©Can national autonomy be separated from the territorial state? Marrying multiculturalism with nationalism1.

I am a self-loving Jew, but the Jew I love in me is the Diaspora Jew, the Jew that was blessed for 2,000 years by having no country to call his/her own. That this was accompanied by many cruel disadvantages is well known, but it had one crowning advantage that towered over all the rest. By being an outsider in every country and belonging to the family of outsiders throughout the world, Jews on the whole suffered less from the small-minded prejudices that disfigure all forms of nationalism. Professor Bertell Ollman “Letter of Resignation from the Jewish People” Dialectical Marxism, The Writings of Bertell Ollman http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/index.php

DRAFT. Not for quotation. Comments welcome.

©Ephraim Nimni School of Politics, International Studies & Philosophy Queen's University Belfast 21 University Square Belfast BT7 1PA Northern Ireland Tel: +44 (0)28 9097 3625 Fax: +44 (0)28 9097 5048 Office 18.104 ext. 3625 e-mail: e.nimni@qub.ac.uk http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Staff/Nimni/ Introduction

The politics of recognition of overlapping national and ethnocultural identities is a

neglected topic in Radical Geopolitics. While in colloquial and academic speech the

idea of the nation-state is superficially understood as unproblematic, “really existing”2

nation-states are by and large, discursive misnomers. A nation is not a state. The later

is a governmental and administrative apparatus and the former a cultural community,

-- self defined or otherwise -- akin but not identical to an ethnic group. Nation-states

are modern symbiotic creatures, governmental entities that claim to supply a

sovereign territory to a nation. While there are 192 states represented in the United

Nations (another gigantic misnomer), these contain circa 2500 nations, thirteen times

more nations than states represented in the UN. Less than 10% of all states

represented in the UN are nation-states in the literal sense of the term (most of them

are small enclaves or islands), encompassing a single cultural community in the

11 TThhiiss ppaappeerr ssoommee ssuummmmaarriizzeess kkeeyy iiddeeaass ooff mmyy ffoorrtthhccoommiinngg bbooookk,, MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall NNaattiioonnaalliissmm,, RRoouuttlleeddggee,, LLoonnddoonn 22000099 22 TThhee tteerrmm iiss ttaakkeenn ffrroomm ““rreeaallllyy eexxiissttiinngg ssoocciiaalliissmm”” aa eeuupphheemmiissmm ffoorr SSoovviieett ssttyyllee ssttaatteess,, sseeee aallssoo EErriiccaa BBeennnneerr,, RReeaallllyy EExxiissttiinngg NNaattiioonnaalliissmmss,, OOxxffoorrdd MMoonnooggrraapphhss,, 11999955 ,, pppp.. 22

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territory over which they exercise sovereignty3. Political and cultural boundaries did

not historically coincide, and they coincide even less today. The quest for nation-

states has not only thrown geopolitics into turmoil4, but has motivated a bloody and

destructive political quest for a model that is by and large, unfeasible and

unattainable.

Apart from some small exceptions and perhaps a few large states, “really existing”

nation-state territorial spaces are the intermixed abode of a plurality of ethnocultural

communities. In most cases they coexist, but sometimes with unease, and many

demand political recognition of one form or another. The subversive impact of

globalization and its concurrent weakening of state sovereignty throw into the open

the recurrent illusion that the state is the state of the nation, for the geopolitical space

of the state can no longer be understood to be the domain of one nation. To be sure,

this was the case for some time, but the observation remained hidden by the seductive

fallacies of the hijab (حجاب) of modernization. These fallacies are already present in

both, the liberal and Marxist traditions. These ideologies understand the nation-state

as a discrete unit and with a few noted exceptions, have no normative desire to

question or deconstruct this equivocal term. The nation-state is often the space for the

tense interplay of different communities, some of whom resent the institutional and

cultural privileges of the titular ethnicity and in a small but significant number of

instances, they are locked into nasty and festering conflicts.

When territorial self-determination in the guise of state secession or partition is called

upon as remedy for protracted ethnonational conflicts, the problem is compounded

because often the abode of contending national communities overlaps. The very

process of demanding partition and separate nation-states renders this particular form

of state organisation obsolete, for the demand of a nation state for a stateless nation

becomes a fateful zero-sum relation; national emancipation for some leads to national

oppression, exile, ethnic cleansing or worse for others, as few can be surgically

33 SStteepphheenn RRyyaann,, ““NNaattiioonnaalliissmm aanndd EEtthhnniicc CCoonnfflliicctt””,, iinn BBrriiaann WWhhiittee,, RRiicchhaarrdd LLiittttllee aanndd MMiicchhaaeell SSmmiitthh,, IIssssuueess iinn WWoorrlldd PPoolliittiiccss,, MMaaccMMiillllaann,, LLoonnddoonn,, 11999977.. pppp..116622--66,, SSeeee aallssoo AAnntthhoonnyy SSmmiitthh,, NNaattiioonnaall IIddeennttiittyy,, PPeenngguuiinn BBooookkss,, 11998800 pppp.. 1144--2244 44 AAnntthhoonnyy DD.. SSmmiitthh,, ““SSttaattee--MMaakkiinngg aanndd NNaattiioonn--BBuuiillddiinngg””,, iinn JJoohhnn AA.. HHaallll ((eedd..)) TThhee SSttaattee,, CCrriittiiccaall CCoonncceeppttss,, LLoonnddoonn,, RRoouuttlleeddggee,, 11999933 pp..6600

isolated in defined territorial spaces. As we commemorate this year the 60th

anniversary of the Nakba (النكبة), the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, the recurrent

horrifying ordeal of its indigenous inhabitants must lead us to reflect how the system

of nation states allows for these crimes of lèse-humanité to be committed with

impunity. Even post colonial states that unify their different ethnies into the

emancipatory struggle discover later that the syndrome of the nation state comes back

to haunt them. With some noted exceptions, post colonial states show a manifest

inability to accommodate ethnic diversity in their midst because of obsessive fears of

state disintegration if they concede autonomy to minorities. The latest example in a

long list is East Timor, the newest postcolonial state.

Nationalism is a central ingredient in legitimising the institution of the nation state but

astonishingly, “really existing” nation states fail to contain nationalism within their

own ranks. In a perplexing and paradoxical way, minority nationalism becomes a

delegitimizing model of “real existing” nation states. Nationalism also encourages the

proliferation of minority nationalist demands for recognition that for lack of

alternatives, threatens the integrity of “really existing” nation states with secession.

These demands are not always easily accommodated in the single and tight sovereign

domain of the nation state container. It is thus necessary to rethink the space of the

state, and in particular, its indivisible sovereignty, so that it is able accommodate in an

agonist manner5, competing demands for self-determination from national and ethnic

communities.

This paper will thus offer some tentative ideas as to how the notion of national self-

determination and the politics of recognition of minorities can be extricated from the

zero-sum relationship dictated by the dogma of indivisible state sovereignty. For this

we require some imaginative rearrangements of the spatial politics of the state.

