Canada: Integrated Action Plan

Canada: Integrated Action Plan Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident

Greg Rzentkowski

Director General

Directorate of Power Reactor Regulation

August 2013

e-Doc 4185357 (PPT)

2 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

Presentation Outline

• Evolution of Canadian Regulatory Framework

• CNSC Integrated Action Plan

• Current Status of Fukushima Actions

• Future Actions

Evolution of Canadian Regulatory Framework


Canadian Nuclear Power Plants Evolution of Regulatory Requirements

• Canadian regulatory philosophy has evolved from

an NRX accident in Chalk River in 1952 – Partial meltdown and hydrogen explosions due to

operator error and mechanical problems in the

shutdown systems

• Consideration of single and dual failures based on

conservative assumptions – Separate, independent and redundant safety

systems

– Design basis of CANDU reactors includes selected

Beyond Design Basis Accidents

• Adaptation of International Standards and

Practices


Canadian Nuclear Power Plants CANDU Design Philosophy

• Design philosophy – Reliable safety system

– Multiple barriers

• Large inventory of water – Primary/Secondary coolant

– Moderator coolant

• Many hours of passive cooling – Extended recovery time

• In-ground spent fuel pools – Seismically qualified

– Diverse means of adding water

CNSC Integrated Action plan


CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report Objective Review of Canadian NPPs

• Thirteen recommendations in four areas – Strengthening defence-in-depth

• External events and beyond design basis accidents

• Design and safety analysis

• Severe accident management

– Enhancing emergency preparedness • On-site and off-site emergency response

• Multiple jurisdictions

– Improving regulatory framework and processes • Act, regulations and regulatory documents

• Compliance and licensing processes

– Enhancing international cooperation • CANDU owner countries

• Other International regulators


Independent Reviews External Advisory Committee (EAC)

• Formed by CNSC President to provide an independent assessment

of the CNSC response – Non-nuclear independent expert panel

• Final report issued in April 2012

– Concluded that the CNSC acted promptly and appropriately in the early

stages of the crisis

– Made nine recommendations complementing Task Force

recommendations, pertained to: • improving communications domestically, and internationally among

regulators

• examining area of human and organizational performance

• addressing Nuclear facilities other than Power Plants (non-NPPs)


Independent Reviews Integrated Regulatory Review Service Mission (IRRS)

• IRRS Follow-up Mission completed in Dec. 2011 – Extended to cover Canada’s response to Fukushima

– CNSC response rated as a good practice for other regulatory

bodies to follow

• IRRS Follow-up Mission Report

• “…CNSC completed a systematic and thorough

review of the lessons learned from the accident, making

full use of all the available information including the

review of actions taken by other international

regulators. CNSC has set up an action plan for

addressing all the findings and recommendations”


CNSC Integrated Action Plan Reviews and Recommendations

• Integrates reviews and recommendations from – CNSC Fukushima Task Force

– External Advisory Committee

– IAEA/IRRS follow-up mission

• Applies to all nuclear facilities and CNSC – Strengthening defence-in-depth

– Enhancing emergency response

– Improving regulatory framework and processes

– Enhancing international collaboration

– Enhancing communications and public education

...continued focus to reduce likelihood of accidents

and mitigate consequences


CNSC Action Plan Implementation Timely and transparent approach

Recommendations

Implementation Timeline

Short

(Dec 2012)

Medium

(Dec 2013)

Long

(Dec 2015)

Strengthening defence-in-depth

1 – Verify Robustness of NPP Design x x x

2 – Assessment of Site-Specific External Hazards x

3 – Enhance Modeling Capabilities x

Enhancing emergency preparedness

4 – Assess Emergency On-Site Emergency Plans x

5 – Update Emergency Facilities and Equipment x

6 – Off-site Emergency Plans and Programs x

Improving regulatory framework and processes

7 – Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations Amendments x

8 – Radiation Protection Regulations Amendments x

9 – Update Regulatory Document Framework x x

10 – Amend Power Reactor Operating Licences x

11 – Implementation of Periodic Safety Review x

Enhancing international cooperation

12 – Collaboration with CANDU Owner Countries x

13 – Enhance International Cooperation x

14 – Communication and Public Education x x


CNSC Integrated Action Plan Implementation Strategy

• Fukushima actions – with specified deliverables

• 36 actions: Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)

• 11 actions: Major Nuclear Facilities (non-NPPs)

• 35 actions: CNSC

– and timeline • Short-term: 12 months (December 2012)

• Medium-term: 24 months (December 2013)

• Long-term: 48 months (December 2015)

• Station-specific actions – implementation of safety improvements during scheduled outages

– procedures and guidelines

...all short-term actions closed

Status of Fukushima Actions


Strengthening Defence-in-Depth Implemented Safety Improvements

• Design modifications – Preventing fuel failure

• Implementation of Emergency Mitigating Equipment (EME) – EME portable water pumps/generators

» System connection and piping to add makeup water to: » Steam Generators » Irradiated Fuel Bays (or Spent Fuel Pools)

– Preventing containment failure

• Demonstration adequacy/provisions of relief capacity – Bleed condenser/degasser relief capacity

• Installation of Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners – Installation during unit outages

• Upgrades to electric power for key instrumentation – Evaluation of critical loads during station blackout

• Analyses and reassessments – Improved modeling of severe accidents for multi-unit plants

…safety improvements through lessons learned


EME Pickering (2) EME Darlington

Flood Protection

Strengthening Defence-in-Depth Implemented Safety Improvements — OPG

EME Pickering (1)


EME Fire Pumpers (5 in total) Bruce A 400 kW Generator (2)

Dry Hydrants

Permanent piping to

spent fuel pool

Strengthening Defence-in-Depth Implemented Safety Improvements — Bruce Power


Strengthening Defence-in-Depth Implemented Safety Improvements — NB Power


Strengthening Defence-in-Depth Implemented Safety Improvements — NB Power

Future Actions


Future Actions Strengthening Defence-in-Depth

• Design Modifications – Preventing fuel failure

• Water makeup connections to primary heat transport system

– Preventing/Arresting severe core damage

• Moderator systems and shield tank

– Preventing containment failure for multi-unit accident sequences • Performance-based approach

• Analyses and Reassessments

– Re-evaluation of site-specific magnitudes of external event to which NPP site may be susceptible

• Earthquakes / Flooding / High winds – Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)

• Multi-units / Instrument survivability / Plant habitability

– Irradiated Fuel Bay Structural integrity analyses • Temperature in excess of design

…progress towards full implementation on track

Concluding Remarks


Concluding Remarks

• Increasing safety margins by reducing likelihood of

severe accident and mitigating consequences – Design upgrades

– Processes, procedures and guidelines

• Safety improvements confirmed through international

benchmarking

…making Canadian Nuclear Power Plants safer

Thank you!

Documents

Canada: Integrated Action Plan