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Can social systems be autopoietic?Assessing Luhmann’s social theory

John Mingers

Abstract

The theory of autopoiesis, that is systems that are self-producing or self-constructing, was originally developed to explain the particular nature of living asopposed to non-living entities. It was subsequently enlarged to encompass cogni-tion and language leading to what is known as second-order cybernetics. However,as with earlier biological theories, many authors have tried to extend the domainof the theory to encompass social systems, the most notable being Luhmann. Thepurpose of this article is to consider critically the extent to which the theory ofautopoiesis, as originally defined, can be applied to social systems – that is, whethersocial systems are autopoietic. And, if it cannot, whether some weaker versionmight be appropriate.

Introduction

The theory of autopoiesis, that is systems that are self-producing or self-constructing, was originally developed by Maturana and Varela (Maturana,1975; Maturana and Varela, 1980; Maturana and Varela, 1987) to explain theparticular nature of living as opposed to non-living entities. It was subse-quently enlarged to encompass cognition and language leading to what isknown as second-order cybernetics (Maturana, 1978; Maturana, 1978; Varela,1991).1 However, as with earlier biological theories many authors have triedto extend the domain of the theory to encompass social systems. Initialattempts (eg, (Beer, 1975; Faucheux, 1979; Robb, 1989; Zeleny and Hufford,1992)) were sociologically crude, and were greeted sceptically (Mingers, 1989;Mingers, 1992) but since then a major social theorist, Niklas Luhmann (1995)has made autopoiesis the basis of his social theory.

The purpose of this article is to consider critically the extent to which thetheory of autopoiesis, as originally defined, can be applied to social systems.That is whether social systems are autopoietic.2 And, if it cannot, whethersome weaker version might be appropriate. A major problem in this under-taking is that the nature of social systems and social structure is itself a highlydebatable issue.3 My strategy will be to take some of the major conceptuali-

© The Editorial Board of The Sociological Review 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers,108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

sations – Luhmann, Giddens, Bhaskar – and consider the extent to whichautopoiesis is compatible with their theory. This article will concentrate onLuhmann. The first section briefly outlines autopoietic theory, why it is attrac-tive to social theorists, and some of the problems in its application. Then, inthe next section, an abstract example is introduced of a social process (theself-referential game of Nomic) that could clearly be seen as autopoietic inorder to crystallise the points at issue in the more extended discussion of socialautopoiesis in the final sections.

The attractions of social autopoiesis

For reasons of space I shall not provide a detailed exposition of the theory ofautopoiesis4 but since the key concepts can be quite obscure I have provideda glossary. Suffice it to say that it is an ambitious theory aiming to explainboth the nature of living systems and the biological foundations of human cog-nition and language in a way that recognises the centrality of self-reference,recursion, and the process of (self-) observation. It does so in a very coher-ent and consistent manner, and has generated significant interest and debatein realms as diverse as law, family therapy, sociology, literature, and cognitivescience (Mingers, 1995). What then are the attractions of autopoiesis as asocial theory?

The very concept of a self-producing or self-constructing system has inter-esting and radical implications. Traditionally, systems theory itself has dealtwith open systems that process or transform inputs into outputs.5 Such a viewcan be applied to, say, an organisation quite easily6 – resources are taken in,undergo production processes, and result in products and services. Withinsociology, systems theory was initially associated with Parsons (1951) and itsmain concern was seen as explaining pattern and order within society, ratherthan more dynamic processes of change and development. As such it was gen-erally condemned for being overly functionalist although there has been arevival in interest in Parsons’ work, see for example Habermas (1987: Ch.VII). Buckley (1967; 1968) tried to address the problem of change with a muchmore dynamic view of systems. Societies were seen as complex adaptivesystems which used internal feedback processes to change their structures tobetter survive in a turbulent and changing environment7.

There are, however, severe problems with this open-systems view. First, itgives primacy to the environment – it is the system that has to adapt itself tothe environment. This seems to imply that it is the environment that somehowspecifies or determines the structure of a social system. Yet, what exactly isthe environment within which a social system, more especially a society, mightexist? Is it the physical world, or other societies, or what? More generally, howwould one draw a boundary to demarcate off some well-defined social systemthat then interacts with an equally well-specified environment? Secondly,what could possibly be the inputs and outputs of such a system? Does it really

Can social systems be autopoietic?

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make sense to conceptualise a society, or part of it such as a family, as a proces-sor of inputs into outputs?

An autopoietic system however is quite different – it does not transforminputs into outputs, instead it transforms itself into itself. What is meant by8

this is that the outputs of the system, that which it produces, are its own inter-nal components, and the inputs it uses are again its own components (it doesalways require some elements from the environment, and it does excretewaste). It is thus in a continual dynamic state of self-production9. The conse-quences of this are:

i. A continual, circular process of production must be established thatproduces all that is necessary for continued autopoiesis. There is thus adeep closure of the system – it produces that which is necessary for itto continue to produce that which is necessary for it to continue toproduce . . .

ii. Since the system produces itself it gains a significant degree of auton-omy – it depends less on other entities for its continual existence. Atthe same time, if it ever fails to produce that which is necessary thenautopoiesis must break down and the entity will disintegrate. No func-tionalism is involved however – the system either contingently main-tains autopoiesis, or it does not.

iii. The theory distinguishes between the structure and the organisation ofa system (see glossary). The structure (the actual components and theirrelations) may change dramatically over time, or may be realised inmany ways, so long as the organisation maintains its relations of self-production. It can be said to be organisationally closed but structurallyopen.

iv. The changes that can occur must allow autopoiesis to continue and theyare determined by the structure at each point in time. They are notdetermined by the environment which can only trigger or select particular possibilities from those that the structure makes available(structural determinism).

v. Systems can become structurally-coupled to other systems, and to their environment, but this is a process of mutual specification (or co-evolutionary drift as Maturana would call it) rather than the adapta-tion of one system to another.

vi. The theory also incorporates cognition, language and observation in acoherent manner. It is anti-Cartesian in not separating cognition andaction but emphasising embodied cognition (Varela, 1991; Mingers,1995; Mingers, 2001). It is non-representationalist in its view of lan-guage. And it embraces self-reference and recursion in generating abiological theory of the observer and, indeed, itself.

