á

by F. ELWYN JONES, Q.C., M.P.

An international movement for freedom

of opinion and religion

The Amnesty movement is composed of peoples of all nationalities,

politics, religions and social views who are determined to work together

in defence of freedom of the mind.

The spread of dictatorship, the tensions that have resulted from the

Cold War, and the increasing cleavage between races of different colour,

have combined to make state persecution of the individual the gravest

social problem of the 1960's.

The principal object of Amnesty is to mobilize public opinion in

defence of those men and women who are imprisoned because their

ideas are unacceptable to their governments. It has been formed so that

there should be some central, international organization capable of

concentrating efforts to secure the release of these "Prisoners of Con-

science". Essentially an impartial organization as regards religion and

politics, it aims at uniting groups in different countries working towards

the same end—the freedom and dignity of the human mind.

with Personal Freedom in Countries which, forwant of a better generalization, have beencalled Marxist-Leninist Countries. 'They containa third of the world's population, about athousand million people.

Broadly their basic approach to law is that itis created to serve the over-riding needs of thecommunity. The Common Law approach onthe other hand, which prevails in much of thewestern world, is that each person is entitled tothe widest range of personal liberty of action,subject only to his not injuring the communityor his neighbours.

It was hoped that lawyers and writers broughtup in both systems of law would attend thesecond conference. Unhappily, although lawyersand writers were invited from each of the"Marxist-Leninist" countries, none attended.

In these circumstances the Conference, theproceedings of which arc reported here, drewupon the two symposia which were prepared byDr. John Keep, an authority in this field ofstudy, from over twenty working papers suppliedby specialists in this subject. Their content iscritical, but without malice.

Mr. Leslie Hale, M P said in the House ofCommons recently: "If music is the inter-national language of the heart, the concept ofjustice is the international currency of themind." It is in the spirit of these words that thisbook is published.

Amnesty's concern is with freedom of' opinionand freedom of religion. Its members arc ofdiffering political and religious views but arcunited by Voltaire's dictum: "I detest yourviews, but am prepared to die for your right toexpress them." Amnesty's interventions havebeen made on both sides or thc great politicaldivide on behalf of "Prisoners of Conscience",wherever they may be. Some of them are amongthe finest orour contemporaries.

The process of imprisonmcnt is one of thesanctions of a country's criminal law and anoutcome of the working of its legal procedure.These are in turn the product of that country'spolitical and social system.

Amnesty, since its inception, has been trying tofind thc facts about these matters all over theworld. It is not easy One of the significantthings about Governments which do incarceratenumbers of "Prisoners of Conscience" is thatthey are most reluctant to lift the veil whichhides them.

Amnesty has accordingly embarked on a seriesof conferences to study the state of personalfreedom in different parts of the world. Thefirst, held in January, 1962, was on "PersonalFreedom in the Emergent Countries". Thethird, which will be held in London in Novem-ber, 1962, will be on "Personal Freedom inWestern Europe". The second Conference, heldin London on June 16th, 1962, was concerned

of the people. Marxism was to lead to thewithering away of the state. We shall have a

friendlier picture of these countries if thewithering of the state is hurried up."

Opening the Conference, the Chairman,F. Elwyn Jones, Q.C., M.P., said that anappeal had just come to Amnesty from

Madrid and Barcelona where writers,intellectuals and politicians who went tothe Munich Conference of the EuropeanMovement advocating Democracy in Spainhad been imprisoned and were now await-ing trial. They were mostly Christiandemocrats and monarchists. Amnesty had

arranged to send a leading figure in theCatholic world to Madrid to makeenquiries.

Explaining the object of' the Conference,Mr. Elwyn Jones said that Amnesty is intended

to be a bridge across the frontiers of nations,

ideologies and creeds. We wished to consider asfairly and dispassionately as possible how far

the countries under discussion gave effect toArticles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights.We had hoped that people from the com-

munist countries would come, but, despite

assurances that this conference was not anattempt to attack their way of lith, unhappily

no one had responded. We had invited writers,

lawyers and embassies from Poland, Yugoslavia,Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany, Russia and

Cuba (and a few more), but the response hadbeen nil. We greatly regretted that these

invitations had not been accepted. We had

tried to remedy this by seeking the assistance

In the discussion that followed ProfessorPeter Hilton, of Birmingham, spoke about thc

importance of maintaining contacts betweenMarxist countries and the West. He compared

his own experiences while travelling in differentparts of Eastern Europe. He said a considerablenumber of people in Poland were allowed

passports to travel to the West each ycar; andan invitation received by a Pole to come to a

Western conference was considered as "a featherin his cap". On the other hand, in Roumania

such an invitation was regarded with suspicionand might get the recipient into trouble. He

believed that it was most important that

Marxist governments should be encouraged toallow their citizens to travel freely abroad. Inthis connection, he thought it vital that Westerninstitutions should not take advantage of visiting

mathematicians and scicntists to make themtempting financial offers to stay in the West.

Quite humanly, these offers were sometimes

accepted. But the reaction of suspicion on thepart of the Marxist government concerned was

equally human. He believed that if Westerninstitutions wanted to offer jobs to Eastern

scientists, they should make it a matter of

honour to convey the invitation openly beforethe scientist reached the West, or alternatively,

after he had returned home.

of experts on the countries under discussion, and

they had helped us in preparing papers onpersonal freedom and the legal codes. These

had been collated by Dr. Keep.The Chairman then introduced Mr. Elvin,

Chairman of Amnesty's Policy Committee, and

a former representative at UNESCO and the

debates on human rights at the United Nations.Mr. Elvin said that "the concern of Amnesty

is expression of freedom and those men and

women who arc persecuted because of having

opinions which run counter to those of theirgovernment. I shall not concern myself withhostile criticism of any regime, because we in

Amnesty differ in our religions and politics. We

wish to rouse public opinion by non-violentpressure".

Within Marxist-Lenin philosophy there is a

real, though no doubt limited room formanceuvre. Even the most repressive regime, if

it wants other people to have a friendly imageof it, must in some ways be tolerant and open to

change. There are differences of degree of

expression allowed in Marxist countries anddifferences in any given country over a period

of time. There is more freedom of expression inPoland than in the U.S.S.R. It is realized by

Poles that they might risk an explosion of the

Hungarian type if they did not allow freedomof expression to a certain extent. The fact that

there is comparison between Marxist countries

shows there is room for manceuVre. These

Opening the second session the Chairmanintroduced Mr. Leonard Schapiro, Reader in

Russian Government and Politics, University ofLondon.

To start with, Mr. Schapiro said he thought

it important to define the three essential safe-guards which every society should provide

within its legal system. First, there should be

provision to prevent people being unfairly

accused on false evidence or through malice.

Second, there should be guarantees, if a man

variations arc important not only for themselvesbut because they demand discussion, even

disagreement on right and wrong methods.Within the frame of Marxist ideology change is

not just brushed aside as bourgeois criticism. An

outside opinion can have some effect. In the1920's some Amcrican officials found themselves

in Moscow. They were amazed to hear theRussian crowd chanting a word which sounded

like "moon". In answer to their question it wasexplained that the Russians were calling for the

release of Tom Mooney, an American tradeunionist who had recently been arrested during

the time of the "Red" scare. Those Americanofficials were undoubtedly impressed.

"I am certain that we must resist thetemptation to be silent just because weseem to anger these governments. So manygovernments rely on the public to forgetthat people are in gaol for their beliefs. Thelong term effects of our protests are likelyto do more good for the victims thansilence."

"Why has there been a thaw in Russia in

recent years? Some people would say it isbecause the Russians acknowledge that they

cannot now be attacked. I think that repression

from fear must have been very greatly modified

in the U.S.S.R. because of their increasedmilitary strength. But I suggest that there is a

simpler explanation; that the Russians have

decided that life under a leader intent on thepersonality cult is a bad way of life. Oneimportant factor is the spread of education

which, though slow, is a tremendous social

solvent in the long run. One cannot be educatedwithout asking questions. The important thing

about machines is that they change men's mindsand the way they look at things. The present

policy is somewhat like the liberalism of

Trotsky. The links with the West are growingand the Russians do want a friendly picture of

themselves in our eyes now that there is more

interchange between the two countries.""We are not sentimental in thinking Marxists

will change to our way of thinking overnight.

Marx wanted greater freedom for the masses

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is accused and brought to court, that he shouldbe allowed freedom to present his side of thccase. Thirdly, there must be at all times vigilanceby the public, the press, and officials in order toensure that the first two safeguards arc main-tained. The wording of the constitution whichmight offer all sorts of rights for the citizen wasno substitute for thc personal vigilance whichwas required.

Applying those principles to those countricson the other side of the Iron Curtain, Mr.Schapiro said he thought it reasonable to bearin mind that all the Governments had come topower following a revolutionary situation or inthe wake of Soviet armies. To this extent it wasnot possible to compare the situation prevailingin thc earlier period in thc history of thosecountrics with that of Western Europeancountries of the same epoch. During the firstyears of the establishment of these regimes lawwas inevitably a nuisance—it was somethingwhich got in the way of the revolutionarychanges the new government wished to make.

During the years which followed the pressureof revolutionary change diminished, but as itbecame progressively possible for thc Govern-ments to remove the pressure of administrativecontrol, so there developed a danger of apopular explosion from below. "There is no

potential situation so dangerous", he said,"as when abad regime starts to reform." The examples of this

could be seen in thc events of the Autumn of1956 in Hungary and Poland.

Considering in turn thc three essential safe-guards, Mr. Schapiro observed that there wasnow much less unfair and malicious accusationthan there had been in a period prior to 1955.The preliminary investigation of accusationshad been put under the control of the Pro-curators instead of, as formerly, the securityforces. It was now known that in Stalin's timethese security forces had their secret instructionsto use torture when the occasion required. Thequalification of the present system was that allProcurators had to be members of the Com-munist party and were subjected to the instruc-tions of the party. If the party decided to obtain

a result by illegal methods, it was in a positionto ordcr the Procurator to bend the law.

Another improvement was that Counsel forthe Defence were now allowed to enter theproceedings at an earlier stage. At the presenttime in the Soviet Union the Defending Counselwere allowed access to their clients and thedocuments at the conclusion of the investiga-tion. Since 1957 there had been pressure thatDefending Counsel should be allowed to takepart in thc investigatory process, which wassomething especially desirable because at leasta quarter of the investigators had no legaltraining at all.

Low Status of the Bar

Turning to thc position of Defending Counseland the latitude allowed to them, Mr. Schapiroremarked that the status of the legal Bar inRussia was extremely low. In 'czarist days thebar had enjoyed a fine tradition in independence,but now barristers were subjected to all thecontrols of a system in which they had tooperate within legal collectives. They werebadly paid, and thc evidence showed thatamong law students there was no ambition totake up the role of barrister. Law students wentinto Government service or became Procuratorsor judges; only as a last resort did they becomebarristers. In the exercise of their profession atthe Bar they had only limited independence.One example was the case of a DefendingCounsel who had defended his client on thegrounds that he had been arrested not by thepolice or under warrant but by an officiouspasser-by. Because the client was charged with"hooliganism", this technical defence was badlyreceived by the court and the press, with theresult that the lawyer was reprimanded.

It was in the field of public vigilance thatthe situation showed least improvement. Mr.Schapiro commented very critically on thestandard of reporting of law eases in the Sovietpress. He said that the choice of cases publishedwas arbitrary and irregular. Even when a casewas reported the standard of journalism wasdisgraceful. The whole report was almost always

In a system where there was a lack of officialvigilance there was bound to be an occasionaltrumped up casc. He did not want to go intoparticulars of any example, such as that or thewell known case against Madame Ivinskaya,but he did want to mention a more dangerousdevelopment. This was that where it suited theGovernment, men and women were broughtbefore the courts on insufficient evidence andconvicted as a part of Government policy. Thishad happened frequently as a part of the recentanti-religious campaigns. Priests, rabbis,mothers, had all been convicted and their casesblazencd throughout the Soviet press as awarning to others. Another Government cam-paign was against the so-called "parasites".There was no exact definition in the law as towhat was a "parasite". Dr. Keep's paper hadbrought out that all through the Marxist-Leninistcountries this lack of definition of offences was a mostdisturbing feature of the administration of justice.Those charged with being "parasites" werebrought before a so-called "Comrades Court"which had considerable powers of punishment.These gatherings of party members wereentitled to deport a "parasite" for a period ofup to five years and a required part of thisperiod had to be spent in a labour camp.Though called "courts" these bodies were reallyadministrative. Their actions against "parasites"were in breach of the law of December 20th,1958, which laid down that nobody should besentenced except after a judicial hearing.

A duty to criticize

Mr. Schapiro concluded his address bymaking three final observations. First, heobserved, Marxist countries always insisted ontheir right to criticize the administration ofjustice in the West, and so they should. Butwhen the West started to criticize what went onin the courts of their country they resented anybreath of criticism and suggested that it was allpart of the Cold War. However much the cryof Cold War was raised, he thought there was aduty to criticize, the more particularly since theRussian public was denied that right.

slanted to bring out a political moral, and eventhough it was right that the guilt of the accusedperson should be reported, there was no excusefor not publishing the outlines of his defence.Worse still was the practise of passing commentin the report, not based on any evidence, thatthe accused was a depraved and perniciouscharacter.

