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December 2010
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Case Study on the Management of Identity
Can Nigeria Achieve Unity in Diversity?
December 2010
The Fund for Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit research and educational organization that
works to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security. We promote sustainable security through
research, training and education, engagement of civil society, building bridges across diverse sectors, and
developing innovative technologies and tools for policy makers. A leader in the conflict assessment and early
warning field, the Fund for Peace focuses on the problems of weak and failing states. Our objective is to create
practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are useful to decision-makers.
Copyright © 2010 The Fund for Peace.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Fund for Peace.
Case Study Prepared for
The Office of the Special Adviser of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide
The Fund for Peace Conflict Early Warning and Assessment
Report Written by
Dr. Pauline H. Baker
Nate Haken
Will Ferroggiaro
The Fund for Peace Publication FFP : CPGPR1210 (Version 1210A)
Circulation: PUBLIC
The Fund for Peace
1720 I Street NW
7th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
T: +1 202 223 7940
F: +1 202 223 7947
www.fundforpeace.org
2 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Foreword & Contents
This report—Can Nigeria Achieve
Unity in Diversity?—is the first in a series of
papers examining how different countries
manage ethnic, racial, religious, or other
identities in order to prevent conflict leading
to mass atrocities and genocide. The paper
examines Nigeria’s political institutions, legal
structures, and policy initiatives to address
the issues arising from its complex society.
Several measures were adopted to encourage
broad political inclusion and reduce the
potential for conflict. First, Nigeria has
created additional states from its original
four regionally-based states in order to
decentralize power to avoid secessionist
movements and respond to demands for
statehood from minorities. Second, a
constitutional provision was established
requiring “the federal character” to be
reflected through state representation at the
center through the “federal character”
principle, which requires the national cabinet
to include at least one minister from each of
the 36 states. At the local level, the
constitution provided for a preference for
“indigenes” (by custom, this refers to those
whose ancestors were original inhabitants of
the community) over “non-indigenes” (those
who migrated, or whose ancestors migrated,
to the area). These designations affect the
allocation of land, jobs, education, and
political appointments. Third, an informal
“power shifting” practice (sometimes
referred to as the “zoning” or “rotational”
rule) was adopted for the presidential
nomination process of the dominant political
party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). It
requires presidential nominees to rotate
between Southerners and Northerners at
least once every two terms (or eight years).
Fourth, the electoral system was amended to
discourage ethnic voting and secessionist
tendencies. It requires, in addition to the
popular vote, that a presidential candidate
has to receive one-quarter of the votes cast
in two-thirds of the states plus the federal
capital to be declared a winner. On the
surface, this provision appears to establish a
government based on a broad mandate; in
practice, it encourages political parties to
pressure local agents to record winning votes
in their areas at any cost. This requirement
has had the effect of incentivizing fraud in
elections, undermining political legitimacy,
and generating public cynicism about
elections generally. Finally, the positive
effects that might have emerged from these
efforts to foster political inclusion were
undermined by a steady trend toward
political centralization that emerged during
approximately three decades of military rule.
In sum, the Nigerian experience shows the
weakness of stressing form over function in
managing diversity. Nigeria’s challenges in
integrating ethnic, regional and religious
identities into a framework based on national
unity remain. Indeed, Nigeria could fragment
again, and particular groups could again
become targets of mass atrocities.
This paper and subsequent papers are
produced by The Fund for Peace working with
the cooperation of the United Nations Office
of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-
General on the Prevention of Genocide
(OSAPG) in order to assist the Special Adviser
in his early warning and prevention efforts.
The mandate of the Special Adviser is to
make recommendations to the Secretary-
General and through him, the United Nations
Security Council, to prevent genocide, and to
inform and educate opinion leaders and
policy makers on how to recognize and
prevent potential genocides. In support of
Introduction 5
Background 6
Application of the Genocide Framework 9
Inter-Group Relations 9
Capacity of the State 14
Presence of Illegal Arms and Armed Elements 16
Motivation of Leading Actors 16
Circumstances that Facilitate Genocide 17
Genocidal Acts 18
Evidence of Intent to Destroy 18
Triggering Factors 19
Conclusion and Recommendations 20
Endnotes 22
Appendix: UN Genocide Analysis Framework 24
About The Fund for Peace 27
3 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Unity in Nigeria
Overview
the Office, the FfP is producing this series of
objective case studies that identify the
factors for identity conflict as well as
government actions that either exacerbate or
mitigate identity-related conflict. The
primary goal of the papers is to identify best
practices in how countries addressed identity
and fostered inclusion so as to avoid such
conflict.
The concept and modalities for the series of
papers, as well as the countries to be
examined, were jointly agreed between FfP
and OSAPG. The papers employ the OSAPG
Analysis Framework as a central lens on the
issues. Drafts of the papers are peer
reviewed by an independent expert reviewer
chosen by FfP, a senior UN official, and
OSAPG. The Fund for Peace finalizes the
papers for dissemination within the UN
system and to a broader public audience. This
initiative has been generously supported by
Humanity United, while the series of
dialogues on the papers is supported by The
Stanley Foundation.
The principal author of this paper is Dr.
Pauline H. Baker, President Emeritus of The
Fund for Peace. Senior Associates Will
Ferroggiaro and Nate Haken contributed
drafting, editing, and research, and FfP Intern
Shane Hensinger assisted in production of
the report. It was reviewed by John Campbell
(U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria 2004-2007); a
senior UN Department of Political Affairs
official; and the Special Adviser and his staff.
However, the views contained herein are
solely those of The Fund for Peace.
4 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Overview
1. Nigeria was widely expected to be
a “showcase of democracy” and a “giant of
Africa” at the time of independence in 1960.
It had an agricultural economy, an educated
middle class, a large number of professionals
(judges, lawyers, civil servants, and
entrepreneurs), a free press, and a
parliamentary system based on a federal
constitution that was peacefully negotiated
with Britain, its former colonial ruler. It was
widely believed that when Nigeria celebrated
its fiftieth anniversary in 2010, it would have
a diversified economy, a robust democracy,
and a leading role in international diplomacy.
2. Boasting an estimated population of 158
million, Nigeria’s cultural diversity is a major
feature that has been one of the country’s
proudest characteristics.1 The most
heterogeneous country in Sub-Saharan Africa,
it contains at least 250 ethno-linguistic
groups, approximately half of whom are
Muslim, 40% Christian, and the remainder
adhering to traditional beliefs, although there
is often a blending of religious practices. The
country is more than twice the size of
California, with a variety of topographical
zones stretching from the arid southern rim
of the Sahara Desert in the north to the dense
tropical mangrove swamps of the Gulf of
Guinea in the south. Since independence, the
population has become increasingly young
(forty-two percent are under the age of
fourteen), urban (forty-eight percent live in
cities and towns), and unequal (billionaires
proliferate while 70% of the country is
classified as poor, with 35% living in
absolute poverty).2 The average life
expectancy is only forty-seven years and
average school retention is eight years.
The Harvard School of Public Health stated in
a recent study that “Nigeria stands ready to
collect a substantial demographic dividend if
it continues with recent positive economic
growth, improves health standards, and
harnesses a growing workforce.” However, it
warned that because of the “lost decade” of
the 1990s, when per capital GDP fell below
1980 levels, if Nigeria fails to take the
necessary steps soon, its prospects will be
bleak and could be catastrophic …
Demographic factors are steadily elevating
Nigeria’s risk of conflict.”3
3. Nigeria contains more historic pre-colonial
kingdoms than any other country in Africa,
some dating back to the fifth century. Its sixty
years of British colonial rule saw frequent
administrative reclassifications to unify the
ethnic and religious mosaic into a single
state. Post-independence leaders continued
to experiment with various methods of
political inclusion, many of which were highly
creative. Yet decades of military rule,
enormous oil profits, and a one party
dominant political system fostered political
centralization that strained national unity and
fostered unaccountability. While Nigeria has
exerted an influential voice in diplomatic
circles, its internal weaknesses have
prevented it from fulfilling its early promise.
Nigeria remains highly fragile, having
experienced a brutal civil war, military coups,
an armed insurgency, communal atrocities,
religious conflict, and the rise of
fundamentalist sects. The country is largely
governed by ex-generals and business
tycoons who operate as political “godfathers”
making back-room deals to wield power and
accumulate personal wealth. State
institutions remain weak, inter-group
relations are tense, the economy is suffering
from “the resource curse,” and national unity
is far from assured.
5 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Unity in Nigeria
Introduction
4. While there were ethnic tensions
within the federation dating back to colonial
rule, the first appearance of violent ethnic-
based conflict in the country occurred in
1966, when a military coup d’état was
mounted following a rigged election in the
then Western Region. A group of mostly Igbo
army officers overthrew the northern Hausa
Fulani-dominated government, ostensibly to
eliminate political corruption. The murder
and mutilation of top government and
Muslim leaders was seen as an Igbo plot to
install an anti-northern government in power.
Following a pro-north counter-coup six
months later, fighting broke out nationwide
with pogroms targeting Igbos. Most were
driven back to their area of origin in the then
Eastern Region. A Middle Belt Christian
general, Yakubu Gowan, was selected as a
compromise candidate to run the military
government following the coup, but it was
too late to contain the forces of
fragmentation. In 1967, rebel Igbo leaders
declared the independence of the breakaway
state of Biafra (comprising the entire former
Eastern Region), a territory that was
populated not only by Igbos, but by
minorities who historically feared Igbo
domination—Ijaw, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Calabari,
Rivers and others in the oil-rich Niger Delta.
One million people were estimated to have
died in the ensuing Nigerian Civil War (1967-
1970).
5. When the Nigerian military overran the
Biafran territory in 1970, there were
widespread fears of genocidal revenge
against the Igbos. Instead, the federal
government declared a “no victors, no
vanqui shed” pol i c y to p romote
reconciliation. Rebel leaders who had fled
the country were invited back; they were
neither put on trial nor punished. Forty years
after the end of the Biafran War,4 many
believe that there is still a bias against Igbos
occupying high offices. Yet Goodluck
Jonathan appointed an Igbo as Chief of Army
Staff, a key post, in September 2010 as part
of a general military shake-up, an action
applauded by Igbo civil groups. Whether an
Igbo could be nominated for president by a
major party remains an open question.
Windfall profits that the country received just
at the end of the civil war from the dramatic
rise in oil prices allowed the government to
soothe lingering ethnic grievances at the end
of the civil war. The distribution of oil money
and the policy of reconciliation eased the
reunion, and Nigeria turned its attention
toward becoming one of the wealthiest
countries in Africa, as the country’s economy
transitioned to one based largely on the
extractive industry.
6. While Nigeria rebounded quickly from the
civil war and there was no policy of
recrimination, the war and the subsequent
restructuring of the economy set the stage
for another source of unrest that erupted in
the 1980s—an armed insurgency by ethnic
minorities in the oil-producing Niger Delta
region, the minority areas of the former
breakaway Biafran region. Both the Biafran
War and the Niger Delta rebellion have
shaped the way Nigeria managed political
diversity. Several measures were adopted to
encourage broad political inclusion, of which
four are especially notable. It is important to
understand these efforts in order to grasp the
context in which inter-group relations exist
within the country.
