Contents

Abbreviations vi

Notes on the Contributors vii

Introduction: High Roads and Blind Alleys – The English Civil War and its Historiography

JOHN ADAMSON 1

1 Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 36DAVID SCOTT

2 Anglicanism and Royalism in the 1640s 61ANTHONY MILTON

3 Perceptions of Parliament: Factions and ‘The Public’ 82JASON PEACEY

4 The Baronial Context of the Irish Civil Wars 106JANE OHLMEYER

5 The ‘Scottish Moment’, 1638–45 125ALLAN I. MACINNES

6 Centre and Locality in Civil-War England 153CLIVE HOLMES

7 The Politics of Fairfax’s Army, 1645–9 175IAN GENTLES

8 Rhetoric, Reality, and the Varieties of Civil-War Radicalism 202PHILIP BAKER

Notes 225

Suggestions for Further Reading 305

Index 316

v

1. Rethinking Royalist Politics,1642–9DAVID SCOTT

The Royalists are the Cinderella of mid-seventeenth century history.They are largely overlooked by the exponents of the ‘New BritishHistory’, and look like being bypassed once again in the current rush ofinterest in the Civil-War ‘public sphere’. True, the Royalists remain oneof the few groups in the Civil War that most of the public have actuallyheard of, if only as one half of the double-act of ‘Cavaliers andRoundheads’. But among historians ‘the king’s party’ is unfashionable,and royalist politics – particularly at the top end of the social scale – evenmore so. There have been several recent studies of royalist literature andpropaganda (though few convincingly bridge the gap between politicaltheory and practice);1 David Underdown and Mark Stoyle have injectednew life into the study of popular Royalism;2 and the Sealed Knot andother battle re-enactment societies sustain a small but lively market inroyalist military history.3 But virtually all we have in the way of recentpublished work on royalist high politics is a few articles by RonaldHutton and James Daly in the 1970s and 1980s, occasional, though illu-minating, pieces by Ian Roy, and a ten-year-old monograph by DavidSmith.4 One recent miscellany of essays devoted to ‘Royalism’ actuallyderides the study of court politics during the 1640.5 No historian hasfocused specifically on the king, his supporters, his court, and his campduring the period from the collapse of the Personal Rule to the regicide.Analysis of royalist factions is in a similarly primitive state. As yet, noattempt has been made to trace the connections between the ‘ultras’,‘moderates’, ‘swordsmen’ or any of the other royalist factions that havebeen identified in the early 1640s with David Underdown’s ‘Louvreparty’ and ‘Old Royalists’ of the 1650s.6 Our picture of the three Stuartkingdoms during the 1640s cannot but be flawed while one wholesection of the tableau remains virtually blank.

Why this neglect of the Royalists? Is it because, as Hutton and othershave suggested, so much royalist documentation was burned by itsowners at the end of the war as to make it very difficult to say anything

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Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 37

definitive about the structure of the king’s party?7 There is certainlysomething in this. Clearly we lack the mass of material on the workingsof the central and local government under the king that we possess forthe Parliamentarians. On the other hand, we have more private corre-spondence for the royalist grandees (that is, the most influential menaround the king and queen),8 particularly after 1644 when they scatteredto the four winds, than for their parliamentarian counterparts, who weremostly living cheek by jowl in London and rarely needed to communi-cate by paper. But perhaps the main reason for the dearth of researchon the Royalists is simply the fact that they lost – and not just the firstCivil War but the second as well. The Royalists were two-time losers,and their defeats gave force to the arguments of S. R. Gardiner andother Whig historians that England’s advance to constitutional maturityunder Victoria was a legacy of the parliamentarian victory. From thisteleological perspective, the Royalists were not just on the wrong side ofthe war, they were on the wrong side of History. Until recently, moststudies of the 1640s were premised on the need to explain the EnglishRevolution, in which the Royalists’ role was merely that of obstacles inthe path of the juggernaut. To explain why the Parliamentarians wonwas at one and the same time to explain why the Royalists lost.

This teleological approach to the 1640s may have lost much of its force,but it lingers on in the tendency to regard the Royalists as (in the words of1066 and All That) ‘Wrong but Wromantic’.9 The effect is to lend adistinctly Whiggish feel to the way we look at Royalism. There is a preoc-cupation with personality, as if the Royalists failed partly through want of‘character’;10 and a corresponding neglect of royalist wartime institutions– from the royal court to the Parliament that the king summoned to meetat Oxford in 1644.11 Intrigue and factionalism at court are often attributedto short-sighted and selfish motives, rather than a desire for power in orderto shape and implement policy. Above all, there is the continuing predilec-tion when discussing Royalism for historians to employ curiously nine-teenth-century terms like ‘Constitutional Royalism’.

I FALSE TAXONOMIES: THE MIRAGE OF‘CONSTITUTIONAL ROYALISM’

In the writing on Civil War loyalties since the 1640s, ‘ConstitutionalRoyalism’ is actually a recent invention. The great Whig historianThomas Babington Macaulay coined the phrase ‘constitutional royalist’,

but he applied it sparingly, and it did not catch on with his successors.Brian Wormald in his 1951 case-study of Sir Edward Hyde, Earl ofClarendon, referred to the ‘so-called Constitutional Royalists’.12

However, as this construction suggests, he found the term unsatisfactory,and particularly so with reference to Hyde himself. The historian whoidentified Constitutional Royalism as a distinct political theory, andconstructed a royalist faction around it, is David L. Smith. In Smith’saccount, the Constitutional Royalists were those leading figures withinthe king’s party whose support for a negotiated settlement amounted toa ‘knee-jerk reflex’; its leading figures were the Duke of Richmond, theMarquess of Hertford, the Earls of Southampton, Lindsey, and Dorset,Viscount Falkland, Sir John Culpeper, Sir Edward Hyde, and a fewothers.13 Smith sums up their credo as a belief ‘that royal powers shouldbe guided and limited by the rule of law . . . a respect for Parliament’splace in the constitution . . . a defence of the existing Church of Englandand Protestant religion “by law established” . . . [and] a wish to preserve. . . royal discretionary powers’.14

Perhaps the most obvious problem with this formulation is its vague-ness – not to say its potential for internal contradiction, as the king’sdiscretionary powers could (and had) been exercised in ways that manyconsidered at variance with the rule of law. To conceive of the ‘ancientconstitution’,15 and by extension royalist constitutionalism, in suchbroad terms is to render it virtually useless as a reference point forfactional alignments within the king’s party; for one would be hard-pushed to find Royalists who did not believe in the ‘rule of law’ or respect‘Parliament’s place in the constitution’. This is what George Lord Digby,often portrayed as the most unconstitutionalist of the royalist grandees,had to say on such matters:

The truth is . . . the Kings of England are never in their glory, in theirsplendor, in their Majestique Soveraignty, but in Parliaments. Whereis the power of imposing Taxes? Where is the power of restoring fromincapacites [sic]? Where is the legislative Authority? Marry in theKing. . . . But how? in the King circled in, fortified and evirtuated[sic] by his Parliament. The King out of Parliament hath a limited, acircumscribed Jurisdiction. But wayted on by his Parliament, noMonarch of the East is so absolute in dispelling Grievances.16

We face a conundrum. If even Digby – the most politique of the royal-ist grandees – recognized the fundamentals of the ancient constitution, it

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is hard to see how a ‘constitutionalist’ outlook has any use as a factionallabel. And yet to employ a tighter definition of the ancient constitutionmay be equally self-defeating. As Glen Burgess has recently argued,early Stuart England had no constitution in the sense of a blueprint, orset of first principles, for governing. The ‘constitution’ was ‘the completeset of laws, prerogatives and rights, and the polity they defined. Theconstitution had no existence, no formulation, apart from its specifics.’17

Consequently, no two Royalists (or Parliamentarians for that matter)ordered and interpreted this mass of specifics in exactly the same way.18

The ancient constitution was therefore at once too broad, and toonarrow, a platform for factional organization.

This lack of consensus on constitutional details even afflicted thethree men generally regarded as the ‘leading theorists’ of ConstitutionalRoyalism – Viscount Falkland, Sir John Culpeper, and Sir EdwardHyde.19 Their disagreement over the king’s answer to the NineteenPropositions (Parliament’s eve-of-war ultimatum of 1642), and whetherCharles was one of or superior to the three estates of the realm, is wellknown.20 But they also disagreed on another supposed tenet ofConstitutional Royalism – the maintenance of ‘the Church by law estab-lished’ as an integral part of the government of England.21 Hyde, in hisown words, ‘did really believe the church of England the most exactlyformed and framed for the encouragement and advancement of learn-ing and piety, and for the preservation of peace, of any church in theworld’.22 He reverenced the Church of England not only as a necessarypart of the political establishment, and an instrument of good govern-ment, but also because ‘its politics encouraged the virtues, the goodorder, learning, and decency, that God intended for man’.23

But contrast his position with that of his friend Viscount Falkland.Falkland had ‘a better opinion of the church of England, and the religionof it, than of any other church and religion. . . . But he had in his ownjudgement such a latitude in opinion, that he did not believe any part ofthe order of government of it to be so essentially necessary to religion,but that it might be parted with, and altered, for a notable public bene-fit or convenience.’24 In other words, he thought that episcopacy –government of the church by bishops – should be retained, but not at theexpense of achieving a lasting peace. Sir John Culpeper (appointedMaster of the Rolls at Oxford early in 1643) took an even more prag-matic line, being ‘very indifferent’ in matters of religion, ‘but moreinclined to what was established, to avoid the accidents which commonlyattended a change’.25 Culpeper, a ‘true politique’, favoured episcopacy on

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 39

grounds of political expediency, and once it had become inexpedient todo so (as it had by 1646) he was willing to endorse Presbyterianism formuch the same reason.26 Culpeper had spent some of his youth in mili-tary service abroad, and ‘like a tall sword-man’ he was quick to take andgive offence.27 True to his irascible nature, he put his faith in force or thethreat of force, not in laws and constitutions;28 and it is perhaps notsurprising therefore that one of the most serious rivalries at Oxford wasbetween him and the pompous, lawyerly Hyde.29 During 1643,Culpeper made several attempts to block Hyde’s preferment at courtand, with John Ashburnham (Treasurer of the King’s Army and aGroom of the Bedchamber), to encroach on his office as Chancellor ofthe Exchequer.30 The resulting ‘jealousy or coldness’ between the twomen poisoned their relationship for years.31 Moreover, what is oftencited as evidence of Culpeper’s irenic disposition – his call for peacenegotiations at the opening of the Oxford Parliament in January 164432

– looks on closer inspection more like that time-honoured courtier tacticof using Parliament as a platform from which to attack his rivals. Thushe made purging the court and camp of Catholics and those, such asDigby, who had been declared traitors by Westminster the crux of his‘peace initiative’.33 As he probably predicted, his demand for theremoval of highly-placed Catholics was taken up by the lower House,although ultimately to little effect.

And if Culpeper’s ‘constitutionalist’ credentials are suspect, thenthose of the Duke of Richmond are non-existent. A cousin of the kingand the highest-ranking figure at court after princes Rupert andMaurice, Richmond ‘was of a great and haughty spirit, and so punctualin point of honour that he never swerved a tittle’.34 He was apparentlyhostile to the Long Parliament’s attack on the Personal Rule – withwhich ‘Constitutionalists’ were supposed to have been broadly in sympa-thy.35 More to the point, he and another alleged ‘Constitutionalist’, theEarl of Lindsey, were devoted supporters of the figure widely regardedas the most hard-line royalist opponent of peace talks during the earlyyears of the war, Prince Rupert, which is hard to reconcile with enthu-siasm for a negotiated settlement.36

The argument for the existence of a coherent constitutionalist partyis questionable in other ways. For example, there seems to have been nonecessary connection between reverence for the ancient constitution andthe advocacy of peace negotiations with the Parliamentarians, based ona genuine desire for compromise. As the case of Hyde demonstrates onlytoo clearly, adherence to the ancient constitution and the common law

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as the touchstones of political action – rather than helping to bridge thedistance between Royalists and Parliamentarians – could actually mili-tate against the king offering the kind of generous concessions that wouldhave been necessary if an irresistible momentum towards peace wereever to be created at Westminster.37 Hyde’s refusal to compromise onwhat he saw as ‘the essential props and supports of the old Government’– which included the king’s prerogative powers as well as the pre-warepiscopal church – may explain why he came to be regarded by manyParliamentarians ‘as a man who more industriously opposed peace thanany other of the King’s Council’.38 Sir Edward Nicholas, one ofCharles’s two Secretaries of State and a close friend of Hyde’s, sharedthe latter’s resolve to maintain the full panoply of ‘the auntient govern-ment of England’.39 Indeed, it was precisely Nicholas’s attachment to‘the best composed & equallest Gov[er]nem[en]t that ev[er] wasConstituted under any Monarch in the world’ that made him one of themore hawkish of the royalist grandees.40

However, supposing that Constitutional Royalism can be reified,then if it is to be anything more than a synonym for Royalism in generalthere must be a group to which the term cannot apply. In other words,there must be a faction that subscribed to a creed of UnconstitutionalRoyalism; and indeed just such a group has been identified, led by thequeen, together with Prince Rupert, Lords Jermyn, Digby, Percy, andWilmot, and the Groom of the Bedchamber, John Ashburnham.41 Thehallmark of these ‘ultra-Royalists’, by general consent, was a determina-tion to eschew a negotiated settlement with Parliament in favour of anoutright military victory, such as would allow Charles to rule as an ‘abso-lutist’ king – that is, without reference to Parliament or the laws of therealm.42 Yet just as one struggles to find ‘Constitutionalists’ who wereconsistently and unequivocally in favour of negotiating in good faithwith Parliament, it is equally hard to find ‘ultras’ who were consistentlyand unequivocally against doing so. Even some of the Army Plotters of1641 (who had attempted to bring about the legislature’s dissolution byforce) – the figures at court allegedly most hostile to peace talks – endedup advocating negotiations with Parliament. Of Wilmot, Sir PhilipWarwick remarked, ‘he that marks [his] whole progress thro’ this warr,shall find him much affected to be an umpire of peace’.43 Lord Percy,another Army Plotter, was effectively sent into exile early in 1645 for hisimmoderate support for peace.44 Likewise, Prince Rupert was weighingthe benefits of a negotiated settlement well before the king’s cause hadbecome militarily hopeless.45 Even Digby, the figure who conforms most

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 41

nearly to the Whig stereotype of the brilliant yet weak-characteredCavalier, was at times interested in negotiating with Parliament –though as I have already argued, support for negotiations did not neces-sarily equate with a desire for real compromise.46

The notion of an ‘absolutist’ faction at Oxford is even more prob-lematic – not least because of our uncertainty as to what Caroline ‘abso-lutism’ might or should look like. According to Glenn Burgess and otherrevisionist historians, it is only those who held the view that the kingcould make and break laws at will, without recourse to any formal legalchannels, who can properly be termed absolutists.47 On this definition,very few besides Thomas Hobbes and (possibly) Sir Robert Filmer qual-ify, and it is not clear how much impact they had on royalist counselsduring the Civil War.48 To Johann Sommerville, however, this defini-tion of absolutism is far too narrow, not to say anachronistic. He arguesthat the term ‘absolutist’ can be applied to anyone who maintained thatroyal power derived directly from God, and that the law therefore tookits authority from the king (rather than vice versa), who was justified inoverriding it in cases of necessity (of which he was the sole judge), andthat subjects were obliged to obey even illegal royal commands providedthat these did not contradict divine law.49 On this definition, certainly,many royalist writers were absolutists; indeed, the difficulty lies in findingone who was not. It is also likely, though impossible to prove, that mostof the royalist grandees embraced something resembling this view of theking’s powers and the subjects’ duties; although at least one of theirnumber – Digby’s father, the first Earl of Bristol – allowed for passiveresistance to royal commands that subverted the law.50 To complicatematters still further, Royalists did not equate absolute monarchy witharbitrary government (tyranny) in the way that parliamentarian polemi-cists did. Most Royalists could happily conceive of a limited, yetabsolute, monarchy.51 Hyde, for example, believed that the king wasbound to rule according to law, but that this obligation was ultimatelymoral in nature and that there were no enforceable limitations upon hisauthority: ‘His Majesty is not the first (and I hope will not be the last)King of England, that hath not held Himself Accomptable to anyEarthly Power.’52

Militant and authoritarian strands of royalist thought were by nomeans confined to the fringes of the king’s party. But to locate themwithin the context of a struggle between ‘absolutism’ and ‘constitution-alism’, still less to construct parties around these positions, cannot besustained by the evidence. There were undoubtedly prominent Royalists

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whose ideas called into question the 1641–2 constitutional and ecclesi-astical settlement and the re-establishment of ‘known ways’ in govern-ment should the king triumph. A number of senior royalist officers wereimpatient of civilian counsels and their powerbases such as the PrivyCouncil; and it was feared that if Charles prevailed by force of arms thenthis impatience would translate into arbitrary government.53 As we shallsee, however, except during the opening months of the war, the swords-men never formed a united bloc or possessed a coherent agenda.54

A more considered and sustained bid to build upon the achievementsof the Personal Rule was made by leading clergymen at Oxford. AsAnthony Milton’s contribution to this volume reveals, many royalistclergymen repudiated the 1641–2 ecclesiastical settlement – and partic-ularly the removal of bishops from the House of Lords.55 There werealso royalist divines, Calvinists as well as Laudians, who articulatedexalted notions of divine-right kingship and the role of the clerical estatein government; and on this latter score at least they made enemies notonly of the ‘moderate’ Falkland, but also the ‘politique’ Culpeper, andthe ‘extremist’ Digby.56 But the most serious challenge to the restorationof the ancient constitution came from the queen and several of her Civil-War circle, notably William Cavendish first Earl of Newcastle, LordJermyn, and Sir John Culpeper. These men had absorbed the key lessonof the Personal Rule (and of Strafford’s lieutenancy of Ireland in partic-ular)57 and of the Civil War itself for the governing of the three king-doms, and that was the indispensability of a standing, centrally-paidarmy to the effective exercise of power.58 Newcastle is a particularlyinteresting member of this group. A patron of Hobbes and a close friendof Strafford’s, he was implicated in the Army Plots of 1641; consistentlyopposed moves towards a negotiated settlement during the Civil War;and, by 1648, favoured a military alliance with the Scots to restore theking.59 Like Hobbes, he maintained that ‘theye thatt have the Armeshave the Purse, & they thatt have the Purse hath obedience, So ThattArmes Is all’.60 This line of argument challenged some contemporaries’perception of how a law-abiding monarchy should function, just asStrafford’s doctrine of ‘Thorough’ had in the 1630s.

