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Can global integrity indicators identify operational entry points for anticorruption reforms?. Steve Knack, Lead Economist, DECHD and Maks Kobonbaev , PRMPS. Course on Actionable Governance Indicators: Making AGIs Relevant for Operations Thursday, April 29, 2010, MC4-800. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Can global integrity indicators identify operational entry points for anticorruption reforms?
Course on Actionable Governance Indicators: Making AGIs Relevant for OperationsThursday, April 29, 2010, MC4-800
Steve Knack, Lead Economist, DECHD andMaks Kobonbaev, PRMPS
www.globalintegrity.org/report.globalintegrity.org
Global integrity indicators
www.agidata.org >data>sourcesagidata.info>data>sources
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Outline: questions:
What are the global integrity indicators?
Are they actionable?
How many countries does global integrity cover and how do countries perform on integrity and anticorruption?
Why does it matter to look at in law (de jure) and in practice (de facto) aspects of integrity?
How can these indicators inform “policy choices” with respect to anticorruption reforms?
Can we use these indicators in our work and how can we do so effectively?
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What are the global integrity indicators?
GI questions are narrowly defined and specific and, hence, provide an actionable roadmap for understanding particular dimensions of governance and for the design of anticorruption reforms
320 discrete questions per country (differs for local and sector tools) Local experts, not international analysts, construct the country
assessments Double-blind and transparent peer review comments 100% transparency: all disaggregated scores, comments, references, and
peer review comments published. “In law” vs. “In practice” – capturing the implementation gap Each indicator has a score, an explanatory comment and a supporting
reference Ordinal scoring (0, 25, 50, 75, 100) anchored by unique scoring criteria
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Global integrity categories and themesNo. Categories No. Themes (Sub-categories) 1 Civil Society, Public Info.
and Media
1.1 1.2 1.3
Civil Society Organizations Media Public Access to Information
2 Elections
2.1 2.2 2.3
Voting and Citizen Participation Election Integrity Political Financing
3 Government Accountability
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
Executive Accountability Legislative Accountability Judicial Accountability Budget Processes
4 Administration and Civil Service
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
Civil Service Regulations Whistle-blowing Measures Procurement Privatization
5 Oversight and Regulation
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5
National Ombudsman Supreme Audit Institution Taxes and Customs State-Owned Enterprises Business Regulation
6 Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
Anti-Corruption Law Anti-Corruption Agency Rule of Law Law Enforcement
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Are global integrity indicators actionable?
Actionable Governance Indicators
• Focus on specific aspects of governance
• Disaggregated and narrowly defined
• Allow identification of specific problems within governance system
• Provide entry points for:– Policy reform– Monitoring of Impacts
• Track how well institutional objectives are being met
Broad Governance Indicators• Assess general dimensions of governance
– Accountability– Capacity– Transparency– Corruption
• Limited explanatory power– Do not explain how policy is affected
by E.g. lack of accountability– Citizen perception of corruption
might be high but we don’t know which factors contribute to such perceptions
• Are of little use for anticorruption reforms
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Government accountability
•Executive accountability•Legislative accountability•Judicial accountability•Budget oversight
Judicial accountabilityMerit-based appointmentAccountability of the judiciaryConflict of interest requirementsPublic access to asset disclosures
More action-worthy aspects of judicial accountability –
more specific
Dimensions of government accountability – still broad