The public's opportunity to enforce thc civilrights granted by the constitution could only bedone through thc Procurators. On occasions theProcurators did take up public complaints.Indeed there was some evidence, he said, thatProcurators often wanted to assuage their knownsense of guilt for the part that thcy had playedduring Stalin's regime. After all, they had beenthere in office—many of them—during all theyears when these now openly admitted illegali-ties took place.

Mr. Schapiro thought it might be instructiveto consider the extent to which Procuratorsto-day uphold the law in circumstances wherethe Government had a fixed policy which itwished to enforce regardless of the law. Every-one was aware of the tremendous wave ofspeculation which had been taking place in theSoviet Union, and of the recent reimposition ofthe death penalty. He quoted a newspaperreport of the case of a man who was sentencedto 15 years' imprisonment on June 15th, 1961,under a law which had not been passed at thetime when his offence had been committed.Shortly after this, on July ist, thc death penaltywas introduced. The Procurator then applied toa higher court on the ground that the penaltyimposed was insufficient. In due course theSupreme court sentenced the man to beexecuted and he was duly shot. By bringing theprosecution of the appeal under retro-activelaws the Procurator was violating Article 8 of thelaw of December 20th, 1958. This Article statesthat no man shall suffer a penalty which hasbeen introduced retrospectively. How muchconfidence, Mr. Shapiro asked, could one havein a system of invigilation where the invigilators,the Procurators themselves, deliberately brokethe law?

4 5

in themselves they appear to be all right, but itis how they can be abused that is a cause for

disquiet.Q. To what extent has the operation of theprocess of persuasion conditioned people to

acccpt thc present system as just ?A. I think there is a lot in that. I think there is

a strong sense of lack of law, a feeling thatlawyers are rubbish. Khruschev said : "Why wait

for the police to catch someone, catch them

yourselves", or words to that effect.

Mr. Ralph Kabes, of the International Com-

mission of Jurists spoke about the evidence of theclass-character of penal treatment in the

Marxist-Leninist countries. He gave examples

of the way in which men from bourgeois back-

grounds were given lengthy terms of imprison-ment, while those from working-class back-

grounds, guilty of thc same sort of offences, wereeither excused, as being misled, or else givenlight sentences.

Mr. Peter Benenson, joint Hon. Secretary of

Amnesty,concluded the discussion by describingthe activities of the movement, particularly with

reference to the difficult task of compiling lists of

names of those in prison in Marxist countries.Wherever possible, he explained, Amnestyen-

deavoured to secure the adoption of theseprisoners by local groups, who then became

responsible for keeping their name before the

public and their hope alive.

Secondly, the system with its present defects

had nothing to do with Marx. Both Marx andEngels had detested injusticc, and their writings

resounded with denunciations of the injusticessuffered by the working class. Similarly he knew

nothing in the doctrines of Socialism whichjustified arbitrary imprisonment. He kncw that

at the height of the revolution, Lcnin was quoted

as saying, "it is better that ten innocent menshould be convicted than that one guilty man

escape." But those words were spoken duringextraordinary times—Lenin himself was not ablood-thirsty man. The speaker believed that the

reason for the defects to which hc had alluded

was the insecurity which these regimes felt, notfrom outside invasion, but from internaldissatisfaction.

Lastly, he said that speaking as a social

scientist who had once practised as a lawyer, hebelieved that the Soviet Government would be

wise, in its own interests, to allow the law to take

its course without interference. He instancedthe present epidemic of black marketeering in

Russia as an example of what happens in acountry where the law falls into contempt;

where the people feel, he said, that the law is

their enemy they will turn to extra-legalactivities.

PERSONAL FREEDOM IN WESTERN EUROPE

Amnesty's third conference in the series on

'Personal Freedom in Contemporary Society'

will be held in London on

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER i7th, 1962

Maurice Cranston will be one of the speakers

Norman Marsh will take the Chair

A number of questions were put to Mr.Schapiro.Q. Does the accused appeal against sentence ordoes the Procurator have responsibility forappealing ?A. Both; the accused has the right to appeal,and the Procurator also.

Q. Do you associate the vast quantity ofeconomic crimes with food shortages in Russia ?

A. I think shortages are always connected, e.g.

Black Market in this country during the war,

but I do not think it is the only factor. I have

two explanations. (a) To a large extent theregime depends on illegality to run at all. (b) I

think the effect on the regimes of this type is to

some extent to turn this kind of thing into a formof protest, but this is only my theory.

Q. Is there legal aid in the ths.s.a. ?

A. The services of an advocate are allotted

extensively ; money is no problem.Q. What do you know about the people not

brought to trial ?A. I do not know what happens in practice, but

I have been told by Russians to whom I have

talked, that Procurators are now increasingly

reliable and will not sign warrants for preventa-tive detention without trial.Q. Are the Procurators still finding people whowere illegally sentenced during the Stalin

period ?A. Procurators do rehabilitate people in camps,

and widows arc reinstated.Q. How is news of trials kept out of the press 2A. It is a most elaborate organization. There is

a part of the central committee with four

secretaries who deal with nothing else and haveofficials in every newspaper office. There are

definite instructions which go out at regularintervals. You can even keep an earthquake out

of the newspapers if it is thought undesirable toput it in.Q. How are judges appointed ?A. The judges are elected; their election is

controlled by the Party as with the Trade

Unions. They are not all Party members,but they are Party approved; they sit with

assessors who represent the public. There hasbeen some talk that the assessors should be

increased and should attend separately from theJudges, like the jury here; they should judge the

facts and the Judges should judge on points of

law. This is still being advocated, so thereobviously is feeling among lawyers that this

would be a good thing.Q. Could you say something more about theComrades Courts, and abolishing the role of

judge altogether ?A. These are not courts in any ordinary sense

but are the voice of the people and are controlledby the Party. They are in most cases unanimous.

The danger of them is that as they are Party

controlled they can be used as an administrativeweapon; they sometimes are, but may not be.

I fear them because they are so liable to abuse;

6

confined to some of the morc illuminatingaspects of the East European sccnc as it hasdeveloped over the last few years.

FREEDO OF EXPRESSIONBy DR. JOHN KEEP

Lecturer in Russian History, University of London

(This and the following paper on Legal Rights were compiled with the help of contributions from eAperts on the different Marxist-Leninist countries)

FREEDOM TO CRITICIZE

In all communist countries the leadership isconcerned to prevent excessive bureaucraticrigidity and to forestall thc crystallization ofvested interests within thc ruling apparatuswhich could hinder thc execution of Partypolicy. This aim is served by the practiceofficially known as "criticism and seff-criticism",which is defined as

The dictum of Friedrich Engels that "freedomis the consciousness of necessity" has long sinccbeen part of official doctrine in the Soviet Unionand other communist countries. To quote theauthoritative Soviet Political Dictionary:

"Freedom consists not in any supposed indepen-dence of man from natural and social laws, butin the possibility of understanding and utilizingthese laws . . . In the conditions of an antagonisticsociety the elemental character of social develop-ment does not give man the chance to develop hisactivity, freely, but makes him the slave of neces-sity. Only communist society implies the transitionof man from the realm of necessity to the realm of

freedom."'On innumerable occasions Communist leadersand ideological spokesmen have made it plainthat in their view thc law determining thepresent phase of human evolution is that of"transition from capitalism to socialism", andwithin the socialist countries the construction ofa fully communist society under the leadershipof the Party, as the self-styled "vanguard of thepeople". True freedom therefore consists inidentifying oneself as closely as possible with thisirreversible historical process. It is the "moral-political duty" of every citizen in a communistcountry to participate with enthusiasm in thenational effort to resolve the tasks posed by theParty: to raise the material and cultural level of

"the basic method of ascertaining and overcomingmistakes in the work of Marxist parties andother organizations of the working people."3

Members of such bodies arc not only permitted,but actively encouraged, to criticize, at meetingsor in letters to the press, ctc., details concerningthe application of Party policy, or the work ofindividual executants of that policy—subject tothe all-important proviso that they do not bringinto question the Party's "general line", specificGovernment measures, or the activities of thetop leaders. Criticism must be "constructive"and "business-like", i.c., designed to assist theParty in strengthening the socialist order. Thedecision whether such criticism is to be regardedas "constructive" or "destructive" rests withhigher authority, so that the system acts as ameans of control. Subordinates arc continuallyliable to censure either for "covering up oneanother's faults if thcy do not go far enough intheir criticism, or with "lack of ideologicalfirmness" if they go too far.

into accepting its rule. Only under socialism dothc people cnjoy real liberty, of a superiorquality than "bourgeois" freedom, for thcconstitutions of the socialist states assurcs thecitizcns basic liberties (of speech, press, assem-bly, conscience, ctc.), and also gives thcm thcmaterial means to exercise thcir rights, sincemeeting halls, printing prcsscs, and the like arcplaced exclusively "at the disposal of the work-ing people and their organizations." But theserights are qualified: they are granted "inaccordance with the interests of the workingpeople and with the aim of strengthening thesocialist orderw—and according to Marxist-Leninist philosophy the "interests" of theworking people arc determined solely by theParty.

It follows that the constitutional libertiesgranted to the citizens of communist countricsarc fictitious. There exists no mechanismwhereby thc individual may lawfully defendhis "fundamental rights" against infringementby Party organs, or State agencies acting atthe Party's behest, since the judicial system isitself part of thc government apparatus. More-over, all "public organizations" (sec below),and all communications media arc closely con-trolled by the Party, which ensures that nocxprcssion of political opinion, in word or deed,takes place without its sanction. Liberty there-fore exists only to the extent that the Party mayfind it expedient to tolerate it, which may varyconsiderably from time to time and place toplace, in accordance with changes in the powerof the Party vis-d-vis the population. Where itsauthority is at a low ebb, its policy may be oneof temporary relaxation until such time as itjudges the moment ripe for a further advancetowards the realization of its goals.

A full picture of the current position withregard to liberty in the communist world wouldnecessitate an examination of the generalinternal situation within each country and itsruling party, and an assessment of the degree ofsuccess or failure attained by each party inimplementing its various policies. Such a task isclearly beyond the scope of this report, which is

Wider Opportunity for Criticism

The limits of such permitted criticism areeverywhere narrow, but they have been some-what widened in recent years. In the SOVIETUNION, for example, several "nation-widediscussions" have been staged by thc authoritiessince 1957, with the object of stimulating publicinterest in, and approval of, Party policies.These have affected a wider audience than was

society, to inculcate "proletarian internation-alism", respect for labour and other socialistvirtues, and to help strengthen the might of theState and its organizations. The official Marxist-Leninist doctrine postulates that the Com-munist Party is, automatically and at all times,the sole genuine representative of the interest ofthe popular masses. Hence slackness in imple-menting its directives is interpreted as evidenceof political immaturity or backsliding, if not ofactual hostile class tendencies, which it is thcduty of thc Party and of the citizens in generalto overcome, by persuasion—or, if that fails, bycoercion. The ideal is a fully collectivist societyin which the individual, voluntarily and fromdeep ideological conviction, "harmonizes" hisindividual interests with those of society as awhole.

This outlook leaves no room for individualfreedom in the Western sense of the term. Com-munists acknowledge that "bourgeois" demo-cratic political and civil liberties played apositive role in the rise of capitalism. But theyarc not deemed to have an intrinsic value inthemselves, and the degree of their implementa-tion depends on the current exigiencies of theclass struggle. At present, the argument runs,where such liberties exist in thc "imperialist"world they serve merely as an instrument in thehands of the exploiting class to dupe thc masses

8 9

customary hitherto, although they do notrepresent any basically new departure in Sovietpolitics. The result of this, together withchanges in the police systcm, has been a modestincrease in freedom of expression, and thepolitical atmosphere is now less constrainedthat it was in Stalin's day. This relaxation ismost apparent in fields that are relativelyremote from current policies, e.g., in the artsand sciences. In the Party itself and in economiccollectives (factories, farms, planning bodies,etc.), the ideological controls arc as tight as ever.Thus in 1956 action was quickly taken, in theSoviet Union and in most other communistcountries, to prevent the discussions on the"liquidation of the personality cult" fromgetting out of hand (as happened in Poland andHungary), and to maintain the fiction ofmonolithic conformity to the Party line. It isstill too early to analyze the consequences of thc22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U., which doubtlessshocked many people into questioning thecorrectness and consistency of Party policy. Butso far the dissenters have been obliged to keeptheir thoughts to themselves: little evidence hasyet come to light of political discussions withinthe Parties exceeding the permitted bounds.This does not mean that the degree of licencepermitted, or the tone of the debates, neces-sarily meets with approval outside the countryconcerned : on the contrary, the developmentof "polycentrism" within the Soviet bloc hasshown quite clearly that serious divergencies ofopinion exist between the leaders of somenational communist parties.

