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THIS DOCUMENT IS T H E PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY-S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1940.

S E C R E T . Copy No. ^ *j

W . M . (40) 148th Conclusions.

T O B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y .

I t is requested t h a t special care may be t aken to ensure the secrecy of th is document.

W A R C A B I N E T 148 (40) .

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Thursday, May 30, 1940, at 5-30 P . M .

P r e sen t : The R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S. CHURCHILL, M . P . , P r i m e Min i s t e r (in the Chair).

The R i g h t Hon . N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN, The R i g h t Hon . C. R. A T T L E E , M.P . , M.P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council . L o r d P r i v y Seal.

The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , The R i g h t H o n . A . GREENWOOD, M.P . , Secre tary of S t a t e for Fore ign Minis te r w i thou t Por t fo l io . Affairs.

The following were also p r e s e n t :

The R i g h t H o n . A. V . ALEXANDER, The R i g h t H o n . A N T H O N Y E D E N , M.P . , M.P . , F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y . Secretary of S ta t e for W a r .

The R i g h t H o n . Si r A R C H I B A L D The R i g h t Hon . S i r J O H N A N D E R S O N , SINCLAIR, Bt. , M . P . , Secretary of M.P . , Secre tary of S t a t e for the S ta te for A i r . Home D e p a r t m e n t a n d Min i s te r of

Home Secur i ty The R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T CALDECOTE, The R i g h t Hon . A . D U F F COOPER, M.P . ,

Secre tary of S t a t e for Dominion Minis te r of In fo rma t ion . Affairs.

The R i g h t H o n . M A L C O L M M A C D O N A L D , Mr . R. H . C R O S S , M.P . , Min i s te r of M.P . , Min i s t e r of H e a l t h (Item 11). S h i p p i n g (Item 9).

The H o n . S i r A L E X A N D E R CADOGAN, A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L . N . P e r m a n e n t Unde r -Sec re t a ry of S t a t e N E W A L L , Chief of the A i r Staff. for Fore ign Affairs .

A d m i r a l of t he Fleet S i r D U D L E Y Genera l S i r J O H N D I L L , Chief of the P O U N D , F i r s t Sea L o r d a n d Chief of Imper i a l Genera l Staff. Naval Staff.

Secretariat. Sir E D W A R D B R I D G E S . Major -Genera l H . L . I S M A Y . Lieutenant-Colonel V . D Y K E S , R E . Group C a p t a i n W . E L L I O T . Mr. E . P . DONALDSON. Mr. G. N. F L E M M I N G .

W A R C A B I N E T 148 (40) .

CONTENTS. Minute

No. Subject. Page 1 The Wes t e rn F r o n t 311

Withdrawal of the B.E.F. from France. Situation at Dunkirk.

2 The A i r S i tua t ion ... , 311

3 F rance 312 Communications with the French Government.

4 U n i t e d Sta tes of Amer ica ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 Message from President Roosevelt to His Majesty The King.

5 I t a ly 312 Suggested direct approach to Signor Mussolini.

6 I t a ly 313 Probable intentions.

7 I t a ly 313 Action against Italians in the United Kingdom.

8 Seizure of Crete in the event of I t a l i a n host i l i t ies . . . . . . 313 9 Norway 314

10 Invas ion of Grea t B r i t a i n ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 11 Evacua t ion of school chi ldren ... ... . . . . . . 316

9 n o i? ^

The Western Front. Withdrawal of the B.E.F. from France. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 147th Conclusions, Minute 1.)

Situation at Dunkirk.

The AirSituation.(PreviousReference:W.M. (40) 146thConclusions,Minute 4.)

1. The Prime Minister said t h a t he h a d received conflicting accounts of the numbers of the Br i t i sh E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force who h a d been evacuated. The W a r Office figure of the numbers evacuated to Dover, Ramsga te , M a r g a t e and H a r w i c h since the 20th M a y were as follows :—

B r i t i s h fit 92,642 B r i t i s h wounded 8,152 All ies 4,447

To ta l ... 105,241

The A d m i r a l t y had given a figure of 86,000.

