550

Bullshit and Philosophy

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Bullshit is philosophy and vice versa...one of my favorite titles...

Citation preview

Page 1: Bullshit and Philosophy
Page 2: Bullshit and Philosophy
Page 3: Bullshit and Philosophy
Page 4: Bullshit and Philosophy

Table of Contents

Popular Culture and Philosophy®Title PageOn Bullshitmania

I - To Shoot the Bull?

Chapter 1 - On Letting It SlideTolerable BullshitIntolerable BullshitBullshit and Self-DeceptionBlameless BullshitBullshit and Truth

Chapter 2 - A Defense of Common SenseThe Truth Matters“What Exactly Do You Mean?”Let’s Stop Bullshitting Ourselves

Chapter 3 - The Pragmatics of Bullshit, IntelligentlyDesigned

The Example of Intelligent DesignA Definition of Bullshit—New and Improved!The Truth in BullshitThe Truth about SemanticsSolving Frankfurt’s Puzzle, or, Baseball, Hot

Page 5: Bullshit and Philosophy

Dogs, Apple Pie, and BullshitThe Case for Purism about Bullshit

Chapter 4 - Bullshit and the Foibles of the Human Mind, or:What the Masters of ...

Some Cognitive Foibles of the Human MindReclaiming the Public Square

Chapter 5 - Bullshit and PersonalityDoes the Bullshitter Pay Attention to the Truth?Two Modes of BullshitBullshit and Personality DisordersSome Examples of Bullshit in Personality

DisordersPerfect Partners: Bullshit and Distorted Social

PerceptionsThe Threat Posed by Bullshit

Chapter 6 - Performing Bullshit and the Post-SincereCondition

Mission StatementShitty Attitudes: On the Use and Misuse of

Bullshit in LifeBullshit as a Condition of LifeThe World as Will to BullshitOvercoming Overwhelming Bullshit

Chapter 7 - The Importance of Being Earnest: A PragmaticApproach to Bullshitting

Two Tauroscatological SchoolsThe Epistemic ImperativeThe Problem with BullshittingSo Why Bullshit?

Page 6: Bullshit and Philosophy

II - The Bull by the Horns

Chapter 8 - Deeper into Bullshit1 Without the Shit of the Bull2 Two Species of Bullshit3 Bullshit and Lying4 Bullshit as Unclarifiable Unclarity5 Bullshit as Product and Bullshit as Process

Chapter 9 - The Unity of BullshitNo Bullshit, Please, We’re AustrianA Little Carnap in EveryoneThe Unity of Bullshit

Chapter 10 - Raising the Tone: Definition, Bullshit, and theDefinition of Bullshit

Semantic NegligenceA Caricature History of SemanticsPersuasive DefinitionBroadening the AnalysisBackfireGood DefinitionsIs Frankfurt’s Definition of ‘Bullshit’ Itself PD?

Chapter 11 - Different Kinds and Aspects of BullshitHarry Frankfurt on BullshitA Different Take on BullshitA Different Kind of Bullshit

III - It’s All Around Us

Page 7: Bullshit and Philosophy

Chapter 12 - The Republic of Bullshit: On the Dumbing-Upof Democracy

Bullshitting and Lying in PoliticsThe Myth of the ‘Well-Informed’ Citizen‘Dumbing-Up’: Some Distortions of Democratic

EqualityPhilosophy versus Bullshit

Chapter 13 - Political Bullshit and the Stoic Story of SelfHow to Analyze BullshitStories Shape Our FeelingsBullshit Around the Globe

Chapter 14 - Bullshit at the Interface of Science and Policy:Global Warming, ...

Bullshit of the Isolated FactBullshit of Universal StandardsCombatting the Two Kinds of Bullshit

Chapter 15 - Rhetoric Is Not BullshitThe Problem (and Politics) of RhetoricThe Truth about PostmodernismRhetoric and Bullshit

Chapter 16 - Just BullshitBullshit as a Call to Open-MindednessWittgenstein: Ultimate Bullshit Detector—or

Bullshitter?Bullshit as Deferred Epistemic GratificationThe Scientific Method as a Search for the

Justice in Bullshit

Page 8: Bullshit and Philosophy

Our Distinguished Panel of Incomparable GeniusesOur Index, Exquisitely Crafted for Your IlluminationALSO FROM OPEN COURTCopyright Page

Page 9: Bullshit and Philosophy

Popular Culture and Philosophy®

Series Editor: George A. Reisch

VOLUME 1Seinfeld and Philosophy: A Book about Everything andNothing (2000)Edited by William Irwin

VOLUME 2The Simpsons and Philosophy: The D’oh! of Homer(2001) Edited by William Irwin, Mark T. Conard, and AeonJ. Skoble

VOLUME 3The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the Desert of theReal (2002) Edited by William Irwin

VOLUME 4Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy: Fear andTrembling in Sunnydale (2003) Edited by James B. South

VOLUME 5The Lord of the Rings and Philosophy: One Book to RuleThem All (2003) Edited by Gregory Bassham and EricBronson

Page 10: Bullshit and Philosophy

VOLUME 6Baseball and Philosophy: Thinking Outside the Batter’sBox (2004) Edited by Eric Bronson

VOLUME 7The Sopranos and Philosophy: I Kill Therefore I Am(2004) Edited by Richard Greene and Peter Vernezze

