Burgoyne the Right Tool for the Job SWJ FINAL

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TheRightToolfortheJob:

AnEvaluationoftheEffectivenessofCounterinsurgencyPrinciplesagainstCriminalInsurgency

MichaelL.Burgoyne1

December1,2011

1SpecialthankstoDr.TammyS.Schultz,Dr.T.X.Hammes,andMAJDustinHeumphreusfortheirinvaluable

assistanceinthedevelopmentofthisstudy.Anyerrorsarethesoleresponsibilityoftheauthor.



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Abstract

Powerfulcriminalgroupsaredevelopingintoseriousthreatstonationstates.Increasinglyintense

violenceinMexicoisofparticularinteresttotheUnitedStates.Comingontheheelsofinsurgency

experiencesinIraqandAfghanistan,theUnitedStatesispredisposedtoapplyitstested

counterinsurgencydoctrinetotheproblem.Thisstudyaddressestheeffectivenessofcounterinsurgency

principlesagainstcriminalinsurgenciesthroughacasestudyanalysisofColombia’sfightagainstthe

MedellinandCaliCartelsandRiodeJaneiro’seffortsagainstfavelagangs.U.S.counterinsurgency

doctrineprovedtobehighlyeffectiveagainstRio’sgangs,however,thecampaignagainsttheMedellin

andCaliCartelsindicatesthatanenemyfocusedapproachmaybemoreappropriateagainstadrug

traffickingorganization.TheresultsofthisstudyshowthatwhilemuchofU.S.counterinsurgency

doctrineisapplicabletocriminalthreats,severaladjustmentstocampaignplanningandthreatanalysis

toolswillberequiredtoensureitseffectivenessagainstemergingcriminalnationalsecuritythreats.

Mexicoiscurrentlyengulfedbyrampantviolencethathastakenover40,000livessince2006.2

SecretaryofStateHillaryClintonreferredtothedrugfueledviolenceasan“insurgency,”whileothers

havecalledita“criminalinsurgency.”3Criminalthreatstostatestabilityarebecomingmorecommon;

JapaneseYakuza,ChineseTriads,Italianmafia,Russianmafia,andColombianBandasCriminalesall

representdangerousevolvingcriminalorganizations.4Theseuniqueapoliticalsecuritythreatsarenota

newphenomenon,buttheyarerapidlydevelopingintooneofthemostdangerouschallengesinthe

globalizedworld.OneofthegreatestnationalsecuritythreatsfacingtheUnitedStatestodayisthe

rapidlydeterioratingsecuritysituationinMexicowhereDrugTraffickingOrganizations(DTO)5and

enforcergangshaveignitedacountrywidewar.6

2BBC,“Mexico’sDrugRelatedViolence,”August26,2011,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-

10681249.AlsoseeLosAngelesTimes,“MexicoUnderSiegeWebsite”,http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-

war/#/its-a-war.3HillaryClinton,SpeechtoCouncilonForeignRelations,(Washington,DC,September8,2010),

http://www.cfr.org/publication/22896/conversation_with_us_secretary_of_state_hillary_rodham_clinton.html;

andJohnP.SullivanandAdamElkus,“StateofSiege:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,2008,

www.swj.com.4MaxManwaring,Gangs,Pseudo-Militaries,andotherModernMercenaries,(Norman:OklahomaUniversityPress,

2010),21-22.5ThetermDrugTraffickingOrganizationofDTOwillbeusedtodenoteorganizationswhohaveaprimarybusiness

modelbasedondrugtrafficking.AlthoughmostDTOsalsoengageinextortion,protection,prostitution,and



2

MexicancriminalorganizationshaveevolvedintoexistentialthreatstotheMexicanstateand

arenowgrowingintheUnitedStates.7Initiallytransportationelementssubordinatetothepowerful

Colombiancartels,MexicanDTOscapitalizedoneffectiveinterdictionintheCaribbeanandthedemise

oftheMedellinandCaliCartelstoincreasetheircontrolofthedrugtrade.Thisincreaseincriminal

powercoincidedwithanequallyimportantpoliticalupheavalinMexico.

TheelectionofPresidentVicenteFoxofthePANpartyin2000effectivelyendedtheoneparty

systemthrowinglongstandingarrangementsbetweenPRIleadersandDTOsintochaos.Institutionalized

corruptionandgovernmentcontroloftheilliciteconomycollapsedintoviolenceasDTOswenttowar

witheachotherandthestatetoincreasetheircontrolofterritoryandlucrativedrugroutes.8Following

hiselectionin2006,MexicanPresidentFelipeCalderónembarkeduponacampaignagainstorganized

crimeemployingthe“fullforceofthestateinordertosafeguardthelibertyandsecurityofitscitizens.”9

However,thereremainsnoendtotheviolenceinsight;2010wasthemostviolentyearyetwith15,273

homicides.10Calderon’sstrategyhasbeenapplaudedandcriticizedinbothMexicoandtheUnited

States.Equally,theU.S.responsetothecrisishasbeenthesubjectofintensepolicydebate.Muchofthe

frustrationwiththegovernmentresponsestemsfromconfusionregardingthenatureoftheconflict.

CarlVonClausewitzwarnsthat“thefirst,thesupreme,themostfarreachingactofjudgment

thatthestatesmanandcommanderhavetomakeistoestablish…thekindofwaronwhichtheyare

humantraffickingthisstudywilluseDTOtodifferentiatebetweensmugglingorganizationsandmafiatype

organizations.6RobertJ.Bunker,“ElImperativoEstratégicodeEstadosUnidosDebeCambiardeIrak-AfganistánaMéxico-Las

AméricasylaEstabilizacióndeEuropa,”SmallWarsJournal ,2011.7U.S.DepartmentofJustice,NationalDrugThreatAssessment ,(NationalDrugIntelligenceCenter,August,2011),

8,http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf .8GeorgeGrayson,Mexico:NarcoViolenceandaFailedState? ,(NewBrunswick:Transaction,2010),39-52.9GobiernoFederal,“ModelodeOperaciónEstratégicayTácticaFrentealaDelincuenciaOrganizada,”April30,

2009,http://www.pgr.gob.mx/prensa/documentos.asp.10SaraMillerLlana,“Mexicodrugwardeathtollup60percentin2010.Why?”ChristianScienceMonitor ,January

13,2011.



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embarking;neithermistakingitfor,nortryingtoturnitinto,somethingthatisalientoitsnature.”11

Comingontheheelsofthedevelopmentofarobustcounterinsurgencydoctrine,manyU.S.defenseand

lawenforcementscholarshavedesignatedtheMexicanconflictaninsurgency.12Accordingly,

counterinsurgencymethodologieshavebeenrecommendedastheproperresponse.13Conversely,other

scholarslikeDavidShirkandformerheadoftheDrugEnforcementAdministrationRobertBonnerhave

calledforalawenforcementresponse.14Farmorethanamereacademicsemanticdebate,theterm

insurgencyimpactswhichagenciesandmethodologiesgovernmentforcesemployagainsttheproblem.

Thesetypesof“wickedproblems”aredefinedby“one’sideaforsolvingit.”15Anincorrectdiagnosisof

theproblemanditssolutioncanhavefarreachingrepercussions.

Whateveritsnature,theUnitedStateshasvitalinterestsinMexico.TheUnitedStateshasspent

90billiondollarsonbordersecuritysince200116andspendsover15billiondollarsannuallyondrug

control.17MexicoistheUnitedStates’thirdlargesttradingpartnerwith393billiondollarsintradein

2010.18TheUnitedStatesappropriated1.5billiondollarstosupporttheMéridaInitiative,a

multinationalsecurityagreementthatfocusesonoperationalsupporttolawenforcementand

11CarlVonClausewitz,OnWar ,transMichaelHowardandPeterParet,(Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,

1997),88.12MatthewD.LaPlante,“ArmyofficialsuggestsU.S.troopsmightbeneededinMexico,”SaltLakeTribune,March

22,2011;JohnP.SullivanandAdamElkus,“StateofSiege:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,

2008;SullivanandElkus“Cartelvs.Cartel:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,2009;Sullivanand

RobertBunker,“CartelEvolutionRevisited,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies21,(March23,2010).13BobKillebrewandJenniferBernal, CrimeWars:Gangs,CartelsandU.S.NationalSecurity,(Washington,DC:

CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity,2010).AlsoseeRepresentativeConnieMack,PreparedRemarksbeforeHouse

ForeignAffairsCommittee,“MeridaPartTwo:InsurgencyandTerrorisminMexico,”October4,2011.14WoodrowWilsonCenterMexicoInstitutePresentation,SharedResponsibility ,(Washington,DC,October22,

2010).RobertBonner,“TheNewCocaineCowboys,”ForeignAffairs89,(2010).15HorstW.J.RittelandMelvinM.Webber,“DilemmasinaGeneralTheoryofPlanning,”PolicySciences4,(1973),

161.16MarthaMendoza,“$90bspentonbordersecurity,withmixedresults,” AssociatedPress,June26,2011.

17ExecutiveOfficeofthePresident,OfficeofNationalDrugControlPolicy,NationalDrugControlStrategyFY2011

BudgetSummary ,(Washington,DC:2010).http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-

research/fy11budget.pdf.18U.S.CensusBureau,ForeignTradeStatistics2010,http://www.census.gov/foreign-

trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1012yr.html,



4

institutionalprofessionalization.19GiventheimportanceofMexicototheUnitedStatesandthescopeof

theconflict,itisimperativethattheU.S.strategyfittheproblem.

BeforetheUnitedStatesembarksonanexpensivecounterinsurgencycampaignoradvises

foreigngovernmentsontheirowncampaigns,theefficacyofcounterinsurgencyprinciplesagainst

economicorcriminalgroupsshouldbeevaluated.Criminalinsurgencyisauniquetypeofthreat.This

studyaddressesthequestiontowhatextentcounterinsurgencyprinciples,asoutlinedinFieldManual3-

24Counterinsurgency,areeffectiveagainstcriminalinsurgencies;specifically,inColombia’sfightagainst

theMedellinandCaliCartelsandRiodeJaneiro’seffortsagainstfavelagangs?

Thisstudyarguesthattheanalysisofpowerfulcriminalorganizationsusinganinsurgency

frameworkisusefulandthattheColombiancartelsandRio’sfavelagangscanbeappropriately

describedascriminalinsurgencies.SeveralcounterinsurgencyprincipleslistedinFM3-24wereeffective

inbothcasestudiesincludingunderstandingtheenvironment,intelligencedrivenoperations,longterm

commitment,smallunitempowerment,learningandadapting,andsupportingthehostnation.In

addition,counterinsurgencymethodologies,asfoundinU.S.doctrine,werehighlyeffectiveagainstRio’s

favelagangs.However,themethodologyemployedinthecaseoftheMedellinandCaliCartelsindicates

thatanenemyfocusedapproachcanbeeffectiveagainstaDTO.Furthermore,aDTO’sfinancialcenter

ofgravityseriouslydegradestheeffectivenessofsomeoftheprinciplesfoundinCOINdoctrine.Finally,

severalfactorsandtechniquesnotspecificallyreferencedinCOINdoctrinecanbecriticalinthecaseofa

criminalinsurgency,suchasvettedunits,anticorruptionmeasures,financialtargeting,divideand

conquerapproaches,andsocialandculturalrootcauses.Thisstudywillbrieflyreviewtheevolutionof

theconceptofcriminalinsurgency.ThestudywillthenexaminetheMedellinandCaliCartelsfollowed

byRio’sfavelagangs.Eachcasewillincludeabriefhistoricalsummary,ananalysisusinganinsurgency

19U.S.DepartmentofState,BureauofPublicAffairs,TheMeridaInitiative:ExpandingtheU.S./MexicoPartnership,

March3,2011.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/plrmo/157797.htm,



5

lens,andanexaminationofthegovernmentresponsebasedonCOINprinciples.Finally,implicationsfor

securitypolicyandrecommendationswillbeprovided.

Thisstudyis“policy-evaluative”andwillexaminetheimplicittheoreticalassumptionthat

criminalinsurgenciescanbedefeatedbycurrentcounterinsurgencydoctrine.20Giventheimportanceof

thesecuritythreatsinvolved,itisimportanttoask“willthepolicyproducetheresultsthatits

proponentspromise?”21InvestigationssuchasRAND’srecentcounterinsurgencyreport

22andtheFishel-

ManwaringSWORDmodelhavescientificallyevaluatedtheeffectivenessofcounterinsurgency

strategies;however,currentliteraturehasnotadequatelyaddressedtheuseofcounterinsurgency

doctrineagainstcriminalthreats.23

Thisprojectusesastructuredcomparisonofcasestudieswiththegoalofidentifyingthevalue

ofcurrentcounterinsurgencyprinciplesintheuniquecircumstancesofacriminalinsurgency.24Political

scientist,StephenVanEvranotesthatwhenworkingwithpolicyprescriptivestudies,researchersshould

studycaseswhosebackgroundcharacteristicsparallelthecharacteristicsofthecurrentorfuturepolicy

problems.”25Assuch,twocaseswereselectedthatcloselyresemblecurrentsecurityconcernsin

Mexico:theColombiandefeatoftheCaliandMedellinCartelsandtheBrazilianfightagainstfavela

gangs.

Bothofthesecaseswereconsideredgovernmentvictoriesbecausethethreatstonational

securityweredefeated.Thisstudyassumesthatbothofthesecasesaregovernmentvictoriesand

20StephenVanEvra,GuidetoMethodsforStudentsofPoliticalScience,(Ithica:CornellUniversityPress,1997),91.

21Ibid.22ChristopherPaul,ColinP.Clarke,andBethGrill, VictoryhasaThousandFathers,(SantaMonica:RAND,2010).

23JohnT.Fishel,andMaxG.Manwaring,UncomfortableWarsRevisited,(Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,

2006)and“TheSWORDModelofCounterinsurgency:ASummaryandUpdate”SmallWarsJournal,2008also

“InsurgencyandCounter-Insurgency:TowardaNewAnalyticalApproach,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies3,(Winter,

1992),272.24AlexanderL.GeorgeandAndrewBennett,CaseStudiesandTheoryDevelopmentintheSocialSciences,

(Cambridge:MITPress,2005),75.25VanEvra,85.



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focusesonthemethodologiesutilized.InColombia,thepowerfulMedellinandCaliCartelswere

dismantledleavingresidualcriminalgroups.Thisstudydoesnotexpanditstimehorizontoinclude

effortsatcommunitypolicinginColombiaafterthefalloftheMedellinandCaliCartels.Expandingthe

casetoincludetheseinitiativeswouldresultindifficultymanagingthedistinctionbetweencriminal

insurgencyandcrimeaswellasbetweencounterinsurgencyandnormalgovernance.Furthermore,the

securityproblemsinCaliandMedellinafterthefallofthemajorDTOscloselyresemblethe

characteristicsoftheRiocasestudy.

TheRiocasestudy,however,isamoredefinedphenomenonwithlesspossibilityofintervening

variablesarisingfromtraditionalinsurgentgroupsliketheFARC(RevolutionaryArmedForcesof

Colombia)andELN(NationalLiberationArmy)presentinColombia.InRio,gangsthathadsuccessfully

succeededfromgovernmentcontrolweredisplacedandcontrolwasreestablished.26Since2008,the

governmenthasclearedsome25communitiesandreassertedstatecontrolover280,000citizens.27

Tomaintainadisciplinedconfigurativeapproachthecasesareevaluatedusinganinsurgency

analysisframeworkoutlinedbyinsurgencyexpertBardO’Neillandthe13principlesandimperativesof

counterinsurgencyasfoundinFieldManual3-24.Oneofthestrengthsofutilizingacasestudy

methodologyisthatitserves“theheuristicpurposeofinductivelyidentifyingadditionalvariablesand

generatinghypotheses.”28ThedetailedcasestudyapproachallowsthisstudytogobeyondO’Neill’s

frameworkandthe13principlestoidentifyotherfactorsthatareimportanttotheproblem.

TheEvolutionofCriminalInsurgency

26SecurityoperationsinRioareongoing.Thisstudyfocusedonfavelasthathadalreadybeenoccupiedunderthe

UPPprogram.27UPPWebsite.

28GeorgeandBennett,45.



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Thescopeandintensityofcriminalintrastateviolencehasforcedgovernmentstoapplyboth

lawenforcementandmilitaryassetsinthefighttoestablishstability.Whilecriminals,brigands,pirates,

andorganizedcrimearenotnew,thepowerandreachassociatedwiththesegroupshasforcedsecurity

scholarstoreassessthenatureofthesethreats.Duetotheuniquenessoflargescalecriminalviolence,

fivefieldsofsecuritystudiesconvergeintheanalysisofthephenomenon:gangstudies,organizedcrime

studies,terrorismstudies,futurewarfarestudies,andinsurgencystudies.29Insurgencydoctrineand

methodologyhavetakenaleadingroleinthedebatelargelyduetoU.S.counterinsurgencyeffortsin

IraqandAfghanistan.Thecriminalinsurgencyconceptwasderivedfromaquestioningofclassic

insurgencyliterature.VladimirLenin,MaoTse-Tung,andErnestoCheGuevaraestablishedthe

theoreticalfoundationsoftwentiethcenturyinsurgency.However,securityscholarslikeSteveMetz

havechallengedthevalidityoftheclassicalinsurgencymodelinrecentinternalconflicts.Finally,law

enforcementexpertJohnSullivanexpandeduponMetz’sinvestigationtocreatetheconceptofcriminal

insurgency.Eachwillbeexaminedinturn.

