Can Obama and Rouhani Make Peace?

7/27/2019 Can Obama and Rouhani Make Peace?

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Country-specific Studies (1)

STUDIES

on

IRANResponses,Articles

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Foreign Policy Research CentreNEW DELHI (India)

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Country specific Studies (1) STUDIES on IRAN

1

In the month of April 2013, Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC)launched a country-specific studies project. These countries hold an

importance place for India . Each study seeks to highlight Indias

relationship in bilateral and international perspective. The initiativebegins with Iran and is to be followed by similar studies on other

countries-Pakistan,Afghanistan.

The Iran project is a timely initiative and in our venture, we have the

support of national and international scholars who have agreed to

come under the umbrella of FPRC to disseminate knowledge on Iran. We

express our sincere gratitude to them for their cooperation in bringing

this project to a successful culmination. They have always been a source

of strength to us.

Dr.Mahendra Gaur Dr.Indira Gaur

Director Mg. Director

Foreign Policy Research Centre

New Delhi


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Dr. Mark N. Katz

Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University (Fairfax, Virginia, USA)

Prof. HooshangAmirahmadiFormer director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University

&

Kayvon Afshari

Political scientist and CBS News journalist


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Can Rouhani and Obama Make Peace?Identifying the systemic factors that constrain US-Iran communication

HooshangAmirahmadi and Kayvon Afshari

HooshangAmirahmadi is a professor and former director of the Center for Middle Eastern

Studies at Rutgers University. He holds a PhD from Cornell University and is the founder and

president of the American Iranian Council. He is also a Senior Associate Member at Oxford

University in the U.K.

Kayvon Afshari is a political scientist and CBS News journalist. He also managed the 2013

campaign to elect HooshangAmirahmadi as president of Iran. He holds an MA in International

Relations from NYU.

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Abstract

The recent election of moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has led many observers to

speculate that direct talks between Iran and the United States may take place in the next four

years. This prediction is based on the belief that elected officials can play a decisive role in

shaping foreign policy and international relations. While we remain cautiously optimistic that

this is the case, there are many systemic factors that challenge the ability of leaders to pursue

dialogue.

In this paper, we identify the first three sequential steps for communication: 1.) engaging, 2.)

sustaining talks, and 3.) reducing tension.Next, we outline the unique challenges that leaders

face at each of these steps, constraining them from advancing. In particular, we highlight the

role of mistrust and fear, Iranian pride, previous negotiating failures, lack of honesty and

diplomacy, misinformation, reciprocity, and the Islamic Revolution as the main challenges. Then,

we discuss the role of third parties including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Great Britainin

constraining US-Iran dialogue. Finally, we outline our recommendations for future constructive

diplomacy between the two governments.

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Introduction

The relationship between theIslamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America remains

an anomaly in international relations. The two sides have not had diplomatic relations for over

thirty years, a longer period than the diplomatic cutoff after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and

the communist takeover in China in 1949. Throughout the Cold War, the US and USSR

maintained open channels of communication precisely because they were enemies who wished


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to avoid a spiraling conflict. In the case of US-Iran relations, a series of constraints is preventing

the two sides from even talking to one another.

Beyond the constraints, there are issues that are dividing the two countries. The US alleges that

Iran is not being transparent about its nuclear program, threatens Israel, funds terrorism, abuses

human rights, and promotes anti-Americanism. The Islamic Republic complains about USsupport forits political opposition and ethnic groups, unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and,

most importantly, that the US seeks regime change in Iran. All of these issues certainly explain

the conflict between the two countries, but they do not explain the failure to engage in

meaningful dialogue aimed at resolving those issues. In order to understand the failure to

communicate, one must analyze it procedurally by dissecting each sequential step in the

diplomatic process, beginning with engagement.

Engaging

The main causes of the failure to engage are mistrust and fear on both sides. For Iranianofficials, media reports of American covert operations to destabilize the Islamic Republic,

sanctions, suspicion that the US is pursuing regime change, and the accusation of being part of

an axis of evil have created mistrust of the United States, prompting Ayatollah Khamenei to

say that the best response is to not retreat from the enemy, not even one step.