Given these characteristics of autopoietic systems we can see several reasonswhy the theory might be attractive for sociologists:

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i. The distinction between organisation and structure allows for radicalchange and development in a system without loss of its identity. Thisis very common in the social world where we see many groupings –families, companies, religions, cultures and societies – that exhibit long-term stability and persistence despite enormous changes in their envi-ronment, and their own internal membership and structure.

ii. The organisational closure of the system means that we do not have tospecify external inputs and outputs, nor do we have to see the systemas functionally dependent on other systems. Its ‘purpose’ is simply itsown continual self-production.

iii. The idea of structural determinism places the origin of change anddevelopment firmly within the system rather than from the environ-ment, whilst the concept of structural coupling shows how, neverthe-less, systems and their environments can mutually shape each other.

vi. The focus on self-production fits well with the ideas of Giddens (1984)and Bhaskar (1979; 1997) who both emphasise the way in which socialstructures are continually (re)produced and transformed through thesocial activities that they govern. It also resonated with Luhmann’s(1982) conception of a society functionally differentiated into subsys-tems, each essentially closed with respect to the others.

v. The acceptance of self-reference and the ideas concerning languageand observation also fit in well with the linguistic and communicativeturn (Habermas, 1979; Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 1987; Luhmann,1989) in sociology and the greater recognition of the importance of thebody (Turner, 1984; Featherstone, Turner et al., 1991; Shilling, 1993;Synnott, 1993; Grosz, 1994).

vi. It resonates well with social constructivist (Gergen, 1999) viewpoints– Maturana (1988) emphasises the extent to which we ‘bring forth’ theworld we experience through our own linguistic distinctions.

vii. Within law especially, autopoiesis has the potential to reconcile majorproblems. For instance, the split between the ‘pure theory’ view of lawas autonomous and the sociology of law view that it is societally depen-dent (Ewald, 1987); and the paradoxes generated by the fundamentallyself-referential nature of law (Teubner, 1990) – ‘only laws make laws’.

We can see that autopoiesis represents a major advance over previous systemstheories in its sophistication and its potential for addressing many of the con-cerns of current social theory. However, there are major difficulties in simplyapplying the biological theory of autopoiesis to social systems which will nowbe outlined.

The problems of social autopoiesis

Whilst the idea of autopoietic organisations and social systems is very attrac-tive there are fundamental difficulties involved in such an application. If the



concept is only to be used metaphorically, as Morgan (1986) suggests, to generate interesting insight then no great problems emerge – it is simply amatter of whether or not it is fruitful. To go beyond metaphor, however, andsuggest that an organisation or a social system is autopoietic raises significantontological claims that are very difficult to substantiate (Brown, 1988; Stokes,1990; Veld, Schaap et al., 1991; Meynen, 1992; Kickert, 1993). This is alreadyexplicitly addressed in autopoiesis at the physical level where a clear distinc-tion is drawn between the observer’s descriptions and the operationalautopoietic system. The problem is more acute with social systems. We, asobservers, are trying to observe systems of which we are only a part, the con-stitution of which is still the subject of much debate. Without discussing thesedifficult philosophical problems in general, a number of aspects particular toautopoiesis need to be mentioned.

If it is to be claimed that social systems are autopoietic, then we mustexamine very carefully the specific definition or criteria for autopoiesis andevaluate the extent to which they can be met by whatever we take to be socialsystems. There are three essential elements in the definition of autopoiesis(see glossary):

i. Fundamentally, autopoiesis is concerned with processes of production– the production of those components which themselves constitute thesystem. It is therefore essential to identify clearly what are the compo-nents of an autopoietic social system, and what are its processes of production.

ii. The autopoietic organisation is constituted in terms of temporal andspatial relations, and the components involved must create a boundarydefining the entity as a unity – that is, a whole interacting with its envi-ronment. In the case of social systems, is it possible to identify cleardemarcations or boundaries that are constructed and maintained by thesystem?

iii. The concept of the autopoietic organisation specifies nothing beyondprocesses of self-production. It does not specify particular structuralproperties or components. It is thus so abstract or general that in prin-ciple it should be applicable to systems of any kind. It should not, there-fore, need to be modified to deal with social systems. If it is, can we stilluse the term ‘autopoietic’?