VOLUME 8Woody Allen and Philosophy: You Mean My WholeFallacy Is Wrong? (2004) Edited by Mark T. Conard andAeon J. Skoble

VOLUME 9Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts(2004) Edited by David Baggett and Shawn E. Klein

VOLUME 10Mel Gibson’s Passion and Philosophy: The Cross, theQuestions, the Controversy (2004) Edited by Jorge J.E.Gracia

VOLUME 11More Matrix and Philosophy: Revolutions and ReloadedDecoded (2005) Edited by William Irwin

VOLUME 12Star Wars and Philosophy: More Powerful than You Can

Page 11: Bullshit and Philosophy

Possibly Imagine (2005) Edited by Jason T. Eberl andKevin S. Decker

VOLUME 13Superheroes and Philosophy: Truth, Justice, and theSocratic Way (2005) Edited by Tom Morris and MattMorris

VOLUME 14The Atkins Diet and Philosophy: Chewing the Fat withKant and Nietzsche (2005) Edited by Lisa Heldke, KerriMommer, and Cynthia Pineo

VOLUME 15The Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy: The Lion, theWitch, and the Worldview (2005) Edited by GregoryBassham and Jerry L. Walls

VOLUME 16Hip Hop and Philosophy: Rhyme 2 Reason (2005) Editedby Derrick Darby and Tommie Shelby

VOLUME 17Bob Dylan and Philosophy: It’s Alright Ma (I’m OnlyThinking) (2006) Edited by Peter Vernezze and Carl J.Porter

VOLUME 18

Page 12: Bullshit and Philosophy

Harley-Davidson and Philosophy: Full-Throttle Aristotle(2006) Edited by Bernard E. Rollin, Carolyn M. Gray, KerriMommer, and Cynthia Pineo

VOLUME 19Monty Python and Philosophy: Nudge Nudge, ThinkThink! (2006) Edited by Gary L. Hardcastle and George AReisch

VOLUME 20Poker and Philosophy: Pocket Rockets and PhilosopherKings (2006) Edited by Eric Bronson

VOLUME 21U2 and Philosophy: How to Decipher an Atomic Band(2006) Edited by Mark A. Wrathall

VOLUME 22The Undead and Philosophy: Chicken Soup for theSoulless (2006) Edited by Richard Greene and K. SilemMohammad

VOLUME 23James Bond and Philosophy: Questions Are Forever(2006) Edited by Jacob M. Held and James B. South

VOLUME 24Bullshit and Philosophy: Guaranteed to Get Perfect

Page 13: Bullshit and Philosophy

Results Every Time (2006) Edited by Gary L. Hardcastleand George A. Reisch

VOLUME 25The Beatles and Philosophy: Nothing You Can Think thatCan’t Be Thunk (2006) Edited by Michael Baur and StevenBaur

IN PREPARATION:

South Park and Philosophy (2007) Edited by RichardHanley

Hitchcock and Philosophy (2007) Edited by DavidBaggett and William Drumin

The Grateful Dead and Philosophy (2007) Edited bySteven Gimbel

Page 14: Bullshit and Philosophy

On Bullshitmania

GEORGE A. REISCH and GARY L.HARDCASTLE

It was just a book, after all—a book written by an Ivy Leaguephilosopher, Princeton’s Harry G. Frankfurt, attempting toclarify a particular concept. That clarification would beachieved, moreover, in an ordinary way, at least for IvyLeague philosophers. Philosophical authorities from thepast would be cited, quoted, and interpreted; the flaws intheir analyses pointed out; and suddenly a concept or termw e thought we had understood would be revealed as infact confused, vague, and murky. Then, at the work’sintellectual crescendo, a new and clearer interpretation ofthe concept would emerge for other philosophers toconsider and, eventually, tear apart once again. A day inthe life of professional philosophy.

But this book was unusual. It was very small, even cute.Sitting on bookstore shelves and display tables, it couldeasily have been mistaken for a children’s book, or apocket-size collection of affirmations. The austere,classical style of its cover and its title might rather have

Page 15: Bullshit and Philosophy

suggested an ancient oration or a collection of lyric poems.But the words elegantly printed on the cover did not say “OnLove,” “On Poetics,” or even, “On Truth (and its GeneralScarcity).” They said “On Bullshit,” and the public loved it.1

No other work by a living academic philosopher hasbeen so well received. After twenty-six weeks on The NewYork Times bestseller list, On Bullshit is poised to sellmore copies than any commercial philosophy book, ever.Yes, philosophically themed books like Zen and the Art ofMotorcycle Maintenance and Gödel, Escher, Bach werehugely successful. But they were written for wide, popularaudiences. On Bullshit, in contrast, circulated for twodecades exclusively among professional academicphilosophers. Such experts in logic, conceptual analysisand (Frankfurt’s specialty) moral theory usually have littleinterest in popular philosophical writings. All the moresurprising, then, that on leaving the ivory tower for mainstreet, On Bullshit became such a hit.