7. First, there was a proliferation of states. In
the beginning, this was done to divide the
political opposition, but after the civil war it
was intended to decentralize power to avoid
more secessionist movements and respond to
demands for statehood from minorities. Out
of the original three regions at
independence, Nigeria was re-divided into
four “regions” in 1963, then into 12 “states”
in 1967, 19 in 1977, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991,
and 36 in 1996. The proliferation of states
led to a proliferation of bureaucracies and
patronage. It also prompted a new process of
disbursing federal revenue, particularly after
the civil war, when allocations began to be
distributed directly from the central
government to state governors who, in turn,
reallocated sums to local government
chairmen. This was the beginning of a new
revenue-allocation process which created
more opportunities for corruption as well as a
new class of power brokers—state governors
who continue to wield extensive influence.
Revenue distribution focused on which
persons received funds in the hierarchy of
power rather than which authorities, such as
the state legislatures or treasuries. Political
competition for holding office, even at the
local level, then intensified dramatically
because the winners had direct access to
revenue from oil allocations.
8. Second, a constitutional provision was
established requiring state representation to
be reflected at the center through the
“federal character” principle, which requires
the national cabinet to include at least one
minister from each of the 36 states. At the
local level, the constitution provided for a
preference for “indigenes” (by custom, this
refers to those whose ancestors were original
inhabitants of the community) over “non-
indigenes” (those who migrated, or whose
ancestors migrated, to the area). The
designation affects the allocation of land,
jobs, education, and political appointments.
However, the definition of “indigene” versus
“non-indigene” is unclear in the constitution.
The principle has had the negative effect of
establishing two classes of citizens, with
6 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Unity in Nigeria
Background
different rights in different areas of the
country. This has led to inter-group clashes,
particularly in mixed communities in the
North, including cities with substantial
clusters of Nigerians who migrate to towns
for economic opportunity. They are often
regarded as “foreigners” by the locals, even if
their families have lived there for
generations.
9. Third, an informal “power shifting” practice
(sometimes referred to as the “zoning” or
“rotational” rule) was adopted for the
presidential nomination process of the
dominant political party, the Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP). Unwritten and
untested in court, this principle has become
accepted as standard practice by most
political parties. It requires presidential
nominees to rotate between Christian
Southerners and Muslim Northerners at least
once every two terms (or eight years). Over
time, it has created constitutional crises, as
happened with the death of President Umaru
Yar’Adua, a Muslim northerner, in June 2010,
before the expiration of his first term. His
death meant that there was an automatic
power shift from the North to the South. This
set off an intense controversy over whether
Yar’Adua’s successor, Vice President
Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from the South-
South region, was entitled to run for political
office in the 2011 election under the zoning
rule. Leaders from the North claimed he could
not, as Yar’Adua had not served his full
term.5 Others, especially from the South-
South, argued that Jonathan should be
allowed to run for office, and that the power-
shifting rule should be dropped.
10. Fourth, the electoral system was
amended to discourage ethnic voting and
secessionist tendencies. It requires, in
addition to the popular vote, that a
presidential candidate has to receive one-
quarter of the votes cast in each of two-thirds
of the states plus the federal capital to be
declared a winner. On the surface, this
provision appears to establish a government
based on a broad mandate; in practice, it
encourages political parties to pressure local
agents to record winning votes in their areas
at any cost, including rigging, to meet the
necessary electoral quotas. This requirement
has had the effect of incentivizing fraud in
elections, undermining the political
legitimacy of several presidencies, and
generating public cynicism about elections
generally.
11. At the time they were adopted, these four
measures to broaden political representation
were thought to be the political glue that
would bring diverse elements of the country
together. However, they had unintended
consequences that often produced the
opposite effect. Institutionalizing ethno-
religious identity as the centerpiece of
political representation downgraded merit
and performance as qualifications for office
and reinforced political competition along
ethno-religious lines. In addition, ambiguities
about the rights of indigenes and non-
indigenes eroded the concept of citizenship
with equal rights under the law throughout
the country.
12. The power-shifting or zoning principle
caused other political difficulties, in
particular, tensions regarding presidential
succession. The debate over the nomination
process following Yar’Adua’s death
threatened key policy initiatives, including
the amnesty and cease fire for the Niger
Delta. It also deepened splits within the
ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and
sharpened the north-south/Muslim-Christian
rivalries.
13. Moreover, these measures intensified the
gap between minorities, on the one hand,
which represent roughly 40% of the
population, and the big three ethnic groups—
the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo—
on the other hand, which together represent
60% of the population. Historically, the big
three have had more access to government
jobs, contracts, education, and political
patronage. Minority grievances have been
expressed in many ways in different parts of
the country. In the Niger Delta, they exploded
in the 1990s into an armed insurgency in the
core oil-producing states in the southeast
part of the country. In the Middle Belt and
mixed cities in the north with many
minorities, communal clashes have been
common for decades, breaking out most
frequently when land and water became
scarce. The conflict in the Niger Delta with
several minorities did not involve religious
disputes (its population is predominantly
Christian); the causes of friction there were
rooted in grievances from environmental
degradation and competition for resources.6
14. Finally, the positive effects that might
have emerged from these efforts to foster
political inclusion were undermined by a
steady trend toward political centralization
that emerged during approximately three
decades of military rule. From 1970 to 1999,
power and wealth was concentrated in the
hands of unaccountable military elites and
their business associates, even as steps were
being taken to devolve formal power to the
states. When civilian rule returned in 1999,
there was little change in this trend, as the
system benefited civilian politicians as well
as generals. Since most government revenue
came from oil profits rather than taxes, and
since the PDP had become the dominant
political party, the ruling elites had ample
7 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Background
resources for using patronage to maintain
control. Opposition parties were represented
in the national assembly and at the state
level. In this respect, the creation of more
states and the distribution of revenue
allowed state governors to become
formidable political actors in their own right.
Nonetheless, even if they belonged to
opposition parties, they, too, assimilated into
the political system that is widely known in
Nigeria as being based on political
“godfathers” or informal power brokers,
consisting of former office-holders, ex-
generals, business leaders, state governors,
powerful local government chairmen, and
current federal officials, who use patronage
and oil revenues for self-aggrandizement and
political survival.
15. As a result, the cultivation of democratic
institutions, the elimination of poverty, and
the building of critical infrastructure have all
been neglected. With that neglect, federalism
weakened, corruption soared, economic
development stalled, the integrity of state
institutions eroded, inequality worsened, and
the North/South rivalry intensified. As the
quality and capacity of governance declined,
many groups felt marginalized and alienated,
as the state failed to provide basic services,
including security and justice. The erosion of
the judicial system, in particular, prompted
twelve northern states, or one-third of the
country, to adopt Sharia law in 2000, to
achieve some form of dispute resolution and
to instill a moral code that secular courts
lacked. While the Islamic code had been
practiced in civil cases in Nigeria for
centuries, this was the first time it was
applied to criminal violations, with harsh
punishments from the Islamic code that are
offensive to human rights advocates. In 2002,
Islamic law was also adopted in a southern
state, Oyo, for civil law cases only, such as
marriage, divorce, and land issues.
16. Though formally exempting Christians,
Sharia law created fear among Christians
living in states that adopted it. Violent riots
erupted, particular in northern cities with
Christian populations. Nigeria’s Islamic elites
have traditionally been moderate, so the
more radical versions of Sharia law are also a
threat to the Muslim establishment,
particularly the emirs and imams who have
managed Islamic practices in the past.
However, Islamic radicalism appears to be
attractive in areas with poor governance and
low economic development, such as the
impoverished North, where agricultural and
manufacturing sectors have withered as the
country’s oil industry prospered.
17. In this atmosphere, inter-group friction
has grown. Some estimates put the number
of civilians who have died from inter-
communal violence since 1999 as high as
13,000 (thirteen thousand), a figure which
others have challenged as being too low.
There is no authoritative figure, and while
commissions have been established, there
has been no official investigation.7 Most
perpetrators have gone unpunished,
especially those who incited communal
violence in the Northern and Middle Belt
regions. Rebels in the Niger Delta have also
widened their range of operations, with the
Ijaws in the forefront of armed resistance.
Some militants accepted the Yar’Adua
amnesty offer made in June 2009, but hold-
outs have resumed scattered attacks due to
disappointment over unfulfilled promises of
training and employment, the lack of a
political process that addresses the root
issues behind the rebellion, and the absence
of a robust reintegration program. Most of
the amnesty program is based simply on “buy
-outs” of individuals, a practice that is not
sustainable. Once payments to the ex-
militants stop, they could go back to
militancy or crime due to economic
desperation. Criminality in the Niger Delta
has increased, including armed robbery,
k idnapping for ransom, poli t ica l
assassinations, and violence against
journalists.
18. In sum, although the resolution of the
Nigerian civil war succeeded in preserving
the territorial integrity of the country, it did
not resolve the fundamental problem of
integrating ethnic, regional and religious
identities into a framework based on national
unity. Nigeria could fragment again, and
particular groups could again become targets
of mass atrocities.
19. The Nigerian experience shows the
weakness of stressing form over function in
managing diversity. There were political
motives behind some of the measures
adopted to institutionalize diversity, but
there was also a sincere desire to avert break
-away movements that could split the
country apart. Because these measures were
not well thought-out or implemented,
however, they had unintended consequences
that undermined national unity and created
or deepened group grievances. As Nigeria
enters a new political era, it is an open
question whether sufficient reforms will be
made to reverse these trends. Communal
groups cannot be adequately protected until
there is good governance, the rule of law,
equal citizenship rights, fiscal transparency,
equitable economic development, and an end
to impunity for violators of human rights—all
of which will require committed leadership
backed by an inter-ethnic and inter-religious
elite coalition dedicated to achieving these
goals.
8 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Background
20. Violence among identity groups
has occurred several times in different
locations over the course of fifty years of
Nigerian independence. Historically, targeted
acts of genocide on a large scale were
committed only once—in the period
preceding the outbreak of the Biafran War
when the more prosperous, educated and
Christian Igbo people were blamed for the
first military coup d’état that overthrew the
central government, then dominated by the
Muslim northern region. Pogroms were
launched against Igbos shortly afterward,
driving them back to their homeland in the
East. Thousands were killed. However, the
Biafran War (1967-1970) itself was not a
genocidal war, despite a perception fueled by
press accounts of alleged deliberate
starvation. Nor was it primarily a war over
control of oil, which was not being produced
in large quantities at the time. Rather, it was a
war to repress secession, or, as the
government described it—to “Keep Nigeria
One.” The reality was summed up by John de
St. Jorre, an independent journalist:
First, there was no ‘genocide’, massacres or
gratuitous killings; in the history of warfare
there can rarely have been such a
bloodless end and such a merciful
aftermath. Secondly, the expectations (and
some of the reports) of mass starvation
were not fulfilled…But there was mass
hunger and there were concentrations of
starving, sick and exhausted people,
usually refugees caught a long way from
home, some of whom died because aid was
too slow in reaching them. There is no
accurate figure for this category and
probably never will be, though it ran into
thousands, possibly even hundreds of
thousands.…Apart from the patchy
handling of the relief situation the most
outstanding feature of the end of the war
was the remarkable atmosphere of
reconciliation…It was marvelous to see
officers and men who had been facing
each other over the barrel of a gun for two
and a half years embrace and weep tears of
joy.8
21. Since the end of the war, Igbos have been
divided into seven states, two of which are
inhabited largely by other minority groups.
