Bushfire Death Trap The Eltham Gateway

BUSHFIREDEATH TRAP

“…trying to set fires, rather than prevent them”

Tim MalseedDavid Packham

2013

THE ELTHAM GATEWAY

www.elthamsdeathtrap.com

http://elthamsdeathtrap.com

Bushfire Death Trap - The Eltham Gateway


BUSHFIRE DEATH TRAP - THE ELTHAM GATEWAYwww.elthamsdeathtrap.com

Tim Malseed, Eltham Gateway resident & corresponding author �[email protected]

David Packham, Adjunct Senior Research Fellow, School of Geography and Environmental Science, Monash [email protected]

AcknowledgementsSpecial thanks to June Engish, Brian Murray & Mary McDonald Nillumbik Ratepayers Associa�on, Rod Incoll former

Victorian Government Chief Fire Officer, Belinda Clarkson former Victorian Government Councillor, Bill Gammage Eltham Death Trap’s

theme “...trying to set fires, rather than prevent them”, Associate Professor Neville Norman “Difficult valua�ons”, Felicity Dunnemental health, Peter Clarkson (volunteer fire fighter on Black Saturday), for design and layout

ForewordTwo weeks a�er Black Saturday, the Prime Minister of Australia was asked in parliament:

“My ques�on is to the Prime Minister, and I recognise that he answered part of this to the member forMcEwen earlier. My ques�on relates to the Prime Minister’s comments at yesterday’s memorial servicethat successive governments have failed in terms of bushfire management, and also comments made byWurundjeri elder, Aunty Joy Murphy, from Healesville who said that Aboriginal people historically burnedthe land every seven years for ‘cleansing and regrowth’, but Black Saturday was a ‘torture of the land’.Prime Minister, could you elaborate on your comment and, given that every inquiry since 1939 hasfocused on fuel reduc�on in fire-prone areas, do you believe it is �me we learnt from AboriginalAustralians, whose fires�ck management prac�ces created the bush environment that white Australiansare a�emp�ng to modify to a landscape that has never existed?” Tony Windsor Independent MP

Prime Minister Kevin Rudd replied to the Ques�on without No�ce:

“Given that our Aboriginal brothers and sisters have occupied this con�nent for 40,000 years, there isgreat wisdom to be learned. We also need to ensure that that wisdom is combined with that of earlypioneering families ... these things need to be drawn together. What we cannot allow to happen is for thisto dri� on into the future without resolve. As a parliament and as a government we need to bring thesethings together and to agree on a course of ac�on” Edited

Internal design by Clarkson & MalseedCover by Nancy Malseed, Un�tled Mono PrintPrinted by Ferny Creek Prin�ng

ISBN 978-0-646-90139-8

http://elthamsdeathtrap.com/docs/7.pdf



Execu�ve Summary 1Recommenda�ons 2The Eltham Gateway 3Black Saturday 2009 4The 2009-10 Victorian Government Inquiry 5Eltham’s History of Extreme Bushfire Risk:

Aborigines, pre 1835 7White Colonists/Se�lers, 1835 to 1960 8Conserva�on movement, 1960 to 1983 9The Greens, 1983 to 2009-10 9

Eltham Gateway’s Extreme Bushfire Threat:Local Laws and Policies 11Fuels 11Winds 12Drought 12Timing 12Emergency Egress 13Roads designed to gridlock 14“Leave Early” Policy 14

Precedents 14Death and Trauma Risk 15Extreme Bushfire Emergency Warnings 16Extreme Bushfire Cost:

Deaths 16Trauma 16Mental Health 16

Recommenda�ons 18Conclusion 19Appendix: Ra�onale for paper 20

Links to support documents - www.elthamsdeathtrap.com

Table of Contents




Bushfire Death Trap - The Eltham Gateway Page 1


The Eltham Gateway is part of anAustralian metropolitan suburb18 kilometres from the citycentre of Melbourne, theVictorian state capital. On 7February 2009, Victoria suffereda number of extreme bushfires,which killed 173 people. Itbecame known as “BlackSaturday”.

This paper's focus is on the mostdeadly fire on Black Saturday, theEast Kilmore bushfire. If the EastKilmore bushfire had con�nuedits devasta�ng passage into theEltham Gateway as predicted,then thousands could have beenkilled and in excess of 100,000people trauma�sed (see map below).

Six years earlier in 2003, the EastKilmore bushfire was forecast bytwo expert independentassessments, which wereformally presented to theVictorian Government. Theauthors of these assessments,David Packham and Rod Incoll,were ques�oned in detail by aformal Victorian GovernmentHearing Panel. Their expertadvice that fuel be reduced to 10tonnes per hectare (t/ha), wasnot ac�oned.

Following Black Saturday’sextreme bushfires, the $90million Victorian GovernmentInquiry did not ques�on Packhamand Incoll about their earlierpredic�ve assessments. Nor didthe Victorian GovernmentInquiry ques�on those PlanningMinisters “…with specificresponsibility…” for extremebushfire mi�ga�on. Further, theAborigines’ culturally entrenchedmanagement of extremebushfire over the millennia was

almost completely ignored andWestern Australia’s success atavoiding loss of life for 50 yearswas men�oned, but notrecommended. In the opinion ofthis paper, the VictorianGovernment Inquiry’sdelibera�ons were inadequateabout some specific issues ofexpert advice, responsibility andgovernance. It was publicallylabeled a “...whitewash nobodyeven no�ced” (Jounalist, Andrew Bolt).

Eltham’s known history ofextreme bushfire mi�ga�onstarts with the Aborigines’ coolburns, followed by white se�lers’use of fire breaks and non-flammable vegeta�on, and inmore recent �mes, the VictorianGovernment’s down-grading ofappropriate extreme bushfirerisk management.

