctator s six m ont hs te rm


39/197

of office expire d and h e and Mi nucius re turned to Rom e. T he ar my, which was

by n ow obse rving Ha n nibal s wi nter qu arters at Ge run ium, was left un der th e

co m mand of Serv ilius Ge mi n us and M arcus At ilius Regulus , th e co nsul ele cted

to replace Plarni ni us .

Soon after Fabius had assumed office he had issued a general order to t he

rura l po p ulation in the regions t hrea tened by Hannibal, ins tructing them to

seek shelter in th e n earest walled tow n , taki ng wi th them th eir lives tock an d

a ll th e food th at th ey we re able t o carry, an d de stroying w ha t was left . T he

aim , as w it h hi s co n t in ued h arassm ent of Ha nnib al s fo raging p arties, was to

d eprive th e Punic a rmy o f supplies. Aft er C arinae. and especially in Liv y s

n arrative, it w as claimed th at Fa biu s h ad und erstood th e secret of d efeating

th e e ne my. H annibal s ho uld n ot be fac ed in b attl e, bu t slowly star ved in t o

submission. ithout food, hi s m otley colle ction o f m ercenaries would desertor flee a n d th e invasio n wo uld fail. T his is clearly a great exagge ration, and

eve n in Livy s own n arrative Fa bius stra tegy appears t o have infli cted lit t le

rea l loss o n th e e nemy , and c ertainly never p revented H a nn ibal from m oving

w herever h e w ished. Fabius Maxi m us r ealized th at afte r Tras imene th e Ro ma n

army was not in a fit s ta te t o e ngage in a n open ba ttle wi th any chance ofsuccess. The refore h e avoi ded b attle , an d struck at the ene my i n th e o n ly ways

possi ble, ski rmishing wi th sma ll d eta ch m ent s a nd making it as d ifficult as

possi ble to gai n supplies. Th is is very mu ch i n accor dance w it h th e Helleni stic

military wis do m of th e era , whe n a genera l should only seek battl e w he n he

h ad a reasonable hope of success ; if h e h ad not , th e n he sho uld avoid co ntact,bu t seek to b uild u p his ow n streng th an d reduce the enemy s un til wi nning

a b at t le w as more p ractical. The ins tinc tive reac t ion of m ost Roman

co mmanders was to see k dir ect co nfrontat ion as soo n as possible. Fa bius real-

ized th at thi s was un wise a t th at time , bu t still had troubl e restraining his

subordinates. Th e ni ckname h e subsequently earned, th e Delayer cunctatoripaid tribut e to hi s w ill p ower.


40/197

T ROM N M IL IT RY S YS T M

om e d id no t employ professional sold iers . Instead uniquel y amongst

powerful s tates by this period she continued to rely on temporary

militias raised whenever required a nd then disbande d at t he en d of

a conflic t . Every five years a census was carrie d ou t of all Ro m n citizenslisting th eir p roperty . Soldiers were expected to provi de their own weapons

and eq uip me n t th erefore a man s census rating dete rmi ned no t only whether

or no t h e was e ligible to serve ut also in what capa city . The major ity of

Roman soldie rs owned small farms since land was t he m ain basis of wea lth.

As ci tizens they were legall y obliged to serve for up to sixteen years or

campaigns ut un til the Punic Wars such prolonged mili tar y service was

extre mely unusual.

T RIV L

RMI S

NN E


41/197

TH RIV L RMI S

The word legion legia h d originall y me nt levy nd referred to all the


42/197

This bronze Boeotian

helmet was found in

the River Tigris bu t

is an e xample of a

type commonly worn

by Roman cavalrymen

The se h elmet s were

made fr om s heet bronz ewhich was hammered

over a ca rved stone

to give i t it s

distinctive shape

its structure was much less flexible. There is insufficient

evidence to solve this question with absolute certainty but the

evidence for a major reform of the Roman army after nn e is

unconvincing nd rests largely on a s ingle passage of Livydescribing a local tactica l ploy used in 211 2 On the whole it is

likely th t the Roman military system in 216 BC differed only

in minor details from Polybius description .