L a t e r in the Meet ing the First Lord of the Admiralty sa id t h a t the A d m i r a l t y figure for the number landed a t all the po r t s u p to 12 noon t h a t day was 101,154.

The Prime Minister asked t h a t the W a r Office and the A d m i r a l t y should, in fu ture , collaborate in comput ing the numbers of B r i t i s h and other t roops evacuated from France , w i t h a view to submi t t ing an agreed repor t to the W a r Cabinet .

The P r i m e Min i s te r r ead a repor t from D u n k i r k s t a t ing t h a t a ship h a d been sunk there t h a t a f ternoon under condit ions which suggested t h a t i t m i g h t be difficult to cont inue to use the h a r b o u r ; t h a t fog was seriously in t e r f e r ing w i t h the evacuat ion; a n d t h a t progress was being delayed by the w i t h d r a w a l of the more modern destroyers.

The Chief of Naval Staff sa id t ha t he h a d no knowledge of th i s repor t and t h a t every available destroyer was being used.

L a t e r in the Mee t ing the Minister of Information r ead to the W a r Cabine t a d r a f t communique as to the opera t ion of w i t h d r a w a l from France and as to the very successful a i r fighting on the previous day (see M i n u t e 2).

The Secretary of State for War sa id t ha t Lord Gor t h a d been placed in a difficult posi t ion owing to the fact t h a t the senior French officers at D u n k i r k had received no orders a t all about evacuation. I f the F rench received clear orders to evacuate as many of the t roops as possible, the B r i t i s h could th in out the t roops hold ing the per imeter , bu t in present c ircumstances Lord Gor t felt compelled to r e t a in local reserves for counter -a t tack in order not to let the F rench down. The Secretary of S ta te suggested t h a t a te legram should be sent by the P r i m e Min i s t e r to M. R e y n a u d ask ing for the F rench act ion to be co-ordinated w i t h t h a t of the Br i t i sh . H e read the te rms of the proposed te legram to the W a r Cabinet .

Af t e r discussion, the W a r Cab ine t— (1) Au thor i sed the Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff to

despatch to Genera l W e y g a n d a te legram in the above sense.*

(2) Approved the te rms of an official s ta tement to be made to the P ress by the Min i s t ry of In fo rma t ion announcing t h a t evacuat ion was in progress , and g iv ing some descr ip t ion of the opera t ions which were t a k i n g place.

2. The Chief of the Air Staff sa id tha t d u r i n g the opera t ions on the previous day the Royal A i r Force h a d definitely accounted for 76 enemy a i r c r a f t in F rance and Norway. The t rue figure probably amounted to more. Three of these had been shot down in

Norway and the remainder over D u n k i r k . Aga ins t this , our to ta l losses h a d amounted to 30. Th i s figure included 16 F igh t e r s a n d

3 out of 15 heavy Bombers which h a d been caugh t by fog on * Copy attached to these Conclusions.

France. Communica­tions with the French Government. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 147th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

United States ofAmerica.Message fromPresident

r e t u r n i n g from opera t ions on the previous n igh t . The crews of these h a d been saved by j u m p i n g w i t h pa rachu te s . The r e m a i n i n g losses h a d been among a i rc ra f t belonging to t he Fleet A i r A r m a n d A i r Component . Bombing opera t ions on the previous day h a d been directed main ly on enemy road movements south of the Br i t i sh Exped i t ionary Force.

The a i r opera t ions in progress t h a t day were being hampered by fog and low cloud; nevertheless, 47 bombers were a t t h a t moment out on var ious missions. The bad flying wea the r over F r a n c e was in our favour in ty ing the enemy to the g r o u n d and p reven t ing h im from bombing the beaches from which the Br i t i sh E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force was evacuat ing . So far, only one enemy a i r c r a f t h a d been repor ted t h a t day over D u n k i r k .

The W a r Cabine t took note of the above s ta tement .

3 . The W a r Cabine t had before them the following infor­mat ion :—

(a) A te legram from the Swayne Miss ion to the W a r Office in r ega rd to the posi t ion on the Oise Canal .

(b) Repor t s to the P r i m e Min i s t e r from Genera l Spea r s as to the posi t ion of the F rench A r m y and French requests for assistance.