But the queen and her circle were interested primarily in ways ofenabling Charles to get things done, not in advancing theories of hislegal and constitutional position. Their main concern, therefore, washow he would regain power and then enforce his will between the meet-ings of Parliament – which, they assumed, would remain occasionalevents rather than making for a semi-permanent executive. If they did

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 43

make a philosophical case for their ideas it was couched not in terms of‘absolutism’ versus ‘constitutionalism’, but in the more traditional formof whether royal authority should rest ultimately on ‘force’ or ‘love’.61

If the attempt to explain the structure of royalist politics in terms of aconstitutionalist–unconstitutionalist dichotomy is unconvincing, thenhow are we to interpret the divisions among the king’s leading support-ers? Ronald Hutton’s ill-defined classification of ‘ultras’ and ‘moderates’is simply a variation on the constitutionalist–unconstitutionalist theme,and has rightly been criticized for assuming more than it elucidates.62

Ian Roy’s structuralist model of court factionalism – implied in histaxonomy of ‘swordsmen’, ‘courtiers’, and ‘civilians’ – is more useful inthat it acknowledges how different kinds of office and sources of powermight lead to divergent political perspectives and expectations.63

Nevertheless, it leaves unanswered the question of what religious andpolitical differences, if any, underlay these divisions. However, one thingseems clear – the parti pris dualism of ‘Constitutionalists’ and ‘absolutists’,‘moderates’ and ‘ultras’ will not answer. A new model of royalist highpolitics is needed, and the remainder of this essay will attempt to provideone, if only in outline.

II THE EMERGENCE OF ROYALIST PARTIES, 1642–5

Royalist high politics presents a very confusing picture at the start of theEnglish Civil War. There were clearly many tensions within the king’snewly constituted party, notably between some of his more gung-homilitary men and ‘the Lords at Court’ – the civilian nobles who occupiedthe senior posts in the royalist administration.64 Broadly speaking,however, political divisions at Oxford (the king’s headquarters) duringthe first year of the Civil War were analogous to those at Westminster.There were a number of courtiers who formed what might be called a‘peace interest’, notably the Earls of Dorset and Bath, ViscountFalkland, and Lords Spencer and Savile.65 Their conception of whatconstituted an acceptable settlement was evidently close enough to thatof moderate Parliamentarians to make them willing to countenancemajor royal concessions. Indeed, to read Lord Spencer bemoaning theinfluence of ‘Papists’ and ‘evil counsellors’ at court, one might beforgiven for thinking that he was a Parliamentarian.66 All were firmProtestants, and at least one – Falkland – was prepared to countenancelimited godly reform of the Church of England. The unexpected success

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of the king’s army during the Edgehill campaign of October–November1642 undoubtedly weakened the influence of the doves at court, just asit strengthened that of the peace party at Westminster. Nevertheless, thepeace lords maintained a foothold at court during 1643, and particularlyit seems on the Privy Council and the ‘sitting council’ for the defence ofOxford.67 Thus, in April 1643, Sir Edward Nicholas referred darkly to‘diverse [men]’ about the king ‘that would have an acc[o]m[m]odationatt any rate [i.e. price]’.68 And there was talk at Oxford, well into thatsummer, of ‘hollow-hearted Counsellors who affect too much theParliamentary way’.69 But while the war went the king’s way (as it didthroughout the spring and summer of 1643), those at court who advo-cated genuine compromise were generally sidelined when it came toshaping policy and managing the war-effort.70

At the other end of the political spectrum were the true ‘Cavaliers’ –leading Royalists who were eager to settle the war solely by the sword.This ‘war interest’ included Prince Rupert, Prince Maurice, LordWilmot, and their hangers-on – for example, Daniel O’Neill and the‘bold and peremptory’ Tom Elyott – and several men closely associatedwith the queen, notably Lord Digby and Sir John Berkeley.71 Again, allthe heads of this faction were Protestants, and in the case of Rupert afirm Calvinist. At the war interest’s core were two overlapping groups:senior army officers, and men who had been implicated in the 1641Army Plots or had otherwise incurred charges of treason against them atWestminster. For those in this second category, any kind of treaty withParliament was dangerous, and therefore a military solution seemedtheir best option, at least for the first year of the war. Their positionmirrored that of the leading ‘fiery spirits’ at Westminster – ViscountSaye and Sele, John Pym and their friends – who, having conspired tobring in the Scots in 1640, needed either an outright victory or the moststringent of settlements to preserve them from the king’s futurevengeance. Conversely, the fear of parliamentarian vengeance wasnever strong enough to hold the royalist war interest together, and bylate 1643 its leaders were jealous of each other’s influence and movingin different political directions.72

For much of the war, however, most of the royalist grandees, includ-ing men associated with either the war or peace interests at court, werewilling at one time or other to pursue a third option between theextremes of ‘an acc[o]m[m]odation att any rate’ on the one side and a‘perfect [i.e. complete and absolute] victory’ on the other. One of theleading exponents of this via media in royalist politics was Sir Edward

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 45

Hyde. It is revealing that during the Oxford peace treaty ofMarch–April 1643, the ‘hawkish’ Digby warmly supported the promo-tion of the ‘irenic’ Hyde as Chancellor of the Exchequer.73 What mayseem like an act of political folly (or at least inconsistency) on Digby’spart becomes readily comprehensible, however, once we realize thatHyde’s role in the Oxford negotiations was not that of Wormald’scompromising peacemaker, but that of a royalist engagé. Hyde utterlyrejected any idea of a settlement on Parliament’s official peace terms.74

Instead, he favoured the secret and far more lenient propositions beingput to the king covertly by the leader of the parliamentary delegation atOxford, the Earl of Northumberland – and this, only as a means ofdividing the parliamentarian peace and war parties so completely thathe hoped further resistance to the king would collapse.75

Oxford politicians like Hyde had the latitude and the connectionswith disaffected elements among the parliamentarian leadership toexplore the possibility of a political coup against the fiery spirits. Onseveral occasions before the end of the war, especially when peace talkswere in the offing, there was a group at court eager for the king to makeenough concessions as would allow the peace party at Westminster tobring him in ‘honour and safety’ to London, where he might (in Hyde’stelling phrase) be ‘repossessed of his . . . power’.76 For most of the warthe commitment of supposed moderates like Hyde to a negotiated settle-ment was therefore qualified. They used negotiations not so much toforge a genuine accommodation as to force what would amount to aparliamentarian capitulation – and to a some extent therefore theyshared the same ends as those courtiers who favoured a military solution.

The most revealing demonstration of this middle way in royalist poli-tics occurred during the summer of 1643, and grew out of the rivalry incourt and camp between the king’s commander in the west, theMarquess of Hertford, and his adversaries Princes Rupert andMaurice.77 The Earl of Newcastle’s victories in the north of England inthe first half of 1643, and Rupert’s capture of Bristol (26 July), threat-ened to bring a ‘perfect victory’ within the king’s grasp, with theexpected result that the swordsmen would reap the rewards in terms ofoffices and power in the post-restoration court at the expense of landedmagnates like Hertford. Moreover, by the summer of 1643, Rupert hadalienated not only the ‘lords at Oxford’ but also several of his erstwhilesupporters, notably Digby and Wilmot.78 To forestall a military victory,Rupert’s enemies at court hatched a scheme to bring the war to a swiftand politically-engineered conclusion by closing the middle ground in

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English politics, excluding both the royalist swordsmen and the fieryspirits at Westminster. The evidence for this design is fragmentary, butcompelling.79 With the connivance of Rupert’s enemies at court, theEarl of Northumberland and other peace party grandees at Westminsterdrew up a series of vaguely worded peace propositions during thesummer, which they presented to the Commons early in August. At thesame time, they succeeded in winning over the commander ofParliament’s main – indeed, by the end of July, only – field army, theEarl of Essex, who was Hertford’s brother-in-law and friend.80 It seemsthat the Westminster grandees and their allies at court hoped to useEssex’s, and possibly Hertford’s, army to underwrite the August peacepropositions, and if necessary to quash opposition to them by force. Withthe hawks at Oxford and Westminster neutralized, it was thought thatthe king would be able to return to London and be restored to power onthe very softest of terms. It is not surprising that Hyde, who was a closeally of Hertford’s, was apparently involved in this design, for it wasessentially a more ambitious version of what he and other leading politi-cians on both sides had been attempting during the Oxford treaty.81 Inthe event, the August peace initiative collapsed after the king, atRupert’s insistence, removed Hertford from command, and theCommons rejected the Lords’ propositions (the City militants havingrallied in support of the fiery spirits in the House), whereupon Essexwithdrew his support from the parliamentary peace party.82

Significantly, one of the reasons plausibly advanced for Essex’s defectionfrom the peace camp at Westminster was because he believed thatHertford’s services ‘were not enough valued by the King’.83

Victory for the hawks in the summer of 1643 ended any prospect ofan exclusively English settlement of the war, and ushered in a new phasein the conflict. Until the second half of 1643 the wars and unrest in allthree Stuart kingdoms had consisted of a series of largely discrete, ifcausally interlinked, conflicts. But all this began to change in Septemberwith the king’s endorsement of a temporary ‘cessation’ with the IrishConfederates – or Catholic ‘rebels’ as most people in England preferredto regard them – thereby allowing him to import some of the Englishtroops that had been sent to Ireland following the Irish Rising in 1641.The king had approved the cessation in response to Parliament’s effortsto negotiate a military alliance with the Scottish Covenanters, whichculminated later that same month in the signing of the Solemn Leagueand Covenant. Under the impact of the cessation and the Covenant,England became the main theatre in something not far short of a single

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 47

‘archipelagic’ war. And as the nature of the war in England changed, sotoo did factional alignments at Oxford (and Westminster).84

From the very emergence of the Royalist party there had been amajor fault-line among the grandees over the propriety of bringing inforeign Catholic troops. Digby and several other members of the queen’scircle were contemplating pitting Irish ‘rebels’ against English ‘rebels’well before the outbreak of hostilities in England.85 It was reported fromLondon in January 1642 that the ‘ill-affected party, which are those thatfollow the Court, do now speak very favourably of the Irish as thosewhose grievances were great, their demands moderate, and may standthe King in much stead’.86 However, the mere suggestion a few monthslater that Charles intended to go to Ireland – ostensibly to suppress therebellion, but (as the queen revealed) to ‘join the army of the Catholics’– caused a ripple of anxiety among some of Hyde’s royalist friends.87 Solong as victory by English force of arms, either on the battlefield or insupport of a political coup, remained within Charles’s grasp there was noimperative to press for foreign intervention, and therefore disagreementamong the grandees on this issue was held in check. But theCovenanters’ entry into the English Civil War on the side of Parliamentat the beginning of 1644 required Charles to bring in troops fromIreland if he were to redress the military balance. Few, if any, of thegrandees objected to the king importing Protestant troops from Ireland– and between October 1643 and April 1644 about 10,000 or so wereshipped over piecemeal to English ports up and down the west coast.88

The king’s problem, however, was that these troops could not possiblyoffset the military advantage that Parliament gained from the 21,000strong Covenanter army that marched across the Tweed – the Anglo-Scottish border – in January 1644. If he were to defeat both the EnglishParliamentarians and the Scottish Covenanters, Charles realized that hewould have to import Catholic troops from Ireland as well, and this meantnegotiating a peace treaty with the Confederates that allowed them free-dom of worship and greater political autonomy. Some of the royalistgrandees thought this an acceptable price to secure victory in England.89

Others, however, including several figures committed to the vigorousprosecution of the war, found it extremely hard to stomach. Not onlywould a treaty with the Confederates threaten the Protestant ascendancyand English interest in Ireland, but it would also involve Catholic troopsinvading English soil.

The Royalists’ defeat at Marston Moor in July 1644 forced thegrandees to confront this foreign-intervention question head on. After

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Marston Moor, victory for the king became, if not wholly unattainable,then difficult to achieve without foreign intervention – most obviously inthe form of a Confederate army. Marston Moor – and, still moreemphatically, the king’s defeat at Naseby in June 1645 – left the Oxfordgrandees with only two real choices: either they too must bring in foreigntroops, or they must seek a genuine accommodation with theWestminster Parliament. And during 1644 rival factions began to formaround these stark alternatives.

The potential for this ‘foreign intervention issue’ to split the royalistgrandees was already clear from the debates at Oxford in April–May1644 over the king’s Irish policy. Misgivings at court at the prospect of atreaty with the Confederates were so great ‘that some of the Lordsdesired to avoid sitting in counsell when the businesse of Ireland wasdebated’.90 In this atmosphere of apprehension and mistrust, the captureof the king’s Irish policy by the mercurial Lord Digby did not helpmatters. Within a few months of his appointment as Secretary of Statein September 1643 (in succession to Falkland), Digby had taken chargeof the procuring of troops, both Protestant and even Catholic, fromIreland.91 To Digby and his Irish royalist collaborators, the Earl ofAntrim and Daniel O’Neill, bringing over Catholic troops from Irelandseemed both a logical and a necessary response to Parliament’s militaryalliance with the Covenanters. But Sir Edward Nicholas (Digby’s fellowSecretary of State), Hyde, and many others at court had no faith in‘popish undertakers’ such as Antrim, and were deeply unhappy at theidea of employing Irish Catholic troops against British Protestants.92 Itseems likely that the proposal to set up a Council under the Prince ofWales in the west of England, which was presented to the Privy Councilby Digby in May 1644, was intended partly as a way of removing thosecourtiers who were ‘something rigide in the busines of the Irish’.93

However, most of the grandees earmarked for banishment refused to co-operate, and so the proposal was shelved.94 As a result, the king wasforced to hand back negotiations with the Confederates to the king’s LordLieutenant of Ireland, the Marquess of Ormond, who was no happier atthe prospect of making concessions to Papists than were Nicholas andHyde. The scheme for the Prince’s Council would be revived immedi-ately after the collapse of the Uxbridge treaty in early 1645 – in otherwords, when the king’s need for Irish troops had become critical, and the‘cautious councillors’ at court were once again an obstacle to achievingthis objective.

Digby’s involvement in Irish policy was also unfortunate in that it

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 49

added a political dimension to his feud with Prince Rupert – thepersonal antipathy which of all the rivalries in the king’s party was themost damaging. One of the few issues on which Rupert’s thinking seemsto have moved beyond personal interest and pique was that of makingsignificant concessions to the Confederates in return for Catholic troopsto win the English Civil War. He, too, was distrustful of Antrim andO’Neill, and the only political reason he gave for urging an accommo-dation after Naseby was the conviction that the Confederates wouldcheat the king.95 Yet Rupert’s dislike of Digby and his political machi-nations might have been contained but for another unfortunate devel-opment – the queen’s departure from Oxford in April 1644.

Although Henriette Marie’s arrival at Oxford in July 1643 is gener-ally seen as a major blow to the royalist ‘moderates’, her departure tenmonths later, accompanied by her closest adviser, Jermyn, was actuallyfar more damaging to court unity. Over the winter of 1643–4 thequeen’s circle had made great efforts to reach an understanding withRupert. Digby failed in this enterprise, and was covertly returningRupert’s hostility with interest by early 1644.96 But Jermyn, with thehelp of Ormond’s client and Rupert’s court intelligencer, Arthur Trevor,was spectacularly successful.97 Jermyn, the consummate courtier, mightalmost have been fashioned just to smooth Rupert’s easily ruffled feath-ers. Besides soliciting the queen and the Oxford Parliament on Rupert’sbehalf, Jermyn kept a ‘particular watche’ on Digby and the prince’sother court rivals.98 According to Trevor, neither ‘Rupert nor all thenumbers in arithmeticke have any efficacy, but are cyphers, without lordJermine’.99

Jermyn’s departure from Oxford destroyed this promising newalliance. More than that, it deprived Rupert of his link to the queen, andto the influence and resources she commanded, just weeks after his bril-liant victory at Newark on 22 March 1644 had raised the jealousy of hisrivals to new heights. With both Rupert and Jermyn absent from courtduring the summer, the prince’s great enemies – Digby, Culpeper,Percy, and Wilmot – openly professed indifference whether he orParliament prevailed in the north.100 Rupert, the exiled soldier-of-fortune, had no political power-base independent of the personal favourhis success as a general brought him from the king.101 Once his luck onthe battlefield deserted him, his rivals realized it would be an easy matterto complete his estrangement from the king. Rupert’s humiliating defeatat Marston Moor, in July 1644, offered them their chance.

