Bureaucratic Politics and the Fall of Ayub Khan

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ZIRING, LAWRENCE, Bureaucratic Politics and the Fall of Ayub Khan , Asian Affairs, anAmerican Review, 8:5 (1981:May/June) p.304

Bureaucratic Politics

and the Fa ll of Ayub Khan

LAW RENCE Z IR IN G

.E i t i c a l develo pment can be equated w ith human develop-

m ent. To su gg es t th is, however, is to str ess human opportunity and

freedom and the peculi ar political s tru c tu res w hich m ake them pos-

sib le. T h e fact that A y ub Khan was preoccupied w ith the need to

fo rg e national u n ity , preserve the te rrit o rial s ta te , and generall y m ain -

tain law an d order explain s w hy he was ind ifferen t to the need for

dis tr ib utive justice. 1 The arb itra ry decisionm aking of Pakistani

au thorit ies durin g the A y u b decade p e rp etu a ted perennia l form s of

so cia l control and negated anyreal possibili ty of poli tic al pro gre ss .

In sum , an adm inistrativ e state was reinforced at the cost of nation-

bui lding.2 U nder A y ub K han , Pakistan m ade little progress in organ-

iz ing a politi cal co m m u n ity that promoted com passion, w is dom ,

to lerance, and coo pera tion . Even now , hu m an rela tions rem ain at

prim it ive lev els, and fear, th reats , and p un ish m en t sustain what m ight

obje ctively be described as arti fic ia l linkages. Th is was m ade glaringly

ap pa ren t by the tr agic secessi on of East Pakistan. M ore over, the con-

tin u ing turbu lence in S ind, Balu chis tan, the N o rthw est F ron tie r , and

Punjab indicates a p erpe tu a tio n of th is dile m m a.

Econom ic developm ent is not sy n o n y m o u s w ith politi cal devel-

o p m en t. U n d er A y ub K han , Pakistan m ade strik in g econo m ic gain s;

but th is progress prod uced little if any polit ical change. T his is not to

deny the sa lience of econom ic developm ent or to m inim iz e its re la -

tionsh ip with , and hence im pact o n , the poli ti cal syste m . Techno-

logical change is co n stan tly m odifying our relationship w ith the

environm ent. B u t does it also a lte r fun dam enta l poli ti cal relati ons

304

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Bureaucratic Politics and the Fall o f Ayub Khan 309

bureaucratic apparatus. "Emergency rule" often replaces "martial

law," and the pre-eminence of civilians over the military establishment seems assured. But there are no guarantees.

Authoritarian systems generally do not allow for institutionalor legal succession; and thus, when a transfer to military authority is

effected (as in Pakistan with Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan), it is

mainly a matter of raw power.

The distinguishing characteristic between ritualistic and multi

national authoritarian systems can be found in their use of technology. Multinational authoritarian systems are far more advanced and

sophisticated. Still, both systems closely resemble one another in

their internal political relationships and techniques. It might be

argued, therefore, that a technologically backward society is morelikely to become enamored of the multinational authoritarian model

than of the representative democratic model.

The assumption has already been m a d t ~ that a model national

democratic system is a representative or parliamentary type whereexecutive power is limited. This, of course, raises questions about

pa.rliamentary systems that do not succeed in practice, as was the

case in Pakistan in 1958 and to some extent in India in 1975. It can

be hypothesized that justice, equality, opportuni ty, and collaboration can only be achieved in a society where the arbitrary and exces

sive uses of coercion are drastically reduced, if not eliminated. Thefact that this is something of an abstract ideal perhaps supports the

thesis that political underdevelopment is widespread and deepseated.I f it were otherwise, greater strides would already have been made

toward the structuring of a supranational political order. It can be

suggested, however, that political underdevelopment need not be apermanent condition. There is no reason to be fatalistic on this point.

I t is still possible to consider political development a meaningful

goal. But such development will not come through the working of

natural or automatic forces. Political development must be deliber

ately induced. It has to be striven for on a broad front. I t should be

noted that some "modernizing" elites have tried to construct repre

sentative systems, but the fragile nature of this political experimenthas forced a number of them to give up their quest.

III

Bureaucratic dominance is a perennial feature impeding the develop-


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314 Asian A ffa irs

task. Masih uzzaman, a hig h-ranking member of the CSP, addressed

him self to th is fact when he w rote : 15

The Muslim League and Awami League were political parties

of some size. In te rm s of sheer membership, they could easily

outr ival the bureaucracy. Bu t in competence, education , wealth,

and power, they were no match fo r the latter. I t was na tu ra l

for the government organizatio ns to resent the grow th of the

polit ical organizations. These organizations had s tarted demand

ing a share in the power, priv ilege, and patronage of the govern

ment 5ervants. A t lower levels, they wanted to break the monop

oly o f the petty government servants. Through creating One

Unit (the amalgamation of the provinces of West Pakistan in to

a single adm inistrati ve unit) , while the country took an impor

tant step towards in tegration , it should not be forgotten that it

removed the politic ia ns far the r away from the locus of power,

that is, the dis trict.