Nothing said here denies the symbolic link between territorial spaces and ethno

national communities, and sometimes, religious identities. Anthony Smith calls this

55 II ttaakkee tthhee tteerrmm aaggoonniissmm ttoo mmeeaann iinn tthhiiss ccaassee tthhee ccoonnvveerrssiioonn ooff eenneemmiieess iinnttoo aannttaaggoonniissttss tthhaatt rreeccooggnniissee tthhee lleeggiittiimmaaccyy ooff eeaacchh ootthheerr aanndd ooppeerraattee iinn aaccccoorrddiinngg ttoo mmuuttuuaallllyy aaggrreeeedd ggaammee rruulleess.. SSeeee CChhaannttaall MMoouuffffee,, TThhee DDeemmooccrraattiicc PPaarraaddooxx.. LLoonnddoonn VVeerrssoo,, 22000000 aanndd OOnn tthhee PPoolliittiiccaall,, LLoonnddoonn RRoouuttlleeddggee,, 22000055

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relationship “ethnoscapes”6, the geopolitical dimension that allows the nation to

imagine itself. However, the problem is not here: ethnonational communities can

share their ethnospaces with others and this is not necessarily an obstacle for

cohabitation or shared sovereignty. The obstacle is not in the mythical or ancestral

connexion to an ethnoscape, but it comes from a different direction. It comes from the

institutional organisation of the nation state that followed the triumph of liberal

democracy: the idea of popular sovereignty and the way in which with modernity, the

nation became its repository and the sole source of its legitimation. Like the ancient

deity of the Hebrew tribes, the sovereign nation state is a jealous creature that abhors

any internal competition. This highly contagious idea even contaminates its rivals: the

most authoritarian of state’ rulers claims to rule on behalf of the nation. Moreover,

even when Universalist ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism and indeed

political Islam become hegemonic, they do so only when only when they empirically

intertwine themselves with the ideal of the nation state and thus enigmatically

surrender their hard argued Universalist claims.7

NATIONALISM AND CONTEMPORARY MULTICULTURALISM Nationalism and multiculturalism are growing ideological discourses in the

contemporary world. They both express the desire for the recognition of cultural

diversity and share important assumptions and ambivalences in their prescriptions for

the political organisation of societies. Both are community oriented, suspicious of

rationalist ideologies or abstract universalisms, and attach cardinal importance to the

recognition of difference. In view of their commonalties, many could conclude that

they are interrelated world views.

In the empirical world of “really existing” nation states, however, these

ideologies fiercely oppose each other. Nationalists are suspicious of multiculturalism

because they believe it subverts the cohesion of the nation, as nationalist writers and

practitioners are generally concerned on how to best create or maintain the unity and

66 AAnntthhoonnyy DD.. SSmmiitthh,, ““CCuullttuurree,, CCoommmmuunniittyy aanndd TTeerrrriittoorryy:: TThhee PPoolliittiiccss ooff EEtthhnniicciittyy aanndd NNaattiioonnaalliissmm””,, IInntteerrnnaattiioonnaall AAffffaaiirrss VVooll.. 7722,, NNoo.. 33,, ((JJuull..,, 11999966)),, pppp.. 445533--44.. 77 AA ssiimmiillaarr aarrgguummeenntt hhaass bbeeeenn ffoorrcceeffuullllyy ddeevveelloopp iinn MMiicchhaaeell MMaannnn,, TThhee DDaarrkk SSiiddee ooff DDeemmooccrraaccyy,, EExxppllaaiinniinngg EEtthhnniicc CClleeaannssiinngg,, UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff CCaalliiffoorrnniiaa PPrreessss,, LLooss AAnnggeelleess,, 22000055

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stability of the modern nation-state. Where nation states do not exist, nationalists are

expected to campaign for its creation.

In contrast, most multiculturalist writers and practitioners are hostile to the

nation state because they see in the doctrine of one nation in one state an asphyxiation

of cultural diversity. This accusation is vigorously sustained even if the nation state

protects individual rights and is liberal and democratic. Kymlicka and Strahele8

represent well this growing chorus of multicultural voices, when they say that grave

injustices to ethnic and national minorities can occur in nation states without

depriving individual members of minorities of their civil and political rights. The

plight of indigenous peoples throughout the world clearly shows the problem.

Presented in these terms, the ideologies of nationalism and multiculturalism

are antithetical. But can nationalism exist without the goal of building or protecting an

independent nation state? This paper only begins to explore this question, one that

surprisingly is rarely asked, considering that in Europe and North America there are

several concrete cases of successful nationalisms that refrained from building separate

nation states. As an ideology, nationalism has been variously described as having a

‘chameleon like” ability to mutate according to social and ideological circumstances9

or as a thin centred ideology that embellishes and sustains the features of its host

ideologies10. If nationalism in the age of ideologies is suffused with ambiguities and

paradoxes, Why is it that writers and practitioners that perceptively show the

ideological ambiguities of nationalism, nevertheless see it as unequivocally

committed to sustaining the normative and institutional model of the nation state?

In recent years, the ideology of multiculturalism is increasingly invoked in

Western liberal democracies as a possible remedy to the nation state’s quandary on

whether to assimilate or integrate its minorities. The very term “minority” results

from the acceptance that states are in principle monocultural, for the idea of a

88 WW.. KKyymmlliicckkaa aanndd CC.. SSttrraaeehhllee,, ““CCoossmmooppoolliittaanniissmm,, nnaattiioonn ssttaatteess aanndd mmiinnoorriittyy nnaattiioonnaalliissmm:: aa ccrriittiiccaall rreevviieeww ooff rreecceenntt lliitteerraattuurree””,, EEuurrooppeeaann JJoouurrnnaall ooff PPhhiilloossoopphhyy 77//11 ((AApprriill 11999999)) pp.. 7766 99 AAnntthhoonnyy SSmmiitthh,, NNaattiioonnaalliissmm aanndd MMooddeerrnniissmm,, RRoouuttlleeddggee,, LLoonnddoonn 11999988,, pp.. 4444 1100 MMiicchhaaeell FFrreeeeddeenn ((11999988)) IIss NNaattiioonnaalliissmm aa DDiissttiinncctt IIddeeoollooggyy?? PPoolliittiiccaall SSttuuddiieess 4466 ((44)) ,, pppp.. 775500--11

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minority is meaningless without a referent to a dominant majority. Multiculturalism

has until recently explained the problem without developing an institutional model to

accommodate diversity within the framework of democratic states, so there is a

pressing need to develop a model for the differential representation of ethnic and

national groups within multination states.

THE DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM

Contemporary liberal democracy is caught in a dilemma; how should it adapt to

national and ethnic minority demands for differential rights while sustaining the

principle of equality of rights and obligations for individuals as a meta narrative? The

dual impact of the politics of difference and the demands for political recognition for

national and ethnic minorities is pushing liberalism beyond its traditional conceptual

limits. The question is whether liberalism -- a political ideology designed to sustain

equality in autonomy and freedom of choice for individuals -- can accommodate

demands for differential group rights for national and ethnic minorities. Earlier, the

liberal solution was to advocate the principle of territorial self-determination

(meaning self-government in separate nation-states) as a solution to the predicament

of oppressed peoples. It is however, no longer possible - and one doubts whether it

was ever possible -- to isolate surgically ethno-national communities into single

territorial spaces. This conventional vision of territorial self determination also runs

into serious difficulties when, as in the cases of Ireland and Palestine, one community

wants one identity for the nation-state and the other want another11.

Within the boundaries of existing nation-states, ethnic and national minorities

increasingly demand some form of political recognition. Here begins the liberal

democratic predicament, which is well expressed by Amy Gutmann12: "... Can

citizens with diverse identities be represented as equals if public institutions do not 1111 JJoohhnn MMccGGaarrrryy,, aanndd BBrreennddaann OO''LLeeaarryy BBrreennddaann,, ((EExxppllaaiinniinngg NNoorrtthheerrnn IIrreellaanndd:: BBrrookkeenn IImmaaggeess,, BBllaacckkwweellll,, OOxxffoorrdd.. 11999955)) pp.. 3355,, EEpphhrraaiimm NNiimmnnii,, ,, ““PPoollyynnaattiioonnaall SSttaatteess:: LLiibbeerraall,, IIlllliibbeerraall oorr PPoosstt LLiibbeerraall??””.. AASSEENN BBuulllleettiinn,, TThhee JJoouurrnnaall ooff tthhee AAssssoocciiaattiioonn ffoorr tthhee SSttuuddyy ooff EEtthhnniicciittyy aanndd NNaattiioonnaalliissmm,, LLoonnddoonn,, NNoo.. 1133,, SSuummmmeerr ((11999977)),, pp.. 11 1122 IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn ttoo ""TThhee PPoolliittiiccss ooff RReeccooggnniittiioonn"" iinn AA.. GGuuttmmaannnn ((eedd..)) MMuullttiiccuullttuurraalliissmm,, EExxaammiinniinngg tthhee PPoolliittiiccss ooff RReeccooggnniittiioonn,, ((PPrriinncceettoonn UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 11999944)),, pppp 33--44..

