Can you speak Microsoft? (Certainly I can, but I may not)

Can you speak Microsoft?

(Certainly I can, but I may not)

Bibliografia Weckstrom, Katja G., "The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big

Business: Comparing Approaches to the Balancing of Societal Interests Behind Trademark Protection" . Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2007 Available at SSRN: {http://ssrn.com/abstract=963220}

Christophe Geiger *Geiger: Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression - The Proportionality of Criticism IIC 2007 Heft 3 320

Laura E. Little , Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, Social Science Research Network Electronic paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124627 (to be published 2009)

Bibliografia Matthew Rimmer, The Black Label: Trade Mark Dilution,

Culture Jamming and the No Logo Movement, (2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed

Weighing the parody factor in a trade mark infringement and dilution case Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, No. 06-2267 (4th Cir. 13 November 2007), Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4

EMILY ADELMAN, TRADEMARK PARODIES:WHEN IS IT OK TO LAUGH, Emily Adelman, Comment, Trademark Parodies: When is it OK to Laugh?, 6 J.MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 72 (2006).

A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão


Art. 124. Não são registráveis como marca:

III - expressão, figura, desenho ou qualquer outro sinal contrário à moral e aos bons costumes ou que ofenda a honra ou imagem de pessoas ou atente contra liberdade de consciência, crença, culto religioso ou idéia e sentimento dignos de respeito e veneração;


Art. 100. Não é registrável como desenho industrial:

I - o que for contrário à moral e aos bons costumes ou que ofenda a honra ou imagem de pessoas, ou atente contra liberdade de consciência, crença, culto religioso ou idéia e sentimentos dignos de respeito e veneração;











Tradicionalmente, excluem-se do registro os signos contrários à moral e às idéias, religiões e sentimentos veneráveis (art. 124, III; Convenção de Paris, art. 6º, 2º, parte III).

Assim, mesmo se o signo é res nullius no mercado pertinente, a tradição normativa brasileira, do direito comparado e dos tratados em vigor impedem o registro de um signo – quando o signo em si mesmo é contrário àqueles valores.


Assim, tem-se admitido, sob a chancela da jurisprudência, que o direito constitucional de registro pode ser coibido por razões de ordem pública. Veja-se, abaixo, a questão das vedações – possíveis ou não – ao registro de marcas para produtos de tabaco.

Anote-se, porém, que, a luz do Direito Internacional pertinente, a licitude das marcas não tem relação com os produtos sobre os quais a marca e aposta. Vige, impositivo, o princípio da independência da marcas em face dos produtos e dos serviços (Convenção da União de Paris, art. 7º). BODENHAUSEN, Guide to the Paris Convention, BIRPI, 1969, p. 128.

Assim, é posível recusar uma marca cujo signo seja contrário à ordem pública ou moralidade, mas não cujo uso – aposto a um determinado produto ou serviço – o seja.


Fabio Cesar dos Santos Oliveira[1] a entender que, salvo razoabilidade na pretensão da política pública, seria inconstitucional a lei que excluísse um determinada atividade do âmbito do registro marcário. No caso, tratava-se de projeto de lei que vedava o registro de marcas para produtos de tabaco.

[1] Direito Constitucional. Direito Econômico. Propriedade Industrial. Proibição Legislativa do Registro de Novas Marcas de Cigarro, Revista de Direito Mercantil, 133, p. 288. Vide em tema correlato, Clemerson Merlin Clève, Proscrição da propaganda comercial do tabaco nos meios de comunicação de massa, regime constitucional da liberdade de conformação legislativa e limites da atividade normativa de restrição a direitos fundamentais, Revista Forense - vol. 382 Pareceres, p. 209.


Curiosamente, uma das mais importantes decisões do Conselho Constitucional Francês versa exatamente sobre a mesma questão, concluindo pela constitucionalidade de uma vedação similar. Mas os elementos da decisão, significativos para nosso tema, são de que se reconheceu o estatuto constitucional do direito sobre a marca como propriedade, fazendo incidir sobre ela os interesses maiores da saúde pública.