TheadventofinternationalcommunismandthewaveofdecolonizationfollowingWorldWarII

ledtoarenaissanceinunconventionalwarfaretheory.Oneofthemostinfluentialthinkerswasthe

leaderoftheRussianRevolution,VladimirLenin.GangandinsurgencyexpertMaxManwaringlabels

Lenin’smethods“political-psychologicalwar”designedto“erodetheeffectivesovereigntyand

legitimacy”ofthestate.30Lenin’suseofrevolutionarycellsandmilitiastowhittleawayatthestate

wouldbemodifiedbyperhapsthemostinfluentialthinkerininsurgencytheory,MaoTse-Tung.Mao’s

methodologydiffersfromLenin’sinthattheprimarytoolistheuseofmilitaryforcethatexpandsfrom

insurgentcontrolledterritories.31Mao’smodelwasreplicatedinseveralcountriesanditsinfluencecan

29RobertJ.Bunker,“TheMexicanCartelDebate:AsViewedThroughFiveDivergentFieldsofSecurityStudies,”

SmallWarsJournal ,(11February2011),www.swj.com,(16March2011).30Manwaring,Gangs,Pseudo-Militaries,andotherModernMercenaries,21-22.

31MaoTse-Tung,OnGuerrillaWarfare,(Champaign:UniversityofIllinoisPress,2000).



8

beseenintheCubanRevolutionwhereCheGuevaradevelopedhisownadaptation.Guevara’s foco

methodutilizesasmalldeterminedcadreandreliesinitiallyonamobilemilitarycampaign.Guevaraalso

callsforthe“finalstage”whichincludes“urbanguerrillawarfare.”Thiscombinationofconventional

warfareintheruralareasandurbanviolenceleadstothecollapseofthestate.32

Thesethreeclassicinsurgencytheoristshavesignificantdifferencesintheirrevolutionary

strategies.Theyare,howeverunitedintheirunderstandingofinsurgencyasabattleforpopular

support.Allthreethinkersdependonacommunistideologyandpoliticalvisiontomotivatetheir

followers.Inaddition,theyallrecognizethepopulation’simportanceinprovidinglogisticsand

intelligence.However,Post-ColdWarerascholarshavechallengedtheconceptthatinsurgencyis

organized,unifiedinpurpose,anddependentonpopularsupport.

StevenMetz’s“RethinkingInsurgency”argueseffectivelythatPost-ColdWarinsurgenciesdiffer

fromthoseduringtheColdWarandmorecloselyresemblea“violentandcompetitivemarket.”33Metz

assertsthatColdWarinsurgenciestypicallyincluded“clearanddiscretecombatants”thatenjoyed

outsidesponsors.34Moderninsurgencies,incontrast,lackastatesponsorandareamorecomplexmix

ofnon-statearmedandunarmedforceswithvaryingmotivations.Metzcontendsthatthecomplexityof

moderninsurgenciesleadsactorstopursuea“market”typestrategyinwhichtheytrytoobtainmore

limitedgoalsratherthanfullcontrolofthestate.35Mostimportantlytocriminalinsurgency,Metzdraws

fromtheworkofPaulCollier,36toshowthatoften“profitability”ismoreimportantthanpoliticalgoals.

37

“RethinkingInsurgency”isacornerstoneofthedebateregardinginsurgency’sevolutionandit

establishesanewlensthroughwhichtoviewinternalconflicts.Metzbreaksfreefrompolitically

32Ernesto‘Che’Guevara,GuerrillaWarfare,(Melbourne:OceanPress,2006),89-91.

33StevenMetz,RethinkingInsurgency ,(Carlisle:StrategicStudiesInstitute,2007),v.

34Ibid.

35Ibid.,43.

36PaulCollier,“TheMarketforCivilWar,” ForeignPolicy ,May-June2003.

37Metz,44.



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motivatedcommunistrevolutionarymovementsandexaminesthecomplexinteractionofarmedgroups

inmodernintrastateviolence,therebyopeningthedoorforotherstocreatesubclassesofinsurgencyto

describecurrentconflicts.

Aleadingscholarinthefieldoforganizedcrime,JohnP.Sullivan,hasexpandedupontheideas

expoundedbyMetzbycreatingtheconceptof“criminalinsurgency.”Sullivandefinestheparametersof

criminalinsurgency:

Criminalinsurgencyisdifferentfromclassicterrorismandinsurgencybecausethe

criminalinsurgents’overarchingpoliticalmotiveistogainautonomouseconomic

controloverterritory…notallinsurgenciesconformtotheclassicLeninistorMaoist

models.Notallinsurgentsseektotakeoverthegovernmentorhaveanideologicalfoundation.Someseekafree-rangetodevelopparallelstructuresforprofitandpower.

Nevertheless,theyhaveapoliticaldimension,usingpoliticalmaneuveringand

instrumentalviolencetoaccomplishtheireconomicgoals.Assuchtheyareinsurgents—

albeitofacriminalvariety.38

Sullivan,workingwithotherprominentthinkersinsecuritystudies,likeAdamElkusandRobertBunker,

isleadingthediscussiononcriminalinsurgency.39Inhisbriefarticle“CriminalInsurgencyinthe

Americas,”Sullivanprovideshismostthoroughdefinitionofthephenomenonandgivesseveralbrief

examples:intra-cartelviolenceinMexico,CentralAmericangangs,andBrazilianfavelagangs.

ThemainstrengthofSullivan’sworkishiscreationofatypologywithinMetz’sframeworkthat

canbestudiedandseparatedfromothersubclassesofmoderninsurgencies.Sullivan’suseoftheterm

criminalinsurgencyhasigniteddebatewithinthesecuritystudiescommunityandbroughtconsiderable

academicconsiderationtothephenomenon.Basedonanunderstandingofthethreatdescribedby

Sullivan,otherscholarshaveattemptedtoidentifywaystocounterthephenomenon.

CounterinsurgencyPrinciples

38Sullivan,“CriminalInsurgencyintheAmericas,” SmallWarsJournal ,(2010).

39SullivanandAdamElkus,“StateofSiege:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,(2008);Sullivanand

Elkus“Cartelvs.Cartel:Mexico’sCriminalInsurgency,”SmallWarsJournal ,(2009);SullivanandRobertBunker,

“CartelEvolutionRevisited,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies21,(March23,2010).



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WhereasMetzandSullivanfocusonidentifyingandclassifyingthechangingnatureof

insurgency,BobKillebrewandJenniferBernaloftheCenterforaNewAmericanSecurity(CNAS)devote

theirenergiestothedevelopmentofpolicysolutionstocriminalinsurgencies.IntheCNASreport, Crime

Wars:Gangs,CartelsandU.S.NationalSecurity ,KillebrewandBernalsuggestthat“theUnitedStates

seetheproblem[criminalviolenceintheWesternHemisphere]forwhatitis–acriminalinsurgency

againstthefoundationsofitsownsocietyandthoseofstateslikeMexico,Colombiaandothersin

between.”40Killebrewfurthermoreassertsthat“Mexicancartels…constituteaclassiccaseof

insurgency…andithastobetreatedlikeaninsurgency.”41Workingfromthebasisofinsurgency,the

CNASreportoffersrecommendationsthatincludethehallmarksofacounterinsurgencyapproachlike

legitimategovernance,directaction,andintelligencedrivenoperations.42

TheCNASreport’sgreatstrengthisthatitgoesbeyondthesimpledescriptionofcriminal

insurgencyandattemptstoprovideactionablesolutions.KillebrewandBernalacceptthecriminal

insurgencyparadigmandapplybothoperationalandstrategiccounterinsurgencymethodologiestothe

problem.TheCNASreportdoesanexcellentjobcreatingdialogueontheimportantsecuritythreats

posedbycriminalinsurgencies.BuildinguponKillebrewandBernal’swork,thisstudyaimstoidentify

nuancesanddifferencesthatmaycomplicatetheuseofcounterinsurgencymethodologiesagainst

criminalinsurgencies.

TheU.S.ArmyandMarineCorpsFieldManual3-24Counterinsurgency providesthebasisfor

U.S.operationalmethodologywhenconfrontinganinsurgency.ThemanualdrawsheavilyfromFrench

armyofficerandveteranofcounterinsurgencyeffortsinIndochinaandAlgeria,DavidGalula.Thecentral40KillebrewandBernal,8.

41PresentationbyForeignPolicyResearchInstitute,TheGeopoliticsofNorthernMexicoandImplicationsforU.S.

Policy ,(Washington,D.C.January11,2011).ThisconcepthasalsobeenpositedbyPhilWilliams,“Illicitmarkets,

weakstatesandviolence:IraqandMexico,”CrimeLawandSocialChange52,(2009),335.“[T]helessonsof

counterinsurgencyinIraqmightactuallyprovideabasisforamoreeffectivestrategyagainstdrugtrafficking

organizationsbytheMexicangovernment.”42KillebrewandBernal,50-60.



11

tenantofGalula’sseminalwork,CounterinsurgencyWarfare:TheoryandPractice,isthatthepopulation

isthecenterofgravity.43RobertThompson,aBritishveteranoftheBurmaCampaignandtheMalayan

EmergencyaswellastheheadoftheBritishadvisorymissiontoVietnam,isalsohighlyinfluentialinU.S.

doctrine.Inhisbook,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency ,Thompson,likeGalula,recognizestheprimacy

ofthepopulationandpoliticalgoalsascomponentsofanysuccessfulcounterinsurgencystrategy.44

WhenKillebrewstatesthatcriminalinsurgency“hastobetreatedlikeaninsurgency,”theimplicationis

thattheU.S.governmentwillapplythedoctrinefoundinFM3-24totheproblem.45

FM3-24evolvedfromtheU.S.occupationsofIraqandAfghanistanandthemilitary’sstrugglewith

counterinsurgencyoperations.Arguably,followingitsimplementation,FM3-24createdachangein

strategyandmindsetinbothIraqandAfghanistanthatledtoavastimprovementinbothconflicts.The

manualdoesanexcellentjobofcreatingaperspectivethroughwhichtounderstandinsurgencyand

developoperationalmethodologiestodefeatit.TheSWORDmodeldevelopedbyJohnT.FishelandMax

Manwaring46andtheRANDstudyVictoryhasaThousandFathers

47applyscientificrigortoinsurgencies

andbothmodelssupporttheprinciplesfoundinFM3-24.Criticshowever,arguethatFM3-24istoo

heavilybaseduponColdWarinsurgenciesandthatitsfocusonthepopulationhasnotbeenprovento

beeffective.48

43DavidGalula,CounterinsurgencyWarfare,(Westport:PraegerSecurityInternational,2006),75-94.

44RobertThompson,DefeatingCommunistInsurgency ,(St.Petersburg:HailerPublishing,2005),50-59.

45Infact,BobKillebrew,asaretiredArmySpecialForcesColonel,hasanuancedanddeepunderstanding

counterinsurgencythatgoesbeyondFM3-24.HisowncallforacounterinsurgencystrategyinMexicomaynot

alignperfectlywiththecounterinsurgencydoctrinefoundinthemanual.However,FM3-24isthejointdoctrine

forCounterinsurgencyandwouldprovidetheguidingprinciplesforanyU.S.counterinsurgencysupporttoMexico.46JohnT.Fishel,andMaxG.Manwaring,UncomfortableWarsRevisited,(Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,

2006)and“TheSWORDModelofCounterinsurgency:ASummaryandUpdate”SmallWarsJournal,2008also

“InsurgencyandCounter-Insurgency:TowardaNewAnalyticalApproach,”SmallWarsandInsurgencies3,

(Winter,1992).47ChristopherPaul,ColinP.Clarke,andBethGrill, VictoryhasaThousandFathers,(SantaMonica:RAND,2010).

48GianGentile,“TimefortheDeconstructionofFieldManual3-24” JointForcesQuarterly 58(Washington,DC:July

2010).AlsoGeoffDemarest,“Let’sTaketheFrenchExperienceinAlgeriaoutofU.S.CounterinsurgencyDoctrine,”

MilitaryReview ,(July-August,2010).



12

Unlikemuchdoctrine,FM3-24utilizesprinciplesallowingpractitionerstoadaptwithina

counterinsurgencyframework.ContributingauthorJohnNaglarguesthatthemanualisa“catalystin

theprocessofmakingtheArmyandMarineCorpsmoreeffectivelearningorganizationsthatarebetter

abletoadapttotherapidlychangingnatureofmoderncounterinsurgencycampaigns.”49Ifthemanualis

adaptabletocriminalinsurgencies,thesolutionsliewithinits13principlesandimperatives.

1. Legitimacyisthemainobjective

2. Unityofeffortisessential

3. Politicalfactorsareprimary

4. Counterinsurgentsmustunderstandtheenvironment

5. Intelligencedrivesoperations

6. Insurgentsmustbeisolatedfromtheircauseandsupport

7. Securityundertheruleoflawisessential8. Counterinsurgentsmustprepareforalongtermcommitment

9. Manageinformationandexpectations

10. Usetheappropriatelevelofforce11. Learnandadapt12. Empowerthelowestlevels

13. Supportthehostnation 50

ScholarslikeBunkerandSullivanarguethatcriminalinsurgenciesareanemerging“newformof

warfare”thatconstitutesa“modalwarfareshift.”51Giventhegrowingnumberoflargescaleorganized

crimethreats,itisimperativetoascertainifFM3-24isadaptabletoacriminalinsurgencythrough

systematiccasestudyanalysis.

TheMedellinandCaliCartels

HistoricalBackground

Bythe1980s,Colombiahadbeensufferingfrominternalviolenceforoverthirtyyears.Guerrilla

groupsliketheFARCandELNarosefromLaViolencia,atenyearconflictthatleftover200,000dead.

49JohnNaglForwardtoTheU.S.Army/MarineCorpsCounterinsurgencyFieldManual ,(Chicago:Universityof

ChicagoPress,2007).50DepartmentoftheArmy,FieldManual3-24,Counterinsurgency ,(Washington,DC:USGovernmentPrinting

Office,2006),1-20thru1-26.51Bunker,“TheMexicanCartelDebate:AsViewedThroughFiveDivergentFieldsofSecurityStudies,”4.



13

TheColombiangovernment’sbattlewithleftistguerrillaswascomplicatedbyaskyrocketingdemandfor

cocaine.CocawashistoricallyproducedinPeru;however,enterprisinginternationalcriminalsrealized

thatColombia’ssimilarclimateanddearthofgovernmentcontrolmadeitanideallocationforcocaine

production.52Illicitprofitsfloodedthecountryfindingtheirwaytoguerrillas,corruptofficials,andanew

classofcocainebarons.Twopowerfuldrugtraffickingorganizations,theMedellinandCaliCartels,

emergedfromthechaostodominatethedrugtradeandthreatenthestateitself.

TheMedellinCartel,centeredinthecityofMedellininAntioquia,wasledbytheinfamousPablo

Escobar.Escobargrewupsurroundedbyviolenceandbecameanaccomplishedthief,kidnapper,and

murderer.MarkBowden,authorof KillingPablo,notes“crimewasalreadyPablo’selement.Hewas

violentandunprincipled,andadeterminedclimber.Hewasn’tanentrepreneur,andhewasn’tevenan

especiallytalentedbusinessman.Hewasjustruthless.”53EscobarisbelievedtohavekilledFabio

Restrepo,theleadingtraffickerfromMedellinin1975,andappropriatedhisdrugrunningorganization

whichincludedtheOchoabrothers.Escobarconsolidatedhispowerandquicklyadoptedatacticcalled

“plataoplomo,”(bulletorabribe)tocowthelocalauthorities.Escobar’ssuccess,builtuponviolence,

grewalongwithhisownambition.54

Escobar,notcontentwithhisstatusasacriminal,soughttolegitimizehisposition.Hepurchased

hisownnewspaperandusedhiswealthtoprovidehousingandsoccerfieldsforthepoorofMedellin.

EscobarbecameactiveinpoliticsbecauseofhisfearofextraditiontotheUnitedStates.Hewaselected

asanalternatetoCongressin1982;however,hissordidhistoryresultedinhisexpulsionfromtheNew

LiberalPartyandhiswithdrawalfrompoliticstwoyearslater.Escobarputasidehispoliticalambition

andpursuedaterroristcampaignagainsttheColombiangovernmentculminatingwiththeassassination

ofpresidentialcandidateLuisGalánandthebombingofAviancaflight203.TheColombiangovernment

52Authorinterviews,U.S.Embassy,Bogota,August,2009.

53MarkBowden,KillingPablo,(NewYork:PenguinBooks,2001),22.

54Ibid.