Merit based appointmentTransparent procedure for selecting national-level judgesProfessional criteria are followed in selecting judges Confirmation process for national-level judges exists (by legislature or independent body)Accountability of the judgesMembers of judiciary give reasons for their decisions Disciplinary agency exists for judicial systemDisciplinary agency is protected from political interferenceDisciplinary agency initiates investigations and imposes penalties on offendersConflicts of interest requirementsJudges are required to file asset disclosuresRegulations on gifts to members of the judiciary exitsIndependent auditing of asset disclosure forms exitsRestrictions for judges to enter private sector existsPublic access to asset disclosure records of judgesCitizens can access asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period and at a reasonable costAsset disclosure records are of high quality
More actionable indicators of judicial accountability – even more specific
Illustration of actionability
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GI sample: country coverage by years
2004 2006 2007 2008 2009 recent 2009-2006
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
25
41
52
46
29
85
No. of countries
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Countries’ performance on GI index: 2009 country rankings
RefineryPlatform
Astana
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Countries’ performance on GI index:Sample of 85 countries, 2009-2006
Source: GI 2006-2009 (N=85)
Performance Tiers Countries (sorted from top to bottom performance showing) Very strong (score > 90)
None
Strong (90 > score ≥ 80)
Poland, South Korea, Bulgaria, United States, Latvia Israel Japan, Spain Romania
Moderate (80 > score ≥ 70)
Canada, Benin, Costa Rica, Italy, South Africa, France, , Macedonia, Chile, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Indonesia, Georgia, Malawi, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico, Philippines, Rwanda
Weak (70 > score ≥ 60)
Vanuatu, India, Argentina, Turkey, Uganda, Russia, Peru, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Kenya, Colombia, Bangladesh, Moldova, Kosovo, Nepal, Belarus, Thailand, Ghana, Senegal, Guatemala, Kyrgyz Republic, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Venezuela, Tanzania, China, Ecuador
Very Weak (60> score ≥ 50)
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Nicaragua, Armenia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Ethiopia, Algeria, Jordan, Cameroon, Burundi, Egypt, Liberia, Iraq, Tajikistan, West Bank, Lebanon
Extremely Weak (score < 50)
Morocco, Cambodia, Yemen, Congo, Dem. Rep., Vietnam, Angola, Somalia
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Outline: questions:
What are the global integrity indicators?
Are they actionable?
How many countries does global integrity cover and how do countries perform on integrity and anticorruption?
Why does it matter to look at in law (de jure) and in practice (de facto) aspects of integrity?
How can these indicators inform “policy choices” with respect to anticorruption reforms?
Can we use these indicators in our work and how can we do so effectively?
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05
1015
20Fr
eque
ncy
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100GI (In Law)
Distribution on de jure integrity
Source: GI 2006-2009 (N=85)
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Distribution on de facto integrity
Source: GI 2006-2009 (N=85)
05
1015
20Fr
eque
ncy
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100GI (In Practice)
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LAW
S (d
e ju
re in
tegr
ity)
IMPLEMENTATION (de facto integrity)
Laws vs. implementation
Weak laws; weak implementation Weak laws; strong implementation
Strong laws; weak implementation Strong laws; strong implementation
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To what extent do laws matter for actual practices?
Legal aspects of public access to information seem to correlate with actual public access to information (r=0.66)
De jure and de facto civil society organizations are weakly related (r=0.07) Civil society organizations and media are strongly associated (r=0.71) Legal framework for campaign financing seems to be associated with how