10. Considérant sans doute, que la prohibition de la publicité et de la propagande en faveur du tabac est susceptible d'affecter dans son exercice le droit de propriété d'une marque concernant le tabac ou des produits du tabac ; 11. Mais considérant que ces dispositions trouvent leur fondement dans le principe constitutionnel de protection de la santé publique ; qu'au demeurant, la loi réserve la possibilité de faire de la publicité à l'intérieur des débits de tabac ;; 12. Considérant qu'il résulte de ce qui précède que la limitation apportée par l'article 3 à certaines modalités d'exercice du droit de propriété n'est pas contraire à la Constitution ."

A colisão da marca com as liberdades expressivas

Como uma marca pode colidir com a liberdade de expressão

Por ser instrumento de concorrência e compromisso com o consumidor, a marca não deixa jamais de ser também instrumento de expressão e de informação.

Faz parte essencial dos direitos fundamentais o uso da língua, de forma livre e construtora dos valores humanos.

Vem aqui a noção, crucial para nosso tema, de patrimônio cultural:

Art. 216 - Constituem patrimônio cultural brasileiro os bens de natureza material e imaterial, tomados individualmente ou em conjunto, portadores de referência à identidade, à ação, à memória dos diferentes grupos formadores da sociedade brasileira, nos quais se incluem:

I - as formas de expressão; (...)


Quanto do dever do Estado, e do direito público subjetivo, ao acesso à cultura:

Art. 215 - O Estado garantirá a todos o pleno exercício dos direitos culturais e acesso às fontes da cultura nacional, e apoiará e incentivará a valorização e a difusão das manifestações culturais.

Para José Afonso da Silva, os direitos culturais a que se refere o art. 215 são os seguintes: se trata de direitos informados pelo princípio da universalidade, isto é, direitos

garantidos a todos. Quais são esses direitos culturais reconhecidos na Constituição? São: a) direito

de criação cultural, compreendidas as criações cientificas, artísticas e tecnológicas; b) direito de acesso às fontes da cultura nacional; c) direito de difusão da cultura; d) liberdade de formas de expressão cultural; e) liberdade de manifestações culturais; f) direito-dever estatal de formação do patrimônio cultural brasileiro e de proteção dos bens de cultura, que, assim, ficam sujeitos a um regime jurídico especial, como forma de propriedade de interesse público. Tais direitos decorrem das normas dos arts. 215 e 216, que merecerão, ainda, exame mais aprofundado no titulo da ordem social[1].

[1] SILVA, op. cit., p. 320.


Certo é que o titular da marca, ao utilizar a capacidade expressiva do objeto de seu direito para atuar no mercado, sofre necessariamente de uma apropriação do signo pelo domínio comum, qualificado pela liberdade de expressão.

Assim lembra Alex Kosinski[1]: The point is that any doctrine that gives people property rights in

words, symbols, and images that have worked their way into our popular culture must carefully consider the communicative functions those marks serve.

The originator of a trademark or logo cannot simply assert, “It’s mine, I own it, and you have to pay for it any time you use it.”

Words and images do not worm their way into our discourse by accident; they’re generally thrust there by well-orchestrated campaigns intended to burn them into our collective consciousness.


Having embarked on that endeavor, the originator of the symbol necessarily - and justly - must give up some measure of control.

The originator must understand that the mark or symbol or image is no longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it also belongs to all those other minds who have received and integrated it.

This does not imply a total loss of control, however, only that the public’s right to make use of the word or image must be considered in the balance as we decide what rights the owner is entitled to assert.

[1] Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Trademarks Unplugged, New York University Law Review, October 1993, 68 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 960.

Marca e direito à expressão

O estatuto constitucional das marcas tem assim outra vertente além da propriedade – o da liberdade de informação. E isso se dá de forma dupla: existe a tensão entre o direito à informação de terceiros e exclusividade legal do titular da marca.

O princípio constitucional opositor, aqui, é o vazado no art. 5º da Carta: IX – é livre a expressão da atividade intelectual,

artística, científica e de comunicação, independentemente de censura ou licença.


