AGUSTIN VS. BACALAN (1985)

WHAT: A complaint for ejectment with damages

WHERE: City Court (MTC) of Cebu

FACTS:

1. Bacalan (respondent) is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space in a building owned by the late Susana Agustin. Due to non-payment of rentals despite repeated demands, an action to eject him was filed. Praintiff prayed that defendant be ordered to pay {2,300 representing arrears in rentals the corresponding retas until he actually vacates the place, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs.

2. DEFENDANT: In his answer, the defendant-appellee included a counter-claim alleging that the present action was "clearly unfounded and devoid of merits, as it is tainted with malice and bad faith on the part of the plaintiff for the obvious reason that plaintiff pretty well knows that defendant does not have any rentals in arrears due to the estate of Susana Agustin. He stated, "That by virtue of the unwarranted and malicious filing of this action by the plaintiff, his counterclaim includes:

P50,000 moral damages

P10,000.00 in concept of exemplary damages.

P3,500.00 as attorney's fees

City Court Dismissed counterclaim.Ordered defendant to vacate and pay 3,887.10 backrentals and 150 attorney’s fees.

CFI Reversed City Court.Ordered plaintiff to pay:P10,000 moral damagesP5,000 exemplary damagesP1,000 attorney’s fees

3. No appeal by plaintiff from CFI decision.4. PLAINTIFF: filed a complaint with CFI Cebu against defendant and deputy sheriff for the Declaration of

Nullity of the CFI Decision on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void from the beginning because:

a. It grants relief in total of P16,000 which is beyond the jurisdiction ofCity Court Cebu Citing Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which limits the jurisdiction of the city courts in civil cases to P10,000 as the maximum amount of the demand

5. DEFENDANT: filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff has no cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction to declare the nullity of a decision of another branch of the CFI Cebu

CFI CEBU The allegation is not a ground of an annulment of judgment. Probably for certiorari

CA Certified ISSUE: WON CFI may, in appeal, award defendant’s counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction fo the court of origin.

PLAINTIFF’s CONTENTION: moral damages may not properly be awarded in ejectment cases, the only recoverable damages therein being the reasonable compensation for use and occupancy of the premises and the legal measure of damages being the fair rental value of the property

HELD: The money judgment awarded to defendant is a counterclaim. A defending party may set up acclaim for money pr any other relief which he may have against the opposing party in a counterclaim. And the court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary damages as prayed for. The grant of moral damages here as a

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counterclaim and not as damages for the unlawful detention of property must be upheld. The amount is another matter.

Re Nature of Counterclaim vis a vis Jurisdiction: A court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set-off or counterclaim in excess of its

jurisdiction (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court). A counterclaim beyond the court's jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or weaken plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court).

An appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waives so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable.

Nevertheless, the defendant-appellee, in the case at bar, set up his claim in excess of the jurisdiction of the city court as a compulsory counterclaim.

In the case at bar, by presenting his claim voluntarily before the City Court of Cebu, the defendant-appellee submitted the same to the jurisdiction of the court. He became bound thereby. The amount of P10,000.00 being the jurisdictional amount assigned the City Court of Cebu, whose jurisdiction the defendant-appellee has invoked, he is thereby deemed to have waived the excess of his claim beyond P10,000.00. It is as though the defendant-appellee had set up a counterclaim in the amount of P10,000.00 only.

ISSUE: May the Court of First Instance then, on appeal, award defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond that amount?

HELD: the defendant-appellee's counterclaim beyond P10,000.00, the jurisdictional amount of the city Court of Cebu, should be treated as having been deemed waived. It is as though it has never been brought before trial court. It may not be entertained on appeal.

Re Amount of Judgment based on a counterclaim in excess of the jurisdiction of the court of origin:

The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation of the exercise of the same judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original and appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial power. It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause

It is a well-settled rule that when court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either as an estoppel or otherwise.

The nullity of such portion of the decision in question, however, is not such as to affect the conclusions reached by the court in the main case for ejectment.

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The Court of First Instance, in the case at bar, having awarded judgment in favor of the defendant-appellee in excess of its appellate jurisdiction to the extent of P6,000.00 over the maximum allowable award of P10,000.00, the excess is null and void and of no effect. Such being the case, an action to declare the nullity of the award as brought by the plaintiff-appellant before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch V is a proper remedy.