In the wake of Marston Moor, Rupert vacillated between anger and

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despair, and spent much of September and October 1644 sulking atBristol.102 Indeed, on several occasions that autumn he declared that ifhis enemies at court were not suppressed he would abandon the royalcause.103 Although he was made nominal commander-in-chief of theroyal army in November 1644, this appointment, as he quickly discov-ered, was merely a precursor to the creation of a rival command – underthe general of the king’s western army, George Lord Goring – to ‘coun-terpoise’ (and neutralize) his own.104 By mid-December, Richmond’ssecretary, Thomas Webb, was reporting that ‘our soldiers are most forpeace, Prince Rupert first of all’.105 Rupert’s great ally, Richmond, wasalso becoming disillusioned with court politics by December 1644. Hisefforts to advance the forthcoming peace talks with Parliament atUxbridge were seen by the king as backsliding on the duke’s part.106

Within a few months of the collapse of the treaty in February 1645 –which the pro-accommodation faction blamed on Digby107 – Richmondand Webb were involved in secret negotiations with the Independentgrandees to surrender Oxford to the New Model Army.108

By the late summer of 1645 the factional battle-lines among thegrandees were beginning to harden. The heads of the foreign alliancefaction were Digby, Jermyn, Culpeper, and possibly the crypto-CatholicLord Cottington; shortly to be joined by Ashburnham. In the pro-accommodation camp were Rupert, Richmond, Rupert’s old enemy theMarquess of Hertford, and a majority of the ‘Oxford lords’, includingthe Earls of Dorset, Lindsey, Southampton, and Portland.109 The Princeof Wales’s councillors were too busy fighting their own battles in theWest Country to engage fully with the deepening conflict among theirformer colleagues in Oxford and Paris.110 The exception was Culpeper,whose willingness to consider ‘expedients’ had brought him closer toDigby from mid-1644;111 and by the summer of 1645 his letters wereechoing the views of the foreign alliance faction.112

III WHICH ALLIANCE? RIVAL ROYALIST STRATEGIES,1645–7

Even after the crushing royalist defeats in England (at Naseby in June1645) and in Scotland (at Philiphaugh that September), Digby, Jermyn,and Culpeper – the leaders of what might be termed the ‘foreign inter-vention faction’ – did not abandon hope of a Confederate army comingto the king’s rescue. However, with Ormond seemingly taking forever to

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 51

negotiate a treaty with the Irish, the English advocates of a foreignintervention began to consider an even more controversial course – amilitary alliance with their ostensible enemies, the ScottishCovenanters.113 In this, their task was made easier by developments atWestminster. There, the growing power of the anti-Scottish,Independent faction was placing ever increasing strain on theParliamentarian–Covenanter alliance; and by the autumn of 1645 theScots were beginning to question whether their interests might not bebetter served in alliance with a defeated and, they hoped, chastenedking rather than with the English Parliament.

The willingness of some Royalists to continue the war by allying withthe Scots destroyed any prospect of the king’s party uniting in the face ofdefeat. To the opponents of such an intervention – Richmond, Hertfordand their circle – the idea of a restoration by means of a Covenanterarmy represented a far greater betrayal of the king’s cause, and a moreflagrant foreign encroachment on English sovereignty, than the import-ing of Irish Catholic troops. Hence, from the autumn of 1645, theRichmond–Hertford group was defined largely by its conviction that anegotiated settlement with Parliament was preferable to a rapproche-ment with the Scots. Consequently, in seeking an accommodation withParliament it looked naturally to the Independents, who were themselvesresolutely opposed to continuing Scottish intervention in English affairs.

To the dismay of the Richmond–Hertford group and theirIndependent allies, the conjunction of king and Covenanters became areality in May 1646, when at the instigation of the queen and the Frenchgovernment, Charles surrendered to the Scottish army at Newark.Anxious to avoid a confrontation with the New Model Army, the Scotshurriedly decamped with their royal prize to the Covenanter garrison ofNewcastle, out of reach of any parliamentarian bid to recapture themonarch. This was the opportunity the advocates of a foreign interven-tion, the Jermyn–Culpeper faction, had been waiting (and almostcertainly planning) for – the king was in Scottish hands; the French wereon side; and the Scots’ allies at Westminster, the Presbyterians, werepoised to lend political and military assistance if Charles and theCovenanters could reach an agreement. Only one contingency, itseemed, could undermine this projected alliance: if the Independentscould seize the Prince of Wales and, should the king refuse their terms,set him on the throne in his father’s stead.

The Channel Island of Jersey thus became the focus of theJermyn–Culpeper faction’s anxieties. The prince and his Council had

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taken refuge there in April 1646 after the collapse of the royalist war-effort in England, and although they were relatively safe in this islandredoubt, rumours nevertheless abounded that the Independents wereintent on the prince’s capture.114 Moreover, the queen and her circlehad doubts as to the political reliability of the Prince’s Council. Theysuspected, and with good reason, that some of the Councillors had triedto use the prince as a means of brokering a settlement with theIndependents.115 In June 1646, therefore, Jermyn, Digby, and Culpeperarrived on Jersey with explicit orders from the queen to remove theprince to France. This was the first time that the queen’s circle and theprince’s Councillors had rubbed shoulders in over a year, and it was onlynow that Jermyn, Digby, and Culpeper publicly made clear theirsupport for a military alliance with Covenanters, backed by the French.

The arrival of Jermyn and his colleagues on Jersey precipitated abitter quarrel among the assembled royalist grandees. When the prince’sCouncillors discovered what Jermyn, Culpeper, and Digby were advo-cating, most of them were appalled – in particular Hyde, the Earl ofBerkshire, Capel, Hopton, and the king’s veteran Lord General, the Earlof Brentford. Their hostility to a royalist–Scottish alliance was emphatic.Better, thought Hyde, that the king had been captured at Oxford by theNew Model Army, than to seek restitution of his throne at the hands ofthe Scots.116 The ensuing debate over how to respond to the queen’sorders for the removal of the Prince of Wales to France (orders by nowconfirmed by the king) split the royalist grandees on Jersey down themiddle. Predictably, the supporters of the royalist–Scottish alliance,Jermyn, Digby, and Culpeper, urged the Prince of Wales’s immediateremoval, arguing that their greatest hope of restoring the king lay withthe French, ‘not only for the assistance they were to receave from themin men or money, but for what the Scotts should doe for the Kinge; andthat . . . without the Prince’s goinge into France, they would doenothinge’.117 Hyde and his friends responded that the king’s best policylay in fomenting the divisions between Independents and Presbyteriansat Westminster. They argued that placing the Prince of Wales in thecustody of a foreign (and Catholic) power, whose interests they regardedas antithetical to those of England, would only serve to re-unite theparties at Westminster, undermine the prospect of a negotiated settle-ment, and alienate the affections of the English people.118 But theprince, eager to sample the delights of Paris, was quickly won over byJermyn, and this ‘great combustion’ among the grandees endedrancorously, with a ‘visible strangeness’ growing between the two

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 53

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sides.119 When the prince left for Paris – accompanied by Jermyn,Digby, and Culpeper – Hyde and his friends disdained to follow,remaining defiantly on Jersey. From then on, Hyde’s circle was broadlyaligned with their fellow opponents of the alliance with the Scots (andFrench), the Richmond–Hertford faction, back in England.120

The strategic and political choices that the pro-foreign intervention-ists had outlined on Jersey dictated the kind of royal concessions theythought were necessary in matters of religion. With the king and thePrince of Wales safely beyond the Independents’ clutches, Jermyn,Culpeper, and Ashburnham wrote a series of letters to Charles begginghim to abandon episcopacy in England and to take the Covenant(committing himself to a Presbyterian settlement throughout all threekingdoms). The Scots would not engage on his behalf, they assured him,unless he accepted a Presbyterian Church settlement in England.121 But,they told the king, these would not have to be concessions made in goodfaith. They calculated that the king’s engagement with the Scots wouldprovoke a new civil war, and that a restoration of monarchy by meansof an Anglo-Scottish Presbyterian army,122 backed by the French, wouldgive Charles the power, somewhere down the line, to restore his Crownand Church to their pre-war glory.

Theirs, however, was not the only royalist counsel the king wasreceiving during his Scottish captivity. In September 1646, while theJermyn–Culpeper faction tried desperately to get Charles to do a dealwith the Scots, Richmond and Hertford collaborated with leading oppo-nents of the Scots at Westminster – Sir Henry Vane junior, OliverCromwell, and other Independent grandees – to prevent such a conjunc-tion.123 Communication between this anti-Scottish, Independent–royalist coalition and the king was difficult. From the moment ofCharles’s flight from Oxford in May 1646, the Scottish Covenanters hadbarred Richmond and his circle from attending the king,124 and there-fore the Independent–royalist coalition conveyed its terms to Charles insecret, via the Clerk of the Closet (the cleric who controlled the king’sprivate chapel, or ‘closet’), Dr Richard Steward – a man who, it wasnoted, was ‘animated in the highest degree against the Scotch andPresbyterians’.125 The terms offered by the coalition were calculated toappeal to the king. If Charles would allow limited religious toleration,and wash his hands of the Covenant and Presbyterianism, Richmondand his Independent allies offered to restore him to ‘the full execution ofhis regal authority’, and to establish a ‘moderated Episcopacy’.126 In theevent, the king – confident that he could do better than either set of

terms – rejected them both, and for a brief period over the winter of1646–7, it looked as if the Scots had turned their back on Charles andthe fate of his English kingdom. The Scots agreed to withdraw theirarmy from England, and early in 1647 collected the first instalment ofthe £400,000 they had been voted at Westminster to quit the kingdom,and handed Charles over to the English Parliament. The strategy ofrestoring the king’s fortunes by seeking a foreign alliance, which hadalready failed in the Irish context, now failed comprehensively again inthe Scottish; and the political standing of its leading advocates – Jermyn,Culpeper, and the queen – declined accordingly.

The final reshuffle among the royalist ‘gamesters’ occurred inresponse to the Scots’ handover of the king to the English Parliament inJanuary 1647 – a readily justifiable and yet seemingly unsavoury trans-action. Even men who had striven to remain above the factional fray, orwho had backed the idea of foreign military intervention, now lookedfavourably on doing some kind of deal with Parliament’s Independent(and anti-Scottish) faction. To Ashburnham, Cottington, and Nicholas,for example, the surrender of the king represented one betrayal toomany by the Scots, and they made common cause with the long-estab-lished opponents of the Scots, the Richmond–Hertford faction.

IV ROYALIST ENDGAMES, 1647–51

In the context of 1647, the first full year of peace in England since 1641,it looked as though they had backed the winning side. Indeed, the inter-nal contest between the royalist factions was all but decided, or so itseemed, by the New Model Army’s seizure of the king in June 1647. Thearmy’s professed determination to restore the king to his ‘Honour,Crowne, & Dignity’ gave the Richmond–Hertford faction and theIndependent grandees the perfect opportunity to resurrect their peaceinitiative of September 1646.127 Moreover, although the queen generallyfavoured the Presbyterian interest, the Scots’ ‘betrayal’ of Charles at thebeginning of 1647 had apparently dampened her enthusiasm for aScottish-brokered settlement. All that Jermyn and Culpeper could do, toensure they had at least some input in the anticipated settlement, was tosend one of their own circle, Sir John Berkeley, to mediate with the king’scaptors.128 Berkeley was joined on this mission by Ashburnham, who bynow was ‘an implacable enemy to the Scots, and no friend to the other[i.e. English] Presbyterians’.129 Although Ashburnham co-operated with

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Berkeley, in practice he seems to have answered principally to theRichmond–Hertford grandees, and their Independent allies.130 The twomen were assisted by ‘the counsels and pressing persuasions of threepersons permitted by the army at that time about him [the king], and ingreat credit with him’ – apparently Richmond, Hertford, and Hyde’sclose friend, Lord Capel.131 And the peace propositions that emergedfrom the army’s consultations with the Independent andRichmond–Hertford grandees in the summer of 1647 – the Heads ofProposals – were probably an extended version of the terms they hadoffered the king the previous autumn.132

Whatever their origins, however, the Heads represent the fullestexpression of the convergence between the anti-Scots Royalists andIndependents within the English Parliament. Their alliance was basedon a number of shared convictions. First, there was an appreciation thatthere could be no viable settlement that ignored the strength of feelingin England for episcopacy and the Book of Common Prayer, or thatfailed to extend liberty of conscience to the godly.133 Secondly, there wasa chauvinistic tendency to see the relationship between the two Britishkingdoms in terms of England’s ‘ancient superioritie’ over Scotland;134

and in both camps this English chauvinism shaded into a xenophobicdislike of the Scottish people themselves – ‘the Off-Scum[m]e of theworld’ as one Royalist called them;135 ‘that beggarly nation’, in thewords of the Independent grandee the Earl of Northumberland.136

Thirdly, there was a shared desire to demarcate and preserve an Englishframe of government, and an apprehension of the threat to nationalsovereignty and honour posed by foreign intervention – particularly inthe form of Covenanting ‘confederalism’, as Allan Macinnes has termedit (Scottish desires for a ‘joint interest’ in governing all three Stuart king-doms). Figures as seemingly poles apart as Oliver Cromwell and theDuke of Richmond’s secretary, Thomas Webb, interpreted the Scots’political ambitions in almost identical fashion – as an attempt to‘vassalise’ the English people.137 Finally, the anti-Scots Royalists and theIndependent Parliamentarians were united, too, by a deep distrust of theFrench Crown and its perceived ambition to keep England weak anddivided.138 It is revealing that most of the leading figures in the pro-Spanish (and therefore, of course, anti-French) clique at court during the1630s aligned with the Richmond–Hertford faction in the 1640s.139

Several of the Jermyn–Culpeper faction, by contrast, were pensioners ofthe French Crown.140 And whereas the Richmond–Hertford faction atthe very least acquiesced in the Independents’ programme to re-assert

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English hegemony in the three kingdoms, the pro-Scottish (and pro-French) Jermyn–Culpeper faction apparently envisaged a state of prag-matic collaboration among the British and Irish Protestant élites,possibly involving the creation of an Anglo-Scottish court of the kindthat was to be outlined in the Engagement – the treaty that Charlessigned late in 1647 with the Covenanter faction led by the Duke ofHamilton.141

Charles’s rejection of the Heads and signing of the Engagementrevived the political fortunes of the Jermyn–Culpeper faction, which hadbeen scheming in favour of Scottish military intervention since 1645. Atthe same time, however, the Engagement served to widen the breach inroyalist ranks. The Richmond–Hertford grandees would have nothing todo with a royalist campaign based upon another Scottish invasion; whileHyde denounced the Engagement as a thing ‘most scandalous andderogatory to the honour and interest of the English nation’.142 TheRichmond–Hertford faction and the Independent and army grandeescontinued to pursue their goal of an exclusively English monarchicalsettlement to within a few days of king’s execution in January 1649.143

After the regicide a distraught Richmond, Hertford, and their circle with-drew from political life. But although the king’s grisly demise was a conse-quence, if not an inevitable one, of the failure of the royalist–Scottishalliance, Jermyn and Culpeper continued to insist ‘that the condition ofhis [Charles II’s] affayres doth enact noething in the world soe pressinglyof him as that he goe to the utmost length he can possibly for suche asatisfaction of Scotland as may beget an unanimous engagement of thenation for his interests’.144 The power-struggle between the rival royalistfactions had fatally undermined the king’s cause during the Second CivilWar (summer 1648), and was to have a significant negative impact bothon Ormond’s royalist coalition in Ireland in 1648 and 1649, and on theScottish invasion of England in 1651.145 Only the Scots’ defeat at thebattle of Worcester in September 1651 finally gave victory in this strug-gle to Hyde and other anti-foreign-intervention grandees – the group thatwas to dominate royal counsels through to the Restoration and beyond.

V THE ROYALISTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE PEOPLE

Here then are the outlines of a new model of royalist politics, highlight-ing the ‘British’ and European context of divisions in the king’s party.

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 57

Despite fears in the Richmond–Hertford camp that their rivals’ policy ofallying with the Scots would subvert the integrity of English government,there is no evidence that the warring royalist factions had come toembrace radically different ideas about the constitution in the sense ofthe rules and laws defining the scope of royal authority. Their quarrelwas more political and tactical than ideological. Two rival royalistnetworks had emerged by 1647 – one in Paris around the queen and theJermyn–Culpeper grandees, the other centred upon Richmond andHertford – and both were determined to exclude the other from anyhonour or advantage entailed in restoring the king.