In applying these ideas strictly there are obvious problems. Is it right to char-acterise social systems as essentially processes of production and, if it is, whatexactly is it that they are producing? If human beings are taken as the com-ponents of social systems then it is clear that they are not produced by suchsystems but by other physical and biological processes. If we do not takehumans as components, then what are the components of social systems? Theemphasis on physical space and a self-defined boundary consisting of compo-nents produced by the system is also problematic. Whilst space is a dimension

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of social interaction, it does not seem possible to sustain the central idea of aboundary between those components which are both produced by and par-ticipate in production, and those which are not. Again, taking people as com-ponents, they can choose to belong or not belong to particular groups ornetworks, and will be members of many at any time. What is it then that couldconstitute the boundaries of such a systems? What might be its environment?And, how can it be said that such a social system can act as a unity or whole– surely it is only individual people who act?

Overall, it seems difficult to sustain the idea that social systems are autopoi-etic, at least in strict accordance with the formal definition. However it is possible that a more generalised version, such as Varela’s (1979) idea of organ-isational closure that does not specify processes of production, could be fruit-fully applied. A more radical approach is to apply autopoiesis not to physicalsystems (such as groups of people) but to concepts or ideas or rules.Maturana defines a unity as ‘. . . an entity, concrete or conceptual, defined byan operation of distinction’ (Maturana, 1975, my emphasis), and thus opensthe possibility of a non-physical autopoietic system. Such a system mightconsist of concepts, or descriptions, or rules, or communications which inter-act and self-produce.

An ‘ideal-type’: Nomic, a self-producing game

The primary purpose of this article is to evaluate the possibility that socialsystems could be autopoietic. This is particularly difficult as there is little dis-ciplinary agreement about the actual nature of social systems or social struc-ture and so the results of the enquiry will depend to some extent on whichtheory(ies) are used for comparison. To sharpen the issues, this section willintroduce an abstract model or ideal-type that, I would argue, encapsulatesthe requirements for a social embodiment of autopoiesis. This is a veryunusual game called ‘Nomic’ invented by Peter Suber (1990) and based onlegal self-reference.

Nomic was created to demonstrate the reflexivity of law – that is, the ideathat only laws can create laws. All legal systems have a set of rules (ie, laws)that govern how the system itself is to be changed, how particular laws can becreated, repealed or amended. These can be seen as ‘meta-laws’. However,there must also be provision for these meta-laws to be changed (meta-meta-laws), although generally changing these is harder and more complexthan changing ordinary laws. This potentially leads to an infinite regress but inpractice all legal systems actually stop at a certain point, although this may bemulti-layed and there may, at the limits, be ambiguities or unresolvable situa-tions. Nomic is based on this context but has only two levels – what are called‘mutable’ and ‘immutable’ rules, although the immutable rules can, in time, bechanged. The point of Nomic, and that which makes it self-producing, is that the object of the game is nothing other than making changes to the rules.



The players take turns and, as the rules as initially set up, a turn consistsin proposing, discussing, and then voting on a change to the rules. A changecould be: (1) the deletion, creation, or amendment of a mutable rule; (2) thedeletion, creation, or amendment of an amendment; (3) the transmutation ofan immutable rule into a mutable one or vice versa. If the vote is in favour ofthe change it is adopted henceforth. Thus, by playing the game the rules bywhich the game is played will change. Initially, the immutable rules governthe main features of the game, for example that a play of the game is a proposed change to the rules, while the mutable ones govern the minor fea-tures such as the voting majority. However, since the immutables can them-selves be changed, albeit in two stages by first making them mutable, it ispossible to change even these rules and hence the nature of the game entirely.It would be possible, for example, to begin playing Nomic and end up playingchess!

This fascinating game has many interesting aspects, but I will just bring outthe relations with autopoiesis and social systems. First, it appears to qualifyas a genuine example of non-physical autopoiesis. Its components are therules, which are essentially conceptual although they may be embodied inwriting, speech, or cognitive activity. These constitute the structure of thesystem in Maturana’s terms. During any particular play of the game this struc-ture may well change drastically even though the identity of the game con-tinues throughout the process. What constitutes the identity of the game as agame of Nomic is precisely its organisation as one of self-production – themodification and generation of its own components, ie, the rules.

Note that under this interpretation the players are not a constitutive partof the autopoietic system since they are not produced by the system10. It isnecessary to bracket the players and focus exclusively on the interaction andevolution of the rules alone. This is in fact quite plausible since the playersneed not even be humans, they could conceivably be suitably programmedcomputers. One divergence from the formal definition of autopoiesis is thelack of specific boundary components – there are no rules that can be said tobe boundary rules. However, it may be that with self-producing conceptualsystems it is only necessary for the system itself to be able to clearly demar-cate inside from outside. In this case to be able to distinguish ‘genuine’ rulesthat apply at a particular time from ‘false’ ones that have not been incorpo-rated correctly, or indeed from everything else, eg, the players.

Second, it is easy to make parallels with social theorists such as Giddensand Bhaskar who emphasise the duality of social structure. The players par-ticipating in a game are an example of Giddens’ social system, while the rulesof the game are equivalent to his social structure. The rules both enable andconstrain the actions of the players, while the playing of the game directlyreproduces and transforms the structure (rules). A question arising here is:could the same be said of any game, or only of a reflexive game like Nomic?Consider chess: while the rules govern the possible moves and actions thereis no feedback from moves to rules. Nothing in the play of the game can alter

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the rules. However, if we consider not the formal rules of chess but the infor-mal knowledge of tactics and strategy then the same situation does seems toapply. For a knowledgeable player moves are governed by informal (as muchas formal) rules while the history of past chess games generates the informalknowledge. Thus ordinary games have a degree of self-production withinexternally fixed constraints but Nomic is radically autonomous by incorpo-rating its constitutive rules within its own domain of possible changes.

