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BY BOB KRESS AND REAR ADM. PAUL GILLCRIST U.S. NAVY, RETIRED
The requirements for a practical, deep
interdiction fighter/bomber have long
been the subject of controversy within
the naval aviation community, especially
when it comes to the F-140 Tomcat versus
F/A-lBE/F Super Hornet. Often, however, the
definition of "deep interdiction" is changed
to fit the aircraft being discussed, rather
than taking into account the real-world
theater of operations for which it is destined.
243 --
As shown over Afghanistan, there were four basic requirements for any carrier strike force: • Reach the target. • Don't get shot down by surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), or enemy fighters. • Strike the target. • Return to the carrier before running out of gas.
Within these four seemingly simple rules are the needs for an airplane to have a long range while carrying sufficient munitions to hammer a target, and still be able to fight its way through enemy aircraft and AAA threats.
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Afghanistan Scenario Because our government doesn't tell us all of its secrets, we had to make some assumptions while using Afghanistan as an example. It is, however, obvious that reaching the target presents a great challenge. To avoid Silkworm missiles, the carrier battle group probably would not want to venture north of a line joining Masqat in Oman and Ahmadabad in Pakistan. Along this line, the group would be somewhat west of Karachi. Reaching Kabul in Afghanistan would require a oneway flight of roughly 825 statute miles.
Assuming the use of S-3 tankers, an F-14D strike
refueling somewhere between the towns of Quetta and Sukkur in Pakistan wouldn't have any trouble attacking targets in the northernmost parts of Afghanistan. If, however, an F-18 refuels in the same spot, it will barely make it to Kabul. The unrefueled radius of an F-14D carrying the normal strike load (four 2,000-pound LGBs, two HARMs, two Sidewinders, plus 6 7 5 rounds of 20 mm ammo, and two 280-gallon external tanks) is at least 500 miles. Accompanying F-18s have only a 350-mile radius carrying about half the bomb load. To complete the picture of mission distances, the S-3s would have to dash back to the carriers,
June 2020 9
F-140 VS. F/A-lBE/F
EVEN GIVEN UNLIMITED IN-FLIGHT TANKER REFUELING, THE USAF F-15 AND F-16 COULD NOT BE USED WITHOUT A MIDDLE EASTERN GROUND BASE
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hot refuel, and meet the raid coming out of Afghanistan, which would be much in need of JP-4 cocktails.
Why are we nitpicking over mission details? Easy! At the beginning of the studies that led to this article, we were convinced that the Afghan campaign would be an all-USAF show, and that would lead to questions of carrier fleet effectiveness. But map studies combined with knowledge of geopolitical restrictions showed that carrier assets, primarily the F-14D, were just about the United States' only option. This has clearly been substantiated by events.
Of course, the F-14Ds were not the first to hit targets in Afghanistan; B-2 stealth bombers each carried sixteen 2,000-pound GPS-guided bombs. They flew from Whiteman AFB in Missouri; a 33-hour round trip. Further, big-time USAF strategic air assets-B-52s and B-ls, arrived shortly afterward.
It was soon apparent that USAF tactical aircraft were not being used in Afghanistan. We went back to the maps and found that, even given unlimited inflight tanker refueling, the USAF F-15 and F-16 could not be used without a Middle Eastern ground base. Turkish bases were simply too far away and would require refueling over hostile areas. Only the use of tactical air bases in Turkmenistan and/ or Uzbekistan would work, and this would allow only partial coverage of Afghanistan.
The big question then becomes: does the Navy have the assets to be able to carry this kind of war into the future, and what kind of planning is in place? To cut to the chase, the discussion once again reverts to whether or not the new Super Hornet will really cut the mustard or if the Navy has taken yet another wrong turn that will cost us dearly on the battlefield.
History of Naval Aviation Difficulties The subject of the erosion of Naval aviation has nagged both of us ever since the cancellation of the A-12 program by the Secretary of Defense in the late 1980s. It was a watershed for a number
of reasons, not the least of which was the level of bad management that had not been seen in the Pentagon for decades! We can look back on that day and clearly see that the unraveling of the fabric of Naval aviation would become a longterm trend. Neither of us contends that the A-12, as envisioned by Navy leaders, was the right airplane to develop at that point in history. In fact, it wasn't! That, however, is another story.
We have put off writing this article simply because we know it is likely to ruffle many feathers in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, but events in Afghanistan again brought our main arguments into focus. Is writing this kind of article worthwhile? We wondered if we might be seen as "piling it on" when the Navy was in difficulty and clearly on a steep, downhill slide. Well, we have listened, with no small restraint, to the pontifications that justify how well the Navy is doing with its favorite program, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet-despite unimpeachable reports to the contrary from the guys in the fleet. Comments made to us by young fleet pilots who have flown the airplane and describe it as "a dog" carry much more weight than statements from senior officers and civilians higher up in the food chain. But certain pontifications in a statement by a senior Naval officer who should have known better served as the last straw.