14

launchedamajorefforttodestroytheMedellincartelaidedbyU.S.governmentsupportandashadowy

vigilantegroupcalledLosPepes(PeoplePersecutedbyPabloEscobar).Intheend,theseelements

dismantledthecartelandeventuallykilledEscobarin1993.55

LocatedintheValledeCauca,theCaliCartel’sdevelopmentandmethodsdifferedfromits

Medellincompetitor.LawenforcementscholarRonChepesuiknotes“neverwerethestylesoftwo

majorcriminalorganizationsoperatinginthesamespacesodifferent.WhiletheMedellinCarteltriedto

bullyandbribethestate,theCaliCartelworkedquietlybehindthescenestocorruptit.”56Thecartel

leadership–JoseSantacruzLondoñoandtheRodriguezOrejuelabrothers,GilbertoandMiguel–

developedtheircartellikeamodernmultinationalcorporationcompletewithafranchisingsystemof

cellsandregionalmanagers.Theyutilizedthelatesttelecommunicationstechnologiestocoordinate

theiroperationsandmanagesophisticatedcounterintelligence.57

Initially,theCaliandMedellinCartelscoexistedandevencooperated,butbythe1990s

competitionbecamefierce.TheCaliCarteliswidelybelievedtohavecoordinatedwiththegovernment

intheirpursuitofEscobar.CalimembersarealsobelievedtohavebeenmembersofLosPepes.After

thedeathofEscobar,theColombiangovernmentturneditssightsontheCaliCartel.Inspiteofintense

corruptionthatreachedeveryleveloftheColombiangovernment,theDrugEnforcement

Administration(DEA)andtheirlocalpartnerswereabletodismantletheCaliCartel,arrestingthemajor

leadersin1995and1996.58

MedellinandCaliasInsurgency

55Ibid.

56RonChepesuik,TheBulletortheBribe,(Westport:Praeger,2003),62.

57Ibid.

58Ibid.



15

ChinesestrategistSunTzucounselsthat“onewhoknowstheenemyandknowshimselfwillnot

beendangeredinahundredengagements.”59Similarly,insurgencyscholarBardO’Neillbelievesthat

determiningthenatureofaninsurgencyhas“vitalpracticalimplications.”60O’Neill’sbookInsurgency

andTerrorismprovidesadetailedframeworkforinsurgencyanalysis.O’Neillevaluatessixfactorsthat

makeupthenatureofaninsurgency:thetypeofinsurgency,formsofwarfareadopted,thestrategic

approach,popularsupport,organization,andexternalsupport.61

TheMedellinandCaliCartelsfallunderthe“commercialist”insurgencycategoryinO’Neill’s

framework,althoughamoreexactcategoryiscriminalinsurgency.Theyalsoexhibitthecharacteristics

ofa“reformist”insurgencythatis“non-revolutionary”butseekstoaffectcertainpolicies;inthiscase,

legalcontrolsandextradition.62However,thereformistattributesarebetterunderstoodundertheir

overarchingcriminalmotivations.TheCaliandMedellinCartelscloselyresemblethecriminalinsurgency

conceptasdefinedbySullivan.RensselaerLee’sanalysisofColombianDTOsintheearly1990smirrors

thedefinitionpositedbySullivan:

Unlikeguerrillas,whoseobjectiveisseizingpower,traffickersarenotultimately

interestedindestroyingasocialorderthatnurturesthem…theColombianmafiabasicallyseekstoprospercommerciallywithoutbeingdisturbed…cocainetraffickers

haveboughtintothepoliticalsystemandcansuccessfullymanipulatekey

institutions…maintaindefactocontrolofmajorcitiessuchasMedellinandentire

regions…traffickersdonothesitatetouseviolenceagainstgovernmentofficialsand

otherpublicfigurestopromotelimitedpoliticalobjectives .63

TheMedellinandCaliCartelsfitSullivan’sdefinitionofacriminalinsurgencyandcanbefurther

evaluatedunderO’Neill’sframeworktoimproveunderstandingofthephenomenon.

59SunTzu, ArtofWar ,ed.RalphD.Sawyer,(Boulder:WestviewPress,1994),179.

60BardO’Neill, InsurgencyandTerrorism,(Washington,DC:PotomacBooks,2005),31.

61Ibid.,15-43.

62Ibid.

63RensselaerLee,TheWhiteLabyrinth,(NewBrunswick:Transaction,1991),9-10.



16

Thecartelsutilizedvariousformsofwarfaretoachievetheirobjectives.Theymaintained

thousandsofpaidenforcerstodominatetheirempiresthroughviolence.64Inaddition,thecartelswould

backguerrillaorparamilitaryforcesinsupportoftheirgoals.InApril1981,thesisterofMedellin

traffickerJorgeOchoawaskidnapped,leadingEscobar,inconjunctionwithothertraffickersincluding

themainCaliCartelfigures,toformthevigilantegroup“DeathtoKidnappers”(MAS).MASincluded

CarlosCastaño,whowouldlaterleadtheparamilitaryUnitedSelf-defenseForcesofColombia(AUC).

Narcotraffickersbuiltandfundedparamilitaryforcestoprotecttheirsubstantiallandholdingsandcoca

productionfromguerrillaincursionsandtaxation.Notboundbyideology,itiswidelybelievedthat

EscobarsupportedtheNovember1985seizureoftheColombianSupremeCourtbytheleftistinsurgent

groupM-19inwhichthegroupdestroyedcriminalfilesontraffickersthatwouldbeessentialfor

extradition.65TheMedellinCartelmayhavealsoenlistedELN’saidduringtheir1993bombing

campaign.66TheCaliCartelalsocolludedwithstateforcestoformthevigilantegroup LosPepeswhich

systematicallydestroyedtheMedellinCartel.Thisshiftingarrangementofallianceshighlightsthenon-

binaryandambiguousnatureoftheColombiansecuritysituation67andcloselyresemblesthe“marketof

violence”envisionedbyMetz.

68

Althoughthecartelsbuiltormanipulatedlargeparamilitaryandguerrillaformations,their

primaryoperationalmethodologywastheuseofterrorism.Thecartelsutilizedassassinationregularlyto

managetheirbusinessanddiscouragestateinterferencewiththeiroperations.Thecartelssuccessfully

assassinatedjusticeministerRodrigoLaraandnearlykilledintelligenceheadMiguelMaza.Themost

shockingassassinationwasthepublicshootingdeathofpresidentialcandidateCarlosGalán,astrong

opponentofnarcotrafficking.Thecampaignagainstextraditionmarksthemostviolentterroristaction

64PatrickClawsonandRensselaerLee,TheAndeanCocaineIndustry ,(NewYork,St.Martin’sGriffin,1998),196.

65Bowden,53.

66ClawsonandLee,53.

67StathisKalyvas,“TheOntologyof‘PoliticalViolence’:ActionandIdentityinCivilWars,” PerspectivesinPolitics

1:3,(1993).68Metz,v.



17

undertakenbythecartelsagainstthestate.Colombiasuffered40carbombingsbetween1989and1993

includingthedestructionoftheDAS(AdministrativeSecurityDepartment)headquartersinBogota.69In

anattemptonthelifeofthencandidateCésarGaviria,Aviancaflight203wasblownoutofthesky

leaving107dead.TheterroristeffortsprovedfruitfulwhentheColombianlegislaturebannedcriminal

extraditioninJuneof1991.70

CriminalinsurgencyinthecaseofthecartelsdoesnoteasilyfitintooneofO’Neill’scategories

ofinsurgentstrategicapproaches.ThecartelstrategybearslittleresemblancetoaMaoistprotracted

popularwarmethodology.71Inmanyways,thecartelsoperatedmorelikeaLeninistconspiracymodelin

whichpoliticians,securityforces,andkeybureaucraticpostsarecapturedbytheinsurgentsthrougha

mixofideology,intimidation,andfocusedviolence.72Inacommunistrebelliontheseeffortsaregeared

tocreatetheconditionsforageneraluprisingorcoup.Incontrast,thecartelsusedthecorruptingforce

of“plataoplomo”tosubvertstatepoweranddevelopaparallelsystemthattoleratedorsupported

theireconomicgoals.

Inadditiontoasystemofcorruption,thecartelsutilizedaformofurbanwarfaredesignedto

forcestatecompliancewiththeirpolicygoals.Thecartelsoperatedfromanurbanenvironmentin

contrastwithruralmodelsliketheMaoistandFocomethods.ThecitiesofCaliandMedellinweresafe-

havensforthecartelleaderswhomanagedanextensivenetworkofinformantsandenforcerstoprotect

them.Althoughcartelviolencecloselyresembledtraditionalurbanguerrillaactivitiesasfoundinthe

workofAbrahamGuillen73andCarlosMarighella,

74itdidnotsupportafinalphaseinwhichrevolution

orruralguerrillawarfarewouldemerge.ThebombingsinBogotaandwidespreadassassinationswere

69ClawsonandLee,52.

70Ibid.

71Mao,OnGuerrillaWar .

72Manwaring,10-31.

73AbrahamGuillen,PhilosophyoftheUrbanGuerrilla,(NewYork:WilliamMorrow,1973).

74CarlosMarighella,MinimanualoftheUrbanGuerrilla,(Boulder:Paladin,1985).



18

designedtoapplysufficientpressureonthegovernmenttoaltercertainpolicies;theviolencewasnot

designedtooverthrowthegovernment.

Popularsupportisseenasacriticalfactorinmostinsurgencyliteraturebutitwasnotcriticalfor

thecartels.ClassicalCOINtheoristDavidGalularecognizescontrolofthepopulationastheprimary

objectiveinrevolutionarywar75andMaowarns“itisonlyundisciplinedtroopswhomakethepeople

theirenemiesandwho,likethefishoutofitsnativeelement,cannotlive.”76Thecartels,toalimited

extent,didcourtpopularsupport.EscobarandCarlosLehderbothownednewspapersandtheCali

CartelmaintainedapublicrelationssectionheadedbyjournalistAlbertoGiraldo.77Drugtraffickerswere

strongsupportersoflocalandnationalsoccerteams.78

Escobarcreatedthepoliticalmovement Civismo

enMarchaandevenbuiltanentireneighborhoodforthepoorinMedellin.Allofthisactivity,however,

wasaproductofthemassivewealthprovidedbyillicittrafficking.UnlikeMaoistinsurgencies,thecartels

werenotreliantonthepopulationtoachievetheirgoals.

Althoughviewedasmonolithicblocs,infactthecartelswerenetworkedgroupsofindependent

traffickingorganizationsofvarioussizesthatcooperatedtoimproveprofitsandefficiency.InMedellin,

Escobar,throughoppressiveforce,wasabletoestablishhimselfastheundisputedheadofthecartel.

Likewise,Calimaintainedaseniorleadershipsectionbutitmorecloselyresembledamultinational

corporation:“Intermsofstructure,marketing,anddistribution,thedrugmafiahadasmuchincommon

withgiantcompaniesthatmadeFortunemagazine’sannuallistofthetop500companiesasitdidwith

itsrivalsinthedrugtrade.”79TheMedellinandCaliCartelsofferedtwoverydifferentstructuresforthe

governmenttotarget.

75Galula,4.

76Mao,93

77Chepesuik,70.

78JeffandMichaelZimbalist, LosDosEscobares,(AllRiseFilms,2010).

79Chepesuik,110.



19

Externalsupport,whichsomescholarsbelieveiscriticaltoinsurgentsuccess,wasvitalforthe

cartels.80However,thecartelsdidnotdrawsupportfromaColdWarpowerorneighboringcountry;

rather,theywerefundedthroughthedrugtrade,primarilywiththeUnitedStates.Ascriminal

organizations,thecartelshadlittleopportunitytodevelopmeaningfulpartnershipswithoutside

powers.EvenPanamanianstrongmanManuelNoriegawasreluctanttoprovidesanctuarytocapos

fleeingextradition.81Inthecaseofthecartels,supportfromfinancialinstitutionsandtheflowofillicit

fundsrepresentedthebeatingheartofthecartels,withoutwhichtheywouldceasetoexist.

ColombianResponseasCounterinsurgency

Afterobservingthecartelsthroughaninsurgencylens,itisnecessarytoanalyzetheColombian

governmentresponsefromaCOINperspective.Thisisaccomplishedmethodicallythroughtheuseof

the13COINprinciplesandimperativesasfoundinFM3-24.Specificmetricsforeachprinciplewere

derivedfromthefieldmanualandappliedtothecase.Abriefexaminationoftheobservationsis

providedforeachprinciplefollowedbyanassessmentandbasicscoring.

GovernmentLegitimacy 82

Ostensibly,theColombiangovernmentofthe1980sand90swasalegitimatelyelected

democraticgovernment;however,itwasnoteffectivelyprovidingsecurityorgovernancetothe

population.In1993,themurderrateinColombiawasanastounding85per100,000citizens

(Washington,DCwas18.5per100,000in2010)andMedellinwasthemurdercapitaloftheworldwith

5,577homicidesin1994.

83

EvenafterthesuccessfuldismantlingoftheMedellinandCaliCartels,60

80JeffreyRecord,“ExternalAssistance:EnablerofInsurgentSuccess,”Parameters,(Autumn,2006).

81Bowden,45.

82Governmentlegitimacyisexaminedbaseduponavailablecrimefiguresandhomiciderates,thepresenceof

electionsandparticipation,thepresenceofcorruption,developmentandeconomicstatistics,andopinionpolls.

FM3-24,1-21thru1-22.83ClawsonandLee,196.



20

percentofColombiansweredissatisfiedwiththegovernment.84Criminalviolence,guerrillamovements,

andextralegalparamilitaryunitscreatedaperceptionofanineptorcorruptgovernment.

ScholarsPatrickClawsonandRensselaerLeenotethat“narcocorruption…diminishesthe

legitimacyofgoverninginstitutions”andtraffickers“increasinglydisplacethestateintheperformance

ofkeysocialandpoliticalfunctions.”85CorruptioninColombiawasendemic;in1996,2,260officersfrom

thenationalpoliceweredismissedforcorruption.86AlistfoundduringaraidonMiguelRodriguez’s

apartmentdocumented2,800namesofpoliticians,police,andjournalistsontheCaliCartel’spayroll.87

Corruptionreachedthehighestofficesofthecountry,mostnotablywiththecassettetapescandalthat

rockedthepresidencyofErnestoSamper.RecordedconversationsofakeySamperaidtakingfunds

fromtheCaliCartelshowedthatSamper’s1994presidentialcampaignreceivedacriticalinjectionof

fundsthatmayhaveallowedhimtowintheelection.AlthoughSamperenactedatoughpolicyagainst

DTOs,hislegitimacywaspermanentlystainedbycorruption.88

ColombiawasabletodefeattheMedellinandCaliCartelswithoutachievinggovernment

legitimacy.Colombiadidholdpresidentialandlegislativeelectionsthroughouttheconflictperiod;

however,electionswereunderminedbycorruptionmostnotablytheSamperscandal.

89

Widespread

corruption,negativepollingnumbersdespitesecurityadvancesagainstthecartels,andremarkablyhigh

crimeratesindicatethatthisprincipleofCOINwasnotfollowedorachieved.Colombia’svictory

indicatesthatlegitimacymaynotbenecessarytodefeataDTO.Thereforethisprincipleisscored

negatively.

84Semana,“LaGranEncuestadel97,”February10,1997.

85ClawsonandLee,175.

86Ibid.,195.

87Chepesuik,224.

88Ibid.,187-198.

89PoliticalDatabaseoftheAmericasWebsite,“ResultadosElectorales1990-1998,”

http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Col/colombia.html



21

UnityofEffort90

Coordinationbetweenmilitary,lawenforcement,andpoliticalelementsdidexistbutwasnota

whole-of-governmentapproachasoutlinedinFM3-24.91Linesofoperationfoundindoctrineinclude

“governance,essentialservices,andeconomicdevelopment.”92Essentialserviceswerenotaddressedas

apartofthecampaignagainstthecartels.Infact,themassiveinfluxofcocaineprofitstransformedboth

MedellinandCaliintothrivingcitiesandgenerouspublicserviceprojectsfundedbytraffickersimproved

manyneighborhoods.93Theeconomicboomfromcocainealsobenefitedtheeliteswhoprofitedfrom

abundantforeigncurrencyflowingintoColombianbanksandconstructionfirms.Itwasestimatedthat

Calireceivedsome600milliondollarsannuallyfromdrugtrafficking.94

In1993,theyearofPablo

Escobar’sdeath,Medellin’slocalgovernmentreceivedlessthantenpercentofitsoperatingbudget

fromthenationalgovernment,providinglittleincentivetoendtheflowofillicitcash.95Acomplete

whole-of-governmentapproachwouldnotappearuntil2003whenmayorsSergioFajardoandAlonso

Salazarenactedpoliciestobringgovernmentservicesandsecuritytothemosttroubledcommunities.96

Nevertheless,unityofeffortwasachievedattheoperationallevelanditwasakeytothe

government’ssuccess.Initially,significantinteragencycompetitionbetweenthenationalpoliceandthe

Armycausedcomplicationswiththecampaign.97Chepesuiknotesthat“thegodfathersfromCalihada

jumpstartonlawenforcement…becauseofrivalries,competition,andturfbattlesthatplaguedthe

investigation…itwasonlywhenlawenforcementbegantocooperateandshareinformationthat

90Unityofeffortisevaluatedbasedupontheorganizationofgovernmentforcesincludingtheintegrationof

governmentagencies.FM3-24,1-22.91FM3-24,Chap.2.92Ibid.,Chapter5.