Society as a system of autopoietic communication

We move now to consider the work of Niklas Luhmann who has, in fact,embraced autopoietic theory whole-heartedly and put it at the centre of hissystemic social theory11. Luhmann’s work up to autopoiesis is well covered inThe Differentiation of Society (1982), while his major development ofautopoiesis is Soziale Systeme (1984; 1995 (translation)). Much of his theo-retical writing is extremely abstract, but two translated books apply it to eco-logical problems (Luhmann, 1989) and the mass media (Luhmann, 2000).12

Luhmann’s starting point is the idea that modern society13 has become afunctionally differentiated one. Societies are faced by an environment (all thatis not society, not just the physical environment) which is inevitably morecomplex than they are. Over time, societies have become increasing complexthemselves in response, that is increasingly internally differentiated. This hasoccurred in many different forms (Luhmann, 1982: 232ff), for example seg-mentation – the generation of many, essentially identical, subsystems such asvillages in the middle-ages; and stratification where society split into unequalsubsystems forming a hierarchy such as capital and labour. Modern societycan be seen as a development from stratified to functional differentiation.Subsystems become established in terms of the particular tasks that they carryout – for example, the economy, politics, law, science, the mass media, edu-cation and religion. These subsystems become highly autonomous, distin-guishing themselves from their environments self-referentially. Society nolonger has a centre or controlling subsystem, but becomes the indeterminateoutcome of the interactions between these independent but interdependentdomains.

Luhmann brings in autopoiesis by arguing that all these subsystems, andsociety itself, are autopoietic unities and are thus organisationally closed andself-referring. In doing this, he recognises the problems in defining socialautopoiesis, in particular the exact nature of the components and theprocesses of their production (Luhmann, 1986: 172). He accepts that socialsystems do not consist of, or produce, the (physical) people who participatein them14. So, in what sense can they be autopoietic? His answer is similar toVarela’s in suggesting that there can be closed, self-referential systems whichdo not have physical production as their mode of operation. These includeboth social systems and psychic systems (human consciousness). He differs



from Varela in that he calls all such systems autopoietic whereas Varelarestricts that term to living physical systems.

Autopoiesis as the production of communication

So what are the basic elements of social systems which continually producethemselves? Not conscious thoughts, nor behaviour or actions, nor even lan-guage, but communications or, rather, communicative events.15

‘Social systems use communications as their particular mode of autopoi-etic reproduction. Their elements are communications which are recur-sively produced and reproduced by a network of communications andwhich cannot exist outside such a network.’ (Luhmann, 1986: 174)

Each subsystem defines itself what is and is not a communication for it, andthen consists of networks of particular communications which always refer toprevious communications, and lead on to other ones. Society as a wholeencompasses all of the communications of its subsystems as well as the moregeneral communications of the lifeworld.

It is important to understand what Luhmann means by ‘communication’since he uses the term in a very specific sense. He stresses that it is not whatwe might normally mean by a communicative act such as a statement or utter-ance by a particular person. He characterises a communication as an eventconsisting of three indissoluble elements – information, utterance and under-standing – which can enable further communicative operations to occur(Luhmann, 1995: 137). Each of these elements is said to be a selection froma range of possibilities. It is the operation of the autopoietic system whichdefines and makes the selections. Broadly speaking, information is what themessage is about, utterance is the form in which it is produced together withthe intentions of its sender, and understanding is the meaning that it gener-ates (which can include misunderstanding) in the receiver. There must be atleast two parties involved, the communicator and the receiver but these donot have to be specific individuals.

Communication is not the simple sending of a message – it cannot be saidto have occurred until the receiver has received and understood something,even if not what was intended. Indeed, the nature of the communicationremains undefined until it has been interpreted by the other. Nor can it beunderstood as the transmission of some thing (information) from one personto another. The utterance is a selection, a skilled performance chosen toprovoke or trigger a reaction in the receiver. But it can never determine whatthe reaction will be for this too is a complex selection based on the receiver’sown cognitive state.

All these elements are generated or co-produced together as a unity, andthis event allows the possibility of further communications. This happensthrough a fourth selection, by the receiver, the acceptance or rejection of the

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communication’s meaning (Luhmann, 1995: 147). This is distinct from under-standing. Any communication generates meaning, whether intended or not.The fourth selection is the link to action – does the receiver respond in someway to the communication, perhaps to question or disagree, or do they fail torespond and thereby terminate the communicative sequence? It is importantto stress that all three aspects are distinctions made by the (sub)-system itself,not by an outside observer. The system determines what, for it, is informa-tion; how it may be embodied; and how it may be interpreted. In doing thisit draws its own distinction as to what belongs to the system and what doesnot – this is the closure of autopoietic systems.

We can visualise the whole system as an ongoing network of interactingand self-referring communications of different types, and see how they can beseparated from the particular people involved. The people will come and go,and their individual subjective motivations will disappear, but the commu-nicative dynamic will remain.

Having looked at the structure of communication, how are the dynamicsof autopoiesis constituted? Essentially it is a network through time of com-munications referring to other and past communications and leading to newones. However, it is quite a different form of production from physicalautopoiesis, for communications are events. They occur (or at least are com-pleted) at a point in time and then disappear. They may leave traces – mem-ories, papers, films – but these are not the events themselves. What is vital isthe generation of the next (communicative) event, for without this autopoiesisstops; and that this event is different from the previous one. So communica-tive autopoiesis is not a production of structure or pattern or repetition butof networks of differentiated events.