The rival royalist camps were sharply at odds not only over the meansby which the king should be restored but also about how he was to re-affirm and exercise his authority in the post-restoration order. TheRichmond–Hertford group attached great importance to the re-estab-lishment of episcopacy in some form or other – partly no doubt becausethey knew the king would settle for nothing less; but also because, likeCharles, they regarded it as integral to the proper exercise of royalauthority. Not that Richmond and his allies were all devout sons of theChurch of England, or that the Jermyn–Culpeper group were closetCatholics or irreligious pragmatists. The most notorious Catholics orcrypto-Catholics at court – ‘Don’ Cottington and Endymion Porter –aligned with the Richmond–Hertford faction.146 And although Digbywould convert to Catholicism in the 1650s, during the 1640s the queen’scircle were all avowed Protestants (with the possible exception ofJermyn, whose confessional allegiance was and remains a completemystery).147

Unfortunately, we know so little about the political calculations of theRichmond–Hertford grandees that we have to rely instead on the writ-ings of Hyde, Nicholas, and their correspondents, who were clearly insympathy with the grandees’ objectives but not necessarily privy to theircounsels. But if we can take Hyde and Nicholas as broadly representa-tive of the Richmond–Hertford group, their desire for an episcopalChurch settlement was linked closely to their conviction that much ofthe king’s power was located in the affections of the English people,‘without which he hath no hope of reigning’.148 Royal authority, to theirmind, was not an exclusively political phenomenon, derived fromspecific rights and powers; it was also a moral force, rooted in a recipro-cal relationship of trust and loyalty between monarch and people, andindivisible from the honour of the English nation.149 This view of themonarchy shaped their political priorities. The king, they believed, was

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obliged to regain power, but only in a manner consistent with retainingthe affection of his subjects; which, in turn, meant respecting theirattachment to traditional worship according to the Book of CommonPrayer. One of the most effective instruments for governing the people’saffections, thought Hyde and Nicholas, was the episcopate: the group of‘lords spiritual’ whose nomination and promotion was entirely in theking’s power. As Hyde explained: ‘There is no question the Clergy willalways have an extraordinary influence upon the people; and therefore. . . there must be a way to govern the Clergy absolutely, and keep itsubject to the rules, and orders of State; which never was, nor ever canbe, without Bishops; so that in truth civil prudence would make unan-swerable arguments for that order, if piety did not.’150 The ‘right andreverence of the Crown’ were thus inseparable from episcopal govern-ment of the church.151

The pro-Scottish group of courtiers – and, in particular, Jermyn andCulpeper – took a very different view. They perceived the monarchy inmore narrowly political terms, as one among several competing inter-ests. And just as the forging of a strong military party was the ‘onlyengine’ to restore the king, so the sword, as embodied in the militia, wasnecessary to maintain ‘the power and dignity of [the] . . . Crowne’ there-after.152 Without ‘the power of the sword’, wrote Jermyn and Culpeper,‘. . . the Kingly office signefyes very litle’.153 Even before the Civil War,Culpeper had feared the ‘dreadful consequences which would attend theyielding in the point of the militia’.154 He and Jermyn had little faith thatthe English people’s loyalty to the king could be harnessed for politicalor military purposes. Popular approval, or disapproval, therefore figuredlittle in their calculations, and could be set aside altogether for the sakeof obtaining foreign military assistance. ‘All that they [the ScottishCovenanters] can ask’ (including, of course, the abolition of bishopsfrom the English Church), argued Culpeper, ‘or the King part with, is atrifle in respect of the price of a Crown.’155 All, that is, except militaryresources. Control of an army was the key to power, not control of thepulpits. Jermyn and Culpeper, like another key figure in the pro-Scottishalliance faction, the Earl of Newcastle,156 subscribed to Hobbes’s dictum‘that he that is Master of the Militia, is Master of the Kingdom, andconsequently is in possession of a most absolute Sovereignty’.157

Obviously, the manner and terms of the king’s restoration wouldhave huge implications for the constitutional arrangements in andbetween the three Stuart kingdoms. But to portray royalist factionalismas essentially a struggle for or over the constitution is a distortion. None

Rethinking Royalist Politics, 1642–9 59

of the royalist grandees wanted to grub up the foundations of Englishgovernment and restore the king as an arbitrary ruler. Their quarrel wasnot about whether Charles should govern with or without Parliament,through or above the law. It was rooted in deeper tensions – conflictingideas about the foundations of royal authority (were they essentiallymoral or political?); the relationship between the Crown and the people(should it rest upon force or love?); and even the nature of Englishnationhood itself (could another nation, like the Scots, be allowed a voicein deciding the future of its Church?). Inviting Irish Catholics andScottish Covenanters to restore the English monarchy challenged royal-ist thinking on all these issues, and it is here that any investigation intothe structure of the king’s party during the 1640s must begin.

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316

Abbot, George, Archbishop ofCanterbury, bête noire of Laud, 77

abdication, proposed for Charles I,194

Adamson, John, historian, 64, 65, 89;and analysis of Independentparty, 97; and the ascendancy ofthe Earl of Essex, 107; andFairfax’s army, 177, 178, 180,199; and the Army Committee,184; and regicide, 198, 200;arguments on Irish dimension ofthe regicide criticized, 200–1

‘adversary politics’, theory of, 22, 30;re-dating onset of, 89;contemporary perceptions of,100

Agitators, within Fairfax’s army, 164,165; election of, 175; ViscountSaye as ‘adjutator generall’, 185;and Levellers, 188; ‘newAgitators’, 190

Agostini, Gerolamo, Venetianrepresentative in London, 144,245n

Agreement of the People, 190; opposed byofficers, 191; considered as a re-formulation of the socialcontract, 213; later versions,192; Levellers’ sense of betrayalover, 193–4

Alcasar, Luis de, Spanish Jesuit andBishop of Seville, 76

Alexander ‘the Great’, King ofMacedon, 113

allegiance, political, 3, 15, 16–18, 26,27, 33, 35, 118, 171, 174

Anabaptists, 216‘ancient constitution’, defined, 241nAnglicanism, Civil-War, relationship

with king’s party, 63–81; ascounterpart of ‘constitutionalRoyalism’, 25–6; as ‘cement’ forRoyalism, 61; questionablemoderation of, 62; ‘Anglican’defined, 252n

animals, reported baptism of, 219Answer to the Nineteen Propositions (1642),

70; attacked by Heylyn, 71Antichrist, Westminster Parliament

identified as, 77, 78; abolition ofepiscopacy seen as preparatoryfor, 78; Royalists as supportersof, 194

antinomianism, 221Antrim [I], Randal MacDonnell, 2nd

Earl and 1st Marquess of,threatens western seaboard ofScotland, 275n; and provision ofIrish troops to Charles I, 49;sojourn in France of, 111; inpersonal combat, 115; and IrishInsurrection (1641), 117;squabbles with rivalcommanders, 120

Apocalypse, religious enthusiasmsinspired by, 1, 2; Spanish writingon, 76; royalist interpretations ofthe Civil War in the light of, 77,83; and Fifth Monarchists, 217;see also Antichrist

Index

Note: Peers are indexed by the titles by which they were most commonly known during the1640s and by which they are most frequently referred to in the text. Later promotions (as, forexample, Sir Edward Hyde’s to the earldom of Clarendon) are noted in parenthesis. Scottishpeerages are indicated thus [S]; Irish peerages [I]; noblemen not otherwise specified are membersof the English peerage.

Argyll [S], Archibald Campbell, 8thEarl and 1st Marquess of, 28;planned assassination of, 135;dominates the Conservators ofthe Peace, 137; supports Unionwith England, 149; difficulties inpreserving unity amongCovenanters, 150; as ally of theDuke of Richmond and Lennox,249n; considers creation of defacto republic, 212

aristocracy, as term, problematicaluse of, 29 and n.; and politics,33; alliance with Church ofEngland, 62; see also nobility

Arminianism, disruptive influence of,6; revival of in 1650s, 76

armies, Englishof Earl of Essex, dissatisfaction

with, 175–80of Earl of Manchester, at Marston

Moor, 145; incorporation of into‘new modelled’ forces, 177

of Marquess of Hertford, 46–7of Prince Rupert of the Palatinate,

46of Sir William Waller, 174, 177of Sir Thomas (later 3rd Lord)

Fairfax (1645–9), 175–201;anticipated by Covenanterforces of 1640, 131; creation ofas ‘new-modelling’ of existingforces, 15, 31, 145, 175–9;officer list of, 181; demand forimposition of Covenant on, 146;possible confrontation withScottish army (1646), 52;hostility towards CountyCommittees, 156; demandssevere terms against the king,149; blamed for CountyCommittees, 157; heterodoxreligious opinions supposedlyrampant within, 218;disbandment of proposed, 157;disbandment resisted, 214;rapprochement with ‘non-Scottified’ Royalists, 250n;

Declaration (June 1647), 162;Humble Representation (December1647), 163; Remonstrance(November 1648), 215; Levellerinfluence within, 214; proposedservice in Ireland resisted, 189;in Ireland, 106; and mutiny atWare, 191; and Sir Henry Vanejunior, 92; purge of WestminsterParliament by, 93; see alsoAgitators; Committee for theArmy; Cromwell, Oliver;Fairfax, 3rd Lord; Scawen,Robert

armies, Irish,of Earl of Strafford, 121; and

‘military caste’, 124of Lord Inchiquin, in Munster, 119of Marquess of Ormond, 115, 121Roman Catholic armies, 118–20;

and royalist plans to use inEngland, 47, 48, 49, 52, 251n

armies, Scottish,of Earl of Leven, Covenanter

forces in England, 55; size of(1643–4), 140; withdrawal of,28, 141; deployment of inIreland, 136; controversy overcontrol of, 149

of Duke of Hamilton, 151–2of Marquess of Montrose, 148

Army Plots (1641), 41, 43, 45Armyne, Sir William, Commons-

man, as critic of Scots, 144array, commissions of, 136–7, 168arrears, in payments to Fairfax’s

army, 163Ashburnham, John, hostility towards

Hyde, 40; supposed extremeopinions of, 41; urges king toabandon episcopacy, 54;regarded as ‘a great lover of thechurch’, 251n; and the Scots,55; departure from Newcastlefor France, 250n

Assembly of Divines, Westminster,138, 252n

Assizes, 167

Index 317

Athens, Greek republic of, as modelfor Stuart England, 213

atrocities, in Ireland, 122–3Axholme, Lincolnshire, fenmen of, 172Aylmer, G.E., historian, 187, 231n

Baillie, Robert, Scottish divine, 88;member of the Assembly ofDivines at Westminster, 280n

Baker, Philip, historian, 35; onLevellers, 187, 191; and Londonradicals, 200; and regicide, 197

Banbury, Oxfordshire, army mutinyat, 193

Baptists, religious non-conformists,217; and Particular Baptists, 221

Barlow, Thomas, divine, 76‘baronial context’ of Civil War, in

Stuart kingdoms, 27–8, 107–8;in Ireland, 108–24; Hamilton asexemplification of ‘baronialleadership’, 151; and NineteenPropositions (1642), 209–10;misrepresentations of, 237n

Barry, Garret, writer on military drill,113–14

Barrymore [I], David Barry, 6thLord Barry [I] and 1st Earl of,114; conversion toProtestantism, 118

Barwis, Richard, Commons-man,critic of Scots, 144, 165

Bath, Henry Bourchier, 5th Earl of,member of the Oxford ‘peaceinterest’, 44; and royal court,245n

Bayly, Mary, the ‘Maid of Deptford’,cured of scrofula, 79

Bedford, Francis Russell, 4th Earl of,as opponent of the Crown, 208

Belasyse, John, on the decline ofPrince Rupert’s influence, 248n

Bellièvre, Pierre de, see Grignon,seigneur de

Bellings, Richard, historian of IrishCivil War, 115, 116, 119; ondeficiencies of the Irish nobility,120

Benburb, Co. Tyrone, battle of(1646), 114, 122

Berkeley, Sir John, 55; associationwith Queen Henriette Marie, 45

Berkshire, Thomas Howard, 1st Earlof, and the Prince of Wales’sCouncil, 53

Berwick-on-Tweed, Pacification of(1639), 131; as pocket boroughof Earl of Northumberland, 180

Bible, 2, 75, 221; applied toexperience of the Civil War, 78;applied to Charles I, 194;authority of rejected byQuakers, 222

Bishop, Captain George, condemnsCharles I, 195

bishops, Calvinist character of underElizabeth I, 62; removal fromHouse of Lords, 43, 69, 207;limits proposed on their freedomof action, 64; lay hostility to asoffice-holders, 72; see alsoepiscopacy

Bishops’ Wars, Anglo-Scottishcampaigns of 1639–40, 125,128–9

blasphemy, Quaker, 222Blayney [I], Sir Henry Blayney, 2nd

Lord, service in Low Countries,112; support for Protestant cause(1641), 119

blood-guilt, biblical trope applied toCharles I, 195; see also ‘man ofblood’

Bodleian Library, University ofOxford, 81

Bolshevik Revolution, 13, 14Book of Common Prayer, 59, 61;

abolition of, 74; desecration of,78; petitions in favour of(1641–2), 68; allowed under theterms of the Heads of theProposals, 74; diabolicalapprobation of, 79; as ‘thatEnglish masse’, 165; controversyover in Thanet, 173

Book of Orders (1631), 155

318 Index

Boyle of Kinalmeaky [I], LewisBoyle, 1st Viscount, educationof, 112

Brailsford, H.N., historian, 187Bramhall, John, Bishop of Derry

(later Archbishop of Armagh),on bishops’ exclusion from theHouse of Lords, 71; writings of,76

Brentford, Patrick Ruthven, 1st Earlof Forth [S] and 1st Earl of,royalist general, 53

Bristol, James Naylor’s entry into,222

Bristol, John Digby, 1st Earl of, andpassive resistance to themonarch, 42; and PrinceRupert, 51

‘British Problem’, in early Stuarthistoriography, 6, 23; see also‘New British History’

Broghill [I], Roger Boyle, 1st Lord(later 1st Earl of Orrery [I]),112; familiarity with Greek andRoman military practice, 113;rivalry with Lord Inchiquin, 119

Brooke, Robert Greville, 2nd Lord,death of 79

Brotherly Assistance, funds due theScots, 139–40

Brown, Keith, historian, 28Brownrigg, Ralph, Bishop of Exeter,

relation to Pym, 63; supports‘moderated episcopacy’, 64

Buchanan, David, Scottishpolemicist, 83; denouncesIndependents, 94, 97;mentioned, 104; on differencesbetween the Uxbridge andNewcastle Propositions, 283n

Buckingham, George Villiers, 1stDuke of, and young Earl ofOrmond, 121

Buckinghamshire, critics of Fairfax’sarmy in, 163

Bunratty Castle, Co. Clare, handedover to EnglishParliamentarians, 119

Burford, Oxfordshire, army mutinyat, 193; question of Levellerinfluence in, 293n

Burgess, Glenn, historian, on theconstitution, 38

Burkes, Earls of Clanricard [I], 108Burnet, Gilbert, Scottish historian

and Bishop of Salisbury, 198Burroughs, Jeremiah, Independent

divine, 139Burrow, John, historian, 13Butler, Captain Richard, professional

soldier, 113, 114Butlers, Earls of Thomond [I], 108

Calvinism, 6, 8, 62, 63, 64, 66, 75–7,172; as Stuart orthodoxy, 216; ofParticular Baptists, 221

Cambridge, University of, Laudianismin during the 1630s, 64

Canons, ecclesiastical, of 1640,rejected by Archbishop Laud, 67

Capel, Arthur Capel, 1st Lord,royalist general, 53; as memberof the ‘Spanish faction’, 251n

Carbery [I], Richard Vaughan, 2ndEarl of, 62

Carlisle, Scottish garrison at, 148Carlyle, Thomas, historian and

controversialist, 5Case of the Armie Truly Stated (1647),

authorship of, 186; reply to, 190Castlehaven [I], James Tuchet, 3rd

Earl of, memoirs, 116; and IrishInsurrection, 117

Catholics, Roman, at royalist court,58; beliefs of condemned, 69;and military service, 107; andIrish Insurrection (1641),117–18; dominant confessionwithin Ireland, 138; excludedfrom provisions of revisedAgreement of the People, 192;violence against, 206

Caulfield [I], Baron of Charlemont,Sir Toby Caulfield, 1st Lord,elevation to peerage of, 110;military service of, 112

Index 319

Caulfield [I], Baron of Charlemont,Toby Caulfield, 3rd Lord, raisesforces for Protestant cause(1641–3), 119

Cavaliers, as ‘Wromantic’, 12, 37;Ormond as, 121; see alsoRoyalists

‘Cessation’, royalist-Confederatetruce in Ireland (1643), 47, 247n

Chancery, Court of, 173character, as explanatory category, 6,

23Charlemont [I], see CaulfieldCharles I, King of England, Scotland

and Ireland, causal roleattributed to, 23; support forLaudianism by, 62; PersonalRule of, 155; over-reliance onprerogative powers, 126; courtof, 129; assault on powers of,133; visit to Edinburgh in 1641,135; reputed plans to assassinateHamilton and Argyll, 135;compromised by response to theIrish Rebellion, 136; and Answerto the Nineteen Propositions (1642),70; abandons Laud, 63, 64;raises standard at Nottingham,210; correspondence of, 36;advisers criticized, 72; surrenderto Scots at Newark (1646), 52,54, 149; problems of negotiatingwith, 148; instructs conscience,67, 75, 77; presence in Scottishgarrison at Newcastle, 52;conviction that religion was‘foundation of all power’, 252n;handed over by the Scots to theEnglish Parliament, 150; termsof Independent-backedrestoration of, 54; reassured asto making concessions involvingPresbyterian settlement, 73;rejects Heads of the Proposalsand flees Hampton Court, 185;trial and execution of, 33, 57,193, 196–9; as Anglican martyr,62, 79; miraculous cures

attributed to, 79; criticized byHeylyn, 80; loyalty of Ormondtowards, 121; see also regicide