93Semana,“UnRobinHoodPaisa,”April,1983.

94Semana,“Calicaliente,”December27,1993.

95Semana,“Medellínvive,”March29,1993.

96VandaFelbab-Brown,“ReducingUrbanViolence:LessonsfromMedellin,Colombia,”Brookings,September7,

2011.97AuthorinterviewwithCOL(ret)WilliamSpracherformerdefenseattachétoColombia,Washington,DC,August

15,2011.



22

headwaywasmade.”98Duetorampantcorruption,thecreationofColonelHugoMartinez’svetted

SearchBlocwithexpandedauthoritiesandcapacitieswasessential.SearchBlocalsoservedasaplugin

forsubstantialintelligence,lawenforcement,andmilitaryassistancefromtheUnitedStates.

Unityofeffortwasonlypartiallyachievedinthiscase.FM3-24callsfor“liaisonwithleaders

fromawidevarietyofnonmilitaryagencies”includingnon-governmentalorganizations.99The

governmenteffectivelyintegratedintelligence,vettedtacticalunits,andoutsidesupportfromthe

UnitedStates.TheSearchBlocmorecloselyresembledapurecounterterrorismteamthanaCOIN

approachasoutlinedinFM3-24.100Becauseoperationalandtacticalunitywasachievedbutawhole-of-

governmentapproachwasnotpursuedthisprincipleisratedasaneutralresult.Thisindicatesthata

taskorganizationthatresemblesaCTunitcanbeeffectiveagainstaDTO.

PrimacyofPoliticalFactors101

PoliticalfactorsaredifficulttomeasureinthecaseoftheMedellinandCaliCartels.FM3-24

counselsthat“resolvingmostinsurgenciesrequiresapoliticalsolution”andthatrevolutionarywaris

“80percentpolitical.”102However,incontrastwithtypicalinsurgencies,thecartelshadverylimited

politicalagendas.Thecartelshadtwoprimarypoliticalgoals:limitedautonomyfromgovernment

persecutionoftheirbusinessandtheprohibitionofextradition.Therewasnograndpoliticalmaneuver

torelievetensionsliketheBritishtransferofauthoritytotheMalayansduringtheEmergency.103The

cartels’economicorientationmadepoliticalnegotiationdifficult.Atonepoint,theleadersoftheCali

Cartelattemptedtonegotiateanendtococaineproductiononlytofindthattheylackedsufficient

98Chepesuik,261.

99FM3-24,1-22.

100FredKaplan,“CTorCOIN?”Slate,March24,2009.AndrewExum,“OnCOINandCT,”SmallWarsJournal,2009,

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/200-exum.pdf .101Theprimacyofpoliticalfactorsismeasuredbytheparticipationofpoliticalleadersintheplanningofsecurity

actionsandthepresenceofattemptsatnegotiatedsolution.FM3-24,1-22.102FM3-24,1-22.

103JohnNagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2002).



23

authorityoversubordinatedrugproducersstillhungrytocreatetheirownfortunes.104Beyonddrug

tradelegalizationonlylimitednegotiationscouldbepursued.

PoliticalcontrolofoperationsremainedfirmlyinthehandsoftheColombianpresidentswho

alternatedbetweenutilizingtheSearchBlocandnegotiations.TheColombiangovernmentsuccessfully

broughtsometwentyleadersoftheMedellinCarteltosurrenderbaseduponreducedsentencesanda

banonextradition.ThemostfamousresultofthesenegotiationswasEscobar’ssurrendertohiscustom-

madepalatialprisonLaCathedral .105ProsecutorGeneralGustavodeGreiffconductedaseriesofclumsy

anduncoordinatednegotiationswiththecartelsandhis“extremelylenientsurrendertermsfordrug

dealersbecameanembarrassmenttotheColombiangovernmentandatargetforU.S.hostility.”106Asa

result,negotiationprovedoflimitedvalueinthecase.

FM3-24statesthat“resolvingmostinsurgenciesrequiresapoliticalsolution;”howeverinthis

case,thegovernmentforcesoptedtodestroytheiropponentsafternegotiatedeffortsfailed.107The

spiritofthepoliticalprimacyprincipleisthatthecounterinsurgentfocusesonrootcausesthatare

drivingtheinsurgency;forexample,lackofaccesstopoliticalrepresentationortheabsenceof

governmentservices.Therootcauseinthiscase,though,wastheeconomicopportunityprovidedby

theproductionandtraffickingofillicitdrugs.IfdrugtraffickinginColombiaistreatedasaninherent

constantinColombiansecurity,thenamorepreciserootcauseoftheconflictwouldbethepresenceof

ultraviolentandexcessivelyempoweredcartelleaderscapableofchallengingthenationalgovernment.

Giventhatcontroloveroperationsremainedincivilianhandsandunsuccessfulnegotiationswere

pursued,thisprinciplewasfollowedbutnotsuccessfullyandisscoredasneutral.

104WilliamC.Rempel, AttheDevil’sTable,(NewYork:RandomHouse,2011),128-129.

105Bowden,98-99.

106ClawsonandLee,117.

107FM3-24,1-22.



24

UnderstandingoftheEnvironment108

Governmentforceshadaclearandnuancedunderstandingoftheconflictenvironment.The

membersoftheSearchBlocwereColombianpolicewithanativeknowledgeoftheenvironmentandan

understandingoftheircriminaltargets.TheColombiangovernmenthadbeenengagedinaninternal

conflictfordecadeswhentheDTOsemergedinthe1980s.BythetimeoftheapprehensionofMiguel

Rodriguez,theSearchBlochadbeentrackingdrugtraffickersforfourstraightyears.DEAagentsfrom

theUnitedStateshadastrongbackgroundintheregionandcountry.Veterans,likeDEAAgentJoeToft,

hadadeepunderstandingofColombiaandthethreatposedbyDTOs.

TheColombiangovernmentwasnotattackingtheDTOsinavacuum.Theprimarythreatstothe

statewerepowerfulguerrillagroupsliketheFARCandELN.Cartelleaders,asmajorlandowners,were

keybackersofself-defensegroupsthatperformedcriticalsecurityrolesinruralareaswherethe

governmentwasweak.ItwasonlyaftertheextensiveterrorcampaignlaunchedbyEscobarthatthe

governmentturneditssightsonthecartels.Furthermore,thegovernmentsuccessfullypittedonecartel

againsttheotherthroughtheuseof LosPepes.Operatinginacomplexconflictenvironmentrequired

theColombiangovernmenttoapplyMachiavellianskillbymanagingshiftingalliancestoachieveits

goals.109

Aswithatraditionalinsurgentthreat,understandingtheenvironmentprovedtobeacritical

assetinColombia.Localknowledgeandsignificanttimecounteringthethreatclearlyestablishthis

principleasakeyelementoftheColombiansuccess.Assuch,thisprincipleisscoredpositively.In

addition,formeradministratoroftheDEARobertBonneridentifiedthedivide-and-conquerstrategyasa

108Counterinsurgentunderstandingoftheenvironmentisbasedonthetimespentbyforcesdealingwiththe

problemandtheoriginsofsecurityforces.FM3-24,1-22thru1-23.109AdamElkus,“MexicanCartels:AStrategicApproach,”InfinityJournal ,June27,2011,

http://www.infinityjournal.com/article.php?article=27 .



25

keyfactorinthedefeatofthecartels.110FM3-24doesnotspecificallyaddressthesequential

engagementofmultiplethreats,butitprovedessentialinthiscase.

IntelligenceDrivenOperations111

Operationsagainstthecartelswerelargelyintelligencedriven.InthecaseoftheMedellin

Cartel,securityforcesdrewfrombothtechnicalandhumansources.Signalsintelligenceassetswere

abletoeffectivelyinterceptcommunications.FormerEscobarassociatesinLosPepesprovideda

detailedunderstandingofthestructureandweaknessesoftheMedellinCartel.112Theremarkable

intelligenceandcounterintelligenceapparatusoftheCaliCartelfedtheSearchBlocand LosPepeswith

actionableintelligence.113Descriptionsofmissionsindicatethatraidsandoperationshadspecific

objectivesratherthanlargesweepsdiscouragedinFM3-24.114

TheCaliCartelwasdismantledusingsimilarmethods.TheCaliCartel’srelianceon

communicationstechnologymadeitsusceptibletolawenforcementsignalexploitation.Analyzing

criminalnetworksthroughphonecommunicationsishighlyeffectivefordevelopingtargetablelink

diagrams.115InformantslikeGuillermoPallomari,HaroldAckerman,andJorgeSalcedowerecriticalfor

theSearchBlocandtheDEAtodevelopanunderstandingoftheworkingsoftheCaliCartel.116

Theextensiveuseofactionableintelligencewasakeyattributeofthecampaignagainstthe

cartels.Thisstudyscoresthisprincipleaspositive.Theuseofintelligenceinlieuoflargecordonand

110RobertBonner,“TheNewCocaineCowboys,”ForeignAffairs89,(2010).

111Descriptionsofoperationsandtargetsareutilizedtomeasureif“operationsareshapedbytimelyspecificand

reliableintelligence…gatheredandanalyzedatthelowestlevel.”FM3-24,1-23.112Semana,“YofuielcreadordelosPepes,”June27,1994.

113Rempel,53-120.

114Semana,“Labusqueda,metroametro,”November15,1993.Semana,“Laconstanciavence,”January3,1994.

Bowden,KillingPablo.115MangaiNatarajan,“UnderstandingtheStructureofaDrugTraffickingOrganization:AConversationalAnalysis,”

IllegalDrugMarkets,(NewYork:CriminalJusticePress,2000).116Rempel,213-278.



26

searchoperationsfallsdirectlyinlinewiththeguidanceinFM3-24.Thisconvergenceindicatesthatthe

developmentofasystematictargetingsystemisessentialagainstDTOsaswellaspoliticalinsurgencies.

IsolationfromPopularSupport/InformationManagement117

TheDASbuildingbombing,Aviancaairlinebombing,andassassinationofGaláneffectively

endedthepopularlyhelddashingdrugbaronimagebutitdidnotresultinfullpublicsupportfor

governmentsecuritypolicy.Pollingatthetimesuggeststhatthegovernmentdidnotconductan

effectiveinformationcampaigntomaintainpublicsupport.Despitethecartelviolence,inone1989poll,

58percentofrespondentsfavorednegotiationswiththecartelsand60percentsupportedamnesty.118

Evenin1997,afterboththeMedellinandCaliCartelsweredefeated,pollresultsshowed71percentof

respondentssaidthatsecurityhadworsenedandPresidentSamperhelda54percentunfavorable

rating.119Despitetheseinformationcampaignfailings,theColombiangovernmentachievedvictorydue

totheuniquesupportstructureofthecartels.

ThecampaignagainstthecartelsturnstheMaoistinsurgentstructureonitsheadinthatthe

cartelssuppliedthepopulationratherthanthepopulationsupplyingthecartels.120InMedellin,Escobar

developedphilanthropicventurestoimprovethelivesofthepoor.TheCaliCartel’sprofits“permeated

theCalieconomyandthenativesbecameaddictedtolaunderedmoneyandconspicuous

consumption.”121Thecartelleadersgainedpersonalrecognitionfromtheirdonationstosocietybutthey

didnotreceiveessentialsupport.Thepowerfulcounterintelligenceandsecurityapparatusdevelopedby

117Determiningthelevelofseparationfrompopularsupportisaccomplishedthroughaccountsofcartelandgang

reactionstofinancialtargetingbysecurityforcesaswellaspollingdata.Informationoperationsareevaluated

throughpollingfigures,accountsofcivilmilitaryoperationsandpublicaffairsactivities.FM3-24,1-23.118Semana,“Lagranencuestadel89,”January22,1990.

119Semana,“lagranencuesta97,”February10,1997.

120DavidKilcullin,“Counter-insurgencyRedux,”Survival 48,(2006),DavidKilcullinnotesthesamephenomenonin

Iraqwherewealthyinsurgentspaidlocalstoconductattacks.121Chepesuik,68.



27

bothorganizationswasbasedonmonetarycompensation–notideology.Popularsupportwasnot

essentialtothecartels–cashflowwas.

Identifyingtheenemy’scenterofgravityiscrucialinthedevelopmentofaneffectivestrategy.

Clausewitzdescribesthecenterofgravityas“thehubofallpowerandmovement,onwhicheverything

depends.Thatisthepointagainstwhichallourenergiesshouldbedirected.”122Unlikepolitical

insurgencies,Colombianorganizedcrimegroupslackedanideologytoattractmembersandtheir

politicalgoalsrevolvedaroundincreasingtheirillicitincomes.Sinceillicitincomewasthecenterof

gravityforthecartels,financialtargetingofthecartelsprovedessential.Severalmultinational

operationsledbytheDEAresultedinmillionsofdollarsinseizures,multiplearrests,andthe

identificationofcriticalbankaccounts.123Inaddition,theColombianlawenforcement,ledbyProsecutor

GeneralAlfonsoValdivieso,alsoattackedthecartels’politicalsupportnetwork.Heinvestigated

numerousmembersofthepoliticaleliteincluding12congressmen,andalthoughPresidentSamper

escapedcharges,someofhistopaidesdidnot.124Bysimultaneouslypursuingdirectactionandfinancial

targeting,thegovernmentwasabletotightenanoosearoundthecartelsbyseizingresourcesand

removingtheircommandandcontrol.

TheColombiangovernmentfailedtoconductsuccessfulinformationoperations,whichis

reflectedbypollingresultsatthetime.Thereforethisstudyscoresinformationoperationsnegatively.

FM3-24warnsthat“victoryisgainednotwhenisolationisachieved,butwhenthevictoryis

permanentlymaintainedbyandwiththepeople’sactivesupport.”125TheColombiangovernmentdid

notrequireorobtainpopularsupporttodefeatthecartels,buttheydideffectivelyemployfinancial

targetingandinformantstoisolatethecartelsfromtheirsourcesofsupport.Assuch,isolationfrom

122Clausewitz,596.

123Chepesuik.,103.

124DouglasFarah,“Colombia’sCulpables;DrugCorruptionProbeImplicatesRulingClass,”WashingtonPost ,August

22,1995.125FM3-24,1-23.



28

popularsupportisscoredneutralbecausethegovernmentachievedsuccessbutfailedtoachieve

popularsupportasdesignedinFM3-24.

RuleofLaw126

RobertThompsonwarnsthat“thegovernmentmustfunctioninaccordancewiththelaw”and

avoidthe“verystrongtemptation…toactoutsidethelaw.”127Theruleoflawwasnotmaintainedduring

theColombiangovernment’sfightagainstthecartels.ColonelMartinezoftheSearchBlocdescribedhis

effortsagainsttheMedellinCartelas“awar…anarmedconfrontationbetweenthecartelandthe

state.”128Furthermore,theuseofLosPepes,avigilanteorganizationcomposedofparamilitaries,Cali

Cartelmembers,andfrustratedpolicewasadeparturefromColombianlaw.LosPepeslauncheda

murderouscampaignofassassinationsandattacksonthekeyplayersintheMedellinCartel.129Thisis

nottosaythatCOINcannotutilizestronglaws,whichThompsonsaysagovernmentcando.130The

Colombiangovernment,however,didnotestablishtoughrules.Itsimplyignoredtherulesoutof

expediency.131

Theuseofparamilitariesandvigilantes,whileeffective,mustbescorednegativelyinthisstudy.

AlthoughFM3-24warnsthat“illegitimateactionsunderminebothlongandshorttermCOINefforts,”

extrajudicialactivitiesprovedeffectiveinthiscase.132AsDougFarahnotes“theimportanceoftheLos

Pepescannotbeoverestimated.”133Thefindingsherematchwiththedivide-and-conquerstrategy

126Adherencetotheruleoflawismeasurebyavailablenumbersandaccountsofincidentsofexcessiveforce,

unlawfuldetention,torture,andpunishment.FM3-24,1-23thru1-24.127Thompson,52.

128DavidKeane,TheTrueStoryofKillingPablo,(WildEyesProductions,2002).

129Semana,“YofuielcreadordelosPepes,”June27,1994.

130Thompson,53.

131AuthorinterviewwithCOL(ret)WilliamSpracher,formerdefenseattachétoColombia,Washington,DC,August

15,2011.132FM3-24,1-24.

133AuthorinterviewwithDougFarah,Washington,DC,August8,2011.



29

identifiedpreviously.Thishighlightstheconceptthattemporaryalliancesmayproveeffectiveagainst

criminalgroupsdespitepotentialdamagetogovernmentlegitimacy.