The Polybian legion consisted of cavalry heavy infantry nd

loose order skirmishers. Cavalry were provided by the wealthy equestrian order

nd included th e sons of m ny senators eager to make a n me for courage nd

so help their future political careers . Their equipment h d been copied from

th e Greeks nd consisted of bron ze helmet mail rmour or a metal or linen

cuirass circular shield sword spear nd javelins. Later Roman horsemen

employed the four-horned saddle which provided an excellent seat nd it is

distinctly possible th t this was already in use. The basic organization was the

turm of thirty subdivided into three groups of te n each led by a decurion.

Normally there were te n t urm per legion providing a cava lry force of 300

bu t we also read of legions with only 200 cavalr y so this probably varied.

The m in strength of the legion was its heavy inf ntry who were divided

into three lines on th e basis of age nd experience since all possessed the same

property qualification. The first line lJastati consisted of y oung m en in their

troops raised by the Republic in on e year but by this period the legion was

the basic building block of the Roman rm y. Our best description of the legion

is provided by Polybius nd was writ ten in the middle of the sec ond century

BC more th n sixty years after nn e . The historian claims th t his descrip

tion does in fact refer to the war with Hannibal nd his narrativ e of thes e

campaigns was certainly based upon this ssumption . However

it has sometimes been suggested th tthe

army didnot

assumethis form unt il after nn e nd th t at the time of the battle

NN E

which for the Romans was considered to be th e late twenties) , whilst th e third


43/197

Antenna typ

sword th most

common s idearm

o th Spanis h

inf ntry t

Cannae

line triarii was composed of th e experienced , older men. Each line was

dividedinto ten

basic tactical units,the

maniples ,bu t

for administrativepurposes these were split in to two cen turies each comm nded by a centurion.

The centurion of the rig ht h n d cent ury was senior to his colleag ue, nd

co m m n ded t he who le m nip le w he n b ot h officers were present. Ce nturions

were ppointed or e lected from mongst th e ordinary soldiers. Eac h was

assisted by his second in comm nd optio a st nd rd bearer sig ll ifer , trumpeter tcomiceni nd a guard comm nder ttesserariusi.

The soldiers in all three lines carried th e same defensive equipment of a

bronze helmet, a pectoral or chest plate, probably a greave for th e left leg, nd

a bodyshield sCI/tum . This was oval in shape, bout 1.2m 4 feet) in length

and 60cm 2 feet) in width nd cons tructed from th ree layers of p lywood, eachlaid at right angles to th e next . t was thicker in the centre nd flexible at the

edges , making it very resilient to blows, n d the top nd bottom edges were

reinforced wi th a bronze edging to prevent split ting . Good protect ion came

at a price, for th e Roman shield was ver y hea vy, round lOkg 22 pounds ), nd

in battle its entire weight was borne by the left rm as th e soldier held th e

horizontal h ndgrip b eh in d t he boss . Wealthier soldiers rep laced th e bronze

or iron pectoral with a cuirass of mail or scale rmour which, lthoug h heavier,

offe red far better pro tection. All so ldiers carried a short thrusting sword, which

probably was already of the type known as th e Spanish sword tgiadius

nispaniensis; - th e classic sidearm of th e Roman soldier for over five centuries .

Most also carried a dagger. The triarii were armed with thrust ing spears, up to

2m . 8-9 feet ) in length , but t he hastati nd pr n p es both carried the famous

Roman pilum. This was a heavy javelin consisting of a wooden shaft some

1.2m 4 feet) in length tt ched to a narrow iron sh nk 60cm 2 feet) long,

topped by a small pyramid-shaped point. All of th e weapon s weight was

concent rated behind t he small tip, giving it g reat penetrative power. The

length of th e metal sh nk gave it th e reach to p unch through an enemy s

T RIV L RMI S

mere ly stuck in the shield it was very difficult to pull free an d might force the

di d hi i h d d hi ld d fi h d Th i l


44/197

ma n to discard his weighed-down shield a nd fig ht u npro tected. The pi lum s

maximum range was about 9m . c 100 feet ), but its effective range some

t hing like half that According to Polybius each so ldier carried two pila one

lighter than the other, but the archaeological evidence suggests rather more

variety than such a simple, clear division.