[1] Sobre o uso social das marcas como manifestação de liberdade de expressão, vide Sonia K. Katyal¸Semiotic Disobedience, encontrado em http://justinhughes.net/ipsc2005/papers/Paper-KATYAL.doc, visitado em 26/10/2006:

‘As many other scholars have argued, an overbroad extension of trademark rights can deleteriously impact the marketplaces of speech and affect democratic deliberation. Yet at the same time, an overbroad assessment of trademark control can also split the marketplace of speech, thereby sowing the seeds for semiotic disobedience.

Rather than forming parodies that receive enfranchisement under the law, some artists and activists will seek to interrupt and then occupy the sovereignty of the brand itself— raising, and even inviting—civil sanction.


Consider this case, involving the ubiquitous Starbucks logo, which consists of a green and white graphic depiction of a mermaid, emblazoned on countless Starbucks items, including cups, napkins, apparel, mugs, ice creams, coffees, and other assorted retail items.

Cartoonist Kieron Dwyer reworked the logo extensively, first by anatomically enhancing it, adding a navel ring as well as a cellular phone, opening the mermaid’s eyes, and then by replacing the words “Starbucks Coffee” with the words “Consumer Whore.”

And some versions of the parody include the slogan “Buy More Now” underneath the logo.

Although well aware that there were some risks of a lawsuit involved in his logo, Dwyer insisted on publishing his work on the cover of his comic magazine, and selling a few t-shirts along the way.

Soon after, he was faced with a suit from Starbucks alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and dilution. The suit contended that the logo was “sexually offensive” and would tarnish the trademark by associating it “with conduct that many consumers will find lewd, immoral, and unacceptable.”


[The court’s approach in resolving this case is both interesting and symbolic of the difficulty courts have with integrating semiotic disobedience into case law regarding the intersection of trademark and First Amendment principles.

While the court rejected Starbucks’ trademark and copyright infringement claims on the grounds that the mark represented protected parody and fair use, the court ultimately granted an injunction against further publication on the grounds that the parody tarnished Starbuck’s image, thus constituting dilution.

In other words, the parody’s negative, humorous association had to be enjoined, simply, because it worked successfully in exposing the subtle motivations behind the Starbucks enterprise”.


Em palestra na UFJF em 14/9/2006, me foi suscitado pela platéia como exemplo de uso parodial de marca o caso Daspu, onde se criou um brand através da analogia com a marca de alto luxo Daslu.


A Daspu, grife lançada pela ong de prostitutas Davida, foi notificada anteontem pela Daslu. A megaloja de luxo paulistana, que há 3 meses foi investigada por sonegaçao e contrabando, considerou a criaçao da marca “um deboche que visou denegrir a imagem da Daslu” e ameaçou “tomar as medidas judiciais” caso a Daspu nao mude seu nome em 10 dias. A Daspu contratou advogado para cuidar do caso.

O nome da ONG é genial (Davida).

2. A grife vai produzir três estilos diferentes: moda batalha, festa e básica.


No entanto, vide a observação de Jason Bosland, The Culture of Trade Marks: An Alternative Cultural Theory Perspective, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771184, vistado em 26/10/2006: “The underlying difficulty with shaping a dilution right is balancing the

competing interests in allowing the public to use a mark as an expressive resource through criticism or commentary, while at the same time, preventing harm which is adverse to a trade mark’s continued cultural use.

To balance these interests, I propose that the expressive use of a mark should be protected from dilution in the context of trade, that is, where a plaintiff’s mark is being used in the advertising context to market a defendant’s goods or services.

This is to be compared with a commercial situation where the defendant’s expressive use of a trade mark forms part of the goods on offer, such as in the title or lyrics of a song, or where the trade mark is used in a poster or on a t-shirt.”

Primeira hipótese: Exercício de crítica

Freedom of Expression Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression - The

Proportionality of Criticism Christophe Geiger *Geiger: Trade Marks and Freedom of

Expression - The Proportionality of Criticism IIC 2007 Heft 3 320

It has now become common practice for a number of corporate trade mark holders to try to use their intellectual property rights to prevent criticism of their company´s products or policies by certain organisations.

