21
55 000199.00 £EVOLUTION FROM A F.A.R. THE ýUBANARMED FORCES IN AFRICA AND THE.-4DDLE EAST ()Wi~lia~m:j.jrch ] C A -poesoa Pa Sep 07 The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author. The paper does not necessarily represent the views of either the Center for Naval Analyses or the Department of Defense. DDC CDi nJ. TU C-) 'CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES V 9 19?7 ULitJ 1401 Wilson Boulevard -i U. Arlington, Virginia 22209 F C4.:

C4. · 2011. 5. 14. · Cuban military missions have been active in Africa since 1961 (and in the Middle East since 1973; see map). Military ties with the Angolan MPLA were established

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    0

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 55 000199.00

    £EVOLUTION FROM A F.A.R. THE ýUBANARMED FORCESIN AFRICA AND THE.-4DDLE EAST

    ()Wi~lia~m:j.jrch ]

    C A -poesoa PaSep 07

    The ideas expressed in this paper are those of theauthor. The paper does not necessarily representthe views of either the Center for Naval Analysesor the Department of Defense.

    DDCCDi nJ. TU

    C-) 'CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES V 9 19?7ULitJ 1401 Wilson Boulevard -i

    U. Arlington, Virginia 22209 F

    C4.:

  • r

    REVOLUTION FROM A F.A.R. -- THE CUBANARMED FORCES IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

    William J. Durch

    CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

    The views expressed in this paper are those ofthe author and do not necessarily represent theposition of the Center for Naval Analyses, theDepartment of Defense, or any other Governmentaqency.

  • REVOLUTION FROM A F.A.R. -- THE CUBANARMED FORCES IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

    In 1975, when Fidel Castro sent thousands of combat troops

    to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (the

    MPLA), many observers were taken aback at what they presumed to be

    a radical and dangerous departure in Cuban foreign policy. At best

    it seemed to signal renewed Cuban interest in the export of

    revolution,* and at worst, a new round of superpower competition

    in the Third World, in the form of nwar by proxy."y Two years later,

    as Cuban troops remain mired in Angola, the issue of Cuban military

    missions overseas remains one of the stumbling blocks to further

    improvements in U. S.-Cuban relations.týA close look ait ee

    missions, their origins, purposes, and likely futures - on--e• rdu•,

    Cuban military missions have been active in Africa since 1961

    (and in the Middle East since 1973; see map). Military ties with

    the Angolan MPLA were established a decade before the first Cuban

    combat troops set foot in Angola. Castro's support for liberation

    movements and "progressive" regimes has, furthermore, transcended

    Cuban-Soviet relations. In the mid-60s -- when Havana and Moscow

    were at odds over Castro's domestic policies and his support for

    guerrilla groups in Latin America -- Cuban policies in Africa were

    essentially indistinguishable from those of the 1970s, a period

    of growing Cuban-Soviet cooperation. The Angolan intervention

    itself, while a radical departure in level of effort, was not a

    -1-

  • Iur~W

    W-- -,0

    _ _ _? W

    NTS CI too CA

    BYcc)

    -2-

  • radical departure in policy, but an outgrowth of more than a

    decade of Cuban military involvement in the region.

    It may seem ironic that Castro should have scored his

    greatest foreign policy victories in Africa, after all the

    concern in the 1960s over his efforts to export revolution to

    Latin America. But the one follows 1rom the other. Cuban efforts in

    this hemisphere, directed at countries then closely aligned with

    the U. S., attracted American attention and reaction. Africa, on

    .he other hand, remained a strategic backwater in U. S. policy-making

    until quite recently, its states newly-independent and largely

    non-aligned, its remaining colonies inviting liberation. As OAS

    sanctions increasingly isolated Cuba from its own region, Africa

    came to occupy an important place in Cuban foreign policy. Its

    "progressive" states offered political ties outside the socialist

    bloc, while its liberation movements offered a relatively risk-free

    opportunity to advance the cause of revolution in the Third World.

    Cuban activities in Africa actually predate Havana's troubles

    with the OAS. By 1960, Cuban arms and medical personnel had reached

    the National Liberation Front fighting the French in Algeria. In 1961,

    Cuban instructors established a training camp for African guerrillas in

    Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana; the camp remained active until Nkrumah's over-

    throw in early 1966. Similar activities may have been undertaken in

    Algeria in the early 1960s. But all these were relatively low-level

    -3-

  • endeavors. Cuba's first substantial military venture in Africa came

    in late 1963, during the border conflict between Algeria and Morocco.

    A long-simmering territorial dispute between Algeria and

    Morocco erupted into war on October 14, 1963. One week later, the

    Cuban ship Aracelio iglesias docked at the Algerian port of Oran with

    a cargo of T-34 tanks and 50 Cuban technicians. Algeria asserted that

    the shipment was part of a previous agreement with Cuba, not related

    to the fighting. The time of its arrival supports the Algerian claim.

    Oran is almost two weeks' sailing time from Havana; the ship must have

    been en route to Oran when the fighting began.

    Algeria had little armor in its inventory before the Cuban

    shipment, and Cuba clearly intended to train the Algerians in, the use

    of the tanks -- hence the 50 technicians. The outbreak of war, how-

    ever, required both a speedup in the delivery of equipment, and the

    dispatch of troops to man it if it was to be of any use to Algeria in

    the immediate crisis. Two other Cuban ships, therefore, left Havana

    for Algeria shortly after the war broke ourt. The Gonzalez Lines docked

    at Oran on October 28, and another ship docked the 29th. Both carried

    arms -- tanks, artillery, mortars, ammunitinn -- and very likely the

    bulk of four hundred Cuban tank troops. An Air Cubana Britannia, landing

    at Oran on the 29th, may have brought in additional troops.

    There is little evidence that the Cubans ever engaged in

    combat (a ceasefire was signed on October 30). The mission probably

    remained in Algeria through the end of the year, training the Algerians.

    "-4-

  • It withdrew in early January. Cuban-Moroccan diplomatic relations,

    severed during the crisis, then resumed.