Page 16: Bullshit and Philosophy

Apropos for Today

Why did it happen? One answer, easy and obvious, wassuggested by comedian Jon Stewart, host of television’sThe Daily Show. Stewart interviewed Frankfurt after thebook had become a bestseller. When Frankfurt explainedhis idea that, unlike the liar, “the bullshitter doesn’t reallycare whether what he says is true,” the audience erupted inlaughter and giggles. “I should warn you,” Stewart said,leaning in to reassure his startled guest. “When they hearthat word, it tickles them.” “Especially coming from an IvyLeague Professor,” Frankfurt added.

True, that word does not often (or, really, ever) appear inthe title of academic treatises. But this book’s appealcannot be fully explained by its cover. Like a sweet little oldlady giving someone the finger, the novelty of a minorobscenity quickly gets old. On Bullshit is different. Even forthose who may see the book as merely a joke, or a mostappropriate gift for an annoying boss or co-worker, it is ajoke that seems to have hit a cultural nerve.

As it turns out, Stewart also suggested a deeper, andbetter, answer. The book, he noted, is “very apropos fortoday.” He did not elaborate; he just asked Frankfurt aboutits origin and joked about whether Frankfurt had his factsright or was just . . . never mind. Truth is, Stewart didn’t

Page 17: Bullshit and Philosophy

need to explain why the book is apropos. There was, as thesaying goes, an elephant in the room during that interview.It was the same elephant that haunted Frankfurt’s otherappearances on television and radio. On each occasion itlounged next to Frankfurt and his interviewer, waiting to benamed, discussed, or at least acknowledged. Yet not evenStewart, who makes his living with clever, incisive parody ofpolitics and its news coverage, mentioned explicitly why itis that On Bullshit is “very apropos for today.”

The elephant was, of course, a war. Like most others inUnited States’ history, it sharply divided popular opinion.But this war was highly unusual, too. Its supporters as wellas its critics came to agree that the official reasons forwaging it, the ones put to the public, to Congress, and tothe United States’ allies, turned out to be . . . well, put it thisway: the claims that once seemed to make the invasion ofIraq necessary and urgent—that Iraq possessed andplanned to use nuclear and chemical weapons of massdestruction, that it had high-technology devices (such asremote controlled airplanes) for deploying those weapons,and that it was complicit in the attacks of September 11th,2001—are now understood to be best described by thatword.

That’s why Stewart’s audience seemed to shiftuncomfortably in their seats as he and Frankfurt discussedbullshit’s indifference to truth and falsity, its hidden interestin manipulating belief and behavior, and the way onesenses, as Frankfurt put it in his book, that the “bullshitter is

Page 18: Bullshit and Philosophy

trying to get away with something.” The audience had cometo see Stewart and his writers skewer current politicalevents, after all, so few would have missed the obviousreferents—the absence of weapons of mass destruction inIraq and the admission that sources for these claims were,in retrospect, not credible—that made the book soapropos. There is and will likely remain little agreementabout who, exactly, got away with what, exactly, in the run-upto the war. But there is a widespread sense that UnitedStates citizens, soldiers, and allies have been taken in.2

These are troubling suspicions. They are unmentionable,if not unthinkable, for some, because they threatencherished ideals about the political and moral integrity ofthe United States. That’s why this elephant is difficult toacknowledge. One way to acknowledge it, though, isthrough the cushion of humor. Everyone in Stewart’saudience had surely heard the joke that WMDs had finallybeen located: they were weapons of mass distraction, andthey were stockpiled in Washington D.C. Others no doubtfound a cushion in the small and inviting form of the book. Ithad just the right author—an Ivy League philosopher, expertin the kind of critical, balanced, and objective thinking that,as the invasion of Iraq drew near, seemed eclipsed byfrightening memories of 9/11 and frightening talk of WMDs.And it struck a comforting tone—its classical title and bookjacket portray bullshit not as something alien, massive, andmenacing but rather as just one of the many human foiblesthat have puzzled thinkers and artists for centuries. Indeed,

Page 19: Bullshit and Philosophy

Frankfurt’s philosophical detachment from contemporaryevents, necessitated in one respect by the essay’s history,makes On Bullshit apropos in an altogether different way.Call it bullshit without tears. It allows readers to approachthat elephant abstractly, generically, and as it recursthroughout the ages—without having to take up thosedisturbing questions that make the book so relevant in thefirst place.

Page 20: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Year in Bullshit

When Stewart asked Frankfurt whether our cultureoccasionally cleans house by “truth-telling,” or whether “itjust keeps piling,” Frankfurt thought carefully for a momentand scored another laugh with his audience—“I think it justkeeps piling.” Again, they knew what he meant. For in thewake of the missing WMDs, On Bullshit appeared amidstan explosion of various kinds of fraud and deception.Some, such as identity theft and eBay swindles, wereenabled by new technologies of commerce, the Internet,and the demise of the photograph as a trustworthydocument (see the neologism ‘to photoshop’). Yet otherkinds seem inexplicable without positing something like acultural attitude or climate in which truth has become—much as Frankfurt feared—less important than thedemands of political, commercial, artistic, and evenscientific success.

Evidence for this abounds in Laura Penny’s Your Call IsImportant to Us: The Truth about Bullshit, which appearedon bookstore shelves shortly after On Bullshit. Reflectingon years of headline scandals involving the CatholicChurch, the mutual fund industry, and fallen corporate titanssuch as Enron and MCI, Penny observed that we live in an“era of unprecedented bullshit production” (p. 1). What’s

Page 21: Bullshit and Philosophy

especially striking is the sudden prominence of fraud withininstitutions that have heretofore been very careful aboutwhat’s fiction and what’s not.