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recognise their identities . . .?" Gutmann further argues that this challenge is

"endemic" to liberal democracies because they are committed in principle to the

notion of equal representation. Here is the essence of the liberal problem. Classical

liberalism has difficulties in accepting the segmental representation of ethnic

communities precisely because it is committed to the principle of equal representation

for individuals. Whatever the method employed, the ideological goal of liberalism is

the erosion of ethnic solidarities in the public domain and the promotion of a more

"rational" state based on equal individual rights13. It is in this principled and

uncompromising demand for individual equality that the need for the recognition of

communal diversity is lost.

There are, however, some influential liberal attempts to tackle the thorny issue of

minority representation and the nation state. Will Kymlicka14 argues that ethnic and

cultural diversity is the norm for most contemporary states. This diversity, Kymlicka

contends, gives rise to some important and potentially divisive questions, such as

language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, educational curriculum,

land claims and, last but not least, immigration and citizenship. While Kymlicka is

aware of the historical dimensions of ethnic diversity, other “post-national” writers

with short memories15 argue instead that post-war internationalisation of labour

markets, decolonisation, and the expansion of the discourse of human rights make

diversity to be the hallmark of our period, the characteristic of an era when the politics

of difference overrides classical forms of nation-state citizenship. But is this really

the case? As Calhoun16 argues, nationalism and ethnic diversity has been big news

on and off for 200 years. Many problems that are perceived today as novel and

sometimes intractable were in fact systematically discussed when nationalism

previously made big news. Such is, for example, the period of the apogee of the

1133 JJoohhnn MMccGGaarrrryy,, aanndd BBrreennddaann OO''LLeeaarryy,,,, ""FFiivvee ffaallllaacciieess:: NNoorrtthheerrnn IIrreellaanndd aanndd tthhee LLiiaabbiilliittiieess ooff LLiibbeerraalliissmm"" EEtthhnniicc aanndd RRaacciiaall SSttuuddiieess,, VVooll.. 1188,, NNoo.. 44,, ((11999955)),, pp..883399.. 1144 WWiillll KKyymmlliicckkaa,, MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall CCiittiizzeennsshhiipp,, ((OOxxffoorrdd UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 11999955)),, pp.. 11 1155 YYaasseemmiinn SSooyyssaall ,, ““CChhaannggiinngg CCiittiizzeennsshhiipp iinn EEuurrooppee”” ,, iinn DDaavviidd CCeessaarriinnii aanndd MMaarryy FFuullbbrrooookk,, ((eeddss..)) CCiittiizzeennsshhiipp,, NNaattiioonnaalliittyy aanndd MMiiggrraattiioonn iinn EEuurrooppee,, ((RRoouuttlleeddggee,, LLoonnddoonn 11999966)),, pppp.. 1188--1199.. 1166 CCrraaiigg CCaallhhoouunn,, NNaattiioonnaalliissmm,, ((MMiinnnneessoottaa UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 11999977)) pp.. 11..

nation-state, and the period coinciding with the disintegration of Imperial Austria

around the turn of the twentieth century.

A re-examination of the nationalities debate in Austria during this period reveals

surprising analogies to contemporary liberal democratic debates on minority rights

and multiculturalism. A brief discussion of the Austrian case is necessary to avoid the

well-known problem of theorists who for lack of historical knowledge are inclined to

reinvent wheels. Early twentieth century Vienna, like contemporary London, Paris,

Berlin, Toronto Sydney and others, experienced an influx of noticeably diverse ethno-

national communities. Much in the same way as contemporary differential

development has generated the "North-South" divide and pushed many ethnically

diverse migrants into metropolitan centres, so too differential development in late

Imperial Austria pushed many different ethnic groups into Vienna and to the more

affluent and predominately German speaking areas of the Empire. Much in the same

way as there is a reaction against "alien" migration in Paris, Berlin, Rome, and

London today, so too there was a strong reaction in Vienna.

Much in the same way as the contemporary challenge of accommodating diverse

ethnic cultures within one territorial unit has proved fertile ground for novel

interpretations of democratic politics (politics of difference, multiculturalism), so too

the nationalities conflict in late Imperial Austria generated novel and daring attempts

to redefine democratic politics and accommodate ethnic diversity. On of the most

daring and original models was Renner's project of national cultural autonomy. Karl

Renner was one of the most important Socialist politicians in twentieth century

Austria. Twice State President, immediately after the First and Second World Wars

and an accomplished constitutional jurist, he first sketched the model for national

cultural autonomy. This was an ingenious model for a two-tier system of government

that devolved considerable non-territorial autonomy to national communities, while

keeping the administrative unity of the multinational state.17 More on this later.

1177 SSeeee KKaarrll RReennnneerr ((SSyynnooppttiiccuuss)) ,, SSttaaaatt uunndd NNaattiioonn ((VViieennnnaa:: JJ.. DDiieettll,, 11889999)),, EEnngglliisshh ttrraannssllaattiioonn,, „„SSttaattee aanndd nnaattiioonn““ iinn EE.. NNiimmnnii ((eedd..)) NNaattiioonnaall ccuullttuurraall AAuuttoonnoommyy aanndd iittss CCoonntteemmppoorraarryy CCrriittiiccss,, LLoonnddoonn,, RRoouuttlleeddggee,, 22000033,, pppp.. 1155--4488..

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Multiculturalism is a neologism; it can be traced to the 1960s and its origins lie in

Quebec. But, does it designate a new idea? If contemporary multiculturalism is

concerned with including, recognising and representing ethnically diverse social

segments in one political unit, then it is surely not wrong to see the Austrian thinkers

as the precursors of multiculturalism when the liberal political consensus following J.

Stuart Mill saw monocultural nation-states as optimal and desirable political units18.

Nationalism without a Nation-state

If the nation-state is compromised by multiculturalism, can there be a nationalism that

does not advocate a state for the nation? Or, will nationalism be simply buried under

the rising tide of multiculturalism? Any epitaph for nationalism is premature, for as I

will argue below, nationalism does not have the inherent need to build nation-states.

But first I will examine the main objections to the idea that nationalism can exist

without a nation-state. The first objection is the territorial principle. Anthony Smith

suggests, that what is important for nationalists is a sense of homeland, a historic

“sacred”, territory, not just boundaries19. This argument has contemporary as well as

ancient resonance. In post-colonial settler societies this argument is at the centre of

the claims of indigenous peoples for self-determination. However, indigenous peoples

in liberal settler societies rarely demand separate nation-states. It is far more often the

case that, when faced with a state ultimately based on an alien and violent intrusion

into their ancestral homelands -- an intrusion that made them scattered minorities in

the first place -- indigenous peoples demand national autonomy and public

recognition of their way of life. Yet for indigenous peoples, a sacred territory, an

ancient homeland, in short an ethnoscape, is a crucial ingredient in their sense of

nationhood and in their demand for self-determination. However, this demand does

not require the exclusive sovereign control over their sacred territories, nor the

creation of an exclusive territorial state. It is possible for a nationalist movement to

18 In the words of John Stuart Mill: Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities’. In J.S. Mill, Considerations of Representative Government, various editions and dates. 1199 AA.. DD.. SSmmiitthh,, NNaattiioonnaalliissmm aanndd MMooddeerrnniissmm,, RRoouuttlleeddggee,, LLoonnddoonn 11998888,, pp..8833..

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feel a strong affinity with a given territory, to revere it as a sacred ancestral land, and,

at the same time, not to require an ethnically exclusive nation-state to rule over it. In

the Israeli case, the strongest Jewish enemies of Zionism, the ultra-orthodox Naturei

Karta (Aramaic for “Guardians of the gates” -- meaning the gates of the city of

Jerusalem), have as their name indicates, an unmistakable religious attachment to an

ethnoscape. Yet they are implacably opposed to Zionism and Israeli sovereignty, they

refuse to participate in Israeli institutions and are represented instead in the non-

Jewish Palestinian National Council. The discussion above builds up to the idea it is

possible for multi-nation states to satisfy demands of religious, ethnic and national

communities for a special relation with ethnoscapes without constructing exclusive

territorial sovereignties.

Those who see nationalism as creation of the nation-state can raise a second objection.