    The Cubans' interest in Africa remained high in 1964, probably

    increasing as their isolation from Latin America became more complete.

    Che Guevara's trip to Africa late that year signalled a new round of

    activism.

    In the course of his three-month trip, Guevara spoke out in

    support of rebel forces in Congo-Leopoldville (now Zaire). He also met

    with the leaders of the liberation movements in Portugal's African

    colonies -- Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea -- and pledged

    Cuban aid to all three movements, as well as to the Zairean rebels.

    Cuban ships delivered arms to Congo-Brazzaville (home base

    fox the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA) in

    mfd-1965, and to Guinea (home base for t1e African Party for the

    Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, the

    PAIGC) about a year later. Cuban support of the Front for the Libera-

    tion of Mozambique (FRELIMO), based in Tanzania, is harder to establish,

    but Cuban instructors were apparently serving in guerrilla training

    camps in Tanzania by the late 1960s. Much earlier, Cuban military

    advisers, Che Guevara among them, were serving in the field with guer-

    rilla groups in Zaire.

    Guevara entered Zaire via Tanzania with a small band of

    Cubans in April 1965. He was joined in July by perhaps 200 additional

    men, who entered Zaire through neighboring Congo-Brazzaville. But

    -5-

  • the Cubans found the rebel forces unwilling to fight and their leaders

    corrupt. After Zaire's Chief of Staff, Gen. Mobutu, seized power in

    a military coup in November 1965, Guevara and his men departed, probably

    joining the growing Cuban mission in Congo-Brazzaville.

    The Brazzaville mission marks a turning point in Cuban

    military diplomacy in Africa. Its origins may be traced in pan:t to

    the wave of military coups that toppled many African governments in

    1965 and 1966. Among the leaders ousted were two of Cuba's best

    friends in Africa, Algeria's Ben Bella and Ghana's Nkrumah. With

    their downfall, Cuba lost both of its African guerrilla training bases.

    When new bases were established, in Congo-Brazzaville and Guinea, Cuba

    devoted more attention to protecting the host "progressive" governments.

    Consolidating revolutiunary gains already made became as important as

    promoting revolution anew.

    Cuba's fresh experience in combating energetic counter-

    revolutionary activities at home suited it, perhaps uniquely, to that

    task. Thus, from 1965 on, Cuba devoted a large part of its advisory

    effort in Africa to the training of popular militias, under the con-

    trol of ruling parties, as counterweights to the regular armed forces.

    Brazzaville was the first of these missions. Cuba did not abandon its

    support for African revolutionary movements. But after the disaster

    in Zaire, Castro seems to have focused his attention on the task of

    liberating the Portuguese colonies and seems generally to have let

    established African governments alone.

    -6-

  • The Cuban mission to Congo-Brazzaville grew from perhaps

    250 men in mid-1965 to as many as 700 by June 1966, training a popular

    militia and serving as a presidential guard. In late June, the Cubans

    thwarted an attempted coup by the army, physically protecting govern-

    ment and party leaders during three days of unrest. In the wake of the

    attempted coup, the Cuban mission grew. By October, it numbered per-

    haps 1,00 men, making it half as large as the Congolese National

    Army itself. The mission was phased out by the Congolese government

    over the next two years, and a successful -- and complicatei -- coup

    apparently brought the mission to an end by late 1968.

    Not only did the Brazzaville mission train the Con4olese

    militia, but at Dolisie, on the Cabinda border, Cuban instructors

    traid guerrillas of the Angolan MPLA. Active Cuban support for the

    MPLA thus preceded, by about ten years, the arrival of Cuban combat

    troops in Angola. Although the Brazzaville mission was phased out,

    a small contingent of Cuban instructors appears to have stayed with the

    MPLA into the 1970s.

    Cuba's mission to the West African nation of Guinea essen-

    tially duplicated the one in Brazzaville. Guinea's security-conscious

    president, Sekou Toure, requested both a Cuban presidential guard and

    Cuban instruztors for Guinea's militia. He received both. Militia

    training was underway by December 1966. It continues today.

    Cuban advisers probably joined PAIGC guerrillas operating

    inside Portuguese Guinea in late 1966. Their presence was first noted

    "-7-

  • publicly by the Portuguese in February 1967. As the advisory mission

    grew, the Cubans assumed responsibility for logistics, communications,

    and other technical services for the guerrillas. They also served in

    the field, and suffered casualties.

    Cuban activism in Africa trailed off toward the end of the

    1960s. The Brazzaville mission essentially ended. The mission to

    Guinea and the PAIGC and the small advisory efforts with the MPLA and

    FRELIMO were now the only Cuban military missions on the continent; no

    new ones were undertaken.

    When Cuban activism began to pick up once again in 1971,

    attention was first paid to the liberation of Portuguese Guinea. This

    was the first mission to receive additional men; by 1974, as maiy as

    200 advisers were working with the guerrillas.

    New missions in the 1970s included Sierra Leone in 1972, where

    Cuban advisers trained a 500-man internal security unit for President

    Siaka Stevens. A small contingent of Cuban advisers remains. In 1973,

    Cuba sent perhaps 80 military advisers to Equatorial Guinea to train a

    militia and other internal security forces as part of a larger, 500-min

    Cuban technical assistance mission.

    The year 1973 also saw Cuban missions for the first time

    in the Middle East, as the geographic scope of Cuban activities

    expanded.

    A 200-man advisory group -- including, for the first time,

    pilots -- was sent to South Yemen in the spring of 1973, in response

    -8-

  • to a request from that country's ruling party. Cuban aid was re-

    quested despite the presence ot a Soviet aid mission, because the

    Yomenis were appavently dissatisfied with the help they were receiving

    from Moscow. The Cuban mission trained the armed forces and militia,

    helped the government set up Committees for the Defense of the

    Revolution, modeled on those in Cuba, and gave indirect support to

    the Dhofar rebellion in neighboring Oman. After Iranian Special

    Forces intervened in the Dhofar rebellion on behalf of Oman, Cuba

    sent an additional 500 men to South Yemen. Yemen broke off support

    for the Dhofaris in early 1976. Tho Cuban mission -- which may

    have been drawn down earlier in support of Angola -- was back to

    200 men by spring 1976.