MACEDA VA CA, CEMENT CENTER, INC. (1989)

FACTS:

1. Petitioner as lessor of the disputed property. Respondent Cement Center as the contractor2. The leased property originally belonged to the Sps. Arturo Victoria and Maxima Monserrat, maternal aunt

of the petitioner.3. Petitioner was leasing the property from his aunt. He proposed to have it repaired and renovated subject

ot reimbursement of his expenses, to which the owners agreed. The remodelling cost was P40,000.4. But Maceda did not stop. In what appears to be an orgy of building, he introduced more improvements. He

constructed a new driveway, a basketball court and raised the ground level near the creek, elevated the fence, remodelled the gate, and landscaped the lawn.

5. His aunt passed away. His aunt’s atty-in-fact Atty. Rustico Zapata, Sr. promised to sell the property to him for P125,000/ But he was eventually informed that his aunt sold has sold the property to Mrs. Gomez so he should vacate it. He refused to leave. Atty-in-fact filed a case against him, Dismissed on plaintiff’s own motion.

6. In 1974, petitioner was informed that the property has been sold to Pablo Zubiri for 145,000.Petitioner refused to vacate. Again, Atty-in-fact filed:WHAT: Ejectment caseWHERE: Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal

7. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to retain possession of the premises until his expenses were duly reimbursed to him.

8. In 1981, Zubiri soldthe property to Private Respondent Cement Center, Inc. Maceda was asked to vacate. Maceda insisted that he be reimbursed for the improvements. Cement demanded P4,000 monthly rental from April 1982. In 1984, another ejectment case was filed with the MTC of San Juan, Rizal.

9. Maceda set up a counterclaim for P240,000.

MTC Ordered Maceda to vacate and play CEMENT P2,000P2,000 per month as reasonable compensation for his use of the premises until he actually vacates,P5,000 as attorney's fees.Plaintiff to pay Maceda P158,000 as the value of his improvements and repairs, less his accrued rentals of P64,000 as of December 1985 and the sum of P12,000 which he had earlier received as partial reimbursement.

RTC Set aside decision. Dismissed Cement’s ejectment complaint.Ordered cement to pay Maceda P182,000 for necessary and useful improvements.

CA Affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment claim.Set aside payment to Maceda of P182,000 because MTC lacked jurisdiction over the claim which exceeds P20,000.“The claim for reimbursement in the total amount of P240,000.00 was alleged by private respondent by way of counterclaim in his answer. It is clear that the amount of counterclaim, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Under Section 33, B.P. Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount of the demand does not exceed P20,000.00 exclusive of

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interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind. It goes without saying that the Regional Trial Court has no authority to entertain the counterclaim because it took cognizance of the case by virtue of its appellate jurisdiction.”“Considering that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the counterclaim, the decision of the Regional Trial Court on appeal giving private respondent the right of retention is without legal basis. Besides, the right of retention applies only to a possessor in good faith under Article 546 of the Civil Code.”

10. Maceda assails the setting aside of the money judgment of 182,000 and the rejection of his claim to a right of retention over the leased premises.

SC HELD: MTC did not have original jurisdiction over his counterclaim as it exceeds 20,000.

Re Counterclaim amount in excess of Original Court’s Jurisdiction: The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan awarding him P158,000 on his

counterclaim, and that of the Regional Trial Court raising the award to P182,200, were invalid for lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action for sum of money (Maceda's counterclaim for the value of his improvements is one such action) is limited to a demand that "does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind." (Sec. 33, (1), B.P. Blg. 129.) A counterclaim in the municipal or city court beyond that jurisdictional limit may be pleaded only by way of defense to weaken the plaintiffs claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief.

Maceda is entitled onlyto the reimbursement of the initial remodelling job approved by the owner which cost P40,000.

Maceda is ordered to pay P32,864.36 as unpaid rentals. Dismissal of counterclaim is affirmed.

Why was the award of counterclaim not reduced to P20,000 instead of dismissing it altogether?

VITAL-GOZON VS CA, DR. DELA FUENTE (1992)

FACTS:

1. In 1987, EO 119 issued by Pres. Cory Aquino, reorganized various offices offices of the ministry of Healt; existing offices were abolished, transfers of personnels effected.

2. Private Respondent Dr. Alejandro dela Fuente wasthe Chief of Clinics of National Children’s Hospital, appointed on Dec 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he was the Medical Specialist II. On February 4, 1988, he received a notice that he would be reappointedto Medical Specialist II.

3. Considering this is to be a demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board.

4. When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC Case No. 4.

5. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla,

6. CSC in August 9, 1988 upheld the promotion. It held that the demotion is void. CSC ordered dela Fuente be retained and that he be paid back salaries

7. No MR was filed nor appeal filed to SC. The resolution became final on September 21, 1988.8. Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of the National Children’s Hospitalwas demanded implementation

of the Resolution. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred "de la Fuente's claims to the Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice and/or action. But she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await

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"legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department." On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.