Discussion ensued as to the ex ten t of the help wh ich we could afford to the French a t the present j unc tu re . De ta i l s of th i s discussion a re recorded in the Sec re ta ry ' s S t a n d a r d F i le of W a r Cabinet Conclusions.

The W a r C a b i n e t ­(1) Agreed t h a t the P r i m e Min i s t e r and the L o r d P r i v y Seal,

accompanied by the Chief of the I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff, should proceed to F r a n c e on the following day.

(2) Gave general approva l to the l ine which the P r i m e Min i s t e r proposed to t ake in his discussions w i t h the French Government .

4. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the W a r Cabine t t h a t he h a d j u s t h e a r d t h a t the

U n i t e d Sta tes Ambassador h a d asked for an audience w i t h H i s Majes ty The K i n g m o rde r to p re sen t a message from P r e s i d e n t

Roosevelt to His Roosevelt. H e knew no th ing as to the n a t u r e of the message. Majesty TheKing.

Italy. Suggested direct approach to Signor Mussolini. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 146th Conclusions, Minute 12.)

Cab ine t took note of th i s s ta tement . T h e W a r

5, The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t he h a d j u s t received a telephone message from Flis Majes ty ' s Ambassador in P a r i s to t he effect t h a t M. Da lad ie r h a d a g a i n ra ised the quest ion of m a k i n g a d i rect communica t ion to S ignor Mussolini , and h a d handed h im a document se t t ing out the l ines on which he proposed to make such an approach . S i r Rona ld Campbel l had done his best to d issuade M. Dalad ie r , bu t the la t t e r had only r e tu rned to the charge.

The Fore ign Secre tary suggested t h a t i t was useless to a t t empt to r e s t r a in the F rench any longer from m a k i n g the proposed approach , bu t t ha t we m u s t make it qu i t e clear t h a t they should not commit us by any th ing which they sa id to Signor Mussol in i .

The W a r Cabine t approved the l ine of act ion proposed by the Fore ign Secretary.

Italy. Probable intentions. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 146th Conclusions, Minute 10.)

Italy. Action against Italians in the United Kingdom. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 146th Conclusions, Minute 11.)

Seizure of Crete in the Event of Italian Hostilities. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 126th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

6. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d rew the a t t en t ion of the W a r Cabinet to te legram No. 15 (Saving), da ted the 28th May, from H i s Majes ty ' s Ambassador a t Lisbon repor t ing t h a t Dr . Sa lazar was sa id to have expressed the belief t ha t I t a ly would not enter the war .

The W a r Cabinet took note of this s ta tement .

7. The Home Secretary sa id t h a t the number of despera te charac te rs whom he would wish to in t e rn was 1,500 I ta l i ans , p lus 300 Br i t i sh subjects connected wi th I t a l i a n ins t i tu t ions in th i s country .

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said t ha t Count Ciano h a d ra ised w i t h S i r Pe rcy Lora ine the question of evacuat ing B r i t i s h subjects from I ta ly . The Fore ign Secretary suggested tha t , as soon as the French Government had repl ied to the communicat ion which we h a d made to them on the previous day, Si r Percy Lora ine should say to Count Ciano tha t we apprec ia ted the fact t ha t he was p lac ing no obstacle in the way of Br i t i sh subjects leaving I t a l y ; t h a t we should like to act reciprocally and fac i l i ta te the d e p a r t u r e of I t a l i a n s in th is count ry ; t ha t the first shipload would be leaving shortly, and t h a t we should be g lad to know to which por t i t should be directed. H e (the Fore ign Secretary) would be glad if the A d m i r a l t y would a t once have a ship p repa red for th is purpose, so t h a t as soon as we h a d hea rd from the French Government the scheme could be p u t in motion, if so decided.

The Fore ign Secre tary added t h a t we migh t continue in the presen t posi t ion vis-a-vis I t a l y for some fur ther t ime ; was i t necessary t h a t these 1,800 men should be seized at once ?

The Home Secretary sa id t ha t he had no objection to some fu r the r delay, provided t h a t there was no leakage of our intent ions. H e assumed t h a t the communicat ion made to the French had deal t w i t h the m a t t e r on the basis of a r e t u r n of the I t a l i ans to the i r country on h u m a n i t a r i a n grounds .