This diversity also has had the indirect conse-quence of increasing the opportunities forfreedom of expression available to non-Com-munists in certain more favoured countries. Themost repressive conditions would appear toexist in China, Albania and East Germany.Mao Tse-tung is unlikely to attempt a repetitionon any serious scale of the abortive "rectifica-tion" experiment of 1957, when intellectualsresponded all too eagerly to the invitation to"let a hundred flowers bloom". In EAST GERMANY

political controls have been tightened appre-

that the prospects for a limited freedom ofexpression arc brighter in Yugoslavia than inany country within the Soviet orbit, where theideal of the "withering away of the state" is stillan empty slogan rather than a clearly formu-lated goal. But it is still much too early to bedogmatic on this point.

ciably since the sealing-off of West Berlin, whichintensified popular opposition to the Ulbrichtregime. The tenor of life is illustrated by thefollowing incidents reported in the East Germanpress:

On January 23rd, 1962, 3 schoolboysfrom Mecklenburg were sentenced to5 and 34 years' imprisonment withhard labour for staging a protest intheir classroom against the conscrip-tion law; 5 schoolmasters who hadtaught them were summarily dis-missed.

On October 31st, ig6i, the Potsdam"Bauernecho" reported that a farmerliving near Cottbus was sent to jail for2 years for "saying that the Farmers'Party advocated the suppression of thefarmers instead of promoting thewelfare of the village population" and"agitating against the Soviet Union".

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND INTELLECTUAL OPINION

It is much harder for a communist regime totolerate freedom of' the written than of thespoken word. Marxist-Leninists have alwaysregarded the press as a mighty weapon in thestruggle for men's minds. The same holds true ofliterature generally, since they do not recognizethe conventional Western distinction betweenbelles-lettres and "mere" journalism. AsIlyichov, the chief Soviet ideologist, declared ata conference of Party workers in December,I 96 I , the task of the Press "is to fight to imple-ment the programme for the construction ofcommunism". Similarly, in an address toSoviet writers and artists published last May,M. Khrushchev proclaimed once again thattheir task was

On September 12th, 1961, the Dresden"Sachsische Zeitung" reported that onAugust hith, a local youth was sen-tenced to 24 years' imprisonment for"agitating against the G.D.R." He hadsaid: "why are they putting tanks inposition if we are for peace?"

In CZECHOSLOVAKIA, RUMANIA and BULGARIA

there seems to have been little change in recentyears, although here as elsewhere in easternEurope there exists an unofficial "communica-tions system" which serves as an independentsource of information among the population atlarge. In HUNGARY, where controls are as tight

as they were prior to the revolution, an observernotes that "the weapon of irony is extremelysharp: witty and malicious jokes against theregime circulate freely by word of mouth andassume the character of folklore"—but theycannot of course be published.

Greater Freedom in PolandOf all the communist countries POLAND has

the best reputation so far as freedom of speechis concerned. This situation has no basis in law:the 1952 constitution contains provisions wordedin much the same form as in the constitutionsof the other "people's democracies".4 But theParty leadership appreciates the strength ofnon-communist opinion in the country andfinds it expedient to allow it to be ventilatedwithin limits that, for eastern European stan-dards, arc relatively wide. In Warsaw thereexisted until recently a well-known literary andsocial club where patrons were able to engage infairly uninhibited discussion. In March, 1962, itsuspended operations under official pressure.There arc, however, other café-clubs, run by thesocialist youth organization, where discussioncontinues, even if under closer supervision, andit appears that the authorities arc not at presentopposed to the existence of these forums ofpublic opinion. On the other hand, a lawpassed by the Sejm on March 3oth, 1962, againstthe opposition of the Catholic deputies, tightensup the existing regulations governing assembliesand public processions. Its provisions are inmany instances vaguely worded, especially in sofar as church gatherings are concerned. Criticsof the bill have been assured by communistspokesmen that their fears are exaggerated. Itremains to be seen how the law will be appliedin practice.

In YUGOSLAVIA there appears to be greaterfreedom of expression than in any country of theSoviet bloc (except, perhaps, Poland). Here aselsewhere criticism may be directed only againstthe details of government policy, not its sub-stance. On the other hand, in introducing thedraft of the new constitution, M. Kardeljrecently stated that the decentralization of thcadministrative system was to continue in thenear future, and that this would ensure allcitizens a wide measure of civil liberty. Personalrights, he explained, had to be limited so longas the danger of "reaction" existed, but only tothe extent necessary to prevent acts of violenceagainst the socialist order. It may be thought

"to educate the people in the spirit of communistideals, that will awaken in them a sense ofadmiration for all that is beautifhl in oursocialist reality and inspire men to devote all theirstrength, knowledge and aptitudes to selflessservice to their people . . . and to make themimplacable foes of all anti-social and negativeelements in e."5

For this reason all publishing houses, periodicals,and other outlets for expression are controlledby Party or State organs, or bodies under Partycontrol (e.g., writers' associations, youth organi-zations, etc.).6 A high proportion of thosepermitted to voice their opinions in print arcnormally Party members. This is not anessential pre-requisite, but the distinction be-tween Party and non-Party is to some extentillusory, since the latter are also required toprofess the Party's philosophy and to accept its

10 I I

control over what they write. In the speech

quoted above M. Khruschev also said :

"Soviet writers, conzposers, artists and film andtheatre workers find an inexhaustible source ofcreative inspiration in the Party's policy andideology. They accept the Party's ideas as theirown."

"At the 22nd Party Congress the products of recentyears were evaluated highly, in that they reflectedsocialist actuality correctly and brightly. But ofcourse this evaluation does not mean that every-thing now on the bookshelves, the theatrical stageand cinema screens satisfies the increased culturaland aesthetic requirements of the people . . . By nomeans all writers and artists are drawing inspira-tion from the well-springs of life ; there are stillgrey faceless works, and not infrequently caseswhen, instead of creative competition with the bestin progressive foreign art, there is imitation of"fashionable" modern bourgeois works whichclaim to be in the van of progress and full ofinnovations . . ."9

"Partiynost" in the Arts

This principle of "Party-mindedness' (partiy-nost), in literature and the arts requires that all

works should reflect the Party's political and

moral values. Writers are expected to concen-

trate on current issues (more precisely, on thc

achievements and goals of thc masses under

Party leadership). Any undue emphasis on the{{ negative features" of contemporary "socialist

reality" is regarded as evidence of political

unreliability. It renders the artist liable to

pressure and, in an extreme casc, to penalties

such as exclusion from cultural organizations

and denial of the right to publish his works.

Expulsion entails loss of one's livelihood and the

privileged status in society which writers and

artists normally enjoy, thus putting a high

premium on conformity. Today, ideological

error does not normally involve the severe penal

sanctions imposed in Stalin's day, sincc the

Party now relics on subtler methods of coercion.

But the treatment of Pasternak and Mme.

Ivinskaya shows that thc ultimate weapons

remain in reserve for use as needed.

In some eastern European countries (Poland,

Hungary), the situation is slightly morc favour-

able so far as the expression of unorthodox views

is concerned. One useful barometer to the state

of the intellectual climate is provided by the

satirical journals. Though rather flat by

Western standards, the Polish Szpilki and the

Hungarian Ludas Matyi frequently go quite far

in their criticism of domestic shortcomings. In

Bulgaria, by way of contrast, the editor of the

humorous weekly Sturskel was dismissed in

March, 1961, for allowing the permitted limits

to be exceeded. (The reason may have been that

one of his employees had written, apropos of an

These shortcomings may be explained by two

main factors. One is the need for the literary

authorities to permit a measure of individuality

if they arc to maintain reasonably high artistic

standards and to retain the interests of a

discriminating public. The other factor is the

subtle resourcefulness shown by many sincere

and talented artists in conveying the truth as

they see it despite the restrictions imposed upon

them. In the Soviet Union and elsewhere in

eastern Europe the cultural "thaw" has en-

couraged many writers to demonstrate their

allegiance to human and universal values, and

in the process to create works of high artistic

merit. This "quest for truth", particularly

evident among the younger generation of

writers, has found a warm response among those

tired and sceptical or easy propagandist slogans

and anxious to work out for themselves their

own individual attitude to life. This movement

is more complex than is often supposed: it is

closely bound up with a desire, born out of grim

experience, to reduce the all-embracing power

of the state and to expand the range of individual

and group freedom, but usually presupposes

some kind of socialist or collectivist framework.

It need not in itself be consciously anti-com-

munist, although the realization of its program-

matic ideas might well prove fatal to the com-

munist system as it exists today. Nor can it be

regarded automatically as a pro-Western move-

Il The director [of the publishing housl isresponsible for the ideological, scientific andartistic content of published works, for thefulfilment of the plan, and for the economic andfinancial results of the plan. He organizes thepublication of printed works . . . being guided bythe decisions of the Party and Government, hissuperior organizations and the requests of theworking people.

. The chief editor . . . takes full responsibilityfor the ideological-scientific and literary quail&of the books published . . .

14. decides questions of the approval or rejectionof manuscripts.111/3. The editorial manager receives the MS.

from the author, acquaints himself with itscontents • . . and also prepares a decision on theacceptance or rejection of the MS. in accordancewith the terms of the contract and the existing

From this it is clear that a work must undergo

an involved series of controls before it sees the

light of day.Another medium of supervision is inherent in

the planning system itself, which enables the

political authorities to keep themselves informed

or forthcoming works, and to direct the quantity

of book output in various fields. The supply of

newsprint for periodicals may also be used as a

means of denying organizations of which theParty disapproves (in practice, religious) bodies,

from publishing their journals in an edition as

large as potential sales would justify. (Such

sanctions, which were widely applied in the

"people's democracies" during the period of

initial sovietization (1945-49), were recently

applied in Poland against the well-known

Catholic weekly Tyszgodnik Powsiechny, the

circulation of which was arbitrarily reduced

from 50,000 to 40,000 copies.)

official campaign for increased attention to

advertising, the couplet:

"How can you advertiseWhen there is no merchandise?")7

Where the "thaw" has penetrated less deeply

the range of taboo subjects is wider and satirists

arc required to direct a larger proportion of their

fire against the "imperialist" enemy. It stands to

reason that they, like all other journalists, arc at

the Party's service, and the abuses which they

expose arc those that impede realization of its

policies.

The degree of intellectual liberty allowed is

determined, not by law or decree, but by the

judgement of the Party leaders, who make their

will known through official directives and

informal contacts. Experienced writers and

artists can often sense changes in the atmosphere

by a kind of intuition. In communist countries

censorship is not simply a matter or submitting

publications to some official who excises what is

objectionable. The system is rather one of "self-

censorship" by the writers and artists them-

selves, who are trained and pledged to observe

Party discipline. In each collective (editorial

board, stage company, etc.), the Party members

and other "politically alert" elements exercise

ideological supervision over their comrades.

This supplements the normal administrative

control exercised by the Ministry of Culture (or

similar body), acting on instructions from a

department of the Central Committee. The

details of the administrative arrangements may

vary: in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, for example, each

publishing house, editorial offiee, or printing

shop has a permanent overseer who is an official

of the Main Administration of Press Supervision

in the Ministry of The Interior. His decision is

irrevocable. Appeals arc theoretically possible

through Party channels, but there are no known

instances of this right having been exercised. In

the SOVIET UNION the situation may be gauged

fmm a model decree on the basic duties of

publishing workers approved by the Ministry

of Culture on May 13th, 1955, which contains

the following articles:

"The Quest for Truth"

Despite these controls works still appear which

are subsequently criticized for lack of ideological

rectitude. According to an authoritative Soviet

commentator :

12 1 3

ment, although one of its characteristics is ademand for a freer exchange of ideas betweenEast and West.

Throughout the Soviet orbit there has beenan increase during recent years in culturalcontacts with the West. The number of Westernworks selected for translation has grown, andsome modern Western plays have been stagedby domestic companies. There has been verylittle trace of unorthodoxy in the press orcultural life in BULGARIA, RUMANIA or CZECHO-

SLOVAKIA—to say nothing of CHINA, ALBANIA orEAST GERMANY. In the latter country it is rathera question of intensified intellectual controls,evident in the persecution of students anduniversity teachers who have expressed opposi-tion to current Party policies and have sought tomaintain scholarly contact with the West. Theattempt to impose "socialist reform" on EastGerman universities and colleges has led over1,Goo teachers to flee to the West since 1958. InHUNGARY the situation is somewhat less bleak.Clandestine literary works are passed eagerlyfrom hand to hand, and there have been someinstances of writers expressing nonconformistpolitical opinions in articles dealing withostensibly non-political topics. Surveying theintellectual situation at the end of 1960, theleading literary weekly remarked that it wasimpossible to overestimate the extent to which"bourgeois ideology, artistic outlook and moralstandards" had permeated the consciousness ofyoung writers. But the Kadar regime, aware ofits weakness, and anxious not to repeat themeasures that led to the explosion of 1956, isacting with a certain discretion in it: culturalpolicy. Some, though not all, of the intellectualsprominent in the revolution have been released,and given a modest opportunity to write. Therehave also been several instances of literary workscoming under heavy criticism after publicationwithout any punitive measures being takenagainst authors or editors.

In POLAND a greater degree of tolerationexists. A cooler wind has been blowing duringrecent months, but, as one Western observer hasremarked, "the terms 'restrictions', 'pressures'

para. r 26 of the Constitution whose activity iscarried on under the guidance of the CommunistParty and the Soviet state, which pursue varioussocial, cultural, educational, scholarly, defence,sporting—but not economic—aims."