The pronouncement appeared along with a spate of triumphal announcements that celebrated the successful completion of the Super Hornet's first operational evaluation (OPEVAL). In a publication titled "Inside Washington," the Navy's director of operational testing is quoted as saying that the Super Hornet was superior to its earlier models "in every category but three: acceleration, maximum speed and sustained turning performance." This pronouncement boggled our minds because these are the very performance capabilities that determine a tactical airplane's survival. Then, as if to justify this hand grenade, the officer is quoted as stating that the Navy has sacrificed speed in the Super Hornet for other beneficial
nvc,;.ptate F/A-18Fs fOrnrupon a single "E°' model .. E" and "F"' models are both Super Hornets. (Photo by Ted tarlson/Fotodynamlcs.com)
I
F-140 VS. F/A-lBE/F
A yellow shirt flight deck director guides "Tomcatter 104" (BuNo. 164345) towards waist cat three as part of the day's first launch cycle on January 13, 2006. This jet was also a GBU-38 dropper over Iraq and completed 154 sorties during VF-31's sixmonth deployment. It was one of three F-14Ds from the unit to be given war reserve status following its delivery to DavisMonthan AFB in Arizona in September 2006. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy.)
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capabilities, and he asserts, "Brute speed is no longer the discriminator it once was when the benchmark was the Soviet threat." It is clear to us that this naval officer doesn't have a clue about aerial combat and the importance of total energy in the complex equation of energy maneuverability. Nor does he seem to understand that Third World countries all around the globe are purchasing the very latest operational Russian-built fighters, which are also licensed for production in China. The Russian aerial threat still exists; what has changed is that the pilots aren't Russians.
As a nation, we have always had the means to protect our own global interests as well as those of other countries. Short of nuclear war, the carrier battle groups have been able to strike on very short notice. A president's first question in time of crisis is often, "Where are the carriers?"
F-14D Tomcats Carry a Major Punch With a layered defense, including air assets, guided-missile cruisers and frigates, and undersea backing, the carrier battle groups are almost invulnerable. On the longer Nimitz-class carrier, we see the F-14D-a truly long-range fighter/ bomber, plus lightweight F/A-18A fighter/ bombers. The long-range A-6 bombers are gone forever, but its derivative, the EA-6B Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft is in place, and that is in much demand by both the USN and the USAF. This country's Desert Fox and Kosovo experiences have, at last-and correctlyshifted the focus away from stealth and toward electronic warfare. In short, at the moment, the deck complement looks adequate. The F-14D can pick up the A-6's role because it was designed to do so from scratch. Its performance in Kosovo as a very effective strike leader has more than borne out that fact. With
F-140 VS. F/A-lBE/F
LANTIRN [Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night], night vision devices, and synthetic aperture A/G radar, the F-14 targeted not only its own four 2,000-pound weapons, but also the ordnance of F/A-18s, RAF GRls, and F-16s, which don't have such capable sensors.
An interesting comparison can be made to quantify the F-14D's strike effectiveness. Compare one F-14D and one B-2 bomber during a two-night (33-hour) mission in Kosovo. In reactive situations (no foreign base), the B-2 operates from the United States (lack of overseas B-2 basing is a serious constraint, and there are only a limited number of B-2s to begin with). The chart shows the weapons delivered-United States to Kosovo and back-for the B-2 and the F-14D.
Carrier Effectiveness Is the Issue This simple chart says a great deal about a carrier battle group's effectiveness. Remember that there were-or could be-24 F-14Ds on a ship, such as the John C. Stennis (CVN-71). Twenty-four F-14Ds can deliver more weapons than the entire 16 aircraft of a B-2 fleet. Unfortunately, the numbers of F-14Ds are dwindling, and they will be almost certainly be gone in another 10 years. What will be their replacement?
The F-14D will be replaced by the F/A-18E Super Hornet, which attempts deep-interdiction missions. Though it's a whizzy little airshow performer with a nice, modern cockpit, it has only 36 percent of the F-14Ds payload/range capability. The F/A-18E Super Hornet has been improved, but still has at best 48 percent of the F-14D's capability to deliver a fixed number of bombs (in pounds) on target. This naturally means that the carrier radius of influence drops to 48 percent of what it would have been with the same number of F-14Ds. As a result, the area of influence (not radius) drops to 23 percent! No wonder the U.S. Navy is working on "buddy tanker" versions of the Super Hornet.
1£1 Fl ightJourna l.com
33-HOUR MISSION STRIKE EFFECTIVENESS B-2 F-1'1D
No. of 2,000-pound bombs 20*
Mission time (hours) 33**
No. of missions 1
No. of bombs delivered 20
First bombs on target (hours) 17.5
*Average Week-1/17/00; 40,000 lb. payload
** From Whiteman AFB, Missouri
*** All night missions
Lt
3+
5***
20
Approx. 2
The F-140 information is from Desert Fox operations.
By the way, now that the A-6 tanker has gone, how will the Hornets get to deep-interdiction targets? Contrary to what we're officially told, a tanker variant of the Hornet is simply not the answer. In an attempt to make it supersonic, the F-18E has been given a low aspect ratio and a razor blade of a wing. This hurts subsonic drag and carrier takeoff payload when compared to an A-6 tanker, which is an aerodynamically efficient solution. Equally silly is the proposal for an EW version of the F-18E. The same aerodynamic reasons apply for this airplane, plus it has an external stores dilemma. To get sufficient range to support a deep interdiction mission, the EF-18E would have to use up precious external store stations with fuel tanks, rather than ECM pods as carried on the EA-6B. Perhaps the Navy should consider putting the EA-6B back into upgraded and modernized production and build some of them as tankers?
