Language: English Original: French AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

PROJECT: GOOD GOVERNANCE SUPPORT PROJECT COUNTRY: BURKINA FASO

COMPLETION REPORT

Date: [27 February 2009]

Appraisal Team

Team Leader: S. N’GUESSAN, Task Manager, OSGE.1 Team Members: T. DAYO, Economist, BFFO K. HOMAWOO, Computer Engineer, OSGE Sector Director: G. NEGATU, Director, ORWA Regional Director J.K.LITSE Sector Division Manager: C. SANTISO, Division Manager, OSGE.1

Peer Reviewers

F. BONGJOH: Chief Education Analyst, OSHD.1 B. BA-DIAGNE: Chief Health Analyst, OSHD.3 E. DIA: Senior Education Analyst, OSHD.1 T. HOUENINVO: Senior Macro-economist, OSGE.2

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pages Currency Equivalents, Weights and Measures, Fiscal Year, List of Tables, List of Annexes, List of Acronyms and Abbreviations, Executive Summary, Basic Project Data, Project Logical Framework Matrix: i) to ix)

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND FORMULATION 1

2.1 Purpose of the Grant 1 2.2 Objectives 1 2.3 Description 1 2.4 Formulation 2

3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3

3.1 Effectiveness and Start-up 3 3.2 Implementation Schedule 3 3.3 Modifications 3 3.4 Reporting 4 3.5 Procurement of Goods and Services 4 3.6 Sources of Finance and Disbursements 4

4. PROJECT PERFORMANCE 4

4.1 Operational Performance 4 4.2 Performance of Component 1 6 4.3 Performance of Component 2 6 4.4 Performance of Component 3 6 4.5 Performance Problems Common to the Three Components 7 4.6 Institutional Performance 7 4.7 Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Suppliers 7

5. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 8

5.1 Social Impact 8 5.2 Environmental Impact 9

6. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 9

7. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK AND THE COUNTRY 9

7.1 Performance of the Bank 9 7.2 Performance of the Country 9

8. OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RATING 10

9. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10

9.1 Conclusions 10 9.2 Lessons Learnt 10 9.3 Recommendations 11

ANNEXES This completion report was prepared by Mr. S. NGUESSAN, Chief Procurement Specialist, OSGE1, Mr. T. DAYO, Macroeconomist, BFFO, K. HOMAWOO, Computer Engineer and Operations Assistant at OSGE and a Governance Consultant, following their mission to Burkina Faso in December 2008. For any further information, please contact Mr. Carlos SANTISO, Division Manager, OSGE.1 (Ext. 2186) or Mr. Gabriel NEGATU, Director, OSGE (Ext. 2077).

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit : CFA Franc (CFAF) At Project Appraisal (30 September 2001) : UA 1 = CFAF 948.029 At Project Completion (December 2008) : UA 1 = CFAF 705.300

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

FISCAL YEAR

1 January – 31 December

LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Table 1: Project Financing Plan v 2. Table 2: Disbursements -Uses v 3. Table 3: Disbursements -Resources vi 4. Table 4: Logical framework of Progress Achieved vi

LIST OF ANNEXES Annexes Number of pages 1. Map of Burkina Faso, Project Cost, and Disbursements 1 3. Performance of Project Implementation 1 4. Performance of the Bank 1 5. Project Impact on Development 1 6. Matrix of Recommendations and Follow-up Actions 1 7. Government Comments on the Bank Completion Report 1 8. Sources of Information 1

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIAIONS ABMAQ : Burkinabe Quality Management Association ADB : African Development Bank ANLAC : National Anti-corruption Agency APRM : African Peer Review Mechanism CARFO : Autonomous Civil Service Retirement Financing Fund CGD : Centre for Democratic Governance CID : Integrated Expenditure System CIE : Integrated Governmnt Accounting CIR : Integrated Revenue System BTC : Belgian Technical Cooperation CVGT : Village Land Management Committee DCCF : Central Financial Control Department DCMP : Central Procurement Department DELGI : General Delegation of IT DGCOOP : Directorate-General for Cooperation DGEP/DCEI : Directorate-General for Economic and Planning/Central Directorate of Studies and Investments DGMP : Directorate-General for Procurement DSI : Directorate for Data Processing Services ENAREF : National School of Financial Governance ADF : African Development Fund CFC : Common Fund for Commodities PABG : Good Governance Support Programme HACLC : High Authority for Coordination of the Fight against Corruption IGE : State Inspectorate General IGF : Inspectorate-General of Finance HIPC I : Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative MATD : Ministry of Local Administration and Decentralization MEDEV : Ministry of Economy and Development MEF : Ministry of Economic Planning and Finance MFB : Ministry of Finance and Budget MFPRE : Ministry of Public Service and State Reform MPTIC : Ministry of Posts, Information Technology and Communication NC : National Counterpart NDC : National Decentralization Commission NGGP : National Good Governance Plan OBG : Good Governance Observatory ONATEL : National Telecommunications Office PAI4M : Institutional Support Project for 04 Ministries PRSP : Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PRSSP : Poverty Reduction Strategy Support Programme RESINA : Public Service Information System Network RGAP : Global Public Service Reform SEBG : Good Governance Executive Secretariat SG-CGM : General Secretariat of the Government and the Council of Ministers SIGASPE : Integrated System for Administrative and Payroll Management of Central Government Employees SP/PNBG : Permanent Secretariat of National Good Governance Policy SP/PPF : Permanent Secretariat for Monitoring Financial Policies and Programmes STC/PDES : Technical Secretariat for Coordinating Economic and Social Development Programmes BD : Bidding Documents TGI : Regional Court WAEMU : West African Economic and Monetary Union UNDP : United Nations Development Programme VDC : Village Development Committee