Looking specifically at the relationship between communications,Luhmann (1986: 175) says that they will either be hetero-referential or auto-referential. A later communication distinguishes between the information andutterance of an earlier communication. It then either concerns the informa-tion – questioning it, denying it or enlarging on it (hetero-), or it concerns theutterance – asking how it was said, why it was said, or who said it (auto-). Ineach case, the later communication makes its own particular distinctions (orselections) among these varied possibilities.

We can see here the relationship of communication to meaning (Luhmann,1985; Luhmann, 1990). Events (especially communications) refer to and arerelated to many other events and possibilities. The production of communi-cation is precisely this selection from the manifold possibilities – distinguish-ing what is by what it is not. It is these related events and possibilities whichconstitute meaning. Meaning is the openness of all possibilities; all the relations, distinctions and denials that could be generated – a very Husserlianconstruction. It is that which provides newness and difference between com-munications. On the other hand, a particular communication closes this off – it fixes one possibility in order that something might actually happen.Autopoietic communication can thus be seen as meaning-processing



(Luhmann, 1989: 17), generating distinctions to convert the open field ofmeaning into the particular information/utterances which thereby constitutea society.

The autopoiesis of society

A social system comes into being whenever an autopoietic connection ofcommunications occurs and distinguishes itself against an environment byrestricting the appropriate communications. Accordingly, social systems arenot comprised of persons and actions but of communications. (Luhmann,1989: 145)

Society differentiates itself into subsystems each of which is an autopoieticnetwork of recursive communications. Society itself is also autopoietic con-sisting of all these communications plus all others not specifically involved insubsystems – the communications of the lifeworld (Luhmann, 1989).16 Assuch, it distinguishes itself from its environment – that which is not commu-nication. Thus, not only the physical environment but also people and theirconsciousnesses are in the social system’s environment. Only thoughts cangenerate thoughts and equally only communications can generate communi-cations. Society is a closed system in that it cannot communicate directly with its environment since the environment, by definition, does not commu-nicate. Events happen in the physical world (eg, pollution) but this does notaffect society until it becomes the subject of a communication – society cannotcommunicate with but only about its environment according to its capacitiesfor information processing. This does not mean that society is totally isolated– it is like physical autopoiesis, organisationally closed but interactively open. The environment (especially people) can trigger or irritate society andsociety may then generate a communication but its nature and form will bedetermined by society or a particular subsystem, not by the environmentaldisturbance.

In a similar way, the subsystems also distinguish themselves within societyand specify their own boundaries. They too form closed networks of commu-nications – each one only being able to process or deal with communicationsof its own type. Luhmann analyses their workings in terms of codes and pro-grams. He argues (Luhmann, 1989: 36ff) that each subsystem utilises a par-ticular binary code representing the good/bad, positive/negative for thatsubsystem. For example, the code for the law is legal/illegal, for the economyto pay/not pay, for science truth/falsity, for politics the holding/not holding ofoffice, for the mass media information/non-information. The code providesthe basic guidance for a subsystem for without it the self-referential opera-tions would be entirely undetermined. The code itself is just the particular cat-egories, and it therefore requires some means or criteria for assigning eventsto a category. This is the program – the rules for coding. This separation is oneway in which variety can be increased since it allows the program to bechangeable even though the code is not. For example, the historical develop-

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ment from natural to positive law involves a shift from defining legality interms of religious or natural criteria which were unchangeable to criteriawhich are defined by society and are thus open to change.

For subsystems, the other functional subsystems exist as part of their envi-ronment and there are much greater interactions and dependencies betweensubsystems than between society and its environment. The subsystems havebecome autonomous and independent, but at the same time more interde-pendent since they rely on the existence of the other subsystems to carry out particular functions. Interactions between subsystems are reasonably welldefined – legal communication can give rise to economic ones which in turn trigger political ones. When a subsystem is triggered by its environmentand generates a communication about a particular matter, this is called resonance.17

There are several types of (structural) couplings. First, the coupling of com-munication (ie, society) to sense-systems, that is, individual consciousnesses,but not, he argues, to the general physical world. Then there is the couplingof subsystems to society itself. Indeed, this coupling is most close, since thesubsystems are not something other than society but part of its very consti-tution. Nevertheless, they do distinguish themselves through their operation.Finally, there is structural coupling between subsystems, and here he detailsa few specific combinations. The economic and legal subsystems are mainlylinked through the law of property and contract, and politics and the legalsystem by constitutional law. Events in these particular fields generate com-munications in both the connected subsystems which then become part of thesubsystems’ autopoietic operation.

We are thus left with a view of society very different from the traditionalone. Society is essentially centreless – there is no core or fundamental divi-sion driving it, and there is no privileged position from which a rational overallview can be developed. Instead we have self-defined autonomous subsystemsin a constant process of renewal and redefinition, locked together in a fragilebalancing act, resonating amongst themselves but relatively unresponsive tosociety’s external environment.

Luhmann’s autopoiesis – evaluation

The question now is, to what extent can we accept Luhmann’s social theoryas genuinely and correctly embodying the underlying theory of autopoiesis asset out above? The conditions to be met were articulated above – to be ableto clearly specify the components and concomitant processes of productionof those components. And, to be able to identify a clearly demarcated bound-ary so that the system can be said to act as an organisationally closed unityand to produce itself as a whole.