However, an even greater cause of mistrust is the US-led Operation Ajax that overthrew the

democratic Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953. As Ayatollah Khomeini once

said of the United States, When we have been bitten by a snake, we are even afraid of a piece

of rope which from afar looks like a snake We fear you socially and politically.The coup has

led to a firm belief in the Iranian psyche that the United States and its intelligence agencies

intend to cause street disruptions in Iran, topple the Islamic Republic, and install their own

friendly leaders. Naturally, this psyche has led to a great deal of mistrust and fear leading to a

blockage of negotiating with the United States.

This mistrust and fear of the United States prompted a group of radical Muslim students to

storm the American Embassy in 1979, taking embassy officials as hostages for 444 days.

Observing that the Shah had been admitted to the US, they believed that the United States

government was planning another coup to overthrow their nascent theocratic government.

While their suspicions were partly validated by seized embassy documents outlining espionage

and covert links with opposition groups, the view from Washington remains vastly different tothis day. To the United States, this watershed event is a scar in US-Iran relations, demonstrating

that the Islamic Republic is a revolutionary, ideological, radical government that ignores

international norms of diplomacy and therefore cannot be trusted. This American prism has led

to a deep mistrust of the Islamic Republic as well as the conclusion that Tehran will not be an

honest party at the negotiating table. Events such as attacks on the Khobar Towers and the


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American embassy in Beirut, the revelation of Iranian nuclear activities in 2003, and attacks on

American troops in Iraq have further heightened this sense of mistrust and fear.

Beyond the mutual mistrust, Iranian pride has challenged the ability of the two parties to

engage one another. Iran sees itself as a great civilization with a long history and rich culture.

This belief in Iranian greatness extends to scientific developments and has generated nationalpride for the countrys nuclear program. In fact, a widely published survey by the RAND

Corporation showed that 87% of Iranians strongly support the development of peaceful nuclear

energy. This national support, deeply rooted in the nations self-esteem, has led observers such

as former International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammad ElBaradei to advise

the United States to take on a more respectful tone that is sensitive to Iranian pride.

While American officials view policy setting as a calculating, rational process of weighing costs

and benefits and see pride as a tertiary factor, to Iranians it is a core concern. This dichotomy

may be the reason why Americans have failed to appreciate Iranian sensitivity and adopt a

language that would effectively neutralize pride.As Iranian officials frequently point out, the

dual track policy of carrots and sticks is more fitting for a donkey than a proud nation.

Sustaining Talks

Assuming that the two sides can sit at the negotiating table, the next challenge will be for them

to sustain those talks by building an agenda and negotiating each item in a diplomatic manner of

reciprocating realistic concessions.The main challenges at this step are previous negotiating

failures, a lack of honesty and diplomacy, misinformation, and reciprocity.

Previous rounds of dialogue, which failed to produce any breakthroughs, give leaders the notion

that any talks are destined to fail. For example, Iranian officials participated in the 2001 Bonn

Conference, in which both sides participated in fruitful dialogue aimed at forming a post-Taliban

national unity government for Afghanistan. Previously, the two sides had engaged in tactical

cooperation and Iran used its links with the Northern Alliance to help topple the Afghan Taliban.

This short-lived grace period ended in 2002 when President Bush labeled Iran as part of the axis

of evil. The Afghan experience and other unreciprocated cooperation have left Iranian officials

with the impression that dialogue with the United States is largely worthless. Similarly, the

United States believes that Iran will not be an honest negotiator. After negotiating with the P5+1

and voluntarily signing the Additional Protocol in 2003, it later reneged on its obligations and

suspended the agreement.