    During the October War between Israel and the Arab states,

    Cuba sent the equivalent of two battalions of tank troops and a

    small number of pilots to serve with the Syrians on the Golan

    Heights -- the so-called "solidarity front" -- alongside Moroccans,

    Jordanians, and Saudis. The Cubans reportedly participated in the

    sporadic fighting that continued on the heights until the Syrian-

    Israeli disengagement agreement of late May 1974. The troops were

    withdrawn in early 1975 after Syria agreed to renew the mandate of

    the U.N. peacekeeping force.

    Syria represented the second deployment of conventional

    Cuban combat troops. As in Algeria ten years before, Cuba came to

    the aid of a friend in distress, and the deployment was similar in

    -9-

  • size, but this time the Cubans brought no equipment with them. As

    in Algeria, when the immediate crisis ended, the Cubans pulled out.

    Another Cuban mission in the 1970s was sent to Sovnalia,

    the first advisers arriving in early 1974. There were 50 by 1975,

    and the number increased again in 1976, though reports of 600-1,000

    Cuban troops were exaggerated. The Somali mission includes 60-70

    pilots, but most of the advisers are probably working with Somali

    internal security forces and the various guerrilla groups that are

    a part of the politics of the Horn of Africa.

    Much the same can be said about the Cuban mission to Iraq,

    where perhaps 150 advisers arrived in July and August 1976. In

    Mozambique, by mid-1976, about 250 Cuban advisers were training

    members of the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). Their numbers had

    increased to perhaps 600 by year's end, and the Cubans appear to be

    edginq out the Chinese as the guerrillas' primary advisers.

    In connection with the continued fighting in Angola, per-

    haps 400 Cubans remain stationed in Congo-Drazzaville, where they

    support Cuban troops in Angola and nearby Cabinda. As many as 3,O0O

    Cuban troops had been reported transferred to the Congo from Angola

    in mid-1976. At the opposite end of Angola, Cuban instructors train

    guerrillas of the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

    South Africa returns the favor by helping Jonas Savimbi's UNITA, which

    is still fighting in Angola.

    Finally, in the wake of Fidel Castro's recent trip to Africa,

    one mission (thus far, numbering about 50) was sent to Ethiopia to train

    -10-

  • the popular militia, and others, of roughly the same size, have been

    sent to Zambia (to train Rhodesian guerrillas) and reportedly to Libya

    (to serve as presidential guards).

    In summary, Cuban foreign policy in Africa has been consistent

    for more than a decade, with Cuban advisers training guerrilla groups

    and popular militias, and serving in other internal security roles, in

    more than a dozen African (and more recently, Middle Eastern) countries.

    That policy included support for the Angolan MPLA.

    Active Cuban support for the MPLA dates back to 1965. It

    developed not only because Agos':inho Neto and his people had the proper

    ideological credentials, but because Cuba considered their rivals -•

    FNLA leader Holden Roberto, and his patron, President Mobutu of Zaire --

    to be tools of the CIA. Havana further accused Mobutu, in the late 1960s,

    ot using Cuban exiles both to run Zaire's transport system and to train

    the FNLA. The same "counterrevolutionary forces" arrayed against Cuba

    itself were thus seen to be arrayed age'nst the MPLA as well. Success

    of the MPLA would be both a victory against colonialism and a defeat for

    the enemies of the Cuban revolution.

    The Angolan civil war represented the playing out of these and

    other long-standing interests in the fate of Portugal's last colony in

    Africa. Cuban involvement in that conflict was predictable, given its

    specific interests, and its record of military diplomacy in that region,

    What the events of 1975 determined was the extent and timing of that

    involvement.

    -II-

  • There are a number of good chronologies of events in

    Angola in 1975. Suffice it to say here that, as a result of

    fighting among the rival liberation groups in March 1975, arms

    deliveries to the MPLA by the Soviet bloc were increased. But

    what can a largely illiterate guerrilla force do with a growing

    inventory of sophisticated weaponry? In May, the MPLA asked for

    Cuban advisers. In June, the first 230 Cubans arrived to establish

    four training camps in MPLA-held territory in Angola and Cabinda.

    This mission was about as large as the one that had been sent to

    help the guerrillas in Portuguese Guinea, or the original mission

    to South Yemen -- a curious fact, given the greater size of Angola,

    unless the initial deployment was what amounted to a standard

    training unit.

    The scope of the necessary commitment probably became

    clear soon after this first contingent of advisers arrived. A

    larger contingent of perhaps 1,500 Cubans -- what Havana calls

    "instructors" and what the U.S. calls "combat troops" -- reached

    Angola aboard Cuban ships in late September and early October.

    Some of these troops manned the Cuban training camps, while others

    joined MPLA forces in the field. They were, in short, both instruc-

    tors and combat troops. But this does not necessarily contradict

    Cuba's later claim not to have sent "combat units" until South African

    forces had intervened in strength. As in Portuguese Guinea, Cuban

    troops appear to have been serving with MPLA units, at this point,

    rather uian in units of their own. Even South Africa's account of

    -12-

  • the fighting (as given in a widely reported press release of February

    1977) seems to refer to separate Cuban combat units only after the

    first week of November. Furthermore, given the ratios of troops to

    advisors maintained by Cuba in Portuguese Guinea and South Yemen

    (between 20:1 and 50:1), and the size oi the advisory task in Angola

    (to train an army of 30,000 men), a 1,500-man advisory group was

    not outsized. The effort, though greater, was consistent with

    previous Cuban behavior.

    The Cuban six-month training timetable was set back when

    the South African-supported mechanized column entered the war on

    October 23. The Cuban mission, and the war, were soon in serious

    danger. Cuba responded with an air/sea trooplift (and the Soviet

    Union responded with an arms airlift) as Angola swiftly became Cuba's

    first conventional war. The South African intervention was not a

    post facto rationalization for Cuban involvement, but a real threat

    to Cuban lives and to Cuba's ten-year commitment to the MPLA.