Fostering state identities and creating more
local governments would make it harder for
groups to secede, it was thought. Igbos
reported that they faced discrimination in the
immediate post-war period, particularly by
being purged from the upper ranks of the
military, but they gradually prospered in
private enterprise, thrived in the informal
economy, and acquired high positions in the
political parties and government, including
eventually the armed forces. Nonetheless,
some Igbos continue to express feelings of
psychological and economic marginalization,
even though they remain one of the largest
and most influential groups in the country.
While they are not usually the primary
targets, Igbos have been victimized by riots in
the North aimed generally at Southerners. In
July 2007, the former Biafran leader, General
Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, renewed his call
for secession of Igbo states. This call has not
been widely supported. Indeed, some Igbos
argue that, having shed their blood, they
have earned the right to be part of Nigeria. An
intra-ethnic debate such as this is not an
uncommon legacy of civil war, but it shows
that Igbos have not fully reconciled their dual
role in the country’s history—a group
responsible for the break-up of the country
and a targeted victim of ethnic cleansing. In
seeming contradiction to this revived call for
secession, Ojukwu and others have also
called for Igbos to have “their turn” at the
Nigerian presidency.
22. Another crisis in Nigeria’s attempts to
deal with identity occurred with the Yoruba
people, who became the central focus of
concern when the country’s freest and fairest
election was annulled depriving them of
power in 1993 by the then president, Major-
General Ibrahim Babamasi Babangida, known
as IBB. The Yoruba form the majority
population in six states in the southwest, and
they represent substantial proportions of the
population in three additional states.9 Their
moment appeared to have arrived when
Nigerians went to the polls on June 12, 1993
to end military rule and select a civilian
government. Early results showed that
Moshood Abiola, a wealthy and popular
Muslim Yoruba businessman, was winning a
landslide victory. However, Babangida, a
Nupe from Niger State, abruptly annulled the
election before results were released, setting
off massive demonstrations that paralyzed
several Nigerian cities and led to threats of
Yoruba secession. Due to riots, strikes, and
protests from a strong Yoruba-led
prodemocracy movement, Babangida was
forced to step down and turn over power to
an interim government. That government
lasted only three months before Defense
Minister Gen. Sani Abacha, a Muslim from
Kano State, led a coup d’état in November.
Abacha dissolved all civilian institutions,
including the national legislature and state
governments. His regime was the most
authoritarian military government in Nigeria’s
history and it was responsible for many
human rights violations, including executing
activists from the Niger Delta, arresting
political opponents, and intimidating the
press. The Abacha government jailed Abiola
for sedition in 1994. In a bizarre twist,
9 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Unity in Nigeria
Application of the Genocide Framework
Inter-Group Relations
Abacha died suddenly of an apparent heart
attack in June 1998, and within a month, so
did Abiola.10 He collapsed during a meeting
with high-level U.S. officials who were trying
to arrange a diplomatic solution to the
political impasse. The Yoruba were outraged
that not only had the election been stolen
from them and their leader imprisoned, but
now, as he was going to be released, it was
rumored that he had been poisoned to
prevent his installation in office.11 This crisis
brought Nigeria closer to a break-up than at
any other time since the end of the civil war.
23. In the 1999 election that followed the
death of Abiola, a Yoruba was voted into
office—retired Major-General Olusegun
Obasanjo, partly in deference to the
aggrieved feelings of marginalization by the
Yoruba population. A Christian, Obasanjo was
a former head of state who had also been
imprisoned by Abacha. As the military leader
in charge of the incursion that ended the
Biafra war, his disciplined forces had been
credited with avoiding a genocidal aftermath.
Although it was a flawed election, the 1999
poll was widely seen by Nigerians as a means
to send the soldiers back to their barracks
and return the country to civilian rule. That
blood, they have earned the right to be part
of Nigeria. An intra-ethnic debate such as this
is not an uncommon legacy of civil war, but it
shows that Igbos have not fully reconciled
their dual role in the country’s history—a
group responsible for the break-up of the
country and a targeted victim of ethnic
cleansing. In seeming contradiction to this
revived call for secession, Ojukwu and others
have also called for Igbos to have “their turn”
at the Nigerian presidency.
22. Another crisis in Nigeria’s attempts to
deal with identity occurred with the Yoruba
people, who became the central focus of
concern when the country’s freest and fairest
election was annulled depriving them of
power in 1993 by the then president, Major-
General Ibrahim Babamasi Babangida, known
as IBB. The Yoruba form the majority
population in six states in the southwest, and
they represent substantial proportions of the
population in three additional states.9 Their
moment appeared to have arrived when
Nigerians went to the polls on June 12, 1993
to end military rule and select a civilian
government. Early results showed that
Moshood Abiola, a wealthy and popular
Muslim Yoruba businessman, was winning a
landslide victory. However, Babangida, a
Nupe from Niger State, abruptly annulled the
election before results were released, setting
off massive demonstrations that paralyzed
several Nigerian cities and led to threats of
Yoruba secession. Due to riots, strikes, and
protests from a strong Yoruba-led
prodemocracy movement, Babangida was
forced to step down and turn over power to
an interim government. That government
lasted only three months before Defense
Minister Gen. Sani Abacha, a Muslim from
Kano State, led a coup d’état in November.
Abacha dissolved all civilian institutions,
including the national legislature and state
governments. His regime was the most
authoritarian military government in Nigeria’s
history and it was responsible for many
human rights violations, including executing
activists from the Niger Delta, arresting
political opponents, and intimidating the
press. The Abacha government jailed Abiola
for sedition in 1994. In a bizarre twist,
Abacha died suddenly of an apparent heart
attack in June 1998, and within a month, so
did Abiola.10 He collapsed during a meeting
with high-level U.S. officials who were trying
to arrange a diplomatic solution to the
political impasse. The Yoruba were outraged
that not only had the election been stolen
from them and their leader imprisoned, but
now, as he was going to be released, it was
rumored that he had been poisoned to
prevent his installation in office.11 This crisis
brought Nigeria closer to a break-up than at
any other time since the end of the civil war.
23. In the 1999 election that followed the
death of Abiola, a Yoruba was voted into
office—retired Major-General Olusegun
Obasanjo, partly in deference to the
aggrieved feelings of marginalization by the
Yoruba population. A Christian, Obasanjo was
a former head of state who had also been
imprisoned by Abacha. As the military leader
in charge of the incursion that ended the
Biafra war, his disciplined forces had been
credited with avoiding a genocidal aftermath.
Although it was a flawed election, the 1999
poll was widely seen by Nigerians as a means
to send the soldiers back to their barracks
and return the country to civilian rule. That
Obasanjo was a Yoruba helped ease the
transition. Northern political “godfathers”
reluctantly acquiesced to Obasanjo as a way
to get beyond the crisis and preserve the
union. In addition, the PDP adopted the
principle of power-shifting in order to assure
the Yorubas that they and other groups could
get more than one chance at the political
helm. Obasanjo benefited most from this new
principle. He won a second term in 2003
(although that election was also regarded as
rigged), and he tried, but ultimately failed, to
change the constitution to run for a third
term in 2007.
24. When thwarted in his quest for a third
term by a legislative vote prompted by a
massive outcry from the public, Obasanjo, as
party leader, hand-picked his successor,
10 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Application of the Genocide Framework
Umaru Yar’Adua, a little-known Muslim
governor from Katsina State. Thus, power
passed power back to the North per the
zoning principle. When Yar’Adua died in
2010 before he could complete his first full
term in office, Vice President Goodluck
Jonathan, a Christian Southerner, succeeded
him. This not only shifted power back again
to the South, it opened up the contest for the
presidency in 2011. In August 2010, the PDP,
after considerable controversy, decided to
waive the zoning principle which would have
prevented the PDP nomination of Jonathan,
but it also reaffirmed the principle, creating
confusion. After much speculation and just
four months before the election, Goodluck
Jonathan announced that he would run for
the presidency in January 2011.
25. In addition to deaths from the civil war
and the disturbances surrounding the 1993
election controversy, tens of thousands of
other people have been killed in sectarian
violence over the years. However, no single
group stands out as being at risk of genocide.
Rather, identity-based violence—some
thought to be planned, some spontaneous—
often erupts from local causes, such as access
to jobs, land, education, economic
opportunity, damage to the environment, and
control of local government. These disputes
can easily spiral into identity-related
conflicts that have wider national
significance, instigated by leaders who want
to advance their own agendas. There have
also been rebellions by fundamentalist
Muslim sects, such as the Maitatsine riots in
the 1980s and Boko Haram unrest in the
2000s, both of which triggered massive
responses from the federal government.
Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Benue, and Taraba
states have all had bloody clashes in the
1990s and the 2000s, often involving
religious disputes between Christians and
Muslims, intra-religious rivalry among Muslim
sects, or competition over resources.
26. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999,
inter-group conflict has been concentrated in
the Middle Belt states, an area sometimes
called a “mini-Nigeria” because it is the most
heterogeneous part of the country. Plateau
State and the area around its regional capital,
Jos, have some 50-100 ethnic groups, none of
which are dominant. Until the last ten years,
these groups lived in peace.12 Formerly the
center of the tin-mining industry, its main
economic activities today are cattle-raising
by Hausa Fulani nomads and agriculture by
local residents or “indigenes.” As agriculture
has expanded, both land and access to water
for cattle have been in limited supply,
inducing friction between the two
communities.13 Droughts, population growth,
and expanded settlement have sharpened
the differences between Muslims and
Christians. In 2001, 1,000 persons were killed
and mosques and churches burned in inter-
group riots that were sparked when a non-
indigenous Muslim received a local
government job that indigenous Christians
believed belong to them. In 2004, more than
500 people were murdered in cycles of
religious revenge. In 2008, disputes over
local council polls erupted in violence with
900 killed, and another 300 were later killed
in a dispute over a plot of land. In January
2010, an estimated 500 Muslims were killed
over land-use disputes between Muslim
Hausa-Fulani herders and Christian farmers
from local ethnic groups. Two months later,
there was a retaliatory attack by Muslims for
the Christian attack in January, resulting in
another 500 dead. Sporadic killings
continued months later. Whereas most of the
states in the North are Muslim, Plateau State
is an exception in that it is largely Christian,
never having been conquered by the 19th
century Muslim Sokoto caliphate.
27. Another source of friction is the vague
definition of an “indigene.”14 By custom, the
term refers to people whose ancestors
originally inhabited the area. Preference for
indigenes, or “sons of the soil,” is common
throughout the country. In effect, it has
created two classes of citizens: preferred-
status indigenes and secondary-status non-
indigenes, even if the latter may have resided
in, owned property, or used land in the area
for generations. Preference for indigenes is a
widely-accepted discriminatory practice that
has been institutionalized in the law. A
constitutional remedy eliminating
preferences would help reduce the tension,
but it would not suffice unless the cultural
practice of discrimination based on area of
origin was outlawed altogether.