While these companies have prevailed in a number of cases, the courts are increasingly relying on freedom of expression as a ground for permitting the use of trade marks for purposes of parody or criticism.

Nevertheless, freedom of expression is not a justification for simply every kind of use, and excesses can be punished under civil law. What form does this abuse take?

Freedom of Expression This is clearly the case for the freedom of expression in Art. 10 of the Convention,

the European Court of Human Rights having laid down beyond all doubt that „genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the state´s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals“.

This can be regarded as the logical consequence of a certain transfer of state power to the benefit of the business world, with the result that abuses of power can occasionally also come from major companies who are tempted to use legal means to achieve what they cannot achieve by means of social consensus.

They are encouraged in this approach by a certain development of intellectual property which is increasingly marked by the logic of the protection of investments

Freedom of Expression It is therefore hardly surprising that intellectual property rights, granting their

holders a formidable „right to prohibit“, have been invoked in order to prevent criticism. Sometimes with success, since in certain cases the courts seem to have considered that the absence of express limits allows the rightholder to forbid any use of the protected sign.

In particular, they have sometimes held in cases similar to that under discussion that the misappropriation of a trade mark in an anti-smoking campaign amounts to an infringement.

In these cases, trade marks had been used to draw attention to the harm that tobacco causes to health: a pool of tar emanating from the Marlboro packet or the winged helmet of Gitanes cigarettes placed on a skull.

Other decisions have also prohibited the reproduction of a trade mark in newspaper articles, whatever the purpose.

It is difficult not to believe that the trade marks in these cases were used for purposes that strongly resemble a type of private censorship.

Freedom of Expression This is a strange paradox. While intellectual

property rights are without doubt an element of a liberal society, it would now seem that, to quote Professor Vivant, „liberalism has discovered the charms of feudalism“.

While under the ancien régime the control of speech and information was the responsibility of the lord (or other governor), today it would seem to be controlled by powerful companies.

The result is, as we have already emphasised, that it has gradually become apparent that individual liberties require protection not only as against the state but equally as against private persons, and it is for this reason that constitutional rights have gradually acquired an increasingly important position in civil law litigation.

Freedom of Expression In the context of intellectual property rights, certain

authors have expressed their concern, emphasising the risk to the subject as a whole that might result from the application of the sometimes vague rules that constitute fundamental rights.

Admittedly these fears are in part justified, as is confirmed by the fact that a large number of litigants today misuse the concept of freedom of expression and freedom of information in order to avoid being punished for infringement. However, the courts are by no means deceived, and only very rarely give intellectual property rights second place to freedom of expression.

They only do so in extreme cases, specifically where the undifferentiated application of the law would lead to undesirable results in the light of its purpose. Fundamental rights such as competition law thus sometimes serve as a corrective measure and thereby contribute to guaranteeing a certain coherence of intellectual property.

Freedom of Expression

In particular, the courts have in a number of cases allowed the use of a trade mark for critical purposes by relying on the freedom of expression.

However, there are also limits to the freedom of expression, and abuse could lead to the perpetrator being made liable under civil law (in France, on the basis of Art. 1382 of the Civil Code).

It is in this field that the ruling of the Supreme Court dated 19 October 2006 is of particular interest, allowing as it does a slightly better definition of the limits to the freedom of expression when it is in conflict with trade mark rights

Freedom of Expression It is therefore hardly surprising that intellectual property rights,

granting their holders a formidable „right to prohibit“, have been invoked in order to prevent criticism. Sometimes with success, since in certain cases the courts seem to have considered that the absence of express limits allows the rightholder to forbid any use of the protected sign.

In particular, they have sometimes held in cases similar to that under discussion that the misappropriation of a trade mark in an anti-smoking campaign amounts to an infringement.

In these cases, trade marks had been used to draw attention to the harm that tobacco causes to health: a pool of tar emanating from the Marlboro packet or the winged helmet of Gitanes cigarettes placed on a skull.