In many theories of modernisation and uneven development, nationalism is simply an

instrument or a tool in the construction of nation-states. If the nation state is no longer

there, the tool becomes redundant. These arguments can be refuted by reference to the

cultural dimension of nationalism. Even in those cases where nations and nationalisms

where created by nation-states, in post-colonial settler societies for example, these

new state nationalisms reshaped previous ethnicities and became as it where,

ethnicised. When nation building was successful - and in some few cases it was - a

new cultural community was galvanised independently from the nation-state and it

lives in the subjectivity of its members. For example, expatriates of colonial settler

societies do not cease to be members of the new nations when they reside outside

their nation-states. Their behaviour in foreign environments is not markedly different

from the behaviour of expatriates from more ancient historical nations. In a significant

number of cases however, nation building was unsuccessful and those post-colonial

societies are divided by antagonistic ethnic nationalisms. Here the nation-state model

is simply useless; it cannot bridge the gap between contending ethnic nationalisms. A

multicultural nationalist model will be more appropriate here, as it will legitimise

ethnic diversity by creating a community of communities and not only a community

of individual citizens as the nation-state does.

Those who argue that only the nation-state can provide international recognition and

security to the nation can raise a third objection. In the post-Westphalian world, only

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nation-states are recognised as international entities, and the doctrine of non-

intervention provides some security to the nation. The argument can also be extended

to say that because the nation-state is highly institutionalised, and the nation is not,

then it is only the nation-state that can provide some long term stability to the nation.

While this argument was an important ingredient to the stability of the post-

Westphalian model, the model has been severely dislocated by globalisation. First

there are transnational organisations that have the ability to undermine or compromise

the sovereignty of most nation-states. The room for manoeuvre of most nation-state

politicians has been severely curtailed by the tangible existence of non-state,

transnational economic powers that are capable of imposing harsh demands on nation-

state economies. The phenomenon is not circumscribed to the non-western world.

Many “first-world” nation-states are powerless when confronted by these non-state

powers. Examples abound. As the EU shows, nations are no longer secure in the

nation-state castle; its defences have been breached. The castle that offers protection

now is the large multinational one. To enjoy this protection, the nation forgoes parts

of its former sovereignty.

Equally, the proliferation of inter-state actors, international human rights

organisations, etc, not only further restrict the room for manoeuvre of contemporary

nation-states, but also in a truly unprecedented manner, create competing identities to

that of the nation-state. Amnesty International, Médecins sans Frontières, and similar

groupings together with the phenomenal explosion in communication are rendering

increasingly obsolete the protections afforded by the nation-state. The dislocation of

the nation-state permits the resurfacing of internal cleavages, and the nation-state no

longer offers the same degree of security, stability, and international recognition.

After Westphalia, most nations saw in the territorial state the only accepted form of

international recognition and security through the doctrine of non-intervention. The

weakening of the nation-state makes this argument less plausible. The emergence of

international blocs significantly weakens the sovereignty of the state. The European

Union, the most developed regional bloc, paradoxically emerged in the very region

where the nation-state was invented. The doctrine of the nation-state is one of the

most successful European exports. However, through the European Union, the nations

that invented the nation-state are at the very least, diminishing its power, sovereignty,

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and influence. The stateless nations of Europe generally embrace the European Union;

they see in the European Union a path to liberation from the yoke of the nation-state

in whose territories they live. These stateless nations also know well that the

expansion and strengthening of the European Union dramatically diminishes their

possibility of obtaining a separate sovereign nation-state. The nationalist movements

of stateless nations that support European integration are not less nationalist because

of this. It is equally extraordinary to see that the ethnic nation-states that emerged

from the catastrophe of the former Yugoslavia also wish to join the European Union.

This is a most intriguing paradox; these nationalist movements who recently did not

hesitate to kill, mame and ethnically cleanse to achieve a sovereign nation-state, are

now willing to give up the sovereign power they cruelly fought for in order to join the

European Union.

The nation-state is seen by nationalists as medium or instrument to achieve nationalist

goals and except for Fascists, is not seen an end in itself. The aim of nationalists is

NOT to build states for their own sake, but as a medium to obtain security, freedom

and self-determination for the nation. National sovereignty is the preferred instrument

to achieve this. Since the onset of modernity and until recently, for lack of

alternatives, nations could only achieve these goals by building sovereign nation

states. As a result of this regrettable situation, the goal of self-determination was

significantly narrowed to mean only the establishment of a sovereign nation state.

With the expansion of globalisation and the concurrent weakening of the state

sovereignty, the phenomenal expansion of regional organisations and the spread of

multiculturalism, new spaces open for the recognition of difference and this will

incrementally allow more feasible alternatives for the survival and well-being of

nations. Some examples are readily available: Basque, Québécois and Catalan

nationalists are achieving their goals of security, recognition and national survival by

means other than a full sovereign state. The United Kingdom, Spain and Canada have

special arrangements to attend to the national demands of minority nationalisms.

These arrangements are complex and difficult and not without acrimony and false

starts, and they are expensive. They are nevertheless preferable to all concerned than

to proceed with the curse of partition and secession. But to make these arrangements

viable and safeguard the rights of national and ethnic communities participating in the

multination state, multicultural nationalism must sustain the principle of asymmetrical

12

collective rights. This is now more achievable than in previous periods when the

nation state reigned supreme. The international environment today is more

sympathetic to minority claims than in previous generations and to some extent,

stigmatises old assimilationist models and encourages minority rights activism.20

The debate about Collective Rights in the multination state A sharp divide between collective and individual rights is often difficult to sustain. Most

democratic rights are not restricted to one individual but can only be enjoyed collectively by a

plurality of individuals. Van Aaken defines rights as legally recognised interests which are to

be found in a continuum from individual to collective interests21. Granting collective or

supplementary rights to these communities can cause difficulties because national and ethnic

groups are seldom institutionalised. Moreover, nations and ethnic groups are ideologically

plural even if they share common cultural mores. Internally, they are open to competing

ideological interpretations of the national, ethnic or religious self. This is not recognised with

the same ease as it is recognised in the institution of the state. It is generally accepted that

citizens of liberal nation states have competing definitions of “the national interest” and

which of them prevails is the result of an electoral tussle between contending political groups.

Likewise, national and ethnic communities, minorities or otherwise, are the arena for similar

hegemonic tussles. However, minority nationalisms or minority religious political ideologies

are much less commonly understood as temporary outcomes of internal struggles, and this

tends to stigmatise and obfuscate the identity of these communities. Pre-modern religious

practices of minorities are often wrongly seen as constitutive, which are then counterpoised to

the modernity of the beliefs of the dominant group. This conveniently forgets that dominant

groups also have a history or a reality of pre-modern religious practices and that these are

subjected to vibrant debates. In both, majority and minority communities, the less externally

threatened communities feel, the more the will be inclined to air internal debates in public and

to accept compromise ideas, and vice versa, the more threatened they feel, the less inclined

they will be to engage in debates and will normally close ranks to find protection.

Consequently, the recognition of collective rights in the public domain is not only a critical

normative need, but will crucially encourage internal minority debate, compromising

attitudes, and a more robust group integration into the larger polity. For this to be achieved,

2200 WWiillll KKyymmlliicckkaa,, MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall OOddyysssseeyyss,, OOxxffoorrdd UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 22000077 pp.. 4444 2211AAnnnnee VVaann AAaakkeenn,, ((22000055)),, ““MMaakkiinngg IInntteerrnnaattiioonnaall HHuummaann RRiigghhttss PPrrootteeccttiioonn MMoorree EEffffeeccttiivvee:: AA RRaattiioonnaall--CChhooiiccee AApppprrooaacchh ttoo tthhee EEffffeeccttiivveenneessss ooff IIuuss SSttaannddii PPrroovviissiioonnss””,, PPrreepprriinnttss ooff tthhee MMaaxx PPllaanncckk IInnssttiittuuttee ffoorr RReesseeaarrcchh oonn CCoolllleeccttiivvee GGooooddss,, BBoonnnn //1166 pp.. 99

13

some degree of institutionalisation is needed.