28. Besides the North, another area of unrest
is the Niger Delta which formally consists of
nine states in the south-eastern part of the
country, where the jugular vein of the
economy, the oil industry, is located.15 Over
40 ethnic groups speaking some 250 dialects
live in this area, including Efik, Ibibio, Annang,
Oron, Ogoni, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Igbo, Urhobo,
Yoruba, and Kalabari. Commercial oil
production has existed in Nigeria since the
1950s, but the industry did not take off until
the 1970s, when international prices soared
and major reserves of the highly desirable
“sweet c rude” were di scovered.
Environmental degradation has increased in
the producing areas of the Niger Delta since
that time. The government has neglected to
compensate the local population or protect
the environment from leakages, gas flaring,
and other abuses that have polluted the air,
11 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Application of the Genocide Framework
soil and water, damaging arable land and
fishing stocks. A report in The New York
Times comparing the 2010 Gulf Oil Spill in
the U.S. to the Nigerian experience, estimated
that an average of 11 million gallons of oil
(more than the Exxon Valdez) a year has
spilled into the Niger Delta for the past 50
years.16
29. Antagonism had been building in the area
for years, but the tipping point in the Niger
Delta came in November 1995, when the
Abacha military government executed nine
ethnic Ogoni activists, including Ken Saro-
Wiwa, a popular spokesperson for the Ogoni
people, creating an international outcry. From
that time onward, the region has been a
hotbed of ethnic violence, with attacks
concentrated on multinational oi l
installations and government targets.
However, the rebellion is not unified in its
12 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Percent Incidence of Poverty versus Self-Assessment by Nigerian Region and State
Zones State Incidence of Poverty
Self-Assessment: Very Poor
North Central Benue 55.33 26.15
Kogi 88.55 28.63
Kwara 85.22 32.57
Nassarawa 61.59 19.23
Niger 63.90 18.10
Plateau 60.37 19.42
Average 69.16 24.02
North East Adamawa 71.73 26.97
Bauchi 86.29 27.01
Borno 53.63 36.86
Gombe 77.01 12.25
Taraba 62.15 29.71
Yobe 83.25 26.29
Average 72.34 26.52
North West Jigawa 95.07 13.87
Kaduna 50.24 11.87
Kano 61.29 18.40
Katsina 71.06 5.60
Kebbi 89.65 12.53
Sokoto 76.81 17.89
Zamfara 80.93 18.52
Average 75.01 14.10
Zones State Incidence of Poverty
Self-Assessment: Very Poor
South East Abia 22.27 34.45
Anambra 20.11 16.19
Ebonyi 43.33 36.74
Enugu 31.12 17.24
Imo 27.39 25.42
Average 29.21 26.16
South South Akwa Ibom 34.82 16.86
Bayelsa 19.98 61.48
C/River 41.61 21.70
Delta 45.35 25.13
Edo 33.09 34.51
Rivers 29.09 14.93
Average 33.99 29.10
South West Ekiti 42.27 35.57
Lagos 63.58 16.84
Ogun 31.73 18.55
Ondo 42.14 34.12
Osun 32.35 20.45
Oyo 24.08 12.51
Average 39.36 23.01
These statistics are broken down according to the six economic zones of the country, with the
zonal averages in bold. Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, National Bureau of Statistics, Social
Statistics in Nigeria, 2005, available at http://www.nigeriastat.gov.ng/, accessed April 8, 2010.
Application of the Genocide Framework
goals. Some militants have kidnapped
civilians for ransom, and there have been
infighting as well. In 1997, for example, the
Urhobo, Itsekiri, and Ijaw fought over the
relocation of a local government
headquarters, a move that would determine
the distribution of oil revenues among the
three groups. The offer of a ceasefire and
amnesty by the late president Yar’Adua
divided the militants deeply as well.
30. Leading the insurgency are the Ijaws, the
fourth largest ethnic group in the country and
the largest in the Niger Delta, spread over six
states,17 but—unlike the Igbos, Yoruba, and
Hausa-Fulani—they do not constitute the
majority in any one of them. Anti-government
protests over the environment originated
with the Ogoni, but the Ijaws have effectively
been in the forefront in armed protest which
succeeded, at its height in 2009, in reducing
oil production by as much as 25%. The Ijaws
also use the language of ethnic nationalism
to mobilize many of the diverse peoples of
the region around the cause of greater justice
for the peoples of the Niger Delta.
31. According to government reports,
President Yar’Adua’s amnesty program
reportedly had lured about 20,000 fighters
into the rehabilitation program,18 but some
recalcitrant remnants of MEND (Movement
for the Emancipation of the People of the
Niger Delta) did not respond positively and
threatened to resume the insurgency. Lack of
development in the region drives much of the
popular support enjoyed by the militants,
even though they are divided by internal
splits, have corrupt leaders, and indulge in
criminal acts, including kidnapping, bombings
and “bunkering”—the illegal theft of oil.19
Since petroleum represents 95% of the
country’s export earnings and 80% of
government revenues, resolving the
insurrection in the Niger Delta is vital to the
country’s economic survival. Even a small
group of hold-outs could wreak havoc on the
industry.
32. Another source of communal conflict in
Nigeria is the wider tension between the
North and South. This is based both on
historical and cultural differences as well as
on a growing disparity between rich and
poor, which have led to perceptions of group-
based inequality generally. For example,
rebels in the Niger Delta believe that a
greater share of the oil money will resolve
their development problems. They argue that
this will ensure that they will not be
politically repressed or economically
marginalized. However, Nigeria’s oil-
producing states already receive huge
revenue allocations, but due to corruption
and the system of revenue distribution, the
funds have not reached the grass-roots level.
This is not likely to change simply by
throwing more money at the problem.
Moreover, contrary to widespread
impression, overall poverty rates are actually
more severe in the North than in the South.
When the average of number of people living
above the poverty line in each region is
divided by the average Gross Domestic
Product of that region, the South-South,
where the Ijaw live, has the smallest
proportion of impoverished inhabitants, as
seen in the chart on page opposite. The issue
is not the total number of people living in
poverty, but rather the poverty rate relative
to the amount of revenue being generated by
the region. This may explain why more
people in the South-South tend to assess
themselves as “very poor” compared to other
Nigerians, despite the fact that the
percentage of poor people (i.e., those living
below the poverty line) in the North is much
higher.
33. In real terms, the North is worse off than
most other parts of the country. De-
industrialization has hit many cities hard in
the region, especially Kano and Kaduna,
which have faced high unemployment, the
emergence of fundamentalist sects, and
growing frustration among youth. The
adoption of Sharia law in the 12 northern
states has also sharpened Northern identity.
Historically, even though there have been
cultural differences, religion has not been a
cause for violence in the country. Since the
1990s, tensions have flared over resources,
revenue allocation, and local government
control. As a result, inter-communal violence
between Muslims and Christians has
worsened. Religious tolerance is weakening
not only because of resource issues, but also
because of cultural sensitivities, such as
disputes over Muslim prayer in public places,
the ability of Christian women to ride
motorbikes in Muslim areas, and the holding
of beauty contests. For example, in 2002, the
Miss World beauty contest had to be moved
from Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, to London
following violent attacks by Muslim youths
who were angered by what they believed
were inflammatory, anti-Islam news
commentaries surrounding the pageant.20
13 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Application of the Genocide Framework
34. The National Assembly of Nigeria
is moderately strong, and has demonstrated
independence of the executive, notably by
denying former President Olusegun
Obasanjo’s bid to change the constitution to
allow him to run for a third term in 2007. The
Parliamentary Powers’ Index places Nigeria at
about the 50th percentile globally with a
score of 0.47.21 Thus, there is a significant
degree of potential legislative independence
when the issue is sufficiently salient to
generate a popular outcry. The legislature is
backed by a 1999 constitution that could
legally protect citizens from being victims of
genocide should warning signs be recognized
and acted upon, though it is uncertain
whether the security apparatus could act
quickly in that capacity.
35. The political party system is less
developed, as it has drifted from a multiparty
system at the time of independence toward a
one party-dominant system since the return
to civilian rule in 1999. The PDP has won
every presidential election since then. It
dominates both houses of the national
legislature, and controls three-quarters of the
state governorships. In the aftermath of the
transition to power of President Goodluck
Jonathan in 2010, however, and the resulting
controversy over power-shifting, party in-
fighting broke out. The PDP leadership
suspended 19 prominent dissident members
for criticizing the lack of transparency in
selecting candidates for political office.
Power struggles centered on the role of the
Southern president, who is resented by
Northerners who feel his succession violates
the zoning principle. Reformers are calling
for revamping the system, maintaining that
the state governors have become too
powerful and are overtaking the party
machinery in the nomination process. Each
state governor has his own patronage system,
his own party machinery, and very often his
own militia or team of mercenaries who can
be mobilized during elections to manipulate
polling outcomes. If the PDP splits, two
outcomes are possible: more open
competition in a two party or multiparty
system, or further fragmentation, such that
no clear majority is possible to attain.
36. Other state institutions are weak, given
the history of military rule and the dominant
role of “godfathers.” The constitution
provides for an independent judiciary, but
the once proud justice system is a shadow of
its former self, susceptible to political
pressure and corruption, except for justices
on the Supreme Court who have
demonstrated some independence.
According to the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators, Nigeria is the weakest
of the world’s 20 most populous countries
concerning the Rule of Law. According to the
Bank’s evaluation, people do not “have
confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”
The erosion of the system of justice was a
major factor in driving the adoption of Sharia
law in the North, as well as permitting
impunity whenever violence breaks out.
37. The security forces also present
challenges. The military has good capacity
regarding peacekeeping missions, having
served with distinction after some
unfortunate initial assignments in West
Africa. No one has produced an authoritative
study on ethnic representation in the armed
forces. Prior to Obasanjo’s presidential terms,
the military’s officer ranks were primarily
staffed by Northerners, with the rank and file
soldiers recruited predominantly from the
Middle Belt states. Obasanjo diversified the
upper ranks, but the rank and file is still
thought to be primarily from the Middle Belt.
In September 2010, President Goodluck
Jonathan replaced the top brass of the
security establishment, appointing new
service chiefs, a new Director of the State
Security Services (SSS), and a new acting
Inspector General of Police. Military and
police leadership shake-ups are common
with new administrations. This new shake-up
involves people from several regions of the
country. The military is used by the
government to impose domestic order and it
exercises its firepower freely, often
indiscriminately, killing many non-
combatants. The security forces are often
accused of abuse and political favoritism.
After the 2010 violence in Jos, for example,
Christians alleged bias on the part of the
military against them, and called for Major-
General Saleh Maina, the commanding officer
in Jos, to be held accountable for alleged
abuses by security forces that were sent in to
quell the Jos disturbances. In the past, the
security forces had been accused of taking
the side of Christians in similar clashes. The
then Chief of the Army Staff, Lt-General
Abdulrahman Bello Dambazau, denied these
allegations. One issue that has not been
seriously debated is the structure of the
police force, a national institution.22 Local
populations often feel that national police do
not know the culture, speak the language, or
are familiar with the terrain of the areas over
which they have jurisdiction. The federal
government, however, is reluctant to have
locally-controlled and locally-recruited
police for fear that they may support break-
away movements or become more ethnically-
oriented, rather than nationally oriented in
their loyalties. However, initiatives to
14 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Capacity of the State to Prevent Genocide
Application of the Genocide Framework
decentralize power in order to strengthen
security might consider establishing local
police, with civilian review boards to oversee
disputes concerning abusive behavior,
resource allocation, and policies concerning
training, promotions, and codes of conduct.