As this is being written, it is too early to comment in an informed manner on the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. The USAF heavy bomber raids are fully public. However, it is evident that USN carrier strike groups that consist of F-14Ds and F-18s are conducting the tactical raids. A study of maps shows that CVN airborne S-3 tankers facilitate the conduct of these raids by refueling, probably over Pakistan. At this time, USAF tactical air assets do not have bases close enough to Afghanistan to allow airborne refueling over friendly nations.
SHORT OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO STRIKE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE. A PRESIDENT'S FIRST QUESTION IN TIME OF CRISIS IS OFTEN, "WHERE ARE THE CARRIERS?"
A Boeing F / A-18E Super Hornet, attached to the VFA-105 "Gunslingers," traps aboard the USS Harry S. Truman. Super Hornets are now ubiquitous within Navy fleet service. The EA-18G Growler is a hybrid of the Super Hornet, but specializes in jamming and electronic attack. (Photo by Ted Carlson/ Fotodynamics.com)
Reported Super Hornet Problems Although the Navy has been working very hard to correct F/A-18E/F OPEVAL problems, it is worth summing them up: the production F/A-18E/F is
As this illustration shows, the F / A-18E is much more than just a modification to
the existing Hornet. It gained a new wing, a new fuselage, a new
empennage, and 9,000 pounds.
10 Feet
r'!r,O.~
F / A-18C HORNET F/ A-18E SUPER HORNET
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significantly overweight with respect to its specifications (32,000 pounds empty weight). This is far in excess of what one would expect for a variant of an existing F/A-18A, B, C or D. Aircraft weight estimation methods could, and should, have been much better; in fact, when we look objectively at the F / A-18E/F, we see an airplane with a brand-new wing, new fuselage, and new empennage--in other words, a new airplane. This is, therefore, what Congress would call a "new start." Both Congress and the Department of Defense (DoD) had to be looking the other way when the Navy was permitted to slip this airplane by as a simple modification of an existing airplane. In combat maneuvering flight, the aircraft had severe wing-drop problems that defied resolution, despite the use of every aerodynamic analytical tool available. Eventually, one test pilot came up with a "leaky-fold-joint" fix that opened
=-....;;;;;=--■ ..
chord-wise air slots to aspirate the wing's upper surface flow and thereby prevent the sharp stalling of one wing before the other. They stalled more or less together, but much earlier and more severely than before. This new fix is what the aerodynamicists call a band-aid. It causes aircraft buffeting, which is generally a source of wing drag. But a fix that combined "acceptable wing-drop" with "acceptable buffeting" had been achieved. One test pilot commented dryly, "I'd like the buffet levels to be a little lower so I could read the heads-up display!"
Owing to its high drag and weight (and probably other factors), the F/A-18E is significantly poorer in acceleration than the F/A-18A. Also, its combat ceiling is substantially lower, and its transonic drag-rise is very high. We have stayed in touch with some pilots at the Navy's test center and have gathered some mind-boggling anecdotal
information. Here are some examples: • An F/A-18A was used to "chase" an F-14D test flight. The F-14D was carrying four 2,000-pound bombs, two 280-gallon drop tanks, two Phoenix missiles, and two Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The chase airplane was in a relatively "clean" configuration with only a centerline fuel tank. At the end of each test flight, the chase airplane was several miles behind the test airplane when the chase airplane
reached "bingo" fuel and had to return to base. • An F/A-18E Super Hornet was tested using the same chase airplane, an earlier model Hornet, in the same configuration. The chase airplane did not need full thrust to stay with the test airplane. • An F/A-18E/F in maximum afterburner thrust cannot exceed Mach 1.0 in level flight below 10,000 feet, even when it is in the clean configuration (no external stores). At 10,000 feet, the F-14D can exceed Mach 1. 6. • A quote from a Hornet pilot is devastatingly frank: "The aircraft is slower than most fighters fielded since the early 1960s." • The most devastating comment came from a Hornet pilot who flew numerous side-by-side comparison flights with F / A-18E/F Super Hornets and says: "We outran them, we out-flew them and we ran them out of gas. I was embarrassed for them."
TOPGUN instructor pilot Lt. Rob "Shooter" Simone "checks six" in a F / A-18 Hornet. NAS Fallon, Nevada hosts NSAWC, which TOPGUN falls under, and is the holy grail of training for fleet Naval Aviators, where carrier air wings do work-ups before actual deployments. (Photo by Ted Carlson/ Fotodynamics.com)
June 2020 17
F-140 VS. F/A-lBE/F
An F-14A takes off from the USS Kittyhawk. (Photo by Katsuhiko Tokunaga/Check Six)
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Updating the F-14? In the January 1991 issue of Naval A via ti on, an article reminded us of some history: "After the dive/bomber became a naval aircraft type in the mid-1930s, fighters were designed primarily as gun platforms. However, the strength and power that characterized the F4U Corsair and F6F Hellcat enabled them to be readily modified to fighter/bombers. Each could carry forward-firing rockets, two 1,000-pound bombs or a droppable fuel tank. The proportion of fighters assigned to fast carriers increased steadily from 25 percent of complement in 1942, to SO percent in 1944, to 70 percent in 1945. The dual role made this great increase in air-to-air combat power possible with little loss in carrier air-to-surface capability."