    Cuba's Africa policy dates from the mid-1960s, and in its

    earlier stages, Cuba's involvement in Angola tracked closely with

    that policy. Given that much, what can be said about the concept

    of proxy war and the contention that the Cubans merely function

    as surrogates for the Soviets in Africa, at Moscow's behest?

    Cuba's present policy toward Africa evolved during a

    period of tension in Cuban-Soviet relations that has been well docu-

    mented in the scholarly literature. Castro crossed Soviet policy

    in South America by supportirg armed struggle as the only means of

    -13-

  • bringing on the revolution. His support for guerrilla groups under-

    mined the quiet "united front" strategies of the pro-Soviet Latin

    communist parties.

    At home, Castro flouted the Soviet model of development

    and eased out of power most of Cuba's so-called "old communists",

    replacing them with his own men. A number of them were accused of

    conspiring against the government. This "microfaction", as Castro

    called it, wanted to bring Cuba's revolution in line with Soviet

    policy, and sought Soviet political and economic pressure against

    Castro's "petty bourgeois" regime to that end. The trial and im-

    prisonment of the microfaction in early 1968 marked the nadir of

    Cuban-Soviet relations. Yet, six months later, Fidel Castro was one

    of the few communist leaders outside the Warsaw Pact to endorse the

    invasion of Czechoslovakia. In the interim, the Soviet Union had

    apparently exerted the kind of ecanomic pressure that the micro-

    faction's leaders had sought. Indeed, all Cuban criticism of the

    Soviet Union ceased. Beyond that, Cuban support for guerrilla groups

    in Latin America began to dry up. By early 1970, guerrilla leaders

    in Venezuela and Colombia were castigating Castro's "betrayal" of

    proletarian internationalism.

    Cuban missions to Africa also tailed off in the late 1960s,

    but the drawdown began before the arrest of the microfaction and

    the subsequent Soviet clampdown, suggesting that factors other than

    Soviet pressure were responsible for this decline. One was probably

    the decline of the Cuban economy -- pushed to collapse in 1970 --

    -14-

  • and the dwindling availability of funds to support overseas missions.

    Another was clearly the political unrest in the Congo. When the

    Cuban mission was asked to leave, it left, and no other countries

    asked for Cuban help.

    Similarly, a recovering Cuban economy and increases in the

    number of targets of opportunity in Africa and the Middle East can

    account in part for the rise in Cuban activism in the 1970s. Cuban-

    Soviet relations have grown closer, and this cooperation has increased

    Cuban capabilities, through Soviet-assisted retraining and reorganiza-

    tion of the armed forces. But the increase in cooperation seems not

    to have affected Cuban intentions. Indeed, Cuba's Africa policy

    today seems indistinguishable from what it was in 1966, when Moscow

    and Havana were at odds.

    This suggests very strongly that Cuban activities in

    Africa have their roots in Cuban, rather than Soviet, interests and

    motives, undermining the "proxy" model of Cuban behavior. The record

    of Cuban activities, furthermore, shows considerablo precedent for

    the initial Cuban deployments to Angola and suggests ample incentives

    for Cuban participation in that conflict, apart from any reasons

    the Soviets may have had for wanting the Cubans to be there. If

    Cuban behavior in Angol~served Soviet interests, Soviet behavior

    equally served Cuban interests -- the two sets converged. Many accounts

    of Angola have focused on Soviet interests alone. This leads to p

    characterization of Angola as a war by proxy -- with patron and

    clients, chessmaster and pawns -- when it might better be characterized

    as a war waged by allies, which the Marxist allies won.

    -15-

  • Future Cuban activities in Africa will depend in part on

    the effects of continued fighting in Angola, and on the unfolding

    of events in Rhodesia. But the consistency of Cuban policy, its

    relative longevity, and the results of Castro's recent trip suggest

    that Cuban activism in Africa is likely to continue. Cuban military

    missions in Africa, long part of local politics, appear to be on the

    continent to stay.

    -16-

  • CNA Professional Papers - 1973 to Present"

    ppI1O3 PP 116 P 2 hsl~Frledheim. Robert L.. "Pollikal Aspects of Ocean Rebhm, Alto S , "An Assetsimet or Military opera.-Eologyi" 48 pp., Feb 1973, published in Who lions Research in the USSR:' 19 pp, Sep 1973, PP9127

    Protect% the Oceans, John La~rremrc Hargrove led) (Reprinted from Pmoceedilap. 30th Military opera. Drseulrch, GZPo It., "Ties3a~ Utlop's Questofa(St. Paul West Publ'it. Co., 1974), published by the items Research Symposium (U), Secret Dec 1972) AteSS to He !'afihties ina A"p Pdo to *he JuraAnreriwin Society of Internallortal Law) AlD 757 93or AD) 770 116 War of 147111 w4p-p.. Jul 1974. AD 706 318

    pp 104 Pla117 F1311Schitk, Jack M., "A Revisew of James Cable, Gunboat McWhits, Peter 9. and Ratliff. It. Dasied.*' Ds. vow, hw Votea Leekooam Roeret F., -" NOONpeDiplomaicy political Applications of Limited Naval funding, a Lgistics Syatemn Under Mining Attack,"00 of Need 0111 sofr Franwsape." I I *p, Mewiyst afForces," 5 pp., Feb 1973,.(Reviewedin the American 24 pp.,Aug 1976 (to be slonattd for publicationl in *0 30 AN*st Ce~veffloo or tOe AeselePolitical Sciensce Review. Vol. LXVI. Dec 1972) Naval Reaseareh 1401110 Quarterly), Presented at Pnytholosifil Awoieloo. 1914) #As t974.