Certainly Luhmann’s work represents a bold attempt to theorise anautopoietic unity in the non-physical domain. It defines the basic componentsof such a system – in this case communications – and holds consistently to this



without confusing domains by, for example, including people within thesystem. The nature of production is shifted to a production of events ratherthan of material components. Finally, the circular and self-defining nature ofthe production network is brought out well, as is the combination of organi-sational closure and interactive openness. Examining it in more detail,however, shows up several problems.

First, let us consider the notion of components and their production. Thatthe components are events does not seem a particular difficulty – ultimatelyit is just a matter of time scale. Given long enough, all production processesbecome events since the produced component will exist and then disintegrate.Equally, with a short enough time horizon all events themselves becomeprocesses as we observe their unfolding.

However, I would argue that there is a problem with the notion of production, specifically with the claim that it is communications (rather than people) that produce further communications. Put another way, there is little attempt to show how societal communication, as an independent phenomenal domain, emerges from the interactions of the human beings whoultimately underpin it. Without human activity there would be no communi-cation. Maturana is always careful to show how new domains arise out of theinteractions of observers, but with Luhmann the observer is lost completelyin favour of the observation. This is an important lacuna with a number ofconcomitant problems, some of which are also identified by Habermas (1985).How do communications actually occur? It is one thing to say analytically thatcommunications generate communications, but operationally they requirepeople to undertake specific actions and make specific choices. Is not the claimthat ‘communication produces communication’ stretching the notion of pro-duction too far? One communication my stimulate another but surely it doesnot produce or generate it.18 How does this interaction occur? What factorsaffect the selections that are actually made? In general, what is the relation-ship between the psychic systems of individual consciousness and the socialsystem of communication?

Luhmann does consider this analytically with his concept of interpenetra-tion. This describes the way in which something can be an element in twosystems at the same time. Thus an action (eg, an utterance) is part of thepsychic system of human activity. At the same time it can be used, as anelement, within a social system of communication, but it will not be the ‘same’element in the two systems – it will have different functions. ‘ {I}nterpene-trating systems converge in individual elements – that is, they use the sameones – but they give each of them a different selectivity and connectivity, dif-ferent pasts and futures’ (Luhmann, 1995: 215, original emphasis). Whilst thiswould seem to be true descriptively, it does not seem to provide sufficientexplanation of the complex interaction between the two levels.

Luhmann’s theory would seem to rely on his concept of meaning as thelink between the two. A communication opens up possibilities through itsmeaning to people whose selections then generate new communications.

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However, this appears to be a very individualistic analysis. Little attention is paid to the constituting of these subjects as subjects and the major role oflanguage in this. In Maturana’s terms, Luhmann ignores the importance oflanguaging and consensuality which provides an already existing, a priori,structure generating an intersubjective domain of interactions. Such anapproach would provide a general bedrock in the lifeworld out of which theparticular specialised communicative subsystems can be seen to arise.

Second, how does Luhmann’s theory deal with the question of boundaries?At first sight it looks promising. In defining components as communicationsit draws a clear distinction from that which is not communication, eg the phys-ical or psychological domains. It then specifies functional subsystems withinsociety as a whole that demarcate themselves by distinguishing their own com-munications. Whilst this does not actually involve boundary components, itdoes (to the extent that it is successful) generate a clear cleavage in the com-municational space.

The question is whether, empirically, subsystems can be properly describedin such a pure fashion. In the economic sphere, for example, it may be thatthe ultimate operations underlying it are monetary payments, but if we seekto explain particular happenings we immediately find that social, political andlegal factors are at work. This is because it is people who make economic deci-sions – to buy, or sell, or invest, or lend – and people form a nexus betweenall the different subsystems. Their decisions are affected by their expectationswhich are conditioned by communications from other domains. Moreover,communications can often be said to belong to more than one domain. Forexample, signing a loan agreement both generates a transfer of money andestablishes legal obligations. Gaining a research grant is both a communica-tion about academic status and a payment. As another example, Luhmanncharacterises organisations as recursive networks of communications aboutdecisions and only decisions (Luhmann, 2000). Yet, this seems an incrediblyreductionist view of the rich complex of social interactions within an organisation.

To summarise, this section has developed the following conclusions con-cerning the application of autopoiesis to social systems by Luhmann. In termsof components and processes of production, we can take the components ofsuch a system to be communicative events, where communication consists ofinformation, utterance, and understanding. However, there are problems inaccepting that communications are produced by other communications alonerather than by people within social interaction. This is part of the problem ofthe totalising nature of the definition of society as communications and onlycommunication, leaving the mutual interaction between people and societyunder-theorised.

In terms of organisational closure, the idea that society, and its subsystems,define their own boundaries through communications that do/do not belongto them has some potential but it is difficult to accept empirically that sub-systems can be adequately characterised in such a pure and separable manner.



Conclusions

As discussed in the introductory sections, the theory of self-producing systemsis an enormous development over earlier, functionalist, systems theories andhas many attractions for social theorists. It has, however, often been appliedto social systems with little concern for the problems of transferring a theoryof biological systems to the social realm. The question which this paper beginsto address is the extent to which the theory of autopoiesis can be applied tosocial systems in an ontological, rather than purely metaphorical, sense. Thefirst step was to specify clearly what we took to be the essential core of thetheory of autopoiesis – a specification of particular components, that partici-pate in processes of production of those components, within a well-boundedwhole. The next step is particularly difficult since we cannot compare thesetheoretical constructs directly, in an unmediated way, with social reality forsocial reality is always, already constructed and theorised. Our approach hastherefore been to ask to what extent can a particular social theory be seen ascompatible with the formal theory of autopoiesis.

