Cambodian Higher Education Institutional Governance with Reflections to

Regional Practices

Say SOK, PhD HEQCIP Technical Advisor

1.  Why Governance? Three Models of Higher Education Governance

2.  Global Moves to Autonomy from State Controlled to State-Steered Systems

3.  Autonomy in Low- and Middle-Income East Asia – Examples Show That It Works

4.  Two Fundamental Issues the System is Facing – Incomplete Autonomy and Incomplete Accountability

5.  Where Are We Now?

WHY GOVERNANCE? THREE MODELS OF HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE

WHY IS UNDERSTANDING HE GOVERNANCE IMPERATIVE?

-  Good governance: The CORE of RS/NSDP

-  Governance: one of the three key areas identified in HE Vision 2030 & ESP 2014-2018 for immediate and long-term reforms to improve HE quality

-  ‘Governance is at the heart of the story of higher education’ (RIA, 2012)

-  “Good governance is not a sufficient condition for achieving high quality, but it is certainly a necessary one. Governance sets the parameters for management. A mismanaged enterprise cannot flourish, and institutions of higher education are no exception.” (World Bank, 2000)

-  There is still a large room to improve higher education governance in Cambodia and for Cambodia to learn from countries in the region to fast-track higher education quality improvement.

WHAT IS GOVERNANCE?

!  Focusing on structures & processes of decision-making (Jon Pierre & Peter Guys, 2000)

!  Interactive and collaborative process including state and non-state actors in a proactive role, determining who is allowed to make decisions, and under what conditions (Ronald Jones & Say Sok, 2015, forthcoming, June 2015)

!  Multi-level governance: system & institutional; shift towards output control and audit (steering) & focusing on structures, processes and objects of decision-making (Barbara Kehm, 2010)

THREE MODELS OF HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE

!  Anglo-American model = Strong tradition of distancing HEIs from intervention by the state

!  European/Continental model = HEIs are established under legislation, thus giving considerable power to governments with regard to university administration

!  (East) Asian model = Governments have tended to regard universities fairly explicitly as instruments for advancing national cohesion and economic advancement (Anderson, Johnson and Milligan, 2000)

WHY IS UNDERSTANDING THE MODELS IMPORTANT?

!  With different models, decision-making structures, processes, and objects differ.

! These models determines the interaction & (power) relations between the state and HEIs and even with HEIs per se.

! Anglo-American model = adopts a shared governance notion, in which the state, institutional administrators, professors (and even students) share the responsibility of university governance under the tutelage of a board & university administrators (especially vice-chancellors and deans) and professors are empowered to manage the universities, with relatively weaker state control.

! European model = The state and professors form two powerful elements in university governance (e.g. In Germany, the state has more power over the administrative affairs and professors over the academic affairs).

! Asian model = quite large variations in institutional cultures and state-HEI relations, depending on their historical-cultural practices & foreign influence, but the state has tried to steer HEIs to meet its goals, with increasing institutional autonomy, in many cases (developmental states, e.g. Japan, Korea, Hong Kong/China and even emerging economies such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia)

! Noteworthy: “There is still no common understanding of or agreement on the most effective mode of governance for higher education” and there is no ‘one-fits-all’ governance model that can simply taken off the shelf and be considered as a best practice (RIA, 2012).

GLOBAL MOVES TO AUTONOMY FROM STATE-CONTROLLED TO

STATE-STEERED SYSTEMS

A MOVE FROM STATE-CONTROLLED TO STATE-STEERED SYSTEMS

The discussion of higher education governance & models of HE governance wind down to:

1.  Institutional autonomy and accountability: More institutional autonomy is granted to HEIs, under the tutelage of the board of directors, to which the top administrators are accountable to, and with the rectors playing the leadership roles in institutional management.

2.  The roles of the state in higher education development and transformation: The shift of the state roles from controlling and managing the direct operation of HEIs to ‘steering from the distance’ through visionary policy and proactive legal intervention, instruments and standards for quality assurance and education, HEMIS, and performance-based financing to ensure institutional accountability.

Worldwide in the past two decades, HE sector has increasingly adopted market like behavior in the hope of achieving efficiency gains — often in the form of greater institutional autonomy in exchange for more institutional accountability & with the state playing more supervisory and visionary roles —

Institutional autonomy is the “degree of freedom of the university to steer itself” (Asklings, et al., 1999; Marton, 2000) or the “condition where academia determines how its work is carried out” (Neave & van Vught, 1994). It can also be defined as ‘[p]ower and authority of an institution to run its own affairs without undue influence or direction of government’ (Sharifah H. Shahabudin, 2011)

Basic principle: HEIs operate better if they are in charge of their own destiny. It encourages institutions to have the freedom to make choices about their internal management and governance, given ideally existing market-driven incentives.