    44th National Meeting, Operations Research Society AD 754 Oilpp His of Amerkca November 1973, AD A030 434Corn, Robert J and Phsillips, Gary R.. "On Optimal *rMivetly of Fkare, PP 129Correetion of Gunfiue Errors," 212 pp., Mar 1973, eeRes~ch OuPgOnted Iin Peor sisri Oftice of Now'. Rd",l Arlon od Ileewita, StWubY, "Pawla U01.AD 761 674 Reorwch ContgractN0001E41680273-0017 oi haoe5heiaa i mePte of

    Paria Usalmat"4p. s1974, (Ps*tb

    Sloloff, Peter H.. "User's Guide for Gurreralteed "Iaro. C.L IXrard 4Mak, 3,l, Bp. Ar Saae 97)A 8Factor Analysis program (FACTAN)." 35 pp. Fe~b 1973,oot ( .Rerinted, "from Opmlit:' 18ers Vol.2, Ar Snwr17)A 11973, (Includes an addendusm Publiahed Avg 1974) No. 2, MowrAjr 197,1) PP ts~s h1ur "nt d hes O eeAD) 738 924 DMNý1 0."d i W o "

    PP 107 pp 119 Na111al Goaened dIPa. lueesm In WeNUl hib'SUN*Staloff. Peter H.. "Relating Favtor Analytically Do StolofT, Petar and Lockmnu, Robert F, "Develosp OW tW 20 It. 1974, AD 716 3V#lived MeauMe to Exopnoun Variables.' 17 pp. Mar -en of Navy Human Relationsa Qusietierstaire," 2 pp 1311973. AD 73A8 120 PP.. May 1974. (Poblished In American Psychological m .."saybo or v'w e

    Association Proceedings, list Annual Conwatnw, o , WesansI Roloo" G5p.. "Analss of974, ' (PubllrelPP l09 1973) AD) 779 240 1oWe Naval Polic" .4 M. Aug 1974~ w, NnW" t

    MtcCosnnell, Jameis Me and Kelly. Anne M , "Super. scre 120i YokP~ pn ky)A MWra3I9INpower Naval Diplonsacy an the lrtdrrPakistani Cril'" p 214 pp. S Feb 1973. (Published, witht rertjoia.l, 1 Smith, Michael te. and Sebrimper, Renald A..* P 132Survival, NeseIDue 1973) AD 761 673 'Economnic Analysis of the [atrocity DI5ilooedo of Itisinnus. Seesaw D., "Raid Diflompaw ta HowCriminal Activity,' 30 pp.. Jusn 1974, (Presented atN re t ieMre:AFeiisyRpit"7PP10 the Econometric Society Meetings, 3o Dec 1973) W W.,% F heb 93 (Maarkel:a 2 A t 1974w %Wt, I 77

    BersvineltuFrndeGJust 7970 (Pr3ei pp. Fob~ 1ha 75, I(Hopier Was2 c t 94 tIRediefr.Frd ."Salaries A Framework for flth AD803 Eeoeontiic Association Conenetion IR AMoy, N.Y.)Study of Tread," & pp. Dec 197.1, (Publishead in .conorrks.North CeamlimSrae &L'rfrrstv AD A 00 I31Review of Inessia and Wealth, Series 1ll, No 4, Dec f113"ocieessdRteinof P13

    Aulpoata. Joseph, "A Crmitiqu of Costl Analysis,' ui 49th Annual Conference, Western Economic Astocia AD A 007 912

    pp.. Jut 1973, AD 766 376 in oVgsNo.10Jn97)A7053

    Herrick, Robert W., "Thei USSR's 'Waru Belt of Kelly. Anne M., '"The Soviet Nava 11e1en1. Rain M.up VpeAn o 1f, a . Pw.D e.0F"A " o NhestUsfense Concept A Unfloid MWltary, Plait for Der the firaq iuwsiti Border Dispiute. Maech.-AprlJ 1973." koif Vllrdy time" 39 pp., Dec 1975, (Mo.,lease Apinte Srabomre Nuclear Attack by Strike 34 pp.,iJun 1974, (Plsliffihed in Soviet Nava Pokey.('arriers and Polaris/Poaidon SSBNs," 1II pp. May oe Michael kiceGuie; New Yok Prser .tdic ltyWA V Ol ' . ofEjbe llatened13141971, At)766 375 AD 780 S92 'jljp.rmaat of MwsMss Eelh werfultg U wffi~sy

    PP 112 PP9123 0! NgybsaGinabers, Lawarence H. "ELF Atmrosphere Noise Petersen, Chattle C., "The Soviet Pbrt'Clearlss Opewra ?i' 134Level Staislitics for Project SANGJUINE," 29 pp, Apr tions int Dongladsa, March 1972'Dwomnbor 1973," 35 Gerdresse, Koenteti A.; Kunasoek, Richardi A.;1974, AL) 786 %9 PP., Jun 1974, (Publalats~d In Michae MccGure, et Al. wiseowriaws Komur, "An**sh of Cl~osr Aieeatioaves

    (ads) Sovest Naoval Policy: Objectives and Conatrakasta, fat Naval Statiesta11 ad Nava Air Bllatle..", 47 p9, 3pp 113 (Now York: ProperrPubliaw, ,1974) AD 780S40 Jun IV75 (RePrInted flu.is "Hewlatin Wofre the

    Ginsberg, Lawreince H, "Propagation Anomaslors fludicomalitlse an MitR" Ooasttarle of thisa Cop.Dunag Project SANGUINE Exeprrmaats." 5 Ppp Apr pp 124 wAtiea oa Armed -erv'ce" U.S. flansita. 93rd Cowt1974, AD ?86 %a Frivliziala, Rtobert L and John, Mary F. *Antics. aresa, lit Seabow, Net 2.22 An 1973)

    Petiag! Soviet Behavior at the Third U.N. Law of thoPP 114 Sea Confterenc: USSIR Pooldtosr and Dilssaaa," 37 V 136

    blalcesy, Arthur P., "Job Satisfaction and Job pp., 10 Apr 1974, (Publihe in Soviet Naval Pokey, Stallkepa Ulilm. ICyhoertica fad DehopelieTuanovei,"411pp,,1al1973,AD768410 ad Michael WeeGwis., Now York Proegpt) Therapy, I~pp,Jwsa 913