From approximately 1980, theVictorian Government has

effec�vely mandated an increaseof landscape level, fuel-genera�ng vegeta�on in theurban rural interface, increasingthe risk of extreme bushfirebecoming extreme suburban fire. The uncontrollable risk factorslike drought, wind and igni�on,o�en distract the VictorianGovernment from addressing theone controllable risk factor - fuel,which is made up of dry grass,leaves, bark and twigs. TheEltham Gateway’s southerlyemergency egress from Victoria’snorth wind-driven extremebushfires, is a single, gridlockprone, bridge over Melbourne’smain river. The flammable treeshrouded egress route to thebridge will predictably become adeath trap in an extremebushfire, because of the“...radiant heat load” (VictorianGovernment’s “Radiant Heat and SetbackMeasurements”, see page 13).

Execu�ve Summary

February 2009 - Eltham’s predicted catastrophe (The Age 7 June 09)



Without a proper local warningstructure, and relying on a locallyand interna�onally discreditedcentralised emergencymanagement system, the ElthamGateway is set to become anextreme bushfire catastrophe,

with thousands of fatali�es.

The 2012 Victorian Governmentwarning DVD “Don’t Wait andSee”, predicts horrendousdevasta�on north of the nextbridge to the east of Eltham, at

Warrandyte. To avoid thathorrendous devasta�on, thispaper recommends the followingac�ons, which are heavy onVictorian Government leadershipand light on taxpayer funds.

1. Change the Minister for Planning’s �tle to “Planning and Bushfire Mi�ga�on”

2. Make Law and Policy like “The Victorian Planning Provisions”, “Neighbourhood Character” and “Environmental Significance Overlays” etc. properly consider extreme bushfire.

3. Conduct a landscape level extreme bushfire risk analysis, a minimum of 10 km north and west of the Eltham Gateway, and reduce fuel in all areas, to less than 5 t/ha.

4. Adopt the West Australian prescribed burningguide called “The Red Book”.

5. Decentralise the Emergency Response Centreto ensure �mely, locally specific informa�on to Eltham Gateway region residents.

6. Address the “Leave early” policy, and take responsibility for the risk of landscape level high fuel, and not make individuals and families responsible.

7. Make main emergency access and egress roads leading to the bridge crossing the YarraRiver safe from poten�ally fatal levels of “radiant heat load”, in an extreme bushfire.

8. Develop an emergency strategy for the ElthamGateway. Review a four lane one way egress and a river ford emergency vehicle access.

9. Address roadside and electricity asset hazard trees and ensure flammable trees do not overhang and fall on main emergency egress roads and electricity assets.

10. Dra� a format for community par�cipa�on inmicro scale prescribed burning, and monitoring of the biodiversity enhancement benefits.

11. Undertake a probability of survival analysis ofhouses and gridlocked cars, in the Eltham Gateway, as a database to determine more precisely the risk of extreme bushfire.

12. Collate the data from Recommenda�ons 1 to 11 and develop a strategy that will restore a reasonable degree of safety to the Eltham Gateway residents.

Recommenda�ons

The Victorian Government should, without further delay:

Execu�ve Summary (con�nued)

The Eltham Gateway is part of anAustralian metropolitan suburb,on the urban-rural interface ofthe Victorian State capital city ofMelbourne. At 18km northeastof the centre of Melbourne, thesuburban area is generally�mbered, with some homesbeing on proper�es of an acre orlarger. The Eltham Gateway is thegeneral area either side of themain road, which extends forabout 3km between the bridgeover the river and the shoppingcentre. The area has undula�ngterrain, with height contoursranging from 20 to over 100metres. The feature that makesthe Eltham Gateway a death trapis the traffic gridlock pronebridges from both north to southand west to east.

The Eltham Gateway is aculturally important area, beingthe centre of Australia’s mudbrick house movement, and awell known arts and cra�community with its focal point,the ar�sts colony Montsalvat. Apopular miniature railway and anumber of significant heritagebuildings are also located withinthe Eltham Gateway. At thesouthern end and extending tothe north, is the Diamond Creekfloodplain, with a mixture ofsports grounds, parks and na�vebush. The na�ve bush coveredbanks are o�en embedded withhousing, that has part canopycover and extensive fine fuels,some�mes collected on roofs.Community self help ini�a�ves toreduce these landscape level finefuels to a safer level, is hamperedby the Victorian Government.



The Eltham Gateway

The Eltham Gateway’s single north tosouth emergency egress death trap

The Eltham Gateway’s west to eastemergency egress death trap



Black Saturday on 7 February2009 was Australia’s highestfatality extreme bushfire (Engel,Lane, Reeder and Rezny, The Meteorologyof Black Saturday, Quarterly Journal of theRoyal Meteorological Society, accepted forpublica�on 14 May 2012).

Victoria’s human losses on theday were 173 lives and about10,000 people trauma�sed. Inthe Eltham Gateway region, 22%of the municipality was burnt, 41people were killed, at least 2,000people trauma�sed, andextensive economic costs.

A senior Victorian Governmentfirefighter giving testimony at theVictorian Government Inquiry setup in the days following the fires,described the early progress ofthe East Kilmore bushfire:

“…it was actually going to rundown through Eden Park rightdown through Mernda, Doreen,all those sorts of areas (direct line to

the Eltham Gateway), but the windstarted to swing around. Ken (A

Fire Force Captain on reconnoitre)

certainly plo�ed the fire for us. Ashe drove back to Whi�lesea itwas actually spo�ng alongsidethe car at 100 kilometres an hour.He relayed every few minutes theprogress of the fire. But it was afirestorm that he had never seenbefore”

Black Saturday’s extremebushfire occurred as a result ofigni�on during extremetemperature, low humidity andhigh wind condi�ons. Thesecondi�ons are combined to makeup the Forest Fire Danger Index(FFDI). However, even with anextreme FFDI, there is no firewithout fuel. On the day, thelandscape-wide high fuelresulted in the fire’s extreme

intensity, spread and size,crea�ng convec�on-drivenhurricane strength wind that at�mes swirled like a tornado. Theresul�ng extreme winds droveburning embers like a red hotsand blaster, making breathing,seeing and hearing nearimpossible, and strippingclothing, hair and skin offhumans and animals.