Like publishing. One of the more dramatic scandalssurrounding truth and authenticity belonged to OprahWinfrey and author James Frey, whose A Million LittlePieces Oprah recommended to her enormous, book-hungry audience as a true, inspirational story. After thebook was exposed as largely fiction, Ms. Winfrey firstdefended the book (as nonetheless inspirational) but thendramatically retracted her support and scolded aremorseful, tearful Frey on national television for hisbetrayal of trust and truth. Within weeks, another celebratednovelist, J.T. Leroy, whose autobiographical writingsdetailed his rise from teen-age poverty and truck-stopprostitution to New York-style literary success, took hiswhacks—once again—for peddling fictional stories asnonfiction memoirs. Unlike Frey, however, J.T. Leroy feltlittle remorse, or pain. In fact, he didn’t exist. This fictionincluded the author himself, who turned out to beconstructed by an aspiring female writer who for yearsposed successfully as the celebrated author’s friend,confidant, and business agent. (When cameras werepresent, J.T. Leroy himself was impersonated by a boyishfemale friend wearing men’s clothes and dark glasses.)

The distinction between fiction and non-fiction has neverbeen terribly popular in advertising circles. But professionaladvertising has at least always recognized the distinctionbetween what is an advertisement and what is not an

Page 22: Bullshit and Philosophy

between what is an advertisement and what is not anadvertisement. Until recently, advertisements announcethemselves on signs or billboards, and they remainconfined between programming segments on radio ortelevision—all of which helps us recognize them asadvertisements. Two emerging trends, however, seemdesigned to blur this distinction and create advertisementsthat appear to be something else entirely. “Productplacement” injects recognizable products or brands intomovies or television shows, while “word of mouthadvertising” takes the additional step of blurring thedistinction between professional advertisers and ordinarycitizens. On this model, individuals are compensated to“talk-up” specific products with others whom they mayencounter in the course of ordinary life—at work, in thesupermarket, at soccer practice, and so on. Here,advertising begins to seamlessly join ordinary life in waysthat make it increasingly difficult to determine not onlywhether claims are true or false, but additionally whether afriend, colleague or family member is recommending aproduct because they honestly like it or because they arerewarded for recommending it.

Perhaps the most striking and surprising of bullshit’ssuccesses are the inroads it has made into the worlds ofscience and scientific research. The philosopher KarlPopper held that science deserves respect preciselybecause it seeks to falsify its own claims—activelyeliminating, so to speak, its own bullshit. Yet that idealseems to be fading behind headlines about scientific fraud

Page 23: Bullshit and Philosophy

and misconduct. Some of the more familiar examples:• Investigative panels determine that

research purported to have established someresult, taken as gospel by other labs, wasfabricated.

• Pharmaceutical corporations generouslyfund scientific studies and publish only those thatappear to document the safety of their products.

• Tenured university professors promote theirreligious convictions in the guise of scientificexpertise.

• Political appointees at federal scienceagencies insert special wording in agency-publications designed to promote religiouscriticisms of established scientific knowledge.

There’s nothing new in the appeal to science byindividuals, corporations, or governments seeking tolegitimate and advance their specific interests and plans.What is new is the notion that this is very easy to do—thatlegitimate scientific knowledge consists merely in whateverclaims may be hyped through an effective public relationscampaign, or published without controversy in a magazineor journal.

And then there’s “that word.” Though it has become asordinary and common as these kinds of fraud andmisrepresentation to which it usually refers, there remainsome frontiers it has not yet conquered. While mostacademics (not those writing here, of course) shun itsvulgarity, that politeness has not stopped the establishment

Page 24: Bullshit and Philosophy

of a new academic journal— Plagiary: Cross-DisciplinaryStudies in Plagiarism, Fabrication and Falsification—dedicated to analyzing and better understanding all suchvarieties of fraud and misrepresentation throughout modernculture. Others, if less polite, are more direct. The popularwriter and radio commentator Al Franken has latelyaugmented the rules of his call-in quiz show “Spot theWeasel” with a new, fourth choice. Callers attempting tomatch wits with Franken and his guests can now identifyrecorded statements by politicians as either true, a lie, aweasel, or “BS.” While Comedy Central’s The Daily Showgoes all the way with mentioning “bullshit,” the other majornetworks, as of this writing at least, continue to censor theword. Still, it’s hard to miss. When Bright Eyes (aka ConorOberst) sang “When the President Talks to God” on JayLeno’s Tonight Show, he asked,

When the President talks to God Does he ever think that maybe he’s not? That that voice is just inside his head When he kneels next to the presidential bed Does he ever smell his own [bleep] When the President talks to God?

One could also ask whether these censors wereeffective. Did this audience, unlike Jon Stewart’s, remainunaware that Oberst had again used “that word” to point tothat elephant? The answer was at the end of Oberst’s song,as he sang, “I doubt it. I doubt it.”