    AD) 763 701P1,115 P137

    Silverman, Leater P, "The Dtlerirnasnts of Enter. PP9125 hwtwe Chilise C., "The skivia waes ad thepsacy and Elnesiver Admissions to Hospitals.' 143 Welinlead, Robert G.. "Soviet Naval Opseatuiona-Tet Reopening of the bse Cada: ~eee gOPeosprp., 18Jul 1973, AD)766 377 Yearsof Chopa," 17 pp.. Asse 1974, (Pubhloott in Mesa is ties Gulf of Siuez" 3Op. sag 7,

    Soviet Naval Policy, ad. Michae MceGwlr; New AlD AOIS 376York: Presser) AD 783 962

    IONA Professional Papers with an AD number may be obtained from the National Technical Informnation Service, U.S. Departmentof Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Other papers are available from the author &t the Center for Naval Anglyse 1401

    Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

  • CNA Professional Papers - 1973 to Prasent (Continued)

    pp 139 PP9149 PP9161

    Stallings. William.l "BRIDGE: An Interactive Dl.& Sourets, Michael L., "Counterforsie Effiectiverees .A Milich. Michael E. and Peel, Vice Ador. Ray (USN.

    leeGnrt~lFacility," 5 pp', Au$ 1975 (Re. Comparison of the To"pi "K" Meanor, and a Comn- Retired), "Fleet Comnmanders. Afloat or Ashtore'" 9

    prntd wmIEE Tralsactiona, o Systems. Man. puter Simulahtion," 24 pp.. Mar 1976 (Presented at pp.. Aug 1976 (Reprinted from U.S. N"ie

    Ins~titut

    and Cybernetics, Vol. 5, No. 3.,May 1973) teneraialStudy Association Meeting, 27 Feb Pincqeddings. Jun 1976) AD k030 45o

    1976) AD A.022 591

    PP 139 PP 162

    Morgan. William F., Jr., "Beyond Folklore rand Fables PP 150 Ffiridlsfim, Robert L., "Parliamentary Diplomacy."

    in Forestry to Positive Economrics," 14 pp., (Pwe Kelly, Anne M. and Petersen. Chadle. "Recent 106 pp. Sep 1976 AD A033 306

    tabentu at Southern Economic Association Meetings Changes in Soviet Nave~ policy: Prospects f'or Arnoe

    November, 1974) Aug 1975, AD A015 293 Lnmitations in the Mediterranean land Indian Ocean," PP 163

    28 pp., Ape 1976, AD A 023 723 Lockmran, Robert F., "A MOde for PredictIngl Re.

    PP 140 cmit Lownell" 9 ppý. Sep 1976 (Presensted at the 64th

    Mahoney. Robert and aieuchnen. Doeila, "SirmiLa. pp 151 annual convention of the American paycwaala~

    lion. Experimentation, and Content." 36 pp.. I Sep HiOrowitt. Stanley A., "now Economic Conmequenicea Association, Washington. DR. 4

    Sep 1976)

    1975, (Publisahed in Simulation A Guone, Vol 6. No. of PoItcal Philooaphsy," A pp., Ape 1976 (Reprinted AD A030 459

    3. Sep 1975) from Economic Inquiry, Vol. XIV, No. [,Mar 1976)

    Okktti5UkhW Ie'. PP 164

    pp 152 Mahoney, Robert I., Jr., "An Aumeatnmenof Mible

    PP 141 Mislaid, Maurice M.. "Oni Nth Integral sohutionst of and Elite Pereeptions In FrINc". The United King

    Mirrabli, Maurice M... "Geneealisrd Harrilet Poly. the Selseodinger Equationl, Without Utititing I%- donm, Ind the Federal Republic of Geormany, 31 pp..

    nomlial,"' 5 pp., Faeb 1976 (Repainted from the cedure.,' 10 pp.. Apr 1976 (Reprinted from Journal Feb 1977 (Preaented at Confetence hieceptlitt

    of

    Journal of Computationial and Applied Mathematics, of Mathematical Phsysics, Vol 17, No 4 (Apr 1976), the U.S. - Sovit Blalnce and the Political Uses of

    Vol I.No 4 (1975). .71-277). %6&575) Military Power- sponsored by Director, Advanced

    *Res'aeefh supoepur'd br els Nertosial -Scient'e liResnawh supported by the Notionael science ftemearch Projects Apincy, April 1976) AD 036 599

    PP 165

    PP 141 PP9153 odoJnM**fetofTaeRsrcis-

    "LcAmen. Rohert F, Jeo.n Chritlopher, and lMitrahil. Maurice M.. l"WKB Expansions by Path imort, ams MfSte."Effeclipof Trade ban 1976. on

    Shughart. William F. 1I, "Modees for EstimatinS Pro, tategrils. With Applicationa to the Anharmonic limports I ofB Steel."67nce.,Nn e 1976) Pa

    mature Leaves and Recruiting District Petforoirnce." Oacillaltie,"" 137 pp., May 1976, (Suboalicil fo aeertILSCneecei e Q6

    16 pp., Dec 1975 (Preaented at the RAND Con. publication in Annalsoif ."hyaicsl. AD A02¶s 44 PP 166

    loervcac on Defense Manpower. Feb 197b, to he Rfesarvik suppiwh'd In, the' Natiivrnr $S'wri Feldman, Paul, "Impedimenta to the lfeplmentatime

    published in tire conference proceeduing) Foendotion of Dealrable Cheanp in the Regalation Of Urinal

    AD A 020 443 Public Trnsoetatiott." 12 pp.. Oct 1976,

    PP 1S4 AD A033 322

    pp143 Mizrata, Maurice M., "On the Senr*Ctneaicll Ex.