Charles, Prince of Wales (later KingCharles II), Council of, 49;divided counsels of, 51, 248n;Independent plan to seize, 52–3;departure for Jersey, 249n;removal of to France, 53;Jermyn-Culpeper faction’sintentions for, 57; betraysepiscopalian Church, 80

Charles Louis, de jure Prince-Elector(Kurfürst) of the Palatinate, 129;projects to restore, 129

Chichester of Belfast [I], Sir ArthurChichester, 1st Lord, LordDeputy of Ireland, epitaph of,110

Chillingworth, William, divine, 71chivalry, as moral code, 107–8, 113;

and personal combat, 115;displayed by commanders inIreland, 119

Christian (Kristian) IV, King ofDenmark, 130; and territorialwar with Sweden, 151

Christianson, Paul, historian, 21Church of England, wartime fortunes

of, 61–81; defence of traditions,38; motives for allegiancetowards, 61–2; doubtfully de-Laudianized, 63; Charles’s oathto preserve (1643), 64

Clancarty [I], 2nd ViscountMuskerry and 1st Earl of, 117;trial for ‘war crimes’ of, 123

Clandeboy (or Clandeboye) [I],James Hamilton of Bangor, 1stViscount, support for Protestantcause, 119

Clanricard [I], Richard Burke, 4thEarl of, 111

Clanricard [I], Ulick Burke, 5th Earland 1st Marquess of, 116; andIrish Insurrection, 117; influencewithin Connacht, 119–20;attitudes to fellow peers, 122

320 Index

Clare, John Holles, 2nd Earl of,correspondent of Fairfaxes, 183

Clare Castle, Co. Limerick, 106Clarendon, Edward Hyde, 1st Earl

of, see Hyde, Sir EdwardClarke, William, secretary of Fairfax’s

army’s councils, 189Clarkson, Laurence, antinomian

opinions of, 222class struggle, as explanation of the

Civil War, 206clothworkers, of Colchester, 171Clotworthy, Sir John, Commons-

man, as leading Presbyterian,86

Clubmen, rising by, 146; politicallanguage of, 168

Cochrane, Colonel John, as Scottishemissary to Sweden, 130

coign and livery, in Ireland, 109Colchester, Essex, 171Cold War, 16Commissioners, Scottish, in London,

125; involvement in Root-and-Branch campaign, 134; Englishhostility towards, 135; concludemilitary alliance with England,138; role during Civil War,142–8; identities of, 279n

Committee at Derby House,bicameral executive (1646–8),95, 184

Committee for Common Burdens,Scottish, 137

Committee for Taking the Accountsof the Kingdom, Presbyterianbias of, 98

Committee for the Army (1645–9),creation of, 180; politicalcomplexion of, 184

Committee of Both Kingdoms,bicameral executive (1642–4),95, 125; creation of, 126;implications for the Earl ofEssex, 177; highlights animositybetween Scots and English,143–4, 181; Northumberland’sinfluence on, 183, 184; changes

to membership of, 281n;sidelining of, 149

Committee of Estates, Scottishexecutive, 127; given power togovern in the intermissions ofParliament, 132; andrepresentative in Zeeland, 281n;fraught relations with France(1643–4), 282n

Committee of Plundered Ministers,172, 173

Committee of Revenue, bicameralstanding committee, 95, 97

Committee of Safety, bicameralexecutive committee (1642–5),95

Committee of War, English, jointarmy-parliamentary executive,178

Committees, County, agencies ofparliamentarian administrationin the localities, 153–70;Fairfax’s army’s suspicions of,162–3; in Kent, 173

committees, House of Commons, seeParliament, House of Commons

Committees of War, for Scottishshires, 131, 283n

Common Council of London, 182;radical complexion of afterelections of 1648, 198

common law, of England, 117; ascomponent in Clubmen’srhetoric, 168; use of by fenmenand miners, 172, 174; andFairfax’s army, 190

Commons, House of, see Parliament,English

commonwealth, as concept, 32–3;contemporary usages of, 70,142, 169; pursuit of ‘godlycommonwealth’, 209; andFairfax’s army, 189

Commonwealth, formalestablishment of English (1649),215

‘Commonwealth’s men’, 134Como, David, historian, 33

Index 321

Condren, Conal, historian, 203Confederation of Kilkenny, Catholic

government of Ireland, 31, 133;impact on Oxford politics(1643), 47; royalist need fortroops provided by, 49–50; armyof, 114; Supreme Council of,117, 120; joined by Marquess ofClanricard, 120; military failureof, 131; considers offering theCrown to a foreign sovereign,212

confederation, as political principle,see federation

Connacht, Irish province of,influence of Earl of Clanricardwithin, 119–20

Conquest, Norman, of Ireland,114–15; of England, 220

conscience, liberty of, 213; instructionof the royal, 67

Conservators of the Peace (of 1641),appointment of, 137

Constableship of England, revival aspermanent office proposed, 210

constitutions, of England, royalistattitudes towards, 38, 40;‘ancient constitution’, 241n

contingency, as explanatory category,23

Convention of Estates, Scottish, seeParliament, Scottish

Convocation, Southern (1640), 63, 64Cooper, J. P., historian, 230nCoote, Sir Charles, Lord Justice of

Ireland, 116; forces of frightenlocal nobility and gentry, 271n

Coppe, Abiezer, Ranter,denunciations of the rich, 223

Cork [I], Richard Boyle, 1st Earl of,educates his sons, 112; andoutbreak of Irish Rebellion, 117;finances Protestant forces, 119

Cornwall, neutralism in, 167;Fairfax’s army’s activities in,293n

corruption, of royal court, 9, 19;Parliament, 83, 84, 97, 99, 172

Cottington, Francis Cottington, 1stLord, and foreign alliance withking’s party, 51; support for useby the king of Irish troops inEngland, 251n; and royalcounsels, 245n; on surrender ofthe king, 55; and courtCatholics, 58

Council of Officers, of Fairfax’s army,meetings at St Albans andWhitehall, 192

Council of War, of Fairfax’s army,and execution of the king, 196,197, 198

County Committees see Committees,County

‘county community’, historiography,origins of vogue for, 14–15;rationale of, 16, 18; criticized asconcept, 19, 154, 170; possibleover-supply of works on, 21

court, royal, supposed godlessness of,11, 72

Covenant, Scottish National (1638),126; stipulations of, 283n; madeprecondition of holding publicoffice, 132; divine missionimposed by, 210

Covenant, Solemn League andCovenant, Anglo-Scottish(1643), 47, 125; swearing of 138;king urged to subscribe, 54; endschances of a ‘moderatedepiscopacy’, 73–4; identifiedwith Number of the Beast, 78;enforcement of, 85; federativeimplications of, 142; EnglishParliament’s failure to honour,151, 279n; as obstacle to thetrial and execution of the king,196

Covenanters, Scottish, rebellion ofthe, 127–9, 223; rejection ofnew Prayer Book (1638), 224;embassy to Sweden from(1640), 130; defiance ofCharles’s instructions, 131;willingness to intervene in

322 Index

England, 133; possible royalistalliance with (1645–8), 52, 56,60; waning influence of, 147–8;consider rival Union withSweden, 151

‘Covenanting movement’, 133–6Crawford, Major-General Lawrence,

officer in army of Earl ofManchester, 177

Cressy, David, historian, 30Cromartie, Alan, historian, 30;

quoted 26Cromwell, Henry, Lord Lieutenant of

Ireland, 81Cromwell, Oliver, Commons-man

and general (later LordProtector of England), 1;conquest of Ireland, 2; regimentof, 7, 190; role at MarstonMoor, 145; conflict with Earl ofManchester, 177; threatenedprosecution of, 145; and armyreforms, 177–84; at Naseby,182; appointed Lieutenant-General, 182; possiblenegotiations with Royalists, 54;relations with the ‘lordlyinterest’, 86; opposition to peaceinterest, 142; role in formulatingthe Heads of the Proposals, 184;and Lilburne, 185, 188;friendship with WilliamWalwyn, 188; antagonismtowards Agitators, 191; beliefthat God had witnessed againstthe king, 215; presence inLondon around time of Pride’sPurge, 294n; attitudes toregicide, 196–9; mocked as‘King Oliver’ (1648), 86;dedicatee of manuscript byHeylyn, 81

Culmer, Richard, of Thanet, puritandivine, 172

Culpeper, Sir Cheney, hostility tocorruption in committees, 103;on Scottish invasion of 1648,152

Culpeper, Sir John, 38; reputedindifference to matters ofreligion, 39–40; support forbishops’ exclusion from Houseof Lords, 69; attitude to war inthe north, 50; moves closertowards Digby, 51; as Digby’s‘point man’ in the Prince ofWales’s Council, 248n; arrivalon Jersey, 53; urges king toabandon episcopacy, 54; andfriendship with Hamilton, 251n;and probable friendship with SirJohn Berkeley, 250n; see alsoJermyn-Culpeper interest

Cumberland, accusations againstlocal governors in, 164–5;County Committee of, 165

Daly, James, historian, 36dancing, as subject of aristocratic

education, 112Daniel, biblical Book of, 219Declaration of Dislike (1647), 92deference, ambiguous attitudes

towards in Devon, 171; andfenmen of East Anglia, 172

Denbigh, Basil Feilding, 2nd Earl of,159

Denmark–Norway, Swedish alliancesagainst, 125; and Europeandiplomacy, 129; attitude towardsCovenanter influence in Britain,141; Swedish wars with, 151

deposition, of kings, convenientprecedents for, 194, 212

Derby House, Westminster, venue formeeting of the Committee ofBoth Kingdoms, 144

Derby House Committee, seeCommittee at Derby House

D’Ewes, Sir Simonds, Commons-man and diarist, 178; on passageof the New Model’s officer list,181

Digby, George, 2nd Lord (later 2nd Earl of Bristol), attitude to Parliament, 38, 40;

Index 323

Digby, George (cont.):supposed unconstitutionalism of,41, 43; presents anti-Laudiangrievances to Parliament, 69;and ‘war interest’ at Oxford, 45;supporter of Prince Rupert, 46;malign influence over Charles I’sIrish policy, 49–50; appointedSecretary of State (1643), 49;and the king’s counsels, 245n;sidelines Edward Nicholas,247n; blamed for collapse ofUxbridge treaty, 51; arrival onJersey, 53; friendship with Hyde,249n

Diggers, radical sect, 21, 202, 217; as‘True Levellers’, 219–20;agricultural experiments of, 220;short-lived existence of, 223;communalism of, 224

Dillon of Costello-Gallen [I], ThomasDillon, 4th Viscount, mission toCharles I, 116

Directory of Public Worship (1645), 172Donagan, Barbara, historian, 107–8Dorset, Clubmen rising in, 168Dorset, Edward Sackville, 4th Earl of,

38; and ‘peace interest’ atOxford, 44, 51; and royalcounsels, 245n

Doughty, John, royalist divine,critical of Answer to the NineteenPropositions, 71

Douglas, Robert, Scottish divine,member of Assembly of Divines,280n

Downinge, Calybute, parliamentariandivine, as protégé of 2nd Earl ofWarwick, 209

Downs, The, defeat of the Spanishfleet in, 129

drainage, of fens, social consequencesof, 171

Drogheda, siege of (1641–2), 118Drury Lane, Westminster, 118Dryden, John, poet and satirist, 121Duncannon Fort, Co. Wexford, siege

of, 114

Duppa, Brian, Bishop of Salisbury,informs conscience of the king,67; supports alienation ofbishops’ lands, 73; ‘Laudianpedigree’ of, 253n

Durham, Scottish occupation of, 132;expressions of concern aboutlocal governors, 165

Dutch Republic, see United ProvincesDyve, Sir Lewis, 184

East Anglia, Fairfax’s army’squartering in, 164; puritan spiritof its freeholders, 11; see alsoEastern Association; fenmen

Eastern Association, parliamentarianorganization in East Anglia, 166;and Earl of Manchester, 177

Economic History Review, 15Edgehill, Warwickshire, military

campaign around, 45Edward II, deposed King of England,

as cynosure of bad kingship, 194Edwards, Thomas, Presbyterian

heresiographer, 101, 205; and‘schismatical abomination’ of theIndependents, 218; writesGangraena (1646), 218

Eighty Years War (1568–1648), 111Eikon Basilike (1649), 65elections, management of, 90;

‘recruiter’, 90; demand for morefrequent, 104; abuses in conductof, 189

Eleven Members (1647), 91, 92;techniques used by againstopponents in, 101; chargesagainst, 164

Elizabeth I, Queen of England andIreland, supposed pristine stateof the Church under, 64;religious settlement of, 252n

Elton, G. R., historian, on narrativehistory, 234

Elyott, Tom, at royalist court, 45Engagement, pro-royalist Anglo-

Scottish treaty (1647), 56;sponsored by Hamilton group,

324 Index

152; as ploy to ‘vassalise’ theEnglish, 251n

‘English Revolution’, and Marxisttheory, 14; question for socialexplanation of, 18

episcopacy, attitudes towards, 26, 38;Root-and-Branch campaignagainst, 134, 204; ViscountFalkland on attitudes towards,92; ‘moderated’ version of, 54,73; Hyde’s and Nicholas’s viewof, 59; influence of, 59; royalistdivines’ suspicions of the highcommand concerning, 71;secular utility of, 72; Scottishpressure for abolition, 143;attitudes towards abolition of,74, 78, 80; and the Heads of theProposals (1647), 74; publisheddefences of, 68, 76; compatibilitywith republican governmenturged by Heylyn, 80

erastianism, 65; and royalist clergy,62, 63, 66, 73; battles over, 72

Essex, anti-army petitions circulatedin, 164

Essex, Robert Devereux, 3rd Earl of,imperious ways of, 29;involvement with peaceinitiatives (1643), 47; alliancewith Scots, 84; leadership ofPresbyterian interest, 86, 142;dissatisfaction with the militarymanagement of, 176; early plansto oust, 177; opposition to thecreation of Committee of BothKingdoms, 95, 177; disaster atLostwithiel, 178; considersprosecution of Cromwell, 145,179; army of subsumed withNew Model, 175, 180;parliamentary opposition to,181, 186; attempts to block‘new-modelling’ of the armies,182; ambivalent attitude towardsPresbyterian settlement, 146;relations with half-brother, the5th Earl of Clanricard, 116, 120;

lack of a comparable figure inIrish Civil War, 121

ethnicity, as factor in allegiance, 31;sometimes transcended byquestions of honour, 123

Everard, Robert, soldier-Agitator, 190Everitt, Alan, historian, 154, 170, 232n‘evil counsellors’, 4Exchequer, 97Exclusion Crisis, 3

faction, royalist workings of, 37; modelof proposed, 44–60; ‘absolutist’faction at Oxford, 42–60;contemporary understandings of,85; belated scrutiny of atWestminster, 99; varieties ofparliamentarian, 142; ‘Essexian’,in House of Lords, 179

Fairfax of Cameron [S], FerdinandoFairfax, 2nd Lord, general forParliament in NorthernAssociation, 145; politicalconnections of, 183; and LordWharton, 289n

Fairfax of Cameron [S], Sir ThomasFairfax, 3rd Lord, army of,175–201; appointed LordGeneral for Parliament, 31, 145,183; relations with Independentnobles, 183, 186; politicalactivity within the regiments of,187, 189; Levellers and, 191;revolts in South Wales, 161; andregicide, 193; meets with Dutchambassadors, 197; petitions to,164

Falkland [S], Lucius Cary, 2ndViscount, 38; attitude towardsepiscopal Church of England,39, 69; comments on attitudestowards episcopacy, 92; as dove,44; importance within the king’scounsels, 245n; influence onHyde’s appointment asChancellor of the Exchequer,246n; ambiguous reactions tothe death of, 69

Index 325

fast sermons, to Oxford Parliament,78; preachers of, 253n

federation, ideal of, within Britain,126; ‘federative’ union defined,138n; Scottish plans for, 141–6;as a means of safeguarding thepowers of the ScottishParliament, 210; Argyll’s supportfor, 149; failure of, 152

fenmen, 171–2Ferne, Henry, royalist divine, defends

episcopacy, 71, 74; silence on‘moderated episcopacy’, 73

‘fiery spirits’, 86Fifth Monarchists, believers in

imminent Second Coming ofChrist, 217; theocracy envisagedby, 220–1

Fiennes, Nathaniel, Commons-man,91

Filmer, Sir Robert, ‘absolutism’ of,42, 243n

finances, public, 99–103Fingal [I], Christopher Plunkett, 2nd

Earl of, General of Horse forCo. Meath, 118

Firth, Sir Charles Harding, historian,warning to Edwardian peerage,9

Fitzgeralds, Earls of Kildare [I], 108Flanders, see Spanish NetherlandsFleet Prison, London, 165, 167Fletcher, Anthony, historian, 20Florence, as republic, 80Flower Power, influence of on 1960s

historians’ choices of subject, 21‘formality’, sin of, condemned, 78;

formalism and anti-formalism,216; and Baptists, 217

Foster, Andrew, historian, onresurgent clericalism, 72

Four Bills (1647), parliamentaryultimatum to Charles I, 211

France, political interventions by inEngland, 26; Scottish overturestowards, 274n; interventionsought by Royalists, 54;payment of pensions to