Page 25: Bullshit and Philosophy

It’s this sense of despair and cynicism, finally,surrounding our era of bullshit that most fundamentallyexplains the appeal of Frankfurt’s book. No doubt, some ofthose who picked up On Bullshit did so only for the noveltyof reading an Ivy League philosophy professor expound onthe topic. But for many that curiosity was connected todeeper worries about what lay ahead for a culture so knee-deep. As New York Times columnist Frank Rich put it whencommenting on Ms. Winfrey’s theatrical defense of truth,the scandal surrounding A Million Little Pieces was largerthan the question of “whether Mr. Frey’s autobiography istrue or not, or whether it sits on a fiction or nonfiction shelfat Barnes and Noble.” The genuine scandal is that “suchdistinctions have long since washed away in much of ourpublic life.” In an age of bullshit, we all become politiciansor white-collar criminals, able neither to confirm nor denythe veracity of what we see, or know, or think we know. “It’sas if the country is living in a permanent state of suspensionof disbelief,” Rich suggested as he put his finger on thepotentially enormous social and cultural costs of bullshit’sdominance (New York Times, 22nd January, 2006). Forconstant, nagging suspicions—that political leaders areconsciously deceiving the public, that your favorite teacheris bent on partisan indoctrination, or that your family doctor,your senator, stockbroker, or product-recommendingneighbor is in some corporation’s pocket—would seem tobe socially corrosive and destabilizing. The fear thatsimple, direct communication, free of hidden agendas and

Page 26: Bullshit and Philosophy

interests, is becoming impossible may have led many(including those television and radio producers who madeFrankfurt a sudden celebrity) to seize Frankfurt as apopular guru with a prescient, prophetic warning—aMarshall McLuhan or Timothy Leary for the post-Enron,post-Iraq era. After all, the opening line of On Bullshit, that“one of the most salient features of our culture is that thereis so much bullshit,” was written in 1985. Twenty years later,there’s so much more.

Page 27: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Dream of a Bullshit-Free Culture

If ours is a culture of bullshit, then why was it that aphilosopher took center stage as America’s main bullshit-analyzer? Why not a novelist or sociologist? We don’tpretend to understand the vagaries of fashion and populartaste better than anyone else. But part of the answer, wethink, is that Frankfurt is reviving a philosophical tradition.Philosophers have long sought to understand exactly how itis that certain statements or beliefs seem to deceive us,take us in, or make us not care very much whether they aretrue or false. Long before Frankfurt, that is, philosophershave been trying to determine exactly what bullshit is andhow it works its magic.

This may be a surprising claim. Philosophy itself, after all,is often regarded as part and parcel with the bullshit ofpopular culture. The person who survives a personaltragedy by reflecting on the mysteries of the universe,someone might say, is “taking things philosophically.”That’s more polite and respectful, after all, than pointing outthat she’s distracting herself from unbearable loss ordisappointment by almost absent-mindedly contemplatingabstractions or pondering paradoxes—bullshitting herself.A walk through the “philosophy” section at your localbookstore may confirm the impression that philosophers’

Page 28: Bullshit and Philosophy

interests are in that otherworldly arcana of the supernatural,the occult, and the “metaphysical.”

Not so. Some of the most influential and enduringphilosophy, dating back centuries, is devoted to identifyingand understanding bullshit. This is not so that it may beindulged in further, but so that we may liberate ourselvesfrom its delusions and deceptions. The archetypal sage-in-a-toga Socrates, for example, is justly revered fordedicating his life to the search for persons who were trulywise, rather than interested merely in passing on opinion,or hearsay, or beliefs of any sort bereft of evidence orsimply good sense.

Twenty centuries later, the French polymath RenéDescartes started off the first of his six Meditations on FirstPhilosophy with the rather brave recognition that so muchof what he learned in the best French schools of the timewas just plain false. “Some years ago I was struck,” hewrote, “by the large number of falsehoods that I hadaccepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtfulnature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently basedon them.”3 Descartes’s remedy was a program of self-discipline that began with the rejection of those beliefs thatfell short of certainty and, that completed, proceeded withthe construction of a system of beliefs that was “stable andlikely to last.” It was a lonely, individualistic enterprise, butthe very fact that Descartes recorded his progress in hisMeditations reveals that it was something he believedothers could, and ought, to do as well. It was, indeed, a

Page 29: Bullshit and Philosophy

common Enlightenment fantasy that everyone would followalong. The result would be a world with a lot less bullshit,maybe none at all.

That vision was shared by the next century’s David Hume(who otherwise shared precious little with Descartes, but itwas enough). Hume held that all real knowledge took theform either of mathematics and similar “formal” sciences(which he termed “relations of ideas”) or of natural science(for Hume, “matters of fact”), and he ended his An EnquiryConcerning Human Understanding (a popularization,relatively speaking, of his two-volume A Treatise of HumanNature) with clear instructions for how to treat bits ofspeech that pretended to, but in fact did not, belong ineither category:

When we run over libraries, persuaded of theseprinciples, what havoc must we make? If we takein our hand any volume; of divinity or schoolmetaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does itcontain any abstract reasoning concerningquantity or number? No. Does it contain anyexperimental reasoning concerning matter offact and existence? No. Commit it then to theflames: For it can contain nothing but sophistryand illusion.4

An Enlightenment call for book burning? Not quite. Thebooks Hume would have us cast into the flames are books

Page 30: Bullshit and Philosophy

only in the most literal sense—they have pages, bindings,covers and words strung together into sentences andparagraphs. But they say nothing. Their offense, moreover,is that they are presented as though they do say something.That’s the illusion, and it’s perpetrated by the sophistry ofprinted words, pages, bindings, covers, blurbs, reviews,and the rest. Better to burn such sham books, such bullshit,says Hume. Burn it all.