9. Dela Fuente asked CSC to enforce its judgment. Hoever, CSC told him to file in court a petition for mandamus because of the belief that CSC had no coercive powers –unlike a court- to enforce its final decisions/ resolutions.

10. Dela Fuente filed:WHAT: an action of mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction to compel Vital and NCH to comply eith the CSC ResolutionWHERE: CA

11. He prayed among others:a. Writ of preliminary injunction to implement the orderb. To pay him 100,000 moral damages, 20,000 exemplary damages, and 10,000 attorney’s fees and

litigation expenses12. After a month, he filed with CA:

WHATL Supplemental/ Amended Petition as “quo warrant” aside from “mandamus” adding 3 respondents

CA CSC Resolution already final. Ordered respondents to obey and implement CSC Resolution.Re Damages:de la Fuente's prayer for damages — founded essentially on the refusal of Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different forum — was DENIED on the ground that the "petitions (for mandamus) are not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said) claim of damages."

13. Petitioner Vital-Gozun did not file and MR or an appeal.14. Dela Fuente filed:

WHAT: Motion for ReconsiderationCONTENTION: He insisted that the Appellate Court had competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a claim for damages might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals had authority to issue such writs only 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts — the Supreme Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals — were conferred concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require him to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues,To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.

15. Writ of Execution was filed and was granted. 16. CA resolved the MR of dela Fuente. Modified its decision with regard damages.

CA (acting on the MR)

deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b) consequently describing and treating it as a "PARTIAL DECISION," and (c) scheduling "further proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (of damages)," since said question "cannot be resolved by mere reference to the pleadings." 23 This was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

Sec. 3. Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,

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trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction, in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer to take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be recovered from the defendant officer/

WON CA has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus. YES. It has Jurisdiction.

SOLGEN’s CONTENTION: SOLGEN filed a special civil action for Certiorary arguing that:

a. B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear, as a trial court, claims for moral and exemplary damages;

b. Sec 3, Rule 65 commanding defendant to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. Is nothing more than a procedural rule allowing joinder of causes of action. and such an award of damages is allowable only in actions commenced in Regional Trial Courts but not in the Court of Appeals or this Court.

c. assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction over the claims for damages, it lost the power to take cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9, 1989 had, by its own pronouncement, become final and executory;

HELD: Section 9, B.P. 129: original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

. . . Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction

Contention 1: Section 9 of BP 129 has NO explicit and specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages," hence, Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to assume cognizance of claims for such damages.

HELD: The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their specified jurisdiction.

Contention 2: Sec 3, Rule 65 in question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages

HELD: is untenable. It implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.

Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to authorize to date) rendition of judgment in a mandamus action "commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant." 39 The provision makes plain that the damages are an

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incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical counterpart provision.

Re Special Writs vis a vis award of Damages:

Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the provision governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court just cited, as well as the rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows that in conferring on the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over the special civil action of mandamus, among others, as well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or processes, the Batasang Pambansa clearly intended that said Court should exercise all the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action of mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to the petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.

WHAT THE HIGH COURT DISAPPROVES: undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse

TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY

Quick recall: Estopped. Filed at City CFI Cebu. Should have filed with inferior court (MTC)

Issue of jurisdiction raised at CA, only after 15 years of litigation.

FACTS:

1. On July 19, 1948, Sps Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced against Sps Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio:WHAT: action to recover P1,908 with legal interestWHERE: CFI (now RTC) of Cebu

2. Writ of attachment was issued but was dissolved upon filing of a counterbond by defndants and Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.

3. CFI ruled in favour of plaintiffs, issued a writ of execution. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety’s bond.

4. Surety granted the motion for execution. Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing.

TC Denied motion to quash. Ordered ExecutionCA Affirmed the TC orders

5. Not one of the assignment of errors to RTC decision— it is obvious — raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.

6. Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year.

7. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that:a. appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of

the sum of P1,908.00 only;b. that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, had already become effective, Section 88 of

which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs;

c. that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

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Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case.

8. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.

9. CA referred the case to SC:

This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.

ISSUE: WON may validly raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction on CFI in its appeal to CA. NO!

HELD: The case field before CFI Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced.