Royalists, 56; as refuge ofViscount Tara, 106, and of Earlof Tyrone, 111–12; visit of Earlof Antrim to, 111; attitudetowards Covenanter influence inBritain, 141; fraught relationswith (1644), 282n; Scottishalliance with considered byArgyll, 212; see also Grignon,seigneur de

franchise, 192; see also Agreement of thePeople

French Revolution, 13

Gardiner, Samuel Rawson, Victorianhistorian, influence of, 3, 7, 10,20; durability of work by, 20, 33;and royalist historiography, 37;publication of History, 5

garrisons, support for regicide within(1648), 192

General Assembly of the Kirk,Scottish, 127, 130, 138

General Council of the Army, 176;meetings at Putney, 190;endorses Vote of No Addresses,186

Gentles, Ian, historian, 31gentry, English, twentieth-century

historians’ preoccupation with,18; controversy over, 16, 231n;apogee of interest in, 16–17;decline of in Civil War, 153;Civil-War committees’ hostilitytowards, 162

Gillespie, George, Scottish divine,member of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster,280n

Glamorgan, County Committee of,161; grievances of county, 158;anti-parliamentarian rising in,161; Royalists in, 167; Clubmenin, 168

Glasgow, General Assembly at, 127,129

Glenawley, see Hamilton ofGlenawley

326 Index

Gloucester, Prince Henry of England,1st Duke of, proposed assubstitute for Charles I as king,198

Glynne, John, Commons-man,accusations against, 164

Golden Grove, Camarthenshire, seatof the Earl of Carbery, 62

Goring, George Goring, styled Lord,as rival to Prince Rupert, 51

Gormanston [I], Nicholas Preston,6th Viscount, death of, 120–21

Gothic, elements in Civil-Warpolitics, 126, 209

‘grandees’, as leading figures inWestminster Parliament, 86,87–90, 93, 94, 96, 98–103, 212;willingness to exploit print, 100;equivalents in Ireland, 118; asleading members of the army,185, 191

Great Council of Peers at York(1640), 132

Great Depression, economic crisis ofthe 1920s and 1930s, 13

Greece, as ‘nurse of chivalry’, 113grievances, redress of, in Parliament,

133; local, 153Grignon, Pierre de Bellièvre, seigneur

[sieur] de, French Resident inEngland, 196

Grotius, Hugo (Huig de Groot),Dutch jurist, as Swedish agent inFrance, 125

Habermas, Jürgen, Germanphilosopher and social theorist,32

Habsburgs, Austrian, 112hagiarchy, defined, 221nHaicéad, Pádraigan, Irish poet-priest,

113Halesiados (1648), historicizing poem,

170Hamilton [S], James Hamilton, 3rd

Marquess and 1st Duke of, 28;and Engagement, 57; andGlasgow Assembly, 128;

planned assassination of, 135;elevation to dukedom, 280n;‘baronial leadership’ exemplifiedby, 151; secret negotiations withthe Covenanters, 248n; meetingswith Cromwell, 198

Hamilton of Glenawley [I], HughHamilton, 1st Lord, Swedishservice of, 112–13, 270n

Hammond, Henry, royalist divine,62, 66; and episcopacy, 71, 74;during 1650s, 73; failure to writein support of Ussher scheme, 73;denies that the Pope isAntichrist, 76

Hammond, Robert, officer inFairfax’s army, 197

Hampden, John, Commons-man,and parliamentary management,91

Hampton Court Palace, Charles Iflees, 185

Hardacre, Paul, historian, 228nHarris, John, radical pamphleteer,

88Harrison, Colonel Thomas, 915Hartlib, Samuel, reformer, 125;

members of his circle, 152Heads of the Proposals (1647),

royalist origins of, 55, 184;formulation of, 184–5; and Bookof Common Prayer, 74; effortsto persuade king to accept, 78;concerns with abuses bycommittees in, 163; introducedinto House of Lords, 185; limitspowers of the Crown, 211

Heal, Felicity, historian, 230Henderson, Alexander, Scottish

divine, 128; appointed royalchaplain, 277n

Henriette Marie, Queen consort ofEngland, Scotland and Ireland,political associates of, 45; arrivalin Oxford (1643), 50; dealingswith Covenanters, 147;temporary decline of politicalinfluence (1647), 55

Index 327

heresy, 205, 219; plebeian traditionof, 223

Hertford, Edward Seymour, 10th Earland 1st Marquess of, 38, 46; feudbetween Prince Rupert and, 47,51, 247n; hostility to a Scottishalliance, 52; and origins of theHeads of the Proposals, 184

Hertfordshire, petitions from, 164Hesilrige, Sir Arthur, Commons-man

and military commander, 178Hewson, Colonel John, regiment in

Fairfax’s army of, 164Heylyn, Peter, Laudian divine, 34,

66, 76; view of Lord Falkland’sdeath, 69; complaints againstremoval of bishops from Houseof Lords, 71; historical accountof English Reformation by, 76;critical views of James I andCharles I, 80; dedicates work toCromwell, 81

Hexter, J. H., historian, critic ofsocial-change theories, 16;invents ‘middle group’, 84

High Commission, Court of, 65;abolition of, 69, 209

High Court of Justice, tribunal fortrial of Charles I, 196

Hill, Christopher, historian, 14, 24;The World Turned Upside Down,202; and evidence for a plebeianheretical underground, 216;perspicacity of, 229n; criticismsof by Jonathan Scott, 300

Hirst, Derek, historian, critique ofHill, 236n

historiography, of 1640s and 1650s,1–35; political influences on, 3;themes dominant in 1970s and1980s, 13; ‘Balkanization’ of, 35;impact of Scottish militaryfortunes in 1640s upon, 141;and County Committees, 154–5,162; ‘county community’historiography, 20, 32; and trialof Charles I, 194; see also ‘NewBritish History’

history, uses of in Civil War, 2; andcodes of honour, 113–14; localistthemes in, 169

Hobbes, Thomas, politicalphilosopher, 30–1, 42; onpower of the militia, 59; quoted,252n

Holdsworth, Richard, Master ofEmmanuel College, Cambridge,64

Holland, see United ProvincesHolland, Cornelius, Commons-man,

as ‘zanie’, 86Holland, Henry Rich, 1st Earl of, as

leading member of the ‘peaceinterest’, 246n

Holles, Denzell, Commons-man, asleading Presbyterian, 86; aspartisan of the ScottishCovenanters, 142, 150; onCounty Committees, 156–7,158, 162, 166; ally of the Earl ofEssex, 178, 180; hostilitytowards Fairfax’s army, 191,193

Holmes, Clive, historian, critic of the‘county community’historiography, 20, 32; andparliamentarian tyranny, 213;surveys the English gentry, 230n

Hopton, Sir Ralph, royalistcommander, 53

honour, as stimulus to politicalaction, 27; rival codes of, 106;classical influences on, 113;‘soldierly honour’, 114, 122–4;‘honour of a peere’, 120;transcends enthnicity, 123; andsoldiers of Fairfax’s army, 189

Hotham, senior, Sir John, 168Howard of Escrick, Edward Howard,

1st Lord, relations withFairfaxes, 183

Household, of Charles I, Scottishdemands for representationwithin, 143

Hudson, Michael, chaplain toCharles I, writings of, 77

328 Index

Hughes, Ann, 29; and centre-localrelations, 174, 311; study ofGangraena, 205

Hungary, Scottish mercantilecommunities in, 151

Hutton, Ronald, 36, 44; DPhildissertation of, 235n

Hyde, Sir Edward (later 1st Earl ofClarendon), as ‘constitutionalRoyalist’, 38, 39, 243n;pomposity of, 40; appointmentas Chancellor of the Exchequer,246n; exponent of via media,45–6; attitudes towardsnegotiations with Parliament,46; as ally of Marquess ofHertford, 47, 246n; and use offoreign forces, 48, 49; oppositionto Covenanter alliance, 53;reluctance to follow the Princeof Wales to Paris, 54; as memberof the ‘Spanish faction’, 251n;and regicide, 249n; and 1650s,57; view of Viscount Tara, 108;History by, 116

iconoclasm, 2; refusal of Thanetparishioners to participate in,173; directed against 1630s‘innovations’, 206; Fairfax’sarmy accused of, 219

identity, national, 126, 153, 167, 168,174; Kentish, 169; incontemporary Britain, 3

ideology, 12, 153; marginal influenceon the origins of Revisionism,22; as false antithesis to ‘faction’,25; varieties of, 210

Inchiquin [I], Murrough O’Brien,6th Lord (and later 1st Earl of),Protestant commander inMunster, 119; rivalry withBoyles of Cork, 119

Independency, clergy associated withecclesiology of, 139; supportwithin Fairfax’s army for, 147;and relation to the state Church,217

Independents, as political faction atWestminster, 52; divisionsamong, 53; possible royalistalliance, 55–6; and the Earl ofEssex, 84; reputed animusagainst the king, 85; insistenceon an absolute victory over theking, 147; demand power overthe militia from the king, 149;plans to limit royal powers, 211;plans to seize the Prince ofWales, 52, 53; so-called ‘royalIndependents’, 88, 212; ‘cabal’,93–9; and parliamentarycommittees, 95–6; reasons forparliamentary dominance of,96; see also Heads of theProposals

Innocent X, Giambattista Pamphili,Pope, considered as Protector ofIreland, 212

innovations, in religion, 61Inquisition, Spanish, 95intelligence, military, 119‘interests’, language of, 47, 84, 142Ireland, as theatre of war, 107;

experience of independence inthe 1640s, 2; Catholic ‘rebellion’of 1641, 8, 47, 111, 116–19,133, 210; use of Irish forces tosupport the king’s party (1643),47, 49, (1645–6), 52, 60; conductof war in, 106–24; Cromwellianconquest of, 27; militarizationof, 111; William III’s invasion of,226n

Ireton, Henry, Commons-man andsoldier, 106; andprofessionalization of militaryservice, 124; dedicatee of workby John Musgrave, 165; andformulation of Heads of theProposals, 184; supports Vote ofNo Addresses, 185; juniorofficers rally to defeat, 192; earlysupport for regicide, 196; role indrafting the Remonstrance(November 1648), 215

Index 329

Israel, biblical, as point of reference,35, 78, 209

‘Jack-puddings’, in EnglishParliament, 163

James, King, VI of Scotland, I ofEngland and Ireland, 6; viewson sovereign power attacked, 80;‘no bishop, no king’, 80

Jermyn, Henry, 1st Lord, reputed‘ultra-Royalist’, 41; absencefrom court, 50; arrival on Jersey,53; urges king to abandonepiscopacy, 54; attitude towardsmonarchy, 59; see also Jermyn-Culpeper interest

Jermyn-Culpeper interest, support ofan alliance with Scots, 52, 53,54, 56, 57; and view ofAshburnham, 251n

Jersey, Channel Island, refuge ofPrince of Wales and his Council,52–3

John of Leiden, self-styled ‘King ofMünster’, radical andpolygamist, 85

Johnston (recte Jhonston) of Wariston,Sir Archibald, Scottish jurist,128; knighting of, 277n

Jubbes, Lieutenant-Colonel John, 195junto, ‘junto men’, 86; methods of

Independent, 99, 211; HenryParker proposes a ‘general junto’of all three kingdoms, 277n

juries, 160Justices of the Peace, supplanted

during Civil War, 156, 157Juxon, Thomas, London militia

officer and diarist, 181; on armyreforms, 182; and the want of a‘dictator’, 264n

Juxon, William, Bishop of London,advises king, 67; overseer ofLaud’s will, 68; supportsalienation of bishops’ lands, 73

Kent, localist studies of, 154–5;centre-local relations in, 172

Kent, County Committee of, allegedto keep a seraglio, 169

Kesteven, Lincolnshire, 160Kildare [I], George FitzGerald, 16th

Earl of, conversion toProtestantism, 118

Kinalmeaky [I], Viscount, see Boyleof Kinalmeaky

King, Edward, relations withClement Walker and DenzellHolles, 158; as improbabledefender of local community,159; as Manchester’s ‘rottweiler’,160; as spokesman for locality,166

Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer,parliamentarian newsbook, 157;on Self-Denying Ordinance, 179

Kishlansky, Mark, historian, 21, 89,90, 238n; on creation ofFairfax’s army, 176, 179, 199,200; on public interest overprivate, 214; see also adversarypolitics

Lake, Peter, historian, quoted 20, 23,24

Lambert, John, colonel in Fairfax’sarmy, 184

Lambeth Palace, Surrey, apprenticeattack on, 207

Laud, William, Archbishop ofCanterbury, 5; hostility toduring 1630s, 61; influence ofclergy who had enjoyed hissupport, 67; criticism of 1640Canons by, 67; and Parliaments,61; abandoned by the king, 63;imprisonment in Tower, 66;resurgence of ‘Laudian party’post-1643, 26; execution of, 74;ultimate triumph of, 226n

Lauderdale, John Maitland, styledLord Maitland (later 2nd Earland 1st Duke of), 279n

‘Laudian moment’, 67Laudianism, clericalism associated

with, 12; regarded as socially

330 Index

regressive, 12; relative neglect ofas subject, 25

Lecale [I], Thomas Cromwell, 1stViscount (later 1st Earl ofArdglass [I]), supports Protestantcause in Ulster, 119

Leinster, Irish province of, nobility in,118

Lent preachers at royalist court, 64;Laudian credentials of, 66

Lenthall, William, Speaker of theHouse of Commons, 94, 97

L’Estrange, Roger, royalist writingsof, 170

Levellers, post-1968 enthusiasm for,21; origins of, 213; influence onFairfax’s army, 186;underestimated, 191–3;consigned to political oblivion,194; background in Londonreligious non-conformity, 208;and social doctrine of ‘practicalChristianity’, 214; see alsoLilburne, John; Wildman, John

Leven [S], Alexander Leslie, 1st Earlof, Scottish general, 129; releasefrom service in Sweden, 130;elevation to the peerage of,277n; appointed commander ofBritish forces in Ireland, 143

Lewes, Sir William, Commons-man,accusations against, 164

liberty, liberties, as political ideal,125, 208; Leveller influence ondiscourse of, 214; religious formsof, 216–18; of the subject, 292n

Lilburne, John, Leveller leader, 93;demand for frequent elections,104; attacks House of Lords,185; on origin of the ‘Leveller’name, 187; and demands ofFairfax’s army, 188; relation toarmy, 189, 192–3; contributionto Leveller thought by, 214; andpunishment of Charles I, 194;throws away opportunity toinfluence republican settlement,200

Lincoln, shocking goings-on in,158–9

Lincolnshire, County Committee of,169–70; neutralism in, 167

Lindsey, Montagu Bertie, 2nd Earlof, pro-accommodation stanceof, 38, 51

Liscarroll, Co. Cork, battle at, 112;and Lord Inchiquin, 119

Lismore, Co. Waterford, company ofthe Earl of Cork at, 119

localism, 161; and historiography, 17,19–20; and languages of protest,166–70

Loewenstein, David, historian, 75London, politics within, 32, 33;

militia forces of, 92; sympathiesfor the Scottish invasion of 1640,132; support for ScottishCovenanters (1646–7), 150;support for anti-CountyCommittee lobby, 158; TrainedBands of, 181; merchantcommunity of and Fairfax’sarmy, 183; Leveller influenceand organization within, 188,214; occupation of by Fairfax’sarmy (1647), 187; occupiedagain (1648), 196; see alsoCommon Council

London, Treaty of (1640–1), 135, 143Lostwithiel, Cornwall, surrender of

Essex’s army at, 178Lothian [S], William Ker, 3rd Earl

of, as Scottish Commissioner,279n

Love, Christopher, Presbyterianplotter, 160

Low Countries, 112; see also SpanishNetherlands and UnitedProvinces

Lyndon, Brian, historian, 169

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, coinerof term ‘constitutionalRoyalism’, 37

MacDonnell, Maurice, bastard son of1st Earl of Antrim [I], 112

Index 331

Macinnes, Allan, historian, 28, 208,237n; quoted 56

Magna Carta, 167Maidstone, Kent, New Model victory

at, 170Malcolm, Joyce, historian, 247n‘malignants’, see RoyalistsMaltby, Judith, historian, 68‘man of blood’, biblical trope,

applied to Charles I, 194–5,219

Manchester, Edward Montagu, 2ndEarl of, 142; at Marston Moor,145; as commander in EastAnglia, 177; and dispute atLincoln, 159; reputed to havecome under the influence ofLawrence Crawford, 177;despondency after MarstonMoor, 177; army ofconsolidated, 175

Manning, Brian, historian, 206,228n, 236n

Manning, Roger, historian, 27; onmilitary service of nobility,107–8, 115

Mars, god of war, 113Marshall, Stephen, Presbyterian

divine, 139; relations with Earlof Warwick, 171

Marston Moor, Yorkshire, battle(1644), 48, 49; impact on royalistfactionalism, 50–1; role ofScottish forces, 140; andCromwell, 145; impact on Earlof Manchester, 177

Marten, Henry, Commons-man andwit, contemplates the destructionof the royal family, 212