Allowing for increased institutional autonomy means that governments increasingly exit from the day-to-day management of the tertiary sector, allowing universities and other higher education institutions to determine their own path, while the governments take the developmental roles more seriously.

AUTONOMY FOR LOW- AND MIDDLE INCOME EAST ASIA:

EXAMPLES SHOW THAT IT WORKS

EFFECT OF AUTONOMY AT INSTITUTION LEVEL

The Hong Kong University of Technology became an internationally ranked university within a decade of its founding in 1991, aided by two factors.

First, its first-tier faculty recruitment policies were successful, tapping into the potential of the Chinese diaspora, thanks to its level of academic and administrative freedom (including freedom to fix salaries).

Second, the university related well with local & regional firms through a significant presence of external members from businesses in the University Council & it had substantial freedom to partner with firms both in and beyond HK SAR, China, and to launch regional initiatives.

Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH) in the Republic of Korea, which specializes in science and technology, is a private university that has achieved world-class status over the past decade. The university has always had high levels of management autonomy & used performance indicators.

In 2006 Singapore pushed through extensive autonomy for its two premier public HEIs, NUS and NTU, after accepting recommendations of the Steering Committee to Review Autonomy, Governance and Funding, set up in 2004.

In Thailand, a few autonomous universities that have moved out of the government bureaucratic structure have begun to successfully position themselves as value adding partners for several growth industries.

Malaysia extended limited autonomy to all its 17 public universities. But despite a strong blueprint for reform, implementation was poor.

TWO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES: INCOMPLETE AUTONOMY AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTABILITY

Incomplete autonomy

Lack of alignment between the two is a problem because they need to work in a complementary fashion

The two policy areas where governments have extended autonomy furthest are (a) institutions’ control over academic content & structure of programs and (b) at least in middle-income countries, the introduction of block grants. Significant limitations remain in other areas.

Incomplete autonomy (con’d)

Substantive autonomy Low-income countries in the region have no or very limited staffing autonomy.

Not like some middle- and high-income countries:

The Thai government no longer requires the 13 autonomous universities to offer faculty lifetime contracts (staff being university employees) and encourages pay to be incentivized through rewards.

In Thailand, now the appointment and promotion of professorship is done by HEIs themselves (with all the committee members from outside the HEIs in question) based on their internal rules, although this needs to conform with the criteria and processes set by OHEC.

In Hong Kong SAR, China, they have historically had such autonomy and can hire and fire faculty as well as set salaries.

Japanese institutions, after the 2004 reforms, have been able to convert the status of university employees to non–civil servants and have committed to introduce fixed-term contracts.

Incomplete autonomy (con’d)

Procedural autonomy In Japan after the 2004 reforms, national universities for the first time

received non-earmarked block grants to spend as they see fit. And although the Ministry of Education and Training sets the standard annual tuition fee, it allowed higher education institutions to increase fees 20% in 2007.

Hong Kong SAR, China, has some financial autonomy across a range of areas. Universities can borrow funds from commercial banks & financial markets. Universities can set fees for self-funded programs.

After 2006 in Singapore, though the gov’t remains committed to being the major funder in the sector, newly autonomous universities have been encouraged to seek out other sources of funding, particularly from industry. These universities have been given the freedom to set tuition fees and have been given full autonomy over human resources, including setting remuneration packages.

Incomplete autonomy (con’d)

Indonesian autonomous HEIs are granted them more financial autonomy – including utilizing funds without approval from MEF, devising own compensation schemes for university employees, determining tuition fees, and receiving multi-year financial assistance through competitive-based funding schemes (ADB, 2012).

In Thailand, autonomous HEIs are allowed to manage their funding without the approval from MoE & MEF, and receive block grants from the gov’t with the ability to roll over the unspent budget to the next fiscal year. Public HEIs in general are allowed to set their own tuition fees; design own staff compensation schemes, and design own compensation schemes for university employees (ADB, 2011, 2012; Bovornsiri, 2006).

Public HEIs in the Philippines have fiscal autonomy, and thus incomes generated by the HEIs ‘are put in special trust funds that can be retained or disbursed by the HEIs when approved by their BoRs’. It is also worth highlighting that many public HEIs in this country have strong BoRs, which are the key governing agents (ADB, 2012).

Incomplete autonomy (con’d)

In Thailand, the processes to select university council members & top university administrators start from within HEIs ‘with no interference from politicians’, although they appointment shall be done by the king, with submission via the bureaucratic system (Suwanwela, 2008).