Any openings in buildings weredefenceless under this severeember a�ack. Many forest areasburnt at such intensity that theywere reduced to blackened sparsand sterilised white powder. Anumber of comparisons, withhundreds of nuclear bombs werelater used by experts to conveythe extreme level of energyreleased.

The westerly wind changeoccurred about 6:00 pm, and notthe forecast 9:00 pm. If the EastKilmore fire had impacted on theEltham Gateway and surroundingsuburbs, as predicted earlier inthe day at the Victorian

Government's centralisedEmergency Response Centre, farmore deaths, trauma and costswould have occurred.

The reason for this poten�aldisaster was explained byAustralia’s most informedhistorian on Aboriginal land careusing cool burning. BillGammage, who visited theEltham Gateway in April 2012, isan historian and adjunctprofessor in the Humani�esResearch Centre at the AustralianNa�onal University, and winnerof the 2012 Prime Minister'sliterary award for Australianhistory. Gammage also won the2012 Victorian GovernmentPremier’s Awards for bothLitrature and Non-Fic�on.Gammage was asked: “In regardto extreme bushfire, in this areaof Eltham, how would you rateour risk now, compared withbefore white se�lement?” Part ofGammage’s answer was, “It's asthough you are trying to set firesrather than prevent them”.

Black Saturday 2009

Firefighters surrounded by flame on Black Saturday



http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=OStdGl2LuI0



The inquiry was ini�ated daysa�er Black Saturday. It wasreported on by a generallyposi�ve Victorian media, assistedby an apparently even largerVictorian Government mediamanagement sector. The $90million Inquiry did not crossexamine the ac�ons of Minister’sfor Planning, failed toappropriately acknowledgeAborigines, and paid li�le regardto Western Australia’s successfulextreme bushfire management.

The Inquiry went into forensicdetail on response, case historiesand the opinions of Victoriangovernment employees.Meanwhile the VictorianGovernment Planning Minister’sand their Premiers, who had“…the specific responsibilityfor…” extreme bushfiremi�ga�on planning, did notappear as witnesses.

The Victorian Government wereformally advised by experts in2003 to reduce fuel to 10 t/haand had not done so. TheVictorian Government leaders,former Premier Bracks (2001 to2007), the then exis�ng PremierBrumby (2007 to 2010), andformer Planning MinistersDelahunty (2002 to 2005), Hulls(2005 to 2006) and the thenexis�ng Minister Madden (2006to 2009), did not appear aswitnesses at the VictorianGovernment Inquiry.

The $90 million VictorianGovernment Inquiry about thedeaths of 173 people even cross-examined two of our localcommunity group leaders, whohad no “…specific responsibility

for…” extreme bushfiremi�ga�on. Meanwhile thosewho had the power andresponsibility for the six yearsbetween the independentPackham and Incoll assessmentsof 2003 and Black Saturday in2009 were not cross-examined.

Andrew Bolt Australia's mostread journalist wrote:

“Why were the Black Saturdayguilty not named? The VictorianBushfires Royal Commission’sfinal report last weekend is thewhitewash nobody even no�ced”

The 2009-10 Victorian Government Inquiry

“...specific responsibility...rests with Minister for Planning..”




Ted BaillieuPremier 2010-2013

Ma�hew GuyPlanning Minister

2010-current

Steve BracksPremier 1999-2007

John BrumbyPremier 2007-2010

Mary DelahuntyPlanning Minister

2002-2005

Jus�n MaddenPlanning Minister

2006-2010

Rob HullsPlanning Minister

2005-2006

The Inquiry stated that inWestern Australia “ There havebeen no high-intensity,landscape-scale bushfires inthese forests (since 1961)…nolives have been lost in forestfires…(and)…this approach has

be�er supported biodiversityvalues”. Despite WesternAustralia’s record, not one of theVictorian Government Inquiry’s62 recommenda�ons men�onedWestern Australia. Furthermore,Aboriginal success with extreme

bushfire mi�ga�on for at leasthundreds and probablythousands of years, was almostignored. The Prime Minister ofAustralia’s earlier plea "...there isgreat wisdom to be learned”, wasnot learnt.

“... the specific responsibility for...(Bushfire Mitigation)...rests with Minister for Planning...”

2013, Unmitigated fuel loads in the Eltham Gateway - dictate bushfire intensity




Eltham’s History of Extreme Bushfire Risk

1890 - Grasslands from Heidelberg to the foothills (Streeton)

2013 - Flammable vegetation from Heidelberg to the foothills

Aborigines, pre 1835The primary record of exis�ngcondi�ons before Europeanse�lement comes from earlywhite documents. Analysisindicates that Aborigines wereexpert at landscape widesustainable flora and faunamanagement, for at leasthundreds and probablythousands of years. The principaltools used were embers or fires�cks for igni�on and green leafybranches for control. Theyconducted deliberate, frequent,small fires – which we now call‘prescribed’ or ‘cool’ burning.“When we do burning the wholeland comes alive again - it isreborn” (Bill Gammage, “The BiggestEstate on Earth”, page 184, Alan and Unwin

