Camner Lipsitz Notification

8/8/2019 Camner Lipsitz Notification

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA

BANKUNITED,

as [purported]successor in interestto [SEIZED] BANKUNITED, FSB.,

Plaintiff,

vs. DISPOSEDCASE NO.: 09-6016-CA

JENNIFER FRANKLIN-PRESCOTT, et al.

___________________________________________________________________________/

CAMNER LIPSITZ NOTIFICATION

IN SUPPORT OF DEF. HUGH D. HAYES RECUSAL

MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION ON THE RECORD

1. On 09/01/2010, the Clerk of Court, Assistant Director D. M., kindly prepared CIVIL

ACTION PROGRESS DOCKET, which erroneously showed Serena K. Paskewicz, Esq.

as Plaintiff(s) Attorney.

2. Here, neither S. K. Paskewicz nor Camner Lipsitz represent the purported Plaintiff(s).

Camner, Lipsitz, P.A. had notified Jennifer Franklin Prescott:

Please be advised this firm no longer handles matters for BankUnited


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(c) Time. A motion to disqualify shall be made within a reasonable time after

discovery of the facts constituting grounds for disqualification.(d) Determination. The judge against whom the motion is directed shall determine

only the legal sufficiency of the motion. The judge shall not pass on the truth of the

facts alleged. If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall enter an order of

disqualification and proceed no further in the action.(e) Judge's Initiative. Nothing in this rule limits a judge's authority to enter an order of

disqualification on the judge's own initiative.

Said rule was intended to unify the procedure for judicial disqualification.

RULE 2.330. DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGES

5. Said Rule stated:

(a) Application. This rule applies only to county and circuit judges in all matters in

all divisions of court.

(b) Parties. Any party, including the state, may move to disqualify the trial judgeassigned to the case on grounds provided by rule, by statute, or by the Code of

Judicial Conduct.

(c) Motion. A motion to disqualify shall:

(1) be in writing;

(2) allege specifically the facts and reasons upon which the movant relies as thegrounds for disqualification;

(3) be sworn to by the party by signing the motion under oath or by a separateaffidavit;

SECTION 38.10, FLA. STAT.

6. Section 38.10 gives parties the right to move to disqualify a judge when the party fears that

he or she will not receive a fair trial . . . on account of the prejudice of the judge of that

court against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party. Fla. Stat. 38.10. Rule of

Judicial Administration 2.330 specifies that a motion to disqualify must show that the party

fears that he or she will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described

prejudice orbias of the judge. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330.

7. S. 38.10, Fla. Stat., stated:


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38.10 Disqualification of judge for prejudice; application; affidavits; etc.--

Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes and files an affidavit stating fearthat he or she will not receive a fair trial in the court where the suit is pending on

account of the prejudice of the judge of that court against the applicant or in favor of

the adverse party, the judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be

designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of this state for the substitution ofjudges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified.

8. Here, Franklin Prescott has been stating fear that she will not receive a fair trial in the court

where the suit is [purportedly] pending on account of the objectiveprejudice of the judge of

that court against the applicant. Here, objectively biased Judge Hayes shall proceed no

further, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed by the laws of this

state for the substitution of judges for the trial of causes in which the presiding judge is

disqualified.

JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTTS RIGHT TO APPEAL

9. If the judge denies a motion to disqualify brought under 38.10 the movant has the right to

appeal. Lynch v. State, ___ So. 2d ___, Nos. SC06-2233, SC07-1246, 2008 WL 4809783, at

*26 (Fla. Nov. 6, 2008). As the Florida Supreme Court recently held: A motion to

disqualify is governed substantively by section 38.10, Florida Statutes, and procedurally by

Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330. Here, Franklin Prescotts motion to

disqualify Defendant objectively partial Judge Hayes is citing 38.10 and Rule 2.330, as

well as Canon 3E(1).

10. The Florida Supreme Court has also held, in effect, that 38.10 and the Canons require the

same thing. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983). In Livingston the

court cited the Canons requirement that a judge disqualify himself when his impartiality

might reasonably be questioned and concluded that it was totally consistent with Florida

case law applying 38.10. Id. Both require disqualification when a party can show a well


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grounded fear that she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. Id. (quoting

State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 179 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla. 1938)); see also Berry v. Berry, 765

So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2000) (quoting Canon 3E(1) when describing the standard for

granting a motion under 38.10). Here of course, this Court was bound to follow Florida

appellate court decisions interpreting that states law. The final arbiter of state law is the

state Supreme Court, which is another way of saying that Florida law is what the Florida

Supreme Court says it is.