That might also be a way of building public
confidence in the police.
38. A serious problem in the security forces is
impunity and lack of accountability. This
issue is especially severe among the police,
who are underpaid, undertrained,
overstretched, and not held accountable for
undisciplined behavior, such as extra-judicial
killings. They have been accused of routinely
torturing and killing suspects, particularly
those who cannot afford to bribe them.
Human Rights Watch stated in its 2008 report
on Nigeria that some 10,000 Nigerians have
been shot and killed by the Nigerian national
police force since 2000 during the course of
police operations. Amnesty International
accused the police of killing at will and
conducting their own executions.
39. In the Niger Delta, vulnerable groups lack
institutional protections against extensive
criminality, as well as political unrest. The
Ijaws, who represent the majority of
organized militants in the Niger Delta, could
be the most likely targets of extra-judicial
killings or excessive use of force by the
military. Should the Niger Delta conflict not
be settled, the potential exists for an
escalation along ethnic lines, especially if the
amnesty program collapses.
40. While the security forces have been
accused of exercising a heavy hand when
operating in the Niger Delta, they are
frequently absent when conflict initially
breaks out; especially in the communal
conflicts that erupt in the North. When rioting
occurs and an emergency erupts, police and
military set up roadblocks, establish curfews,
and bring order. When the violence subsides,
they typically withdraw, leaving the drivers
of conflict and often the perpetrators of
violence untouched. Shamaki Gad Peter, the
Director of the Nigerian League for Human
Rights, has argued that those responsible for
violence in the North typically go free. “Most
of those arrested are usually minors who
cannot be legally subjected to such criminal
prosecutions. Many of the suspects arrested
say they have sponsors, but at the end of the
day, the sponsors are neither prosecuted nor
their names disclosed to the public.”23
According to legal experts and human rights
groups, “perpetrators of mass killings in
Nigeria have largely gone unpunished over
the past decade.”24 Investigations by Human
Rights Watch into inter-communal violence
that has killed more than 13,000 people in
the North since 1999 showed that
commissions are often set up and
recommendations made, but no effective
action taken.25 In addition, the military,
including the Joint Task Force, the special
unit created to combat the rebellion in the
Niger Delta, and the Nigerian Navy, have been
implicated in oil bunkering, a highly lucrative
criminal activity. However, there have been
no investigations into such allegations.
41. The media is very active, independent,
and outspoken, providing probably the best
voice internally against the perpetration of
organized violence and an end to impunity.
There are over 100 national and local
publications, many of which are privately-
owned and critical of the government, as well
as hundreds of broadcast outlets licensed by
the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission.
However, Freedom House has asserted that
there have been cases in which security
agencies used arbitrary detention and
extrajudicial measures to muffle political
activism and restrict press coverage.
Journalists have also been kidnapped and
intimidated. Such thuggery is a constant
threat to media freedom and casts a
menacing shadow over the ability of
journalists to pursue independent
investigations or expose wrong-doing in high
circles.
42. Along with the relative media freedom,
the non-governmental sector—including
national human rights organizations,
democracy activists, trade unions, and
women’s organizations—are permitted to
function freely. The non-governmental
community has had fewer restrictions on
their activities since the advent of civilian
rule. Civil society has played a significant role
in monitoring elections, organizing group
interests, and being a watchdog of
democracy. With the support of foreign
assistance programs, some organizations are
training to provide a conflict early-warning
system and monitor violence in areas of high
tension, such as the Niger Delta, or in
advance of elections. As witnesses to
outbreaks of violence, they could play a role
in preventing genocide or mass atrocities by
sounding the alarm, activating an
international response, insisting on
accountability, and working to end impunity.
However, the nongovernmental sector is
weakened by a lack of resources, and many
are not institutionally sustainable without
international support. In addition, the bulk of
civil society activity occurs in the South.
There is far less such activity in the North.
15 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Application of the Genocide Framework
43. Small arms proliferation is a
major problem in West Africa, and Nigeria is a
major importer of arms due to the high
demand during elections and communal
conflicts. Shamaki Gad Peter, the League for
Human Rights Director, has noted that in the
inter-communal violence in the northern
conflict zones, “the accused are poor people
who struggle to feed themselves, but [yet
they] have access to AK-47 rifles which sell at
around US $2,000 [on] the black market.
Where do these poor people get these guns?
They must have sponsors.”26 One group that
has managed to smuggle small arms into the
country that presents a threat is Boko Haram
(whose name in Hausa means “Western
Education is Forbidden”), a radical Islamic
sect that launched an uprising in the
northeastern state of Borno last year. The
revolt was brutally repressed by the military
and police in an assault mounted in July 2009
that left 800 dead. The sect’s leader was
captured and died (or was killed) in police
custody. More killings have occurred since
then in Bornu’s capital, Maiduguri, the
headquarters of Boko Haram, in incidents
committed both by the security forces and
unknown motorcycle drive-by assassins. Boko
Haram is known locally as Nigeria’s “Taliban,”
because it stands for the same strict religious
principles and practices. However, no direct
links have been discovered between Boko
Haram and any Islamic organizations in Asia
or the Middle East. One year after the
crackdown on the group, they successfully
staged a jail break in September 2010, in
which more than 721 inmates, including
members of the sect, were freed from a
prison in the northern town of Bauchi,
showing that the sect was still capable of
inflicting serious attacks.27 Just a month
before the jailbreak, security services
reported that they had intercepted a large
arms cache being smuggled into the country
from Chad.28 Intercommunal violence based
on resource competition in the North could
be exploited by extremist groups, such as
Boko Haram, who want to set up an Islamic
community that applies fundamentalist
Islamic laws and practices in the country’s
Muslim areas.
44. In the Niger Delta, militant coalitions and
groups, such as the Joint Revolutionary
Council, an umbrella organization which
includes the Movement for the Emancipation
of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Reformed
Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force
(NDPVF), and the Martyrs' Brigade, are heavily
armed. Their purchases are usually funded
through oil theft and protection money paid
by oil companies.29 These groups often have
an ethnic basis to their mobilization,
especially among the Ijaw.30 Militants
frequently have linkages to elected officials,
such as the alliance between then Ijaw Youth
Council (IYC) leader, Mujahid Dokubo-Asari,
and an Igbo governor of Rivers State, Peter
Odili. Asari apparently intimidated Odili’s
political opposition in exchange for access to
oil bunkering routes. When the two of them
had a falling out, Odili supported another
Ijaw militant, Ateke Tom, against his former
ally.31 Odili is no longer governor.
45. Relationships between sponsors or
political “godfathers” and militant groups
occur throughout Nigeria. The “godfathers”
provide access to arms, financing, and
recruits, depending on the political pressures
at the time, and this facilitates politicians
having a ready militia at their disposal, often
during elections. Typically, security forces
turn a blind eye to the activities of these
factions. When conflict between groups
escalates to a level of mass violence, the
military typically is sent in to quell the
disturbances.
16 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Presence of Illegal Arms and Armed Elements
46. There is no evidence of any
strategic campaigns, official or otherwise, to
eliminate in whole or part any particular
group in Nigeria. However, there is distrust
and stereotyping among groups, especially
when resources become scarce, elections are
looming, or there is a change in leadership.
There is not yet any “hate speech” as such,
but polarizing language of indigene versus
non-indigene (or “settler”) is often used to
drive a wedge between communities and
justify acts of violence. Such practices are
also common during election campaigns
when ethno-religious divisions are exploited
to win votes, control economic resources,
acquire land, or receive favoritism in
contracts, licensing, and jobs. While
exclusionary practices have been given
prominent attention in the North, it is a
national phenomenon that has affected other
states, including:
• Modakeke (settlers) and Ife (indigenes) in
Osun State
Motivation of Leading Actors
Application of the Genocide Framework
• Sabon Gari (or migrant) settlements and
the local Hausa indigenes in Kano State
• Sabo Gari settlements and the local Yoruba
population in Oyo State
• Hausa (settlers) and the Kataf (indigenes)
in Kaduna State
• Urhobo (settlers) and the Itsekiri
(indigenes) in Delta State
• Urhobo (settlers) and the Tiv (indigenes) in
Taraba state
• Jukun-Chamba (settlers) and the Kuteb
(indigenes) in Taraba state
• Hausa (settlers) and the Yoruba (indigenes)
in Ogun state
Politicians and security forces play groups
against each other, in much the way that Odili
split the Ijaw opposition by playing Ateke
Tom against Mujahid Dokubo-Asari.
47. In recent years, however, new actors are
becoming involved in perpetrating violence.
Churches and mosques have financed and
rallied mobs to commit acts of violence in the
defense of their religion or community, or in
response to a perceived offense, such as
disrespecting the Prophet Mohammed or
desecrating holy sites or sacred ground.
Politicians have appealed to communal
nationalism and religious identities to win
votes, and corrupt officials have looked the
other way when violence has occurred. While
there appears to be no planning or intention
for genocide to occur, there are also no
effective mechanisms on the ground to
prevent or stop spontaneous or planned local
violence against groups to settle old scores
and get revenge for past atrocities. When and
if such violence occurs, Nigeria’s vulnerability
is that it may fulfill Edmund Burke’s warning
that the only thing that is necessary for evil
to triumph is for good men to do nothing.
17 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
48. The uncertainties and instability
that prevailed in the period leading up to the
Nigerian Civil War are by no means as intense
in 2010 as they were in 1966-1967, when the
country began to fragment. However, there
are new circumstances that could facilitate
genocide or mass atrocities as the country
transitions into a new administration. Four
scenarios of widespread identity-based
violence in the future are plausible. The first
scenario would be a resurgence of unrest that
spirals out of control in the Niger Delta. A
tenuous ceasefire is being resisted by the
Joint Revolutionary Council, a recently
formed group which has claimed
responsibility for an attack on a Royal Dutch
Shell facility since the amnesty offer of June
2009, and many militants who have accepted
the amnesty have complained of false or
unfulfilled promises of jobs and training. If
the ceasefire and amnesty should break
down, or if the payments by the government
to militants end and full-scale armed
resistance resumes, a security crackdown by
the government could occur under a newly
elec ted adminis t ration . In these
circumstances, the Ijaw people, who
constitute the heart of the militancy, would
likely be most affected.
49. A second scenario would be expanded
identity-based violence breaking out from
intercommunal fighting in the mixed
communities in the North between indigenes
and non-indigenes. This could result in
several possible outcomes: a North-South
split, a religious war between Christians and
Muslims, or an intra-Islamic struggle that pits
Nigeria’s moderate Islamic establishment of
respected emirs32 and other Islamic
associations against extremist groups and
Islamic sects which have begun to infiltrate
Nigeria, such as the Boko Haram.
50. Third, electoral campaigns could spark a
serious identity-based conflict. In 2007, all
the principal presidential contenders were
Muslims from the North and there are
substantial pressures to ensure that the North
again recaptures the presidency in 2011. If
President Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian
Southerner, is nominated by a major party,
his opponent is almost certainly going to be a
Muslim Northerner. This will be the first time
that the Muslim/Christian rivalry will be
played directly out at the national level. If the
election is perceived to have been rigged,
violence could erupt on a massive scale with
demonstrations breaking out in Nigerian
cities across the country, instilling fears of
religious retribution and rage.