Other decisions have also prohibited the reproduction of a trade mark in newspaper articles, whatever the purpose.

It is difficult not to believe that the trade marks in these cases were used for purposes that strongly resemble a type of private censorship.

O Caso Esso

Après une ordonnance de référé de 2002 confirmée en appel en 2003 et un jugement au fond de 2004, la cour d’appel de Paris, dans un arrêt du 16 novembre 2005, réaffirme que la campagne en ligne de Greenpeace contre la politique environnementale d’ESSO s’inscrivait dans les limites de la liberté d’expression, principe à valeur constitutionnelle.

La compagnie pétrolière reprochait à l’association d’avoir reproduit sans autorisation sa marque dans le code source du site greenpeace.fr et d’avoir contrefait deux de ses marques par imitation en remplaçant, par exemple, les deux SS d’Esso par des $$.

La cour rejette le recours aux articles L. 713-2 et L. 713-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle dans la mesure où les références aux marques en question « ne visent manifestement pas à promouvoir la commercialisation de produits ou de services, concurrents de ceux de la société appelante, au profit de l’association Greenpeace France mais relève d’un usage purement polémique étranger à la vie des affaires et à la compétition entre entreprises commerciales ».

La cour ne retient pas davantage le dénigrement indiquant que la critique de la politique d’Esso n’excédait pas non plus les limites de la liberté d’expression.

O caso Areva Dans un arrêt du 8 avril 2008, la première chambre

civile de la Cour de cassation vient de donner gain de cause à Greenpeace France et New Zealand qui « agissant conformément à leur objet, dans un but

d’intérêt général et de santé publique par des moyens proportionnés à cette fin, n’avaient pas abusé de leur droit de libre expression ».

La cour suprême a également considéré que l’utilisation des logos Areva ne visait pas la société mais les marques déposées par elle, et par conséquent ses activités et services.

La campagne portant atteinte à ces derniers et non à l’honneur ou à la considération de la personne morale, il ne pouvait donc pas être reproché à Greenpeace d’actes de dénigrement contre la SPCEA.

Considérant qu’à cet égard, les sociétés COMPAGNIE GERVAIS DANONE et GROUPE DANONE ne sauraient invoquer les dispositions de l’article L 713-3 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle, dès lors que, par les modifications apportées à la marque DANONE par l’adjonction du pronom et du verbe ’« jeboycotte » et les textes qui l’accompagnent, l’association RÉSEAU VOLTAIRE et Olivier M. montrent clairement leur intention de dénoncer les pratiques sociales des sociétés mises en cause et les risques pour l’emploi, sans induire en erreur le public quant à l’identité des auteurs de la communication ;

Considérant qu’il s’ensuit que les appelants avaient, en créant les sites litigieux, inscrit leur action dans le cadre d’un stricte exercice de leur liberté d’expression et dans le respect des droits des sociétés intimées dont les produits n’étaient pas dénigrés et que, d’autre part, aucun risque de confusion n’était susceptible de naître dans l’esprit des usagers ;

http://www.foruminternet.org/specialistes/veille-juridique/jurisprudence/cour-d-appel-de-paris-4e-chambre-section-a-30-avril-2003.html?decoupe_recherche=danone

décembre 16, 2007 En France, le droit à la liberté

d’expression semble désormais clairement reconnu à la triple condition: qu’il n’y ait pas de confusion possible

entre la marque à protèger et le signe qui la parodie,

qu’aucun préjudice n’en résulte, dû à une intention de dénigrement ou d’avilissement de la marque parodiée, et

que la parodie ne poursuive pas une finalité commerciale.

http://protectiondesmarques.info/category/droit-des-marques/

Centre d’arbitrage et de médiation de l’OMPIDÉCISION DE LA COMMISSION ADMINISTRATIVESociété Française du Radiotéléphone, SFR contre Zeev ArzoineLitige No. D2007-1505

Enregistrement et usage de mauvaise foi L’enregistrement et l’usage du nom de domaine litigieux sont évidemment de

mauvaise foi. En effet le défendeur semblait parfaitement connaitre l’existence de SFR puisque

son site a été créé pour dénoncer, selon son appréciation, les “arnaques” du requérant comme cela apparait clairement aujourd’hui. A coup sûr il connaissait le nom commercial, l’enseigne sur les magasins et pouvait bien se douter qu’une société de la taille de SFR avait déposé des marques. Il lui appartenait au demeurant de le vérifier avant le dépôt de son site.