The idea of collective rights or group rights acquired a bad name because of the abusive use

of it made by the apartheid regime in South Africa, Israel and other discriminatory states22. It

will be however, a major mistake to associate the idea of collective rights with discriminatory

regimes. Collective rights for national communities are not only compatible with democratic

practices but require internal democracy and procedural arrangements. The presence of

supplementary bodies to manage these demands provide a strong incentive for resolving

internal problems for they will otherwise be referred to wider state institutions. Equally,

reformers have a better chance to defeat fundamentalists for they can clearly show the

rewards for cooperation and compromise with majority communities23.

In “really existing” nation-states, the state is the guarantor of the collective rights of the

dominant or official nation. Consider for example the efforts of nation-states to protect their

languages, to ensure that holidays and festivities of the nation are recognised as public

holidays, and even to represent the symbols and collective memories of the official ethnicity

in the legal system and symbols of the state. In many liberal-democratic nation-states, those

who wish to become citizens are very often required to learn and appreciate the dominant

language, to know the history of the nation and to understand the meaning of its symbols.

Even in the most “civic” of settler nation-states, would be citizens are invited to share, in or at

the very least to understand, the symbols and cultural assets of the dominant nation. It is not

difficult to conclude that nation-state is a very efficient protector of the collective rights of the

dominant or titular nation. The issue is however, that the nation-state cannot protect and

promote the values and symbols of the non-dominant ethnic or national minorities without

fundamentally undermining its primary function: to be the state of the nation. Liberal-

democratic nation-states cannot support with the same devotion the collective rights of

minority cultures without contradicting its goals. The best minorities can expect is some

marginal recognition. With all its emphasis on coexistence, liberal nationalism’s response to

multiculturalist demands does little more than carve out a precarious area of diversity on the

margins of a predominantly assimilationist structure24.

22 John Coakley, “Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-territorial autonomy”, International Political Science Review.1994; 15 pp. 297-8 2233 AAyyeelleett SShhaacchhaarr,, MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall JJuurriissddiiccttiioonnss,, CCuullttuurraall ddiiffffeerreenncceess aanndd WWoommeenn’’ss RRiigghhttss,, CCaammbbrriiddggee UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 22000011,, pp.. 112244 24 B. Parekh, "British Citizenship and Cultural Difference", in Geoff Andrews (ed.) Citizenship, Lawrence and Wishart, London. 1991, p. 194

14

15

In opposition to this, nationalist multiculturalism must suggest a model for the

implementation of the collective rights for all ethnic and national communities whose

members are citizens of the multicultural state. If the multicultural state is to be a community

of communities, then it must protect the legal and administrative personality of each

participating community. This is not only counter-intuitive in a world of nations states, but it

also challenges well established notions of the indivisibility of sovereignty. But this was not

always the case.

Since its creation, the modern state in both, its absolutist and liberal democratic forms,

eroded the system of collective rights that existed in pre-modern states. In a number of pre-

modern empires, such as the Roman and the Ottoman Empires, cultural communities were

understood to be bearers of rights, even if the society was not democratic. In contrast, from its

beginnings, the Absolutist State and its heir, the liberal democratic state dismantled long

established communities – professional and cultural – to reunite emancipated individuals on

the basis of a centralised system of authority25. Otto Bauer, argues that the liberal democratic

state is organised according to the "centralist-atomist" principle. The centralising principle

was initially developed by the absolutist state, and the progressive centralisation of the state

which followed had the effect of reducing society to its smallest parts, in Bauer's words,

atoms, i.e., to single individuals. This idea was inherited by liberalism and taken by it to its

logical conclusion by sweeping away the last remnants of ancient autonomous associations of

individuals. The consequence of this is that state and society in contemporary states are all

embracing centralised totalities. In liberal democracies, there only are two recognised

politico-juridical entities. One is the individual and the other is the sovereign will of the

undivided collective. This is what Bauer and Renner call the centralist-atomist structure of

modern nation-states. This totalising tendency fails to acknowledge meaningful intermediate

locations that result from individuals adhering to different cultural and religious values to the

ones supported by the official ethnicity of the state.26 This matter came to a head recently in

the United Kingdom in the acrimonious criticism that followed the Archbishop of

Canterbury’s recent lecture on Islam in English Law.27 The key argument of the Archbishop

is that human beings have multiple allegiances and that these can be complementary. This is 2255 BB.. PPaarreekkhh,, ““PPoolliittiiccaall TThheeoorryy aanndd tthhee mmuullttiiccuullttuurraall ssoocciieettyy””,, RRaaddiiccaall PPhhiilloossoopphhyy,, VVooll.. 9955,, MMaayy--JJuunnee 11999999,, pp.. 2288.. 2266 OOttttoo BBaauueerr,, TThhee QQuueessttiioonn ooff NNaattiioonnaalliittiieess aanndd SSoocciiaall DDeemmooccrraaccyy,, wwiitthh aann iinnttrroodduuccttiioonn bbyy EE.. NNiimmnnii,, UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff MMiinnnneessoottaa PPrreessss,, MMiinnnneeaappoolliiss,, 22000000,, pppp.. 222233--222244 2277 IIssllaamm iinn EEnngglliisshh LLaaww.. CCiivviill aanndd RReelliiggiioouuss LLaaww iinn EEnnggllaanndd -- lleeccttuurree bbyy tthhee AArrcchhbbiisshhoopp ooff CCaanntteerrbbuurryy,, DDrr RRoowwaann WWiilllliiaammss.. FFrroomm LLaammbbeetthh PPaallaaccee,, 77 FFeebbrruuaarryy 22000088 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/07_02_08_islam.pdfhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/07_02_08_islam.pdf

16

not given due recognition in the legal system of most liberal democracies and on what I call

“really existing” nation states, which demands instead a single, individual, standardised, form

of commitment.

The atomist approach explains the organising principle of the liberal democratic nation-state.

The inhabitants of the state are nationally identified with the state through habitation and

citizenship, and irrespectively of ethnic or religious affiliations. States are thus seen as nation-

states whether they are ethnically homogeneous or not28. In the liberal nation-state the

cultural practice of the dominant nation (the official ethnicity of the state) is disguised by a

single and all encompassing procedural practice that claims to be fair and culturally neutral,

but that is derived from the historical experience of the dominant national community.

Furthermore, a liberal view of culture is by definition grounded in liberal theory and cannot

avoid seeing every culture from its individualistic liberal angle29. This creates some

distortions for minority communities that do not subscribe to secular-liberal values and

procedures or have different cultural mores from those of the dominant community. These

minorities often wish and can justify from their own ethnic or religious perspective an

common form of governance for the state they live in, and, can signal tolerance and the

adherence to human rights principles. For those communities to be integrated, some kind of

state recognition of their way of life and their customary law and in personal matters, is

necessary. This is what the Archbishop of Canterbury calls, following the Israeli feminist

writer Ayelet Shachar30, “supplementary jurisdictions” and these must be congruent with the

common ethos of the state.

In liberal democratic nation states, multiculturalism is always limited by the hegemony of the

dominant nation, and contemporary liberal theories find it very difficult, if not impossible, to

acknowledge the need for collective rights in liberal democracies. Atomist states, however

much consideration they might show for individual democratic rights and however egalitarian

their practices might be, are by definition, adverse to recognising intermediate and

constitutionally enshrined entities. Because of this institutional blockage, small demands for

supplementary jurisdictions are often blown out of proportion and “really existing” nation

2288 UU.. RRaa''aannaann,, ‘‘NNaattiioonn aanndd SSttaattee,, OOrrddeerr oouutt ooff CChhaaooss’’ iinn UU.. RRaa''aannaann eett aall.. ((eeddss..)),, SSttaattee aanndd NNaattiioonn iinn MMuullttiieetthhnniicc SSoocciieettiieess ((MMaanncchheesstteerr:: MMaanncchheesstteerr UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 11999911)),, pp.. 2200.. 2299 BB.. PPaarreekkhh,, ‘‘DDiilleemmmmaass ooff aa MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall TThheeoorryy ooff CCiittiizzeennsshhiipp’’,, CCoonnsstteellllaattiioonnss,, vvooll.. 44,, nnoo.. 11 ((11999977)),, pp.. 6600.. 3300 AAyyeelleett SShhaacchhaarr,, MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall JJuurriissddiiccttiioonnss,, CCuullttuurraall ddiiffffeerreenncceess aanndd WWoommeenn’’ss RRiigghhttss,, CCaammbbrriiddggee UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 22000011,, pp.. 112255

states with national and ethnic minorities face two unpalatable options:

a) To split the state along national lines or

b) to enable the larger national group to assimilate the weaker ones 31.