CANON(S) 3E(1), 3E(1)(f), FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

11. The Florida Supreme Court has adopted a Code of Judicial Conduct to govern the actions

of state court judges and candidates for judicial office. Canon 3E(1) states, e.g.:

(1) A judge shalldisqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judges

impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instanceswhere

12. Those provisions address situations in which a judge must disqualify himself because his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including when he has made a public

statement that commits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to a particular party,

issue, or controversy. Canon 3E(1) [general disqualification provision in Canon 3E(1)],

3E(1)(f) [commits clause at Canon 3E(1)(f)].

13. Canon 3E(1), backed by the threat of a disciplinary proceeding, requires a judge to

disqualify himself if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Fla. Stat. 38.10,

supplemented by Rule 2.330, allows a party to have a judge disqualified for the same reason.

14. Canon 3E(1)(f), which the Florida Supreme Court adopted in January 2006, covers one area

in which a judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See In re Amendment to

Code of Judicial Conduct, 918 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 2006). In addition to the Florida Supreme

Court, the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (Ethics Committee) and the Judicial


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Qualifications Commission (JQC) have roles in administering the Code. The Florida

Supreme Court established the Ethics Committee to render written advisory opinions to

inquiring judges concerning the propriety of contemplated judicial and non-judicial conduct.

Petition of Comm. on Standards of Conduct for Judges, 327 So. 2d 5, 5 (Fla. 1976).

15. Canon 3E is enforced by the Judicial Qualifications Commission, which has the authority

to bring disciplinarycharges against a judge.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS WELL-GROUNDED FEARS

16. Here, Franklin Prescott has been specifically alleging the following facts and reasons upon

which the movant relied as the grounds for Defendant County Judge Hayes

disqualification. Here, Franklin Prescott had well grounded fears that she will not receive

a fair trial at the hands of Defendant objectively partial and bribed County Judge Hugh D.

Hayes.

ADOPTION BY REFERENCE

17. Jennifer Franklin Prescott adopts by reference the pleadings and EXHIBITS on file and of

record in this Motion and Notice of Disposition offacially fraudulentaction.

NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM ALTERATIONS OF RECORD

18. Jennifer Franklin Prescott, who was neverserved, had appealed from

a. The unlawful alteration of the official documents, records, and Case Docket;

b. Thelackof any record of the purported disposition in Jennifer Franklin Prescotts

favor in the Case File;

c. The lackof any record of the dismissalin Jennifer Franklin Prescotts favor;

d. The absence of the FINAL DISPOSITION FORM, 25.075, Florida Statutes, and

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.998, from the Case File;


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e. The lackof any record, reason, and/or explanation of the publicly recorded removal of

the August 2010 complaint in the Case File;

f. The absence of any record, reason, and explanation of the publicly recorded removal of

the August 2010 summons from the Case File;

g. The lackof any transparency, accountability, due process, and equal protection of law;

h. The record lackof any mortgage ornote in this facially fraudulent and frivolousaction;

i. The lackof any record of the removal of ALFRED CAMNER, Esq., and the CAMNER

LIPSITZ law firm and its Attorneys from the mock proceedings;

j. Therecord lackof the means of final disposition before any hearing.

RECORD ABSENCE OF FINAL DISPOSITION FORM, 25.075, FLA. STAT.

19. Jennifer Franklin Prescott could notfindthe Final Disposition Form, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.998, in

the Case File on Tuesday, August 17, 2010. See 25.075, Florida Statutes.

ABSENCE OF DISMISSAL IN JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTTS FAVOR

20. On Tuesday, August 17, 2010, Jennifer Franklin Prescott could notfind the Dismissal in

Jennifer Franklin Prescotts favor in the Case File.

DEFENDANT JUDGE HUGH D. HAYES SUBSTITUTED COUNSEL ON 08/18/2010

21. On August 18, 2010, Defendant Judge Hayes substituted Counsel, and BILL McCOLLUM,

ATTORNEY GENERAL, and Shelley B. Cridlin, Fla. Bar No. 0022451, made an

appearance as counsel for Defendant Judge Hugh D. Hayes, in place of any and all prior

counsel in Federal Case 2:2009-cv-00791.

FALSIFICATIONS AND/OR ALTERATIONS APPARENT

22. Jennifer Franklin Prescott reported Case File demand and/or review in the Clerk of Courts

Office on August 12, 13, and 16, and 17, 2010. While the electronic Docket showed


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a. disposition;

b. complaint; and

c. summons,

none could be ascertainedand/orverifiedin the Naples Courthouse.

DEMANDS FOR CLARIFICATION AND EVIDENCE

23. On Monday, August 16, AM, and Tuesday, August 17, 2010, PM, at the Naples Courthouse,

Jennifer Franklin Prescott demanded to see the Case File evidence of:

a. disposition;

b. complaint; and

c. summons in this fraudulent action.