Comme déjà constaté, il apparait que le site n’était pas exploité ce qui, apparemment, n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui. Mais ceci n’a pas d’incidence sur notre opinion. L’usage du site litigieux reste une atteinte aux droits de propriété industrielle du requérant commise en toute connaissance de cause.

Le but du défendeur est de dénigrer systématiquement le requérant en le traitant d’arnaqueur ce qui constitue un abus du droit à la liberté d’expression. Vide também ”.(The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc,

National Westminster Bank plc A/K/A NatWest Bank v. Personal and Pedro Lopez Case No. D2003-0166

sfrarnaque.com

WIPO Arbitration and Mediation CenterADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION Shell International Petroleum Company Limited v. Alfred DonovanCase No. D2005-0538

There is no evidence to support a claim under subparagraphs (i) or (iii), nor has any direct commercial gain been established, as required by (iv). The Complainant’s case thus rests on subparagraph (ii). Arguably, the Respondent is preventing the Complainant from reflecting its trade name and the name of the “tellshell” facility in a corresponding domain name, but then only in respect of the “.com” TLD. There are several other TLDs available to the Complainant.

More importantly, based on the record in front of this Panel, those trade names are not protected as marks.

In addition, the evidence does not show that the Respondent’s intent and purpose was to prevent the Complainant from using his marks, but rather to draw attention to his criticism of the Complainant’s activities.

The Panel thus finds for the Respondent on the third part of the test.

http://royaldutchshellgroup.com/

Brasil Rubens, assim como outros pescadores, não se conforma

com a instalação da Estação de Tratamento de Esgoto (ETE), apelidada de “pinicão”, em Vila Sauípe. “A Embasa prometeu que não iria poluir o rio e que ia ser muito bom para nós, porque a água ia ficar a mesma coisa ou até melhor do que já era. No final, poluiu tanto que os mariscos e até o mangue começaram a morrer”, queixou-se ele. Ele compara. “Antes, em uma hora a gente pegava 200 aratus. Hoje, em uma maré, só acha quatro ou cinco. A gente até confiou neles, mas hoje vive dessa maneira, todo mundo prejudicado”, diz emocionado.

Brasil Da confusão e práticas a diluir e denegrir marcas e nomes

comerciais de Costa do Sauípe Em relação à possibilidade de alegarmos confusão de marcas,

devemos ressaltar que quaisquer marcas são registradas com limites de aplicabilidade em relação à área merceológica de exploração. No caso, a classe do empreendimento Costa do Sauípe é de hotelaria e já o dos sites pinicão.org e costadosauipe.org seriam relativos à criticas e proteção ao direito ambiental, sendo, portanto, áreas diferentes.

Da mesma forma, visando os sites aparentemente criticar a atuação ambiental e não obter quaisquer imediatos benefícios comerciais, devemos analisar as decisões da WIPO a fim de verificar se, ainda assim, haveria possibilidade de obter-se uma decisão favorável à Sauipe. No direito brasileiro, não nos parece que haveria uma certeza de deferimento do pedido, caso fosse ajuizada ação no território nacional.

http://www.alitaliasucks.com

THIS SITE IS IN NO WAY CONNECTED WITH Alitalia S.p.A. - Italy's flagship air carrier. We support the boycott of: Alitalia Airlines

Here's why: It doesn't pay to purchase Alitalia's cheap airline tickets Here's why: Nobody wants to partner with Alitalia Here's why we think: Alitalia will be out of business within 24 months Here's how: Alitalia tried to steamroll a passenger whose luggage they lost Here's what:

Alitalia did to a passenger after he publicly criticized them - they sued the passenger in Federal Court!