Reins Held Lightly in Yugoslavia

The situation in YUGOSLAVIA is not strictlycomparable to that elsewhere in eastern Europe.There is virtually full freedom of expression inthe arts: writcrs arc not required to be politicallycommitted, although they arc not allowed toengage in direct criticism of the regime or itspolicies. On the other hand, many leading Partymembers appear to be critical of the extent towhich Yugoslavia has approached the standardsof the "bourgeois" world in this respect, and thecase of M. Djilas has recently focussed attentionon the dangers that threaten those who touch onsensitive political issues. The import of foreignbooks and newspapers may be authorized bythe State Secretary for Internal Affairs, for theindividual use of the importer only (usually fora definite period of time and in a specifiedquantity). Occasionally issues containingmaterial deemed prejudicial to Yugoslavinterests arc confiscated (e.g., Daily TelegraphIbr February 16th and 17th, 1961). The U.S.periodical Newsweek has been completely bannedsince October, 1961. The legal position asregards control and ownership subsequent to thePress Law of 1960 is as follows: no notificationor approval is required before publication;institutions engaged in publishing are autono-mous self-administering bodies, governed by acouncil whose members are partly elected, partlynominated. This mechanism still enables theParty to exercise a decisive influence, but atpresent the reins are held lightly and the scopeof free action permitted is fairly wide. But itmust be borne in mind that here as elsewherethese liberties are not inalienable rights, butprivileges granted by authority as favours whichcan be revoked at any time.

and 'tightening up' all have a specifically Polishflavour and content", and the inconsistenciesthat occur make it misleading to generalize.'Offending publicists are normally obliged tochange their jobs instead of being subjected topenal sanctions. The secretary of the Union ofPolish Artists recently stated : "we stand fortolerance and respect for artists' opinions. Wcdo not rcject the Party spirit but we do not seekto impose our views on anyone against hisconvictions." This suggests that the ideologicalstruggle is conceived rather as a long-termcampaign, fought in the main with the weaponsof persuasion.

The censorship acts as a severe obstacle tothe publication of original thought by Polishwriters, although it is relatively liberal so faras the import of foreign literature is con-cerned. Comment in the Polish press on inter-national affairs is often more reasonable andbalanced than in other communist countries,and journalists are allowed to quote Westernsources for news and information. Warsaw is theonly capital within the Soviet sphere of influencewhere several major Western newspapers andjournals may be bought (generally on subscrip-tion and thus potentially liable to control, Ina afew copies are available in kiosks and publicreading-rooms). A large number of the playscurrently staged in the Polish capital are byWestern authors. On occasion Polish periodicalshave given space to works that could not bepublished in less "liberal" communist countries.Polish writers have been in the forefront of the"new wave" in eastern Europe. One of the mostsignificant features of the cultural scene is that inrecent months discussion has not been confinedto writers and artists but has extended tosociologists and political scientists. A seriesof articles on "socialist humanism" whichappeared in 1961 were read attentively by awide section of the public. The idea that the"dictatorship of the proletariat" is compatiblewith an expanding area of individual freedom isa revolutionary one that has a considerableappeal for many Poles (and others in easternEurope) today.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Independent voluntary associations such asexist in profusion throughout the Westernworld are unknown in communist countries. Allthat are permitted are "public organizations".These arc defined by a Soviet legal authority as

"those unions of working people referred to in

This definition is not very satisfactory, since theParty is formally speaking one such "publicorganization" and since trade unions, which alsoconstitute one category of these bodies, pursueeconomic interests. This terminological uncer-tainty underlines the fact that in a socialistsocicty the main task of trade unions is con-ceived as educational: to mobilize the efforts ofthe masses in the realization of the cconomicplan. Like all other "public organizations", theirrole is to act as "transmission belts" whereby thewill of the Party is conveyed to the masses. Seenin isolation from the Party they arc bodieswithout a spark of life. They can be dissolved atonce in the unlikely event of the blood beginningto flow in their veins. Article 18 of the Sovietcivil code prescribes that they can be closeddown "by compulsion" if they depart from theirstatutory aims, or if their activity "infringes theinterests of the state". They can also be closeddown "voluntarily" by a decision of a generalassembly of members or thcir representatives—i.e., of the Party cell acting in this capacity.

Although no pressure is officially put onmembers to join a trade union or professionalassociation, in practice membership is com-pulsory in order to take up employment or carryon any cultural, educational or recreationalactivity, however harmless from the politicalstandpoint. (Party membership is, of course, aprivilege which imposes serious obligations. Itmay be acquired only after extensive screeningand completion of a period of probationarymembership.)

In Hungary in 1956 the Petofi Circle, anofficially-sponsored association of intellectuals,held several meetings which got out of controlof the Party authorities. The eventual result wasinsurrection and the overthrow of the Stalinistregime. No recent instances have come to lightof "public organizations" leaving the rails in

14 15

this manner, or requiring dissolution for thcirideological unreliability. Party controls havebeen effective enough to make such drasticaction unnecessary. There have, however, beennumerous official complaints at lack of enthu-siasm among the members of such bodies(especially youth organizations), for the fulfil-ment of' their officially-approved goals, andstrenuous efforts have been made to increasetheir vitality. In this connection it is interestingto note the pressure exerted by the Polishgovernment since 1957 on two genuinely non-political student bodies, the Scouts' Union andthc Students' Association, to make thcm give atleast token public support to the official ideology,—which they did in April, 1959, and March,196o, respectively. There is much evidence toshow that the attraction of the overtly politicalyouth organizations, in Poland as elsewhere, liesin the opportunities they offer for travel, enter-tainment, and subsequent advancement in onc'scareer, rather than in their programmatic aims.The same is true of the trade unions.

sophy, faith or convictions"), has been elimi-nated.

impending and take appropriate action to avertit. From EAST GERMANY demonstrations havebeen reported against the new conscription law.Early in February, 1962, at a mass meeting ofcoal workcrs at Hoyerswerda, agitators' speecheswere interrupted by whistles and cries; thepolice were called, the meeting broken up, and14 people arrested. In another incident 5 peoplewere arrested after protests during a cinemaperformance at Zerndorf." Normally the onlydemonstrations and protest marches allowedare those sanctioned by the Party for its ownpolitical purposes (e.g., thc demonstrationsoutside Western embassies in February, 1961,after the assassination of Prime MinisterLumumba). These arc invariably presented asspontaneous outpourings of popular indignation.The workers mobilized on such occasions mightperhaps react more positively to them if theywere not generally obliged to make up theproduction lost during the stoppage by "volun-tary overtime".

Strikes are "Unthinkable"

Under conditions of proletarian dictatorshipit is "unthinkable"—according to official theory—for workers to withdraw their labour, since bydoing so thcy would simply be striking againstthemselves. Here again Poland is something ofan exception, for sincc 1957 a work stoppageof up to 15 minutes' duration has been tacitlyrecognized as permissible. However, no formallaw exists to this effect, and the arrangementhas been condemned in Party pronouncementsas an "un-socialist practice". There have beena number of strikes in Poland during recentyears, some of them publicly reported but mostpassed over in silence. Cases are also known ofstrike leaders being arrested and dismissed. Therehave been occasional indirect reports from othcrcommunist countries of labour unrest. Wherethis occurs it is of course speedily suppressed asa threat to state security, and the officialsresponsible for such laxity called to account.Normally thc Party authorities hear throughtheir information network of any trouble

FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

The constitutions of all communist statescontain a clause modelled on that in the 1936Soviet constitution providing for freedom in thcpet formance of religious cults and freedom ofanti-religious propaganda. But this is notequivalent to freedom of conscience, since inpractice religious bodies arc under the strictestgovernment control. The constitutions alsocontain a phrase to the effect that "the mannerof organization and functioning of religiouscults is regulated by law",'3 which is capable ofthe widest interpretation. It will also be notedthat the law provides specifically only for thefreedom of atheists to convert believers, but notvice versa: a juridicial right to proselytize, inothcr words, does not exist. The new (196o),CZECH constitution warns that "religious beliefor conviction gives no one grounds for refusingto fulfil the civic duties enjoined upon him bylaw"; freedom of conscience, explicitly guaran-teed by the 1948 constitution ("no one shallsuffer prejudice by virtue of his views, philo-

The Struggle Between Church and State

The actual position with regard to religiousfreedom in all the Marxist-Leninist countries isdetermined by two factors: (a) the CommunistParty wields an absolute monopoly of power;(b) it is uncompromisingly hostile to religion,which it sees as a threat to its own claim to theundivided allegiance of the citizcns of a socialiststate. It is an express aim of communistpolicy to eliminate religious belief from theminds of all working people. In all countrieswhere communist regimes have been installedthere has been extensive persecution of thechurches. But the unexpectedly strong resistanceoffered to this repression has often compelled theParty to modify its policies, and to tolerate moreor less prolonged periods of uneasy "coexist-ence" with organized religion, when the struggleagainst it has assumed a somewhat less violentform. Ostensibly the policy is to use methods ofpersuasion only and to avoid "offending theconvictions of believers"." Measures of persecu-tion arc either denied or blamed on an "excessof zeal" on the part of subordinate officials—although their actions arc usually carried out inresponse to pressure from above. The marginbetween persuasion and coercion is in any casefluid and ill-defined. The various institutes forthe dissemination of "scientific knowledge"carry on an energetic activity in the form ofpublications, lectures, etc., and the pressregularly features anti-religious articles. Atpresent the principal aim seems to be to discreditreligious belief .as a "relic of capitalism" byassociating it in the popular mind with crimeand immorality (corruption, speculation, drunk-enness, etc.). Resistance to this propaganda istreated as an "anti-social act" (crime) and laysthe offender open to repression, despite therights formally granted in the constitution. Theanti-religious drive is thus often camouflaged assubsidiary to the campaign against deviantconduct. This suggests that the Party lacks thecourage of its convictions, while frequent admis-

sions in the press as to thc extent of religiousbeliefs, even among young people (not excludingmembers of communist youth organizations),shows that this policy has not yet achieved theresults anticipated.

Day-to-day control over the churches isexercised by a department of the Party CentralCommittee through a government office forecclesiastical affairs, which generally has theright or power to confirm senior church appoint-ments—and in some cases also those of parishclergy. Agents of this body may be attachedwhere expedient to individual prelates tosupervise their activities, while local Party oryouth-organization activists may attend churchservices in order to check sermons, etc., for"hostile" remarks. These can be used in evidenceagainst priests if it is thought necessary to bringthcm to trial. Normally, services are allowed tobe held without physical interruption by hostiledemonstrators (as sometimes occurs in periodsof intensified repression), but church attendancecan be limited by indirect pressure (e.g., holdingof political meetings or sporting activitiessimultaneously with religious services) as wellas by direct intimidation. In the schools childrenarc generally subjected to heavy propagandaand other pressure designed to discourage thcmfrom accompanying their parents to church. Animportant and widely-used weapon is thc fearthat onc's religious convictions will be noted inone's police record and will damage one'seducational prospects and carcer.`5 Hence thepractice of secret weddings, burials and (especi-ally) baptisms is fairly widespread.

Religion in the Schools

Religious instruction in schools is generallyforbidden. A writer in the CZECH paper Pracadeclared that this would be "inappropriate to thesyllabus of a socialist school" and urgedinstead an intensification of atheistic educationto counter hostile parental influences.' InHUNGARY, on the other hand, it is legallyoptional upon demand by to pupils or more.Pressure is exercised to discourage parents fromregistering their children for such instruction.

16 17

China found itself charged with thc crime ofgenocide.

I n YUGOSLAVIA, outside the Soviet bloc, the lawallows citizens to profess any faith or none, andgives all churches an equal legal status. Theymay publish and circulate their own literature,subject to the general provisions of the press law.Hindering the performance of church services isa criminal offence punishable with a fine orimprisonment for up to I year. Religious tuitionmay be given privately (but not in schools), atthe request of the parents. The authorities havethe power to close religious schools or seminarieswhere a criminal offence is committed. The rightto proselytize does not exist. In practice theOrthodox Church enjoys a semi-privilegedposition roughly comparable to that in theSoviet Union, although it is under close politicalcontrol, while the Catholic Church is suspect onaccount of its allegiance to the Vatican.

The percentage of pupils registered variesgreatly : in one Budapest secondary school only3 out of 700 pupils, but in one village 83 percent, arc registered. In POI.AND this question hasrecently provoked a sharp conflict between theCatholic Church and the State. The settlementreached after October, t 956, allowed religiousinstruction in primary and secondary schoolsupon the demand of a majority of the parents.But from 1957 onwards it was prohibited in agrowing number of schools, and a law of July,1961, officially removed it from the curriculum.This was lbllowed in August by a Nlinistry ofEducation regulation providing for strict controlover the places where the catechism was taughtoutside the schools (e.g., the lniilding had to be"in good repair", and teachers were to sign acontract with the authorities, in return forwhich they were to receive pay). The Primateissued a pastoral letter warning the clergy notto sign such contracts and to be prepared for"heavy sacrifices" to protect their rights. In theevent no action has (as yet) been taken againstthose wlm refused to sign, and in November,1961, a new regulation was issued which, whileit did not revoke thc earlier one, withdrew someof its most obnoxious clauses.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Thk freedom, taken for granted! by liberalpolitical philosophers who lived in a moreenlightened age than our own, is of prhneimportance so far as citizens of communistcountries are concerned. Under this head wemay include freedom to mix with foreigners athome, to travel abroad and within the confinesof one's own country, and freedom for thecirculation of ideas from abroad (treated above).