Re Jurisdiction conferred by law vis a vis Laches

GEN RULE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

Although the action was originally against sps Sibonghanoy, Surety became a quasi-party

Re Jurisdiction by Estoppel

Aparty may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches

LACHES, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

BASIS: The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

Re question of jurisdiction vis a vis Public Policy

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. It was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

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After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. Moreover, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

CALIMLIM VS RAMIREZ *important

Quick Recall: NOT Estopped. Filed at CFI Pangasinan as Cadastral Court. Dismissed. Filed a Civil Case at CFI as Regular Court re Ownership. Respondent Motion to Dismissed with CFI as Regular Court.

FACTS:

1. A judgment for a sum of money was rendered by Municipal Court of Manila in favour of Independent Mercantile Corp against a cetain Manuel Magali. Writ of Execution was issued. A land was levied, registered in the name of "Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim", specified that the said levy was only against "all rights, title, action, interest and participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over the parcel of land described in this title. "

2. However, when the Sheriff issued the final Deed of Sale on January 25, 1963, it was erroneously stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the parcel of land described in this title and not only over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the same.

3. Independent was granted by MTC to issue a new Title in its favour in lieu of the execution of sum of money judgment in its favour

4. On November 21, 1967, petitioner Modesta Calimlim, surviving spouse of Domingo Magali, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed:WHAT: a petition praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568.WHERE: CFI Pangasinan Branch 1, sitting as a cadastral court

5. CFI dismissed the petition6. Petitioners did not appeal the dismissal of the petition they filed in LRC. Instead, on January 11, 1971, they

filed:WHAT: complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180 praying for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138 previously registered in the name of Domingo Magali, married to Modesta Calimlim.WHERE: CFI of Pangasinan, now as regular court trying a civil case (as opposed to it sitting as cadastral court

7. Private Respondent claimed to have bought the disputed land from Independent Mercantile on 19678. Priv Repondent’s Contention: Motion to Dismiss on the ground that barred by prior judgment or by the

statute of limitations9. CFI dismissed the civil case on the ground of Estoppel by prior judgment.

ISSUE: WON CFI was correct in dismissing the civil case on the ground of prior judgment. NO!

Re Not a Case of Res Judicata

It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180.

In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication

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of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case presently considered.

Re Why CFI as cadastral court had no jurisdiction:

It has been settled by consistent rulings of this Court that a court of first instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.

The issues raise by petitioners in their petition to cancel the new title refer to ownership or title over the property covered thereby.

The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a result of the errors which were not of their own making. In short, the petition raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.

Re Reliance to Tijam Doctrine:

GEN RULE: Jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.

The exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.

Why laches is inapplicable in case at bar:

The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches. When they learned that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same was "without merit." No explanation was given for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties which do not appear of record.

Upon its petition being dismissed by the CFI acting as cadastral court, the party on January 1, 1971 or only 2 and a half years later filed the civil case.

Hence, we see no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of time or inexcusable negligence.

In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.

Re a decision as non-binding if rendered by a court who lacked jurisdiction:

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances.

The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among

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others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter.

Re Representation with Knowledge to Apply Estoppel

The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be prejudicial to the one who filed the action or suit in the event that he obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter . It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same.

The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions.

Re Duty of the Courts:

If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum.

Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)

SOLIVEN VS FASTFORMS

Quick Facts: ESTOPPED. Filed at RTC Makati City. Should have filed at MTC. Respoondent filed MR at RTC.

FACTS:

1. May 1994, Marie Antoinette Soliven filed:WHERE: RTC ,Br. 60 Makati CityWHAT: complaint for sum of money with damagesAgaint Fastforms Philippines

2. In 1993, Fastforms through its President Dr. Eduardo Escobar obtained a loan from petitioner of 170,0003. Respondent issued a PDC in the amount of 175,000 (5k as interest). 3 weeks later, petitioner was advised

not to deposit the PDC.4. Later on, despite repeated demands, respondent refused to pay its principal obligation and interest due.5. Petitioner prayed for the following:

P195,155.00 as actual damages;P200,000.00 as moral damages;P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; andP100,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.

6. Respondent denied giving authority to its President to secure a loan.

RTC In favour of petitioner ordering payment of 175,000 plus 50,000 attorney’s fees

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7. Fastforms then filed an MR with RTC questioning for the first time RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. ALLEGATION: since the amount of petitioners principal demand (P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691

8. Petitioner’s Contention: espondent is barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the latters jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the complaint and actively participated in all stages of the trial.

CA Reversed. RTC lacked jurisdiction, must have been filed in MTC, the claim being only 195,155; respondent may assail the jurisdiction anytime even for the first time on appeal

ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction? MTC. However. Estoppel by Laches was applied.