Here's how: Alitalia gives up after Public Citizen steps in Here's why: Alitalia Airlines Sucks and why any American can freely say it. Boycott Alitalia: Alitalia has attacked our Free Speech rights Remind Alitalia:

That this is America, where every American has free speech rights even after Alitalia loses our luggage. 1-800-223-5730

Click here to see why Alitalia sucks. Click here to email your Alitalia Horror Story

http://www.starbucked.com/

Africa do Sul Laugh it Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries

Int. (Finance) B. V. t/a Sabmark Int., CCT 42/04. See also, the concurring opinion of the Justice Sachs, in

which he held: „ What is in issue is not the limitation of a right, but the

balancing of competing rights. The present case does not require us to make any

determinations on that matter. But it would appear once all the relevant facts are

established, it should make no difference in principle whether the case is seen as a property rights limitation on free speech, or a free speech limitation on property rights.

At the end of the day this will be an area where nuanced and proportionate balancing in a context-specific and fact-sensitive character will be decisive, and not formal classification based on bright lines“ (emphasis added).

Africa do Sul The Constitution cannot oblige the dour

to laugh. It can, however, prevent the cheerless from snuffing out the laughter of the blithe spirits among us.

Indeed, if our society became completely solemn because of the exercise of state power at the behest of the worthy not only would all irrelevant laughter be suppressed, but temperance considerations could end up placing beer-drinking itself in jeopardy.

And I can see no reason in principle why a joke against the government can be tolerated, but one at the expense of what used to be called Big Business, cannot.

Alemanha Copyright: Humorous Milka postcard is the artistic freedom

captured The Federal Court decided with the judgement of 03.02.2005 (I ZR 159/02) that the freedom of art the brand right approach. For example, if the artistic object is not the right of ownership to the mark by reducing or defamation violated.

Decision reason was the action of the well-known Schokolenproduzenten "Milka" against the publisher of a purple-postcard. The judges clearly were initially found that the presentation of a kennzeichenmäßiger use.

Color, text and the use of the word "Milka" to make the presumption that the card was attributable to the company. The satirical character jokingly-but just based on this connection and is protected by the fundamental artistic freedom.

In case of dispute, that priority because judges no disparagement of the mark and could also detect an exclusively commercial use is not available.

O uso paródico

O uso paródico

LDA Art. 47. São livres as paráfrases e par ódias que não forem verdadeiras reproduções da obra originária nem lhe implicarem descrédito.

O uso paródico

Art. 132, IV é livre a citação da marca em discurso, obra científica ou literária ou qualquer outra publicação, desde que sem conotação comercial e sem prejuízo para seu caráter distintivo.

Quanto a esse último aspecto, o propósito central é garantir a liberdade de expressão quanto ao signo marcário, fora do contexto da especialidade. Mas, como observa Gustavo S. Leonardos, o texto legal dixit minus quam voluit em face do texto constitucional, e tem de ser lido de acordo com a Carta de 1988, para cobrir também exemplos de livre expressão comercial, em particular a publicidade comparativa: A publicidade comparativa que obtenha sucesso, não vai forçosamente prejudicar a

reputação ou integridade da marca comparada? Mesmo a despeito da veracidade e correção da informação ou comunicação publicitária (artigo 38 do Código do Consumidor)? Ou nesta última hipótese poderíamos considerar que há uma inversão do equilíbrio entre as garantias constitucionais previstas nos incisos IX (“é livre a expressão da atividade…de comunicação”) e XXIX (“a lei assegurará…proteção… à propriedade das marcas”) do artigo 5º da Constituição Federal? Se afirmativa a resposta à última pergunta, podemos afirmar que para se dar esta inversão favorável ao anunciante deverá ser observada a prevalência do conteúdo informativo do reclame sobre as demais mensagens, inclusive implícitas, de caráter emotivo ou deceptivo. Caso contrário, haverá a validação da concorrência desleal, do uso indevido de marca alheia, através da propaganda comparativa.[1]

[1] A Perspectiva dos Usuários dos Serviços do INPI em Relação ao Registro de Marcas sob a Lei 9.279/96. Revista da Associação Brasileira da Propriedade Intelectual - ABPI Anais do XVII Seminário Nacional de Propriedade Intelectual, 1997.