How about a Hellcat II, aka Tomcat II? The first order of business would be
to resurrect as many retired F-14s ( of any configuration) as we can. Second, combine these with fleet F-14As, the remaining F-14As and even the Iranian F-14 assets that might be obtainable. (Iran took delivery of approximately 80 F-14s under the Shah; about 30 are still airworthy). Third, design a program to upgrade all of these aircraft to F-14Ds. This may sound wild, but Grumman experience in restoring Malaysian A-4D basket cases to mint condition in the 1980s was very successful, and they were not even Grumman aircraft! Similar success in restoring fleet A-6s at Grumman's St. Augustine, Florida facility was achieved. It would be appropriate for the Navy or DoD to launch a study by a blue ribbon team under the aegis of NAVAIR. We estimate that about 200 additional F-14s could be brought back
into the fleet. The titanium box beams and bulkheads are nearly indestructible, as well as repairable, using electron beam welding; but this is not yet a Tomcat II.
Buying time with these programs would allow the convening of a design team-again led by NAVAIR-of contractor personnel, MIT scientists, and other university help to study the cost of building new F-14s. We think the following design changes to the F-14D are achievable for a new baseline airplane and later for block change improvements:
1. Increase high-value-weapon bring-back capability; this would mean that the F-14D, carrying heavy stores, would hit the arresting gear too fast. We could conclude that a bigger wing with more powerful high-lift flaps and slats is required, but fly-by-wire systems allow a more elegant solution.
2. With flaps down, the basic F-14 needs a down tail load to trim out the flap nosedown pitching moment. Allowing the aircraft to fly slightly unstable in pitch, now enabled by fly-by-wire technology, suggests the use of a canard, which would produce uploads and relieve the down tail loads. Two top views are shown in in the illustration on page 16: the basic
F-14D and the Tomcat II. The Tomcat II features a larger F-14A glove vane in a fixed position and increases the slat chord forward of its beam by three inches.
3. The net result of these changes is that an increase of 4,500 pounds in bring-back store weight could be allowed; this is equivalent to a decrease in approach speed of 12 knots. The relief of down tail loads also solves an aft fuselage maneuvering fatigue problem and brings an air combat maneuvering lift increase of 19 percent. Turning (lift to drag) is also improved by relieving down tail loads. This change could be readily achieved because no primary structure is involved. A further plus of this design change would be that the aircraft's internal fuel capacity could be increased by several thousand pounds.
4. We appreciate the value of staying with a variable-sweep design-especially for the podded, twin-engine F-14. First, we could have a carrier aircraft with landing speeds in the order of 130 knots versus the F-4 Phantom at 145 knots. At the other end, the mission payload/range is greatly increased by flying unswept, as is air combat maneuvering. Why the latter? Because dedicated air combat occurs at below about Mach 0.8 because of high
Having withstood 4G while accelerating from a standing start to 160 knots in little more than 2.5 seconds, "Tomcatter 101" (BuNo.164603) climbs away from the Roosevelt in phase five afterburner at the start of yet another Operation Iraqi Freedom mission. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy.)
June 2020 19
F-140 VS. F/A-lBE/F
The proposed Tomcat II had wider inlets to allow for more belly storage of ordnance.
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0
turning drag-an arena in which the F-14's 20-degree sweep is optimal. And, of course, the F-14 has been to Mach 2.51 with four Sparrows loaded at 68 degrees of wing sweep. It has flown to Mach 1.35 at 5,000 feet (813 knots IAS), at which point the throttle had to be retarded to avoid over-speed.
5. The F-14D longitudinal flight-control system will have to be redesigned to cope with the level of instability induced by the larger glove, which is minus five percent in clean flight and minus 13 percent flaps down at the most aft CG. This is no big deal and, in fact, it may be within the capability of the existing F-14D bobweight system that tolerates some longitudinal instability. For reference, the Grumman X-29 was 45 percent unstable!
6. The F-14D should have some reasonable stealth-enhancing
additions-" sensible stealth" ri---------L ____ L~ as we used to call it-which
PROPOSED TOMCAT II
Basic F-14 wing and inlet glove arrangemnt.
Proposed Tomcat II configuration with a large fixed glove vane and wider slats for UHF radar.
would have practically no impact on weight or performance! Around 1990, a lot of work was done to this end; it included full-scale tests on real F-14s. Some radar-signature experts know exactly what should be done. Comparing the basic radar signatures, the F-14 has a slight fundamental disadvantage: it is larger. Its tunnel-mounted attack stores make, however, virtually no contribution to its signature, and it does not carry a forest of wing tanks and weapons on long-range strike missions (this also keeps its signature down).