2011). In the late 1830’s, earlywhite se�lers observed aboutthe areas between Melbourneand Eltham: East of the city, tea-tree and grass alternated up theYarra un�l the country became‘rather over thickly wooded, andwith a good deal of underwood,which gives a scrubbyappearance’. This was relieved bygrass and open forest belts:Richmond was a ‘grassy hill’,Collingwood a ‘grassy forest’,Kew a ‘grassy range’, Bulleen‘good grassy hills’, Heidelberg ‘anever-varying succession of lightly-�mbered hill and dale,well-grassed downs alternatedwith groups of tall, handsome

trees’, Doncaster off the river a‘barren forest of dwarf stringybark’, about Lower Plenty ‘�mberbut of indifferent quality….Swampy Flat’, in the far hillsKangaroo Ground, grass then,forest now (Bill Gammage, The BiggestEstate on Earth, page 265/6, Allen andUnwin, 2011). These observa�onsare consistent with many earlywhite records across Australia.They establish that theAborigines maintained largeareas of grasslands with mul�plecool burns. As stated in theforeword, Aboriginies had greatwisdom with fire and avoided the‘torture of the land’ seen in thelast decades.

http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/history-under-fire-20121103-28rbw.html



Land management ini�allypursued agricultural and miningobjec�ves on, and accessedthrough, the lightly �mberedAborigines’ grasslands.Elsewhere fire sensi�ve saplings,which the Aborigines hadpreviously controlled, grew intomature trees.

In the extreme bushfires of 1851,the full implica�ons of the end ofAboriginal land management

became apparent. From then toabout the 1960’s, varying levelsof fuel reduc�on, cool burningand roadside firebreaks becamea rural Victorian custom.

The constant cool burning ofexcess fuel became part ofVictorian rural culture. Inresiden�al areas, a fear ofextreme bushfire led buyers innew areas to demand theremoval of flammable trees, to

allow for the plan�ng of non-flammable vegeta�on.

Extreme bushfire was primarily arural problem, where theflammable trees grew. It was notan urban problem where nonflammable and well wateredvegeta�on was lush with moistsummer fronds and leaves,offering some protec�on tohouses and people from embera�ack. They were safer places.

White Colonists/Se�lers, 1835 to 1960

1880’s - Plenty Gorge with grassy hills

2013 - Plenty Gorge with hills covered in flammable vegetation



The Conserva�on movementbegan with field naturalists andothers, who were later joined bypoli�cal ac�vists. The movementa�racted widespread mediasupport, which helped todemonise responsible extremebushfire mi�ga�on works withderogatory terms, such as “slashand burn” and labelling ofdeciduous vegeta�on as “exo�c”,despite it being non-flammable.

With at �mes na�onalis�c zeal,they encouraged the plan�ng offlammable leaf, bark and twigshedding vegeta�on, called“na�ves”, close to and o�enoverhanging houses. Toencourage dry garden “na�ves”,many thousands of tons ofgarden mulch (extreme bushfire

fuel), was trucked into suburbs,and o�en placed next to houses,compounding the risk.

Over this period, the risk oflandscape level extremebushfire, increased in smallannual increments, un�l thedifference between rural andsuburban bushfire fuel levels,became dangerous to residents.

When the Conserva�onmovement came to dominateVictorian government vegeta�onpolicy, cool burning was wronglydowngraded. Road reservesbecame flora corridors, withsome tree trunks right up to thepaved surface. Many policymakers argued that improvedfire figh�ng capability couldovercome increased bushfire

risks. For small controllablebushfires, that was correct,although an unintended by-product of the promptex�nguishing of small bushfireswas that it preserved fuels forfuture extreme bushfires.Improved fire figh�ng capabilityo�en resulted in higher extremebushfire risk.

The quickly established extremebushfires of Ash Wednesday in1983 demonstrated how helplessthe Victorian Government wasagainst mul�ple extremebushfires. A�er Ash Wednesday,some people began theindividual process of reassessingand documen�ng, amongst otherthings, Aboriginal cool burnmethodology.

Conserva�on movement, 1960 to 1983

The passionate, na�onalis�cgrassroots campaigning by theConserva�on movement hadchanged the VictorianGovernment’s policies. Coolburning was dangerously down-graded.

The Green movement a�racted anew spectrum of supporters,happy to join an establishedpoli�cal power base. Discussionabout extreme bushfire wasgenerally not welcomed by theGreen bureaucrats, and wasmostly shut down. For many ingovernment, Green faithreplaced reason.

While there was plen�fulexpenditure on containing smallto medium bushfires that do li�ledamage, the absence of

appropriate exper�se on thekiller extreme bushfires madethe problem worse.

From 1960 to 2009 the risk ofextreme bushfire in the ElthamGateway, crept almostunno�ced, higher un�l it becameworse than for many hundreds, ifnot thousands of years.

Over 50 years, the small annualincrements in extreme bushfirerisk levels approached a poten�alsignificant disaster stage. A highlevel of environmental damagehas been caused, not only byBlack Saturday’s extremebushfires, but also by the earlierand much larger 2003 and2006/7 bushfires in Victoria’snorth-east mountain areas.Millions of tonnes of alpine soil

has been reduced to river silt,compromising Victoria’s watersupplies, and tens of millions ofsmall animals were incinerated.Those high intensity bushfireshave le� rock where there wassoil and the “torture of the land”is extensive. The Greendominated VictorianGovernment’s net biodiversityvalues con�nue to go up insmoke. Meanwhile WesternAustralia has undertaken 50years of careful macromanagement of extremebushfire fuel, protec�ng the soil,small animals and without asingle loss of human life. Thisproves that respect for Aboriginalnet biodiversity values, deliverlarge scale environmental andhuman benefits.

The Greens, 1983 to 2009





Crea�ng a greener future for Victorians

The Victorian Government is suppor�ngprac�cal environmental ac�on by plan�ngtwo million trees across Victoria between2012 and 2014.