Unlike Thai autonomous universities, HEIs in Malaysia has a much smaller number of members and quite limited external non-state representatives. The appointment of board members is very much centralized, and power of the board is curtailed by provisions that certain decisions need approval from central ministries and agencies (see UUCA, 2006).

Malaysia still adopts quite a centralized approach to institutional leadership appointment. The term of office for Vice Chancellor and the deputies and other conditions of service are determined by MoE, after consultation with the board (ADB, 2012).

Incomplete accountability

Current systems still fall short because of limited dev’t of accountability lines to nongov’t stakeholders (e.g. community, households, students, and (non)academic staff) & some deficiencies in the design and implementation of accountability toward the central gov’t.

Accountability to nongovernment stakeholders

Decision-making power: As higher education institutions receive more decision-making power, they need to increase their own institutional and management capacity. One important area is the governing board.

All economies except Korea have governing boards, but their functions are fairly limited in selecting the university leadership, and only in Singapore does the board select vice chancellors, presidents, and rectors.

Composition: BoD composition varies quite significantly in countries in the region.

BoTs of Indonesian autonomous HEIs comprises of representatives from a number of institutions, including concerned ministries, local gov’t, academic senate, academic community and society, industry, academic staff representative, administrative staff representative, alumni, rector and students (UNESCO, 2006).

In Thailand, the board usually comprises of the Chairman, university president, deans/directors of institutes/faculties and other competent individuals (including faculty members) (Office of the Higher Education Commission, 2013; Rungfamai, 2008), and in the case of autonomous universities, external experts (Yilmaz, 2012, 19-27).

Incomplete accountability: term lengths and limits (con’d)

!  For Thai public HEIs, the chairman and honorary members of the board hold a 4-year term of office and can be re-appointed, but cannot hold office for more than two terms.

!  The university president can hold office for 4 years, with a possible extension for another term. The terms of vice presidents and assistant presidents are aligned with that of the President, and if the President is removed from office, the vice presidents and assistant presidents are also removed from office (Thai Higher Education).

!  The term of office of the board members of public HEIs in Malaysia, except for the vice-chancellor, is 3 years with a possible reappointment.

!  In the Philippines, top university administrators are appointed to hold the posts for 4 years, with a possible re-appointment for another term. Upon completion of the term or retirement, they are entitled to join the faculty with the rank of university professor.

Incomplete accountability (con’d) Accountability to the government While less involved in operational management, governments worldwide still have a leading role in

strategic vision, monitoring and evaluation, and financing of the public sector. Various instruments governments need to manage a more autonomous public system are:

(i) a strategic vision and higher education legislation, (ii) a quality assurance system, (iii) education management information systems, and (iv) performance-based financing.

While academic autonomy is important to support a better fit between supply & demand for skills, core curriculum guidelines have to be set by the center. As part of their strategic vision for higher education, countries in lower- and middle-income East Asia will need to incorporate elements of a curriculum reform.

All countries in the region have a quality assurance body and seem to be moving to a more outcome-based system, as seen in the widespread use of accreditation, audit, and assessments.

Incentives for compliance appear to be generally strong: governments require public higher education institutions to undergo the quality assurance process.

Finally, the lack of well-functioning and comprehensive education management information systems (including information not only on institutions but also on graduate employment and skills) in all countries is likely to weaken quality assurance by limiting information on outputs and outcomes. This may also be why performance-based financing is still in its infancy.

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

Institutional Autonomy

Substantive autonomy Considerable autonomy in curriculum design, research policy, entrance

standards, and awarding degrees

BUT Staff appointment and promotion (non/academic, including top

administrators) is still centralized, and staff are full-time civil servants with secured life-time employment.

HEIs have more institutional autonomy in managing non-civil servant non/teaching staff and contractual services offered by civil servants they pay, mainly hourly, through revenues they earn. In a sense, HEIs adopt a dual system of staff management – civil servants and short-term contracted staff.

Some countries in the region such as Thailand & Indonesia (for their

autonomous HEIs) have granted discretionary power to HEIs to manage staff recruitment, promotion, and firing.

Procedural autonomy

Less generous with procedural autonomy, although it is believed that both types of autonomy need to go hand in hand for HEIs to be smoothly operational (Raza, 2010; World Bank, 2012)

Financial management & procurement of public HEIs have to adhere to centralized ministerial regulations.

Salaries of civil servants are governed by rigid regulations on civil service salary schemes.

Line item budgeting is the norm, although government has adopted both non-program and program-based budgeting in 2000 and intended to migrate to entire program-based budgeting in 2015.