politicians and political parties are financed in practice (r=0.63) Executive accountability seems to shape the degree of legislative accountability (r=0.71), judicial accountability (r=0.66) and budget oversight (r=0.66) Presence of tax and customs agency in a national legislation does not correlate at
all with actual capacity and effectiveness of these revenue collection agencies (r=-0.07)
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Mean scores for de jure and de facto integrity themes and implementation gap
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Regressions: De jure and de facto integrity and corruption outcomes
Note: t statistics in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Perceived corruption TI corruption perception index
Reported corruption WEF extent of bribery
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Constant 0.932
(1.0) -2.028 (-2.0)
5.757 (15.1)
-0.642 (-0.7)
2.494 (2.9)
0.900 (0.9)
4.667 (16.8)
1.462 (1.7)
De jure integrity
-0.022 (-1.4)
-0.025* (-1.9)
-0.018 (-1.4)
-0.017 (-1.4)
De facto integrity
0.082** (7.8)
0.058** (5.8)
0.044** (5.2)
0.030** (3.2)
Implementation Gap
-0.082** (-6.8)
-0.052** (-5.1)
-0.043** (-4.9)
-0.027** (-3.0)
Log of GDP per capita (PPP)
0.529** (5.4)
0.664** (7.2)
0.271** (3.0)
0.321** (3.9)
N 85 85 85 85 71 71 71 71 R-squared 0.53 0.65 0.36 0.61 0.33 0.41 0.26 0.40
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Potential “pay-off” areas in improving corruption outcomes Public access to information and media seem to matter the most
- fair access to form media entities, to state-owned outlets and coverage of elections and
independent candidates
Electoral rules and practices seem to matter in general - campaign financing and donations, voter registration system, independent appointments
to election agency and representation
Executive accountability matter more than legislative/judicial Civil service practices seem to be linked more closely with corruption
- political independence, meritocracy, performance, and transparency
Law enforcement correlates more strongly with corruption than ACL/ACA No relationship between procurement rules and corruption in contracting + conflicts of interest regulations and access to procurement bids; - sole sourcing, blacklisting
firms and lifestyle checks In law tax/customs agencies are associated with more bribes in dealing with tax
officials and customs
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Outline: questions:
What are the global integrity indicators?
Are they actionable?
How many countries does global integrity cover and how do countries perform on integrity and anticorruption?
Why does it matter to look at in law (de jure) and in practice (de facto) aspects of integrity?
How can these indicators inform “policy choices” with respect to anticorruption reforms?
Can we use these indicators in our work and how can we do so effectively?
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EXTRA SLIDES
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Illustration: Hierarchy of budget process/oversightIndex № Global integrity Category 3 Government Accountability Theme 3.4 Budget Processes Question 40 Can the legislature provide input to the national budget? Sub-question 40a In law, the legislature can amend the budget. Sub-question 40b In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative
approval. Sub-question 40c In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor
the budget process and provide input or changes. Question 41 Can citizens access the national budgetary process? Sub-question 41a In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a
transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).
Sub-question 41b In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings. Sub-question 41c In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations. Question 42 In law, is there a separate legislative committee which
provides oversight of public funds? Question 43 Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of
public funds effective? Sub-question 43a In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this
committee. Sub-question 43b In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with