HUNGARY Six seminaries arc still extant (out ofI 2 in 1945), with a total of 350 pupils (there arcsome 6 to 7 million Catholics in Hungary). Acertain amount of administrative interference intheir work takes place. In 1958, for example, theBudapest seminary was temporarily closed while70 pupils who had resisted indoctrination werepurged. Priests are sometimes ordained in secret.In POLAND the system IS freer. Attempts havebeen made to subject seminaries to visitationsby State inspectors, but these now seem to havebeen suspended--as has the sporadic practice ofissuing trainee priests with call-up notices formilitary service.

There arc several other fields where Churchand Party come into conflict. In Poland thebuilding of new churches requires an officialpermit, which since 1957 is no longer given.Attempts by state authorities to demolish ahalf-built "illegal" church at Torun in October,

96 1 , led to a peaceful popular demonstration.Another source of contention is the observanceof religious holidays, the number of which theregime is anxious to limit. More important is theimposition of discriminatory taxation uponchurch organizations, which arc now considered"private" instead of "public" as hitherto. TheCatholic University of Lublin (one of severalinstitutes of learning run by the Polish Church),has been held liable for over £2 m. arrears intax. Another recent decree imposes a tax onchurch collections.

Contact Between East and West

The relaxation of the barriers sealing off thecommunist countries from the West in recentyears has enabled many more Westerners tovisit the more accessible parts of eastern Europeand the Soviet Union. Many areas are stillclosed to foreigners for security reasons, but theextent of police surveillance of foreign visitorshas been reduced. However, excessive contactwith NVestern visitors by citizens of thesecountries is still liable to arouse doubts amongother members of the collective, to whicheveryone belongs, as to their political reliability,

Arrests and Imprisonments

The strength of Catholicism in Hungary andPoland presents the rulers of those countrieswith a difficult problem. In general their policyhas been to subject the church to continuedharassment while avoiding a frontal conflict, andto weaken it by encouraging religious groupsprepared to collaborate on certain matters withthe regime ("Patriotic Priests", etc.). InHungary the state has continued to pay anannual subsidy to the church, but has refusedto confirm in office the bishops nominated bythe Vatican; from the government's standpointthe present incumbents thus have no legal status.

The Primate, an involuntary prisoner in theU.S. embassy in Budapest, is unable to exercisehis functions. A wave of arrcsts of clergy andbelievers, said to involve some 1,200 people,occurred in the spring of 1961. A group of it,including 4 priests, were tried for counter-revolutionary activities in June, and sentencedto terms of imprisonment ranging from 21 to12 years. Some of the others arrested then arcbelieved to have been tried in secret in February,1962, but many offenders are presumably stillawaiting completion of the investigation intotheir cases. In CZECHOSLOVAIUA the Primate hasbeen under detention since 1949, and accordingto Vatican sources there are also 9 bishops, over5o0 priests and an unknown number of monksheld in Czech prisons!' In EAST GERMANY theposition of the Evangelical Church has becomemore difficult as a result of the growing internalcrisis in that country and thc sealing off of WestBerlin. Trials of clergy and believers have beenreported from various parts of the sovirr UNION.In July, 1960, the bishop of Kazan was sentencedto 3 years' imprisonment for alleged bribery andimmorality. Some of the worst infringements ofreligious freedom have been reported fromCHINA, where as part of the virulent campaignagainst "Western imperialism" foreign mission-aries have been imprisoned and subjected totorture in efforts to extract confessions ofespionage activities. Chinese Catholics havebeen compelled to dissociate themselves fromVatican policies. Church-going, where it is stillpossible, is apparently fraught with considerablepersonal risk. The fundamental teachings ofBuddhism, the major religion in China, havebeen amended under political pressure, so thatit is now orthodox Buddhist doctrine to kill"counter-revolutionaries", to regard Mao Tse-tung as a Living Buddha, and socialism as theWestern Paradise on Earth. Most fundamentalof all is the insistence by the Party that Buddhistsmust seek salvation in material progress. Themeasures taken against the national religion andculture of the TIBETANS led to an insurrection inthat country in 1959 and the wholesalemassacre of monks and priests. As a result

Training of the Clergy

The number of clergy is generally inadequateto satisfy the needs of the churches—the result,in part, of the restrictions imposed upon thetraining of young priests. About 15o youngpriests are ordained each year in the SOVIETUNION, although the number of Orthodoxbelievers can probably' be counted in tens ofmillions. The situation is still more serious formembers of other ffiiths. The position in themore rigidly controlled cast European countriesis exemplified by that in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, wherethe "Deployment Commission", as it is called,directs young people to certain types of educa-tion and can prevent aspirant clergy fromreceiving the training they desire. Traineepriests, like other college students, receivecompulsory instruction in Marxism-Leninism.Some 12 priests are ordained per annum.17 In

18 19

FREEDO OF THE ACCUSED

if not an actual entry into one's police dossier.For this reason those whose political reputationis not entirely above reproach from the stand-point of the authorities are often reluctant toinvite foreigners to their homes. "We all havenovels writtcn about us", a BULGARIAN intellec-tual remarked recently to a Western visitor inthis connection, referring to the size of his policedossier and to its fictional quality. Conditionsobviously vary so greatly that it is difficult to bespecific about such matters, but broadly speak-ing the same division into hard-frozen andlightly-thawed countries made above holds goodin this respect as well.

LEGAL RIGHTS IN THEMARXIST-LENINIST COUNTRIES

grounds), as well as proof of political reliability,and on occasion there is an unwritten require-ment that they should leave close relativesbehind as "hostages" to guard against thedefections that do such damage to the prestigeof communist countries. In HUNGARY 351000

persons travelled to the West in the first 9months of 1960, while in Czechoslovakia thenumber was only a few thousand, from RUMANIAand BULGARIA only a few hundred.' In EASTGERMANY car owners arc only allowed, by arecent regulation, to visit other communistcountries if they travel in convoys of 6 to 9vehicles, which arc carefully escorted to selectedplaces: some 3,600 citizens only will be permit-ted to take advantage of this arrangement in1962." The role played by refugees from easternGermany in the Berlin crisis needs no emphasis.The number fell from 261,622 in 1957 to 204,902in 1958 and 143,917 in 1959. It thcn rose again,as a result of the forced collectivization drive andother factors, to 199,188 in 1960 and to 159,730in the period January ist to August 15th, 1961,when the Wall was erected in order to stop theflow. About half the fugitives were youngpersons under 25 years of age. 21.

Law is thus expressly recognized as a politicalinstrument. Its purpose is to realize the goals ofthe Party: thc building of a socialist, andultimately a fully communist, society. Similarly,the judicial machinery in a Marxist-Leniniststate implements the Party's will in much thesame way as any agency of the executive. ForLeninist theory dismisses as "bourgeois" theidea of "separation of powers". Instead,authority is concentrated in a single centrewhich makes its will effective through all theadministrative means at its disposal. All judges,lawyers, and other judicial personnel are Statefunctionaries, and arc pledged to carry out thepolicies of the Communist Party, as the self-proclaimed "vanguard of the people".

"In the activity of investigating organs, theProsecutor's Office, and the courts—as of allorgans of the Soviet state—the directing andguiding role belongs to the C.P.S.U. Whileobeying the law in all their activity and securingits unwavering observance by all officials andcitizens, [they] carry out the policy of the Com-munist Party as expressed in law."'

The same principles underlie the judicialsystem in othcr countries with Marxist-Leninistregimes. Hilde Benjamin, the EAST GERMAN

Minister of Justice, has recently stated: "In theGerman Democratic Republic jurists . . . areconstantly working under the leadership of theParty to perfect our law, which we regard as aversatile, conscious and readily manageableinstrument for the construction of socialism."3

Article 97 of the new CZEGFIOSLOVAK constitu-

The Western concept of the "rule of law" isalien to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy obliga-tory in all countries where thc Communist Partyis in power. For the Marxist-Leninist law has nouniversal binding force, but is simply a meansused by the ruling class to assert its hegemony.The Russian revolutionaries hoped to abolishthc state and with it the laws that it made andimplemented, substituting direct rule by themasses, or "thc dictatorship of the proletariat".Lenin defined this dictatorship as

"power won and maintained by the violence of theproletariat against the bourgeoisie, power un-limited by arty laws."

As the dream of imminent world revolutionpaled, the Party leaders came to view law as aprovisional necessity in the isolated Sovietsocialist state. They saw that it could proveuseful in eliminating "class enemies" and con-solidating the Party's power. They demandedfrom the masses absolute obedience to thesocialist laws issued by their government, onthe grounds that they reflected truly the will andinterests of the people. Today socialist law isclaimed to be essentially different from, andsuperior to, "bourgeois" law, since it is

"a weapon for the elimination of exploitation ofman by man and the circumstances that have givenrise to it. The creative role of socialist law isexplained in the first instance by the fact that itsnorms express the scientifically-based policy of theCommunist Party, which is applied by the Sovietgovernment and is the living basis of Sovietsociety."

Tourists and Refugees

The number of sovIET visitors to thc West hasalso risen, although less spectacularly than thetraffic in the reverse direction. Among suchvisitors there arc now ordinary tourists as well asthe officially-sponsored delegations who alonewere permitted to leave the country in earlieryears. It appears that applicants for an exit visaarc required to produce a favourable recom-mendation from their collective, although theyneed not necessarily be Party members. Thesystem of internal passports and labour booksnecessary for a change of residence or occupationis still in force in the Soviet Union. According toa legal handbook this system of control, whichinvolves the ordinary citizen in a good deal ofred tape, "has an important significance forthe maintenance of public order and statesecurity."" Heavy penalties are imposed onthose found living in cities without authoriza-tion. Of the east European countries the mostliberal in permitting travel to the West by itscitizens is POLAND, although the number of exitvisas granted has declined sharply since the

million issued in 1957 (1958: 78,000; 1959:65,000), and the price has recently been raised.The lack of foreign exchange is a limiting factor,since the aspiring tourist must satisfy theauthorities that he will be maintained abroadby friends or relatives. In the more "frozen"countries applicants for visas must show goodreasons for their journey (e.g., compassionate

REFERENCES

Politichtskty auras, Moscow, t958, p. sot.3 Constitution of the U.S.S.R., pants. 124 et seq.; cf. new (1960) Czech

constitution, para. 27.

3 Politicheskiy slovar, p. 297,

4 For text, cl. Gsovski & Grzybowski, Government, Law and Courts in theSoviet Union and Eattern Europe, L., z959, p. 342.

3 Soviet News, London, No. 4471, Nfay 26th, 1962, p. 125.The only independent publishing house is that of the "znak"(Catholic) group in Poland.

7 East Europe, New York, February, 1962, p. 26.8 Published in 1958.9 A. Metehenko, in Kommunizt, Moscow, No. 5, 1962, p. 85.

10 Than, London, May 3rd, 1962.Turidicheskor sloven.,Moscow, 1956, Vol. II, p. 23.

33 Frankfurter ellleetnethe Zettling, Frankfurt, February 7th, 1962.11 Rumanian constitution of 1952, para14 Decree of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U., Pravda, November loth, 1954.33 No believer can of course join the Communist Party. Since Party

membership is a requisite for the most important posts, this may actac an added deterrent to religious belief.Praca, Prague, September 20th, t96u.

17 New fork Times, June t z di, t 96 r.Is New Tork Times, July Gth, t961.

Turidicheskb, slovar, Vol. II, p. 203.317 Nate Ziarher Zeitung, March 13th, 1962.al The Flight/ front the SOUret Zone Federal Ministry for All-German

Questions, Bonn, 1961, pp. 15 et seq.

20

2 I

thin defines it as the prime- tasks of the courts "to

protect the socialist state". Article 41(i) of the

III1NGARIAN constitution specifies that:

"The courts of the Hungarian People's Republic

punish the enemies of the working people, protect

and secure the state, the economic and social order

of people's democracy and its institutions and the

rights of working people, and educate the workers

in the spirit of observance of the rules of socialist

collectivism."