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The project was financed with a TAF/ADF grant of UA 2.35 million representing 83 % of the total project cost to cover 100 % of the foreign exchange costs (UA 2.11 million) and 33.3 % of the local currency costs (UA 0.24 million). The Government share in project financing was UA 0.48 million, i.e. 17 % of the total project cost to finance 66.7 % of the local currency costs. The sector goal of the Good Governance Support Project (PABG) was to contribute to improving the efficiency of public service delivery and strengthening the rational and equitable use of public resources, with a view to poverty reduction. The specific project objective was to contribute to building institutional, human, and documentary and IT capacities to ensure public service efficiency. 2. The project was implemented under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Service and State Reform by the Permanent Secretariat of the National Good Governance Policy (PS-NGGP). Originally scheduled for 24 months from the date of effectiveness of the Grant Agreement in February 2002, the project was finally implemented over a 5-year period with four extensions, as a result of difficulties encountered from 31/12/2004 to 31/12/2005, to 31/12/2006, to 31/12/2007, and to 31/03/2008. 3. In the project design, the areas to be covered were too vast and not sufficiently focused on the priorities. The multi-sector nature of the project posed problems of coordination and monitoring of activities. Implementation was slowed down by delays in the processing of the documents which the project submitted to the Bank. Furthermore, project supervisions became irregular after disbursements of the special project account were suspended in 2005 as a result of the misappropriation of project funds by the SP-NGGP accountant. The project encountered numerous difficulties in its implementation and monitoring-evaluation. It did not take into account: i) civil service personnel capacity building (studies and training); ii) all the administrative, legal and regulatory documents pertaining to the civil service could not be captured, scanned, archived and posted on the Public Service Website in compliance with the rules; iii) non-existence of an appropriate communication strategy; and iv) the interface between the CARFO and the SIGASPE system for processing pension files was not operational. Nonetheless, the activities carried out by the PABG, especially the procurement of data processing equipment and the related training, contributed to consolidating the modernization of the public administration. 4. Actually, notwithstanding the considerable delay in the start-up and conduct of activities, the PABG made a useful contribution to the modernization of the public administration by strengthening computer networks (RESINA), through the interconnection of all the administrative buildings and training for professional staff through thematic seminars reflecting their professional experience. The main lessons to be learnt from project design and implementation are as follows: (i) the failure to adopt a holistic approach to capacity building with the five components (training, system, logistics, monetary and non-monetary incentives) essentially limited the project outcomes to the area of logistics; (ii) the inadequate participatory approach made it impossible to ensure that all the stakeholders adhered not only to the project objectives but also to the implementation procedures; (iii) the extended scope of the PABG diluted the project impacts, (too many activities for the amount allocated to the project); (iv) greater rigour in project management and monitoring would have reduced the dysfunctions that occurred; and (v) lastly, the project management structure could have been efficient if it had been simple, with a responsible team of managers fully conversant with the Bank’s rules of procedure.

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5. Overall, the institutional performance during implementation was unsatisfactory. This institutional weakness was due, among other things, to the inadequate account taken of the project environment. However, globally, the project made it possible to achieve results regarding the improved performance of the beneficiary administrations. Overall project performance was satisfactory. 6. The main recommendations to the Government and the Bank Group are as follows: (A) To the Government to:

a) ensure that computer equipment is maintained and safeguarded, while taking budgetary measures in that regard, in particular in the Municipalities,

b) ensure that all beneficiary structures and Project team members financed by

the Bank are provided with appraisal reports and copies of contractual documents prior to project start-up,

c) take the necessary measures to exercise tighter technical control over third

party services within projects, d) encourage training seminar beneficiaries to organize, in turn, mini-workshops

in their respective departments with a view to sharing their acquired knowledge with their colleagues,

e) give preference in the selection of training seminar instructors to those with a

good knowledge of the country as well as foreign experience, f) take measures to ensure that the beneficiary project structures collect tangible

data on gender aspects with a view to sustaining the achievements; and g) consider setting up a new project to complete the PABG contributions through

support for the creation of additional Internet outlets for the extension of RESINA coverage to all the principal towns of the 13 Regions and the 45 Provinces, and continued support to the computerization of the Municipalities.

(B) To the Bank Group to:

a) adopt a more holistic approach to capacity building for the appraisal of institutional support and capacity building projects so as to subsequently facilitate their implementation and monitoring;

b) adopt, more systematically, a participatory approach in both the design and

monitoring phases of project implementation with a view to obtain greater support from the beneficiaries;

c) exercise tighter control over project implementation during supervision and

mid-term review missions by organizing, among other things, working sessions with the Experts and Consultants recruited; and

d) process, as a matter of urgency, the documents submitted to the Bank for

opinion.

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BASIC PROJECT DATA Country : Burkina Faso Beneficiary : Ministry of Public Service and State Reform Project Name : Good Governance Support Project

(PABG) ADF Grant Number : 2100155001758 Project Number : P/BF/K00-001 Executing Agency : Permanent Secretariat of the Good

Governance National Policy (SP-PABG)

A. PROJECT DATA

Table 1 Project Financing Plan

Financing Instrument Estimate at Appraisal in

UA million Actual Amount at

Completion in UA million ADF Grant 2.35 1.90 Government 0.48 0.36 Total 2.83 2.26

Table 2

Project Milestones Milestones Date Observations

‐ Appraisal October 2001 ‐ Approval 06 February 2002 ‐ Signature 15 February 2002 ‐ Expected Closure 31 December 2004 Four extensions: 31/12/2005, 31

December 2006, 31 December 2007, and 31 March 2008

‐ Actual start-up 2003 ‐ 1st disbursement 25 July 2003 ‐ Suspension of disbursement February 2005 to

March 2007 For embezzlement by the first project accountant

‐ Completion of activities 30 March 2008 ‐ Actual project completion 31 December 2008

B. PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

1. Undrawn Balance • Cancelled amount : UA 445 414 (16%) 2. Time Overrun/Underrun • Slippage on Completion : 3 years • Number of Completion Date Extensions : 4 3. Project Implementation Status : 65 % 4. Verifiable Indicators

1st Component: Public administration modernization support;

2nd Component: support to decentralization and the Poverty Observatory;

3rd Component: Support to coordination and the Good Governance Observatory

Average implementation rate: 59.55 % Average implementation rate: 49.13 % Average implementation rate: 86.66 %

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5. Institutional Performance • ADB : Average • Burkina Faso : Unsatisfactory 6. Performance of Contractors : Average 7. Performance of Consultants : Average 8. Economic Rate of Return • At Appraisal : Not applicable (N.A.) • At Completion : N.A. 9. Financial Rate of Return • At Appraisal : N.A. • At Completion : N.A.

C. MISSIONS AND REPORTING

1. ADB supervision missions Seven (07) supervision missions were fielded by the ADB:

• 1st mission in December 2003 ; • 2nd mission from 29 October to 10 November 2004; • 3rd mission in April 2005 • 4th mission from 15 to 20 December 2005 • 5th mission from 16 to 19 April 2007; • 6th mission from 23 to 25 July 2007; • 7th mission from 13 to 20 November 2007.

2. Activity Reports and Audits

• The implementation structure produced sixteen (16) activity reports comprising

fourteen (14) quarterly, and two (02) annual reports. It was audited four (04) times during fiscal years 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007 and 2008.