51. The fourth scenario would be another
violent change of government at the top.
There are a number of permissive
circumstances that would facilitate such an
event: a history of military coup d’états; the
prominent role that ex-generals continue to
play in politics; the enormous wealth
accumulated by former leaders who deploy
their own militias for political purposes; a
history of assassinations against political
Circumstances that Facilitate Genocide
Application of the Genocide Framework
opponents, many of which have not been
prosecuted; accumulated group grievances
from political turmoil and economic
mismanagement; a huge number of
unemployed youth; and deep public
dissatisfaction with the direction in which the
country is going. If violence were used to
forcefully change the government or remove
a leader, it could plunge Nigeria into another
round of retributive violence against the
group perceived to be behind the action,
reminiscent of the country’s first coup d’état
in 1966, which set off pogroms against the
Igbos and a civil war. This time around,
Nigeria may not have the wherewithal to
survive another round of ethnic fighting and
civil conflict. State institutions, such as the
civil service and the judiciary, which had held
the country together in the past, have eroded
considerably.
52. Each of these scenarios carries different
risks for different groups, and in many cases,
several groups may be at risk simultaneously.
Ijaws would be the likely group to suffer most
in the Niger Delta, but would not be the only
community in danger. Christians appear to be
most vulnerable in the North because they
are the minority, but Muslims have also been
victims of planned attacks by Christians and
would likely be again, if they lived or worked
in the South under times of major distress. In
the event of a forceful overthrow of the
government, any identity group perceived to
be behind an assassination or a coup d’état
could be the target of revenge attacks by
angry mobs.
18 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
53. As noted earlier, the most
extreme conditions of genocidal acts in
Nigeria’s history took place during the
pogroms against the Igbos in 1966-67. Since
then, there have been periodic ethno-
religious outbreaks of violence in the Middle
Belt and in other parts of the country. The
security forces have been alleged to be
complicit in the violence in some cases, but
there has been no evidence of any systematic
national policy to target any identity group in
particular. In the Niger Delta, militants and
criminal gangs have perpetrated killings and
abductions for ransom. In most cases where
militants have been involved, the kidnap
victims have been released unharmed. There
is no pattern of particular ethnic groups
being singled out as kidnap victims or for
targeted killings. When such abuses do occur,
it is usually a product of factionalized elites
settling old scores or criminal activity against
foreigners working in the oil industry in order
to collect ransom. Amnesty International
reported that in the May 2009 military
offensive in the Niger Delta, civilians were
sometimes caught in the crossfire with
militants.33 Although civilian killings may not
be genocidal in intent, the military and police
have not taken adequate precautions to
protect non-combatants. Further, the security
forces often downplay the casualties, either
denying that civilians were killed or
dismissing the deaths as part of the
unintended consequences of their
operations. Rarely have they been brought to
account for such abuses.
Genocidal Acts
54. Thus far, there has been no
evidence of the systematic use of
inflammatory or dangerous speech that
belittles, denigrates or demeans against any
single group. Nor is there evidence of any
intent at the national level to destroy in
whole or in part any particular group.
However, at the local level, identity-based
communal conflict has been recurrent. Riots
in the Middle Belt and elsewhere have
revealed some evidence of deliberate attacks
against particular groups, with Christians
targeting Muslims and vice versa. Attacks are
not only focused on civilians, including
women and children, some of whom have
been mutilated, but have also targeted
churches and mosques, and peoples’ homes
and property. Muslims and Christians have
both engaged in retaliatory attacks.
Commissions appointed to investigate the
causes of such attacks have sometimes
reinforced the very conditions that spawned
these attacks in the first place. For example,
the Commission headed by Justice J. Aribiton
Evidence of Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part….
Application of the Genocide Framework
Fiberesima that was established to delve into
the causes of the 1994 riots in Jos concluded
that there was evidence of intended
destruction of one group by another, but
reaffirmed the discriminatory distinction
between indigenes and non-indigenes by
declaring that the “indigenes”—Berom,
Anaguta and Jarawa ethnic groups—were
rightfully claiming their status, while Hausa
and Fulani ethnic groups were declared
“settlers.” The Commission recommended
the prosecution of Hausa/Fulani leaders
accused of fomenting violence. Such
conclusions can be seen by local groups as
grounds for justifiable preemptive violence
against any group that does not qualify as
“indigene.”
19 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
55. In 1967, the conditions that gave
rise to the pogroms against the Igbos were
deeply embedded in the social and political
contradictions that existed between the more
developed Southerners, who dominated the
economy, and the less developed
Northerners, who controlled the political
system. The immediate triggering factors
were an Igbo-led military coup and a counter-
coup by Northerners. That same economic/
political power split exists to the present
time. The triggering factors that have ignited
violence in the past could likewise spark
violence in the future: another coup d’état,
political assassinations, a rigged election,
communal conflict, or a revived insurgency.
Other types of triggers could be contested
local elections; land disputes; religious
rivalry; competition for jobs; and decisions on
the location of public infrastructure, such as
markets, hospitals, or schools, which may be
seen to favor one group over another. With
the rise of religious identities, fighting may
also break out over control of mosques, the
impact of Sharia law on non-Muslims, or
perceived offenses to religious codes
concerning provocative dress, media
statements or other public behavior. A
number of everyday occurrences have
served, and could serve in the future, as
flashpoints for communal conflict, especially
if they involve indigene vs. settler rights.
Another key triggering factor is the holding of
elections. The Nigerian Independent Electoral
Commission announced National Assembly
elections for January 15, the Presidential
election for January 22, and State Assembly
and Governors elections on January 29. The
date is in flux as INEC, the election
commission, is requesting more time to put
together a new voter registry, order
computers, and overcome other logistical
problems. Whenever it takes place, the
month-long exercise could open up
opportunities around the country for ethno-
religious conflict at many levels.
56. The “godfather” syndrome has also
intensified ethnic loyalties and heightened
identity affiliations to the detriment of
national unity. “Godfathers” have been
known to resort to violence to win elections,
change regimes, eliminate political
opponents, and take revenge for perceived
injustices. In addition, policies undertaken at
the national level can be misinterpreted to
favor one group over another. For example,
President Goodluck Jonathan’s goal to
resolve the rebellion in the Niger Delta is
vulnerable to Northerners and others seeing
it as favoritism toward his home region or his
own Ijaw ethnic group. If that perception
occurred, it would set back efforts to stabilize
the region. Entrenched corruption also makes
conflict and violence more likely, as the
stakes have become so high. Billions are
being made by people who are fortunate
enough to have the right connections,
exercise the right authority, issue the right
contracts, and disperse the right patronage.
57. The premature death of the president
would also be a potential triggering factor for
violence, as it would exacerbate the contest
for power at all levels—local, state, and
national—although it is not clear how this
would be played out. Leaders’ deaths have
created political crisis before, as was
apparent with the demise of Abacha, Abiola,
and Yar’Adua.
Triggering Factors
Application of the Genocide Framework
Unity in Nigeria
Conclusion and Recommendations
58. Nigeria has pioneered some
creative mechanisms to deal with ethnic and
cultural diversity. Many of them might be
appropriate in other heterogeneous societies
in which there is an agreed upon political
system, the rule of law, a sense of national
identity, and leaders’ commitment to equity
and justice. However, absent these
conditions, such measures have the potential
to backfire. While political considerations
certainly played a role in Nigeria, most of
these measures were designed to balance
political and economic interests among the
three major ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa,
and Igbo), provide more political inclusion to
minority groups, and avert secessions after a
brutal civil war. Some of these mechanisms
are informal, such as the political party power
-shifting or zoning practice that requires the
political rotation of the presidency between
Northern and Southern candidates. Others,
such as ensuring the “federal character” of
the government by requiring cabinet
representation of each of the 36 states, and
in local governments, are constitutionally
required. In practice, however, these
innovative mechanisms have not been
sufficient to foster political inclusion or
national unity and several have had the
opposite impact.
59. Efforts to manage diversity have been
undermined by several factors. First,
decentralization, including the federal
system itself, has been nullified by a steady
trend toward the centralization of power
through military rule and a one-party
dominant political system, and the
centralization of wealth through the federal
dispersal of lucrative oil revenues to favored
party politicians, state governors and local
government elites. Second, corrosive
influences from endemic corruption, tight
patronage networks, and rigged elections
contributed to the de-legitimization of these
measures. Many believed they were simply
devices to “divide and rule.” Third, there has
been an erosion of the integrity and
professionalism of core national institutions,
including the police, military, justice system,
civil service, and political leadership. Nigeria
held together during a 2 ½ year civil war—an
important feat that should not be
underestimated—as the national entity has
retained intact, but Nigeria may not be as
fortunate the second time around.
60. Nigeria has a reputation of “muddling
through” its crises. But 50 years on,
institutions have atrophied, corruption has
soared, economic disparities have increased,
political competition has intensified, and new
pressures such as population growth and
scarcity of resources, have created new fault
lines. Promoting inclusiveness, without
ensuring its genuine functionality, cannot
build national unity. Should the “giant of
Africa” continue to fail to manage its rich
cultural diversity with justice, transparency
and sensitivity, the consequences could
result in genocidal violence that would be
felt across the continent and beyond.
61. Nigeria teeters between two possible
outcomes: either a break-through scenario in
which the new administration that comes to
power after the 2011 elections is regarded as
legitimate and effective and begins tackling
the country’s most critical problems, or a
break-down scenario in which the new
administration is not regarded as legitimate
or effective, possibly leading to mass
violence, a coup d’état, or disintegration.34
How the 2011 election is conducted will
shape which of these scenarios comes to
pass. The outcome might not be immediately
evident. Nigeria is reaching a pivotal point
and the fallout from the election could erupt
right away or seep into the body politic to
emerge months later.
62. What is to be done to tip the balance in
favor of the more optimistic scenario? First
and foremost, Nigeria needs to conduct
reasonably free and fair elections. The past
three elections have become progressively
worse and it is not clear how many more
rigged elections the population will tolerate.
Though the timing and sequence of elections
continue to be debated, the most
troublesome issues are going to be logistical
problems, such as the creation of a new
registry of voters, training election workers
for 120 precincts, setting up enumeration
systems, printing ballots, and completing all
the other various administrative tasks that
are required for a free and fair process. The
international community should do all it can
to lessen these problems by providing voter
education and guidance on what is necessary
for the elections to be viewed as credible.
63. Second, Nigeria also needs to review the
mechanisms of political inclusion to see if
they are fulfilling their purpose. Identity-
based quota systems, while useful for
affirmative action to close socio-economic
gaps in the short-term, need sunset
provisions for constant review or they
eventually create friction. Fixed systems of
representation run up against demographic
and democratic problems over time,
becoming sources of grievance when growing
communities have inadequate
representation. Moreover, Nigeria’s quotas—
in the form of the zoning principle, the
federal character principle, and, most of all,
indigene privileges—violate democratic
standards and create artificial barriers to free
20 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
competition, economic opportunity, and
merit-based political appointments. Most of
all, such quotas, however well-intentioned,
emphasize religion, ethnicity, and ancestry,
fixed criteria that create a hierarchy of
political privilege with at least two distinct
classes: one based on preferential treatment
of “indigenes”, the other based on
discriminatory treatment of non-indigenes or
“foreigners.” Nigeria needs to move away
from such distinctions and build unity in
diversity, based on a common definition of
citizenship in which all Nigerians have equal
rights anywhere in the country, including the
right to own property, compete for jobs, and
move freely, regardless of personal identity.