    Ikirowfit. Stanley and Shermn.o Allan (L.Cdr., USN), painsmioIn Quantum Mechanics for Arbitrary PP 166f - Rosined

    "Maintenanice Nl'eruone Effectrueneas na the Navy," Haminllonlans," 19 pp.ý May 1976 (To appearl in the Feldman. Paul, "Whry It's Dlffkcul to Clanada Reglale

    13 pp. Ian 15176 (presented &t the RANDConference Jou~rnal of Mathemratical Physics) AD A02S 441 IK~n,"Oct 1976

    on Detens Manpowee, Feb 1976 . lio be published inthe ociferkcirr pinceedrulp AD A021 Sal pp 155

    pp167Squemn Michael L., "Soviet Foreigs Policy and Thiud Kleinmaun. Samuel, "ROTC S~eic Catowtnisnt

    a

    PP 144 World Nalituisn," 26 pp. Jun 1976 (Prepared for commant," 4 pp.. Nov 1976. (To he published110 in

    Dutach Wilhltr J., "Ther Navy of the Republic of oresenatshori at the Midee-n Political Sioner Ainsiot I' public Choicet, Vol XXIV, Fall 1976) AD A033 305

    China - History, Problem,. and Prospects",' 66 pp.. lion mettioga. Apr ",.1976) AD A028 318l

    Aol 1976, (To be pebtshed in "A Gotsit to Asiatic pp6ta

    Pleeta,' ed. by Beery M 21echonan. Naval Institute PP 156 Lockaman, Robeet F , "Relvelidatioe% of ('NA Suppoe

    Press) AD A.030 460 Stallings. William, "Appiriehes to Chninse Character Paros;WtelSlection Meinimrels" 36 pp.. Nov 1976

    Recognition," 12 pp., Jun 1976 (Reprinted trorn

    PP 145 Pattern Recognition (Peigmiion Not'), Vol 8. Pp PP 169

    Kelly, Anne M , 'Poe9 Visit and the "Ilnernuto"Ilst 87.98, 1976) AD A028 692 Jacobson. Louis S., "Earnings Lawsee of Workers

    Mission" of the Soonet Navy," 3,6 pp. Apr 1976Dipae frm anacungIdsil. 8 p,

    AD A23 46 pp157Nov 1976. (Deliverd as ILAs Conkfeee in DecMorgan. Williom F. "tUnemploymnta and the 1976)

    pp 146 Pentagon budget Is There Any~thing as the Empty

    Fit'moua. Vernon E.. "Alteenstlves for Increasing Pork hereil"' 20 pp, Aug 1976 AD A.030 45 5 PP 170

    Acrew so Scientific Journal~s:' 6 pp.,~Apr 1975 Prechllag, Frank P., "A lime Series Ainalysis of

    (Presented at she 1975 IEEE Conference on Scientific pp Is$ Labor Turnover," Nov 1976. (Delivered at ILASII

    Journals, Cherry tibll, N C., Apr 2&-30. published in Haskell. LCdr Richard D, (USN). "Experimental Conference in Dec 1976)

    IEEEI Tranuations on Professnonall Commnunication. Valiidation of Probability Predictions " 25 pp , Aug

    Vol PC'. Il,No 3, Sep 1973) AD A021 798 1976 (Preseolad at the Military OpciAItons RCMFarh ppl'i1

    Society Meetingl. Fall 1976) AD A030 458 Rlalston, James M., "A Difftsion Model foe G&? Red

    P eP lr 14h7 ta. Lglliie nPoecig p 5 LED Degradatloas" 10 pp., Nov 1976. (Pablishd in

    Olahsier , Journalan ofss Aliaves iynca

    VLctn P 5 47, pp 4511.4527.

    of mStructures," 33 pp, Jun 1976 (Prepared Mcconnaell Janse M, "The Goruhkov Articles, TV Joctna ofA976) Pyc,

    unde task order N,00014-6&1A.0D91-0023 foe ONI) New Goeslskon Book and Thlsi Relation to Policy,* Oc196

    AD A029 389 93 pp. Jul 1976 (To he printed to Soviet Nrvel P 7

    Inflerair omerk id oriaai iriivsiet, c by Claneen, Kathleen P., "Waimln~tagly nt Inaanc and

    PP 148 M MccGwlee aind J. McDonnell. New York Presser) th Legh of Uneployment." Doc 1976, (Presented

    McConnell, Janese M , "IdiltaryotiaTkafth AD A.029 227 at the University ol Rochester Labor Woekulnp on 16

    Soviet Navy in War mid Peace." 62 pp., Dec 1975No196(Published in Soviet Oceans Devielopment Study Of PP

    No6076

    Senate Commrrece commnittee October 1976) Wilson, Desmonds P, Jr., "The U.S Stixth Fleet and P 7

    AD A022 590 the Conventional Defeins of Europe," S0 pp. Sep pp Noeon73d ifribr

    1976; (Submitted for publication In Adeliphi Papers. Kleminman Samuel D.,"ANtonRiaLlfres

    1.1SS Lndo) D 0304int the Addsd.Wocka/DieUhlled-WO&WO Contro

    1.1 S Lndon ADP.03457veiny,' 2 pp. Dec 1976, (Pubisbhoed inthise AmericanEconoinsit, Vol XX. No I, Spring 1976)

    -2-

  • CNA Professional Papers - 1973 to Present (Continued)

    PP 174 PP' 185Mahoney. Robert B , Jr ,. "A Comiparisonr of ihe Kassing, David, "'New Technology arnd Naval Forces pp 195Bitrookings and International Incidents Projeos," 12 in the South Atlantic," 22 pp (This paper wur the lreoiling, Frank, "Unemployment Insurance Taxespp reb 1977 AD 017 206 basis for a presentation ruode at rthe Institute for aird Labor Turnover: Summary of Theoretical

    Foreign Policy Anulyscs, C'ambridge, Mass , 28 April Findings," 12 pp. (Reprinted from Industrial andtop 15 197) [ahot Relation, Review. Vol 30, No. 40. Jut