The Foreign Secretary confirmed tha t our approach h a d been made on these lines.

The W a r Cabinet agreed— (i) T h a t no fu r the r act ion should be t aken in regard to the

in t e rnmen t of I t a l i a n s un t i l a reply had been received from the F rench Government, but t h a t the la t ter should be asked to expedi te the i r reply,

(ii) T h a t in the meant ime the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y should a r r a n g e for a sui table ship to be made available, in which these 1,500 I t a l i ans could be deported as soon as pract icable af ter they h a d been seized,

(iii) T h a t the Fore ign Secretary a n d the Home Secretary, in consultat ion, should review from day to day the question whether these 1,500 I t a l i ans plus the 300 Br i t i sh subjects connected wi th I t a l i a n ins t i tu t ions in this country should be seized.

8. The W a r Cabinet h a d before them a Repor t by the Chiefs of Staff ( W . P . (40) 175) set t ing out the a r rangements which had been concerted wi th the French for the seizure of Crete in the event of an I t a l i a n a t t ack on Greek ter r i tory .

The Chief of the Air Staff said t h a t the All ied forces would take about 48 hours on the voyage. The ships would sail on the orders of local Commanders , wi thou t fur ther reference to the i r home Governments, and a r rangement s had been made to give the

Norway. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 146th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

Invasion of Great Britain. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 147th Conclusions, Minute 3.)

Commanders as early in format ion as possible of a n I t a l i a n a t tack . T h e p l an would not be set in motion unless the I t a l i a n s a t t empted an a t t a c k on Greek soil. T h e Greeks would not be informed of our in ten t ion to occupy Crete un t i l the order for the despa tch of the expedi t ion h a d been issued. I t migh t be difficult to hold Crete indefinitely, w i th the forces proposed, unde r heavy a i r a t t ack from the Dodecanese, but by d i spers ing the t roops to give them protect ion a g a i n s t such a t t ack i t would probably be possible to deny the use of the aerodrome to the I t a l i a n s . I n the last resort the aerodrome could be mined w i t h delay act ion mines, before the forces were evacuated.

T h e W a r C a b i n e t -Approved the a r r angemen t s made for the despa tch of an Al l ied force to seize Cre te in the event of an I t a l i a n a t t ack on Greek te r r i to ry , as set out in P a p e r No. W . P . (40) 175.

9. The W a r Cabinet h a d under considera t ion a M emor andum by the Secretary of S t a t e for Fore ign Affairs in r e g a r d to opera t ions in Norway.

A record of the discussion, and of the conclusions reached, is recorded in the Secre ta ry ' s S t a n d a r d F i le of W a r Cabinet Conclusions.

10. The WTar Cabine t had before them a R e p o r t by the Chiefs of Staff ( W . P . (40) 178).

The Chief of the A ir Staff sa id tha t , in view of recent repor t s of the possibil i ty of a sea-borne ra id on a large scale by a fleet of fas t motor boats, combined w i t h air -borne ra ids , the Chiefs of Staff felt t h a t the Avhole country should be warned a n d roused to the imminen t danger which confronted us . H e drew a t t en t ion to the recommendat ions of the Chiefs of Staff conta ined in p a r a g r a p h 12 of the P a p e r , (b) and (c) h a d a l ready been p u t to the Commander­in-Chief, a n d he was ac t ing accordingly. A s r ega rds (d), add i t i ona l labour for beach defences would be requ i red on a la rge scale. The leng th of coast to be covered was very considerable.

The Lord President of the Council sa id t h a t he was hold ing a meet ing of the Min i s te r s concerned on the following morn ing to deal w i t h the question of rous ing the country. As for t he provision of add i t i ona l labour, the Min i s t e r of Labour had informed h im t h a t Divis ional Control lers h a d a l ready been ins t ruc ted to p r e p a r e the labour exchanges to supply whatever was required , bu t the deta i l s of the requi rements of t he W a r Office h a d not yet been received. The Min i s t e r was p r e p a r e d to use compulsory powers to obtain the labour necessary. T h e L o r d P re s iden t said t h a t he h a d la ter consulted the Commander- in-Chief , Home Forces, who fully concurred in the recommendat ions of the Chiefs of Staff. H e h a d o rdered Commands to proceed immediately w i t h defence works on the beaches, and to p u t local Commanders in touch w i t h the labour exchanges to obta in the men they requi red .