64. Third, Nigeria needs to strengthen state
institutions, particularly the police, military,
the system of justice, and the civil service.
Vast training must be done to raise the level
of performance, salaries must be paid on time
and in full, and a code of conduct must be
enforced under penalty of prosecution to
curtail patronage and corruption. Nigeria can
use its own ample resources to provide for
this kind of state-building.
65. Fourth, there needs to be an emphasis on
development. Special attention needs to be
given to the Middle Belt and Niger Delta
regions, where inter-communal conflict and
an armed insurgency have left these regions
poorer and more conflicted than ever. In both
cases, there must be development that is
visible to the people. Inequality is a major
source of conflict in Nigeria, and the gap
between rich and poor must be narrowed.
66. Last but not least, security must be
emphasized. Murders, assassinations,
kidnappings, rebellions, riots,
demonstrations, oil bunkering, arms
smuggling, cults, religious sects, multiple
militias and thuggery are becoming common
features of Nigerian life, not only as criminal
behavior, but as practices shaping the
conduct of political discourse, the fierceness
of electoral competition, and the quality of
governance.35 Overcoming an anarchic
undercurrent of violence, unrestricted by
effective police work or judicial prosecution,
will be a major challenge as Nigeria confronts
struggles between North and South,
Christians and Muslims, and communal
disputes based on resource scarcity,
environmental devastation, and economic
inequality, any one of which could spiral into
mass violence and atrocities.
67. Whatever the outcome of the 2011
election, Nigeria needs to address the
fundamental issue of how its diverse
population can live together if it is to avoid
backsliding into another civil war. A new
administration could turn the country around.
To do so, however, it must take on the big
issues and be steadfast in its commitment to
fulfilling the promise that Nigeria has had
ever since independence. It could be a
“showcase of democracy,” but has not yet
reached that goal. Genocide on a national
scale is not likely, unless the country breaks
up. What is more likely to erupt on a wider
scale if the steps recommended here are not
taken, are localized incidents of “genocidal
acts” that appear from time to time, under
stressful circumstances where the state is
either unwilling or unable to act.
21 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Conclusion and Recommendations
22 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
1. Population figures are estimates, as a reliable census has not been
conducted in Nigeria for decades because it is highly controversial.
Population figures determine the distribution of funds, and the political
representation of various ethnic and religious groups. The 158 million
estimate comes from a study conducted by the Harvard School of Public
Health sponsored by the British Council, entitled “Nigeria: The Next
Generation Report” (2010). Currently, the eighth most populous country,
Nigeria is projected by the study to have an additional 63 million people,
making it the fifth most populous country in the world after India, China,
the U.S., and Pakistan, by 2030.
2. “Rural Poverty in Nigeria: Rural Poverty Portal Nigeria”, Global Action on
Aging, February 28, 2008, available at http://www.globalaging.org/
ruralaging/world/2008/nigeria.htm, accessed September 21, 2010. The
2010 UNESCO report on poverty painted a more dire picture: a poverty
level in which 92% of Nigerians live on less than $2 day, and 71% live on
less than $1 a day. See “UNESCO on Poverty in Nigeria,” Daily Champion,
January 27, 2010, available at http://allafr ica.com
stories/201001280540.html, accessed September 21, 2010.
3. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
4. The official name of the war is the Nigerian Civil War. Colloquially, it
frequently referred to as the Biafran War.
5. However, party pressure was splitting the North. The forum of 19 Northern
Governors met to take a common position on the issue of the zoning
formula of the Peoples Democratic Party leading up to the 2011 elections.
Reports indicated that they were sharply divided. Those who were
themselves in office for only one term were said to be leaning toward
suspending the zoning rule and backing Jonathan in order to favor their
own re-election. However, Northern youth groups were organizing to
protest abandoning the zoning rule. See “2011: Northern Governors Under
Pressure to Dump Zoning: Northern Youths Converge, Insisting on Zoning,”
African Examiner Online, July 26, 2010, available at http://
www.africanexaminer.com/north_zoning, accessed September 21, 2010.
6. In a revealing survey, ethnicity and religious affiliation were the two
highest-ranking identities for most Nigerians as opposed to state, national,
ECOWAS, and African identities. Northerners were more inclined to identify
by religious affiliation, while Southerners were more inclined to identify by
ethnicity. Nationwide, identity preferences by rank order were: religion,
ethnicity, state of origin, and national allegiance. See Kevin H. Ellsworth,
“Reimagined Communities—Democracy and Ethnic Violence: The Social
Reconstruction of Nigerian Identities and Communal Relations,” paper
presented at the conference of the American Political Science Association,
September 3, 1999. The so-called Middle Belt is the most diverse region of
the country in terms of ethnicity and religion, and it has historically
supplied a large proportion of recruits for the Nigerian armed forces.
Stretching East to West through the central part of the country around the
confluence of the Niger and Benue Rivers, it consists of seven states: Niger,
Kwara (inhabited mostly by Yoruba), Kogi, Benue, Plateau, Nassarawa, and
Taraba.
7. Legal experts and human rights groups documented the lack of
investigations into mass atrocities as a pattern in Nigeria. See “Nigeria:
Investigations of Mass Killings in Nigeria,” IRIN News, April 13, 2010,
available at http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=88797 , accessed
September 21, 2010.
8. John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (Hodder and Stoughton: London,
1972), pp. 404-407.
9. The predominantly Yoruba states are Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and
Oyo. Yoruba also make up large portions of the populations in Edo, Kwara,
and Kogi states. The Yoruba population is about half Muslim and half
Christian, with traditional beliefs integrated with both.
10. The press speculated for months about Abacha’s mysterious death. He was
buried the next day in accordance with Muslim tradition but without an
autopsy. Rumors were rife that he was poisoned by military opponents.
Abiola's cause of death was also reported to be heart failure, which
occurred just as his release from four years of detention was being
considered by Abacha’s military successor.
11. Two autopsies, including one ordered by his family, showed that Abiola had
not been poisoned.
12. Indeed, with its cool climate, Plateau State proclaimed itself the “Home of
Peace and Tourism”.
13. Cattlemen had traditionally migrated to villages and traded cattle for
agricultural goods and access to pasturage, acquiring, in their view,
traditional rights to the land.
14. Section 147 (3) of the 1999 Constitution states that “the President shall
appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of
such State” without defining who an indigene of a state is or how a Nigerian
can become one. Some commentators have said that an indigene may
prove his origins by getting a letter of identification from a traditional ruler
or councilor, or a state could issue a certificate of indigene verification (not
citizenship), but there are no established procedures for such verification
and no section of the constitution resolves the contradiction between the
rights of indigenes in the states and the rights of citizens nationally.
15. The terms used to describe this turbulent region are somewhat confusing.
The core states of the oil-producing Niger Delta, which consists of nine
states, are Delta, Bayelsa (President Goodluck Jonathan’s home state), and
Rivers States. In 2000, six more states were added: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross
River, Edo, Imo, and Ondo, as part of an attempt to identify six economic
zones nationally for planning purposes, as shown in Figure 1. The Niger
Delta and South-South zone, however, are not co-terminous, even though
these terms are often used interchangeably. The South-South consists of
only six states: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers
States.
16. The Exxon Valdez spilled an estimated 10.8 million gallons in Alaska in
1989. See Adam Nossiter, “Far from Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old”,
The New York Times, June 17, 2010, p. A1.
17. The Ijaws are concentrated in Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Akwa
Ibom States.
18. Some observers believe that many criminal elements and unemployed
persons are “turning themselves in” under the amnesty, and that the
number of returnees is inflated.
19. The bunkering problem is thought by many observers to be criminal
behavior that involves more than the militants. Elements of the national
government, particularly the armed forces and politicians, are widely
References
Endnotes
23 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
believed to be collaborating with the rebels, although there has been no
official investigation or report proving such linkages.
20. In 2002, the Miss World beauty contest had to be moved from Abuja,
Nigeria’s capital, to London following violent attacks by Muslim youths. The
riots were sparked by a fashion writer for a local newspaper who had
commented that the Prophet Mohammed might have married one of the
contestants in the beauty contest had he lived to see the pageant, a remark
that offended some Muslims who thought the contest was an indecent
spectacle. Youths attached the newspaper’s office in Kaduna, where two
years earlier, 2,000 had been killed in religious riots. The fighting, which
spread to Abuja, resulted in over 200 killed, hundreds more injured, and
thousands displaced.
21. M. Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig, The Handbook of National
Legislatures: A Global Survey (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009).
22. There is only one national police force. States and localities do not have
their own police.
23. “Nigeria: Bringing perpetrators of mass violence to book - or not”, IRIN
News, April 13, 2010, available at http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx?
ReportId=88794, accessed July 21, 2010.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Adam Nossiter, “Prison Raid in Nigeria Releases Hundreds; Many Freed
Inmates Tied to Islamic Sect,” The New York Times, September 9, 2010, A6.
28. “Assault Rifles, Ammunition Intercepted in Nigeria,” The Associated Press,
August 18, 2010, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100818/
ap_on_re_af/af_nigeria_violence, accessed September 21, 2010. Police
reported that they seized 52 Kalashnikov rifles, more than 1,700 rounds of
ammunition, and $32,000 hidden underneath vegetables and dried fish in
two cars.
29. "Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta", Africa Briefing N°60, Crisis
Group, April 30, 2009, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
africa/west-africa/nigeria/B060-nigeria-seizing-the-moment-in-the-
nigerdelta.aspx, accessed September 21, 2010.
30. Statement of Joint Revolutionary Council, undated, available at http://
www.ijawland.com/JOINT%20REVOLUTIONARY%20COUNCIL.pdf, accessed
July 21, 2010.
31. Ibid; also, "Nigeria's MEND: Odili, Asari, and the NDPVF", STRATFOR Global
Intelligence, March 18, 2009, available at http://www.stratfor.com/
analysis/20090313_nigerias_mend_odili_asari_and_ndpvf, accessed July
21, 2010.
32. Nigeria’s emirate system consists of 12 traditional Muslim leaders, many of
whom are accomplished individuals who have had experience in business,
government, the justice system or the military, and, by virtue of their
traditional roles, have acquired considerable social status in their local
areas as Islamic monarchs. The Sultan of Sokoto is the spiritual leader of all
Nigerian Muslims. One of the most powerful and richest Muslim leaders is
the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, who escaped an assassination attempt
by a 19-year-old Muslim on July 9th, 2010. (see Auwalu Umar and Lawan
Danjuma Adamu, "Confusion at Juma'at prayer: Emir of Kano Escapes
Assassination - 19-year-old assailant says, 'I was sent'", Sunday Trust, July
11, 2010, available at http://www.sunday.dailytrust.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=4191:confusion-at-jummaatprayer-
emir-of-kano-escapes-assassination-19-year-old-assailant-says-i-was-
sent&catid=57:cover&Itemid=126, accessed September 21, 2010.)