Marx, Karl, German economist andphilosopher, 13

Marxism, influence of, 3, 14, 21–2Massie, Edward, army officer and

Commons-man, 102mathematics, 112Maurice, Prince of the Palatinate and

of Bohemia, and ‘war interest’ atOxford, 45, 46, 244n

Maurice (Maurits) of Nassau, Princeof Orange and Stadhouder, tacticsof, 114

Maynard, Sir John, Commons-man,as crypto-royalist, 95

Mayo [I], Sir Miles Bourke, 2ndViscount, reaction to anti-Protestant atrocity, 122

Mazarin, Jules (Giulio RaimondoMazzarino) Cardinal, Prince ofthe Roman Church, 147

medievalism, as point of reference,35; and Scottish political culture,133

Mendle, Michael, historian, 33mercenaries, use of, 268nMercurius Aulicus, royalist newsbook,

66; perfunctory report ofViscount Falkland’s death in, 69

Mercurius Britanicus, parliamentariannewsbook, asserts theneedfulness of the king’s death,212

Mercurius Elencticus, parliamentariannewsbook, 99; and regicide, 196

Mercurius Pragmaticus, royalistnewsbook, MarchamontNedham’s authorship of, 186

Mercurius Rusticus, royalist newsbook,62; tales of anti-royalist outragesin, 72

middle group, nebulous nature of,147

‘middling sort’, 7; as nature’sPuritans, 11; ingrainedreverence for ‘native freedoms’,212; gradual alienation fromParliament, 213; and dispositionto radicalism, 223

‘Military Revolution’, 124militia, constitutional significance of,

59; Charles I’s attitude towards,252n

Milton, Anthony, historian, 24, 43;on Providentialism, 219

miners, in Derbyshire, allegiances of,171

Moderate, The, radical newsbook, 192

332 Index

modernization, narratives of, 22, 24monarchy, royalist attitudes towards,

41–2monopolies, attacked, 223Monro, Major-General Robert,

commander of Scottish forces inIreland, 136, 143; removal fromoffice, 148

Montagu, Richard, Bishop ofNorwich, 66

Montgomery of the Great Ards (orArdes) [I], Sir HughMontgomery, 1st Viscount, 112

Montgomery of the Great Ards (orArdes) [I], Hugh Montgomery,2nd Viscount (later 1st Earl ofMount Alexander [I]), supportfor Protestant cause (1641), 119;capture after the battle ofBenburb, 122

Montreuil, Jean de, French diplomat,147; arrival of, 282n

Montrose [S], James Graham, 5thEarl and 1st Marquess of,victories, 148

Moore, Francis, captain of cavalryand brother of 2nd ViscountMoore [I], 118–19

Moore of Drogheda [I], CharlesMoore, 2nd Viscount, raisestenantry against Irish ‘rebels’,118

Moray, Sir Robert, Scottish officer,282n

Morley, George (later Bishop ofWorcester, and of Winchester),Anglican divine, 65; and the 4thEarl of Pembroke, 253n

Morrill, John, historian, 19, 21, 29n,34, 75, 200; pioneering workof, 61; on ‘county community’,154; and neutralism, 167;argues against Levellerinfluence in the New Model,187, 191; and regicide, 197;and ‘support your local baron’,237n

Morton, A. L., historian, 187

Morton, Thomas, Bishop of Durham,and proposed concessions to theIndependents, 77

Mount Alexander [I], 1st Earl of, seeMontgomery of the Great Ards,2nd Viscount

Mountgarret [I], Richard Butler, 3rdViscount, 113, 117

Mowatt, Hugh, Swedish emissary toScotland and England, 125,151–2, 279n

Mulgrave, Edmund Sheffield, 1stEarl of, parliamentary proxy of,182

multiple kingdoms, ‘problem’ of, 23;see also ‘British Problem’

Munster, Irish province of, as theatreof war, 112, 117, 119; militarycommand in, 113

Muskerry [I], Viscount, see Clancarty[I], 1st Earl of

Musgrave, John, 103; imprisoned inFleet Prison, 165; conflict withBarwis, 166–7

‘mystery of iniquity’, 2mysticism, and radical religion, 222

Namier, Sir Lewis, historian, methodsassociated with, 16

Naples, and republican government,80

Naseby, Northamptonshire, battle of(1645), consequences, 51, 141,146, 175; Cromwell’s service at,182

narrative, low standing of as a modeof historical exposition, 20,234n; rejection of ‘grandnarrative’, 21; lack of withrespect to the Civil War, 24, 33;Whig and Marxist ‘grandnarratives’, 35

Naylor, James, Quaker, 222Nedham, Marchamont, newsbook

writer and satirist, 83, 104; dislikeof Scots, 84; analysis ofWestminster Parliament, 85; viewof parliamentary ‘interests’, 89;

Index 333

Nedham, Marchamont (cont.):and the planning ofparliamentary business, 91;possible informants of, 100;and tyranny, 299n; possibleauthor of The Case of the ArmieTruly Stated, 186; on attitudestowards the execution of theking, 196, 198, 293n; quoted,87

Neile, Richard, Archbishop of York,66

neutralism, in Civil-War allegiances,167

Newark-upon-Trent, Scottishinvolvement in the siege of, 148;royalist depredations launchedfrom, 159

‘New British History’, illusory noveltyof, 23; criticized by Underdown,237

New England, English colonies inAmerica, 238

Newburn, Northumberland, battle of(1640), 131

Newcastle, William Cavendish, 1stEarl of, patron of Hobbes, 43;military successes of (1643), 46;support for royalist-Scottishalliance, 59; hostility to bishopsholding secular offices, 72;quoted, 245n

Newcastle Propositions (1646), 211;David Buchanan on, 283n

Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Scots’difficulties in taking, 140

New Model Army, see armies,English, of Sir Thomas Fairfax

Newport, Isle of Wight, peacenegotiations at, 197

newsbooks, control of, 25; mention ofpublic finances in, 97; reportageof, 100; see Kingdomes WeeklyIntelligencer; Mercurius Aulicus;Mercurius Britanicus; MercuriusElencticus; Mercurius Pragmaticus;Mercurius Rusticus; Moderate; ScotishDove

Nicholas, Sir Edward, hawkishnessof, 41, 45; association withRichmond-Hertford group, 58;and royal counsels, 245n;sidelined by Lord Digby, 247n

Nicoll, Anthony, Commons-man, 86Nineteen Propositions (1642), 209,

246nNine Years’ War (1594–1603), in

Ireland, 110nobility, as moral concept, 106, 116nobility, titular, English, supposed

decline of, 8, 18; regarded asspendthrift, 11, 12, 17;‘opposition peers’ in England inearly 1640s, 18; attitudestowards military service, 27,176; restoration of medievalgreat offices to, 209–10; andcreation of Fairfax’s army, 181;and attractions of Venetianoligarchy to, 213

Irish, sale of Irish titles of nobility,109; extent of military serviceamong, 27, 106, 111; ‘servicenobility’ within, 109–10; asnatural leaders, 115;contribution to 1641Insurrection, 117–18; lacks Earlof Essex figure, 121; baronialnetworks dismantled during1650s, 123

Scottish, influence of grandees, 28;clannish politics of, 30; andCovenanter revolt, 151–2, 208;lordly attitudes towardsunderlings, 238n

Norfolk, neutralism in, 167Norman Yoke, 220Northampton, army mutiny at, 193Northumberland, Scottish occupation

of, 132Northumberland, Algernon Percy,

10th Earl of, collusion withOxford peace interest by, 47;support for peace interest atWestminster, 142; disparagingview of Scots, 56; possible

334 Index

abandonment of WestminsterParliament, 246n; membershipof the Committee of BothKingdoms, 177; relationship tonew Committee for the Army,180, 183; and creation ofFairfax’s army, 199;‘Northumberland–Saye’ groupin House of Lords, 182; supportfor New Model in House ofLords, 184; as advocate of‘monarchical republicanism’,211; opposition to the Vote ofNo Addresses, 186

Nottingham, as venue for Charles’sraising of his standard, 137, 210

Nye, Philip, Independent divine, 139

Oglander, Sir John of Nunwell,royalist views of, 153, 162;quoted, 205

Offaly [I], Lettice Digby (néeFitzGerald), 1st Baroness suo iure(barony for life), chastises leaderof Catholic insurgents, 122; andhonour, 123

Ohlmeyer, Jane, historian, 28Old English, in Ireland, 113, 115Oldisworth, Michael, Commons-

man, 86oligarchy, 86; virtues of Venetian

system, 213; and the RumpParliament, 215

O’Neill, Daniel, and ‘war interest’ atOxford, 45; enthusiasm for theuse of Irish troops in England, 49

O’Neill, Owen Roe, 113ordinances, parliamentary, 161Ormond [I], James Butler, 12th Earl

and 1st Marquess (later 1stDuke) of, 28; as Lord Lieutenantof Ireland, 28–9; role innegotiations with Confederates,49; impact of royalistfactionalism on, 57; and trialand execution of Charles I, 198;and family of, 108; limitedimpact within Protestant

nobility, 121; imperfect militarytraining of, 121; Dryden’streatment of, 121

Orrery [I], Earl of, see BroghillÓ Siochrú, Micheál, historian, 28Ossory [I], Thomas Butler, styled Earl

of, heir of Duke of Ormond, as‘Carthaginian prince’, 123

Overton, Richard, appeals to armyagainst House of Lords, 188;enthusiastic defence ofinnovation, 214

Oxenstierna, Axel Gustafsson, seeSödermöre, Count of

Oxford, seat of court, 31, 36–53, 137;divisions at, 44, 46; and ‘hollow-hearted Counsellors’, 45;advocates of compromisesidelined, 45; rancorous debateendemic at, 49; mutinousbehaviour in, 193; problemswith ‘fundamentally supine’,clergy in, 66; immorality in, 71;disagreeable habits of younglords at, 72; centre for dicingand whoring, 72

Oxford Treaty (1643), 245n

Pale, Irish, 111Papists, alleged influence of at court,

44Parker, Henry, English polemicist,

136; proposes ‘general junto’ ofall three Stuart kingdoms, 277n;doctrines of parliamentary‘absolutism’, 210; asparliamentarian propagandist,211, 242n

Parliament, English (November1640–9), relations between theHouses, 29, 30; early radicalismof (1640–2), 30; as ‘GreatCouncil’ of the realm, 136; majorlegislative reforms of, 133;popular perception of, 33,83–105; and peace negotiations(1643), 47; strained relations withScottish Covenanters, 52, 56;

Index 335

Parliament, English (cont.):and reception of the king(1647), 55; management ofvotes in, 87–8, 90; secrecy ofproceedings in, 89–90;manipulation of standingcommittees, 96–7; revises peaceterms to be offered Charles I,148; ‘rhetorical self-image’ of,174; and financial malfeasancewithin, 265n

House of Commons, as agent ofprogress, 10–11; evidencerelating to, 82; expulsion ofroyalist members from, 85; andmilitary reform, 179–80;Committee of Elections, 90;Committee of Examinations, 95;and Fairfax’s army, 199

House of Lords, viewed as declining,9; removal of bishops from, 43,69; petitions to, 172; hostilitytowards an Anglo-Scottishalliance, 137; and Self-DenyingOrdinance, 179–81; decline ofpowers of, 85; introduction ofHeads of the Proposals into, aslegislation, 185; rejectsordinance for the king’s trial,215; abolition of, 15, 33, 205;and Lloyd George’s ‘People’sBudget’, 9

see also Committees (by name);petitions

Parliament, English, Oxford(1644–6), 40; exclusion ofbishops from, 70; fast sermonsbefore, 78; and military finance,247n

Parliament, English, ‘Nominated’(1653), 172

Parliament, English, ‘Rump’(1649–53), 172; and assertion ofsovereignty by the Commons,215

Parliament, Irish, adjournment of(1641), 116; right to wage warand English Parliament, 276n

Parliament, Scottish, and Conventionof Estates, 131; clerical estateabolished in, 132; andratification of the Treaty ofLondon, 135; summoned asConvention of Estates at Argyll’sinstigation (1643), 137, 138

parliamentarian party, Victorianattitudes towards, 5

‘patriots’, 87Peacey, Jason, historian, 31, 33; on

parliamentarian tyranny, 213Pelham, Peregrine, Commons-man,

181Pembroke, Philip Herbert, 4th Earl

of, domestic chaplains of, 70, 77;and George Morley, 253n

Penington, Isaac, Commons-man,presents Root-and-BranchPetition to Commons, 134

Percy of Alnwick, Henry, 1st Lord,factional position of, 40; attitudetowards war, 50

periodization, of the 1640s, 22, 30Petition of Right (1628), 167, 168petitions, to Parliament, 90; for

peace, 103; proliferation of in1648, 155; Kent petition of1642, 170; ordered burnt, byHouse of Commons, 189;Leveller ‘Large Petition’, 191

Philiphaugh, Selkirkshire, battle of(1645), 51

plantations, in Ireland, 133, 278nPocklington, John, divine and

controversialist, 66Poland–Lithuania, and support for

Covenanter army, 129; Scottishmercantile communities in, 151

Poole, Elizabeth, prophetess, 196popularity, 83Porter, Endymion, and plans to use

Irish troops in the king’s servicein England, 251n

Portland, Jerome Weston, 2nd Earlof, pro-accommodation views of,51

Prague, Peace of (1635), 129

336 Index

preaching, radical ‘tub’, 223; see alsofast sermons

precedent, medieval, use of, 28, 35,133

prerogative, royal, 82, 84, 208, 272nPresbyterian party, 31; in Scotland,

31; and settlement, 52; HenrietteMarie’s favourable attitudetowards, 55; regarded as worsethan Jesuits, 74; alliance with theEarl of Essex, 84; and politicalmanagement, 160; as ‘gang ofScottified jockies’, 84; on declineof the Lords, 85; criticized byarmy, 90; and CountyCommittees, 156

Presbyterianism, established asEnglish state Church (1646), 148

Presbyterians, ‘royal’, 88Preston, General Thomas, see Tara,

1st ViscountPrestwich, Menna, historian, 231nPride, Colonel Thomas, 162;

Cromwell writes to, 198Prideaux, Edmund, Commons-man,

86Prideaux, John, divine, as opponent

of Laud, 63Pride’s Purge (1648), 22, 176, 196,

294nprinting, influence of, 31, 32, 33;

explosion of during 1640s, 104Privy Council, Elizabethan, 228n;

historical neglect of, 19, 20;royalist, 43, 184

propaganda, 90, 206; and HenryParker, 210–11

prosopography, 82; employed byMarchamont Nedham, 85

Providentialism, 2, 75, 79; NewModel as agent of Providence,175; revealed will of God as asanction for action, 215; andCromwell as exponent of, 219

provincialism, and arguments of JohnMorrill, 167

proxies, parliamentary, used byViscount Saye, 182

Prynne, William, Commons-man andpolemicist, 92; as puritan‘martyr’ during 1630s, 159;condemns ‘tyranny’ ofparliamentary committees, 94,166; and public finances, 97,102; alliance with Scots, 167;considers precedents fordeposition of kings, 212

‘public sphere’, 31, 32; implicationsfor study of Royalism, 36

Puritanism, as politically energizingcreed, 11, 12; a means of ‘socialcontrol’, 12; association withParliamentarianism, 18; andpolemical works, 79;‘dogmatism’ of, 226

‘Puritan Revolution’, as regarded byTawney, 10; as term, 15

Putney, Surrey, meetings of GeneralCouncil of Army at, 189; Levellerinfluence in debates at, 214

Pym, John, Commons-man, 208; as‘King Pym’, 28; hard line innegotiations of, 45; and kin of,86; and parliamentarymanagement, 91; influence onthe Commons’ Speaker, 94;concern with ecclesiasticalreformation, 134

Quakers, relative numerousness of,217, 222; influence in Scotlandand Ireland, 218; and ‘internallight’, 222

Quarter Sessions, 160, 167

radicalism, defined, 203–4; discussed202–24; emergence of in CivilWar, 101; religious forms of,216–23; impact of 1960s zeitgeiston study of, 21; and possibleuniqueness of Englishexperience, 298n

Rainborowe, Colonel, Thomas,proposed as Vice-Admiral, 185

Ram, Robert, parliamentarian divine,194

Index 337

Ranters, 21; religious radicalism and,217; and antinomianism, 221;sexual libertinism of, 222

Reading, Berkshire, temporary armyheadquarters at, 188

Reformadoes, decommissionedsoldiers and officers, 158

regicide, 186, 194; advocated (1648),191, 196–7; army’s role in, 176,192, 196; origins of proposal,194; discussed by JohnSaltmarsh, 212; Ireton’s supportfor, 196; opposed by Cromwell,197, 198; and Fairfax’s army,209; and the Diggers, 220

religion, reductionist views of, 12; asdestabilizing force, 23; royalistattitudes towards, 25; see alsoAntichrist; Assembly of Divines;Bible; bishops; Book ofCommon Prayer; episcopacy;Independents; Presbyterians;Revelation; Second Coming ofChrist; sects

Remonstrance of the Army (1648), 192,195, 197, 215

republicanism, ‘natural’ disposition ofPuritans towards, 11, 15;problems of definition, 34;‘classical republicanism’, 34, 35,209, 213, 240n; Ireton’s supportfor, 106; ‘monarchical’ forms of,211; de facto republic consideredin Scotland, 212; see alsocommonwealth

resistance theories, 127Revelation, biblical Book of, 217; see

also Apocalypse‘Revisionist’ historians, 21, 24;

characteristics, 22; influence,22–3, 30; and Levellers, 189;and Civil-War radicalism, 208,216