This article has concentrated on Luhmann’s social theory since it actuallyhas autopoiesis at its heart although it is more a case of an existing theorybeing re-cast in autopoietic terms rather than developing de novo out ofautopoiesis. Given this, it is unsurprising that the theory has a very strong,although not perfect, isomorphism with autopoiesis. The components of thesystems are clearly defined as communications (rather than people or socialpractices for example), and processes of production, or at least triggering, ofcommunications are specified. The theory also captures the aspects of closureand self-reference that are so much a part of autopoiesis. Society as a wholeis a closed domain of communication generating communications and thusdistinguishes itself from both the physical environment, and psychic systems.Within society, functional subsystems close themselves of by referentially constructing distinctions between communications that belong and those thatdo not.

However, it could be said that this theoretical purity is gained at theexpense of an incredibly abstract and reductive view of the social world.Society, and the rich processes of social interaction between real people,become marginalised in favour of almost entirely disembodied communica-tive mechanisms. It is as though an analysis of e-mail usage considered onlythe flow of electronic messages around computer networks with no thoughtfor the content of the messages or motivations of the people involved. Yes,that is one level of analysis, but surely not the only one.

At this stage, then, the overall conclusion concerning social autopoiesis isone of agnosticism. If Luhmann’s version captures important aspects ofautopoiesis but presents us with an impoverished view of social processes arethere other theoretical conceptualisations that could be utilised? Or, couldone approach from a different direction by attempting to demonstrate em-

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pirically a self-constructing social system similar to the game of Nomicdescribed earlier. These questions will be pursued with particular referenceto the social theories of Giddens and Bhaskar.

Appendix: brief glossary of autopoietic concepts

Note that Maturana (1987) contains a comprehensive description of the mainconcepts.

An observer is a (human) being capable of making distinctions and descrip-tions through language and whose lived experience is always within language.

A unity is an entity or whole that is distinguished by an observer in relationto a background or medium. A unity may be simple (unanalysed) or com-posite (analysed into components by further distinctions). The type or iden-tity of a simple unity is characterised in terms of properties of the whole in ametadomain to its components. A composite unity is distinguished in termsof components and their relations which taken together generate the simplyunity.

Organisation and structure: composite unities have both an organisation anda structure. The organisation is a particular subset of the relations betweencomponents that determine the properties of the unity as a whole and therebyits identity, type or class. All unities of a particular type have the same organisation. A change of organisation implies a change of identity and viceversa. The structure of a composite unity is the total set of actual componentsand relations belonging to a particular example or instance. Unities with thesame organisation may have different structures, and the structure of a par-ticular entity may change without its organisation changing. Organisation isabstract, structure is concrete.

Structure determined systems: all composite unities consist of componentsand relations (structure), and so any change in the unity must be a change inits structure. Such a change will be determined by the properties of the com-ponents and their relations at that particular point in time, that is, it will bestructurally determined. Outside agents can only trigger changes, they cannotdetermine the nature of the change.

Structural coupling is a mutual relationship or correspondence between thestructure of a unity and the structure of its environment (including otherunities within the environment). This occurs when a unity undergoes recur-rent interactions within its environment whilst maintaining its identity andtherefore its organisation. The changes in structure that occur must be suchas to allow the maintenance of the organisation within that particular environment.



Autopoiesis describes a particular type of organisation. Autopoietic systemsare organised in such a way that they produce their own components – they are self-producing systems. Formally, ‘a composite unity whose organisa-tion can be described as a closed network of productions of components that through their interactions constitute the network of productions thatproduce them, and specify its extension by constituting it boundaries in theirdomain of existence, is an autopoietic system’ (Maturana, 1987: 349). A livingsystem is a special case of an autopoietic system – one whose components are molecules.

The autopoietic organisation can be characterised in terms of three types ofrelations between components and production processes: specificity (what),constitution (where), and order (when).

Autopoietic systems are characterised by autonomy since they are not depen-dent on external production processes, and self-reference since their organi-sation closes in on itself and their structure is self-defined – it can be any solong as its supports autopoiesis.

Allopoiesis describes all types of organisation that produce something otherthan themselves.

Cognitive domain of interactions: the set of possible interactions that anautopoietic system may have in a particular environment that are effective,that is, that preserve autopoiesis. For Maturana, effective action is knowledge:‘living systems are cognitive systems, and to live is to know.’ (Maturana, 1987:357).

Consensual domain of interactions: when two or more autopoietic systemsinteract recurrently with each other, structural coupling may lead to inter-linked sets of interactions between them which may appear to an observer to be co-ordinated. Such an ontogenetically established domain of co-ordinations of actions is a consensual domain. To the extent that such co-ordinations of action have particular effects or meaning within the interactionthey may be described as linguistic.

Language: within a consensual domain, the co-ordinations of action maybecome recursive – that is, particular co-ordinations of action may becometokens or symbols for others. This gives rise to language – a domain of con-sensual co-ordinations of consensual co-ordinations of action.

Warwick University Received 17 May 2001Finanlly accepted 18th January 2002

Notes

1 Hayles (1999) provides an insightful discussion of the transition from the positivism of first-order cybernetics to the constructivism of second-order largely generated by Maturana and

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Varela’s theory of the observer. Wolfe (1995) is an interesting discussion of the implicationsof this transition for feminism and humanism.