Trees are vital for a healthy environment as theyprovide shade, clean the air and help cool theenvironment. They also provide habitat for animalsand plants and help protect our water catchments.

The 2 Million Trees Project will plant 1.5 milliontrees in parklands and other public open space inmetropolitan Melbourne and half a million treesalong waterways in regional Victoria.

The 2 Million Trees Project is suppor�ng tree

plan�ng projects run by councils, schools,community and Landcare groups, commi�ees ofmanagement and other public land managers. Treeplan�ng projects need to deliver a public benefitand demonstrate value for money. The a�achedfact sheet sets out the criteria to qualify for supportfor tree plan�ng projects.

h�p://www.dse.vic.gov.au/conserva�on-and-environment/biodiversity/2-million-trees

Victoria’s destructive high intensity bushfires since 2003

Victorian Government planting flammable trees in suburbia, without mention of fuel mitigation



Eltham Gateway’s Extreme Bushfire Threat

For at least the last threedecades, the VictorianGovernment has mandated fuelproducing vegeta�on policies,without a complimentary fuelmi�ga�on policy. This processhas led to the exis�ng high fuellevels in our urban rural interface

suburbs. Those policies haveeffec�vely encouraged mul�ple-storey, flammable vegeta�onplan�ng around, and at �mesover houses. In extreme bushfirecondi�ons, some of thisvegeta�on burns so rapidly thatit appears to explode.

Local Laws and Policies like“Neighbourhood Character” and“Environmental SignificanceOverlays” protect extremebushfire fuel genera�ngvegeta�on, encouraging thelandscape wide plan�ng of thisvegeta�on.

Local Laws and Policies

Rod Incoll’s Kilowatts per metre of fire front intensity chart

FuelsFuel is the only factor we canmi�gate. It is made up from drygrass, leaves, bark and twigs ofless than 6 millimetres indiameter. The increase in fuelquan�ty exponen�ally increasesan extreme bushfire’s intensity.Without fuel, igni�on would notlead to flame and exis�ng flamewould not be sustained. With lessfuel, fast-moving uncontrollableextreme bushfire’s are graduallyreduced to slow-moving,controllable bushfires (See Incoll

chart). Within the Eltham Gateway,the high fuel is made worse byflood debris and concentra�onsof candlebark. The Eltham

Gateway’s river and creekparkland and road reserves coverabout 70ha, of which about 30hais forested. In many places withinthe Eltham Gateway the na�vebush parks have reachedequilibrium maximum fuel,probably ranging from 25 to 35t/ha (Simmons and Adams (1986), Fueldynamics in an urban fringe dry sclerophyllforest in Victoria. Australian Forestry 49 (30)149-154). These fuel levels inEltham are classified ‘extreme’,and as demonstrated on thechart below, would result in‘Fires not controllable’, atrela�vely low FDI (Natural Resourcesand Environment “Overall Fuel hazardGuide” May 1999).

These pockets of extreme fuel inthe middle of the ElthamGateway are vulnerable tomul�ple igni�on by spo�ng fromthe Plenty Gorge. The 900haPlenty Gorge is a VictorianGovernment designated high firerisk parkland, located some 6kmto the northwest (ie upwind). Aslandscape level fuel has not beenreduced in the Plenty Gorge andEltham Parklands, this paperconcludes that during extremebushfire condi�ons an igni�onwould rapidly become a crownfire extending into the tops oftrees (10,000 Kilowa�s permetre).

High fuel generating vegetation near Eltham Gateway’s River



Historically, the winds driving thekiller extreme bushfires inVictoria come from the north andlater in the day veer around andcome from the south west (Lukeand McArthur. Bushfires in Australia, Page89, Australian Government PublishingService Canberra, 1978).

The hilly terrain and extensivetrees within the Eltham Gatewaywill a�enuate the winds in thelower areas, while the ridge topswill be exposed. The windcomponent of the Forest FireDanger Index in the ElthamGateway will be around half of

that measured at Melbourneairport.

On Black Saturday, the ForestFire Danger Index at the airportwas around 200, meaning that itwould have been around 100 atthe Eltham Gateway.

Winds

Extended drought, which driesout the landscape, precedesextreme bushfire in Victoria. Astrategic threat related todrought, is that gum trees shedleaves and bark rela�vely quickly,

poten�ally doubling the availablefuel (Simmons and Adams [1986]). Themoisture indicator most used forbushfire purposes, is the Keetch-Byram Drought Index. In theurban rural interface, drought

�me moisture is further reducedby Victorian Government waterrestric�ons, resul�ng inpreviously lush vegeta�onaround homes becoming dry andready to burn.

Drought

It is worthwhile no�ng thatextreme bushfires, causing asignificant loss of life, haveoccurred between the secondweek of January and mid-February. These fires are; “BlackFriday” on 13 Jan 1939, “Hobart67” on 6 Feb. 1967, “Ash

Wednesday” on 16 Feb 1983, and“Black Saturday” on 7 Feb 2009. Historically, there was a similarday to Black Saturday 158 yearsearlier, “Black Tuesday” on 6 Feb1851. In Australia’s Capital city,over 500 suburban homes weredestroyed in the “Canberra

Bushfires” on 18 Jan 2003. Thispaper concludes, that the threatis only poten�ally disastrousduring January and February. Thelow FFDI, elevated fuel,uncontrollable bushfires in 2013,suggest a longer threat period infuture.