Adm inistrators and politicians were partic ipants in the same

social matrix. Each group was essentia l to the progressive develop

ment of the nation . In reality , however, they lived in compartmen

talized worlds. In Rowland Egger's view, the CSP lived in the past;

hence, it s practices and policies were generally consid ered outmoded

or obsolete . No ted Egger: 16

This is not to question the loyalty or impugn the patrio tism

of the members of the service. I t would be diffic ult to discover

a group more fiercely loyal to the ideal of Pakistan than those

dedicated men. Indeed, part of the source of their myopia is

the fa ct that almost every one of them has a comprehensiv e,

exclu sive, self-sufficient formula for Pakistan 's salvation . . . despit e their loyalty , dedication, and efficiency they are some

what apart from the community which they serve.

Nowhere was th is problem more ala rmin g than in the adm in istra to r 's

dealings with poli ticians. Given the ir own socalled aversion to politi cs and the contempt in which they held politi cians, it was not difficult

to understand the lack of rapport between them . Moreover, i t m ight

be asked how th is attitude developed; and in sig hts might be found in

the preindependence relationship of the adm in istra tor and the

politi cian.


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316 Asian A ffa irs

accomplished w ithou t substantially changing the old ins truments of

colonial bureaucratic rule. I t was obvious that politic al reform had to

be accompanied by considerable administrative reform . Ayub Khan 's

in ability or re lu ctance to press this matter thus weakened his development programs even before they could be launched. No one could

arg ue that bureaucratic reform was a simple undertaking. Bernard

G ladieux, writing on the subject a few years before Ayub 's accession

to power, emphasized th is po in t: 19

At the root of the problem lies the fact that the public service

system is self-regula ting and self-perpetuating in that those who

con tro l the system are at once its benefi ciaries.

Despite the dif ficult ies, it was incumben t on Ayub Khan as

President of Pakistan to correct the evils of bureaucratic rule, especia l

ly th ose enumerated for him by his own Pay and Services Commissio n

in 1962. A salient segment from the Commission's repor t addresses

itself to the restructuring of the serv ices so as: 20

. . . to ensure that from the existing structure , the re shall be

e lim inate d all machinery by which the "powers and authority"

exclusively pertaining to the "chosen representatives" is being

exercised, under antiqua ted or colonial concep tions of admin

istra tion, by persons or groups inside the Services. We conceive

it to be our duty also to provide such a s truc tu re as will keep

all the Serv ices, and all members the reof, how high soever,

in their proper places, as ins truments to aid and obey th e "chosen representatives."

Ayub 's decision to ignore the Commission 's recommendations and to

quash the ir report must be judged one of the gross blunders of his

adm inistration .21

IV

Government planning for national econom ic development is now

universally accla im ed. In the new nations, it is considered among

the first and perhaps the most vital of governmental functions. It s

widespread popularity , however, is relatively new. In the 1930s,

national planning was the exclusive concern of the Bolshevik state.

Even the Nazis and Italian Fascists avoided im itating the Commu

nists. A lthough their econom ies were harnessed to national power,


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322 Asian A ffa irs

18 . See Memorandum Submitted to th e Services Reorganizatio n Com mittee

by th e C. S. P. Associatio n (Rawalpindi: Ferozsons, December 15, 1969).

19 . Bernard Gladieux, Reorganization of the Pakistan Governm ent for

National Development (n.p., May 1955), p. 101.

20. Government of Pakis tan, Report of the Pay and Services Commiss ion, 1959-1962 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), p . 9.

21. Zirin g , op. cit., ch. 6.

22. Some 30 fam ilies were said to cont ro l approximately 50 percent of

Pakistan' s gross national pro duct in 1968-69. See The Pakistan Student

(January-February 1970), p. 10; and my "Perennial Milita rism : An Interpre

tation of Politica l Un derdeve lopment-P ak is tan Under General Yahya Khan

1969-1971 ," in W. Howard Wriggins, ed., Pakistan in Transi tion (Islamabad:

Islamabad Univers ity Press, 1975).

23 . See Gustav Papanek, Pakis tan's Development, Social Goals and Private

Incentive (Cambridge, Mas s.: H arvard Universi ty Pre ss , 1967).

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Bureaucratic Politics and the Fall of Ayub Khan