D. DISBURSEMENTS

In UA million ADF Grant in UA GVT (in CFAF) Total Disbursed: 1.9 0.36

Unused and cancelled balance: 0.45 Annual Disbursements:

2002 0 0 2003 324 798.12 0.01 2004 0 0.11 2005 318 927.93 0 2006 774 639.74 0.06 2007 379 665.63 0.08 2008 113 425.98 0.05

NB : The Government had the overall data, not the details of annual disbursements.

CONTRACTORS AND SUPPLIERS

Types of Bidding Number ‐ International Competitive Bidding (ICB) 2 ‐ National Competitive Bidding (NCB) 34 ‐ National Shopping 2 ‐ Competition on the basis of shortlists 12 ‐ Direct Negotiation 3

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PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

Measures Indicators 2003 base value Progress in 2007 Value by end of PABG, end 2008

Overall Goal: Contribute to poverty reduction through the rational and equitable use of public resources

1. Incidence of Poverty 2. Corruption Index 3. Economic and Institutional Performance

46.40 % (2003) 81st (2004) Performance satisfactory

40.8% (2006), 42.6% in 2007, 90th pays (2006) Performance good

-44.4% in 2008 Performance good

Sector Goal: Improve the efficiency of public service delivery and strengthen the rational and equitable use of resources

1. Capacities for the management and delivery of public services improved

2. Gross enrolment rate

Predominance of manual labour Low development of basic social services. Primary-level enrolment ratio in 2003 was 44.9% including 3.1% for girls

Capacities built up and improved with increasing use of the computer tool and development of the information system Gradual improvement of social indicators. Primary-level enrolment rate in 2006 was 66.55 % including 61.1 for girls

Increased use of the computer tool and the information system Gradual improvement of social indicators. Expected primary-level enrolment rate in 2007 was 67% including 61.2 for girls.

Programme Objective: Contribute to building human, institutional, documentary and IT capacities to ensure efficient public services

1. Support to the civil service for the pursuit of public administrative reform

Performance-based evaluation system not applied Staff were not sufficiently equipped in motivation and innovation techniques and concepts

The administrative staff records were integrated into the SIGASPE with minor delays due to lack of staff The tools of the performance-based evaluation system were prepared but not applied. 600 administrative staff were trained in staff development techniques, and 40 in quality

The administrative staff records were integrated into the SIGASPE The staff performance evaluation system was applied. 600 administrative staff were trained in personnel development techniques, and 58 in quality

2. Contribute to restoring credibility to the judiciary

National texts were not fully harmonized withe those of WAEMU, OHADA, CEMAC and other international agreements

Many texts for harmonization with OHADA, UEMOA, international agreements, etc. were adopted (legal framework of public finance, Labour Code, Merida Convention on corruption, African Union Convention on the prevention and fight against corruption, etc.)

Activities leading to the harmonization of texts were implemented

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Measures

Indicators 2003 base value Progress in July Value at the end of PABG

3. Strengthen economic coordination

PRSP reports were produced with much delay. Ownership by sector Ministries inadequate.

The PRSP annual reviews were held earlier in the year (April). The Commissions produced reports. Under Government leadership, a general framework for the organization of budget support to sustain PRSP implementation was established in 2005 involving nine of the Bank’s partners. The link of the PRSP with the budget was not fully ensured, and ownership by stakeholders was still inadequate.

PRSP implementation reports, frameworks for consultation within a sector and between the sectors were functional and produced reports on the points of consistency and divergence.

4. Control organs are rehabilitated, restructured and have become more operational

The control exercised over public expenditure was inadequate and low in quality

Public expenditure was tracked in the integrated public expenditure system and recorded in the accounts in keeping with the procedures in force. Furthermore, the Audit Court has already published two reports in 2006 and 2007.

The budget review laws were voted in keeping with the procedures in force, and on schedule

Public expenditure was tracked in the integrated public expenditure system and recorded in the accounts in keeping with the procedures in force.

The budget review laws were voted in keeping with procedures in force and on schedule

5. Local management of the 20 poorest municipal councils is computerized and integrated into the management of deconcentrated services and opened to the private sector and civil society

The poor communes were underequipped in computer equipment

The six communes were provided with computer equipment that enabled them to increase and improve service delivery, instead of twenty (20) due to lack of electricity in some areas.

The six communes were provided with technical assistance, training, capital goods to enhance the efficiency of their service delivery to the communities.

6. Information management systems are installed, functional and effectively used at central, deconcentrated and decentralized levels.

Internet access was not well developed in the public services

The systems, Internet, intranet and messaging were developed and used in over thirty administrative buildings. The databases were integrated and shared CID, CIE, SIGASPE, CIR, etc.)

The systems, Internet, intranet and messaging services were developed and shared. Databases were integrated and shared.

7. Support to the strengthening of the Permanent Good Governance Secretariat of the National Anti-corruption Agency (ANLAC).

The Good Governance Secretariat had no operating resources.

The Permanent Good Governance Secretariat was reinforced, equipped and became operational. What remained was internet access connection.

The Permanent Good Governance Secretariat was reinforced and equipped, and became functional. Internet connection was effective

1. INTRODUCTION 1. The Good Governance Support Project (PABG) financed with a grant from the African Development Bank Group (ADB: TAF/ADF) was identified and designed in the late nineties. Following a process begun in 1989, Burkina Faso conducted institutional and economic reforms and established the Rule of Law and a multi-party democracy based on the 1991 Constitution. It has gradually complied with the good governance rules, especially since 1996. It organized an International Conference and designed an initial National Good Governance Plan (PNBG), which was implemented in 1998 and consolidated during the period 2001-2003. 2. The PABG is pursuing the institutional, technical and operational capacity building of the Burkinabé administration and its partners (local communities, civil society and the private sector), involved in the promotion of good governance within a context of poverty reduction. 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND FORMULATION 2.1. Purpose of the Grant 3. The TAF/ADF grant of UA 2.35 million represented 83% of total project cost and was to cover 100 % of the foreign exchange costs (UA 2.11 million) and 33.3% of the local currency costs (UA 0.24 million). The local counterpart was estimated at UA 0.48 million, i.e. 17% of the total project cost to finance 66.7% of the local currency costs. The TAF/ADF resources were to be used in financing all the expenditure categories, while the counterpart fund was to be used to procure two light vehicles and motorcycles, set up the sites and IT network facilities, and maintain operation at deconcentrated and decentralized level. 2.2. Objectives 4. The overall goal of the PABG was to help improve the efficiency of public service delivery and strengthen the national and equitable use of State resources with a view to poverty reduction. The specific project goal was to build the institutional, human, documentary and IT capacities of the public administration with a view to improving its efficacy. In that regard, the project was to support Government’s efforts in the implementation of the Plans of Action and Activity Programmes set out in the National Good Governance Plan (NGGP), in keeping with the Bank’s Country Strategy Paper. It was to support management reforms and mechanisms for the management of public finance, build the institutional capacities of the public administration, contribute to restoring the credibility of justice as a public service, and improve good governance in a cross-cutting manner with a view to enhancing pro-poor public service delivery. 2.3. Description 5. The project had three principal components, namely: (i) Component 1: support to the modernization of the public administration comprising civil service human resource development and the pursuit of administrative reform; the functioning of public sector justice, economic coordination and public finance control; (ii) 2nd Component: support to decentralization and the Poverty Observatory, thanks to two pilot actions, namely, support to the poorest municipalities for deconcentrated public sector/decentralized community