•Judges and lawyers are required to adopt a

political attitude towards their work, and to

avoid "bourgeois formalism" (i.e. interpreta-

tion of the law in a literal manner, without

reference to social-political factors as defined bY

the Party). The very idea of justice is different

from that held outside the Communist world:

justice is that which advances the cause orcom-

munism. Justice is not an abstract principle, but

is conditioned by concrete historical circum-

stance. A judge is required to take into account

not only the facts of the case before him but also

the socio-political motivation of the offender and

the socio-political consequences of his own

judgement.

as is well known, such guarantees were intro-

duced in 1936, shortly belbre the worst abuses

occurred. Such confidence as Soviet citizens

have that the terror is a thing of the past rests

solely upon the Party leaders' assurances that

thcy will observe "socialist legality" in future. It

may be thought that the omens are none too

favourable, since: (a) in the Soviet Union only a

fraction of the contraventions of the law perpe-

tuated undcr Stalin has as yet been acknow-

ledged, and official spokesmen make every

effort to minimize the extent of the harm done;

(b) in some Marxist-Leninist countries the

Party leaders have for political reasons been less

ready to dissociate themselves from Stalinist

practices than their Soviet colleagues. In all the

countries under consideration the Party still

reserves to itself the right to determine the

degree of self-restraint that it observes in its

dealings with the population.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

For the Marxist-Leninist a crime committed

in a socialist state is not simply a breach of the

law but an offence against the whole political

and social order. It is the task of all other

members of the offender's collective to assist the

agencies of the state in subjecting him to such

measures of coercion or persuasion as may be

necessary to give him a duc sense of his responsi-

bilities to the community. Theoretically, crime

should not exist in a socialist society that has

overcome the exploitation from which it

allegedly springs, and it is therefore referred to

as a "relic of capitalism"; although it is recog-

nized that, like other such "relics", it will recur

(although on a decreasing scale), until the final

goal of full communism is attained. This view

leads to a blurring of the distinction between

crime and any other form of deviant, non-

conformist behaviour. One or the bases of

modern jurisprudence is the principle that an

individual may not be punished unless he has

actually broken a law : a desire or intention to

do so is not in itself an offence. This crucial

distinction is, however, much less clear in

"Socialist Legality"

Much has been written in the Marxist-

Leninist countries during recent years about

"socialist legality", a term now favoured in

place of the "revolutionary legality" once

propagated by Lenin. This expression is vague

and self-contradictory (for legality simply means

observance of the law, and cannot logically be

qualified as "socialist", "bourgeois", etc.), but

could perhaps be defined as observance of the

law within the limits found expedient by the

Party. The Party is in effect above the law. It is

not simply that it is impossible to bring a case

against the Party in a court of law, but that its

role as a source of law is not legally recognized.

This explains why it is thought consistent with

"socialist legality" for laws to be issued in

secret (cf., for example, a Rumanian decree of

July ist, 1960, which prescribed the death

penalty for "ex-fascists" caught in possession of

socialist law. The term "crime" is usually

replaced by the expression "socially dangerous

act", which presupposes the existence or some

authority that determines which acts arc in Ihct

dangerous to society, and to what extent. That

authority is the Communist Party.

Since the Party secs the law as an instrument

for the realization of its objectives, it is naturally

anxious to prevent its opponents, who are by

definition "enemies or the people," from evading

justice by taking refuge in legal formalities. For

this reason the laws are often left vague, so that

those who apply them may have broad discre-

tionary powers (subject of course to thc over-

riding claims of Party discipline). Loose

definition of offences (e.g., "acts weakening the

Soviet power") enables the law to be stretched

to cover any action deemed politically objection-

able. The same aim used to be served by the

principle of analogy, whereby a man found

guilty of some offence not covered by the laws

could be sentenced to thc penalty prescribed for

some similar (analogous), crime. This concept

was introduced into Soviet law in the 19205 and

after the Second World War adopted in all the

eastern European countries (except Poland),

when the legal system was adjusted to the

Soviet model. Again, judicial tribunals wcre

given wide latitude to deal with persons found

guilty of "direct" or "indirect" intcnt to commit

a crime, with the accomplices of an offender, or

with those who failed to report impending crimes

of which they had foreknowledge. Similarly, the

law made punishable retro-actively crimes

committed by agents of non-communist regimes

on territory that subsequently came under

communist control. In thc post-war years the

main effects of this has naturally been felt in

eastern Europe (including the Baltic states,

whence countless thousands of persons were

deported on account of their role under the

previous non-communist regimes).

During the post-Stalin "thaw" many Soviet

lawyers began to advocate a stricter interpreta-

tion of the concept orcrime in order to ensure

greater protection for the citizens against

arbitrary acts by the authorities. Others con-

arms, and was not published until December of

that year; many other laws arc never published

at all). Such laws and decrees arc seen as

instructions by thc Party (Government), to

guide its agents, rathcr than as acts or the

public power, as in a democratic state. It

follows that, although steps have been taken in

recent years in most Marxist-Leninist countries

with thc object of assuring the population

increased protection against arbitrary action by

the police or other officials, these rights still rest

on a most precarious basis. No fundamental

change has occurred in the attitude of the

Soviet authorities towards law as such. It is still

seen as an instrument of policy. The Soviet

Union (and the people's democracies also), arc

as remote as ever from the concept of a Rechtstaat

(a state based on the rulc of law), which pre-

supposes the existence or some independent

institutional check upon those who wield power.

No such body exists. Indeed, the very idea of a

Rechtstaat is still criticized by most Soviet jurists

as "bourgeois" and alien--although the merits of

a genuinely constitutional system have been

given added point by the Party's own admissions

of the gross injustices that occurred during the

"era of the personality cult".

Soviet jurists, no doubt sincerely, now con-

demn Stalin's worst crimes and declare it

inconceivable that such "errors" should ever

happen again. But the outside observer cannot

but recognize that there is nothing at present in

the Soviet political system to prevent a repetition

of the purges in Russia in the I93os or the "anti-

cosmopolitan" drives in the people's democra-

cies after 1948. (Whether the Party leaders

would permit such action to occur is a question

for the political scientist, not for the student of

the legal system.) From a judicial point of view

the Party still occupies the position of supremacy

it has always claimed the right to hold; in

practice its powers arc probably greater today

than they were in the Stalin era. To assert, as

Soviet spokesmen sometimes do, that effective

guarantees against arbitrary infringements orthe citizens' personal security are contained in

the Constitution is (to put it mildly,) misleading:

22 23

penal code. Although some of the definitions of

offences have been made more precise, no

reduction has been made in thc number of such

offences. Thc death penalty is imposed for

treason, wrecking, terrorist acts and banditry

(the two last-named offences not being subject

to it hitherto)—as well as for murder in aggra-

vated circumstances. Thc concept of treason is

defined widely and includes "defection to the

enemy" and "flight abroad or refusal to return

from abroad"—by ordinary citizens as well as

members of the armed forces or government

employees. A legal textbook states that defec-

tion:

tinned to insist on a "dialectical" approach to

law, whereby due weight was given to the

political objectives it was supposed to fulfil. The

fundamental principles of Soviet penal law,

published in December, 1958, on the basis of

which the various Soviet republics have drawn

up their new penal codes, were the result of a

compromise between these two tendencies. (A

revised penal code came into force in CZECHO-

SLOVAKIA in November, 19(i1, and in IWNGARY

in February, 1962; it is to be expected that the

codes in the othcr people's democracies will be

brought into line in the near future). The

Soviet code states that a person can be punished

only if he has "either deliberately or by negli-

gence committcd a socially dangerous act

covered by the criminal law". This comes close

to a recognition of the "bourgeois" concept of

null= crimen nulla poena sine lege. Soviet spokes-

men have stated that Article 7 of the old 1926

code, which allowed punishment of persons

considered "a danger to society" has lost its

force. The institution of analogy has been

repudiated, and the definitions of complicity,

intent, and of some crimes have been tightened.

However, there is still room for improvement in

this respect. The dangers that exist may be

illustrated by the case of two Moscow men who

were found guilty of speculation in foreign

currency, and sentenced in July, 1961, to a term

of imprisonment which the Party authorities

found too lenient; they were re-tried and

executed on thc basis of a law passed shortly

before, after thc commission of the crime,

although this law contained no provision as to

retro-active effect.The infoimation available does not allow

comprehensive conclusions as to the situation in

eastern Europe. Analogy appears to be still

recognized in ALBANIA, BULGARIA and RUMANIA,

althought it is probably little used. The new

HUNGARIAN code abolishes it and contains many

improved definitions of offences.

"Protection of the State"

Another problem related to the above is the

greater scope that exists in Marxist-Leninist

that at present sentences vary between ti or I

the maximum penalty and the maximum

penalty itself. Many of them seem excessive by

Western standards.

In eastern Europe the same tendency can be

observed as in the Soviet Union. The death

penalty for economic crimes was introduced in

BULGARIA in 1954, in RUMANIA and HUNGARY in

1958, and in POLAND in 1960 (but only two

Poles arc known to have been sentenced to

death, and so far as is known neither sentence

has been carried out). In CZECHOSLOVAIUA the

maximum penalty for such offences is still 20

years' imprisonment. The press reports cases of

heavy sentences being passed on persons who

"spread hostile propaganda and criticized con-

ditions".

Podochen of April i5th, 1961, cited

the case of a worker sentenced to 2

years imprisonment for singingccobscene" songs and songs "praising

the Western way of life and slandering

the Czech socialist system."

In another case Svobodne Slovo of

March 7th, 1961, reported that an old-

age pensioner from Brno, who collec-

ted stamps, was sentenced to 3 years'

imprisonment for "speculating" in

stamps. In 3 years he had made a

profit of about £250. Such "remnants

of bourgeois individualism", the paper

declared, must be ruthlessly stamped

out.

Here, as in other people's democracies, there is

a constant refrain of sentences on persons who

"sabotage the plan" by putting their own

interests above those of the State. In BULGARIA

43 people were condemned to death for econo-

mic crimes between 1956 and June, 1961. Somc

of these cases have evident political overtones:

e.g., in October, 1961, the Chief Rabbi of

Bulgaria was sentened to 3.,3/4 years' imprison-

ment for alleged currency offences. Political

trials have taken place recently in ALBANIA

(Admiral Sejko and others), and CZECHOSLO-

VAKIA (M. Barak, former Minister of the

Interior, and somc 8o officials, who were

"is treason to the fatherland irrespective of

whether any further concrete activity in the

enemy's interests followed on his [the defector's]

part. The very fact of defiction or flight abroad

already constitutes, from the objective point of

view, the corpus delicti of treason to the

fatherland."4

An earlier law making defectors' relatives

criminally responsible for such actions has been

repealed; they arc now only liable if they

rendered thc fugitive actual assistance. The

offence of "anti-State agitation and propaganda"

(Article 7), carries penalties ranging from 6

months to 7 years deprivation of liberty. It

covers spoken or written communication, the

preparation and retention of leaflets, etc., "with

the aim of undermining or weakening thc

Soviet regime".During the last year the death penalty has

been introduced in the Soviet Union for a

number of other crimes: misappropriation of

State property, counterfeiting, and mutiny by

prisoners (May, 1961); serious currency offences

( July, 1961); and attempted killing of militia-

men, rape and bribe-taking (February, 1962).

Some 50 people arc known from press reports

to have been executed under these provisions,

largely as part of the current drive against

fraud by officials. Sentences have also been

raised for hooliganism, speculation and "para-

sitic living". This shows that the present trend

is once again towards stiffer penalties. It seems

countrics for transgressions of thc law, particu-

larly as regards anti-State crimes, as a result of

the nature of the political and cconomic system.

In the conditions of extreme concentration of

political power and a totally planned economy

thc interests of the State arc correspondingly

more far-reaching. It is characteristic that the

Basic Principles of Penal Legislation of Decem-

ber, 1958, define the prime object of Soviet

justicc as:

"to protect from igfringement: (a) the public and

state system of the U.S.S.R., the socialist econony

and socialist property."

The protection of thc rights and interests of the

citizens takes second place. Legal commentators

stress that this enumeration of thc clauses is

deliberate.

Strong pressures operate for mundane offen-

ces, which in other countrics would not be

offences at all, or would at least bc treated

lightly, to be dealt with as political crimes and

to carry disproportionately heavy sentences.

Thus non-fulfilment of' plan targets, petty

thefts of farm produce, negligent care of

machinery, sale of goods produced by the

labour of others, etc.—offences endemic in

countries where social conditions place ample

opportunity to commit them in the way of the

ordinary citizen—tend to bring him into a

confrontation with the full power of thc law.

During the Stalin era the courts generally

inflicted the highest penalties prescribed for

such offences, as otherwise they were liable to

severe penalties for undue laxity.

The general tendency of the 1938 principles

and the subsequent codes has been to mitigatc

thc severity of the penalties inflicted: the

normal maximum prison term is now to years

instead of 25 as hitherto (in the case of especially

dangerous crimes, or crimes by recidivists, the

ncw maximum term is 15 years). The death

penalty has, however, been retained for a

variety of offences. The new Law on Criminal

Responsibility for Anti-State Crimes, passed

simultaneously with the Basic Principles,

replaces the notorious Article 58 of the old

24 25

ostensibly accused of embezzlement). In EnsT

GERMANY the Council of State adopted a

declaration in January, 1961, stating that the

courts would "mete out harsh punishmcnt to

those who threatened the life of our people and

the existence of our nation." Harsh sentences

were defended on the grounds that thcy would

"ensure the realization of the humanistic aims

of socialism . . . and the products of the labour

or our industrious citizens."5

GERMANY was recently put at I4,000.8 By March,

1962, some 11200 people had been jailed since

the erection of the Berlin Wall, and 26 trials

publicly announced, in which four of the accused

had been sentenced to death. In POLAND the

power of the police is less obvious than in other

people's democracies. A law passed in February,

1962, gives the Supreme Court powcr to review

all verdicts, including those passed by military

courts and other administrative tribunals. This

appears to be a move towards greater legality.