Supporting the heavy infantry an d cavalry were th e light infant ry skir

mishers or velites recruited from th e poorer citizens an d those as yet too young

to serve in the hastati They were armed with a small ro und shie ld, some times

a helmet, a sword, an d a bundle of javelins, but it is unclear whet her t hey were

organized into u nits an d how they were co m manded Ma ny wore pieces of

ani mal skin, especia lly wolf ski n , attac he d to the ir h elm et s a nd Polybius

be lieved th a t this was in tended to allow senior officers to recognize i ndivid

ualsa nd r eward or pun ish t heir be haviour, but is vag ue as to wh o th ese o fficers

were . The nu m ber of triarii was fixed at 600 i n t en m an iples of six ty, b ut th e

remain ing i nfantry stre ngth of th e legion was divi ded equally betwee n th e

hastati prin ipes and velites A leg ion norma lly had 4,200 foo t, and th erefore

there were 1 ,200 me n in each of these contingents, b ut in t imes of pa rticular

crisis the total m ight be increased to 5,000 or eve n m ore . As a res ult, th e size

of a maniple of hastati or principes could vary from 120 to 160 men wh en th e

legion was first formed an d before an y campaign losses ha d occurred .

In battle the three lines of heavy infantry we re forme d one behind the other.

In each line there was a gap equivalent to its fron tage between each ma nip le.

The maniples in the next line were s ta tioned to cover the gaps in th e line

ahead, forming a quincunx pattern, like th e 5 on a die . It has often been

d oubted that t he legio n actua lly fought in such an o pen fo rmation, an d

vario us t heories have been developed to exp lain ho w th e intervals between

ma niples we re closed j ust befo re co n tact, but such views are unco nvincing

and th ere is n ot a s hred of evide nce fro m our so urces t o sup port th e m . All

armies formed battle lin es wit h some intervals be tween th eir units , oth erwise

it was imposs ible t o m ove w itho ut th e un its merging i nt o o ne mass too large

NN E


45/197

for its officers to control nd th e gaps in th e Roman formation were wider

th n usual. The open formation gave t he m nipu l r legion great flexibility

n d allowed it to move across fairly broken country without losing order. Withmore th n half of th e legion in th e second or third line nd thus uncom-

mitted at th e beginning of a battle th e Romans h d plenty of fresh troops

with which to plug a gap in their own line or exploit a break in t he enemy s.

Above th e sixty centurions there were six mili tary tribunes in comm nd of

each legion. A pair of these officers held supreme uthority at nyone timeut all were available to direct th e legion in battle.

TH R IV L RMI S

Part of the re lief

on the firs t


46/197

on the firs tcentury BC altar

of Domitiu s

Ahenobarbusfrom Rome this

depicts soldier s

wearing equip-

ment very similar

to that worn by

the legions at

Cannae This

scene shows

a sacri fice of

popanum cakes

and a bull part

of the comple x

rituals required

to prepare a

Roman armyfor war To the

left of th e altar

s tands a n

officer most

pro ly

military tr ibune

The military tribunes like all of th e senior officers of th e Roman ar my were

no t professional soldiers ut elected magistra tes . The Romans did n ot m in -

tain th e strict divis ion between rmy nd politics common in modern

democracies nd senators followed a career which rought them ot h mili -

tary n d civilian responsib ilities sometimes simultaneous ly. The two co nsuls

e lected each year were t he senior m agist ra tes a nd also prov ide d th e

co mm nde rs for the mos t im port n t of th e State s wars . By modern sta ndards

they were amateurs w ho received no formal training for comm nd nd

instead learned by experience of service wi th th e arm y in various junior

NN E

capacities. Th e a mount o f milit ary exper ience p ossessed by a co nsul in evitably

varied considerably b ut m ost displayed tale nt as leaders of me n even if the y