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partnership with a view to delivering basic services to the poor, and the establishment of the poverty observatory; (iii) 3rd Component: support to coordination and the Good Governance Observatory including an anti-corruption agency, and support to the Executive Secretariat for Good Governance (SEBG) which has become the Permanent Secretariat of the National Good Governance Policy (PS-PNBG). 6. The expenditure to be financed for the achievement of these objectives related to: (i) Studies, technical assistance for IT systems and training programmes; ii) data processing equipment, furniture and fittings; and (iii) operation. 7. These outputs were expected to speed up the processing and execution of administrative and legal decisions and public expenditure for public service clients, particularly the poor.

2.4. Formulation 8. Further to a Government request in July 2001, the ADB appraisal of the PABG was conducted within a context characterized by: i) the implementation and mid-term review of the PRSP in support of the completion stage of the HIPC Initiative; ii) the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Support Programme (PRSSP) with IDA; iii) the update of the Government’s National Good Governance Programme; and iv) tests for the reformulation of new conditions precedent whose final performance was evaluated in July 2000 by the donor community. 9. PABG preparation was based on five pillars of analysis, namely, (i) a diagnostic review of Burkinabé State institutions and the processes that led them up to the formulation of the PABG project; (ii) an analysis of the different interventions of the Technical and Financial Partners who contributed to ensuring the transition from a revolutionary administration (1983 to 1987) to a administration capable of supporting a liberal economy in its growth and competitiveness; (iii) an institutional and human approach to capacity building with special emphasis on training, equipment and procedures; (iv) a relatively broad scope of interventions to cover categories falling under the four areas of good governance, i.e. political, administrative, economic and judicial, and (v) monitoring-evaluation by the ADB. 10. Regarding the outcomes of the appraisal, there were two areas that ought to be improved, namely: (i) Compact and operational concept of capacity: it is necessary to take into account the compact or holistic approach to capacity building, which consists in including its five natural components of training, organization (or system), logistics (equipment), monetary and non-monetary incentives, and comportments (linked to attitudes). Indeed, these five “atoms” of the capacities “molecule” interact to provide energy that ensures the dynamics of institutional and human capacities. They are useful for making diagnoses, identifying needs and actions, and conducting monitoring-evaluation. (ii) Beneficiaries’ involvement and capacity: the beneficiaries were not operationally involved in formulation. A launching ceremony would have been necessary for bringing the various beneficiaries together and ensuring awareness of their role and what was expected of each one of them, and a clear knowledge of the project road map and its implication as far as each of the benefic6iaries was concerned. The a-priori respect of existing national institutions to conduct project execution proved overly optimistic. The project was not prepared with estimates of adequate personnel to monitor its implementation. Nonetheless, the project refers to civil society and the private sector without giving them a specific role in the process of good governance support, which was the principal goal of the project.

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3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 3.1 Effectiveness and Start up 11. Fulfilment of Undertakings: (i) Provide the fund with the undertaking that project management will be ensured by the Executive Secretariat of Good Governance (SEBG): this undertaking is given in the Grant Agreement signed between the ADB and Burkina Faso; (ii) Assign the premises that should be suitably fitted to accommodate the IT networks and systems: a lease agreement was signed between the owner of the building of the Laboratoire du Centre and the Government. 12. Fulfilment of the Conditions Precedent to Effectiveness: (i) Provide evidence of the opening of a special account in a Bank deemed acceptable by the ADF to receive the funds earmarked for the operation of the project unit: a special account was opened at the BIB (main branch) in Ouagadougou; (ii) Provide evidence of the establishment of four sector Committees responsible for sector programmes: Decree 99-198/PRES/PM/MFPD of 14 June 1999 on the creation of good governance organs; (iii) Submit for ADF approval the 2001-2003 training programme and the list of candidates to be trained for the whole programme duration: training programmes were provided gradually and the lists duly provided. 3.2 Implementation Schedule 13. The initially-estimated implementation period of two years (24 months) from the grant agreement effectiveness date in February 2002, proved too short and over optimistic for such a vast programme. The initial closing date was extended four times: 31/12/2005, 31/12/2006, 31/12/2007, and 31/03/2008. The project, which became effective on 12 June 2002, was closed on 31 March 2008, i.e. lasting over five years. The lifting of the suspension of disbursements in March 2007, resumption of activities by a new Permanent Secretary in July 2006, and the extension of the disbursement deadline to late December 2007 and subsequently to 31 March 2008, led to a resumption of normal project operation and implementation of the Government’s programme of priority activities. 3.3 Modifications 14. Resumption of project activities following the lifting of the suspension prompted the re-focusing of the priority activities to be implemented, a review of the list of goods and services, and the definition of an implementation strategy, which proved beneficial. Thus, the activities envisaged, such as training, technical assistance and procurement of IT equipment were revised downwards or were cancelled to the benefit of other activities. However, all the activities relating to the information and communication system were implemented. Between 2003 and 2006, the main activities implemented concerned the procurement of data processing equipment for the beneficiary structures, the development and establishment of the infrastructure of the public administration information system (RESINA) and training (civil servants, and computer engineers for the development of RESINA, etc.).