DEFENDANT JUDGES ASSISTANT ASSERTED MISTAKE/ERROR

24. Defendant Hayes Judicial Assistant, Jan, stated to Jennifer Franklin Prescott that

a. NO August2010 complaint, and

b. NO August2010 summons

appeared in the Case File.

NO negotiable instrumentUNDER GOVERNING CODE

25. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Article 3, governs Negotiable Instruments.

Pursuant to 3-104. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, no negotiable instrument existed,

and no promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money and interest existed in this

fraudulent action. Bankrupt and seized Bankunited was unable to prove any right to

enforce the admittedly non-existent purported instrument. Here, the Court may not enter

judgmentin favor ofseized and bankrupt Bankunited. See UCC, Article 3. Here, the Court

must enter judgment in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott. WHEREFORE, Jennifer


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Franklin Prescott, who was not servedand does not submit to any jurisdiction, moves this

Court to declare the purported action fraudulent and a fraud on the Court, and enter

judgment ofdismissalin favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott.

JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT HOLDS FREE & CLEAR RECORD TITLE

26. Jennifer Franklin Prescott holds unencumbered record title to the subject protected

homesteadreal property. See Collier County Public Records.

PURPORTED DISPOSITION

27. The Case Docket stated disposition:

The purported disposition date was 08/12/2010.

RULE 1.540, FLA. R. CIV. P.

28. Rule 1.540(a), Fla.R.Civ.P., authorizes the court to correct mistakes in a judgment. Here,

purported disposition appeared on the official Docket. Here there were no note, no

entitlement to enforce the admittedly lost/destroyed note, no service, no hearing, and no

due process. Here, records were altered.

BANKUNITED VIOLATED CH. 49, FLA. STAT.

29. Seized and bankrupt Bankunited violated Ch. 49, Fla. Stat., for illegal purposes of

defrauding Jennifer Franklin Prescott and perpetrating fraud on this Court. In this

fraudulent Case,service by publication was not allowed:

49.011 Service of process by publication; cases in which allowed.

49.021 Service of process by publication, upon whom.


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49.031 Sworn statement as condition precedent.

49.041 Sworn statement, natural person as defendant.49.051 Sworn statement, corporation as defendant.

49.061 Sworn statement, parties doing business under a corporate name as defendants.

49.071 Sworn statement, unknown parties as defendants.

49.08Notice of action, form.49.09Notice of action, return day.

49.10Notice of action, publication, proof.

49.11Notice of action, posting, proof.49.12 Mailing of notice of action.

RECORD PERJURY

30. The record and Case File showed perjury by, e.g., Nicholas Krancher. See Exhibits on file.

PURPORTED SUMMONS

31. Purportedly, a summons was issued, ELSA JARERO, who is not any known party to this

fraudulent action. Thesummonsdisappeared from the record without any explanation.

PURPORTED COMPLAINT

32. A complaint appeared on the Docket.

Pursuant to Rule 1.190, Fla.R.Civ.P., the Court had nevergranted any leave. Thesummons

disappeared from the record without any explanation.

PURPORTEDplaintiff HAD NO righttoenforce FICTITIOUS note

33. Seized and bankrupt BankUnited was not entitled to enforce a fictitiousnote. Here,

BankUnited was not any holderof any note ormortgage at the time it filed suit or any time

thereafter. It is elementary that to be a holder, one must be in possession of the instrument.

See s. 673.3011, F.S. Here, BankUnited was not any proper party to file suit toforeclose a

fictitiousun-delivered lost and/ordestroyedinstrument.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY delivery


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34. Under Florida law delivery is necessary to validate a negotiable instrument. A lost and/or

destroyednote or mortgage could not have possibly been delivered.

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY reestablishment

35. Here, the lost and/ordestroyednote or mortgage could not have possibly been reestablished

pursuant to Ch. 71, Fla. Stat.

EMERGENCY AND THREAT OF FURTHER INJURY

36. Known foreclosure fraud is an EMERGENCY. Further injury must be prevented.

NO note NO default

37. The purported plaintiffdid not own or holdany note. No obligation existed. No default

could havepossibly occurred. See also Uniform Commercial Code; Negotiable Instruments.

UNKNOWN LOSS OR DESTRUCTION

38. The bankrupt and seized plaintiff bank asserted that any promissory note and mortgage

have been lostordestroyedand are not in the custody or controlof Bankunited, and the time

and manner of the loss or destruction is unknown. In this Case, Bankunited could not have

possibly reestablishedany lost ordestroyednote or mortgage.