O uso paródico

O dispositivo do art. 132 também protege o uso da marca com fundamento na liberdade de expressão, inclusive em paródia

Em sua resposta à questão 168 da AIPPI, no entanto, a ABPI entende: “However, the trademark owner is entitled to

protect the reputation of his registered trademark. Thus, if the parody is offensive, such aspect might be understood as a harm to the trademark distinctiveness, entitling the owner to legal remedies”.

É de se discordar dessa conclusão. O que se deve recusar é o uso de paródia em competição; mas o livre uso da crítica em circunstâncias diversas do uso no comércio estará integralmente assegurado

Elementos da paródia The elements of parody are:

i) an original host work; ii) the original host work must be famous and/or

known to the particular target audience; iii) the creator of the derivative work, the parody,

must take only so much of the original work as necessary to bring to mind the original host work; and

iv) the derivative work which conjures up the famous host must result in a new, original work.

Parody, by definition brings to mind the original. It then spoofs the original in some way. Once you have brought the original to mind in connection with a product or name other than the original, one of two things is going to happen, it will either be judged a valid parody, in which case there is no liability, or there will be trademark infringement.

http://www.daspu.com.br/putique/

Elementos da paródia A. A parody must be clever

i. a parody must be clever enough to avoid a likelihood of confusion

ii. No sex, drugs or bugs B. Beware of "famous" marks

i. blurring Ii. Tarnishment

C. Beware of "famous" people - Right of publicity Issues Leslie J. Lott, Brett M. Hutton, Trademark Parody,

http://www.lfiplaw.com/articles/trademark_parody.htm

Engaging in trademark parody is a little like shooting at the king. You had better be good at it, because if you attempt and fail, you are in big trouble.

Aparentemente, ninguém obteve liminar…

17 de junho Mentre nella citta’ brasiliana

si teneva l’Off Fashion Rio Show, le prostitute della griffe Daspu hanno presentato la loro collezione per la prossima primavera-estate 2009. Gli abiti di questa linea sono stati realizzati da alcuni studenti e alcuni docenti dell’universita’ di Belo Horizonte. Potete vedere gli abiti e le modelle nella nostra galleria di immagini

Estados Unidos However, use of a mark as parody is a

relevant factor in considering a dilution by blurring claim. In fact, ‘a successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. The brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous.’ Id. at 19–20. In this case, the court said:

Even as Haute Diggity Dog’s parody mimics the famous mark, it communicates simultaneously that it is not the famous mark, but is only satirizing it. And because the famous mark is particularly strong and distinctive, it becomes more likely that a parody will not impair the distinctiveness of the mark. (Id. at 20).

Estados Unidos Practical significance IP practitioners and brand owners can

come away from Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v Haute Diggity Dog, LLC with at least two important lessons. First, a successful parody can provide a defence to a dilution claim.

Second, when there is a successful parody, an owner may have an ‘increased burden’ to show that the distinctiveness of its famous mark is likely to be impaired.

Os problemas paralelos

E TRIPs?

THE LAWFULNESS OF CRITICIZING BIG BUSINESS:COMPARING APPROACHES TO THE BALANCING OF SOCIETALINTERESTS BEHIND TRADEMARK PROTECTIONKatja G. Weckstrom

Trademarks and open source monopoly

When I can freely distribute, change, and fork an open source product, does trademark law sometimes contradict the open source concept? Does it not reach far enough, or does it go too far?

Conclusão „the excessive influence of the

monopolies conferred by trade mark rights inevitably leads to perverse effects that justify the calling into question of the entirety of this field, which, if interpreted reasonably, is so valuable for the various participants in the economy“

C. Caron, comment on the Supreme Commercial Court decision, 14 Jan. 2003, supra note 10, at 29.

A perspectiva de Maristela Basso

Documents

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