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3.4 Reporting 15. The executing agency produced sixteen (16) activity reports comprising 14 quarterly and two (02) annual reports. The quarterly reports were not submitted to the Bank regularly, nor did they adhere to the Bank’s format. The project was audited four (04) times over fiscal years 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007 and 2008. Burkina Faso prepared and submitted its completion report of September 2008 to the Bank; the report presents the overall project situation fairly well fairly but reveals the following principal project shortcomings: i) lack of a manual of administrative, financial and accounting procedures mastered by all the stakeholders in project implementation; ii) management unit inadequately staffed with competent professionals trained in donor procedures; iii) lack of a procurement specialist to centralize the procurement of capital goods; iv) lack of a specialist in Monitoring-Evaluation; iv) lack of an accounting system compatible with accounting software; and vi) lack of systematization of internal and external control procedures (audits) and follow-up of recommendations. All these shortcomings explain why a misappropriation of funds was possible and why there were delays in processing documents. 3.5 Procurement of Goods and Services 16. Overall, goods and services were procured in conformity with the Bank’s rules of procedure. However, there were several delays, especially during the first three years of project implementation. This was due to the failure to comply with the Bank’s procedures and the suspension of disbursements following the above-mentioned misappropriation of funds. To improve the performance of activities following the lifting of the suspension of disbursements in March 2007, the Bank’s supervision missions regularly held working sessions targeting aspects of the Bank’s rules of procedure. This approach led to improving the quality of the procurement files submitted by the Government for the Bank’s no-objection, thereby reducing their approval time. 3.6 Sources of Finance 17. The project was financed by the TAF/ADF and the Burkinabé government. The TAF grant of UA 2.35 million represented 83 % of project costs and covered 100 % of the foreign exchange costs and 33.3 % of the local currency costs. The Burkinabé Government bore the cost of the procurement of 2 cars and 30 motorcycles for the justice system, operating costs (water, electricity, subscription to an LS 521 K at ONATEL for the Internet, and consumables) to the tune of UA 0.48 million. At project closure, there was an undrawn balance on the grant of UA 445,414. The special account still had an unused amount of CFAF 20,629,020.

4. PROJECT PERFORMANCE 4.1. Operational Performance 18. Overall Performance. For the first three years of project implementation (2003 to 2006), its performance was unsatisfactory for several reasons: (i) the project executing agency’s failure to comply with the Bank’s rules of procedure on procurement, disbursements and audit; (ii) misappropriation of funds (CFAF 35 million) in the project management by its first accountant, which obliged to the Bank to suspend disbursements; and (iii) the Bank’s delays in processing project files.

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19. Regarding the misappropriations, the Bank decided to lift the suspension of disbursements on the special account on condition that: i) an external audit was conducted detailing the actual amount embezzled, defining the responsibility of those involved; ii) the existence of an efficient internal control system was confirmed by an independent audit firm; and iii) the Government provided evidence of the reimbursement of the misappropriated funds. The Government fulfilled these three conditions in February 2007 and also brought the misappropriation case to court. The case continues. 20. At the level of public services, the project made it possible to equip almost twelve Ministries, institutions and administrative structures (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of the Public Service, Court of Auditors, the Inspectorate-General of Finance, etc.) and six communes (Diébougou, Niangoloko, Tougan, Yako, Ziniaré and Zorgho), with computer equipment and furniture. The equipment comprised: 238 small computers, 111 laptops, 200 printers, 218 UPS, 10 photocopiers, 9 servers, 4 video projectors, 19 air conditioners, 08 fax machines, 4 vehicles, 30 motorcycles, 169 PC desks, 32 shelved racks, 48 cupboards, and 36 chairs. This equipment helped improve the operating conditions of the beneficiary structures. The main deficiency related to maintenance and upkeep of the equipment. No multimedia centre was operational in the three communes visited by the mission. The three others were. 21. Level of the information system: The development of an information system and support to the migration of the RESINA data processing system of FDDI to ETHERNET (path, data and images) are the main elements of the project’s success. The system permits the use of different applications: integrated expenditure system, integrated system for administrative and payroll management of central government employees, integrated revenue system, plot management software, automated management of transport documents, integrated tax system, single supplier registration, and commercial infrastructure management software. It also provided Internet access to 3000 computers connected to RESINA. It brought IP telephony to over 700 telephones. Some twelve high schools and schools, about ten health Centres and about fifteen Communal structures were connected. Nonetheless, Government efforts to strengthen the security system were inadequate to guarantee the sustainability of the system. (installations against dust, humidity, heat and fire in the Immeuble du 15 Octobre and the DGI) 22. At the level of Training: The following benefitted from training: 600 civil servants in staff development, 16 magistrates (study trips on OHADA law), 10 computer engineers in the framework of RESINA, almost 75 employees in office automation and the internet, and about 60 staff in participatory management and quality. Training of DELGI computer engineers promoted system support for the applications and the development of the RESINA network security system. Impact of training on the improvement of the productivity of beneficiary administrations remained mixed. The other training sessions had fairly limited impact. 23. At the level of Studies and Technical Assistance. The project conducted: i) the study on corrupt practices in the Burkina Faso public administration; ii) preparation of an IGF manual of procedures; iii) a study on the production and identification of cashew nut products; iv) study on the structures for the collection of information on commodities; v) study on the implementation of the recommendations of the IGF reports, and (vi) technical assistance to DELGI (in the framework of RESINA) and to the six communes. These studies helped clarify the formulation of policies, especially on corruption and RESINA.

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4.2. Performance of Component 1: Public Administration Modernization Support 24. Under this component, the overall implementation rate was 59.55 % (i.e. 3/5) was rather satisfactory. However, a detailed examination of the data on outputs revealed a strong performance of the General Secretariat of the Government and Council of Ministers (SGG-CM), the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEDEV) and the SP/PPF. The implementation rate of these structures was 100 %. On the other hand, the DGEP/DCEI and the ADB monitoring units have the lowest implementation rates, i.e., 20% and 25 %. 25. Overall, the implementation rate for activities for all beneficiaries was 62.25 % i.e. a gap of 37.75 %. Activities relating to the information system were mostly implemented with the integration of SIGASPE into RESINA and cabling in the departments. As far as equipment is concerned, the strengthening of public administration modernization has continued with the procurement of computer equipment and accessories. The capacity building activities were also conducted through training and study trips. However, performance at that level remained weak. Indeed, many activities were not implemented, particularly those relating to studies and technical assistance. 4.3. Performance of Component 2 Component: Support to Decentralization and to

the Poverty Reduction Observatory 26. As far as decentralization support was concerned, 49.13% of the activities were carried out, i.e., a gap of 50.87%. This performance was attributed to the fact that extremely few activities were carried out by ONAPAD owing to its non-operation and uncertainties surrounding its liquidation. Indeed, ONAPAD only received equipment and only 14.28% of the training activities were carried out. 27. Regarding decentralization support, it is worth emphasizing that, instead of the 20 Municipalities envisaged at appraisal, only six (06) of them were retained due to lack of basic infrastructure enabling the (14) others to accommodate the planned data processing equipment. In the six (06) beneficiary Municipalities, overall, 83.99% of the activities were carried out contributing to building capacities for producing civil status documents and keeping budget accounts. The operationality of the Multimedia Centres testifies to the success of the achievements of this component. Visits to the centres at the beginning of their installation revealed the actual attendance at these centres by the inhabitants and a shortage of equipment to meet the demand of the inhabitants of these localities. However, none of the multimedia centres of the three visited (December 2008), was operational due to breakdowns as a result of lightning and ONATEL’s delays in taking action. 4.4. Performance of Component 3: Support to Coordination and the National Good