Discussion ensued as to t he possibili ty of different methods of a t t e m p t e d invasion.

The Chief of Naval Staff sa id t h a t there h a d been definite s igns of G e r m a n act ivi ty on the Norweg ian coast. The re were also ind ica t ions t h a t motor-boats h a d been collected a t Bremen and H a m b u r g . Meanwhile , the Germans were known to have an organised force of ships a t Vigo . The disposi t ions to deal w i t h th i s l a t t e r t h r e a t were described. I t migh t also be significant t h a t the Ge rmans h a d left one p a r t i c u l a r s t re tch opposi te our coast clear

of mines. The posi t ion in th i s m a t t e r had been b rough t to the notice of the Commander- in-Chief , Home Forces. I t was hoped tha t the produc t ion of a n t i - t a n k mines for laying on beaches would s t a r t in a week 's t ime.

The Prime Minister doubted whether a r a id on a la rge scale could be ca r r i ed out by fas t motor-boats . These c raf t would have to come over in flotillas, if they were to p u t ashore any useful number of men a t any one poin t . T h e Navy would have to make every endeavour to in te rcept such r a id s on the h igh seas.

The First Sea Lord sa id t h a t submar ine and t r awle r pa t ro ls were being m a i n t a i n e d to get i n fo rma t ion of such ra ids , bu t owing to the speed of the boats and the fac t t ha t they migh t effect the crossing in darkness , the Navy could not gua ran tee t ha t destroyer pa t ro ls would be able to in te rcept them before they reached the shores of th i s country. A single cruiser finding them m i g h t s ink some of the boats, but some would probably get through.

I n the discussion which followed the p r inc ipa l po in ts made were : —

(i) The re was some doubt as to the precise numbers of motor boats which the Ge rmans possessed, bu t they could be fa i r ly quickly constructed. They would be fitted w i t h the aeroplane type of engine,

(ii) The wake which large fast c raf t would leave should be visible to a i r reconnaissance, but experience h a d shown t h a t it was by no means easy to keep t rack of the German motor torpedo boats which h a d been opera t ing recently off the Channel por ts .

(iii) These c ra f t could be readi ly disguised aga ins t a i r reconnaissance as barges . Even if suspicious concen­t r a t i ons were observed in the German or Dutch harbours , i t would be difficult to take effective act ion aga ins t them by n i g h t bombing.

(iv) The coast wa tch ing service h a d been great ly s t rengthened recently, and cons tant wa tch was being main ta ined . Small boat pa t ro ls along the coasts h a d been ins t i tu ted .

The Prime Minister t h o u g h t t h a t we should not hes i ta te to contamina te our beaches w i t h gas if th i s course would be to our advantage . W e h a d the r i g h t to do w h a t we liked w i t h our own te r r i tory .

T h e W a r Cabine t : ­(i) Approved the R e p o r t by the Chiefs of Staff ( W . P . (40)

178). (ii) Took note :—

(a) t h a t the L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council h a d a l ready t aken in h a n d the necessary measures to w a r n a n d rouse the count ry to the imminent danger of invas ion;

(b) t h a t the Commander- in-Chief , Home Forces, was o rde r ing the A r m y a t home to a h igh degree of alertness, pa r t i cu l a r ly a t n ight , a n d was reviewing his disposi t ions in the l ight of the new considerat ions p u t fo rward in the Chiefs of Staff R e p o r t ;

(c) t ha t the Min i s t ry of Labour h a d made all a r r ange ­ments to supply the necessary labour for beach defences, and t h a t the local mi l i t a ry au thor i t i e s had been ins t ruc ted to get in touch w i t h the employment exchanges in order to obtain the i r requi rements .