Both strategies have been tried in the West with equally catastrophic results.

Yael Tamir also opposes granting collective rights to national or ethnic communities. She

argues that national groups are informal, amorphous, lack clear criteria of membership and

the idea of granting them rights is fraught with difficulties32. For this reason Tamir believes

the right to culture should only be an individual right. A similar objection is raised by Will

Kymlicka33.

Without collective rights, national and ethnic minorities are confined to play a subordinated

role in both, the international and domestic systems as they will lack the instruments and

privileges of those involved in collective action. If the nation-state is an institution endowed

with a collective persona, then for multicultural nationalism, national and ethnic communities

equally require some collective rights and privileges. Consider for example a trade union. In

these post-Fordist days, it is difficult to decide who is a worker and who is not, as the

characteristics of the working environment shift continuously. If trade unions were only seen

as a conglomerate of individuals willing to partake in a common activity, they will then lack

immunities and attributes that are granted to corporate bodies. Imagine that an employer

would be able to sue for damages every individual member of a union that goes on strike.

Very soon the trade union will cease to function. A similar situation applies to national and

ethnic communities. Without some kind of institutionalisation and a collective persona, these

communities will be at a disadvantage when dealing with the formal organisations of the

state. Without a collective persona, national and ethnic communities will be unable organise

the resources to educate their young and to protect their way of life.

THE NATIONAL CULTURAL AUTOMY MODEL (NCA)

3311 KKyymmlliicckkaa aanndd SSttrraaeehhllee,, oopp.. CCiitt..,, 11999999,, pp.. 7766 3322 YY..TTaammiirr,, LLiibbeerraall NNaattiioonnaalliissmm,, PPrriinncceettoonn UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 11999933,, pp.. 4477.. 3333 WWiillll KKyymmlliicckkaa,, MMuullttiiccuullttuurraall CCiittiizzeennsshhiipp,, OOxxffoorrdd UUnniivveerrssiittyy PPrreessss,, 11999955,, pp.. 3344

17

I have discussed extensively in previous works how a revamped National Cultural Autonomy

Model could help foster the parameters of multicultural nationalism34. Here the argument will

only be schematically presented.

The model of national-cultural autonomy proposed by Karl Renner is based on the premise

that ethnic and national communities can be organised as autonomous units in multinational

states without considering residential location when the abode of feuding national

communities overlaps. The singularity of this model can be understood when contrasted to

most other theories of national autonomy. In most conventional theories, national autonomy

requires a territorial base for the autonomous national community, or at least the intention to

build some kind of "autonomous homeland" that will serve as the territorial base. In contrast,

Bauer and Renner's theory rests on the idea of "non-territorial national autonomy." This

means that autonomous communities are organised as self governing collectives whatever

their residential location within a multi-nation state. As in the millet system in the Ottoman

Empire, peoples of different ethnic identities can co-exist in the same territory without

straining the principle of national autonomy. The crucial difference with the millet system is,

however, that the autonomous communities are organised democratically and based on

individual consent to belong and internal democracy35. The NCA model acknowledges that

national communities require recognition of their specificity and difference in the public

domain and this is achieved through the existence of legally guaranteed autonomous

corporations. Unlike more conventional forms of autonomy and self-determination, it rejects

the idea of an ethnic or national exclusive control over regions or territorial states.

In its Rennerian version, the NCA model resembles somewhat the present arrangements in

the Brussels-Capital Region (Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Brussels Hoofdstedelijk

34 See, “National Cultural Autonomy as an Alternative to Minority Nationalism”, in Ethnopolitics, Vol. 3 No.3, pp. 345-365, September 2007 also published in David Smith and Karl Cordell (eds.) Cultural Autonomy in Contemporary Europe, Routledge, London, 2008 pp. 9-28, “Constitutional or Agonist Patriotism? the Dilemmas of Liberal Nation-states”, in Per Mouritsen & Knud Erik Jørgensen (eds.) Constituting Communities, Political Solutions to Cultural Conflict , Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2008 pp. 94-116, 2008, National-Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics , Routledge, London 2005, "Introduction to the English Reading Audience," in Otto Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy (Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. xv-xlviii, "Nationalist Multiculturalism in Late Imperial Austria as a Critique of Contemporary Liberalism: The Case of Bauer and Renner," Journal of Political Ideologies, vol. 4 (1999), pp. 289-314 35 For a discussion on how these principles can by applied to the Balkans see: D. Anagnostou, “Breaking the Cycle of Nationalism: The EU, Regional Policy and the Minority of Western Thrace, Greece”, South European Society and Politics, 2001, 6:1, pp. 99 - 124

18

Gewest)36. It requires that all citizens declare their nationality when they reach voting age.

Members of each national community, whatever their territory of residence, would form a

single public body or association endowed with legal personality and collective rights. This

model is based on the premise that the most controversial issues in the relationship between

ethnic and national groups are issues concerning language, education and the recognition of

cultural rights in the public domain. Networks of communication across cultural boundaries

are crucial because the model recognises both, communities and individuals as legitimate

interlocutors. Change is a constant feature of cultural practices. A continuous dialogue within

and between communities and between individuals of different communities is the only way

to secure and formalise a negotiated public space across ethnic boundaries.

While stimulating and thought provoking, the NCA model was developed for the

circumstances of Austria at the beginning of the twentieth century. Our circumstances are

different and they require some revision of it proposals. First, not all national minorities are

interested in the wide range of autonomous rights advocated by Renner. In most liberal

democracies a “thinner” version of the model will be sufficient to meet demands. Second, in

the twenty first century national belonging and allegiance is less clearly defined, as we are

blessed with far more ethnically hybrid and transnational cases. The model of multicultural

Nationalism begins from the premises of the NCA model, but it revises them considerably by

incorporating the more recent insight from models of multiculturalism and ethnic conflict

resolution. These will be discussed in the remainder of this paper.

Hegemony and the Operational Values of Multicultural Nationalism It was argued earlier that national and ethnic communities that participate in a multination

state should enjoy collective rights. At this stage of the debate, critics and sceptics can raise

an important question. How would a multination state, with such a range of community

autonomy, be able to operate as a single political entity? Is the multicultural state not in

danger of disintegration? After all, this was the sad end of most multinational states in the

twentieth century. To ensure the cohesion of the system, participating communities and

individuals will have to partake in a system of operational values that will organise and

sustain the multicultural state. These values must not be immutable, should be voluntarily

agreed and could certainly be, from time to time, revised. To advance these values, nationalist

multiculturalism must constitute itself as a hegemonic project capable of transcending ethnic

36 See Philippe van Parijs, “Must Europe be Belgian? On Democratic Citizenship in Multilingual Polities”, in Catriona McKinnon Iain Hampsher-Monk (eds.) The Demands of Citizenship, London and New York: Continuum, 2000, p. 242

19

divides and mobilising other interest groups in society. Without a multicultural imaginary and

horizon, one that provides guidance and neutralises opponents, the project of multicultural

nationalism has only a limited chance to succeed.

Bhikhu Parekh37 argues that every society is divided into classes, regions, genders,

generations, etc, each with its own overlapping values and practices. These groups cannot co-

operate and constitute a single society without having a minimum set of values in common.

Whatever their origins, these values, Parekh argues, become a part of the society’s moral

structure and he calls them operative public values38. These values which include human

rights, gender equality and so on reflect both, the normative objectives of the legal system,

and a more diffused system of beliefs on how best the social system should be regulated. The

operative public values are then a hegemonic element that mobilises assent and support for

the values of the multination-state.