Governance Observatory 28. With an implementation rate of 86.66%, support to Coordination and the National Observatory of Good Governance (NOGG) recorded the best performance both at the level of DELGI and SEBG. The interconnection of the public administration, as well as the strengthening of RESINA, facilitated communication between the staff and Internet access. The purchase of fibre optic and establishment of the GIGABITS network constituted a significant breakthrough in the intra and Internet communication system of the public

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administration Many Ministerial buildings were interconnected and the staff enjoy a telephone system internally, and internet connection. As far as SEBG was concerned, it was possible to carry out activities despite the difficulties encountered at the beginning of PABG implementation. Training and procurement of capital goods were conducted in keeping with the procedures. The major activity not achieved related to ONBG’s documentary assets. 4.5. Performance Problems Common to the Three Components 29. The activities envisaged but not implemented were: (i) all technical assistance activities (except for those linked to the design of the RESINA data processing system) envisaged for the conduct of studies, and procedures manual, transfer of skills and sensitization of the population on the problem of good governance and the anti-corruption campaign, ii) the documentary assets which should have been created right from the beginning of project implementation concerning the procurement of documents and manuals, for recycling, continuing training and the professional support of civil service staff, in the observatories and in the superior courts, iii) the monitoring-evaluation systems that should have been made available to the public administration, the Ministries involved in the poverty reduction strategy, the consultation and coordination structures and the central, deconcentrated and decentralized control organs. 30. The principal problem noted at the end of the project was in the monitoring and maintenance of equipment. There was some slackening for monitoring was not correctly carried out by the implementation unit to resolve the problems of frequent breakdowns (routers damaged by lightning). The implementation unit did not take the necessary and effective measures to resolve the problems with ONATEL, the Internet access provider. Furthermore, the rooms in which the servers were installed were not well kept, and were often used for storing objects not supposed to be kept there. Maintenance contracts signed with suppliers were not transmitted to the beneficiaries for them to use them at the appropriate time. The beneficiaries were not notified of the project completion date (31/12/2007) to enable them take budgetary measures for the recurrent and maintenance costs. 4.6. Institutional Performance 31. Institutional performance in project implementation was unsatisfactory overall due to: i) the project Implementation Unit’s failure to comply with the Bank’s rules of procedure; ii) the misappropriation of funds in the project management by the first Accountant, which led to the Bank’s suspension of grant disbursements on the special Account of the project from February 2005 to March 2007. In general terms, the Project Implementation Unit’s capacities for executing activities as well as monitoring them, were inadequate. Furthermore, the various beneficiaries were not sufficiently involved in project implementation. It is worth noting that the SEBG did not have the necessary personnel to assume the responsibility of implementation and careful monitoring of the PABG programme of activities. This weak institutional performance was due to inadequate consideration of the institutional environment of the project. 4.7. Performance of Consultants, Contractors and Suppliers 32. The suppliers and service providers of the PABG were generally efficient. However, owing to the disbursement suspension, there were delays in honouring some

8

invoices. There were also delays in deliveries, entailing penalties by the suppliers and providers, which affected the trust between the PABG and the providers. The difficulty in obtaining exemptions and registering tax-free contracts in the public administration departments was felt by the suppliers who found it difficult to execute their works on schedule. 5. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 5.1. Social Impact Poverty Reduction 33. Regarding the project’s contribution to poverty reduction, it must be emphasized that the project implementation period was marked by a slight decline in poverty, from 46.4% in 2003 to 44.4% in 2008, and an improvement in education, from 38% (2003) to 72.5% in 2007/2008. Furthermore, the consolidation of modernization of the administration and the subsequent existence of trained professional staff with computer proficiency, will facilitate rapid access to information by the population and rapid processing of files, thereby making it possible for the poor to access basic administrative services rendered more efficient thanks to the PABG. 34. In general terms, it is worth noting that the performances achieved thanks to the implementation of the PABG both by the public administration and the communes participated very indirectly, and rather globally, to poverty reduction. The same goes for improvements in the speed with which administrative files were processed, RESINA functionality, enhanced capacities of administration staff and the operationalization of control organs such as the Audit Court, IGF, etc. Coupled with that are the poverty reduction actions conducted, especially to support HACLC, and the studies on the matter. 35. In specific terms, the PABG provided support to the key sectors such as marketing of local specialties with a view to the upgrading, marketing of agricultural products through studies (study on the production of cashew nut collection channels, study on the identification of structures for the collection of basic commodities and the fonio network) and contributions in equipment. These actions helped improve the output of the operators of this network. 36. Although it was provided with IT equipment, the Poverty Observatory was unable to carry out important activities such as (i) technical assistance; (ii) recruitment; and (iii) the training of an administrative officer. The non-operationality of the Poverty Observatory had an adverse effect on the perception of the impact of the PABG on poverty, especially as it finally disappeared and became merged with the INSD. Gender Mainstreaming

37. Since there was no adequate monitoring-evaluation mechanism, gender data was unavailable. Nonetheless, one of the major orientations of the PNBG was to increase women’s decision-making power. Admittedly, the PABG did not envisage any specific actions in that regard but, generally, consideration of gender aspects is perceptible here and there. Indeed, in the Multimedia Centres set up in the six Municipalities, the mission observed on the ground that most of the Centres were run by women. Measures should be taken by the beneficiary State and Communal structures of the project actions to gather tangible data on these gender aspects with a view to the sustainability of the achievements.