LongTermCommitment/SupporttheHostNation134

ColombianforceswereconductinginternalCOINwhichmeantthattheyunderstoodthatthey

wouldpursuethecampaignuntilcomplete.ThedeterminationofCol.MartinezoftheSearchBloctakes

onanalmostShakespearianqualitybecauseherealizedthathewasinalifeordeathstrugglewith

Escobar.135Thedevelopmentofthe3,000manSearchBlocwasadirectindicationofColombian’s

seriousness.TheSearchBlocprovedtobeadurableorganizationandcontinuedthroughthedefeatof

theCaliCartelin1996.

U.S.supportwaslimitedbutsustainable,withthecartelsidentifiedasa“threattonational

security”in1986.136The1991NationalDefenseAuthorizationActprovidedtheDepartmentofDefense

with“authoritytoprovidetransportation,reconnaissance,training,intelligence,andbasesupportwhen

requestedbyforeignlawenforcementagenciesforcounternarcoticspurposes.”AverageU.S.aidto

Colombiaduringtheconflictwiththecartelswasamere$63.3millionannually.137Theconstrainedsize

andlevelofU.S.commitmentwasinfluencedbyfreshmemoriesofSomalia,where19servicemenwere

killedinalowintensityoperation.138Thesmallspecialoperationsandlawenforcementfootprint

allowedtheU.S.efforttomaintainasustainablecommitment.Counterintuitively,thelightfootprint

134Longtermcommitmentisobservedthroughthepresenceorabsenceoflastingorganizationsandstructuresas

wellasasustainableoperationstempo.Hostnationfocusistiedtothenumberofforeigntroopsandtheamount

offundingprovided.FM3-24,1-24.135Keane,TheTrueStoryofKillingPablo.

136NationalSecurityDecisionDirective221,April8,1986.

137NinaSerafino,“Colombia:SummaryandTablesonU.S.AssistanceFY1989-FY2004,”CongressionalResearch

Service,May19,2003.138RichardStewart,TheUnitedStatesArmyinSomalia,1992-1994,U.S.ArmyCenterforMilitaryHistory,(2003).



30

approachforU.S.expeditionaryCOINisgenerallymoreeffective.139ThesuccessofU.S.effortswasdue

tothefactthatColombiansecurityforcesledtheeffortandnotanoverbearingU.S.assistanceteam.

Thecreationofadedicatedandvettedunitwithfocusedleadershipaswellastheinternal

natureofthecampaignindicatesthatlongtermcommitmentwasadequatelydisplayedbythe

Colombians.U.S.support,whilelimited,provedtobesustainablefinanciallyandpolitically.Assuchboth

longtermcommitmentandhostnationsupportarescoredpositivelyinthisstudy.Asinatraditional

COINeffort,commitmenttothefightisakeycomponent.AlthoughFM3-24islargelydesignedto

describeexpeditionaryCOIN,theColombiacasestudyshowsthatalightfootprintapproachwas

effectiveagainstcriminalgroups.

UseofForce140

TheColombiangovernmenteffortwasenemyfocused,butdrivenbyspecifictargeting.Security

forcesimplementedstrictpopulationcontrolstolimitthemobilityofcartelmembers,however,theuse

ofheavyfirepowerwasnotaseriousissue.Theconflictdidnotresemblethetypeofguerrillawarfare

seeninthewritingsofCheGuevarawhereattacksagainstgovernmentforcesarerequiredtoseize

resourcesandweardownthegovernment.141Thecartelscontinuedtopurchasetheirsuppliesthrough

theirillicittrade.Governmentforcesreliedonsmallarmsandlightweaponsthroughoutthecampaign.

Withoutheavymilitaryunits,theimpactofrulesofengagementandescalationofforcewasminimal.

Theuseofforceprincipleisevaluatedpositivelyinthestudy.Givenpreviousfindingson

informationoperationsandpopularsupport,itisunclearwhattheresultofpoorrulesofengagement

139HyRothstein,“LessisMore:theproblematicfutureofirregularwarfareinaneraofcollapsingstates,”Third

WorldQuarterly 28,(2007).140Theuseofforceisexaminedbythepresenceofrulesofengagementprocedures,useofheavyweapons,and

presenceoflargenumbersofciviliancasualties.FM3-24,1-25.141Guevara,GuerrillaWarfare.



31

wouldhavebeen.AswithtraditionalCOIN,theuseofintelligencedrivenoperationsnaturallylimits

problemswiththeuseofforce.142

LearningandAdapting143

TheColombiangovernmentanditsU.S.allieseffectivelyadaptedduringthecampaign.The

initialstrategypursuedbytheColombiangovernmentwastolerantcoexistencewiththecartels.This

allowedtheMedellinandCaliCartelstogrowtoanunacceptablelevelofmilitaryandpoliticalpower.In

1983,PabloEscobarevenattemptedtoassumeofficeasacongressionalalternate.144Aftertheterrorist

campaignunleashedbythecartels,thegovernmentinitiatedanintensecrackdownontheMedellin

CartelthroughtheSearchBloc.Inthemidstofthisresponsethegovernmentattemptedtonegotiatean

agreementandacceptedthesurrenderofEscobar.Whenthisprovedineffective,thegovernment

reestablishedthemoreforcefuleffortsoftheSearchBloc.145WhiletheattackontheMedellincartelwas

extremelylethal,themoveagainsttheCaliCartelmorecloselyresembledapoliceinvestigation.146Once

againthegovernmentwouldutilizereducedpunishmenttopromotesurrenders.Thisconstantly

adjustingandshiftingstrategyindicatesthatthegovernmentwasabletotrydifferentmethodologies

andthenmatchtheiroperationstotheiropponents.

Atthetacticallevel,therewerenumerousinnovationsthatprovedcriticalintheeffort.Theuse

ofsignalsintelligencewashighlyeffectiveinthehuntforEscobar.Theuseoffinancialtrackingatthe

internationallevelasseeninoperationsGREENICEandDINEROwasagroundbreakingtechniquefor

142AuthorobservationsIraq2003and2005.

143COINforceadaptationismeasuredbythepresenceofchangesintacticsandthepresenceofamethodfor

capturinganddisseminatinglessons.FM3-24,1-26.144Bowden,35-41.

145Semana,“Labusqueda,metroametro,”November15,1993.

146AuthorinterviewwithDougFarah,August8,2011.



32

attackingtransnationalcrime.147Inaddition,theabilitytoturntheCaliCartel’sadvanced

communicationtechnologiesagainstitwasalsoamajorcoupforgovernmentforces.

TheColombiangovernmentanditsU.S.alliesprovedadaptivethroughouttheconflictwiththe

drugcartelsandthisprincipleisscoredpositively.TraditionalCOINandoperationsagainstorganized

crimeare“wickedproblems”148thatrequireinteractionandadaptationtoachievean“acceptable

steadystate.”149TheColombiangovernment’sabilitytoshapeaneffectivestrategyinafluidand

complexthreatenvironmentwasvital.

SmallUnits150

Theuseofsmallunitswasevidentinthecampaignagainstthecartels.Oneofthemost

importantfactorsthatledtothedemiseofbothcartelswastheuseoftherelativelysmall3,000

memberSearchBloc.WidespreadcorruptionwithintheColombiansecurityforcesmadetheuseof

regularpoliceunitsimpossible.Whenmilitaryforcesweredeployedtheyshowedanabilitytoreduce

commoncrimeintheirimmediatevicinity,butwerevulnerabletocorruptionbyDTOswhentheir

cooperationwasnecessary.151ThevettedandtrustedmembersoftheSearchBlocmadeitdifficultfor

thecartelstocorrupttheorganization.WithinFM3-24,however,thisprincipleisbasedupon

empoweringplatoonsandcompanieswithinlargerformations.Theideabeingthatsmallunitswill

controltheirownterrainandusetheirlocalknowledgetorootoutinsurgentswhileimprovinglocal

147Chepesuik,109-110.GREENICEandDINEROwereinternationalstingsthatincludedtheuseoffakemoney

launderinginstitutionstotrackandseizeillicitfunds.148RittelandWebber,“DilemmasinaGeneralTheoryofPlanning.”

149TXHammes,Presentation,GeorgetownUniversity,Washington,DC,July,2011.

150Smallunitresponsibilityismeasuredbythecontrolofenablersatthelowestlevelandthroughaccountsof

interactionswithhighheadquarters.FM3-24,1-26.151AuthorinterviewwithGeneral(ret)CarlosOspina,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,

August30,2011.



33

conditions.ThiswasnotthecaseinColombia;theSearchBlocmorecloselyresembledacounter-terror

unitthanalinecompanyconductingCOIN.152

Althoughthereisaslightdifferenceinthereasoningbehindtheimportanceofsmallunit

empowermentinFM3-24andinthiscase,thisstudyscoresthisprinciplepositively.Thevettedand

dedicatedSearchBlocwasperhapsthesinglemostimportantfactorinthedefeatofthecartels.Without

atrustedandcapableunitwithmobility,training,andfirepower,successinthiscasewouldhavebeen

unlikely.

GovernmentLegitimacy - LongTermCommitment +

UnityofEffort / InformationOperations -

PrimacyofPoliticalFactors / UseofForce /

UnderstandingtheEnvironment + SmallUnits +

IntelligenceDrivenOperations + LearnandAdapt +

IsolationfromPopularSupport / SupporttoHostNation +

RuleofLaw -

Table1

Table1providesanoverviewoftheresultsoftheColombiacasestudy.Sixofthe13principles

wereappliedsuccessfullyasoutlinedinFM3-24.Fouroftheprincipleswereeithernotapplied

accordingtothedoctrineorwerenotentirelysuccessful.Threeprincipleswerescoredasnotappliedor

failed.

Perhapsmostsurprisingly,governmentlegitimacyanditsassociatedprinciplesoftheruleoflaw

andinformationoperationswerenotachievedduringtheconflict.Theidentificationofthefinancial

centerofgravitythatemergedfromtheanalysisoftheDTOsusingO’Neill’sframeworkexplainshow

thisdeparturefromFM3-24’spopulationcentricapproachwaspossible.AgainstaMaoistinsurgencya

152Exum,“OnCOINandCT.”



34

failuretoachievegovernmentlegitimacyandapplyawhole-of-governmentapproacharefatalerrors;

however,DTOsdonotdrawtheirstrengthfromthepopulationand,therefore,thecenterofgravity

shifts.Thisalsoaffectedtheimportanceofpoliticalsolutionswhicharelessusefulinthefaceof

incentivesarisingfromanilliciteconomy.

ManyCOINprinciplesprovedaseffectiveagainsttheColombiancartelsastheyareintraditional

COIN.Intelligencedriventargetingwascrucialaswasalongtermcommitment.Importantly,learning

andadaptingwasalsocriticalinthefightagainstthecartels.Theevaluationofsomeprinciplesyielded

valuablenuancesforapplyingCOINtocriminalthreats.TheColombianunderstandingoftheirthreat

environmentallowedthemtopursueadivide-and-conquerstrategy,pittingonesub-stategroupagainst

theother.VettedunitswerealsoessentialduetotheDTO’spowertocorruptusingitsillicitoutside

fundingsources.Furthermore,therelianceonillicittraffickingratherthanpopularsupportmadethe

cartelsmorevulnerabletofinancialtargetingthanatraditionalinsurgency.

CriminalGangsinRiodeJaneiro

HistoricalSummary

Priortotheimplementationofthecurrentpolicestrategy,itwasestimatedthattwomillionof

RiodeJaneiro’stotalpopulationof11millionpeoplewerelivinginsome900slumsknownasfavelas.153

Thefavelasresembleanurbanmazeofrandomlyerectedhomesandbusinessesutilizingvariedbuilding

materials.154ThenamefavelacomesfromMountFavela,wherein1897Braziliantroopsfoughtabrief

internalcampaigncalledtheCanudosWar.ThedecommissionedsoldiersfoundthemselvesinRioafter

theconflictawaitinglandgrantsthatwouldneverbedelivered.Theybuiltmakeshifthousinginvacant

153MariaHelenaMoreiraAlvesandPhilipEvanson,LivingintheCrossfire,(Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,

2011),13-15.154AuthorobservationsRocinhaandVillaCanoasfavelas,15January2010.



35

spacesaroundRiowhichcametobeknownasfavelas.155Theneighborhoodslatertookonthepoorand

homelessandgrewexponentiallyduringthemassurbanizationbeginninginthe1970s.

Thisenvironmentwasafertilebreedinggroundforcriminalgroupsthatcreatedungoverned

spaces.156ThehomiciderateinRioin2008was31per100,000,orthreetimestheUnitedNation’s

definitionofanepidemicrate.157However,PoliceLieutenantCoronelAntonioCarballobelieves

mortalityratesinRioforyoungmen“arecomparabletothoseofasocietyatwar,”andthatperhaps70

percentofthe3,000to4,000peoplereportedmissingeachyearareactuallyhomicides.158Inaddition,it

wasestimatedthatpoliceinRiokill41citizensforeachofficerthatiskilled;fourtimestheinternational

average.159

Thisisnotsurprisinggiventhatover100policeofficershavebeenkilledinRioeveryyear

since2000.160FormerPresidentofBrazilFernandoHenriqueCardosolamentsthat“fatalviolenceinthe

favelashasreachedanintolerablelevel,”andBrazil’spromiseofdemocracy“hasyettobefulfilled.”161

Rioiscurrentlyplaguedbythreemajorgangs:theRedCommand( ComandoVermelho),the

ThirdCommand(TerceiroComando),andtheFriendsoftheFriends( AmigosdelosAmigos).162Current

gangsinRiocantracetheirlineagetourbanguerrillasfightingagainstthemilitarydictatorshipinBrazil

duringthe1960sand1970s.InsurgentspursuingarebellionbasedonmethodschampionedbyCarlos

MarighellaandAbrahamGuillenrobbedbanksandattackedgovernmentforces.Politicallymotivated

guerrillasandcommoncriminalsfoundthemselvesinthesameprisonsystemandcriminalsbeganto

modeltheiractivitiesaftertheguerrillas.ComandoVermelhowasoriginallyformedintheprisonsto

155JanicePearlman,Favela,(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2010),24-27.

156Ibid.157JulioJacoboWaiselfisz,MapadeViolencia2011,(Brasilia:InstitutoSangariandMinisteriodaJusticia,2011),34,

http://www.cnt.org.br/Imagens%20CNT/Not%C3%ADcias/Fevereiro%20de%202011/2011mapa_Viol%C3%AAncia

%20(1).pdf .158AlvesandEvanson,162.

159Ibid.,118.

160Ibid.,122.

161FernandoHenriqueCardoso,“Foreword,”inPerlman,Favela.

162Garzon,63-67.



36

controltheinmatepopulationanddemandbetterconditions.TheComandoVermelho’sorganization

provedinvaluableasitrapidlygrewininfluence.163

Inthe1980s,thearrivalofcocainewasdominatedbytheComandoVermelhowhichwasableto

capturevastquantitiesofmoneyandamassimpressivearsenals.TheComandoVermelhocorrupted

policeandofficialswhiledevelopingheavilyarmedgangstoprotectdrugdistributioncentersinthe

favelas.Thefavelasbecameno-goterrainforpoliceforcesandthegovernment.Thevariousfavelasrun

byindependentleadersoperatingwithintheComandoVermelhonetworkbegancompetingwitheach

otherandeventuallyfracturedintothreegroupsin1997.164

ThegovernmentlargelypursuedapolicyofisolationuntiltheinitiationoftheUPP(Pacifying

PoliceUnit)programin2008.165Controlofthefavelaswascededtodruggangsaslongastheyavoided

causingdisturbancesoutsideoftheirareas.Policeforces,oftentheBOPE(PoliceSpecialOperations

Battalion),wouldconductraidsintothefavelastoseizetargetedindividualsorasreprisalsforgang

activities.WhenRiohostedhighprofileevents,likethevisitbyPopeJohnPaulIIin1997andthePan

AmericanGamesin2007,policeandmilitaryforcestemporarilyoccupiedthefavelastopreventcriminal

disruptions.166

Rio’ssecurityissuesgainedworldwideattentionwhen,justtwoweeksafterbeingawardedthe

venueforthe2016OlympicGames,thecityeruptedintoviolenceandapolicehelicopterwasshot

down.167Motivatedbypreparationsforthe2014WorldCupandtheOlympics,thegovernmenthasnow

adoptedacomprehensiveandenduringstrategytoreassertcontrolofthefavelas.Theplanrevolves

163AlvarodeSouzaPinheiro,IrregularWarfare:Brazil’sFightAgainstCriminalUrbanGuerrillas,(HurlbertField:

JointSpecialOperationsUniversityPress,2009),5-8.164Garzon,63-67.

165UPPWebsite,http://www.upprj.com/en/.

166AlvesandEvenson,123-133.

167TomPhillips,“TwelveDeadandHelicopterDownedasRiodeJaneiroDrugGangsgotoWar,”Guardian,October

17,2009.



37

aroundacommunitypolicingconceptledbyspecialpacifyingpoliceunitsanditsphasesclosely

resemblethe“clear-hold-build”methodologyoutlinedinFM3-24.168Since2008,thegovernmenthas

clearedsome25communitiesandreassertedstatecontrolover280,000citizens.169Whilethereare

somecriticsoftheapproach,evidencesuggeststhatthethreeyearoldchangeinmethodologyis

effective.