In “really existing” nation-states, these hegemonic values are a concrete expression of the

national culture of the dominant nation. They usually crystallise over a long period of time

and change slowly. In some “really existing” nation-states, particularly in those with

influential ethnic or national minorities, these values reflect to a degree, the values, and

wishes of not only the dominant nation, but those of influential minorities too. Sometimes,

when a particular group is able to exercise concerted pressure, these values change. In the last

forty years for example, most Western “really existing” nation states had to revise their values

on the position of women in society. While there is still much to be done, the change in the

last forty years has been impressive. In most cases however, the system of operational values

is slow to change and reflects exclusively the values of the dominant nation. This is

particularly the case in most immigration societies including the English speaking settler

societies of the New World and the British State. The widespread belief that migrants should

adapt and integrate into the values of the dominant society (nation) is indicative of the

importance of these operational values in sustaining the cohesiveness of the nation-state.

In these circumstances, national and ethnic minorities within the “really existing” nation-state

are caught in a difficult dilemma. They either forgo important parts of their culture in order to

participate effectively in the institutions of the nation-state, or, they uphold their traditional

values and remain at best, marginal and powerless. The high level of alienation, coercion, and

3377 BB.. PPaarreekkhh,, ““CCuullttuurraall PPlluurraalliissmm aanndd tthhee LLiimmiittss ooff DDiivveerrssiittyy””,, AAlltteerrnnaattiivveess,, 2200,, 11999955,, pppp.. 443311--5577.. 3388 IIbbiidd,, 11999955,, pp.. 443377,, BBhhiikkhhuu PPaarreekkhh,, RReetthhiinnkkiinngg MMuullttiiccuullttuurraalliissmm,, CCuullttuurraall DDiivveerrssiittyy aanndd PPoolliittiiccaall TThheeoorryy,, MMccMMiillllaann,, BBaassiinnggssttookkee,, 22000000,, pp.. 226677

20

pain that these minorities have to endure is comprehensively documented in the

anthropological literature, and need not be expanded here. Often, the result of this coercive

process of acculturation is a collection of disgruntled and disoriented communities and

individuals, who feel helpless in the wake of the considerable degree of cultural compulsion

they have to endure. Uncompromising demands for assimilation backfire. Among many

examples, social injustices and anti-egalitarian policies compounded the sense alienation of

minority communities, and this was a powerful ingredient in the riots of Clichy-sous-Bois,

east of Paris in 200539.

In view of the pain they cause, should these values be scrapped? This is a difficult question;

for without these operational values, a state is not possible. A state is a complex and often

contradictory organisation, encompassing many diverse and conflicting interests. Without a

collective will or some common system of values and some minimal allegiance to them, a

modern state, in its national, multinational or multicultural forms, is impossible, unless of

course that the state is highly authoritarian. This option, however, is not even considered.

Instead, the solution suggested here, is that multicultural nationalism must construct a

counter-hegemonic imaginary, one that is able to mobilise and attract support for a more open

and pluralistic version of the operational values of the state. Multicultural nationalism must

become a fighting creed.

In order to sustain the smooth operation of a multicultural state, the project of multicultural

nationalism must win support across communal divides and suggest ways of constructing a

set of operative values, that include and reflect on the cultures and ways of life of all

participating communities. Here lies the main difference between the nation-state and the

project of multicultural nationalism.

The operational values of a multination state are not easy to build. Importantly, it is not self-

evident which communities should be granted autonomy and collective rights within the

multicultural state. It is not possible to decide in advance what criteria should be used to

enfranchise communities, for the circumstances of each multicultural state varies

considerably, and some communities may not wish far-ranging powers. Decisions on which

group should be granted collective rights should be taken by a commonly agreed procedure,

or, by mutual agreement. However, a distinctive ethnic culture and a democratically

expressed desire to constitute an autonomous community should be central considerations.

This is the point where the democratic negotiation between communities that wish to live

3399 SSeeee aammoonngg mmaannyy,, MMiicchheell KKookkoorreeffff,, LLeess éémmeeuuttiieerrss ddee ll''iinnjjuussttiiccee,, MMoouuvveemmeennttss nnoo 4444 22000066//22

21

together protecting their identity and way of life is tested. However, if a number of conditions

are present, it is possible to organise a system of operational values that at the very least, are

not alienating anyone and could be the basis for a common participation.

First there must be a desire on the part of the communities to be together and partake in the

multicultural state and recognise the right of others to do likewise. This desire to live together

results from different motivations. In many cases it is economic interest. For example, with all

its aspiration to build wide-ranging political institutions, the European Union still is primarily

an economic community. The constituent member states perceive that it is in their own

economic advantage to be part of the Union, so they are prepared to compromise, more or less

dramatically, some key aspects of their sovereignty. In a multination state, a similar process

could help in the formulation of operative public values. Encouraging examples could be

drawn from Spain and Northern Ireland. Spain had to grapple with very difficult

disagreements about the nature of the state and the status of national communities after a long

period of oppression under the Franco dictatorship. The demand for explicit recognition of the

Basque and Catalan nations in the Constitution of the Spanish State, deeply antagonised

Spanish nationalists. A compromise was very hard to achieve. But it was achieved. Not all

issues are settled, and the nationalities question continues from time to time to fuel

controversies. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding ETA, The Spanish State achieved a modus-

vivendi in both, its institutional arrangements and operational values, one that is acceptable to

the majority of Spanish nationalists and to the majority of Basque and Catalan nationalists.

An even more spectacular success was the agreement in Northern Ireland after many years of

violent conflict. The Belfast agreement states that: The two governments (British and Irish)

recognise the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be

accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, and accordingly confirm that

their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship is accepted by both Governments and

would not be affected by any future change in the status of Northern Ireland40 The

representation in the Belfast assembly acknowledges community representation and there is

even an member, Ms Anna Lo, who is a leader of the local Chinese community and the first

politician born in East Asia elected to any parliament or assembly in the United Kingdom.

These are important lessons for multicultural nationalism.

Second, multicultural nationalism must find agreed procedures to periodically revise and

update operative public values. This could take the form of periodical constitutional

assemblies. The relation between national and ethnic communities is never static, reflecting

4400 TThhee BBeellffaasstt AAggrreeeemmeenntt ((CCoommhhaaoonnttúú BBhhééaall FFeeiirrssttee)),, CCoonnssttiittuuttiioonnaall AAggrreeeemmeenntt,, ccllaauussee ((vvii))

22

the flux that is part and parcel of national and ethnic life. As national communities are not

static, this should be reflected in the operative public values of the multination state.

Operative public values, like constitutions, cannot be fixed and sacrosanct agreements

reached at some foundational moment. As James Tully argues, the principle of audi alteram

partem (listen to the other side) must be the guiding point in any multination constitutional

arrangement41. Likewise, continued dialogue and agreed channels for periodical revision

must prevent these public values from becoming operative public fossils.

es

Third, state symbols should reflect ethnic plurality and the languages of constituent

communities should be taught across the ethnic divide. The legal system should be able to

enact supplementary laws that while in line with operative public values, are applicable only

to minority communities. Communal leadership must be always aware of what may be seen

as offensive by other communities and should try to avoid, as much as possible hurting the

feelings of others. This is what the Archbishop of Canterbury calls supplementary

jurisdictions42 . In the United Kingdom there are two examples of this, both required separate

legislation that is not applicable to all citizens. The case of the Agunot (sing. Aguna עגונה

anchored or chained), women in the orthodox Jewish community who are unable to re-marry

because the former husbands do not grant them a divorce; and the case of the ritual dagger

(Kirpan) that must be carried by devout Sikhs at all times. Surely, the plight of the Agunot is

a violation of human rights. However, the excuse that the problem can be easily remedied in

secular courts is irrelevant and offensive to Orthodox Jewish women who wish to live in

accordance with the principles of their faith. Here, secularism becomes as intolerant as its

inverted mirror image, religious fundamentalism. To remedy this, The Divorce (Religious

Marriages) Bill was initiated by the Jewish Community passed its final reading in the British

Houses of Parliament 2002. The bill is designed for the sole use of the orthodox Jewish

community (a minority among UK Jews), and provides for the civil court, when it considers it

appropriate, to order that a decree of divorce is not to be made absolute until a declaration is

made by both parties that they have taken the necessary steps to obtain a religious divorce.

After a religious [and civil] divorce each would be free to re-marry in a religious

ceremony43. The case of the Kirpan also required legislation that is only applicable to the

Sikh community. The Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes it a criminal offense carrying articl

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23

e size

4.