The Enlightenment passion that carried Hume to the endof his Treatise continued to inspire in philosophers visionsof a bullshit-free world. You find them in the writings ofImmanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Ludwig Wittgenstein,for example, though again you’d be hard-pressed to findmuch more in common among these philosophers or, forthat matter, all the philosophers who have railed againstbullshit. The twentieth-century apotheosis of the anti-bullshitcrusade, however, is certainly the Vienna Circle, acollective of science and math-minded Germans andAustrians that shook a communal fist at the culture of theirtime and place, the intellectual free-for-all of Germany andAustria in the 1920s and 1930s (that culture, sadly, shookits much more powerful fist back, sending nearly all of theCircle flying to England and the United States by 1939).The Vienna Circle’s preferred term for bullshit was‘metaphysics’, and so their 1929 manifesto, theWissenschaftliche Weltauffassung (“Scientific World-Conception”), led off with the worry that “metaphysical andtheologizing thought is again on the increase today, not only

Page 31: Bullshit and Philosophy

in life but in science.”5 The “Scientific World-Conception”would be the antidote. It was an embrace of modernscience and a scientific attitude toward things, as well asthe “new objectivity” (or neue Sachlichkeit) pursued bymany artists, designers and architects in European culture.

The Vienna Circle’s target was not the intellectualdiversity that surrounded them but the putative parts of itthat were presented (even accepted) as meaningful—indeed, profoundly meaningful—but in fact amounted tonothing. In 1932 the Circle’s Rudolf Carnap criticized MartinHeidegger, perhaps the most prominent German-speakingphilosopher of the time, on precisely these grounds.6 In his1929 book What Is Metaphysics?, Heidegger ruminatedon the nature of Das Nichts (literally, “the nothing”), andinspired Carnap to figure out exactly what was wrong withsuch supposedly deep and insightful metaphysicalinquiries. In statements like Heidegger’s ‘Das Nichts selbstnichtet’ (“The nothing nothings”), Carnap concluded, therewas only the appearance of a meaningful statement.Behind that appearance, there was Nichts, leading Carnapto suggest that metaphysicians were like “musicianswithout musical ability.” Much as a tone deaf musicianwould likely misuse an instrument, metaphysicians misusedlanguage and presented things that could not be conveyedin words as though they could be. Carnap and others of theCircle argued and debated about just how dangerous thispassing off, this bullshitting, was. But it was bullshit all thesame, and it met with a similar response: if one wanted to

Page 32: Bullshit and Philosophy

express an attitude towards life, that’s fine, but don’t pass itoff as science or something similar. Better to take uppoetry, as Friedrich Nietzsche does, for example, in hisThus Spake Zarathustra (which Carnap cites, incidentally,with approval).

It’s almost an intellectual tragedy that the Vienna Circleand its philosophical legacies, logical positivism andlogical empiricism, came to be associated with stodgy,dispassionate, irrelevant logic-chopping. Thatcharacterization occludes the Circle’s rai-son d’être, whichwas nothing less than the cultivation of a critical attitude toconcentrations of bullshit in pseudoscience and philosophythat would, when taken up generally, reduce bullshit ingovernment, religion, the market, and everyday life. TheVienna Circle’s members thought of themselves not simplyas professional philosophers who happened to live andwork in Vienna, but as the keepers of a tradition of liberal,Enlightenment thinking that had made Vienna the cradle ofprogressive housing programs, adult education,architecture, art and design. Oh, and progressivephilosophy.

Which brings us back to Frankfurt’s On Bullshit. Perhapsby now it’s clear that we see Frankfurt as the latest carrierof the anti-bullshit torch in the Enlightenment Olympics, nowseveral centuries running. In this light, the real significanceof this bullshitmania is that an age-old impulse withinphilosophy to establish itself as a cultural, and not just anacademic, enterprise may finally have found the rightformula and the right language. If so, the best explanation

Page 33: Bullshit and Philosophy

formula and the right language. If so, the best explanationfor the popular interest in On Bullshit may have been thatfirst one, about the novelty of the word itself. Indeed it mayall come down to that word—understood not as a joke, butas a welcome point of connection between what goes on inphilosophy seminar rooms and what goes on when thelights go out and philosophers join their fellow citizens in themarketplace, coffee shop, town hall, and voting booth.

Page 34: Bullshit and Philosophy

How This Book Came to Be

These are the considerations that led us to put together thecollection of chapters that is Bullshit and Philosophy. If it’strue, as we suspect, that the popularity of Frankfurt’s booksignals a willingness among the public to see whatphilosophers have to say about bullshit, then we ought, wethought, to assemble some who were up to the task and tellthem to let it rip. What that means, of course, will varyamong our authors. That said, though, there are somethings this book is not.