2 There are other aspects of the general theory of autopoiesis that are relevant to social theory,for instance Maturana’s theories of cognition, language, self-consciousness, consensualdomains, and domains of explanation, but these are not addressed in this paper.

3 There are two major dimensions to the debate. First, that between agency and structure as tothe ontological validity of concepts of system or structure at all. The anti-structural positionhas been put forcefully by King (1999; 1999; 2000) and rebutted by Archer (Archer, 2000).Second, debates between various proponents of different structural approaches. Of particularrelevance here are debates between Luhmann and Habermas (Habermas, 1985) and betweenadvocates of Giddens’ structuration theory (Cohen, 1989; New, 1994; Manicas, 1998) andBhaskar’s critical realist social theory (Bhaskar, 1979; Porpora, 1989; Archer, 1996; Archer,1998). Within this paper I will primarily discuss the work of Luhmann although mention willbe made of Giddens and Bhaskar. I will not enter the agency/structure debate, assuming thata commitment to a structural ontology of some kind is a pre-condition for the application ofautopoiesis.

4 The basic theory for living systems and cognition is expounded in Maturana and Varela (1980)with a version written for a wider audience in Maturana and Varela (1987). One of the mostrecent comprehensive expositions is (Maturana and Mpodozis, 1995). Maturana has alsowritten on the implications of his ideas for social theory (Maturana, 1980), science (Maturana, 1990), aesthetic experience (Maturana, 1993), and self-consciousness (Maturana,1995). Mingers (1995; 1997) provides a critical introduction to autopoiesis and its applicationin different disciplines. There are special issues of Family Therapy Networker (9, 3, 1985), IrishJ. Psychology (9, 1, 1988), Cardozo Law Review (13, 5, 1992), Cultural Critique (Spring 1995),Social Science Information (35, 2, 1996), and Acta Sociologica (vol. 43, 2000) devoted toautopoiesis and especially the work of Luhmann. Much of his theory tends to be ratherabstract, but Vanderstaeten (2000) looks at the implications for socialization theory and Paterson and Teubner (1998) try to demonstrate legal autopoiesis empirically.

5 In the beginning, in fact, the open systems concept was developed in contrast to the prevail-ing classical tradition, especially in physics, of closed systems that did not interact with theirenvironment at all (von Bertalanffy, 1971). This should not be confused with autopoieticsystems which are organisationally closed but interactively open (see later discussion of thisdistinction).

6 Although it is by no means the only way of conceptualising organisations – see (Burrell andMorgan, 1979; Morgan, 1986).

7 This is very much the basis of Luhmann’s functionally differentiated society to be discussedlater.

8 For the moment we shall assume physical autopoiesis. An example to have in mind might bea single-celled organism such as amoeba.

9 Commentators often talk of reproduction but there is an important distinction to be made.In the physical domain reproduction implies the creation of another, separate, entity. This isnot what autopoiesis means for it is about the continual, self-production of the same entity.In the social domain, Giddens and Bhaskar talk of the ‘reproduction of society’ meaning bythis the continuation (or transformation) of the same society in a similar way to Maturana.In this paper I shall, where appropriate, write (re)production to mark the distinction.

10 Compare this with Luhmann’s account of social systems consisting of communications, withpeople part of the environment of the system.

11 Historically, Luhmann has been enormously prolific over thirty years, although much remainsuntranslated, and he is best known outside Germany for his debates with Habermas, eg(Habermas and Luhmann, 1971; Habermas, 1985). Much of his work is developed from, anda reaction to, Parsons in two ways: explicitly bringing in phenomenology through the cate-gory of ‘meaning’; and at the same time radicalising the abstract and autonomous nature of‘system’. A major step in his development was to reformulate his theory from an action to acommunication orientation (Stichweh, 2000), followed by a further reformulation into



autopoietic terms. Several papers outline his use of autopoiesis rather schematically –Luhmann (1982; 1985; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1992).

12 His theory has been applied in other areas, especially law and public administration(Luhmann, 1987; Luhmann, 1989; Veld, Schaap et al., 1991; Teubner and Febbrajo, 1992;Teubner, 1993; Brans and Rossbach, 1997).

13 The particular nature of ‘society’ for Luhmann will be brought out later.14 Indeed, he argued this before any mention of autopoiesis, see Luhmann(1982: xx).15 Communications, Luhmann argues (1986: 177), are more fundamental than individual com-

municative acts. This is because first, actions need not be inherently social whereas commu-nications are; second, social actions already presuppose communications in the sense that theyrely on or raise the expectation of recognition, understanding, and acceptance by others. Inother words, a social action is inevitably already a communication. Yet, third, a communica-tion is more than simply an action. It involves and therefore includes the understanding ofanother party and so goes beyond the individual action to form the link necessary for socialoperations. A communicative act in itself leads to nothing, it is only when it generates someunderstanding in another that it can trigger a further communication.

16 A major distinction made by Luhmann is between society and interaction. Interaction is directand face-to-face between people. Society emerges from the undifferentiated domain of inter-action and provides the capacity for closure – it structures communication (Luhmann, 1995:416).

17 For example, a discovery in science such as genetic manipulation may lead to political deci-sions about limits of acceptability resulting in new laws governing its use and eventually eco-nomic activity each of which feeds back to the scientific subsystem. Moreover, these effectsmay be disproportionate between subsystems – a minor occurrence in one may trigger a majorresponse in another.

18 See also Teubner (1993, Ch. 2).

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