Timing

House embedded in flammable native vegetation near Eltham Gateway’s Creek



Emergency Egress

Eltham Gateway’s Emergency Egress - A “...radiant heat load” death trap

The Eltham Gateway has manyemergency egress problems,which combine to create a highlevel of risk. The area’s naturalsoutheasterly emergency escaperoute, is blocked by a river with asingle bridge, which is prone togridlock even in good condi�ons.Under high heat, smoke and lifethreatening condi�ons, thebridge is almost certain tocompletely gridlock . The nextbridge to the east is about 13 kmaway by road, while to the westat about 7 km by road, asoutherly turn of the river allowsmul�ple-route suburban egress.That means the ElthamGateway’s bridge is the onlyescape route in 20 km of road.With only this one bridge to

escape the region, people will betrapped and surrounded byflammable vegeta�on lining theroads (see photo below).

The Victorian Governmentadmits in its BushfireNeighbourhood Safer PlacesAssessment Guideline, thatduring an extreme bushfire thesafe distance from a extreme fuelhazard is 140 metres.

The Guidelines states: Radiant Heat and SetbackMeasurementsTo provide ini�al direc�on to CFA staffand others in assessing the suitability ofpoten�al Neighbourhood Safer Places,the following guidance is provided:

Neighbourhood Safer Places must meetthe following criteria for radiant heatload:

1 - If a Neighbourhood Safer Place is anopen space the maximum poten�alradiant heat impac�ng on the site mustbe no more than 2kw/m².

2 - If a Neighbourhood Safer Place is abuilding, the maximum poten�alradiant heat impac�ng on the buildingmust be no more than 10kw/m².

By way of example, NeighbourhoodSafer Places adjoining extreme fuelhazards, this equates to a separa�ondistance from the fire hazard of:

greater than 310 metres from the outeredge of the NSP for an open space; and greater than 140 metres from the outeredge of a building to the fire hazard.

It is acknowledged that for NSPsabu�ng less than extreme fuel hazardsthis separa�on distance may be reducedso long as the criteria for maximumradiant heat impact are met.



The Victorian Governmentaccepts that people will begridlocked in cars close toflammable vegeta�on (“Don't wait and

see). Despite the VictorianGovernment's scien�fic evidenceon the “..radiant heat load”generated by trees, the mainaccess and egress roads are lined

with old, diseased and deadtrees. These trees fall over thepaved surface and crush cars innormal storms. In the hurricanestrength winds created in anextreme bushfire, most roads willbecome blocked. At the passageof the fire front, many trappedvehicles will be unable to go

forward or back. Due to theamount of high fuel adjoining theroads paved area, those trappedpeople in cars will either perish,or face varying degrees oftrauma, during those desperateminutes of “...radiant heat load”.

Roads Designed to Gridlock

The Victorian Government’s "leave early" defence againstextreme bushfire, with it’suncertainty of agreed emergencyprocedures, is untested. TheVictorian Government has putthe responsibility of leaving early

onto “families and individuals”.When an extreme bushfire hasthe poten�al to involve schools,disabled, elderly, sick,unaccompanied children andthose without transport;untested procedures will

predictably lead to a scaled upversion of the disaster thatoccurred in less populated areason Black Saturday. Media imagesat the �me did not convey thefull horror.

“Leave Early” Policy

Eltham Gateways Main Road blocked in normal storm conditions (DV Leader 6 September 2012)

Australian ci�es that have hadextreme bushfires impact theirsuburbs are Hobart (1967),Canberra (2003) and Bendigo(2009). Perhaps most directlyrelevant to the Eltham Gateway,is a town called Macedon, about60 km from Melbourne.

An analysis of the circumstancessurrounding the loss of life in the1983 Ash Wednesday extremebushfires found that 85% of liveslost were outside houses, withhalf of them being on roadways.

Clearly the fuel condi�ons of theroad reserves are a vital factor in

bushfire deaths. Thirty yearslater, the roadsides in the ElthamGateway area are equally unsafe,or worse. Many are thick withflammable na�ve bush and someare narrow, with just enough orno passing room for largevehicles. They are not survivablein an extreme bushfire event.

Precedents

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zvatIhixKxE&feature=youtu.be


http://elthamsdeathtrap.com/docs/16.pdf#page=7



The Eltham Gateway has thepoten�al to be a firefighter'sworst nightmare. That is,landscape wide fire in an urbancontext of hidden accelerants,gas bo�les and panicked peopledriving erra�cally, blockingaccess and egress.

The Victorian Government hasadmi�ed in a 2012 DVD, thesingle tree-shrouded escaperoute across the next bridge inWarrandyte, 13km to the east ofthe Eltham Gateway, would in allprobability become impassable.

The DVD �tled “Don't Wait and See” cau�ons: “…there is a very,very real possibility that they(residents) won’t be able to leavethis area in �mes of a majorbushfire” and “should we have amotor car collision anywhere onthose bridges, those 8,000 peopleor so, trying to flee, are going tofind it extremely hard”.

In 2009 Packham wasinterviewed on television aboutthe risk to life from futureextreme bushfires. The focus of

the na�onally broadcasttelevision interview, was theEltham Gateway’s region.Packham stated that futureextreme bushfire fatali�es couldbe “measured in the thousands”.Six months a�er the Packhaminterview the VictorianGovernment leader, PremierBrumby, used the words“thousands of lives” in atelevision interview in rela�on topoten�al fatali�es on BlackSaturday. Strangly, this drama�cincrease in the predicted deathsrisk assessments, by both anAustralian poli�cal leader and aninterna�onally recognisedbushfire expert, was notrepeated or further commentedon by the media.

During 2011 to 2012, Cr BelindaClarkson copied somemainstream media, numerousformal wri�en requests to theVictorian Government seeking aresponse to this ten-fold increasein risk assessments. Whilst themedia showed no interest, theVictorian Government’s response

appeared ambiguous. Howeverthe Government did agree toaccept Cr Clarkson’s proposi�on“…that the specific responsibilityfor… (extreme bushfire risk mi�ga�on

planning)…rests with Minister forPlanning…”.