47/197

varied considerably, b ut m ost displayed tale nt as leaders of me n , even if the y

lacked th e m ore technical s kills of an arm y co mmander. R oman magistrates

rarely s tood f or e lection on th e basis of pa rticular po licies , in stead relying o n

their rep utation for a bility. It was a system w hic h h eavily favo ured a small

group of wea lthy ar istocratic fam ilies who we re skilled at promoting th e

virtues and successes of for mer generations n d implying th t as m uch or

m ore c ould b e ex pected f rom yo unger m embers of th e family . Wi th o n ly t wo

posts per year, co mpetition for this high h onour was in tense , especially sincea mi xture o f law an d tr adit ion p revented anyone atta ining th e ran k before

th eir early forties , an d was suppose d t o preve n t it b eing h eld t wice with in ten

years . The vas t majority of the 300 or so se nators ne ver b ecame consul , an d

it w as very rar e eve n for t he m emb ers of th e es tablished famili es to w in th e

office more th n once .Th e standard Roman army was c ommanded b y a c onsul and c onsisted of

two l egion s s upported b y so ldiers fro m th e Italian alli es . The latt er were orga n-

ized in to wings a lae with ro ughly th e sa me n umber of in fant ry as a legion ,

ut as m an y a s thr ee tim es th e cavalry. E ach a la was comm n d ed by th r ee

praefecti who were Roma ns, ut very little is kn ow n abo ut th eir i nternal organ -ization a nd t actics. T he a lae were di vided i nto co horts , each pro vided by a

single comm unity, whic h appear t o h ave varied in size fro m abo ut 4 00 to

about 600 me n . It is uncl ear whet her th ese we re in tu rn subdivided in t o mani-

pi es, perhaps o ne for eac h of th e th r ee lin es, or h ow o ften the coh ort it self

was used as a tactical u nit . Our sources pay li ttle attent ion t o t he allies , an dgiv e th e imp ression th at a n a la operated in mu ch th e sa me w ay as a legion .

The no r mal forma tion for a cons ular army was w ith th e inf n tr y o f th e two

legion s i n the cen tre an d a n ala o n either fl an k, so th at th e latt er were usually

know n as th e Lef t or Right a la . The cava lry of th e tw o legions a re u sually

depicted as statio ned on the rig ht wing , the place of h on our, w hilst th e Latinand It alian h orse fo rmed on t he left , ut , given th at th ere were o ften th r ee

ti mes as ma ny of th e latter as th e former, th is may be a n overs imp lification.

T RIV L R M I S

The pick of th e a la e were d rawn off to fo rm th e extraordinarii elite cavalry nd

i f h i di di l f h l d i h


48/197

infantry at the imme diate disposa l of th e cons ul, and so metimes th ese were

used as a d istinct tactical unit in b attle . The entire co nsular arm y usually

co nsisted of a t least 20, 000 m en , ut so metimes th e militar y situatio n r equir ed

a smaller force and a single legion nd an a a might be em p loyed . I n this case

th e army was us uall y comm nded by a prae tor , th e nex t senior magis trate ,

four of w ho m were e lected in eac h year .

The Rom an a rmy in th is period fun ction ed best a t th e level o f th e co nsular

army and it was very rare for a ny enemy t o pose so g reat a th reat th at th e two

consuls were req uired to join forces nd give ba ttle t ogeth er. On t he rare oc ca

sions th t this was co nside red necessary , as w he n Hannibal invaded Italy, it

was n ormal for th e cons uls to hold supreme comm nd on a lternate days .

Deeply e mbedded in th e Roman political sys tem , and th e milit ary h ierarchywas esse ntially an ex tens ion of t his , was th e desire to pr even t an y on e m n

gaining overw helming power. Therefore , just as in po litics any grade of magis

trate had severa l mem bers , all with equal power , so also i n t he m ilitary

orga ni za tion th ere were three decurions to a tutm two ce n turions t o a

m aniple, th ree prefects to a n a la and six tri un es to a legion . Onl y w ith th eappoint ment of a di ctator was t his pri nciple abandoned fo r a se t, six month

pe riod . Differe nces of opi nio n b et ween co nsular co lleagues Scipio nd

Semproni us Longus figure heavil y in our sources befo re t he defea t at Trebia in