Established in the 1880s when Islam swept down from Sokoto during the
jihad led by Usman dan Fodio, the emirs stopped providing social services
to their people when Nigeria became independent. They have no formal
power over secular institutions, such as the police, military or state courts,
but they receive 5% of all funds given to local governments plus gifts from
their constituents. Their powers stem from their religious authority to
select imams in the main mosques, oversee the Sharia court system, and
intervene in the resolution of local disputes, such as land or water.
Politicians seek alliances with the emirs for legitimacy and access to their
considerable resources and status. Emirs have publicly denounced Osama
bin Laden and strongly oppose Islamic fundamentalism, whose followers
tend to view emirs as part of the corrupt political establishment that does
not sufficiently enforce Islamic law. On the other hand, democracy
advocates deem the emirs as an unelected aristocracy whose influence
should be curtailed. Nonetheless, emirs continue to exert influence in the
North.
33. "We fear that hundreds of bystanders, including women and children, have
been killed and injured, and thousands of people remain trapped in the
area – unable to return to their homes having fled the fighting.” Quoted in
Xan Rice, “Niger Delta army offensive killing civilians, says Amnesty", The
Guardian, May 21, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/may/21/hundreds-killed-niger-delta, accessed July 21, 2010.
34. Some outside observers have warned of the possibility of the worst case
scenario. See John Campbell, “SNAPSHOT: Nigeria on the Brink; What
Happens If the 2011 Elections Fail?”, Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2010,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/66707, accessed
September 21, 2010.
35. For example, as electioneering heated up in September, within a single day
it was reported that unidentified assassins murdered a member of the Kano
State Security Service and four members of his family, the Head of the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission’s Forensic Unit who was a key
witness in ongoing cases of corruption was killed by unknown gunmen in
Kaduna, and the campaign manager for one of the leading presidential
candidates alleged that telephone threats had been made to kidnap his son
and take his life by unknown persons. See “SSS operative, wife, three
children killed in Kano,” African Examiner Online, September 15, 2010,
http://www.africanexaminer.com/sss_killed, accessed September 21, 2010;
“Gunmen kill head of EFCC’s forensic unit,” African Examiner Online,
September 15, 2010, available at http://www.africanexaminer.com/
efcc_forensic, accessed September 21, 2010; “Dokpesi fights back at
Jonathan’s camp, alleges threat to his life, children, business interests,”
African Examiner Online, undated, available at http://
www.africanexaminer.com/dokpesi_threat2011, accessed September 21,
2010.
Endnotes
Unity in Nigeria
Appendix: Genocide Analysis Framework
Legal definition of genocide
Genocide is defined in Article 2 of the
Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)
as "any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such: killing members of the group; causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group; deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in
part1; imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; [and]
forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group."
Elements of the framework
The Analysis Framework comprises eight
categories of factors that the OSAPG uses to
determine whether there may be a risk of
genocide in a given situation. The eight
categories of factors are not ranked, and the
absence of information relating to one or
more categories does not necessarily indicate
the absence of a risk of genocide; what is
significant is the cumulative effect of the
factors. Where these factors are effectively
addressed, no longer exist or are no longer
relevant, the risk of genocide is assumed to
decrease.
24 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Office of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide
Framework Factors and Explanation The issues to be analyzed here include:
1. Inter-group relations, including record of discrimination and/or other human rights violations committed against a Group
• Relations between and among groups in terms of tensions, power and economic relations, including perceptions about the targeted group;
• Existing and past conflicts over land, power, security and expressions of group identity, such as language, religion and culture;
• Past and present patterns of discrimination against members of any group which could include:
• Serious discriminatory practices, for instance, the compulsory identification of members of a particular group, imposition of taxes/fines, permission required for social activities such as marriage, compulsory birth-control, the systematic exclusion of groups from positions of power, employment in State institutions and/or key professions2
• Significant disparities in socio-economic indicators showing a pattern of deliberate exclusion from economic resources and social and political life.
• Overt justification for such discriminatory practices;
• History of genocide or related serious and massive human rights violations against a particular group; denial by the perpetrators;
• References to past human rights violations committed against a possible perpetrator group as a justification for genocidal acts against the targeted group in the future.
2. Circumstances that affect the capacity to prevent Genocide
Structures that exist to protect the population and deter genocide include effective legislative protection; independ-ent judiciary and effective national human rights institutions, presence of international actors such as UN operations capable of protecting vulnerable groups, neutral security forces and independent media. Issues to be analyzed here include:
• Existing structures;
• The effectiveness of those structures;
• Whether vulnerable groups have genuine access to the protection afforded by the structures;
• Patterns of impunity and lack of accountability for past crimes committed against the targeted groups;
• Other options for obtaining protection against genocide, e.g. presence of peacekeepers in a position to defend the group, or seeking asylum in other countries.
3. Presence of illegal arms and armed Elements
• Whether there exists a capacity to perpetrate genocide - especially, but not exclusively, by killing;
• How armed groups are formed, who arms them and what links they have to state authorities, if any;
• In cases of armed rebellions or uprising, whether a state has justified targeting groups from which armed actors have drawn their membership.
4. Motivation of leading actors in the State/region; acts which serve to encourage divisions between national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups
• Underlying political, economic, military or other motivation to target a group and to separate it from the rest of the population;
• The use of exclusionary ideology and the construction of identities in terms of “us” and “them” to accentuate differences;
• Depiction of a targeted group as dangerous, disloyal, a security or economic threat or as unworthy or inferior so as to justify action against the group;
• Propaganda campaigns and fabrications about the targeted group used to justify acts against a targeted group by use of dominant, controlled media or “mirror politics”3;
• Any relevant role, whether active or passive, of actors outside the country (e.g., other Governments, armed groups based in neighboring countries, refugee groups or diasporas) and respective political or economic motivations.
5. Circumstances that facilitate perpetration of genocide (dynamic factors)
Any development of events, whether gradual or sudden, that suggest a trajectory towards the perpetration of genocidal violence, or the existence of a longer term plan or policy to commit genocide. Examples:
• Sudden or gradual strengthening of the military or security apparatus; creation of or increased support to militia groups (e.g., sudden increases in arms flow) in the absence of discernible legitimate threats;
• Attempts to reduce or eradicate diversity within the security apparatus;
• Preparation of local population to use them to perpetrate acts;
• Introduction of legislation derogating the rights of a targeted group;
• Imposition of emergency or extraordinary security laws and facilities that erode civil rights and liberties;
• Sudden increase in inflammatory rhetoric or hate propaganda, especially by leaders, that sets a tone of impunity, even if it does not amount to incitement to genocidal violence in itself;
• Permissive environment created by ongoing armed conflict that could facilitate access to weapons and commission of genocide.
6. Genocidal acts • Acts that could be obvious “elements” of the crime of genocide as defined in Article 6 of the Rome Statute,4 such as killings, abduction and disappearances, torture, rape and sexual violence; ‘ethnic cleansing’ or pogroms;5
• Less obvious methods of destruction, such as the deliberate deprivation of resources needed for the group’s physical survival and which are available to the rest of the population, such as clean water, food and medical services;6
• Creation of circumstances that could lead to a slow death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion;
• Programs intended to prevent procreation, including involuntary sterilization, forced abortion, prohibition of marriage and long-term separation of men and women;
• Forcible transfer of children, imposed by direct force or through fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or other methods of coercion;
• Death threats or ill treatment that causes disfigurement or injury; forced or coerced use of drugs or other treatment that damages health.
25 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
Appendix: UN Genocide Analysis Framework
7. Evidence of intent “to destroy in whole or in part …”7
• Statements amounting to hate speech 8 by those involved in a genocidal campaign;
• In a large-scale armed conflict, widespread and systematic nature of acts; intensity and scale of acts and invariabil-ity of killing methods used against the same protected group; types of weapons employed (in particular weapons prohibited under international law) and the extent of bodily injury caused;
• In a non-conflict situation, widespread and/or systematic discriminatory and targeted practices culminating in gross violations of human rights of protected groups, such as extrajudicial killings, torture and displacement;
• The specific means used to achieve “ethnic cleansing” which may underscore that the perpetration of the acts is designed to reach the foundations of the group or what is considered as such by the perpetrator group;
• The nature of the atrocities, e.g., dismemberment of those already killed that reveal a level of dehumanization of the group or euphoria at having total control over another human being, or the systematic rape of women which may be intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child or to cause humiliation and terror in order to fragment the group;
• The destruction of or attacks on cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group that may be designed to annihilate the historic presence of the group or groups;
• Targeted elimination of community leaders and/or men and/or women of a particular age group (the ‘future generation’ or a military-age group);
• Other practices designed to complete the exclusion of targeted group from social/political life.
8. Triggering factors • Future events or circumstances seemingly unrelated to genocide that might aggravate conditions or spark deterioration in the situation, pointing to the likely onset of a genocidal episode. These ‘triggers’ might include:
• Upcoming elections (and associated activities such as voter registration or campaigning; revision of delimitation of electoral boundaries; a call for early elections or the postponement or cancellation of elections; disbanding of election commissions; imposition of new quotas/standards for political party or candidate eligibility);
• Change of Government outside of an electoral or constitutionally sanctioned process;
• Instances where the military is deployed internally to act against civilians;
• Commencement of armed hostilities;
• Natural disasters that may stress state capacity and strengthen active opposition groups;
• Increases in opposition capacity, which may be perceived as a threat and prompt preemptive action, or rapidly declining opposition capacity which may invite rapid action to eliminate problem groups.9
26 The Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org
1. It might be necessary to determine if all or only a part of the group at risk
within a specific geographical location is being targeted. The aim of the
Genocide Convention is to prevent the intentional destruction of entire human
groups, and the part targeted must be significant enough (substantial) to have
an impact on the group as a whole. The substantiality requirement both
captures genocide’s defining character as a crime of massive proportions
(numbers) and reflects the Convention’s concern with the impact the
destruction of the targeted part will have on the overall survival of the group
(emblematic).
2. This could include security, law enforcement or oversight apparatus, such as
police, army and judiciary.
3. “Mirror politics” is a common strategy to create divisions by fabricating events
whereby a person accuses others of what he or she does or wants to do.
4. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
5. Efforts should be made to gather information on a sufficient number of
incidents to determine whether the abuses were substantial, systematic and
widespread over a period of time.
6. Deprivation of the means to sustain life can be imposed through confiscation
of harvests, blockade of foodstuffs, detention in camps, forcible relocation or
expulsion to inhospitable environments.
7. Genocidal intent can develop gradually, e.g., in the course of conflict and not
necessarily before, and genocide may be used as a “tool” or “strategy” to
achieve military goals in an operation whose primary objective may be
unrelated to the targeted group. Evidence of “intent to destroy” can be
inferred from a set of existing facts which would suggest that what is
unfolding or ongoing may be genocide. From a preventive perspective, there
could be other indications of a plan or policy or an attempt to destroy a
protected group before the occurrence of full-blown genocide.
8. The hate speech has to denigrate characteristics of a specific ethnic/racial/
religious/national group.
9. Critical moments can also represent moments of opportunity to improve a
situation and to lessen the risk of genocide.
Appendix: UN Genocide Analysis Framework
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