FavelaGangsasInsurgency

Onceagain,theuseofO’Neill’ssixfactorsisausefulstartingpointfromwhichtodescribea

criminalinsurgencyphenomenon.170Though,criminalgangs,likeDTOs,donoteasilyfitintoO’Neill’s

insurgencytypology.Rio’sgangsbearsomeresemblanceto“secessionist”insurgenciesinthattheyhave

carvedawaysectionsofterritoryfromthestateandareactivelyopposingallstateinfluenceintheir

domains.MaxManwaringbelievesthegangsarea“mutatedformofurbaninsurgency”becauseoftheir

“irrevocableneedtodeposeorcontrolanincumbentgovernmenttoforcearadicalsocio-economic-

politicalrestructuringofthenation-stateanditsgovernance.”171Thegangsalsobehavelikea

commercialistinsurgencyinthattheyfighttocontrollucrativelocaldrugmarketswithinthefavela.172In

essence,thegangsseekfullautonomyfromthestatetoruleovertheirowncriminalkingdoms.

Rio’sgangsutilizeguerrillawarfaretechniquesandterroristattackstoachievetheirgoals.

Operatingincoordinatedsmallunits,thegangspatrolanddefendtheirfavelas.Thefavelasresemble

thesafe-havensincomplexterrainenvisionedbyMao,butthegangslimittheirexpansiontocriminal

raidingoutsideofthefavelaratherthanexportingrevolution.173Thegangsareaformidableurban

guerrillaforce,armedwithassaultrifles,grenades,andheavymachineguns.Theyutilizethemazeof

168FM3-24,5-18thru5-23.

169UPPWebsite.

170O’Neill,15-43.

171Manwaring,StreetGangstheNewUrbanInsurgency ,(Carlisle:SecurityStudiesInstitute,2005),33.

172Ibid.

173Mao,108.



38

pathwaysandramshacklebuildingstofightalethaldefenseindepthagainstassaultinggovernment

securityforces.174Thegangsarealsocapableofcoordinatedwidespreadattacksthatcouldbe

consideredterroristactions.OnDecember28,2006,gangstorchedbussesandlaunchedsynchronized

attacksagainst12policestationsleaving18deadinamovetointimidatethenewstategovernor.175In

Novemberof2010,thegangsstruckagainburningbussesandcars,detonatingimprovisedexplosives,

andengagingpolice.Theattacks,whichleftmorethan35dead,weredesignedtocounterthe

pacificationprogramandmayhavebeentailoredtoprovidenegativeimagestotheinternational

media.176Tactically,thereareclearsimilaritiesbetweeninsurgentsandcriminalgangs.

Unfortunately,O’Neill’sframeworkofinsurgentstrategicapproachesdoesnotprovideaclear

pictureofgangstrategiesinRio.ThegangsinRio,liketheCaliandMedellinCartels,relyonextensive

corruptionofthepoliceforces.However,forDTOsliketheCaliCartel,corruptiontakesonanessential

roleandissimilartoaLeninistrevolutionarytechnique.Thegangs,incontrast,bribepoliceandlocal

officialsbuttheirinfluenceisnowherenearthatofpowerfulDTOs.Gangspaycorruptpolicetolimitor

preventincursionsintheirterritory.177Thegangsresembleaprotractedpopularwarstrategyinthat

theydrawsupportfromthepopulation;however,thereisnophasedrevolutionaryapproach.Inmany

waystheilliciteconomyhasreinvigoratedGuevara’s focomethodandintegratedurbanapproaches.178

Thegangsareessentiallysmallbandsofguerrillasutilizingurbanguerrillatechniques.Theirgoals,

however,areextremelylimited:controlofadelineatedfavelaanditseconomicresources,specifically

drugprofits.Becausethegangsareasecessionistmovement,theydonotpursuethegeneral

revolutionarygoalsoutlinedbyMarighellaandGuillen.

174Pinheiro,5-8.

175MichaelAstor,“18deadasRiogangsclashwithpoliceinviolentshowofforce,”Independent ,December29,

2006.176BBC ,“RiodeJaneiroshakenbyfreshgangviolence,”November25,2010.

177AuthorinterviewRafaelSaleis,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,August30,2011.

178DavidSpencer,“PostColdWarCounterinsurgencyinLatinAmerica,”unpublishedwork.



39

ThefavelagangsmorecloselyresembleMaoistinsurgenciesthantheMedellinandCaliCartels.

Aswasshownpreviously,aDTO’scenterofgravityisitsprofitsfromillicittrafficking.UnlikeMedellin

andCali,thefavelagangsarecloselytiedtothecommunityforresources.Favelagangsarenotprimarily

traffickingorganizationsbutratherparticipateinthedrugtradeattheretaillevel.Drugprofitscome

fromthelocalpopulationandothersthatenterthefavelatopurchasedrugs.Thegangsreceive

weaponsandfundingfromoutsidethefavelabuttheirprimarysourceofincomeislocaldrugsales.

Additionally,somegangsandespeciallymilitiaschargeataxonresidentstohelpfundoperations.179

Manygangsinitiatepublicworksprojectsandthrowpopularfunkmusicpartiestocreateapositive

image.Gangsalsoprovidearudimentaryjusticesystemforconflictarbitration.Shortdurationraiding

andpolicecorruptionalsoalienatedthepublicfromthegovernmentallowingthegangstomaintain

popularsupport.180PopularsupportisanimportantdifferencebetweenpowerfulDTOsandpowerful

gangs.Thecenterofgravityforfavelagangs,likemanyclassicinsurgencies,isthelocalpopulation.

EachfavelahasahighlyorganizedstructurewhiletheoverarchinggroupsliketheComando

Vermelhofunctionmorelikeanetwork.Atthelocallevel,eachfavelaiscontrolledbyaseniorleaderor

dono.Underthedonoisthegeneralmanagerwhomanagesthegangoperationsincludingdrugsales

andmilitaryactivities.Underthegeneralmanger,therearesub-managersforcocainesales,marijuana

sales,andsecurity.Eachdrugdistributionpoint,calleda bocadefumo,hasamanagerandsecurity

force.Finally,guardsareemployedtoprotecttheperimeterofthefavelafrompoliceorrivalgang

incursions.181

ItissomewhatdifficulttoapplyaninsurgencyframeworktothefavelagangsofRio,buttheydo

sharesomeattributeswiththeirpoliticalinsurgentpredecessorswhofoughtthemilitarydictatorship.

Thegangshaveanextremelylimitedgoaltoachieve–maintainingautonomyoverdistinctterrainin

179AlvesandEvanson,20.

180Ibid.,117.

181Garzon,66.



40

ordertomaximizecommercialgainthroughretaildrugsales.Thegangsatthefavelaleveloperatein

organizedunits,employingguerrillatacticstomaintaincontroloftheirterritory.Mostimportantly,their

centerofgravityisthepopulationthatsuppliesthemwithillegaltaxesanddrugprofits.Becausethe

gangs’centerofgravityisthepopulation,thismakesthemvulnerabletomoretraditionalCOIN

methodologies.

TheBrazilianGovernmentResponseasCOIN

Fromthe1980sthrough2008,thegovernmentpursuedapolicyofisolationandraidingagainst

thefavelagangs.However,currentoperationscloselyresembleapopulationcentricCOINmethodology.

Currentcampaignsagainstthefavelasinvolveafourphasedapproach:

1. Intelligencecollection

2. Occupation,usuallyconductedbyBOPEforces

3. InstallationoftheUPPunit

4. Evaluationandcoordinationofgovernmentservicesbetweenpolice,communityleaders,service

providers,andnongovernmentalorganizations182

Rio’sstatesecuritysecretary,JoseMarianoBeltrame,outlinedthegoaloftheoperations:“Wecannot

guaranteethatwewillputanendtodrugtraffickingnordowehavethepretensionofdoingso…[the

ideais]tobreaktheparadigmofterritoriesthatarecontrolledbytraffickerswithweaponsofwar.Our

concreteobjectiveisthatacitizencancomeandgoashepleases,thatpublicandprivateservicescan

getintherewhenevertheywant.”183Unlikepreviousefforts,theUPPprogramisdesignedtolastfora

minimumof25years.184AswithFM3-24,UPPfocusesonthepopulation.“TheUPPisanewmodelof

PublicSecurityandpolicingthatintendstobringpoliceandpopulationclosertogether,aswellas

strengthensocialpoliciesinsidecommunities.Byreestablishingcontroloverareasthatfordecadeswere

182BethMcLoughlin,“WillcrimecrackdowntransformRio’sshantytowns?”BBC ,August20,2011.

183TomPhillips,“RiodeJaneiropoliceoccupyslumsascityfightsbackagainstdruggangs,”Guardian,April12,

2010.184McLoughlin.



41

occupiedbytrafficand,recently,alsobymilitias,theUPPsbringpeacetocommunities…Communitarian

Policeisaconceptandastrategybasedonthepartnershipbetweenthepopulationandpublicsecurity

institutions.”185AnanalysisofthesecurityinitiativeshowsthatCOINprinciplesarewellrepresentedin

thecurrentapproach.

GovernmentLegitimacy

Initially,thegovernmentwasnotseenaslegitimate,buteffortssince2008showan

improvementinpublicperceptionofthegovernment.186Widespreadpolicecorruptionandshortterm

raidsonthefavelasleftthefavelaspopulationalienatedfromthepolice.Thesecurityforces’raiding

cultureledtoadehumanizationoffavelaresidents.Oneofficerevencalledthemilitarypolice“thebest

socialinsecticide.”187Notsurprisingly,manycitizenshadmorerespectforthelocalgangsandtheir

rudimentarylawsthanforgovernmentsecurityforces.188Onesurveyindicatedthatfavelaresidents

believedthatthepolicecommittedmoreactsofviolenceagainstthecommunitybyamarginoftwoto

one.189Thelackofsecurityalsopreventedthecitygovernmentfromdeliveringbasicservicestothe

neighborhoodsleavingthepopulationfeelingabandoned.190

TheUPPprogram,however,haschangedthisperception.Oncesecurityforcesandgovernment

officialsestablishedalastingpresenceinthefavelastheyhavegreatlyimprovedpublicperceptions.The

UPPprogramusesspeciallytrainedyoungofficerstopreventpoliceofficersraisedinacultureof

corruptionfrominfluencingtheeffort.UPPresultsarepromising.96percentofrespondentsinDona

MartaandCidadedeDeusthinkUPPshouldbeexpandedtootherareasand93percentapproveofthe

185UPPWebsite,http://www.upprj.com/en/,

186AlexeiBarrionuevo,“Inroughslum,Brazil’spolicetrysofttouch,”NewYorkTimes,October10,2010.

187AlvesandEvanson,209.

188Perlman,167.

189Ibid.,189.

190Authorobservations,RocinhaandVillaCanoasfavelas,15January2010.



42

program.191InacomprehensivesurveyofcommunitieswithUPPunits,94percentofrespondents

believedtheircommunitywassecure,80percentsaidthattheimageofthepoliceimproved,morethan

70percentfeltbetterrespectedbyoutsidecommunitiesandsaidtheynowhaveavoiceinthe

government.192Challengesremainforgovernmentlegitimacyincludingtheriskofcorruptioninthe

UPPs193andcontinuingdemandsformoregovernmentservices.

194

Thisstudyscoresgovernmentlegitimacypositivelyasthegovernmentnotonlydevelopeda

programdesignedtogainthesupportofthepopulationbutithasachievedsignificantsuccess.This

findingcontrastswiththeColombiancasestudywheregovernmentlegitimacywasnotpursuedor

achieved.Breakingthecycleofgangviolenceandpoliceraidingallowedthegovernmenttodisplacethe

criminalthreatandestablishcontrol.

UnityofEffort

ThesecurityeffortinRioiscoordinatedatthestatelevel.Allstatelevelactivitiesincludingsocial

andsecurityinitiativesarecontrolledbythegovernor,SergioCabral.TheCivilPoliceandMilitaryPolice

arestateforcesandfallunderstatesecuritysecretaryJoseMarianoBeltrame.UPPSocial,astatelevel

program,coordinatesgovernment,privatesector,andNGOprojectswithinUPPfavelas.195Atthe

tacticallevel,occupationsaretypicallycommandedbytheBOPEandthencontrolisgiventoaUPP

commander.Ostensibly,thecoordinationanddeliveryofservicesiscompletedbyaresidential

191PresentationGovernodoRiodeJaneiro,EstadodoRiodeJaneiroSecretariadeSeguranca.

192InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades

dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.193MichaelKerlin,“UPPCorruptionDemandsComplexQuestions,Solutions,”TheRioTimes,September13,2011,

http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/opinion-editorial/opinion/upp-corruption-demands-complex-questions-

solutions/#.194InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades

dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.195AshleyMorse,“PacifyingandReincorporatingRiodeJaniero’sFavelas,”inTacklingUrbanViolenceinLatin

America,(Washington,DC:WOLA,2011).



43

community,butinpracticetheUPPcommanderisseenastheleaderinmostfavelas.196“TheUPP

commanderislikeaking”andeffectivelyreplacestherulinggangleader.197Fortunately,mostfavela

residentsratecooperationbetweentheUPPandthecommunityasgoodorexcellent.198

Thisstudyfindsthatgovernmentforcessuccessfullyachievedunityofcommandintheir

operationsandscoresthisprinciplepositively.Atthestrategiclevelcivilianleadershipisfirmlyin

controlofoperationsandisworkingtointegratesecurityanddevelopmentassets.Atthetacticaland

operationallevels,theBOPE,UPP,andmilitaryunitshaveprovencapableofcoordinatingtheir

actions.199Finally,despiteunclearcommandchains,cooperationbetweencommunityleadersandUPP

commandershasbeeneffective.AswithtraditionalCOINefforts,securityforcesinRiowouldhavehad

tremendousdifficultyoccupyingterrainandcontrollingthepopulationwithoutafunctioningcommand

frameworkthatintegrateddiversegovernmentassets.

PrimacyofPoliticalFactors

AswiththeColombiacasestudy,politicalreconciliationhasplayedalimitedroleinthe

governmentapproach.AlthoughsomeBraziliangangslikethePCC(FirstCapitalCommand)publish

manifestosthatincludepoliticaldemands,mostgangsatthelocallevelaresimplyfocusedon

controllingterrainandprofitingfromdrugsales.200Whilepoliticalinterestsareparamountinaclassic

insurgency,theunderlyingcauseofviolenceinthefavelasisculturalandsocial.Youthareraisedina

cultureofviolenceandlimitedeconomicopportunityleadingtointenseincentivestojoingangs.

SociologistJanicePerlmanobserves:


dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.197AuthorinterviewRafaelSalies,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,August30,2011.


dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010199TheEconomist ,“ConqueringComplexodoAlemao,”December2,2010.

200Pinheiro,11-12.



44

Theinternalizedlackofself-esteem,inevitableforyouthwhoarenevertreatedas

respectablepeople,isconducivetoteenagersdroppingoutofschool,having

unprotectedsexthatleadstoearlypregnancies,andjoiningdruggangs.Atleastinthe

gang,theadolescentboysfeelimportantandpowerful.Theyarearmed,theyhavecash;

theywearexpensiveshoes,shirts,andjewelry;theymayhaveamotorcycle,andthey

attracttheattentionofthemostdesirableyoungwomen.Itisnothardtoimaginea

teenagerbeingwillingtoriskearlydeathforthechancetoexperiencetherespectand

deferencethatordinarypeopletakeastheirbirthright.201

Thegovernmentisnowattemptingtoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofyouthviolence.Increased

securitybytheUPPhasledtosubstantialdecreasesindrugtrafficking;removingthisoptionforyoung

residents.202Theimpositionofgovernmentauthorityprovidesalternaterolemodelsfortheyouthofthe

favelas.203Increasedliciteconomicopportunitygiveyoungmalesalternateroutestorespectand

personalwealth.

AswiththeColombiacasestudy,itisdifficulttoapplythepoliticalprimacyprincipletofavela

gangs.Ratherthanapoliticalideology,therootcausesoftheconflictinRioareanextensivelocalillicit

economyandacultureofgangviolence.GovernmenteffortsintheRiofavelasinmanywaysmore

closelyresemblesanti-gangstrategiesthatfocuson“socialintervention,theprovisionofopportunities,

andcommunitymobilization”toattackthecausesofgangviolence.204Becausethisfocusoncultural

changeisadistinctdeparturefromthepoliticalfocusfoundinFM3-24,thisstudyratesthepolitical

primacyprincipleasneutral.

UnderstandingoftheEnvironment/IntelligenceDrivenOperations

Thepoliceforcesinvolvedintheclearanceandoccupationofthefavelashaveaclear

understandingoftheiroperationalenvironment.DecadesofoperationsinthefavelashavegivenRio

201Perlman,323.


dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.203AlexeiBarrionuevo,“Inroughslum,Brazil’spolicetrysofttouch.”