HELD:

Re “exclusive of damages of whatever kind”:

Under Section 3 of RA 7691, where the amount of the demand in the complaint instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

Administrative Circular No. 09-94 (March 14, 1994),

(Par 2). The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional amount.

Re Jurisdiction by Estoppel:

While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered

IN CASE AT BAR: private respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.

The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the courts jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

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METROMEDIA VS PASTORIN

Quick Facts: NOT estopped. Filed with LA, appealed to NLRC. Should have filed before Voluntary Arbitrator. Metromedia raised the issue at NLRC.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Johnny Pastorin was employed as a Field Representative/ Collector of Metromedia Times. His task was periodic collection of receivables from dealers of petitioner’s mewspapres.

2. Because of tardiness, he was supposedly terminated by the petitioner company, but because of the timely intervention of the union, the dismissal was not effected.

3. However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a magazine dealer (Gloria de Manuel) amounting to 9,000 and when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped collecting the outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After requiring him to explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan but gave no definitive explanation for the same.

4. Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to do field work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the completion of his suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and sent a letter communicating his refusal to accept the transfer.

5. Petitioner filed a complaint for contructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages with Labor Arbiter.

LA in favour of employee Pastorin: Respondent did not commit insubordination or disobedience so as to warrant his transfer, and that petitioner was not aggrieved by respondents failure to settle his obligation with De Manuel.

Metromedia appealed to NLRC.GROUNDS: lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter over Pastorin’s complaint

NLRC Reversed LA’s decision. Being a grievance issue, cognizable by the voluntary arbitratorCA Reversed NLRC, reinstated LA ruling because of estoppel:

“the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.”

ISSUE: WON Metromedia is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of LA over the subject matter of the casefor the first time only in their appeal to NLRC. NOT estopped.

HELD:

Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose petitioners claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground in support of his contention that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat in light of our pronouncement, and more so considering the NLRCs correct observation that jurisdiction over grievance issues, such as the propriety of the reassignment of a union member falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.

Again, GEN RULE: The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Where it appears that the court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the defense may be interposed at any time, even on appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent this court from taking up the question of jurisdiction

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When EXCEPTION applies: “while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a partys active participation in the proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.”

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter

CASES OF JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL:

1. Tijam vs. SibonghanoyThe lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.

2. Martinez v. Merced:Private respondents had at least three opportunities to raise the question of lack of preliminary conference first, when private respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file their position paper; second, at the time when they actually filed their position paper in which they sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan Trial Court; and third; when they filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court expunging from the records the position paper of private respondents, in which motion private respondents even urged the court to sustain their position paper. And yet, in none of these instances was the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised or even hinted at by private respondents. In fine, these are acts amounting to a waiver of the irregularity of the proceedings.

3. Ducat vs CA:Petitioners filing of a Manifestion and Urgent Motion to Set Parameters of Computation is indicative of its conformity with the questioned order of the trial court referring the matter of computation of the excess to SGV and simultaneously thereafter, the issuance of a writ of possession. If petitioner thought that subject order was wrong, it could have taken recourse to the Court of Appeals but petitioner did not. Instead he manifested his acquiescence in the said order by seeking parameters before the trial court. It is now too late for petitioner to question subject order of the trial court. Petitioner cannot be allowed to make a mockery of judicial processes, by changing his position from one of the agreement to disagreement, to suit his needs.

4. Centeno vs. CentenoInvolved question of jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Arbitration Board (DARAB). The movants questioning jurisdiction had actually sought and litigated for affirmative reliefs before the DARAB in support of a submitted counterclaim.

RULE: The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.

If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,

the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel'

However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,

the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.

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FIGUERA VS PEOPLE

Quick Facts: NOT estopped. Filed before the RTC. Should have filed at MTC. Issue raised at CA.

GEN RULE: The issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner was charged for reckless imprudence resulting in homicideWHERE: Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.

2. On August 19, 1998, RTC convicted the petitioner3. He appealed before the CA, questioning among others, for the first time, the RTC’s jurisdiction.

CA Denied the appeal. Estopped from questioning jurisdiction:“petitioner to have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction”

4. SOLGEN’s Contention: the trial went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.

5. PETITIONER’s Contention: the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal.

6. Hence, SC appeals

ISSUE: WON CA was correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the ground of estoppel by laches. NOT estopped.

HELD: Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.

In this case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12

As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties.

Re Tijam’s Non Applicability:

Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. Laches must be clearly present for the Doctrine of Sibonghanoy to apply.

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Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.

True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.

Re Jurisdiction by Estoppel as Injustice

Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.

Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action.

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