The baseline F-14D production aircraft defined above would allow these carefully considered modifications:
A. The installation of the F-119 or the F-120 engines. The F-119 has already been checked for fit. Upgrades of the GE F-110 might also be viable. The objective would be a 40,000-pound class turbofan.
B. The installation of 2-axis, vectorable, axially symmetric engine nozzles for super-augmented pitch, roll, and yaw control.
C. The installation of UHF antennas that would be embedded in the increasedchord leading-edge slats to allow the onboard detection and tracking of stealthy adversaries. Low-frequency radar works well against low radar cross-section objects. Arrays like this were tested at Grumman in around 1990.
In 1990, Grumman defined many versions of what it thought the F-14D could be. The illustration at left shows one of the final designs. It was somewhat overdone in the stealth arena, but it incorporates most of the aforementioned ideas with very little design change or combat penalty. All of the changes are cosmetic "tin," and not basic to the structure.
A Word on Aircraft Design Just as commercial airliners are reaching their design limitations, as fighter designs have matured, they, too, have encountered the limits imposed by the laws of physics. Fighters and airliners are in the same situation, but fighters include a couple of extra dimensions. For instance, a choice has to be made between supersonic flight and subsonic combat maneuvering and cruise efficiency. The same is true for stealth versus electronic warfare. Pick one and design toward it. If you want a V /STOL, design one, but don't try to make it into a tri-service fighter/ bomber.
If you want a long-lasting, long-range fighter/bomber, design it from scratch for the mission as a new or upgraded design-preferably the latter. Then equip it with modern weapons, sensors, surveillance, communications, and EW. Let the sensors and computers-on board and remote-give the crew complete knowledge of the situation in the volume of air they are trying to dominate, and
IF YOU WANT A LONG-LASTING, LONG-RANGE FIGHTER/BOMBER, DESIGN IT FROM SCRATCH FOR THE MISSION AS A NEW OR UPGRADED DESIGN-PREFERABLY THE LATTER.
suggest the best plays. The electronics will continue to advance rapidly to provide capabilities that are now only dimly perceived, but the basic airplane, regardless of who designs it, is quickly approaching the best that it can be. In the meantime, remember to give the crew IR missiles and a Gatling gun for those times at which Murphy's Law intervenes and high-tech warfare once again deteriorates into a growling dogfight.
The bottom line is that, unless aircraft like the F-14D continue to be on board, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers will be deployed with few aircraft on their flight decks, and most of those will be versions of the Hornet and the Super Hornet. Despite all protests to the contrary, with regard to standoff munitions and precision guided weapons, our carrier battle forces will not have the pulverizing power of their 1980s counterparts. When that time arrives, it will be the beginning of the end for carrier forces as we know them todayand the end of their rapid availability to the president in times of need.
The Future of NAVAIR In 1975, an A-7 Corsair II was mounted on a pedestal outside the now closed Navy Master Jet Base, Cecil Field, Florida. On the base of the pedestal was a large bronze plaque bearing the inscription: ''The main battery of the fleet." The battle groups in those days-equipped with Corsair IIs and A-6 Intruders-could truly kick ass and take names. Those days may be over-probably forever-unless strong USN action is taken. We can learn major lessons from our past. Let's hope the Navy and the politicians remember to apply these lessons to the future.
So, Mister President, ask not what your carriers can do for you, but what you can do for your carriers.
June 2020 21
71·1I: l1l:IJJ,171: Editor's note: When we first published the in-depth article on the Tomcat versus the Super Hornet, we knew the conversation had just begun. We started knocking on doors and flipping over rocks looking for someone from the U.S. Navy to act as the official spokesperson for the Super Hornet; unfortunately, we found no takers. However, reams of emails and letters on both sides of the issue arrived in the office. We've selected several to illustrate the arguments that both sides cling to.
LCDR Alan D. Armstrong USN Safety Officer/Flight Demonstration Team Leader VFA-122 NAS Lemoore, California
LIKES THE SUPER HORNET Armstrong: In the February 2002 issue
of Flight Journal, I read with interest
your article on the "Battle of the Super
Fighters" and was very amused at the
conclusions reached by the authors.
I suppose that this should have been
expected because of the two authors-Mr.
Kress and RADM Gillerist (Ret.)-one was
never a tactical aviator, and the other has
not flown tactical aircraft in almost two
decades. Based on their apparent agenda,
I'd be interested to hear for whom these
gentlemen work today. In short, your
reporting on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
was highly inaccurate and irresponsible.
Unlike either of your two authors, I have
flown both the F-14 and the Super Hornet.
Over the past three and a half years, I
have participated in the early engineering,
manufacturing, and development (EMO)
flight tests of the Super Hornet at
Patuxent River, Maryland; flown the
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) in 1999;
co-authored the OPEVAL flight-test report;
and am currently an instructor in the Super
Hornet Fleet Replacement Squadron, VFA-
122, in NAS Lemoore. I am not hesitant to
say that the Super Hornet has plenty of
flaws and performance characteristics
that could be improved, but not nearly to
the degree indicated by Messrs. Kress and
Gillerist.