But there still exists a system of "accelerated

procedure" in which the accused has only a

limited right of defence.

Comrades Courts

While the powers of the political police have

in general diminished, a new threat to legality

has appeared from a different direction, in the

shape of the quasi-judicial "comrades courts".

These have been instituted in the SOVIET UNION

and CZECHOSLOVAKIA) the two states claiming to

be furthest advanced on the road to com-

munism; as yet relatively little has been heard

of them elsewhere. Comrades' courts are

"elected social organs whose aim is to educatecitizens actively in the spirit of a Communistattitude to labour, respect for socialist property,observance of the rules of life in a socialistcommunity, development of collective spirit, com-radeshtP, and respect for the dignity and honourof the citizens."9

They are formed in enterprises, apartment

blocks, etc., on the initiative of "advanced

citizens" (i.e., the Party nucleus), and consist of

men without legal training who are elected for

one year. Their main emphasis is on the "re-

education" of offenders. They are empowered

to pass judgement in public, before the whole

collective, on minor offences such as drunken-

ness, indisicipline, hooliganism, "parasitism",

etc., and to sentence offenders to loss of their

jobs, fines, and (in the case of "parasitism")

even banishment for a term of 2 IO 5 years. The

latter offence is very inadequately defined, and

is intended, for example, to apply to collective

EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

During most of the time that they have

existed Marxist-Leninist regimes have found it

necessary to supplement thc normal judicial

machinery by administrative tribunals com-

posed of officials pickcd for the political relia-

bility, and to institute special court procedures in

which the accused is denied his legal right to

defence. The detection and investigation of

anti-State offences is the function of the political

police. In the SOVIET UNION this body has been

known at various times as the Cheka, O.G.P.U.

N.K.V.D., M.V.D./M.G.B., and is now called

the K.G.B. (Committee for State Security).

Analogous institutions exist in all the people's

democracies. During the Stalin cra in particular

the police exercized a formidable power and

perpetrated the grossest abuses in "purging"

their countries of anyone deemed hostile or

potentially hostile to the regime. The police

apparatus was based on a vast network of spies

and informers; and since even a careless word

could have the most serious consequences, the

majority of the population lived in a state of

constant fear. Many plots against the security

of the State were fabricated for their own pur-

poses by the secret police, acting with the

sanction of the Party leaders of the day. The

Soviet purges cost the lives of millions of people.

They served as a model for those undertaken

after the War in eastern Europe. In these actions

people were arrested en masse,according to lists

drawn up by the police, and were sometimes

shot outright; in other cases they were detained

for long periods awaiting interrogation and then

respects (e.g., rcstrictions on remission of

sentence for good behaviour in certain cases).

Camps are now graded into three types, with

corresponding differences in thc harshness of

the regime.

In January, 1959, Mr. Khrushchev stated

that no one in the Soviet Union was now arrested

for a political offence. But the current practice

is to label political offenders as ordinary crimi-

nals. The existence of political opposition is, of

course, strenuously denied, but there can be no

doubt that political opponents of the regime are

at present confined in camps. The continued

existence of the political police remains a

powerful instrument in the hands of the Party

for controlling the lives and thoughts of thc

people.Similar changes have taken place in the

police system in eastern Europe. In most

countries amnesties have been declared for

certain groups of offenders. That in HUNGARY

in March, 1960, was said to have led to the

liberation of three-quarters of all the political

detainees; the number of those still detained for

their implication in the 1956 revolution has

been put at 9oo-I,2oo.7 Many of those arrested

in the raids of spring, 1961, have not yet been

brought to public trial. Forced labourers work

in the uranium and lignite mines. An amnesty

was announced in CZECHOSLOVAKIA last May

for those convicted of less serious political

offences (e.g., attempted defection, "slandering

the Republic"). In ALBANIA the police are

strongly entrenched, and a Special Board exists

which is empowered to pass sentences of up to

to years' hard labour. In BULGARIA the Minister

of the Interior has wide discretional power to

confine persons who "threaten public order" to

imprisonment in "labour and educational com-

munities" for a I-year term, which can be

extended indefinitely. (Much of the "education"

takes the form of stone-quarrying.) In RUMANIA

the number of political prisoners has been put

at 6o,000 to mock). They are largely employed

in canal-building and other public works in the

Danube delta.The number of political prisoners in EAST

forced by physical and psychological pressure to

confess to real or imaginary crimes. After a

secret trial they were sentenced to death or long

tcrms or imprisonment, usually to exile with

forced labour in a "corrective labour camp".

'these camps, often situated in remote and

isolated areas, were run by the political police

organization itself. The regime in thcm was

harsh in the extreme and a high proportion of

those sent there never returned. The total

number of prisoners in the Soviet camps when

the system reached its maximum extension has

been estimated at between i o and 15 million.

How much of this extra-judicial system

survives today ? It is difficult to answer this

question with assurance, since it is so enshrouded

in secrecy. In 1954 the Special Board of the

M.V.D. was abolished—though it is not known

whether or not it has been replaced by some

other such tribunal, nor whether present-day

political offenders arc dealt with by the ordinary

courts in secret session under some form of

summary procedure.

Nineteen-fifty-six saw the repeal of two laws

dating from the 19305 on the basis of which cases

of terrorism or sabotage could be tried in the

absence of the defendant, the death penalty

being obligatory. Several partial amnesties of

offenders have been decreed, and the police

brought under closer Party control. The

responsibility for the forced labour camps, now

re-classified as "colonies" and thus enjoying a

less arduous regime, has been transferred from

the police to republican ministerics of the

interior and the local soviets.

However, the practical import of these reforms

is far from clear: the new regulations issued in

1958 governing the regime in the camps have

not been published. The leading Western

authority on the question remarks that it is

impossible even to hazard a guess at the present

number of persons confined in penal colonies,

although it is certainly less than under Stalin.6

The post-1953 period saw some relaxations, in

the direction of improved material conditions

and less inhuman treatment, but of late the

situation seems to have worsened again in some

26 27

farmers who devote an excessive amount of time

to work on their own private plots. These

tribunals can serve Party officials as a convenient

means of settling accounts with those of whose

conduct they disapprove, even where thcy have

committed no offence against the law. Such

tribunals arc contrary to Article 7 or the Basic

Principles, where is is stated that no one can be

sentenced except by a decision of a court. The

possibility that such trilmnak might take too

lenient a line with offenders is guarded against

by their submission to close Party control (e.g.,

cases arc vetted beforehand, and appeals arc

possible to regular courts). It should be empha-

sized that the "comrades' courts" arc officially

seen as the embryo of the future legal order

under communism, when thc regular court

system will have "withered away". It is hoped

that by then men will have become so attuned

to collective living that any deviant conduct by

an individual will at once bring ccnsurc by his

comrades. Such a systcm has nothing in common

with the traditional Western concept of a legal

order, and indeed appears rather as a system of

legalized arbitrariness. Whether the ideal is

attainable is another matter.

theoretical justification for this control has been

noted above. In a practical sense it is imple-

mented, not by overt direct Party intervention in

judicial proceedings, but rather through the fact

that judicial personnel arc in their overwhelming

majority Party members and as such bound by

its discipline. Those who arc not members arc

as socialist citizens also obliged to accept the

official Statc philosophy, and arc thus effectively

prevented from acting in an independent

manner. In 1954, 97.4 per ccnt or all Soviet

"people's judges" and 5r 9 per cent of all

"people's assessors" were Party or Komsomolmembers. In 1958, Party Or Komsomol members

accounted for 532 out of I 2125 members of the

Moscow collegitim of advocates.

exclusively political. In YUGOSLAVIA, where

political controls are less obtrusive than else-

where, judges arc required to hold a law degree

and to have 3 years' practical experience before

appointment (10-12 years in thc case of supreme

court judges).A court normally consists of a judge and two

lay ("people's") assessors, who arc either elected

at general meetings in enterprises, etc., or

appointed by local soviets or their equivalent.

Thcy serve for a few days in the year without

pay. Although linked by origin with the jury

system of Western law, they perform a different

function: they arc members or the court with thc

same rights and duties as the judge. Questions

arc decided by majority vote, but cases of

assessors overruling the judge either do not

occur or arc not publicly reported—except in

the period of initial socialization, when assessors

often serve as an instrument of Party control

where politically suspect judges arc still in office.

Prosecution

The prosecution of offenders is carried out by

functionaries of the Prosecutor's Office, headed

by a Prosecutor-General. In the SOVIET UNION

the latter is appointed for a term of 7 years by

the Supreme Soviet. Prosecutors are required to

have legal qualifications, although this condi-

tion is not always met. (In HUNGARY, for

instance, there are many who have only

completed a I-year course.) Their function is a

dual one: to present the State's case against

accused persons and to ensure observance or"socialist legality" in the investigation and trial,

as part of their broader quasi-constitutional

function of supervizing the legality of acts of the

administration in general. It is clear that these

two tasks cannot readily be reconciled, and in

practice prosecutors have tended to regard

themselves first and foremost (if not exclusively),

as watchdogs of the State's interests, and have

showed little or no concern for thc rights of the

individual.In the Stalin era their powers of control were

purely nominal, since the political police

permitted no external interference with their

Judges

Judges arc normally elected, either by the

national legislature, in the case of scnior appoint-

ments, or by the local soviets ("people's com-

mittees", etc.), in the case of thosc of inferior

rank. The tcrm of tenure varies: in the SOVIET

UNION it is 5 years for senior, 2 for junior judges;

in BULGARIA and EAST GERMANY, 5 and 3 years

according to rank; in ALBANIA 4 years, and in

CZECIIOSLOVAKIA 3 years. In HUNGARY, POLAND

and RUMANIA judges arc appointed by the

Ministry of Justice, since although the constitu-

tion provides for their election, no law to this

effect has yet been adopted. The election orjudges serves to give the impression that they are

responsible to the people; in practice, as with

the election of deputies to the national legislature

or local soviet, the election contains no genuine

element of choice and bears a purely formal

character. Candidates (one to a vacancy), are

nominated by the local Party organization.

Similarly, they can in practice be summarily

dismissed before expiry of their legal tcrm of

tenure if some doubt should arise as to their

reliability. Formally, their resignation should

take place after a demand for their recall by their

electors. In practice it would normally suffice

for thcm to be expelled from their local Party

organization, since this automatically leads to

the loss by the expellee of any public post he

may hold. Normally judges can be expected to

"toe the line" from conviction, reinforced by

ideological training and the prospect of promo-

tion for thosc who conform. Political reliability

is of course a major criterion in determining

advancement in the judicial hierarchy.

The question of the legal training and experi-

ence of judges thus play a very different role in

the Marxist-Leninist countries than it does

elsewhere. In non-Communist countries it is

reasonable to assume that, the greater the learn-

ing of the judge, the greater the likelihood of

justice being done impartially. But under the

Marxist-Leninist systcm legal training and

political indoctrination go hand in hand. A well-

trained judge will see no contradiction in

adapting his sense of justice to suit the political

requirements or the Party, since this is an

essential principle of "socialist legality". (This is

not to say that all judges or jurists necessarily

share the same view of how the Party's interests

may best be served.)The early prejudices of the revolutionaries

against legal education, as likely to encourage a

"bourgeois" formalist attitude to law, has now

been overcome, and thc aim is to raise the

professional qualifications of judges to the

highest practicable level. In 1957, 97.4 per

cent of Soviet people's judges had some kind of

legal training, and between one-third and one-

half higher legal training. Somc Soviet jurists

have suggested that higher legal training should

be made obligatory, but their advice has not

been followed.In eastern Europe the percentage of trained

judges is as a rule lower, since "bourgeois"

judges were dismissed after the Communists

took power and have not yet been replaced by

fully-trained socialist cadres. In EAST GERMANY,

for instance, in 1957 only 8 per cent of the

judges had full academic training. Aspiring

judges are now required to have completed 4

years' study, in the first year of which 45 out of

57 classes are devoted to "social science" (i.e.,

Marxism-Leninism and related topics). There

are still some "Slansky assessors", as they are

familiarly known, whose qualifications are

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The formal organizational structure of the

court system in Marxist-Leninist countries does

not differ substantially from that usual in thc

rest of continental Europe: there is a hierarchy

orinstances; cases arc normally heard in lower

("people's"), courts and appeals are allowed to

higher courts, and ultimately to the Supreme

Court. The Ministry of Justice exercises general

supervisory functions over the operation of the

judiciary (election and training of judges,

discipline, etc.). The SOVIET UNION abolished its

central Ministry of Justice in 1956, transferring

its functions to republican ministeries; thcsc are

now also in process of dissolution, and it seems

likely that much of their power will pass to the

various supreme courts. This docs not, however,

imply any reduction in the degree of political

content exercised over the judiciary. The

2 8 29

Guild in December, said that "lawyers may

properly demand freedom but this must be

consistent with the interests of the nation and thc

Socialist state". Pressure was put on the Guild

to reform itself and to eliminate private legal

practice, and after a stormy meeting a resolution

to this effect was passed.'