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5.2. Environmental Impact 38. The project had no special environmental impact on any of its areas of activity: technical assistance, training, equipment supply, operation and their natural or artificial effects. 6. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY 39. The sustainability of the outputs and benefits derived from the project lie in: (i) the maintenance and upkeep of the communication network and integrated and shared information system; (ii) bearing of recurrent costs by the municipalities through computer maintenance contracts, (iii) the timely renewal of all or part of the different items of equipment as they become obsolete. 40. The activities carried out by the PABG contributed to strengthening the e-governance system in Burkina Faso and pushed the public service towards the point of no-return in terms of public administration modernization. However, the critical mass has not been fully achieved. Sustained and continuous payment of the costs of maintenance and upkeep of equipment and buildings is not guaranteed, nor their replacement over time. Lack of maintenance had a negative impact on the sustainability of the PABG achievements. The centres visited already suffered from lack of maintenance (no daily cleaning of the work areas, the floor, etc.); inadequate protection of equipment (major and minor) against dust; persistent lack of stock of consumables for the equipments 7. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK AND THE COUNTRY 41. Despite the delays in the implementation of the different components of the PABG and particularly the Bank’s suspension of disbursements in 2005, the project objectives were partially attained and overall performance was satisfactory. 7.1 Performance of the Bank 42. Regarding the Bank, the areas to be covered at project design were too vast and inadequately focused on priorities. The multisectoral nature of the project posed problems of coordination and monitoring of project activities. Some activities were underestimated from the start, especially the establishment of the information system. The focus on the information system therefore led to a reduction in the activities to be carried out by the project. Furthermore, there was no launch to enable all the beneficiaries to become immersed in activities and conditions for project implementation. As regards implementation, there were delays in the processing of documents submitted by the project to the Bank. With the suspension of disbursement on the project special account, supervisions were no longer regularly carried out. The regularity and quality of supervisions improved after the lifting of the suspension, thanks to close monitoring by the Bank’s country office and the headquarters’ missions. The performance of the Bank was unsatisfactory (Rating: 1.8). 7.2 Performance of the Country 43. The project encountered several difficulties in its implementation and monitoring-evaluation. The coordination of the beneficiary structures was conducted with difficulty by the SP/PNBG which had no human and logistical capacities to properly manage the project. The involvement of the beneficiaries in the monitoring of their activities was mixed. The performance of the Government was unsatisfactory (Rating: 1.7).

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8. OVERALL PERFORMANCE AND RATING 44. There was considerable slippage on the implementation of project activities and there were dysfunctions. Nonetheless, the quality of the equipment provided was good and contributed to improving the performance of the beneficiary administrations. Furthermore, the adoption and publication of administrative acts and texts led to enhanced visibility, transparency and fluidity in MFPRE actions. The transparency and fluidity are perceptible because of e-governance, which was the main strength of the PAGB (improvement of employee productivity, links with the different deconcentrated services, ergonomy and global network access). Overall project performance was satisfactory (Rating: 2.37). 9. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9.1. Conclusions 45. Notwithstanding the delays and the difficulties encountered in implementation, and as far as good governance was concerned, the PABG contributed to building the capacities of the beneficiary institutions of the financing and improvement of the quality of the services. With over 250 workstations (PCs and laptops), administrative capacities were strengthened, the operationality of the network of information systems as well as the interconnection of services promoted fluidity in the circulation of administrative and finance information and reduction in document processing time. Data processing equipment, establishment of multimedia centres, training of municipal officers, assistance to municipalities through recruitment and training in communal management software of six (06) computer engineers, were activities that demonstrated the effectiveness of the PABG support. 46. The installation of the fibre optic of the GIGABIT network with project support remained one of the strongest performances of the project, for it contributed enormously to the growth of e-governance in the administration, through the strengthening of the data processing network (RESINA) by interconnecting several administrative buildings and carrying out training for administrative staff through thematic seminars reflecting their professional experience. In general terms, the Project promoted the emergence of cores of skills within the services responsible for development management and the implementation of the Government’s social policy for poverty reduction. 9.2. Lessons Learnt 47. The main lessons to be learnt from project design and implementation are as follows: (i) the fact that the PABG’s areas of intervention were limited by the lack of a holistic approach to capacity with the five natural components; (ii) the inadequate participatory approach made it impossible to ensure that all the stakeholders complied not only with the project goals but also with the implementation methods; (iii) the PABG’s extended scope diluted project effects (too many activities for the project amount), (iv) greater rigour in project management and monitoring would have reduced the dysfunctions; (v) lastly, the project management structure would have been more effective if it had been simple with a responsible team of managers fully conversant with the Bank’s rules of procedure.

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9.3. Recommendations 9.3.1. To the Government 48. The recommendations to the Government are to: (i) ensure that computer equipment is maintained and safeguarded, while taking budgetary measures in that regard, in particular in the Municipalities, (ii) ensure that all beneficiary structures and Project team members financed by the Bank are provided with appraisal reports and copies of contractual documents prior to project start-up; (iii) take the necessary measures to exercise tighter technical control over third-party services within projects; (iv) encourage training seminar beneficiaries to organize, in turn, mini-workshops in their respective departments with a view to sharing their acquired knowledge with their colleagues, (v) give preference in the selection of training seminar instructors, to those with a good knowledge of the country as well as foreign experience; vi) take measures to ensure that the beneficiary project structures collect tangible data on gender aspects with a view to sustaining the achievements; and; vii) reassured by the experience acquired and lessons learnt, le Government could consider setting up a new project to complete the PABG contributions through support for the creation of additional Internet outlets for the extension of RESINA coverage to all the principal towns of the 13 Regions and the 45 Provinces and continued support to the computerization of the Municipalities. This would ensure an enhanced dissemination/accessibility to economic and financial information by the local authorities and the improvement of the quality of municipal services. 9.3.2. To the Bank 49. The recommendations to ADB are to: (i) adopt a more holistic approach to capacity building for the appraisal of institutional and human support and capacity building projects so as to subsequently facilitate their implementation; (ii) adopt, more systematically, a participatory approach in both the design and monitoring phases of project implementation with a view to obtaining greater support from the beneficiaries, (iii) exercise tighter control over project implementation during supervision and mid-term review missions by organizing, among other things, working sessions with the Experts and Consultants recruited; and (iv) process, as a matter of urgency, the documents submitted to the Bank for opinion.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 MAP OF BURKINA FASO

AND PROJECT AREA

Sites of project activities Ouagadougou Koudougou Diébougou 13 DREP Niangoloko 30 Courts Tougan Yako Ziniaré Zorgho

Training enabled the decentralized and deconcentrated institutions in the provinces to benefit from the knowledge acquired by the employees who benefited from it.