These are encouraging developments that recognise in legislation the importance of minority

faiths in the public life of citizens. It makes these citizens to feel more able and welcome to

partake in the rights and obligations of citizens. Through the recognition of diversity in the

public domain, the multination state makes it possible for diverse communities to identify

with it. However, these encouraging developments are marred by the current wave of

Islamophobia that engulfs Western Europe. This is truly alarming, for this wave of European

Islamophobia is nothing but a variant of historic European anti-Semitism. The recent

Islamophobic film sponsored by the Dutch extremist Geert Wilders, “Fitna”, and the attention

it attracts brings back uncomfortable memories of Germany between 1933 and 1940. The

film reminds of Veit Harlan’s Nazi propaganda movie Jud Süß ( the Jew Suss) and Fritz

Hippler’s Der ewige Jud (the eternal Jew). Let us not forget that these racist filmmakers were

never prosecuted for their racist deeds and died free men in Germany not that long ago.

Hippler was even an activist in the liberal FDP in post-war Germany. In the UK, the ignorant

vitriol and prejudice that was poured by large sections of the media over the Archbishop of

Canterbury for suggesting that supplementary legislation modeled in the above cases could

also be made available to the Islamic community is also a cause of serious concern. Why do

people who manifestly know little or nothing about Islam feel empowered to make such

malicious comments? What Hannah Arendt called the problem of Evil in European culture,

the tendency of ordinary people to conform to mass stereotypes and opinion without critically

thinking about the results of their action or inaction is still haunting us45.

Fourth, minority communities close ranks and do not question their leadership when

intimidated by external threats and vice versa, they are open to compromise and dialogue and

cross community cooperation when they feel recognised and included in the larger polity.

Multicultural nationalism should encourage internal community dialogue about controversial

operational values, and create the conditions for communities to feel secure and able to

critically examine their beliefs. Very often weak minorities desperately hold to their beliefs

and cultures because they are derided or rejected by majority cultures. A multicultural

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nationalist project must instil respect and appreciation for cultures and their values. Only in

conditions of security and self-respect minorities will be prepared to critically engage with

their community values.

Fifth, multicultural nationalism must aim to constitute itself as an inter-communal hegemonic

project in the Gramscian sense of the term. Briefly, Hegemony is rule by consent across class

and community divides. It cannot be the initiative or leadership of one community but there

has to be cross community support. When confronted with a plurality of subjects, unity in

diversity can only be obtained through commonly agreed forms of action, and I call this

nationalist multicultural imaginary, a discursive construct that appeals to unity and action by

incorporating emancipatory demands of constituent groups46. Without constructing a

nationalist multicultural imaginary, one that is capable of constructing a hegemonic project

across ethnic and national divisions, the multination state will remain fragile. Here it must

interface with other social concerns and attempt to incorporate them to the logic of the

project. Only through constructing a multicultural imaginary will multicultural nationalism be

in a position achieve the necessary support to validate its new, more a open set of democratic

operational values.

Conclusion: Is a Multicultural Nationalism feasible? Is Multicultural nationalism an oxymoron and a fancy utopia or, could it provide the basis for

the reform of “really existing” nations intro truly inclusive societies?

Multicultural nationalism is based on the premise that the most controversial issues in the

relationship between ethnic and national groups are issues concerning differential access to

resources, language, education and the recognition of cultural rights in the public domain.

Here, networks of communication across cultural boundaries are crucial because the model

recognises both communities and individuals as legitimate interlocutors. Change is a constant

feature of cultural practices. A continuous dialogue within and between communities and

between individuals of different communities is the only way to secure and formalise a

negotiated public space across community boundaries.

Multination states differ greatly. Some are more integrated; in others ethnic cleavages fuel

much distrust and confrontation. In some situations, minorities do not wish to have far

reaching levels of autonomy but are contented with the recognition of some aspects of their

way of life and culture. In other circumstances, indigenous peoples for example, will not

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25

accept anything less that a broad range of autonomous principles. Ethnic and national

minorities differ in terms of their desire for integration and interaction with other

communities, they may also see themselves as diasporic communities, aspiring for a greater

interaction with communities of the same ethnic affiliation in other parts of the world.

For these reasons, multicultural nationalism cannot propose a rigid model for the operation of

a multicultural state, only a set of flexible guidelines. Some of these will be enumerated

below:

1 Community representation

In most multinational societies, populations are territorially mixed. Patterns of territorial

representation will often exclude vulnerable minorities that do not have the necessary

territorial concentration to exercise more conventional forms of autonomy. For this reason,

national and ethnic minorities who desire autonomy should be constitutionally empowered to

organise a single, democratically elected representative assembly. This assembly will be

empowered to discuss and decide upon questions that affect the cultural life of these

communities; these are for example, education, promotion of community languages, etc.

Recent moves towards devolution in the UK appear to be a move in that direction, except that

these are territorial entities.

Some ethnic and national communities, for a variety of reasons, may not wish to have such a

wide-ranging model of representation. Migrant communities may wish to have a toned-down

system of administration, with fewer competences. Multicultural nationalism cannot

therefore provide a blueprint for all forms of non territorial representation, but provide

general guidelines that will be adapted to the differing circumstances of the participating

communities, this is not uncommon in federal systems, where federal units have different

patterns of representation and representation itself is often asymmetrical.

2 Collective Rights Multicultural nationalism requires a system of collective or group rights. This is what

distinguishes multicultural nationalism from liberal versions of multiculturalism. Here, the

participating national and ethnic communities will be the subject of supplementary legislation

that will incorporate them asymmetrically to the multination state. In some cases, where the

need for autonomy is greater, these communities will be endowed with a corporate collective

persona, enshrined in constitutional laws. These corporations will be publicly accountable.

The existence of these corporate bodies will guarantee the effective exercise of the rights of

26

the participating communities and will empower them to make representations on behalf of its

constituents. These group rights will also ensure the non-interference of others on issues that

are of the strict competence of the communities concerned.

3 Extra-Territorial representation.

Multicultural nationalism proposes to convert “really existing” nation states into multination

states, a state of communities of communities with a devolved system of sovereignty. It will

need a central government, which is territorial in its jurisdiction and non-national and non-

ethnic in its attributions. The role of the central government will be to administer those areas

that are non-contentious in the relations between national and ethnic minorities, and oversee

the smooth operation of the system. The state should be organised under the principles of

representative democracy and respect for human rights. It should co-ordinate and liaise

between the communities and make sure that no citizen or participating community are

illegally coerced. The central state must create mechanisms to resolve disputes between

communities, and guarantee the rights of individuals to freely participate and exit the

constituent communities. An important aspect of central government activity will be to

develop systems and mechanisms that ensure continuous dialog between communities, and

the ability to arbitrate when disputes occur.

4 An Hegemonic System of Operative Public Values Multicultural nationalism should become, like other “ethnic” nationalisms, a hegemonic

project fit to compete with its opponents for cross community support. One that is more

inclusive and tolerant of diversity than its liberal, Republican and nation-state counterparts.

This system of operative public values should be built with cross community support and

cannot be understood to be the domain of one community and not of others. The solidarity of

its supporters is built by their ability to engage in common actions across cultural divides. It

cannot be seen to advance the interests of any particular community in isolation, but it has to

bee seen as a collaborative effort for the good of all communities. It should be flexible enough

to revise its principles to accommodate changing circumstances, while the unshakable

normative goal should be to strengthen a community of communities in which and every

community and indeed, each individual is represented. It should also incorporate sufficient

demands of the participating communities to be a serious alternative to communal forms of

action, be them nationalisms or not. In Gramscian terminology, it should convert itself in a

collective will that builds an historical bloc with a multination democratic imaginary. In

27

conclusion, there will be no multicultural nationalism if it does not suggest a set of

operational values that are acceptable to a significant cross section of participating

communities. For a multicultural state to succeed, multicultural nationalism must constitute

itself into a credible hegemonic force.

Without radically transforming the nation-state, there is no future for multiculturalism.

The task of converting “really existing” nation states into multination states is however,

formidable.

Fin

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