CAMNER KNEW THAT reestablishmentWAS IMPOSSIBLE, CH. 71, FLA. STAT.

39. In particular, Founder and Attorney Alfred Camner and his law firm knew that Bankunited

could not havepossibly reestablishedany lost ordestroyednote or mortgage.

SEIZURE OF BANKRUPT BANKUNITED

40. On Thursday, May 21, 2009, BankUnited, FSB, Coral Gables, FL was seized by the Office

of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)

was named Receiver. Said seizure stripped away the main asset that belonged to the holding

company, BankUnited Financial Corp. Counsel Alfred Camner was the largest shareholder.


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41. The June 22 Report by the U.S. Department of the Treasurys Office of Inspector

General (OIG) was critical of the banks management and Attorney and Founder Alfred

Camner. See Counsel, Camner Lipsitz law firm.

FAILURE & SEIZURE OF THE PURPORTEDplaintiff

42. BankUnited, FSBs failure in May 2009 cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Corps insurance

fund about $5.7 billion the second most costly failure in FDIC history.

NO instrument, and NO lien

43. Here, there was neither any instrumentnor any lien. Noproperty was described.

NO interest, and NOsuccessor in interest

44. Here, Bankunited, FSB, had no interest. Here, Bankunited was not and could not have

possibly been anysuccessor in interest. Nosum was due to theplaintiffbankruptbank.

NO rights and NOstanding

45. Here, Bankunited, just like Bankunited, FSB, had no rights and nostanding.

NO conditions precedent FACIALLY FRIVOLOUS action

46. Here, the conditions precedentto the institution of anyforeclosure action did not occur and

could not havepossibly occurred. Here on its face, the sham action was frivolous.

THE COURT KNEW THAT reestablishmentWAS IMPOSSIBLE

47. Here as a matter of law, reestablishment was impossible. Here, the falsified promissory

note and mortgage have been lost or destroyed and are not in the custody or control of

Bankunited, and the time and mannerof the loss or destruction is unknown. See Ch. 71,

Fla. Stat.

48. Here, Jennifer Franklins record title to herhomesteadproperty was free and clear.


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PROTECTED HOMESTEAD PROPERTY

49. Franklin Prescotts property is protected homestead property.

50. As a matter of law, any accountingunder a prima facie non-existentnote and mortgage was

impossible. The prima facienon-meritoriousdemand for an accountingwas fraudulent.

51. Jennifer Franklin Prescott is not any married woman.

52. Jennifer Franklin Prescott is not any defendantand was notserved.

53. Hugh D. Hayes is a named party Defendant in several actions. See, e.g., Summons/service,

U.S.A. Ex Rel, et al. v. U.S.A., et al. in U.S. District Court.

WHEREFORE, Jennifer Franklin Prescott demands

1. An Orderrecusing Defendant Judge Hugh D. Hayes;

2. An Orderclarifying the parties and parties attorneys;

3. An Orderclarifying the disposition in favor of J. Franklin Prescott on the official record;

4. An Orderdeclaring the purported action fraudulent and a fraud on the Court;

5. An Orderclarifying said purported disposition, summons, and complaint;

6. An Order for judgment and dismissal in favor of Jennifer Franklin Prescott on the record;

7. An Orderdeclaring non-service on any defendant in this fraudulent action, Ch. 49, Fla.

Stat.;

8. An Orderextinguishing the facially non-meritorious action;

9. An Orderdeclaring the admittedlackof any recordof any note ormortgage;

10. An Orderdeclaring any reestablishmentof any note or mortgageimpossible;

11. An Orderdeclaring the lackof any interestby Bankunited;

12. An Orderdeclaring the action without any meritunder existing law;

13. An Orderenjoining any further fraud and harassment by Bankunited;


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14. An Order for sanctions and expenses against said seized and bankrupt bank and its

dismissed and/or fired attorneys at Camner Lipsitz;

15. An Order removing the fired judicial officers with the Camner Lipsitz firm from these

proceedings, and striking their fraudulent pleadings, because they perpetrated record fraud

and fraud on this Court.

________________________

/s/Jennifer Franklin Prescott, record holder of unencumbered title to homestead propertyVictim of bankrupt Bankuniteds record fraud

Victim of seized Bankunited founder Alfred Camners record fraud on this Court

EXHIBITS ON FILE: DOCKET ALTERATIONS

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

U.C.C. Article 3, Negotiable Instruments

PERJURY EVIDENCE, Nicholas Krancher

673.3011, Fla. Stat.; Ch. 71, Fla. Stat.

F.D.I.C. FAILED BANK INFORMATION


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Camner Lipsitz Notification