If fuels and roads remain as theyare (see below), then thousands oflives will be lost from the“...radiant heat load” whenanother extreme bushfire, similarto the East Kilmore fire on BlackSaturday, impacts on the ElthamGateway.

The �me frame for thissignificant bushfire disaster is anydry summer drought period,within the next 50 years. If the 1to 50 rela�onship betweendeaths and trauma is consistentwith Black Saturday, then a100,000 plus trauma casualty tollcould be expected. The disasterin this gridlock trapped suburbanarea will occur a�er igni�on 10km’s or more to the northwest,coincides with a 50 or higherForest Fire Danger Index and highfuel.

Death and Trauma Risk

Extreme bushfire disaster roads in the Eltham Gateway

Extreme bushfire disaster fuels in the Eltham Gateway



http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=OStdGl2LuI0

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=rQhq7_BwVPo




Extreme Bushfire CostDeathsAt 2,000 deaths, thecompensa�on cost to theVictorian Government would beabout $7.457 billion. However,when combined with other costslike response, insurance,government expenditure, �mberasset and inquiry etc, the total

cost escalates to $50 billion (basedon the findings of the Victorian Government’sInquiry. Final Report Volume 1 p.243).Associate Professor NevilleNorman from the University ofMelbourne (PhD CambridgeUniversity), addressed thispaper’s concern regarding cost

and commented "I have read thedocuments thoroughly...I have apaper on valu�on that mighthelp...the RC’s (the VictorianGovernment Inquiry) es�matesare miles too low” (See "Difficult

Valuations").

Clinical and forensic psychologistFelicity Dunne addressed thispaper’s concern about thepoten�al mental health

ramifica�ons of an extremebushfire impac�ng the ElthamGateway, and commented"There would be an

overwhelming acute and chronicmental health impact on theState of Victoria".

Trauma

Mental Health

On Black Saturday thedeath/trauma ra�o was about 1to 50. At 2,000 deaths, thetrauma numbers could be about100,000. Trauma ranges from

shock to third degree burns andsuicidality. A�er talking on sitewith the Opera�onsDirector/Director of Nursing atone of Victoria’s largest hospitals,

this paper concludes themortuary and trauma numberswould overwhelm the VictorianGovernment's healthcaresystem.

Prior to 2:00pm on BlackSaturday both the Chief Scien�stat the Victorian GovernmentEmergency Headquarters and aSenior Fire Officer on the groundnear East Kilmore, predicted thefire would impact on Eltham. Nowarning was given to residents.Centralised Emergency Centresworldwide, have a high warningfailure rate (Herman B. Leonard. GeorgeF. Baker, Jr. Professor of PublicManagement, John F. Kennedy School ofgovernment, Harvard University. Evidencefor the Victorian Bushfires Royal

Commission, 2009. “ Organizing Response toExtreme Emergencies”, April 25 2010).

This paper is of the view thatpeople planning to access andegress through the ElthamGateway, cannot assume theVictorian Government willproperly process a �melywarning. The exis�ng centralisedVictorian GovernmentEmergency Response Centre,would most likely fail to issue a�mely warning, as occurred forsome areas on Black Saturday.

Without �mely warning, lastminute, panicked emergencyaccess and egress road traffic, islikely to slow to a stands�llduring the worst “...radiant heat load”.

With poten�ally 30,000 peoplewarned late or not at all,a�empts to cross the ElthamGateway’s main river bridge, inextreme “...radiant heat load”and smoke condi�ons, willpredictably lead to completegridlock.

Extreme Bushfire Emergency Warnings






http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/faith-under-fire/story-e6frg8h6-1226570810291



1884 - Eltham, a bushfire defendable zone

2013 - Eltham, a potential bushfire disaster zone

The future - another Inferno, this time in the Eltham Gateway

The images below, a wood engraving from 1884 and a photograph from 2013, show the same Elthamloca�on and demonstrate the increase in extreme bushfire flammable flora, with the later imageobscuring from view a large increase in residen�al density.



1. Change the Minister for Planning’s �tle to “Planning and Bushfire Mi�ga�on”

2. Make Law and Policy like “The Victorian Planning Provisions”, “Neighbourhood Character” and “Environmental Significance Overlays” etc. properly consider extreme bushfire.

3. Conduct a landscape level extreme bushfire risk analysis, a minimum of10 km north and west of the ElthamGateway, and reduce fuel in all areas, to less than 5 t/ha.

4. Adopt the West Australian prescribed burning guide called “The Red Book”.

5. Decentralise the Emergency Response Centre to ensure �mely, locally specific informa�on toEltham Gateway region residents.

6. Address the “Leave early” policy, andtake responsibility for the risk of landscape level high fuel, and not make individuals and families responsible.

7. Make main emergency access and egress roads leading to the bridge crossing the Yarra River safe from poten�ally fatal levels of “radiant heat load”, in an extreme bushfire.

8. Develop an emergency strategy for the Eltham Gateway. Review a four lane one way egress and a riverford emergency vehicle access.

9. Address roadside and electricity asset hazard trees and ensure flammable trees do not overhang and fall on main emergency egress roads and electricity assets.

10. Dra� a format for community par�cipa�on in micro scale prescribed burning, and monitoring of the biodiversity enhancement benefits.

11. Undertake a probability of survival analysis of houses and gridlocked cars, in the Eltham Gateway, as a database to determine more precisely the risk of extreme bushfire.

12. Collate the data from Recommenda�ons 1 to 11 and develop a strategy that will restore a reasonable degree of safetyto the Eltham Gateway residents.

Recommenda�ons

The Victorian Government should, without further delay:



This paper concludes that unlesslandscape-level fuel is reduced, asignificant extreme bushfiredisaster in the Eltham Gatewaywill occur during a dry summerdrought period, within the next50 years.