204U.S.DepartmentofJustice,OfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention,“ComprehensiveGang

Model,”October2010,https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231200.pdf .



45

policeastrongbackgroundinthenatureofthepopulationandthegangs.Infact,manyofthepolicelive

inthefavelasorgrewupinthefavelas.Interestingly,corruptionbecomesadoubleedgedswordforthe

gangsoncemoralpolicingisincentivized.Corruptpolicethatstraightenoutalreadyknowthegang

leadersandtheiroperations,whichallowsforhighlyeffectivetargeting.205Inaddition,securityforces

maximizetheuseofsignalsandhumanintelligenceaspartofthefirstphaseofacampaigntoretakea

favela.206GeneralPinheiro’sreviewoflessonsfromthearmy’sdeploymentintothefavelasin2006

notesthat“intelligencedatacollectionabouttheoppositionforcesisanessentialtask.”207Government

forces’detailedunderstandingofthefavelasandtheirfocusonintelligencepreparationhavebeenkey

elementsintheirsuccess.

Thisstudyscorestheprinciplesofunderstandingtheenvironmentandintelligencedriven

operationspositively.Theseprinciplesareconsistentwiththefieldmanualandweresuccessfully

practicedinbothcasescoveredinthisstudy.ThesetraditionalCOINprinciplesretainedtheirvalueeven

whenappliedagainstacriminalthreat.

IsolationfromPopularSupport

Theinitialgovernmentstrategyoffavelaisolationandraidingengenderedpopularsupportfor

thecriminalgangs.Incontrast,effortsundertheUPPhaverapidlybuiltuplocalsupportforthe

governmentanddismantledsupportforthegangs.208DatafromUPPcontrolledfavelasindicatesthat

drugsalesandusedrasticallydeclineoncegovernmentforcestakecontroloftheneighborhoods.209The

occupationofthefavelaseffectivelyisolatesthegangsfromtheirsourceofmaterialsupport,fundsfrom

localdrugsales.Socialprogramsmayexplainsomeofthedeclineindrugsalesbutitismorelikelythat

205AuthorinterviewRafaelSalies,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,August30,2011.

206BethMcLoughlin,“WillcrimecrackdowntransformRio’sshantytowns?”BBC ,August20,2011.

207Pinheiro,32.

208PresentationGovernodoRiodeJaneiro,EstadodoRiodeJaneiroSecretariadeSeguranca.


dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.



46

increasedsecuritydisplacesusersanddealerstounsecuredfavelas.Thefavelapopulationisgenerally

conservativeandhardworkingandisnotinclinedtosupportthegangsintheabsenceofcoercion.The

limitedpopularsupportenjoyedbythegangsquicklycrumblesoncetheircontroloftheilliciteconomy

andforceisdestroyed.210

Thisstudyscoresisolationfrompopularsupportasstronglypositive.Thegovernmentwasable

toseparatethegangsfromtheirmaterialandpopularsupport.Aswasshownintheanalysisusing

O’Neill’smodel,thegangshavealocalcenterofgravityunlikeaDTOcriminalthreat.Thismeansthat,as

withaMaoisttypeinsurgency,theirresourcesarederivedfromthelocalpopulationandcontrolofthe

populationwillcutofftheirsourcesofsupport.

RuleofLaw/UseofForce

Governmentforceshaveimprovedtheiradherencetotheruleoflaw,buttherearestill

significantissueswithpoliceviolatinglegalrequirements.HumanRightsWatchnotesthat“some

Brazilianpoliceofficersengageinabusivepracticesinsteadofpursuingsoundpolicingpolicies.”211Police

inRiooperatewiththeauthoritytousedeadlyforceagainstcriminalsthat“resist.”Underthislawthe

policehavebroadrulesofengagementwhenoperatinginthefavelas.HumanRightsWatchbelieves

thatasignificantnumberofthehundredsofannualpolicekillingsareillegitimate.212Thegovernment

hastakensomeaction.Undercoverpolicearebeingemployedtocatchpoliceabusesandan

ombudsmanisnowinvestigatingcomplaints.213Thegovernmentefforthas,atleastostensibly,followed

aruleoflawapproachandthegangshavebeenpursuedascriminalsunderthejusticesystemrather

thanenemycombatants.

210AuthorinterviewU.S.ArmyForeignAreaOfficer,JamesWinland,October,2011.

211HumanRightsWatch,CountrySummary:Brazil ,January,2011.

212Ibid.

213TheEconomist ,“ConqueringComplexodoAlemao,”December2,2010.



47

Theuseofforcehasbeenlimitedbytheweaponsystemsemployedbythepoliceandmilitary

unitsoperatinginthefavelas.Thepoliceareheavilyarmedwithassaultriflesandutilizearmored

vehiclesbuttheyarenotemployingairstrikes,heavymachineguns,andhighcalibercanonsagainst

theircriminalopponents.PriortotheUPPprogram,theBOPEfollowednotoriouslylooserulesof

engagement.214However,recentpollingoffavelaresidentssuggeststhattheBOPEhasadjustedits

tacticstothenewstrategy.OnlytenpercentofrespondentsfromfavelasdepictedBOPErelationswith

residentsasviolent,41percentdescribedrelationsasfriendlyandprofessional.215

Thisstudyscorestheruleoflawprincipleasneutral.Importantprogresshasbeenmadeto

establishruleoflawbutstudiesbyhumanrightsadvocatesquestionifthatprogresshasbeenentirely

successful.Theuseofforceisscoredpositively.Rulesofengagementhavesubstantiallychangedfrom

theraidingstrategypreviouslyemployed.AswithatraditionalCOINeffort,thesetwoprincipleshave

beenimportantaspectsofthegovernment’sstrategyinRio.Poorrelationsbetweensecurityforcesand

favelaresidentsinpartarisefrompreviousraidingoperationsthatdiscardedtheruleoflawandutilized

openrulesofengagement.Effortstoimproveadherencetotheruleoflawandresponsiblerulesof

engagementhavehelpedthegovernmentdeveloplegitimacy.

LongTermCommitment

Incontrastwithpreviouseffortstogaincontrolofthefavelas,theUPPprogramhasshowna

commitmenttothelongterminclusionofthefavelasundergovernmentcontrol.UPPpoliceunitsare

basedinthefavelasandaredesignedtoworkwiththeneighborhoodsindefinitely.Beltramehas

214ForanoutstandingdramatizationofBOPE’sengagementsinthefavelasseeTropadeElite,directedbyJose

Padiha,ZazenProductions,2007.215InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades

dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010.



48

proclaimedthat“thepolicehavearrivedandthepolicewillremain.”216Investmentintheprogram,

unlikepreviouseffortsatcommunitypolicing,issubstantial.Thecitygovernmentisinvestingeight

milliondollarsonthepoliceacademywiththegoalofincreasingthepoliceforceto60,000officers.217

ThenationalgovernmenthasinitiatedthehalfbilliondollarPRONASCI(NationalProgramforPublic

SecuritywithCitizenship)whichfunnelsmoneythrough94programsaimedatprofessionalizingpolice,

reformingthepenalsystem,preventingyouthviolence,combatingcorruption,andcreatingurban

renewal.218Despitethesenumbers,over60percentoffavelaresidentsstillfearthatonedaycriminals

willretakecontroloftheircommunitiesandthatthecontinuationoftheUPPprogramwilldependon

thewillofthenextgovernment.219Althoughpublicdistrustremains,thegovernmentcampaignhas

achievedbureaucraticmomentumthatwillbedifficulttoreverse.

BasedonthesignificantpoliticalandmaterialinvestmentsmadeintheUPPprogram,thisstudy

evaluateslongtermcommitmentpositivelyinthiscase.Thepreviousidentificationofaculturaland

societalfoundationtotheviolenceindicatesthat,perhapsevenmoresothaninpoliticalCOIN,along

terminvestmentisrequiredtoaddresstheproblem.FM3-24demandsthatthecounterinsurgentforce

havethe“means,ability,stamina,andwilltowin”ifitistosucceed.220Thesequalitieswereequally

importantinthetwocasesofcriminalinsurgenciesdiscussedinthisstudy.ThegovernmentinRiohas

committeditselftoalong-termcampaigntoreassertcontrolofthefavelas.

InformationManagement/SupporttotheHostNation

216TomPhillips,“RiodeJaneiropoliceoccupyslumsascityfightsbackagainstdruggangs,”Guardian,April12,

2010.217UPPwebsite,http://www.upprj.com/en/.

218PRONASCIwebsite,

http://portal.mj.gov.br/pronasci/data/Pages/MJ3444D074ITEMID2C7FC5BAF0D5431AA66A136E434AF6BCPTBRN

N.htm,accessedSeptember7,2011.219InstitutoBrasileirodePesquisaSocial,“PR004-10-UPP-25,01PesquisaSobreaPercepçãoAcercadasUnidades

dePoliciaPacificadora”January25,2010220FM3-24,1-24.



49

InformationoperationssincetheinceptionoftheUPPapproachhavebeenimpressive.The

governmentengagesinextensivepublicoutreachprogramsincludingpolicevisitstolocalschools,free

JiuJitsuclassestaughtbypolice,andabroaddisseminationofinformationproductstoswaythepublic

againstthegangs.221Brazilhasgonefurtherbyengagingtheinternationalcommunitytoavoid

complicationsfromhumanrightsgroupswhichmayaffecttheupcomingWorldCupandOlympics.The

UPPwebsitefeaturespositivestoriesandinteractivedisplaysexplainingtheUPPmissionanditsresults

inseverallanguages.222TheBraziliansareself-reliantandagrowingworldpower,henceaccepted

externalsupportfortheUPPprogramisextremelylimited.U.S.supporthasbeenlargelylimitedto

adviceandindirectinferencesfromU.S.doctrineandexperiencesinIraqandAfghanistan.TheBrazilians

deemedinternationalopinionoftheUPPprogramimportantwhiledecliningdirectforeignassistance.

Thisstudyscoresinformationmanagementasextremelypositive.Aswithpopulationcentric

COIN,developingapositivenarrativeandsolidrapportwiththepopulationwasessentialinthiscase.

Hostnationsupportisclearlypositivebecausethereisverylittleoutsidesupport.Brazilhaseffectively

createdaglobalinformationcampaigntoensureforeignsupportforitsactions.Thisisverysimilarto

thecreativemodificationofinsurgencytheorydevelopedbytheSandinistasinwhichworldpublic

opinionwasaprimaryobjective.223Inthiscase,Braziliseffectivelyengagingtheworldcommunityto

preventcriminalgroupsfromgainingsupportfrominternationalnon-governmentalorganizationsand

humanrightsorganizations.

LearningandAdapting

Governmentforcesclearlylearnedandadaptedtheirtacticsandapproachfromtheriseofthe

gangsinthe1970stocurrenteffortstoday.Theoriginalapproachembracedbythegovernmentwasto

221AlexeiBarrionuevo,“Inroughslum,Brazil’spolicetrysofttouch,”NewYorkTimes,October10,2010.

222UPPwebsite.

223TXHammes,TheSlingandtheStone,”(Minneapolis,Zenith,2006),87-88.



50

isolatethegangsinthefavelasandpreventtheirinfluenceontherestofthecity.Punitiveoperations,

targetedraids,andshorttermoccupationswereusedtomanagetheproblembutneverresultedin

governmentcontrolofthefavelas.WhenBrazilwasawardedtheWorldCupandtheOlympicsitbecame

imperativetoachievealastingsolutiontothefavelaproblemthatdidnotcedesovereigntyover

hundredsofthousandsofcitizenstocriminalgangs.

Braziliansecurityforcesdrewfromavarietyofexperiencestohonetheirtacticalabilitiesand

operationalplans.TheBrazilianmilitaryhasgainedextensiveexperienceoperatinginHaitiasthelead

nationinMINUSTAH(UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti).Thisexperiencewithexpeditionary

peacekeepinghasbeeninvaluableduringoperationsinthefavelas.224

Previousattemptsatcommunity

policingalsoprovidedkeylessons.TheGPAE(PoliceGroupinSpecialAreas)wasimplementedin2000in

CantagaloandPavao-Pavaozinhobutitssuccesswaslimitedbyitsscopeandfunding.225TheUPP

programbenefitedfromaphasedapproachthatallowedadequatetimefororganizationallearning

betweenoperations.Eachfavelarepresentedauniquebutsimilarproblemset,sothegovernmentwas

abletolearnandadaptitssystemsaftereachfavelawasoccupied.Theoccupationswerealso

sequencedsothatthelargerandmostdangerousfavelascameafterthelessdangerousones.This

enabledgovernmentforcestobuildontheirexperiences.

Learningandadapting,aswiththeColombiancase,ispositivelyevaluatedhere.TheBrazilian

approachresemblesacommonCOINinkblotapproach.However,Rio’sterrainmakesitunique.The

contestedfavelasaresimilartoislandswithinthecitythatcanbephysicallyisolatedandengaged

separately.Asglobalurbanizationtrendscontinuetraditionalinsurgenciesandcriminalvariantswill

increasinglybefoundincities.TheisolateandreduceapproachappliedinRiomayprovideCOIN

practitionerswithanalternativetoinkblotmethods.

224Pinheiro,29.

225AlvesandEvanson,160-161.



51

SmallUnits

Theclear-hold-buildmethodologyutilizedbythegovernmentuseslargerobustforcestoinitially

clearafavelaofarmedgangmembersandthenfocusesonsmallUPPunitsthathavecontroloftheir

terrain.TheseUPPelementsareempoweredtocontroltheirzonesandareledbypolicecaptains.As

wasdiscussedpreviously,UPPcommanderslargelyreplacethedominantdrugdealersastherulersof

thefavelas.

ThefocusonsmallunitempowermentisclearlyinlinewiththetenantsofFM3-24andisscored

positivelyinthisstudy.AswiththeColombiancasestudy,corruptionisakeyfactorinRio.TheUPPsare

intentionallyseparatedfromtherestofthepoliceforcetoavoidcorruption.TheUPPsarelargerthan

thevettedSearchBlocinColombiabuttheyaresubjectedtoadifferenttrainingregimenandreceive

additionalpay.

GovernmentLegitimacy + LongTermCommitment +

UnityofEffort + InformationOperations +

PrimacyofPoliticalFactors / UseofForce +

UnderstandingtheEnvironment + SmallUnits +

IntelligenceDrivenOperations + LearnandAdapt +

IsolationfromPopularSupport + SupporttoHostNation +

RuleofLaw /

Table2

Table2showsthatthegovernment’sapproachinRioisagoodmatchwiththepopulation-

centricapproachfoundinFM3-24.ItisalsoevidentthattheproperapplicationoftheCOINprinciples

wascriticalinachievingsuccess.11ofthe13factorswerefollowedandweresuccessful.Twofactors



52

werescoredasneutral.Thegovernmenthasrecognizedtheimportanceoftheruleoflawinits

operations,butitisstillundergoingneededreformstomeetitsnewstandardsforpolicework.

ThegovernmentisaddressingrootcausesofthegangsinRiobutthesearesocial,cultural,and

economicratherthanprimarilypoliticalasiscommonlyunderstoodinclassiccounterinsurgency.One

hearteningfindingisthatthecenterofgravityofafavelagangisvulnerable.Wrestinginsurgentsfrom

theirsourceofsupportwasagruelingprocessinVietnamandMalaya.226Gangs,however,lackreal

legitimacyand,withoutamonopolyofforce,quicklyloseaccesstomaterialsupportfromextortionand

localdrugsales.

Thegovernment’suseofasequentialcampaigncreatedahighlyeffectivesystemforlearning

andadapting.ThenatureoftheurbanthreatinRioresemblesislandsofcontestedterritorythatcanbe

isolatedandreduced.Thegovernmenthasattackedtheproblemsequentiallybyaddressingtheleast

dangerousthreatsfirsttobuildabaseofexperiencebeforetacklingthemoredifficultfavelas.Isolating

pocketsandattackingtheminsequencetomaximizeadaptationcouldproveextremelyusefulwhen

dealingwithsimilarthreatslikeMS-13inCentralAmerica.

Brazil’suseofaninternationalinformationcampaigntoisolatethecriminalgroupsfromoutside

supportandmaintainitspositiveimagedespiteamassivesecuritychallengeisfascinating.Brazil’splace

asarisingpowerandthehostoftwomajorsportingeventsmakesitvulnerabletointernational

pressure.Criminalattemptstouseviolentpropagandahavefailedtocreatepressurefromothernations

andinstitutionslikeFIFAandtheOlympicCommittee.Brazil’srecognitionoftheimportanceofglobal

opinionisavaluablelessonfornotonlyactionsagainstcriminalgroupsbutalsoagainsttraditional

insurgencies.

ResultsandPolicyImplications

226JohnNagl,LearningtoEatSoupwithaKnife,(Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,2005).