In YUGOSLAVIA private practice is still allowed,

and the individual is free to decide whether or

not to undertake a case. Fees arc fixed with thc

client within limits laid down by authority. Half

the executives of the advocates' chambers arc

elected by the members, and half nominated

by the republican assembly (parliament). A

measure of control is exercised by the Party

organization, which can exclude potential

members if they arc deemed 'unworthy'. The

criterion of professional qualification is stricter

in Yugoslavia than elsewhere, as it is also in the

case of judges : advocates must be graduates of a

faculty of law, have passed an advocates'

examination, and have practised for a minimum

of 3 years.

PROCEDURE

Soviet and east European criminal procedure

is based on the continental European system

which provides for a preliminary investigation

before trial, but with omission of some important

safeguards against abuses.

activities. The decline in (heir power has led to

a corresponding revival of the authority of the

Procurator-General and his staff. Nevertheless

thcir powers arc rather narrowly circumscribed.

Prosecutors who show what the Party considers

to be excessive leniency towards accused persons

render themselves liable to dismissal and prose-

cution for undermining the interests of the

State. A striking instance of such pressure

occurred in BULGARIA 111 May, 1961 5 when

K. Popoff, a senior official of the Ministry of

Justice, was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment

for "helping the class enemy" : he was said to

have assisted former landowners to recover

possession of their expropriated property. In

POLAND the resignation of the Procurator-

General, M. Burcla, in the summer of 1961, was

attributed to dissatisfaction at interference by

the Party in the Kielce embezzlement trial.

In performing their control functions prose-

cutors cannot question the legality of Party or

Government decisions, but only actions of the

lower organs of the administration. They are

also empowered to receive complaints from

citizens about illegal actions by officials, where-

upon they investigate the facts and lay them

before the Party authoritics. It is the latter who

decide whether to take up the case. In vuno-

SLAVIA the individual citizen has the right, not

merely to appeal to the prosecutor, but (if the

latter finds no grounds for instituting proceed-

ings), to sue in court the official who has

wronged him. However, as a Western authority

on Yugoslav law points out,

"it is difficult in the present political conditionsto imagine the realization of this right in practiceif the prosecuting official who has overstepped hisduty acted on the initiative or with the approval ofthe Party organization. In such a case the victimof persecution is practically powerless in spite ofthe legal guarantees."

Lawyers

All the Marxist-Leninist countries allow the

accused to have the services of a defence lawyer

(in cases tried under normal procedure). But

than 2 months before being brought to trial, but

this term can be extended by regional and senior

procurators to 6 months, and by the Procurator-

General to 9 months.

The situation is much the same in other

countries. (In HUNGARY, for instance, the normal

limit is i month, which may be extended by the

procurator to 3 months, and by the Procurator-

General to 6 months--but in exceptional

circumstances for further unlimited periods.)

Whether these formalities arc observed in

practice at the present time it is difficult to say.

In YUGOSLAVIA a 9-month limit also applies, but

within 24 hours of his apprehension the arrested

person must be given a "decision on custody"

stating the grounds for the action and informing

him of his right to appeal. The investigating

judge must interrogate the accused within 24

hours, and if the case is to be pursued must

immediately request thc public prosecutor to

open the investigation. In all countries a citizen

who has been wrongly arrested or detained

overlong without trial may complain to the

procurator, but so far as is known this right is not

utilized in practice.

Preliminary Investigation

In all countries considered here the investiga-

tion procedure lacks the distinction made in

Western Europe between police investigation

and pre-trial judicial investigation; the evidence

obtained in both is used in the trial. The two

authorities work in close co-operation, if indeed

they are not in practice identical. Thus, it is the

same person who draws up the indictment

against the accused and determines his length of

detention in custody. The arrcsted person has

the right to present evidence in his defence

during the investigation. But in practice it

appears that insufficient attention is often paid

to his depositions, and that the borderline

between a mere suspect and an accused becomes

blurred. The very fact that the accusation is

proceeded with tends to lead to a presumption

of guilt in the minds of the investigator. The

accused is not told the details of the charge

against him until the investigation is terminated.

Arrest

In the sovtur UNION the arrest of a person

suspected of a serious offence is normally carried

out by the militia (except in political cases, when

the K.G.B. intervenes). If the action is not taken

on the instructions of the investigator (i.e., an

official of the procurator's office), then the latter

must be informed within 24 hours, and must

confirm the detention within 48 11_ours or else

release the person concerned. A warrant of

arrest as such does not exist. In exceptional

circumstances apprehension may take place

before a charge is preferred, but not more than

to days may elapse before this is done. Usually

a person may not be kept in custody for more

their rights arc limited by comparison with those

of advocates in the non-Communist world. Free

practice is either prohibited or officially frowned

upon; the normal system is for lawyers to be

enrolled in a "collegium" (chamber of advo-

cates, lawyers' guild). These exist at a national

and local level, and function under the super-

vision of the Ministry of Justice. Control is

exercised primarily through the Party nucleus

within the collegium. The members elect their

own executive body (Presidium), which controls

thc admission of new members and disciplines

those who err (e.g., by criticizing socialist

institutions in their court speeches). It also

allots briefs among members and distributes the

fees collected from clients. These sums are small

by Western standards, and the status of the

advocate relatively low. Non-advocates without

legal training may be admitted to plead in cases

of lesser significance. The profession has little

appeal for ambitious young men and the ratio of

lawyers to the population is inadequate.

In eastern Europe various methods of pressure

have been and are being used to force lawyers

with private practices to join a collegium. In

HUNGARY, for example, there are special lists

in the Ministry of Justice of politically reliable

lawyers, who are drawn upon in sensitive cases.

In POLAND pressures have been intensified of

late.Three lawyers who took a strong line in

defending 17 men accused of embezzlement, one

of whom was sentenced to death, in a 2-month

trial at Kielce, were called before the Lawyers'

Guild and admonished. One of them, M.

Brojdes, was accused of slandering the prose-

cutor by comparing his methods with those used

by the Nazis in Poland during the war, and was

sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment ( July,

96 I). The lawyer who defended him, Marko-

wicz, also drew political parallels—this time

with the Stalinist practices of the early '505. He

was suspended for insulting "friendly socialist

countries". Shortly afterwards it was announced

that some 6o-8o attorneys were under indict-

ment for violations of the penal code. The

Minister of Justice, addressing a meeting of the

3031

Another factor prejudiciarto the interest of thc

accused is that (unless he is a minor or other-wise incapacitated), he is not allowed to see his

defence lawyer until the investigation is com-plete; nor is the lawyer entitled to he present

during the preliminary investigation.POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA are slightly

more liberal on this point: lawyers may visittheir clients in the presence of the prosecutingofficial or his agent, though in other respects

the system is much the same. In YUGOSLAVIA the1954 code aims to give the decisive role in theinvestigation to die court rather than to theprosecutor, as elsewhere, the latter's part being

narrowed clown to that of a party to the case.This leads to some important differences:

(a) The initial inquiry and preliminaryinvestigation are carried out, depending on thecircumstances, either by prosecuting organs orcourt officials. An authority on Yugoslav lawslates :"In practice the public prosecutorssend more cases

Ibr inquiries to the organs of internal olfairs thanto the district courts, and the investigating judgeswidely utilize their right to transfer either thewhole investigation or individual actions to theinquiry organs of internal affairs. About 75 percent of inquiries are conducted by the police andonly 25 per cent by the courts, while the shareof participation of the investigating judges andthe police in condhcting preliminary investigationsis approximately equal."

(1)) The accused, as slated above, must beMlbrmed of the charge at the beginning, not theend, of the investigation.

(c) Although contacts with the defence lawyerduring the investigation are prohibited, as in othercountries, and counsel may not attend the investiga-tion, the latter right is also denied to the prosecutoras well. Both parties are entitled to attend inquiriesat the scene of the crime, ad hearing of experts,searches of domicile, etc.

It should be emphasized, too, that the Com-

munist idea of the nature of a trial differs from

that customary elsewhere: it is seen, not as acontest between two parties, each of which

presents its own version of the truth, between

which the judge and jury have to decide. Thetask of elucidating the truth is onc shared by all

the partics involved—judge, assessors. prose-cutor, defence lawyer, and the defendant

himself. The prosecution and the defence arcas much partners as opponents. The scope open

to the defence lawyer cannot help but be restric-

ted by the official thcory that the pursuit or truthand justice must coincide with the pursuit of the

good of the State in its efforts to build com-munism.

state that confession must be supplemented byother material evidence, and that the onus ofproof lies on the prosecution. This is as close as

the new Soviet codes come towards recognitionof the principle that an accused is innocent until

he is proved guilty. During the discussion in theSoviet press prior to the adoption of thc 1958

reforms some lawyers pressed for the introduc-tion of the principle of "presumption of inno-

cence", but others condemned it as "bourgeois".The final result is something of a compromise

between thc two viewpoints, but neverthelessrepresents a welcome step towards greater

legality.Another important point to be borne in mind

is the limited ability of the defence lawyer toplead his client's casc. Oratorical flourishes,

appeals to the emotions of the jury—all this hasno place in a Soviet court. Morc than this:

Communist functionaries seem unable to ridthemselves of the suspicion that the defence

lawyer's concern for the interests of his clientmust indicate a lukewarm attitude towards the

interests of the State. He is therefore reduced toentering a cautious plea (pointing out extenuat-

ing circumstances that favour the accused, etc.).Soviet jurists have publicly lamented the fact

that defence lawyers are not bolder in court,

but the political risks involved deter them fromtaking up this challenge.

REFERENCES

fluidic/inky decor, Moscow, [956, Vol. II, p. 425.

3 SOVei A v ugolovny pretwis, ed. Karcv, x053, P. 12.

Newt Deuttchland, September 27th, [nth.

4 Sorettkore ',gramme prove: nsobronaya Mast, cd. B. S. Utcvsky, Moscow,10511, p• 32.

3 Neon Deraschlaruk April 6th, i06 I.

P. Barton, in b. Central Social, Paris, Jul.-Aug. t 06 t, p. 223 et seq.

I New flak Herald Tribune, October 23rd, 1961.

8 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 19t1t, 1062. Cf. N.rdieraldTribune., March II t 062.

9 Neon Deultchlard, April 6th, 1061.

to Le A fondt, July I Ilth, t (161; New Thrk Three, October tsth, 10hNovember I8th, 196 I ; noel, London, December 4th, 106t, Demo-

her 7th, 106 t.

tions arc allowed where the interests of the state

are affected and in certain other circumstances.This provision has to be seen in the light of the

general attitude of the Party towards publicationof news about crimc and legal proceedings. This

is governed by thc concept that such information

fulfils an "educational" role in stimulating ahostile attitude towards anti-social acts and awillingness among the public to assist the

authorities in their struggle against crime. This

means that readers of the Soviet press (includingspecialist journals), have knowledge of only a

fraction of the cases that appear before thecourts—morc precisely, only of those that arc

considered most "enlightening" by those whocontrol the flow of information. IS,Toreover, in all

accounts of trial no mention is ever made of thepoint of view of thc defendant.

The actual proceedings (except where special

procedure is applied), seem now to be conductedin such a way as to give the accused a reasonably

fair trial. He is allowed to object to investigatorsor prosecutors; Ile knows thc names of witnesses

and the main substance of their evidence beforethe trial begins; he has the right to question

witnesses; he may call (or, to be precise, requestthe court to call), his own witnesses and submit

written evidence at the trial; if he has not

choscn a defence lawyer one is assigned to himby the court; and if he is acquitted his legal

expenses are paid by the State; he has a right toconsult his defence lawyer after the trial and

(usually), to appeal; a copy of the judgement ishanded to him shortly after sentence is pro-

nounced. One might take exception to the factthat many trials take place in the absence of the

prosecutor (whose role then falls to the court),and that the presence of a defence lawyer is

obligatory only in more scrious cases--but thcse

are relatively minor points.More important is the question of the weight

given by the court to various forms of evidence.Here one may note the repudiation of the

exaggerated credence placed by courts in thcStalin era upon confession by the accused—even

though such confessions were in many cases

extracted by torture. The ncw Basic Principles

Further copies of this Report are available from

Amnesty, i Mitre Court Buildings, Temple,

London, E.C.4 at 55. each.

Trial

In all the countries concerned the trial must

be conducted in open court, although excep-PRINT ED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY HEADLEY BROTHERS LTD

109 KIMISWAY LONDON WC 2 AND ASHFORD KENT

32

At the present time the most urgent need is for funds. Any

individual over the age of 14 can become a member by paying the

minimum subscription of £1 a year. Local organizations can

affiliate for £2 a year and national organizations for £5 a year. Join

yourself and try and get a local organization with which you may

be connected to affiliate.

2 Take the initiative in forming a group of Three or write to the

central office asking for others in your area who may be interested.

Three families joined together make the basis for a good group,

but local organizations may also be interested in "adopting" three

prisoners and their families.

3 Get your local paper, magazine or journal to publish something

about the Amnesty movement.

4 Offer to speak to local organizations about the work of Amnesty.

(Speakers' notes provided.)

5 Offer to help the Librarian by taking over responsibility for

following up cases from a particular country. (This is only prac-

ticable for those who live in the London Area.)

All communications should be addressed to:

AMNESTY1, Mitre Court Buildings, Temple, London, E.C.4.

Tel: CEN. 7867