Budgeting reallocation is generally legally quite hard.

BUT HEIs have more autonomy over the management of financial resources they earn

from the fee-paying programs – with apparently dubious transparency and accountability.

Institutional Accountability This ‘incomplete autonomy’ is accompanied by ‘incomplete accountability’. This incomplete accountability

especially manifests itself in the composition & selection of board members (small & narrow representatives) & selection of all levels of HEI administrators, even for PAI HEIs.

Institutional accountability – board of directors: Unlike middle income countries in the region, boards of directors in Cambodian HEIs are generally small with as few as 5 members (i.e. rector, a staff representative, and three representatives from concerned ministries), and BoDs miss voices from other important sectors of the economy and society, which may bring in necessary expertise and networks such as industries, academic/professional associations, local community, and students

Institutional accountability – top administrators: Selection & appointment of HEI administrators is centralized, with the post of top university administrators appointed by the gov’t ‘for life’ and in practice often seniority comes before competency, to cite Ahrens and McNamara (2013). In practice, “the method of management and staff appointments – generally these appointments are made by the Government without open application, evaluation of competencies and input from the institution in question.” (Chet, 2006).

This top-down recruitment & appointment may lead to upward accountability to the gov’t and may undermine downward accountability to the staff and especially the students and communities they suppose to serve.

Some countries such as Thailand & Singapore delegate this function to the board of directors (of their autonomous universities), and some countries like the Philippines and Indonesia go further to establish a ‘search committee’ to help recruit the top administrators (ADB, 2012 & UNESCO, 2006).

Some countries even involve teaching staff in the recruitment process. In Indonesia, such administrators and leaders as rectors, deans, & chairs of dep’t, are elected by the university senate, faculty members, and lecturers (ADB, 2012). In Cambodia, the voices from these important stakeholders are missing.

Institutional accountability – mid-level administrators: The appointment and promotion of mid-level administrators (such as deans, department heads, chairs of graduate schools, research centers and head of administrative offices) is generally top-down and the appointees are usually selected by institutional leaders without broad consultation with concerned staff.

While many countries in the region such as Thailand, Indonesia & the Philippines have term lengths and limits for all levels of administrators and even board members, Cambodia does not mandate the term limits and lengths for these posts (except for BoD members).

Institutional accountability – university-based councils: Another noticeable accountability mechanism that is generally missing or weak at the institutional level is such intermediary bodies as the academic council, administrative council and research council.

Experiences from countries in the region show that such councils, if properly established and nurtured, can play crucial roles in assisting top administrators and boards in managing HEIs and can even acts as a checks-and-balances mechanism. This can help create an institutional culture, whereby staff can get involved institutional management.

In Thailand & Malaysia, Faculty Senates, for example, play an important role in the management of and advising HEI administrators in academic affairs, including setting academic standards and faculty recruitment policy.

In Thailand, the President of the Faculty Senate is a BoD member by default, & this body is assigned to elect some members to sit on the council.

In Malaysia, it is even stipulated in the law that all academic matters must be approved by the Faculty Senates before they are to be decided upon by the board of directors (UUCA, 2006).

Establishment of PAI HEIs, a right move, but reform is slow & PAI HEIs are granted relatively less autonomy: Selected public HEIs are granted more institutional autonomy & required to have their respective boards to which the rector is accountable.

BUT Mixed results, at best, from the reform & little meaningful changes in work

culture, i.e. adoption of old top-down governing style &

Board composition is still very small & narrow. (Touch, Mak & You, 2010) & top administrators are still appointed by government.

Thailand (as well as Indonesia) has adopted this gradual approach to reform too. However, it has granted way more institutional autonomy to autonomous universities, which, amongst others, are entitled to be governed by their respective constitutions and councils, select their university administrators (by the university councils), select vice presidents (by the president), select university staff, set their own salary scales, etc. It has also strengthened institutional accountability mechanisms such as the establishment of the Faculty Senates; boards of directors with more and more diverse professional backgrounds, and term lengths and limits for all administrators and board members.

System level governance: In the state-steering system, the roles of the state in determining the success or failure of the sector is still very important, but instead of directly managing HEIs, its roles have been transformed to become more visionary and supervisory.

As discussed above, four key instruments states use to ensure accountability & performance are: (1) a strategic vision and higher education legislation; (2) a quality assurance system; (3) education management information systems (EMIS), and (4) performance-based financing.

In Cambodia these instruments are at best in their early stage of development or are yet to be well-established, and continuing commitment from the government to devising them and/or improving them is needed.