For example, the chapters that follow are not a guidedtour through various varieties of bullshit in modern culture.Nor does this book intend to equip you with a “bullshitdetector” that you might use to finally shut Uncle Ned upabout the wisdom of tax cuts or the alien bodies thegovernment is storing at Area 51. Nor do we offer acollection of indignant would-be radio commentatorsangling for a guest spot on Rush Limbaugh. What this bookdoes, instead, is offer discussions, interpretations, andcriticisms related to Frankfurt’s essay and otherphilosophical work on bullshit. Since On Bullshit wasoriginally written for academic philosophers, and our bookis written for people intrigued by On Bullshit but otherwiseonly tourists in the halls of philosophy, some chapters will

Page 35: Bullshit and Philosophy

help explain what philosophical essays like Frankfurt’s aimto do and how they work. What does it mean, for example,to propose a “theory” of bullshit, given that theories of thisor that usually come from laboratories filled with test tubesand expensive instruments? What does it mean toarticulate “the structure of a concept”—as Frankfurt intendsto do for bullshit?

In this regard, we could have called our book AComplete Idiot’s Guide to Bullshit. But we didn’t. We’re notcomplete idiots, and we have no desire to go to court forcopyright infringement. More importantly, the success of OnBullshit makes it plain that neither idiots nor Ivy Leagueprofessors have a special claim to insights about bullshit. Ifbullshit is one of the defining marks of modern culture, theneveryone has a stake in it, and everyone can benefit fromthinking about it and understanding it. With this in mind, andrecognizing that thought and understanding are theprovince of philosophers, we bring you Bullshit andPhilosophy.

Part I of Bullshit and Philosophy, “To Shoot the Bull?Rethinking and Responding to Bullshit,” contains papersthat say something about bullshit itself—its causes, say, orits effects, or the reactions we have to it. One naturalreaction to most forms of bullshit, for example, accuses thebullshitmania of our time (and books like this) of over-reaction. What’s so bad about bullshit?, one might ask.

Scott Kimbrough’s “On Letting It Slide” takes up thisquestion, noting that in many situations we gladly sacrifice

Page 36: Bullshit and Philosophy

our usual regard for truth for the sake of (among otherthings) the feelings of others, keeping the peace, or simplyentertaining ourselves. Kimbrough reminds us that we letmuch (though not all) bullshit slide, and perhaps we oughtto.

For Conseulo Preti, avoiding bullshit (a “menace,” sheargues, for which audience as much as manufacturer is toblame) might be a matter of emulating a life notably bullshit-free; her “A Defense of Common Sense” offers the earlytwentieth-century analytic philosopher G.E. Moore as onesuch exemplary life.

George Reisch’s “The Pragmatics of Bullshit, IntelligentlyDesigned” looks at bullshit and pseudoscience to arguethat bullshit is not an indifference to truth, or meaning, asFrankfurt and Cohen suggest, but rather an attempt by thebullshitter to run two conversations at once, one, as Reischputs it, “concealed within or downplayed alongside theother.” Reisch’s approach, he claims, explains why we areoften so tolerant of bullshit.

But for Kenneth Taylor and Sara Bernal the interestingquestions about bullshit pertain less to its definition or ourreaction to it than to the reasons for its ubiquity. Taylor’s“Bullshit and the Foibles of the Human Mind,” for example,suggests that the institutional bullshit that surrounds us isabetted by mechanisms of reasoning deeply embedded inour shared cognitive architecture. Taylor’s chapterillustrates these well-established “foibles” of the humanmind, but it also points the way to a culture less steeped inthe bullshit these foibles enable. We must, Taylor implores,

Page 37: Bullshit and Philosophy

marshal education to guard ourselves and our childrenagainst our own cognitive foibles, and we must deliver “thevery means of public representation and persuasion” to afar wider and more diverse array of people. Sara Bernal, incontrast, is struck by a parallel between bullshit and variouspathologies of personality. In “Bullshit and Personality” sheargues that the extraordinary bullshit of the disorderedpersonality arises from an impaired social cognition andresults, naturally, in hobbled social relations.

In “Performing Bullshit and the Post-Sincere Condition,”Alan Richardson unveils a variety of bullshit yet unnoted inthe chapters so far—“performative bullshit,” exemplified inCustomer Service Pledges and Mission Statements.Responding to this bullshit, Richardson suggests, is amatter either of producing “self-evident bullshit thatoutperforms its covert competitors” (in the manner of JonStewart’s The Daily Show) or of rethinking our inheritedEnlightenment values.

Cornelis de Waal, on the other hand, sees bullshit as aviolation of a pragmatism-inspired “general epistemicimperative” to always “proceed upon the hope that there isa true answer to the questions we ask and act from adesire to find that answer.” De Waal’s “The Importance ofBeing Earnest: A Pragmatic Approach to Bullshitting,” thusargues that satisfying the imperative—avoiding bullshit—islargely a matter of sharing the burden of inquiry with ourcommunity rather than shouldering it ourselves in thefashion of Descartes.