Revolution, English, dated to 1640–1,16, 22; dated to 1648–9, 16, 17,22

Rhé, Isle of, France, militaryexpedition to, 112, 121

rhetoric, use of, 83; anti-committeeforms of, 162; ‘localparticularism’ and, 166;‘rhetorical self-image’ ofParliament, 174; and languagesof political radicalism, 202–23;of ‘counsel’, 211; deceptivemoderation within, 254n

Richard II, deposed King ofEngland, as cynosure of badkingship, 194, 212

Richmond, James Stuart, 4th Duke ofLennox [S], and 1st Duke of, 38;political opinions, 40; and royalcounsels, 245n; as ally of PrinceRupert, 247n; involvement inplot to surrender Oxford (1645),51; hostility to Scottish alliance,52; association with theIndependents, 52, 54;questionably identified as‘constitutional Royalist’, 280n;and origins of the Heads of theProposals, 184; manoeuvres atthe time of the king’s execution,251n

Richmond–Hertford faction, 54,55–8; and Church of England,58; involvement in drawing upHeads of the Proposals, 250n

Robartes of Truro, John Robartes,2nd Lord, military commanderfor Parliament, 178

Rome, ancient, role of as historicalexemplar, 34, 35; as republicanexemplar, 209, 213

Root-and-Branch Petition (1640), forabolition of episcopacy inEngland, 134, 204

Roy, Ian, historian, 36, 235n; hismodel of royalist factionalism,44

Royalism, 63–81; dynamism of, 63;see also Royalists

‘Royalism, Constitutional’, problemsrelating to the category, 25–6,44; coinage of term, 37; andHyde, 38–9; moderate

338 Index

Anglicanism as a correlative of,62; Southampton andRichmond as possiblyexemplifying, 280n

Royalists, later attitudes towards, 6,12; seen as inimical to progress,8, 9; new interpretations of, 25;motives for allegiance, 26, 174;emergence of, 31, 137; problemswith categorization, 36;departure from WestminsterParliament censured, 93;appropriation ofparliamentarian arguments by,211; attitudes towards revoltwithin Fairfax’s army, 161;hatred of County Committees,161–2; as supporters ofAntichrist, 194

Rupert, Count Palatine of the Rhineand Prince of Bohemia, Duke ofCumberland [E], royalistgeneral, attitudes in peacenegotiations, 40, 51; supposed‘unconstitutionalism’ of, 41, 45;political vulnerability of, 248n;military successes of, 46; andproposed use of Irish troops, 50;correspondence of, 244n

Russell, Conrad, 5th Earl Russell,historian and politicalcampaigner, 20, 21, 65, 238n;Ford Lectures by, 23; historicallegacy of, 34; view of earlyStuart period, 233n

Rutherford, Samuel, Scottish divine,member of the Assembly ofDivines at Westminster, 280n

Ryves, Bruno, royal chaplain, 72

sacrilege, 72, 77, 78; acts of attributedto Fairfax’s army, 219

St Albans, meeting of New ModelCouncil of Officers, 192

St John, Oliver, as Independentleader, 86; advocate of Scottishalliance (1643), 139; andcreation of Fairfax’s army, 177,

179–82; influence on armypolitics, 184

Saltmarsh, John, puritan divine,discusses lawfulness of regicide,212

salus populi, 209, 214Sanderson, Robert, divine,

condemns Laudian policies of1630s, 65; saintly demeanourof, 67

Savile [I], Thomas Savile, 2nd LordSavile of Pontefract [E] (later 1stEarl of Sussex), 1st Viscount,282n

Scawen, Robert, Commons-man,86–7; as Chairman of theCommittee for the Army, 180;relation to the Earl ofNorthumberland, 184

Saye and Sele, William Fiennes, 8thLord and 1st Viscount, 45;antipathy towards the Earl ofEssex, 84; hostility to peaceinterest at Westminster, 142;creation of the Committee ofBoth Kingdoms, 177; associationwith the Earl ofNorthumberland in the Houseof Lords, 182, 184; role increating the New Model Army,186; and ‘Savile affair’, 282n; asadvocate of ‘monarchicalrepublicanism’, 211; influence in1647, 184; reported to attendmeetings of the General Councilof the Army, 185; relations withthe New Model, 200; VindiciaeVeritatis (1654), as politicalmanifesto of, 211

Scotish Dove, Presbyterian newsbook,156

Scotland, military influence of, 1;English Parliament’s alliancewith, 47, 52; English sense ofsuperiority over, 56; significanceof within royalist politics, 60;relations with England, 125–52;hostility towards in England, 134;

Index 339

Scotland, military influence of (cont.):mobilization of forces by forservice in Ireland, 136; fears of‘Scottish imperialism’, 141; seealso Covenanters, Scottish

Scott, David, historian, 24, 25, 29; onroyalist origins of Heads of theProposals, 184; and peacenegotiations, 255n

Scott, Jonathan, historian, 208; onradicalism, 216, 304n; criticismsof Hill, 300n

Second Coming, of Christ, 217, 221,222; internalized form of, 220

sects, religious, 202, 217; creation ofsectarian tradition in Scotlandand Ireland, 218; ambition tocreate godly state, 223

Self-Denying Ordinance (1645), 27,98; politics of, 145; introducedto Commons, 179; rejected byLords, 180; implications of, 183

Sellar, W.C., historical satirist, 12, 37Sexby, Edward, trooper in Fairfax’s

regiment of horse, 187Sharpe, Kevin, historian, 21, 233nSheldon, Gilbert, Warden of All Souls

College, Oxford (later Bishop ofLondon, and Archbishop ofCanterbury), 62, 66; ally of Laudin the 1630s, 67; patronage ofdisplaced clergy, 73

Skinner, Quentin, historian, 30, 35Skippon, Philip, soldier and

Commons-man, as Major-General of Essex’s army, 181

Slane [I], William Fleming 14thLord, influence of death of, 120

Smith, David L., historian, 38, 236nSmolensk, Russia, military encounter

at, 113Smuts, Malcolm, historian, 244nSödermöre, Axel Gustafsson

Oxenstierna, Count (Greve) of,Chancellor of Sweden, 129;confederation with Scotlandfruitlessly proposed to, 277n

Somerset, County Committee of, 156

Sommerville, Johann, historian, 35;defines ‘absolutism’, 42; onFilmer, 243

Southampton, Thomas Wriothesley,4th Earl of, as pro-accommodation, 38, 51; as‘constitutional Royalist’, 280n

sovereignty, of the people, 189Spain, see Spanish KingdomsSpanish Kingdoms, 107; Irish

military service in, 119; mutiniesamong troops in, 118

Spanish Netherlands, army of 112; astheatre of war, 113; impact ofScottish crisis on Charles’s policytowards, 128

Spencer of Wormleighton, Henry,3rd Lord (later 1st Earl ofSunderland), and Oxford ‘peaceinterest’, 44

Stapilton, Sir Philip, as member ofthe Presbyterian interest, 86;opposition to army reforms of1644–5, 180; leadership of anti-army interest, 178, 186, 193;alliance with Earl of Warwick,182

Star Chamber, Court of, 95;judgement on John Lilburne,188; abolition of, 209

Steward, Dr Richard, Clerk of theCloset, anti-Scots disposition of,54; ‘Anglicanism’ of, 66; as allyof Laud, 67; and devotion to hismemory, 254n; peace treatiesand, 68

Stewardship of England, revival ofoffice proposed, 210

Stone, Lawrence, historian, 16, 29nStoyle, Mark, historian, 36, 61;

research on deference, 171Strafford, Thomas Wentworth, 1st

Earl of, Lord Lieutenant ofIreland, 43; ‘New Army’ inIreland (1640–41), 121; treasonaccusations preferred against,134, 280n; popular pressure forexecution of, 207

340 Index

Strickland, Matthew, representativeof the English Parliament in theUnited Provinces, 281n

Surrey, petition of inhabitants of(1648), 103

Sweden, military service to Crown of,112; diplomatic ambitions of,129, 130, 141, 151; forces of, asmodel for the New Model Army,145; backing for Scottishinvasion of England, 130;attitude towards Covenanterinfluence in Britain, 141; Unionwith considered by ScottishCovenanters, 151; andconsidered by Argyll, 212

Swynfen, John, Commons-man, as‘spaniel’, 86

Tables, Scottish executive committees,127; proceedings validated, 132

Tara, Thomas Preston, 1st Viscount,Governor of Galway, 106, 108;return to Ireland of, 114;membership of community ofhonour, 123–4

Tate, Zouche, Commons-man, andreform of parliamentary armies,179

Tawney, R. H., influence of, 12, 14,16, 23; Religion and the Rise ofCapitalism (1926), 10–11; exponentof social change explanation, 24;reactions against, 21–2, 30;relative breadth of ideas, 18;quoted, 11, 228n

taxation, as grievance againstFairfax’s army, 187

Taylor, Jeremy, chaplain to Earl ofCarbery [I], 62; Anglicanism of,66, 73; Laudianism of, 67;support for religious toleration,73, 77–8; denies doctrine oforiginal sin, 76; tolerationistviews, 77

Temple, Sir John, Commons-manand historian of Ireland, 251n,271n

tenantry, summoned to war, 118; sizeof forces raised among, 119;attitudes towards deference inDevon, 171

Thanet, Isle of, Kent, religiousdisputes in, 172

theocracy, 220Thirty-Nine Articles, 76Thirty Years War, 111, 128, 130–1Thomas, Sir Keith, historian, 4; on

Levellers, 187; onhistoriography, 305; quoted, 24

Thomas, Silken, rebellion in Irelandof, 109

Thompson, E.P., historian, 229nThomond [I], Barnabas O’Brien, 6th

Earl of, neutrality of, 119Thorndike, Herbert, attacks ‘vulgar

mistake’ of James I, 80‘three-kingdoms’ approach to Civil

War, 5, 6; early twentieth-century disappearance of, 13; seealso British Problem; ‘NewBritish History’

tithes, resistance to the payment of,218

toleration, religious, considered byroyalist divines, 64; de rigueuramong royalist divines, 73; andNewport negotiations (1648), 75

Towcester, Northamptonshire,instance of divine punishmentin, 78

Tower of London, 92, 185, 188, 193towns, political elites within, 25;

access to political information in,32

trade, Scottish, to Baltic, 151Trained Bands, London militia, 181treason, Scottish law of, 132;

accusations against Strafford,134

Trevor, Arthur, court informant ofPrince Rupert, 50

Trevor-Roper, Hugh Redwald,historian, as critic of Tawneyitethesis, 15, 16, 230n; earlyinterest in Weber, 230n;

Index 341

Trevor-Roper, Hugh Redwald (cont.):monograph on the Civil War,233n

Triennial Act (1641), English, 132,133, 209

Trinity, doctrine of, 222‘Tudor revolution in government’, 82Twysden, Sir Roger, Royalist, 103Tyacke, Nicholas, historian, 21tyranny, 210; Parliament identified

with, 213; of the Pope, 278n;accusations against the king,299n

Tyrone [I] (Aodh Mór Ó Néill),Hugh O’Neill, 2nd Earl of,rebellion of, 109; defeat of, 110;kin of, 113; size of forcesmustered by, 268n

Ulster, Irish province of, raising ofProtestant troops in, 119

Underdown, David, historian, 17, 36,61; exploration of localism,232n; quoted, 1

Union, between England andScotland (1641), 134; supportedby Argyll, 149–50

United Provinces (the DutchRepublic), 34; as model, 103,213; as theatre of war, 110;English and Irish service in, 112;Charles I’s hostility towards,128–9; Holland and Zeeland assuppliers of munitions forScottish armies, 129;confederation with Scotlandproposed, 277n: as staging-postof Swedish munitions forScotland, 130; ambassadors seekto avert execution of Charles I,196–7

Ussher, James, Archbishop ofArmagh, restoration to theking’s counsels, 63; king’s publicoath-taking before (1643), 64;possible primacy of, 65; as anti-Laudian figurehead, 66; schemefor ‘moderated episcopacy’, 73;

possible printing of this in 1641,256n

Uxbridge, Middlesex, peacenegotiations at (1645), 49;royalist clergy’s concessions at,66, 73; Scottish apprehensionsabout outcome of, 143; DavidBuchanan on, 283n; andsubsequent French diplomacy,147

Vane, junior, Sir Henry, asIndependent leader, 86; use ofthreats by, 92; and formulationof the Covenant (1643), 138;Scottish Covenanters’ trust in,278n; opposition to peaceinterest, 142; involvement increation of Fairfax’s army,179–82; political influence of,184

Venice, Republic of, as possiblemodel, 34, 213; and episcopacy,80; Charles’s powers reduced tono more than a Doge of, 136

violence, rural, 206Vote of No Addresses, parliamentary,

92, 199; petitioners’ revulsionagainst, 169; promotion byCromwell and Ireton, 185

Wales, 31; and County Committees,155–6; suppression of anti-parliamentarian revolts in, 161;and Presbyterian influencewithin, 164

Walker, Clement, Commons-manand polemicist, 87, 104; andpolitical factions, 88; andparliamentary management, 94,95, 96–8, 102; History ofIndependency, 100; tirades againstCounty Committees, 156, 158,162; language of, 168; andtypologies of Commons-men,260n; and secrecy ofparliamentary proceedings,263n

342 Index

Waller, Sir William, Commons-manand general, on the Parliament’sbetrayal from within, 104; and‘peace interest’, 142; army ofconsolidated, 175; focus of hopesfor war-party interest, 177;nicknamed ‘the Conqueror’, 177

Walter, John, historian, 171Walwyn, William, and Fairfax’s

army, 188Ware, Hertfordshire, army mutiny at

(1647), 191war, codes of conduct in, 107;

manuals on the arts of, 113Warner, John, Bishop of Rochester

and diarist, quoted 256nWarwick, Robert Rich, 2nd Earl of,

pro-Covenanter attitudes of,134; and promotion of ‘activecitizenship’, 171; as opponent ofthe king, 208; ‘Warwick-Pymgroup’, 209; mediation of soughtin Kent, 173; association withSir Philip Stapilton, 182;reappointment as Lord Admiral,183

‘Warwick-Pym group’, parliamentary‘interest’, 137

Warwick, Sir Philip, on Wilmot, 41Warwickshire, County Committee of,

157Webb, Thomas, secretary to the Duke

of Richmond, as ally of PrinceRupert, 51; on Scots’ politicalambitions, 56, 251n; on Argyll,249n; on trial of the king, 196

Weber, Max, Swiss sociologist,impact on Englishhistoriography, 8, 10, 12, 23

Wedgwood, Dame Cicely Veronica,historian, patronising views of, 20

Westfield, Thomas, divine, opponentof the et cetera oath, 63

Westmeath [I], Richard Nugent, 1stEarl of, 117, 269n; exchange of,as prisoner, 122; death of, 120

Westminster Assembly of Divines, seeAssembly of Divines

Westmorland, anti-parliamentarianrevolts in, 146

Wharton, Philip Wharton, 4th Lord,as Independent leader, 86; andparliamentary management, 91;relationship with 2nd LordFairfax, 289n; as patron ofBarwis, 165; contacts withIreton, 184; as parliamentarycommissioner to Fairfax’s army,184

Whig interpretation of history, 22Whig party, 3White, Francis, Bishop of Ely, 66Whitehall, historians’ neglect of as a

subject, 19Whitelocke, Bulstrode, Commons-

man, as supporter of the peaceinterest (1644), 142, 282n;counsels caution to Essex, 178–9

Wildman, John, Leveller writer, 88;on financial impropriety atWestminster, 102; not the authorof The Case of the Armie, 187; andAgreement of the People, 190

William I, King of England andDuke of Normandy, 169

Williams, Griffith, Bishop of Ossory,chaplain of 4th Earl ofPembroke, 77; critic of royalistlaymen, 70; attacks Answer to theNineteen Propositions, 71; preachesbefore Henry Cromwell, 81

Williams, John, Bishop of Lincoln(later Archbishop of York), 63,65; diminishing influence atcourt of, 66; identifiesWestminster Parliament asAntichrist, 77

Willoughby of Parham, FrancisWilloughby, 5th Lord, and war-effort in Lincolnshire, 159

Wilmot, Henry Wilmot, 1st Lord(later 1st Earl of Rochester), 41,45; supporter of Prince Rupert,46; attitude to war, 50

Windsor, Berkshire, army prayer-meeting at (1648), 195

Index 343

Winstanley, Gerrard, Digger leader,divine injunctions to, 220

Wither, George, 103Withington, Phil, historian, 32Wolfe, D.M., historian, 187Womock, Laurence, Arminian views

of, 76Woodhouse, A.S.P., historian, 187Woolrych, Austin, historian, 17Wootton, David, historian, 208Worcester, battle of (1651),

implications of Scottish defeatat, 57

Worden, Blair, historian, 3–4; onrepublicanism, 240n

Wormald, Brian, historian, 38Wren, Matthew, Bishop of Ely, 66Wroth, Sir Thomas, as ‘monkey’ of

Edmund Prideaux, 86

Yeatman, R.J., satirist of the Weber-Tawney thesis, 12, 37

York, Great Council of Peers at(1640), 132; supplies to Scottisharmy from, 145

Yorkshire, Scottish occupation of,132; opinion within, 168

‘zanies’, in Westminster Parliament,86, 163; see also Jack-puddings

344 Index