members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.
Sub-question 43c In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.
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Determinants of inclusion in GI assessments GI Participation
(Marginal effect, robust z-stat.) Population (log) 0.173*** 0.189*** 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.320*** (6.4) (6.7) (6.3) (6.2) (6.2) GDP per capita (log) -0.082*** 0.014 0.015 -0.019 (-2.7) (0.2) (0.2) (-0.2) Aid (% of GNI) 0.009** 0.010 0.010 0.0136 (2.1) (1.6) (1.6) (1.4) AFR region 0.318 Omitted Omitted (1.3) EAP region 0.537** 0.249 0.422** (2.3) (1.4) (2.0) ECA region 0.659*** 0.425** 0.514*** (4.0) (2.4) (2.8) LAC region 0.365* 0.042 0.101 (1.8) (0.3) (0.5) MENA region 0.367 0.043 0.330 (1.6) (0.2) (1.4) SAR region 0.289 -0.034 0.220 (0.9) (-0.2) (0.8) High-income (OECD) Omitted -0.251 -0.373 (-1.2) (-1.5) High-income (Non-OECD) Omitted -0.244 -0.150 (-1.0) (-0.4) RSF press freedom -0.010*** (-2.8) N 192 185 185 185 161 Pseudo R2 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.40 0.40
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De jure integrity and perceived corruption
Source: GI 2006-2009 (N=85)
DZA
AGO
ARGARM
AZEBGDBLR
BEN BIHBRA BGR
BDIKHMCMR
CAN
CHL
CHN COL
ZAR
CRI
ECU
EGY ETH
FRA
GEOGHA
GTM
HUN
IND
IDN
IRQ
ISR
ITA
JPN
JOR
KAZKEN
KVO
KGZ
LVA
LBNLBR
LTU
MKD
MWI
MEX
MDAMNGMNEMAR
MOZ
NAM
NPLNIC NGA PAK
PER
PHL
POL
ROM
RUS
RWASENSRB
SLE
SOM
ZAF
KOR
ESP
LKA
SDNTJK
TZATHA
TMP
TUR
UGAUKR
USA
VUT
VEN
VNMWBGYEM
ZWE
02
46
810
TI c
orru
ptio
n pe
rcep
tion
inde
x (2
008)
50 60 70 80 90 100Global integrity (de jure)
TI CPI 2008 Fitted values
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De facto integrity and perceived corruption
Source: GI 2006-2009 (N=85)
DZA
AGO
ARGARM
AZE BGDBLR
BENBIHBRA BGR
BDIKHMCMR
CAN
CHL
CHN COL
ZAR
CRI
ECU
EGYETH
FRA
GEOGHA
GTM
HUN
IND
IDN
IRQ
ISR
ITA
JPN
JOR
KAZKEN
KVO
KGZ
LVA
LBNLBR
LTU
MKD
MWI
MEX
MDAMNGMNEMAR
MOZ
NAM
NPLNIC NGAPAK
PER
PHL
POL
ROM
RUS
RWASENSRB
SLE
SOM
ZAF
KOR
ESP
LKA
SDNTJK
TZATHA
TMP
TUR
UGAUKR
USA
VUT
VEN
VNMWBGYEM
ZWE
02
46
810
TI c
orru
ptio
n pe
rcep
tion
inde
x (2
008)
20 40 60 80Global integrity (de facto)
TI CPI 2008 Fitted values
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Overall integrity De jure integrity De facto integrity No. GI Categories and Themes TI
corruption WEF
bribery TI
corruption WEF
bribery TI
corruption WEF
bribery 1 Civil Society, Public Info. and Media 0.58 0.41 0.36 0.26 0.64 0.47 Civil Society Organizations 0.36 0.22 -0.06 -0.10 0.45 0.31 Media 0.49 0.35 0.29 0.19 0.52 0.40 Public Access to Information 0.47 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.54 0.41 2 Elections 0.63 0.47 0.35 0.22 0.70 0.53 Voting and Citizen Participation 0.47 0.35 0.14 0.09 0.57 0.45 Election Integrity 0.37 0.25 0.07 0.00 0.57 0.42 Political Financing 0.59 0.47 0.35 0.25 0.66 0.53 3 Government Accountability 0.50 0.35 0.21 0.09 0.63 0.47 Executive Accountability 0.55 0.36 0.29 0.11 0.67 0.46 Legislative Accountability 0.44 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.51 0.39 Judicial Accountability 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.47 0.35 Budget Processes 0.38 0.22 0.00 -0.16 0.45 0.34 4 Administration and Civil Service 0.40 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.51 0.44 Civil Service Regulations 0.47 0.33 0.25 0.17 0.54 0.37 Whistle-blowing Measures 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.20 0.18 0.16 Procurement 0.33 0.14 0.16 -0.09 0.46 0.40 Privatization 0.38 0.28 0.24 0.17 0.46 0.38 5 Oversight and Regulation 0.56 0.41 0.28 0.17 0.66 0.51 National Ombudsman 0.31 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.43 0.29 Supreme Audit Institution 0.47 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.53 0.36 Taxes and Customs 0.50 0.45 -0.13 -0.16 0.48 0.44 State-Owned Enterprises 0.31 0.15 0.20 0.11 0.53 0.39 Business Licensing and Regulation 0.50 0.39 0.25 0.19 0.57 0.47 6 Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law 0.56 0.44 0.13 0.03 0.55 0.43 Anti-Corruption Agency 0.32 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.23 Rule of Law 0.53 0.46 0.22 0.16 0.56 0.48 Law Enforcement 0.53 0.43 0.07 -0.08 0.55 0.45 N No. of observations 85 71 85 71 85 71