The article's most damning F-140-to-F/A
lBE/F comparisons and supposed "quotes"
from current aviators concerning the
Super Hornet characteristics are simply
not true and are, indeed, unattributed.
Unfortunately, the authors are guilty of
either an incredibly poor and incomplete
research job or of outright fabrication to
support their point of view. Either way, the
Naval officers in our Super Hornet ready
room had quite a laugh at their attempted
journalism.
One statement in particular caught
my attention; a Hornet pilot was quoted
as saying of his side-by-side comparison
flights with the Super Hornet that "we
outran them, we outflew them, and we ran
them out of gas. I was embarrassed for
them." This quote was originally authored
by a Marine Corps officer in an editorial
in the Virginian-Pilot newspaper in the fall
of 1999. It was supposedly attributed to
another unnamed Marine Corps officer
from an F/A-180 squadron with whom
the Navy had participated in a "Red Flag"
exercise in Nellis AFB during OPEVAL in
1999. These side-by-side comparisons
never took place (I was there), and no
Marine Corps aviator has ever admitted
to having made that statement. In fact,
while working with our Marine Corps
brethren during that exercise, the Super
Hornet functioned well with our F/A-
180 counterparts. The only discernible
difference was that the E/F carried more
bombs and missiles to the target than did
the legacy F/A-lBs, and the Super Hornets
never needed to refuel airborne (which the
legacy F/A-lBs did on virtually every sortie).
As far as classical fighter performance
goes, our aviators (many of them ex-F-14
Tomcat aircrew) are always enthusiastic
about fighting the F-14 because of the
F/A-lB's superior maneuverability and
high AoA [angle of attack] performance
versus that of the Tomcat. Current tactical
aviators understand that survivability and
lethality are not simply a function of top
end speed (as it may have been back when
Mr. Gillerist was last in a tactical aircraft),
but also of many other performance
and installed-system characteristics.
Survivability and lethality are much more
sophisticated concepts than they were
decades ago. The truth, from those who
are staking their lives on it and not simply
casting stones from the outside looking in,
is that while the Super Hornet does have
some deficiencies, it is still one of the
most lethal and survivable tactical aircraft
in the world today.
The most interesting facts in the F-14
versus Super Hornet debate would have
come to light had the authors of your
article ever spoken with anyone who is
actually flying the Super Hornet in the
fleet. If you are seeking journalistic
accuracy, please ask them to interview
our ex-F-14 aircrew to find out whether
any would like to return to a Tomcat
squadron, or which airplane (of any in the
world) they would rather be flying at "the
merge." Considering Messrs. Kress and
Gillcrist's obvious parochial tendencies
toward the F-14, I suspect that they would
be gravely disappointed to learn that
none of the transition aviators I know
would be enthusiastic about returning to
fly Tomcats after having flown the Super
Hornet. In terms of the suitability and
efficacy of the F/A-18E/F as the Navy's
newest strike fighter, that in itself is the
most telling statistic.
Capt. Kurt Schroeder, USN, Ret. Grumman F-lQ Chief Test Pilot
TOMCAT TEST PILOT ANSWERS Schroeder: LCDR Armstrong says: "I
suppose that this should have been
expected because of the two authors-Mr.
Kress and RADM Gillerist (Ret.J-one was
never a tactical aviator, and the other has
not flown tactical aircraft in almost two
decades." In questioning the qualifications
of the authors, I wonder where LCDR
Armstrong stood when Navy "experts"
early in the F/A-lBE/F program made the
following two decisions:
1. Automation will allow the entire mission
to be performed by a single pilot. (What
has caused the rapid expansion of the F/A-
18F program? The desire to get some of
that precious fuel out of the airplane?)
2. The "From the Sea" strategy that
rationalized the elimination of a carrier
based deep-strike capability under the
theory that it would never be needed. (How
does Afghanistan fit this scenario?)
Armstrong continues, "As far as
classical fighter performance goes, our
aviators (many of them ex-F-14 Tomcat
aircrew) are always enthusiastic about
fighting the F-14 because of its superior
maneuverability and high AoA performance
versus the Tomcat." What was the
configuration of each airplane? Were the
F-14s F-110-powered? The true measure
would be to put each aircraft in a typical
war-fighting strike-weapon loading. The
larger the weapons, the greater the
influence; however, even the presence of
the weapon suspension equipment would
significantly degrade the Super Hornet's
performance.
[Schroeder quotes Armstrong] "or which
airplane (of any in the world) they would
rather be flying at 'the merge'": LCDR
Armstrong's spirit is to be admired;
however, he needs to take a serious look
at the potential-threat aircraft available
on the market. The latest Soviet-designed
fighters, complete with thrust vectoring
and off bore-sight weapon cueing and
launch, might get him to change his mind
in a hurry.
[Schroeder quotes Armstrong] "none
of the transition aviators I know would
be enthusiastic about returning to fly
Tomcats after having flown the Super
Hornet." Apparently, LCDR Armstrong
hasn't met any pilots in the F-14B squadron
aboard the Teddy Roosevelt [USS Theodore
Roosevelt] deployed in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom. Scheduled to
give up their Tomcats on return to CO NUS
[Continental United States] in exchange
for brand-new F/A-lBFs, they obviously did
not support the above opinion during an
AP [Associated Press] interview; that is,
unless you interpret the following quote as
being supportive: "I hope the liberal, cross
dressing a-holes who thought the Hornet
could replace this aviation masterpiece
rot in hell." [Quoted on August 23, 2007.