53

CO BR CO BR

GovernmentLegitimacy - + LongTermCommitment + +

UnityofEffort / + InformationOperations - +

PrimacyofPoliticalFactors / / UseofForce / +

UnderstandingtheEnvironment + + SmallUnits + +

IntelligenceDrivenOperations + + LearnandAdapt + +

IsolationfromPopularSupport / + SupporttoHostNation + +

RuleofLaw - /

Table3

Thisstudysetouttodeterminetowhatextentarecounterinsurgencyprinciplesasoutlinedin

FieldManual3-24Counterinsurgency effectiveagainstcriminalinsurgencies.InthecaseofColombia’s

cartels,adifferentapproachprovedeffectiveandsomeprinciplesfoundinFM3-24wereineffectiveor

absent.RiodeJaneiro’seffortsagainstfavelagangs,however,showthattheprinciplesinFM3-24are

highlyeffectiveagainstpowerfulgangs.Thestudyshowsthatmanycounterinsurgencyprinciplesare

applicabletocriminalthreats,butthatsignificantadjustmentstocampaignplanningmaybenecessary

basedontheidentificationofthecriminalgroup’scenterofgravity.Counterinsurgentsshouldalsotake

intoaccountthevalueofvettedunits,anticorruptionactivities,financialtargeting,addressingsocialand

culturalnorms,aswellasdivide-and-conquertechniques.Aswithanyinsurgency,onemustunderstand

the“uniqueeconomic,social,andpoliticalconditionsoftheconflictenvironment.” 227

Thisstudyislimitedinscopebecauseitonlyreviewstwocasesandthereissignificantroomfor

furtherinvestigation.TheSicilianMafiainthe1990sisanotherexcellentcasethatintegratesatargeted

227TXHammes,Presentation,GeorgetownUniversity,Washington,DCJuly18,2011.



54

approachagainstmafialeadersandadedicatedefforttochangepublicperceptionofthegovernment

andthemafia.228Russia’suniquesolutiontoits“violententrepreneurs”involvingtheprivatizationof

securityisanotherinterestingcasethatholdslessonsforCOINpractitionersfacingcriminalgroups.229

Mostimportantly,nocasewasaddressedherewhereagovernmentpursuedafullyresourcedCOIN

approachagainstaDTO.Assuch,policyrecommendationsaresuggestiveratherthanprescriptive.In

manyways,ongoingeffortsinMexicoreflectafullyresourcedapproachwiththeadditionofa

determinedkingpinstrategyaimedagainstcartelleaders.TheresultsoftheMexicangovernment’s

strategyremaintobeseen;however,manyofthefindingsofthisstudyareapplicabletoMexico.As

RobertBunkernotes,criminalinsurgencyisan“emergentphenomenon”andthehistoricalcases

describedinthisstudycannotfullyexplainthemutationofcriminalgroupsinMexicotoday.230This

studydoes,however,providepractitionerswithvaluableinsightsintotheusefulnessofCOINdoctrine

againstcriminalthreats.

BaseduponthisbriefexaminationoftheColombiancampaignagainstthecartelsandRio’s

effortsagainstfavelagangs,largescaleorganizedcrimecanreachascaleandscopethatmeetsthe

standardsofaninsurgency.FavelagangsandtheMedellinandCaliCartelsareeffectivelydescribed

utilizinginsurgencyliteratureandtheyaremostaccuratelycatalogedascriminalinsurgency.Criminal

insurgency,though,isclearlyverydifferentfromclassicalinsurgency.Furthermore,whileinacademic

debateandinplanningcells,thisterminologyishelpfulandprovidesausefultypologyfordeveloping

policyresponses,itisoftennotusefulinthecountriesitisdescribing.Thehistoricalbaggageassociated

withtheterms“insurgency”and“counterinsurgency”inLatinAmericaisofteninsurmountableandcan

distractfromimplementingsolutions.

228DiegoGambetta,TheSicilianMafia,(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,1993).

229VadimVolkov,ViolentEntrepreneurs,(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2002).

230Bunker,“TheMexicanCartelDebate:AsViewedThroughFiveDivergentFieldsofSecurityStudies.”



55

Asthisstudyshows,O’Neill’sinsurgencyanalysisframeworkisnotaperfectfitforevaluatinga

powerfulcriminalorganization.Criminalorganizationshaveuniquestrategicapproaches,maynot

requirepopularsupport,relyheavilyoncorruption,andareshapedbytheirsourceofillicitincome.A

traditionalinsurgencyevaluationofacriminalinsurgencymaymisskeyattributesandvulnerabilitiesof

thethreat.Thedevelopmentofamorecomprehensiveanalysisframeworkthatintegratesanalysistools

usedforgangs,organizedcrime,terrorism,andinsurgencywouldbeavaluabletoolforpolicymakers

andpractitioners.231Aninsurgencyanalysisframeworkaloneisinsufficient.Assuch,careshouldbe

takentoproperlyanalyzeeachuniquesecuritysituation.Iftheterm“criminalinsurgency”detractsfrom

internationalcooperationitshouldbeshelved,butinsurgencyandCOINinsightsshouldremainpartof

threatanalysisandcampaigndesign.

Thisstudyfoundseveralcounterinsurgencyprinciplestobeeffectiveinbothcasesindicating

thattheyaretransferabletocriminalthreats.InColombiaandRio,governmentforceshadadetailed

understandingoftheirenvironmentwhichenabledthemtoruneffectiveoperations.Intricate

knowledgeofthethreatenvironmentledtointelligencedrivenoperationsinbothcases.AswithaCOIN

campaign,operationsagainstcriminalorganizationsalsorequiredalongtermcommitment.Inaddition,

bothcasesfollowedFM3-24’scounselthatforeignsupportshouldbefocusedonhostnation

leadership.Assuch,itisrecommendedthatU.S.supportforgovernmentsfightingacriminalinsurgency

beindirect.

Learningandadaptingwasalsoeffectiveinbothcases.SecurityforcesinRioofferanexcellent

exampleofhowtodesignanurbanCOINcampaignagainstacriminalthreat.Theisolationand

sequentialreductionoffavelasmaximizedtheabilitytolearnlessons,adapttactics,andhonesystems.

TheoperationalizingofthelearningprocessisattheheartofFM3-24andithasprovedhighlyvaluable

231Ibid.



56

inRio.WhilemanyCOINprinciplesareeffectiveagainstcriminalthreats,othersmayrequiresome

doctrinaladaptationstoattackthefoundationsofthethreat.

Theimportanceoftheidentificationofacriminalorganization’scenterofgravitycannotbe

overstated.AseniorU.S.governmentofficialinvolvedinfinancialtargetingadvisesthat“thefirststepin

targetingistounderstandhowtheorganizationmanagesitsresources.Wheredotheyobtainfunding,

inwhatformdotheystoreit,andwhatisthebestwaytointerdictthatmoney?”232ClassicalCOIN

techniquesthatrevolvearoundpopulationcontrolwilleffectivelyisolateacriminalinsurgentlikea

favelagangfundedbyretaildrugsales.DTOsincontrast,donotdrawtheirstrengthfromthelocal

population;rather,theyarefueledbytransnationaldrugtrafficking.

Theimplicationofthisfindingisthattheuseofanapproachthatplacesasoldierorpoliceman

oneverystreetcornerto“securethepopulation”maybeineffective.Soldiersatthestreetlevelmay

providecitizenswithsomerelieffromcommoncrime;however,theycannotimpactaDTO’smain

sourceofpower.DTOswillcontinuetousetheresourcesgainedthroughtransnationaltraffickingto

operate.Furthermore,governmentforcesmustbeawarethatwhenfacingaDTO,securityforceswillbe

vulnerabletocorruptionuntiltheDTO’scenterofgravityhasbeenaddressed.RetiredColombian

Generalandinsurgencyexpert,CarlosOspinanotesthatwhenfightingacriminalorganization“placing

soldiersinthestreetisapoliticalmessage”andisnoteffective.Thevisualpresenceofsecurityforces

mayprovidetheillusionofsecurity,butitdoeslittletodestroyatraffickingorganization.233

TheColombiacasestudyshowsthatanapproachthattargetscartelleadershipandfundingcan

beeffectiveagainstaDTO.Drugtraffickingrequiresanintricatenetworkofcontactsandmanagersto

moveitsproduct.TheColombiangovernmenteffectivelyengagedkeyleadershipnodesinboththe

MedellinandCaliorganizationstoattacktheirsourceofillicitfunds.KeyleaderssuchasPabloEscobar,

232AuthorinterviewwithU.S.officialinvolvedinfinancialtargeting,Washington,DC,August,11,2011.

233AuthorinterviewwithGeneral(ret)CarlosOspina,CenterforHemisphericDefenseStudies,Washington,DC,

August30,2011.



57

JoseSantacruzandtheRodriguezbrothers,GilbertoandMiguelwereallcapturedorkilled.Inaddition,

leadersofkeylogisticsnodes,likeGuillermoPallomariandHaroldAckerman,wereturnedintovaluable

informantsresultinginseriousdamagetotheillicitnetwork.Beyondtheindividualleaders,itis

imperativethatfinancialtargetingbeusedtoisolateDTOsfromtheirfinancialcenterofgravity.Douglas

Farah,anexpertinillicitfinance,believesthat“focusingonthemoney”and“goingafterthedirty

moneyinthepoliticalsystem”arekeylessonsfromtheColombianeffortsagainstthecartels.234DTOs

requireatechnicalapproachtofinancialtargetingtodenythemtheirsourceofstrength.

Thecriminalorganization’scenterofgravityhasseriousimplicationsforCOINcampaigndesign

againstcriminalinsurgency.Counterinsurgentsmustdevelopadetailedunderstandingofthetypeof

criminalorganizationbeingengaged.InColombia,thegovernmentwasfacingpowerfulDTOswhose

centerofgravitywasillicitprofitsfromdrugtrafficking.InRio,druggangsalsoarefundedbydrug

traffickingbuttheirprofitsarederivedfromlocalretailsales.Thismakesthecenterofgravityforthe

favelagangsthelocalpopulationthatpurchasesthedrugsorpayslocalillegaltaxes.

FM3-24offers

practitionersanexample

ofaCOINcampaignplan

brokendownintological

linesofoperation(see

figure1).235Thisexample

isausefulstartingpoint

234AuthorinterviewwithDouglasFarah,Washington,DC,August8,2011.

235FM3-24,5-8.Figure1



58

forcounterinsurgentsfacingaclassicalpoliticalinsurgencyanditcanalsobeofuseforthoseworking

againstacriminalinsurgencyliketheonefoundinRio.Resultsfromthefavelacasestudyshowthatthe

governmentiseffectivelyusingCOINprinciplestosecurethefavelas.Onemajordifferencebetweenthe

politicalCOINmodelandacriminalinsurgencycampaignplanarethestartingconditionsandendstate.

TherootconditionsinRioaresocialandculturalratherthanpolitical.Thereisverylittlepopularsupport

forviolentyouthgangsandthisquicklyevaporatesoncepoliceforcestakecontrol.Thegovernment’s

focusisbetteraimedatshiftingsocialconditionsandnormsthatcreategangsthanatdeveloping

politicalsupport.ACOINcampaignfacingathreatsimilartoRio’sshouldintegrateanti-gangstrategies

thatfocuson“socialintervention,theprovisionofopportunities,andcommunitymobilization”toattack

thecausesofgangviolence.236Ratherthangovernmentsupport,theend-stateshouldbegeared

towardsupportforacceptablesocialnorms.

Colombia’ssuccessfulcampaignagainstthecartelsisnotadequatelyrepresentedbyFM3-24’s

campaignplanexample.Figure2representsthelogicallinesofoperationthatwereeffectiveagainsta

criminalthreatthatisprimarilyfundedbyinternationalillicittrafficking.TheColombiangovernment

pursuedanenemyfocusedstrategydesignedtodestroythecartelsthathadbecomeathreatto

nationalsecurity.Soldiersandpoliceweredeployedinanefforttoimprovecitizensecuritybutother

linesofoperationlikefinancialtargeting,directaction,countercorruption,andalliancemanagement

resultedinthedesiredstablestate.

236U.S.DepartmentofJustice,OfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention,“ComprehensiveGang

Model,”

Figure2



59

Thegovernment

didnotsetouttoend

narcotrafficking;rather,it

soughttoeliminatetwo

organizationsthathad

grownsopowerfulthat

theirmilitarypowerand

politicalcorruptionthreatenedthestate.AfterthedestructionoftheMedellinandCaliCartelsthe

governmentachievedamanageablesteadystate,aswellasreducedlevelsofcorruptionandthe

presenceoflesspowerfulcriminalgroupsthatsubmittedtostatedominance.Againstaclassical

insurgency,anenemyfocusedapproachdoesnotachievelastingresults,butDTOsareuniquely

vulnerabletothismethod.AMaoistinsurgencycanrebuildafteranenemy-centriccampaignbecauseit

growsfromadisaffectedpopulation.Apopulation-centricapproachthatbringsgoodgovernanceand

servicestoaregionwithhighcrimeisalongtermapproachtoprovidingcitizensecurity,butthe

ColombiacaseshowsthatitisnotessentialforacampaignagainstaDTOthatdoesnotrelyon

populationsupportinthefirstplace.

Itisalsoimportanttonotethatthegovernmentmaybefacingmultipletypesoforganizationsat

onetime.Infact,oneorganizationcouldbereceivingfundsfrommultiplesources.Forexample,an

organizationcouldoperateprimarilyasaprotectionandextortionorganizationbutalsoengagein

trafficking.OtherorganizationscouldoperateliketraditionalDTOsbutallythemselveswithgangs

similartofavelagangsinRio.Baseduponthefindingsofthisstudy,ahybridthreatrequiresasequential

solution.TheDTOthreatmustbedealtwithbeforegangsandcitizensecuritycanbeaddressed

effectively.ThegovernmentmustdismantletheDTO’straffickingnetworkandfundingfirstinorderto

breakthecriminalpowertocorruptthesecurityapparatus.Althoughlocalizedviolencewillrisewiththe



60

disintegrationoflargegroupsintosmallercompetingorganizations,itwillbelesstoxictogovernment

institutions.Atthispoint,awhole-of-governmentapproach,asseeninRio,willbeeffective.Aswithany

insurgency,criminalinsurgencyrequiresatailoredapproachbasedonadetailedanalysisofeachthreat

andparticularsituationineachgeographicarea.

InboththeColombiancaseandtheRiocase,theuseoftrustedunitswasvital.Corruptionisa

criticalcomponentandeffortstominimizeitsimpactshouldbeprioritizedwhendealingwithDTOs.The

SearchBlocledbyColMartinezprovedtobecritical.Theuseofasmallvettedunitcanreducethe

influenceofcorruptionandprotectoperationalsecurity.InRio,thegovernmentisworkingtoreform

thepolicedepartmentasawhole;however,theUPPprogramisspecificallydesignedtocreatetrusted,

speciallytrainedunitsthatarelesssusceptibletocorruption.Becausecorruptionisakeyfactorin

criminalinsurgencyandpolicereformisusuallyaslowandoftengenerationalprocess,theuseofvetted

unitshelpsprovideastopgapbeforethesewiderreformscantakehold.Vettedunitsbreakcriminal

groups’powertocorruptbycapturingandkillingkeymembers,attackingsourcesofillicitincome,and

dismantlingthepoliticalsupportnetwork.Theseeffortscreatetimeforinstitutionalreformstotake

place.Assuch,theUnitedStatesshouldfocusitsaidonsmallvettedunitswhenattackingDTOs,

althoughnotforsakingpolicereformaltogether.Broadbasedmilitarysupportandpolicereformswillbe

lesseffectiveintheshorttermthanfocusedaidtospecializedunits.

AnotherkeycomponentoftheColombiansuccessthatshouldberevisitedinFM3-24istheuse

ofadivide-and-conquertechnique.Itisespeciallyeffectiveagainstrivalcriminalgroupsthatareeager

toremovetheircompetitors.TheColombiangovernmentpurposefullydivideditsopponentsand

defeatedtheminsequence.Thiscanbeparticularlyusefulincaseswherethegovernmentlacksthe

capabilitytopursueafullyresourcedCOINapproach.Adivideandconquerapproachallowsthe

governmenttodefeatitsenemiesinsequence,targetingthemostdangerouscriminalgroupsfirst.



ThisstudyoftheMedellinandCaliCartelsandRio’sfavelagangsasinsurgencyhighlightsthe

verydistinctdifferencesbetweenclassicalinsurgenciesandcriminalinsurgencies.Colombia’ssuccess

againstthecartelsshowsthatanenemy-centricapproachthatattacksaDTO’snetworkandfinancial

centerofgravityisaneffectivemethodology.Conversely,aCOINapproachasoutlinedinFM3-24has

proveneffectiveinRiodeJaneirowithsomeadjustments.Essentially,theCOINprinciplesfoundinFM3-

24andaninsurgencyframeworkofanalysisareusefulstartingpointsforthedevelopmentofan

effectivecampaignagainstacriminalinsurgency.However,identifyingthecriminalthreat’scenterof

gravitywilldictatehowmuchdeviationisnecessaryfromcurrentdoctrine.

Theviewsexpressedinthisstudyarethoseoftheauthoranddonotreflecttheofficialpolicyor

positionoftheDepartmentoftheArmy,DepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Government.

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