218 a nd rec ur when Mi nucius Rufus was granted power eq ual t o th e di ctator

in th e fo llowing year. is clear th at th ese n arratives have been partiall ydi storted by th e desire of so me senatorial f amilies to absolve th eir members

from b lame for th ese d efeats. However , this sho u ld n ot o bscure the fac t th at

th e divided comm nd was a weakness in the Roman m ilitary sys tem when it

was called upon to wage war at this level. JO

Probably th e g reatest streng th of th e Roman military s ystem was th e vast

rese rves of m an power w hich un d erlay i t . The pre cise fi gures m ay be qu es

t ioned , ut Polybius s urvey of th e m ale c itizens and allies eligible for ca ll-up

NN E

absorb cas ualties w hich wo uld h ave force d any o ther sta te t o seek peace .

was especially diffic ult for th e Hellenisti c kingdoms to cope wit h hea vy losses


49/197

p y g p y

b oth because o f th e tim e taken to tr ain so ldiers and also beca use of th e re la-

tive ly small pop ulation from which their rec ruits were draw n. In civilian life

Roma n citi zens ha d cons idera ble protec tion u nder t he law ut n early a ll of

th eir rig hts we re sacrificed as soon as th ey e nlisted l egionaries willi ngly

sub jecting themselves to an extreme ly har sh sys tem of discipline . The de th

penal ty was i nflicted eve n for such crimes as th eft w ithin th e c m p an d th e

pu nish me nts for flight failure to perform d uties or for deser tion were as

h arsh . The Rom n a rmy was hi ghly orga ni zed an d di sciplined and i n these

respec ts comp red we ll wi th more professiona l forces . However its essential

impermanence was o ften a weakness . It too k ti me t o abso rb rec ruits t rain

th em to figh t as u nit s acc usto m t h em to tru sting e ach o ther and th eir offi -cers . The lo nger a Roman arm y remained in exis tence assuming th at it d id

n ot s uffer co ns ta n t d efeats th e m ore e ffective a fig hting force it b ecame . By

the e nd of th e Second Punic War some legi on s h d been in co ns t n t service

for over a decade an d we re as we ll dr illed a nd co nfi den t as a ny pro fessiona ls.

e t as soo n as an ar my was discharge d t he w hole process ha d to begin again.

Each new levy usually included men with prior service but they ha d not

serve d t og eth er in th e sa me leg ions and m aniples un d er th e same office rs

before so still needed extensive train ing . Most Roman armies h d th e po ten -

ti al to be very e fficient but it took ti me nd co nsiderable effort on th e p art of

its office rs at a ll levels to reali ze this po ten tial.

THE RTH GINI N MILIT R Y SYSTEM ND H N NI B L S R MY

By th e t ime of th e Second P unic War Car th age h d large ly ndoned th e use

of ci tize n sol d iers. The citizen pop ula tion was too s ma ll t o risk se rious casu-a lties an d as a res ult Cart haginians were o nly re quired to serve in di rect

d efence of th eir c ity a ltho ugh in th ese rare cases th eir e ffectiveness p roved

l I t d P i i li d l t l i l f i ldi S T RIV L RMI S

purely for pa y, b ut man y more were soldiers provided by Carthage s subjects

and allies frequently led by the ir ow n chiefs or princes Punic armies were


50/197

and allies , frequently led by the ir ow n chiefs or princes. Punic armies were

therefore a heterogeneous mixture of races, and we hear of Lib yans and

Numidians from Africa , Iberians, Celtiberians and Lusitanians from Spain,

wild tribesmen from the Balearic Islands , Gauls, Ligurians an d Greeks. During

the great mutinies at t he e nd of th e First Punic War, the rebellious soldiers had

serious problems in communicating with each other. Normally the unifying

bond was provided by th ehigh command

, all of whom were invariablyCarthaginian . is a tribute to these officers that the loyalty of the foreign

soldiers serving Carthage was in general very good, the Mercenary War occur

ring in exceptional circumstances .12

Carthage maintained a much clearer divide between war an d politics than

Rome, an d it was ver y rare for a serving magistrate ever to be given a mili tarycommand . Punic generals were appointed and frequent ly served for ma ny

years with little interference or supervision of their actions from the civil

authorities. As a result many were more experienced than their Roman coun

terparts , who were appointed annually. However, we should not exaggerate

the difference , since Punic commanders were drawn from the ranks of the

same aristocratic families who domi na te d politics . Military appointments

appear to have owed more to weal th an d influence than impartial assessment

of military abili ty . Some Carthaginian generals were very able m en, b ut, in

spite of their longer commands the majori ty did not prove t hemselves

markedly superior to their Roman counterparts .