Attributed to an F-14B pilot from the
USS Theodore Roosevelt when asked by
a reporter of the Associated Press during
Operation Iraqi Freedom what he thought
of transitioning to the Super Hornet on his
return home.]
CDR T.W. Huff, USN Newport, Rhode Island
THE TOMCAT'S DAYS ARE PAST Huff: The authors of this piece certainly
exercised their First Amendment
rights! With all due respect, I think
it's inappropriate to air this kind of
perceived dirty laundry on the pages of
your otherwise fine periodical. I would
have much preferred to read a blend of
qualitative and quantitative comments
from a flight evaluation, as is your norm,
rather than the "axe grind" from what
appears to be a disgruntled Grumman
retiree.
Despite the lack of confidence from
the authors, the sky is not falling on Naval
aviation. Americans can be proud of the
contribution of Navy Air through history,
and especially in the ongoing Afghanistan
campaign. Unfortunately, with the bashing
of the Boeing Super Hornet and NAVAIR
(Naval Air Systems Command) leadership, a
great opportunity was missed to highlight
the capabilities, response and flexibility
of carrier aviation in recent conflicts. The
bottom line is, every service is struggling
with the aging aircraft issue and the
pressure to field highly capable and
affordable platforms.
The authors' comparison numbers,
aircraft configurations, and platform
capabilities are a bit misleading and, in
some cases, inaccurate. I'm not going
to nitpick, but rather, try to clarify a
few things to help readers understand
operations from the "big decks." Contrary
to the article, it was not the F-140 leading
the charge in Operation Enduring Freedom,
but rather F-14As (the oldest Tomcats in
the fleet, mind you) and F/A-lBCs from
Carrier Air Wing Eight embarked [aboard]
USS Enterprise (CVN-65). It wasn't until
later that F-140s arrived. Carrier Air
Wing Eight was also the only air wing
to participate in Allied Force in Kosovo.
F-14Ds didn't play, as the article would
have you believe. The mix of older Hornets
and Tomcats performed remarkably well
in both conflicts. Why? Proven capability
and the best-trained and led maintenance
personnel and operators in the fleet.
Capitalizing on the strengths of multiple
platforms provided the decisive advantage
and strike effectiveness that continue to
be the cornerstone of Naval aviation.
Let's not get carried away with
maximum capability versus reality of
configuring the F-14. The "normal" strike
load-out is far less than that described. It
is rare to launch from a carrier with a load
that you cannot recover with. Each aircraft
has a maximum recoverable weight, and
as you add weapons, tanks, and pods,
there is less gas available to make a safe
recovery. There are a variety of reasons for
not expending ordnance: weather, aircraft/
system problem, target availability, etc.
It is not desirable to jettison perfectly
good (and expensive) ordnance, so a
compromise is made to meet the desired
target damage, provide for additional
mission requirements (i.e., air to air),
and allow for approach/landing reserves.
Besides, with precision weapons, there is
no need to carry excess-the whole theory
behind moving away from the "bomb
truck" mentality toward "one target,
one bomb." With the advent of inertial/
GPS guided weapons- joint direct attack
munitions (JDAM). joint standoff weapon
(JSOW)-a Super Hornet can destroy
multiple targets in one pass, and that
would make a Phantom, Corsair, Intruder,
or Tomcat pilot drool. Tomcat bubbas will
experience this firsthand because they are
undergoing transition training to the Super
Hornet as we speak. This isn't to say that a
"Super" Tomcat couldn't possess the same
capability; it just didn't win the acquisition
battle.
In rough numbers, a Tomcat has about
4,000 more pounds of gas than an F/A-lBC
during a similar mission profile. (Note: the
Super Hornet has that delta in its larger
airframe.) The thing that hurts the Hornet
most is excessive loitering, not flying
distance. Unlike the Tomcat, the Hornet
likes high and fast profiles, and orbiting
at low altitude waiting to recover back
aboard ship kills the gas mileage. With
variable geometry, the Tomcat can spread
its wings forward and be more efficient
in this regime. I 'm a real fan of sweep
wings for carrier-based aircraft because
of the speed range (including a slow
approach) and minimizing the footprint
on the flight deck. The F-14 is far from
a "deep interdiction" platform that the
authors envision-at least, by my definition
and that of a former F-14 squadron
commanding officer who chuckled at the
claims in the article. Without Air Force "big
F-140 VS. F/A-lBE/F
wing" tankers, F-14Ds could not conduct
the kind of strikes (and kill box/forward
air controller missions) currently being
executed-there are simply not enough
"organic" (air wing) S-3s to pass the gas
required for a sizable strike package that
includes suppression of enemy defense
(SEA□) support. Trust me: for the distances
involved in an Afghanistan scenario,
everyone is taking KC-135/KC-10 gas.
Perhaps the A-12 could have made the trip
without a sip-who knows?