The next challenge to sustaining talks is that both sides are lacking in honesty and diplomacy,

attempting to play a win-lose game rather than working for win-win solutions.This may be

because American officials believe that they can extract ever more concessions from Iran by

wielding the threat of more sanctions.Similarly, Iraniannegotiators may believe that they can

break apart the coalition supporting sanctions without giving up the level of concessions that


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Israel, as the closest American partner in the region, inserts itself in US-Iran relations because it

wants to make sure that if there is a path to peace, it runs through Tel Aviv. Surrounded by

enemies, Israel prioritizes its national security and views the source of many threats to its

existence emanating from Iran. It takes the rhetoric of some Islamic Republic leaders seriously,

is alarmed by Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and is deeply concerned about Irans

nuclear program. Naturally, Israel is very skeptical of any potential deal between the US and Iran

because it worries that its own security concerns may fall by the wayside.

Americas other regional partner, Saudi Arabia, is also largely suspicious of talks between the US

and Iran. The Kingdom was founded on the principles of Salafism, a movement in Sunni Islam

that is thoroughly anti-Shia.Through this lens, Saudi Arabia sees Iran as an ideological Shia state

and as a challenger to its claim of being Islams representative.Furthermore, the Kingdom is

worried about rising Shia power in the Arab world from Bahrain to Iraq to Lebanon. It views the

Islamic Republic as destabilizing the status quo by supporting Shia communities, even in its own

Eastern Province.Therefore, it remains skeptical of US-Iran talks so long as its concerns about

Iran as a radical Shia state are not resolved.

Similarly, British officials see Iran as a destabilizer in a region where they have immense oil and

business interests.The British Empires domain once included large swaths of territory in the

Middle East and North Africa. As Lord Palmerston said in 1848, We have no eternal allies, and

we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is

our duty to follow. Those interests, includingaccess to oil, trade, regional stability, and reliable

access to strategic waterways, continue to shape British foreign policy today.

British trade in the Middle East is extensive, including the al-Yamamah arms deal with Saudi

Arabia, the single largest defense contact in UK history. Great Britain is concerned about Irans

threat to regional stability and its behavior toward its Arab neighbors. London remains

doubtfulthat Tehrans behavior will change and therefore is skeptical about the prospect of

US-Iran dialogue, which it sees as likely fruitless.

Conclusion

The recent inauguration of a new president in Tehran presents a potential opening for the

United States and Iran to pursue engagement and find a diplomatic solution to their grievances.

Similarly, while there has been some continuation of Bush policies, the Obama administration

has expressed a greater openness for dialogue with Iran.While leaders certainly matter in

US-Iran relations, the systemic factors outlined in this paper must also be taken into

consideration.

Furthermore, although it is important to consider the issues dividing the US and Iran, it is more

useful to conceptualize the process of communication as a series of steps with unique

challenges. By implementing this framework, one can conclude that the only way for US-Iran

communications to be fruitful will be to effectively neutralize these constraints.


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More specifically, to engage they will need to devise a way to reduce the level of mistrust

between them, and find a diplomatic language that is sensitive to Iranian pride. To sustain their

talks, they must adopt win-win strategies, be honest with one another, deal with the same set of

information, and reciprocate in good faith rather than exploit the other sides concessions.

If they manage to sustain their talks, they will need to finally come to terms with the issue thathas divided them for thirty years: the Islamic Revolution. One solution would be for Iran to

essentially give up on its Revolution and for Rouhani to become the Gorbachev of Iran. This

would certainly satiate the American desire to see a non-theocratic form of government in Iran.

The opposite solution would be for the United States to finally come to terms with the Islamic

Revolution and simply accept Iran as a theocratic state that stokes anti-Americanism and wishes

to export its Revolution.

Between these two extremes there is a middle ground solution in which Iran essentially

relinquishes parts of the Islamic Revolution while the United States stomachs other aspects. For

example, Iran could give up on its revolutionary mandate to support Hezbollah and resist Israel,

and instead adopt the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation approach, whereby it would cease

violence but condition diplomatic relations on a just solution to the Palestinian issue. In return,

the United States could forgo its efforts toward destabilization and regime change.

To be sure, all of these solutions will be very difficult. The two sides have little experience in

dealing with one another and face domestic political pressures that aggravate their problems.

However, leaders on both sides must take these systemic constraints into consideration if there

is any hope of seizing this change in leadership as a breakthrough moment for US-Iran relations.

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Can Obama and Rouhani Make Peace?