With at least 30 years ofinappropriate extreme bushfireplanning, combined with limitedor no emergency egress fortrapped people, thousands ofpeople will die in the ElthamGateway and poten�ally 100,000people will be trauma�sed. Theevent will occur with exis�ng orprojected higher fuel loads, on aForest Fire Danger Index of 50 or

above, a�er igni�on 10 km ormore to the northwest of theEltham Gateway.

The extreme bushfire behaviourwill create extensive emberspo�ng that will repeat theexperience of Black Saturday,though this �me occurring in aresiden�al area with peopletrapped by a river and creek.

In the car-gridlocked ElthamGateway area and at least 10 kmsto the north and west, areduc�on of landscape levelextreme bushfire fuel to reducethe “...radiant heat load”, mustbe ac�oned by the VictorianGovernment without further

delay. In addi�on, thegovernment must more widelyinform residents of their exis�ngpersonal threat level.

The Aboriginal stewards of thisland managed to maintain ahealthy and safe environment upto 1835. More recently theWestern Australian Governmenthas shown how it can be donewithout loss of life and withminimal property damage. TheVictorian Government must nowfollow Western Australia’sexample and provide theleadership to ensure an extremebushfire like Black Saturday doesnot enter the Eltham Gateway.

Conclusion

Packham’s 2003 timely warning, 120 metre high flames near East Kilmore (Photo A. Sewell - 1998)



David Packham, 50 years of expertise, with practical acumen - (The Sun 22 February 1983)

David Packham is aninterna�onally recognisedextreme bushfire expert. Hisfamily fought and saved theirhouse from the 1983 killerextreme bushfire, called AshWednesday. In 2009, over 50hours before Black Saturday’slargest bushfire, the East Kilmorefire was ignited, Packhamemailed the first detailed

warning (4:46 am on Thursday 5 February

2009). Within hours, that warningwas widely distributedthroughout Australia. At11:47am on 7 February, the EastKilmore igni�on occurred, about50 km north-north-west ofEltham. As Packham hadcorrectly forecast in detail, not50 hours before, but six yearsearlier, an igni�on in that specific

area was the Eltham regionsbiggest extreme bushfire risk.

Tim Malseed and his family havebeen residents of the ElthamGateway for 30 years. They wantto con�nue to live there inreasonable safety, without theever increasing fear during thefire season, of an extremebushfire like Black Saturday.

Appendix: Ra�onale for paper




In 1999 a Nillumbik RatepayersAssocia�on (NRA) Director publiclypredicted “Uncontrollablefire…threatens se�lements…”.

In 2001, a former VictorianGovernment fire preven�on officer of30 years’ experience, publicallystated that the Victorian Governmentare “…forcing him to develop a burnyour own house down kit...”.

In 2003, the NRA asked Packham toassess the bushfire risk of the greaterEltham Region. Packham’sassessment was followed by anindependent second opinion, from aformer Victorian Government ChiefFire Officer, Rod Incoll. Both thePackham and Incoll assessmentswere endorsed by the VictorianGovernment’s bushfire force, whichstated “…both of the independentexperts have considerable andappropriate exper�se in the subjectma�er.” The Victorian Governmentques�oned Packham and Incoll at aformal hearing, where they made itclear that unless fuel was reduced,catastrophic fire was inevitable.There was no further response by theVictorian Government to the NRA’sexpert bushfire assessments.

In 2009 on Black Saturday the ElthamGateway residents were physicallyunaffected by the extreme bushfires,and not informed of the predictedspread of the fires into Whi�lesea,Diamond Creek, Greensborough andEltham.

Eleven days a�er Black Saturday, NRAmember and Victorian StateGovernment Councillor BelindaClarkson and others were advised bya Victorian Government employeethat "...Council's insurance cover maybe at risk if any employee (orCouncillor) suggests that thisNillumbik Council or any previousNillumbik Council has in any waybeen at fault in rela�on to the

The NRA issues a public warning (Diamond Valley News 1/12/ 1999)

A local expert issues a public warning (Nillumbik Mail 17/1/2001)

http://www.nillumbikratepayers.asn.au/reports/bushfire-threat-to-nillumbik-shire

http://www.nillumbikratepayers.asn.au/reports/an-overview-of-fire-hazard-and-vegetation-controls-in-the-shire-of-nillumbik




bushfires”. Put simply, now that theNRA and Clarkson had been provenright about the VictorianGovernment’s vegeta�on policybeing disastrous, their whistleblowinghad to stop.

Four weeks a�er Black Saturday anewspaper le�er suggested toMalseed, Clarkson was being bullied(check Bolt blog). This bullying led toMalseed assis�ng Clarkson, who wasclearly a beleaguered whistlebloweron extreme bushfire issues.

Following Clarkson’s cau�on, Malseedcommissioned Packham to inspectthe Eltham Gateway. Packham’sadvice led to Malseed forming theopinion that the VictorianGovernment's management ofextreme bushfire mi�ga�on was ashambles.

In mid 2009, “Inferno - The DayVictoria Burned” (by Roger Franklin), wasthe first of many books publishedabout the fires. The book referred tothe NRA’s expert assessments "...thethreat of catastrophic fire wasdismissed with what now seems aculpable disregard for life and safety".

In June 2011, the Australian Senatewas told “Cr Clarkson’s has stood upfor her community...”.

In 2013, extreme bushfire fuel loadsappear to be worse than ever.

2009 - “...culpable disregard for life and safety"

Email from Nillumbik Shire Council CEOto all Councillors after Black Saturday

“...asking...for the truth translates to harrassment?”



www.elthamsdeathtrap.com


Documents

Bushfire Death Trap The Eltham Gateway