Sure, as a former Hornet driver, I would
have appreciated more gas and a better
forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor to
acquire, identify, and prosecute targets
with laser-guided bombs. Once the
F-14 community decided to get into the
air-to-ground business in earnest following
the Gulf War, "scabbing" the Air Force hand
me-down low altitude navigation/targeting
IR night (LANTIRN) pod to the airplane was
a great idea to significantly boost lethality.
The greater magnification and resolution,
combined with a dedicated rear-cockpit
operator viewing a large display, make this
combination very effective. The advanced
targeting FLIR (ATFLIR, currently in
development) mated to the Super Hornet
promises to take us to the next generation
in IR technology. Let's also mention that
the Hornet is a "plug and play" jet, with
upgrade capability in processors and
software to leverage the enhancements of
emerging smarter weapons, new sensors,
and advanced mission planning. Using the
proven technologies and hardware in the
existing F/A-lBA-0 Hornet was one of the
selling points to reduce the risk of fielding
a new platform. Despite the engineering
challenges and solutions that are common
to any development program, the F/A-lBE/F
passed operational thresholds and will
be an exceptional aircraft with superb
combat capability and growth potential.
I won't argue against the fact that
there are a lot of politics that surround
acquisition programs, but it's important
to note that despite the myriad of cost,
schedule, and performance challenges, the
NAVAIR team is committed to delivering
quality war-fighting tools to the fleet
commensurate with the national military
strategy and service requirements.
Even more daunting is forecasting force
structure that will meet the needs of the
regional command chiefs decades from
now. Few military (or political) planners
would have guessed that we would be
conducting a war in Afghanistan-the
next battle was expected to be fought in
the littorals! Overlaying the needs of the
last war usually results in procuring the
wrong things. A lot of gray matter is being
expended to identify what our forces will
look like "transformed" to efficiently fight
and win future wars. As much as I thought
the Super Tomcat/Tomcat 2000/Tomcat
21/Tomcat II concept had merit, it isn't
on the scope for the immediate future, so
I et's get aver it.
Capt. Kurt Schroeder, USN, Ret. responds
THE TOMCAT SHOULD STAY ON BOARD Schroeder: Commander Huff said:
"Contrary to the article, it was not the
F-140 leading the charge in operation
Enduring Freedom but rather F-14As (the
oldest Tomcats in the fleet, mind you) .... "
The major point of the article was that
the Super Hornet does not replicate the
range/payload of the F-14. Because there
aren't any significant airframe differences
between the A and the D other than the
F-110 powerplant, the comparisons are
valid for either model. The fact that the
TF-30-powered airplane also did a superb
job is a testament to the design and the
people who operate the airplane.
[Quoting Huff] "Let's not get carried
away with maximum capability versus
reality of configuring the F-14." This may be
true for the limited targets in Afghanistan,
but a different scenario demanding
maximum ordnance in a target-rich
environment could easily push demands
for each aircraft. You can always elect
to load less than the airplane's capacity,
but never can you exceed the maximum
capacity, regardless of the situational
urgency.
[Quoting Huff] "In rough numbers, a
Tomcat has about 4,000 more pounds
of gas than an F/A-lBC during a similar
mission profile (note: the Super Hornet has
that delta in its larger airframe)." I hope
CDR Huff doesn't expect the Super Hornet
to fly alongside the F/A-lBC and maintain a
delta of an extra 4,000 pounds of fuel. It is
a bigger airplane with bigger engines, and
the rumor is that the range on internal fuel
is not significantly improved. Additional
range possessed by the Super Hornet is
primarily a result of the larger external fuel
tanks.
[Quoting Huff] "The thing that hurts the
Hornet most is excessive loitering, not
flying distance." This is called operational
flexibility. Though the Tomcat also has
a high-altitude optimal range profile,
if operational requirements drive the
airplane to a different transit speed
or altitude, the range degradation is a
fraction of that experienced by the point
designed Super Hornet. Thanks to variable
geometry and the high-bypass powerplant,
the Tomcat is very tolerant of even
low-altitude loitering-a very important
characteristic for a carrier-based airplane.
[Quoting Huff] "Trust me: for the
distances involved in an Afghanistan
scenario, everyone is taking KC-135/KC-10
gas. "Good point, and it only makes the
range/endurance issue more important.
What if the next scenario precludes Air
Force tanker support and forces the air
wing to depend on organic tanking assets?
A viable tanker is a platform capable of
transferring a lot of fuel a long way from
the carrier. Super Hornet spokespersons
who claim the tanker version represents
the first true "strike tanker" capable
of refueling the strike force en route
and then continuing on as the fighter
escort are smoking something. The drag
associated with the multiple oversize
external tanks carried by the tanker will
eat up a lot of the available fuel, resulting
in a close-in refueling point and the tanker
limping home. Although better than a
sharp stick in the eye, it isn't the solution.
[Quoting Huff] "'scabbing' the Air Force
hand-me-down low altitude navigation/
targeting IR night (LANTIRN) pod to the
airplane .... " Maybe the Navy should do this
more often. LANTIRN became the system
of choice for any Navy-generated laser
guided bomb delivery.