ANNEX 2 SUMMARY TABLES OF

PROJECT COST AND DISBURSEMENTS PABG Financial situation at 30/06/2008

Source: Financial report at 30 June 2008

1- JOBS 2 – RESOURCES

DESCRIPTION 30/06/2008 31/12/2007 DESCRIPTION 30/06/08 31/12/2007

ADF CPN TOTAL ADF CPN TOTAL CPN ADF TOTAL CPN ADF TOTAL I –

EXPENDITURES 1 363 704 632 211 762 489 1 575 467 121 1 308 287 421 198 333 876 1 506 621 297 IV -

DISBURSEMENTS 253 361 334 1 411 524 207 1 664 885 541 221 611 334 1 411 524 207 1 633 135 541

1 - Services 272 810 778 22 850 213 295 660 991 246 591 949 20 171 122 266 763 071 1- Subsidies received 253 361 334 448 737 689 702 099 023 221 611 334 448 737 689 670 349 023

2 - Goods 1 016 602 029 109 512 044 1 126 114 073 1 002 426 529 107 562 448 1 109 988 977 2 – Direct payments 962 786 518 962 786 518 962 786 518 962 786 518

3 - Operation 74 291 825 79 400 232 153 692 057 59 268 943 70 600 306 129 869 249

1 575 467 121

II THIRD PARTY 21 761 139 22 181 234 43 942 373 21 761 139 22 181 234 43 942 373 V - Other resources 400 1 399 000 1 399 400 400 1 399 000 1 399 400

1- Retention payments 1 399 000

1.1 – Mady debtors 21 354 214 9 305 170 30 659 384 21 354 214 9 305 170 30 659 384 2- Unjustified payments

400 400

1.2 CPN expenditures

(various advance financings)

7 293 252 7 293 252 0 7 293 252 7 293 252

1.3 – Balance of National Budget

expenditure

5 582 812 5 582 812 5 582 812 5 582 812

1.4 - VAT 406 925 406 925 406 925 406 925

III – TREASURY 27 457 436 19 418 011 46 875 447 82 874 647 1 096 624 83 971 271

BIB account 27 457 436 27 457 436 82 874 647 0 0

TREASURY account

19 418 011 1 096 624 1 096 624

CASH 0

TOTAL 1 412 923 207 253 361 734 1 666 284 941 1 412 923 207 221 611 734 1 634 534 941 TOTAL 253 361 734 1 412 923 207 1 666 284 941 221 611 734 1 412 923 207 1 634 534 941

ANNEX 3 PERFORMANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT

IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Evaluation Criteria Rating Observations

1. Adherence to Implementation Schedule Unsatisfactory 1.5

There were four extensions; project implementation scheduled for two years extended to 5 years, three months

2. Adherence to Cost Schedule Unsatisfactory 1.5

A UA 445 414 balance and another of CFAF 20 629 020 (in the special account); the first project accountant misappropriated CFAF 35 million

3. Compliance with Conditions Satisfactory 2 Administrative conditions were fulfilled for project effectiveness

4. Adequacy of Supervision and Audits Fairly

Satisfactory 1.8

The Bank correctly ensured project supervision and audit after the suspension was lifted. The Government representatives exercised their responsibilities fairly satisfactorily

5. Satisfactory Operations Average 2 The project’s biggest success is the IT equipment with its associated training

Total 8.8 Overall Assessment of Implementation Performance 1.76 Fairly Satisfactory

ANNEX 4 PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK

Component indicators Rating Observations

1. At Identification Satisfactory 2.5 Satisfactory;

2. At Preparation Unsatisfactory 1.5

(i) The different stakeholders were not associated; (ii) a number of provisions were not made that could have facilitated project implementation (See Annex 9); (iii) a non-holistic capacity building design prevented the adoption of support measures by the supported services (See Annex 8)

3. At Appraisal Unsatisfactory 1.5 Unsatisfactory

4. At Supervision Satisfactory 1.8 The quality of project supervisions and monitoring improved after the suspension was lifted.

Total 7.3 Overall Assessment of Bank Performance 1.83 Unsatisfactory

ANNEX 5

PROJECT IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

No. Component Indicators Rating 1 Relevance and Achievement of Objectives (i) Macro-economic Policy Not applicable

(ii) Sector Policy Relevant 3

(iii) Physical Output Average 2.5

(iv) Financial Policy Average 2.5

(v) Poverty Reduction (social, gender) Average 2.5

(vi) Environment Not applicable (vii) Private Sector Development Not applicable (viii) Other (to be specified) - 2 Institutional Development

(i) Institutional Framework, including restructuring Satisfactory 2.5

(ii) Financial and Management Information Systems (including audit systems) Satisfactory 2.5

(iii) Transfer of Technology Satisfactory 3

(iv) Human Resources (including turnover, training and counterpart staff) Satisfactory 2.5

3 Sustainability

(i) Continued Borrower Commitment Average 2

(ii) Environmental Policy Not applicable

(iii) Institutional Framework Average 2.5

(iv) Technical Viability and Staff Supervision Satisfactory 2.5

(v) Financial Viability and Cost-recovery Mechanisms Not applicable

(vi) Economic Viability Satisfactory 3

(vii) Environmental Viability Not applicable

(viii) Operation and Maintenance (availability of recurrent funding) Average 1.8

4 Rate of Return Not applicable TOTAL 2.37 Overall Assessment of Impact on Development Satisfactory

ANNEX 6 MATRIX OF RECOMMENDATIONS

AND FOLLOW-UP MEASURES

Main Findings/Conclusions Recommendations Follow-up measures Responsibility Formulation/Rationale

- Envisage a Workshop for the launch of projects - Provide for mechanisms to facilitate implementation

(Annex 9) - Take account of the holistic approach to capacity

building (Annex 8)

Internal to ADB: upgrading of officials responsible for capacity building projects

ADB

Project Implementation - Appoint officers in charge of monitoring project implementation directly instead of continuing to assign it to an institution

- Train and upgrade Government personnel on ADB rules and procedures

Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning ADB: Training Workshop for Burkinabè officials

Burkina Faso ADB

Compliance with Grant Agreement Conditions

- Nothing to report - -

Performance Assessment

- Performance assessment is a key dimension for the Bank and the Government; the dysfunctions documented should be the subject of in-depth discussion to prevent their repetition

Government and the ADB Government and the ADB

Sustainability

- Measures should be taken: (i) to ensure fire safety for the equipment, (ii) cleanliness of the rooms where the data processing equipment is installed, (iii) to ensure that the budgets earmark resources for the maintenance and renewal of data processing equipment

The various beneficiary administrative departments

The central and decentralized administration

ANNEX 7 GOVERNMENT COMMENTS

ON THE COMPLETION REPORT OF THE BANK

ANNEX 8 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- Project appraisal report by ADB - Completion report prepared by the Government of Burkina Faso - Quarterly and annual reports of the SEBG - Reports on the various training programmes - Mission reports by the ADB teams - Various memoranda of the ADB missions