We do not have a detailed breakdown of Hannibal s army at the beginning

of the expedition to Italy . The troops left behind in Spain or sent to Africa to

guard against Roman attacks consis ted of infantry an d cavalry from at least

five Spanish tribes, Balearic s lingers , small numbers of Libyan cavalry and a

considerable force of Libyan infantry, Liby -Phoenician a people of mixed

Punic and African stock who enjoyed limited rights) cavalr y, umidian

horsemen from at least four tribes and a small band of Ligurians from


51/197

TH E R I VA L RMIES

erected in Italy on Hannibal s orders , which makes it all the more frustrating

tht less informtion has been preserved bout his own army he n he arrived


52/197

This relief depicting

an Iber ian warrior now in th e National

Archaeological Museum

in Madrid gives a good

indication of th e

appearance of many of

th e Spanish troops at

Cannae. He car ries a flat

oval shaped body shield

and wields a curved

slashing sword or

falcata His headgear

is cur ious in shape and

may be some f or m

of sinew cap.

th t less inform tion has been preserved bout his own army. he n he arrived

in Italy, Hannibal h d sizeable contingents of Libyan foot , Numidian horse , nd

Spanish cavalry nd infantry, as well as a number of Balearic slingers , supported

by war elephants (al though all of the latter h d perished before Cannae) . He

was soon joined by strong contingents from his new-found Gallic allies , who

came to supply almost half of his field army . It is possible th t

Hannibal also h d small contingents from some of the o th er

ethnic groups , bu t if so their numbers were not great. 13

The Libyan foot were th e most reliable element in th e army .

Most fought in close order, lthough it seems likely th t

Libyans were also included mongst th e lonchophoroi

Hannibal s specialist javelin skirmishers. (Many translations of

Polybius render this inappropriately as pikemen .) The heavy

infantry began the war dressed in a version of th e standard

equipment of Hellenistic infantry. They wore bronze helmets

n d body armour, probably made from stiffened linen, carried

large round shields nd probably fought with spears . In 217 BC

Hannibal re-equipped them with th e spoils of th e Roman dead

at Trebia nd Trasimene . It is not clear whether this means th t

he gave them only Roman defensive rmour of helmet, mail cuirass, nd oval

scutum or whether they also dopted the p um nd gladius The Libyans were

well disciplined nd drilled, capable of complex manoeuvres, nd in every

respect the equals , nd sometimes th e superiors , of ny Roman legionaries . If

there were ny Libyan or Liby-Phoenician cavalry with Hannibal s rm y , then

they would have fought in close formation nd carried Hellenistic-style equip

ment, not too dissimilar from Roman cavalry .

The other African contingent was provided by th e Numidians, most of

whom fought as l ight cavalry. These me n rode small , agile horses without

saddle or bridle, wore a simple tunic nd h d only a small round shield for

protection. Their tactics emphasized swift movement nd avoidance of actual

NN E

contact sweeping in to throw javelins a nd th en retreating before th e enemy

could close. At the beginning of the war th e Romans were unprepared for these


53/197

This st tue from

Vacheres in SouthernFrance could e s ily

represent one of th e

we lthier warriors

amongst Hannibal s

Gallic allies He we rs

a torc around his neck

and has mail armour -

a type which may wellhave been invented b y

th e Gauls He carries an

oval shield and has along sword at h is el t

tactics and had great difficulty coping with them The Numidians were linked

by language an d cul

Documents

Cannae (Fields of Battle) - Adrian Goldsworthy