(iii) I nv i t ed the F i r s t Lord of the A d m i r a l t y to repor t to the W a r Cabinet the naval measures in h a n d ( including the laying of minefields) to prevent a possible l a n d i n g on the E a s t Coast.

Evacuation of School Children. (Previous Eef erences: W.M. (40) 138th Conclusions, Minute 10, and W.M. (39) 121st Conclusions, Minute 2.)

11. The Home Secretary recalled t h a t i t h a d been decided to s t a r t the evacuat ion of school ch i ldren and p r io r i ty classes from nineteen por t s on the E a s t Coast a n d South Coast of E n g l a n d on Sunday. Considera t ion was now being given to the evacuat ion of school chi ldren from London a n d other evacuat ion areas . The Min i s te r of H e a l t h was due to broadcas t t h a t evening inv i t ing pa ren t s to regis ter the i r chi ldren before Monday, the 3 rd J u n e . The inducement to be held out to pa r en t s to regis ter the i r chi ldren was t h a t i t migh t be necessary to s t a r t evacuat ion in the following week, and t h a t those registered by the 3 rd J u n e would go first.

The quest ion arose whether th i s dr ive should proceed or whether , if invasion was regarded as a possibil i ty in the near future , i t would be bet ter to order the evacuat ion of a p ropor t ion of the i nhab i t an t s of the E a s t Coast towns. The a rgumen t for the la t te r course was tha t , if the i n h a b i t a n t s of these towns remained where they were, or d id not move u n t i l the country was invaded, they migh t well in ter fere wi th mi l i t a ry opera t ions . I t would not be possible to proceed w i t h both schemes simultaneously.

The Minister of Health pointed out t h a t h i t he r to the policy had been not to s t a r t evacuat ion from London un t i l bombing h a d actual ly been experienced, but in view of the more recent develop­ments i t migh t be necessary to reconsider th is . H e himself was in favour of a movement from London, & c , to Wes t Count ry a reas on account of the length of t ime requ i red to move the la rge numbers involved.

The Chief of the Air Staff sa id t h a t the Chiefs of Staff were definitely of opinion t h a t the E a s t Coast evacuat ion should be given p r io r i t y over London evacuation.

The Lord President of the Council t hough t tha t , as London was well defended, and experience of Ge rman methods on the Cont inent showed t h a t the enemy pre fe r red to a t t ack small towns a n d villages r a the r t h a n large cities, i t was preferable to avoid by evacuat ion the serious mi l i t a ry difficulties t h a t m igh t be entai led if the E a s t Coast were invaded. On the Other hand , the reg i s t ra t ion of chi ldren in London and other evacuat ion a reas in no way commit ted the Government to proceed wi th the evacuat ion of chi ldren so regis tered on any given da te .

The W a r C a b i n e t : — Author i sed the Home Secre tary and the Min i s t e r of H e a l t h to proceed w i t h the ex is t ing a r rangements , inc luding the broadcas t appea l for the r eg i s t r a t ion of school chi ldren in London a n d other evacuat ion areas , on the unde r s t and ing t h a t these a r r angemen t s in no way pre jud iced the decision as to the da te on which the chi ldren now regis tered should be evacuated, or as to the p r io r i ty between evacuat ion of chi ldren from London, & c , a n d evacuat ion of the " u s e l e s s m o u t h s " from cer ta in Eas t Coast towns.

Richmond Terrace, S.W. 1, May 30, 1940.

A N N E X .

Telegram, from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General Weygand (see Minute 1).

O R D E R S have been sent to L o r d G o r t t h a t he is to cont inue to hold h is present posi t ion as long as possible in order to cover the m a x i m u m evacuat ion of Al l ied t roops. I t is clear t h a t the posi t ion a t D u n k i r k cannot be held indefinitely owing, p r inc ipa l ly , to the difficulty of keeping the forces the re suppl ied w i t h food, wa te r a n d mun i t ions . Pol icy must therefore be to evacuate and orders to th i s effect have been given to L o r d Gor t . I should be glad if you would give s imi lar o rders to the Senior F rench Commander in the D u n k i r k region so t h a t he a n d Lord Gor t may be able to act in complete concord. I am sending a copy of th i s message to L o r d Gor t .