    Levine, Daiiiel, Stoltrff, Peter arid Spritill, Nancy.197"Public Drug Treatineni and Addict Conici," June PP 1861976, (Published in Journal of Legeal Studies. Vol Mizinhl., Maurice M . "Phase Space Integral%, With pp 3965. Nit 2) out Unfititng Procedure," 31 pp., May 1977, (Sub. Ralston, J. M. and Loerimae, 0. G.. "Degradation of

    nutted fire publication in Journal of Mathematical Bulik Eloctolr mbownlaeant Efflcimcksy in Zn, 00opedPP l7tr Physics) aP LED's." July 1977, 3 pp. (Reprinted froes

    Felix, Wendi, "Correlates of Retentioin and Pro WBEE Tiarrisatiotts ott Electronr Davaiesa. Vol.rariroir liii USNA G'raduates," Itt pp ,Mar 1977 PP 197 MD24, No. 7, July 1977)

    Coite. Russell C., "Nomography foe Opera linus Re.'I' 177 search," 35 pp., April 1977, (Presented atithe Joint pp 199

    Llsirian.n Robert F and Warner, John T., 'Pie National Meeting of the Operutuotis Research Dutich, Wllim J3 "Revolutioan Prom A F A.R -ddiring Atfritinur A Test rut Alternative '.p Sootety ouf Amenica and The Institute for Manage. Thue Cuban Armend Forces in Africa and thre Middlaepiwoutles." 13 ps; Mar 1977 (Presentied a1t fhe nient Services, Sun Francisco, Cahlornia. 9 May East," Sep 1977. 16 pp.OSD/ONR Criti reire oint I iilitird Attition Xeroox 1977)Irnternatioiial Training Ce'nter,, Lcesburir. Virginia. pp 2034 7 April 1977) pp 1111 Duirchs. Wtllsinm J . "Tires Cuban MIliteny in Africa

    Dutch, William IJ, "Infor'natimo Processirng and and Thor Middle Esau Prom Algeria to Angola."IT' 1714 Oul~onele Forecasting for Multilaterul Negoutiatirona Sep 1977, 67 pp

    Kleiinirani. Qi~inuel 1) "Aiu I virlutritn rif Nivy Uir Testing One Appioach," 53 pp. May 1917 (Pre.trosiritit'd Line Ot1kt or ,ressin~v Pingr~irra." 21 pp paied for preseintation to the 18th Annual CownvertApo! 1477 (l'in Ir preseirted at tho NATO Cii lio'n offit th te rrrnational Studies Association,totoire nour Mirnnlnnwer Plannring u1nd Otgrvufatrirr Ctisre.Park Plasa Hotel, St Louis, Matuoun, MarchDe'signr, Sirosi, hinly. !0 June 0t77) lb 7n, 1977)

    PPV 179 ISO8Stolrilf, Peter 11 aird PIIIIut Stephen I , "VOr..ile A Code, Russull C , "Error Detecticon in ComputerierdModet for Personnel Inventoriy Planniang Ur.~et lnfarnsattvn Retrieval Data fltes," Jaly, 1911, 13Changing Mariagemient p'olity," 14 pp Atirit 10a71, pp., Tii he presented At tihe Sixth Cruanfeld IntterITo hea p'reniedl at the NATO Coniereit on Mao natsional Conifereee on Mecharuined Infoemationapouwer Plroning and Otpruitiort~iri Ieblon Siresi. Storage, and Retinevall Systema. Cianfsiled Institutetily, 20 June 1i9771 of Techtnology Cianfield, fladforJ, FrSglsed. 26.29

    July 1977PP 1110

    Ilniorwitt. Staniley A and cinefirrnao Allan. 'The pp 11i)('luractarensait 'A Naval Polei.uinel And P'eisonnel Mabiouney, Rintoett It, Jr , "ltaropean PenteptiorisPeritoiiiiatic" 16 ppr April 1977, (to ho preuziled And l~air West ('ornipertiton," 96 pp., July 1977at the NATO Coniereecer on Manloower Planning tPiepated fort presentartion at the Annual risertinsand Orginrtttion Design, Stiesa Italy, 20 June of tic~ Interinatioiial Studies Aussiciationr St Louis.1977) MO., Maith. 1477)

    Hitlut Srtj'hen J arid SinIlot Nic Pe "'Air Inventory Ssn'.on, Ronild, "I ti Independent r reld AssignPlanning Model for Nary I rntrvttd Fenoninel,'' 15 HinCur lie Mart's Vicw*,' August 19",. 2s pppp , May 1977, (Prepared for presentation at theJoint National Meetrt'g of the Opertaiotns Reseati.1 p PP 9SSrt~iety of Amcni~a arnd The tinstirtie toi Manage Iloleti, Arlene. "Lilects of Unsemnploymenit Introut Sxuerroe 9 May 1977. Sari l'rantucov ('Air vararke Loittlenretr on Duration and Job Searchformal Outinotre,' August 1977, 6 pp., lI~eptrinted front

    lIndustinal arid f.Abovi Relatioans Review, Votl 30.pp 182 Nun 4, Jul 19771

    Moirtay, Rusacli. 2nd, "The Outfit tot Itir PerfectSitudy or My firnst 11384 Days at ('NA," 57 .p , Pt' 191

    April 1Q77 Horowitz. Sianley A "A Model oi Unemploy

    "turet Insurairte arid the Wink Test." August 1977,pp' 1t3 7 pl, I Reprintied from lIndustrial arid tabhot Re

    baussin. David. "Changes an Soviet Navat t-orees," tattoos Review Vol f4t, No 403, Jul 1477)13 pp., Noveomber, 1976, (Tot he published as a,hrapter it a book publishsed by lie National PP 194Sttateipc Information Centier) ('tannin Kathleen P , "The Efflects of Usemploy

    menri Insuranc~e on the Dunratton of Unemplotyment

    PP 164 and Subsequent Earnings," August 1977, 7 ppInockinan, Roheil F , "Anr Overview of the (Reprinited trin Industrial and Labor Relations050/ONtO Conferete ~ rat First Term Enlisted Review Vol 10. No 40. Jul 1977)Attrition," 22 pp. laJne 1977, (Presented to the39th MORS Working Groiup oni Manpower andPersonnel Plannitng, Aniraptuti. Md., 28 30 June1977)

    ,3