Part II, “The Bull by the Horns: Defining Bullshit,” contains

Page 38: Bullshit and Philosophy

four papers that, in one way or another, try to fix our target—that is, to define exactly what bullshit is, so that we canmore easily spot it, at least, and get rid of it, at best.Leading off this section is G.A. Cohen’s classic essay,“Deeper Into Bullshit,”7 a direct response to Frankfurt’s “OnBullshit” (and the only chapter in this book not writtenespecially for it). In “Deeper Into Bullshit,” Cohen suggeststhat Frankfurt’s definition has missed the mark, or at leastfailed to attend to a kind of bullshit char-acterizable not interms of the intention of the person who produces it (perFrankfurt’s approach) but in terms of its “unclarifiableunclarity.” Many of this book’s other chapters respond toCohen’s essay.8

The next three chapters shed light on this debate bybringing various other intellectual resources to the table.For Gary Hardcastle, the dinner guest is the anti-metaphysical thought of the Vienna Circle’s Rudolf Carnap.Hardcastle’s “The Unity of Bullshit” argues that the anti-metaphysical program of Carnap and his fellow scientificphilosophers of the 1920s and 1930s gives us aperspective that unites the sort of bullshit identified byFrankfurt and Cohen.

Andrew Aberdein, by contrast, in his “Raising the Tone:Definition, Bullshit, and the Definition of Bullshit,” calls uponCharles Stevenson’s notion of a “persuasive definition” tohelp us place Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit in a widercontext. Per his title, Aberdein reaches back to thenineteenth century’s Gottlob Frege to re-introduce the

Page 39: Bullshit and Philosophy

concept of tone into the debate about bullshit.And then, Hans Maes’s and Katrien Schaubroeck’s

“Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit” raisesfundamental and critical questions for Frankfurt’s definitionof bullshit (including questions about the moral status ofbullshit, but more on that below), considers Cohen’sthoughts on bullshit on this score, and raises the question ofwhere pseudoscience belongs in the ever-lusher garden ofbullshit.

Though it has been enjoying its recent foray throughliterary and philosophical treatises under its own name,bullshit lives and breaths in the world off the page. Our finalsection, then, is “It’s All Around Us: Bullshit in Politics,Science, Education, and the Law.” In On Bullshit, Frankfurtsuggested that democracy, in demanding of everyone anopinion on everything, inadvertently promotes bullshit. MarkEvans’s chapter, “The Republic of Bullshit, Or: Were Plato,Strauss and Those Guys Right All Along?” examines thissuggestion among historically significant criticisms ofdemocracy.

Similarly, Vanessa Neumann’s “Political Bullshit and theStoic Story of the Self” provides a detailed account of thesort of bullshit one is apt to find in international politics. Shesuggests that we can better understand and manage suchbullshit if we attend to Stoic theories of self and the rolenarrative plays in persons’ lives.

In “Bullshit at the Interface of Science and Policy: GlobalWarming, Toxic Substances, and Other Pesky Problems,”Heather Douglas treats us to examples of bullshit drawn

Page 40: Bullshit and Philosophy

from the skeptical side of the debate over global warming.She shows how incomplete information and, perhaps moresignificantly, mistaken understandings of scientificobjectivity can serve the ends of bullshit.

David Tietge is concerned to defend rhetoric,understood as the study of language and the role it plays inour lives, from its all-too-frequent association with bullshit.His “Rhetoric Is Not Bullshit” makes the case that aresuscitation of rhetoric in the college and even the high-school classroom may be precisely the antidote to bullshit.Finally, Bullshit and Philosophy closes with an chapterfrom Steve Fuller, fresh from his role as an expert witnessin Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, et al.,concerning the place of Intelligent Design in the ninth-gradepublic school classroom. Fuller’s wide-ranging chapter,“Just Bullshit,” draws upon a wealth of examples frompopular culture, the history of science, and jurisprudence tocall attention to the threat of bullshit in anti-bullshit programsthemselves.

As we noted, Frankfurt’s On Bullshit did not initiate aninterest among philosophers in bullshit; that interest hadbeen there for centuries, if not millennia. But the book’spopularity did manage to remind philosophers and non-philosophers alike of academic philosophy’s specialrelation to bullshit. Our hope, of course, is not just that thesechapters help others learn and think about bullshit, but thatthey also remind philosophy itself that its links to popularculture are much closer and mutually rewarding that most of

Page 41: Bullshit and Philosophy

us realize. To borrow from a tale told here by ScottKimbrough, there is something right in the commonreaction—“that’s bullshit”—many have to academicphilosophy. But that’s not because philosophy produces it,it’s because philosophy is one of our best defenses againstit.

Page 42: Bullshit and Philosophy

I

To Shoot the Bull?

Rethinking and Responding to Bullshit

Page 43: Bullshit and Philosophy

1

On Letting It Slide

SCOTT KIMBROUGH

I have a very frank six-year-old daughter. Recently, uponseeing our house painter puffing away his break, sheshouted that smoking is unhealthy—loudly enough to beheard through the closed window. Mortified, my wife and Iimmediately shushed her. She doesn’t yet understand whyanyone should be offended by an accurate point ofinformation. But there are many offensive truths. William IanMiller notes the danger of indiscreet truth-telling in hisremarkable book, Faking It (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2003):

Truth is not accepted as a defense in such cases;in fact, one of the chief themes of this book is thattruth is an offense, seldom, if ever, a defense.(p.142)

Page 44: Bullshit and Philosophy

Miller’s reminder that truth isn’t always welcomed can helpsolve a puzzle posed by Harry Frankfurt in On Bullshit:

The problem of understanding why our attitudetoward bullshit is generally more benign than ourattitude toward lying is an important one, which Ishall leave as an exercise for the reader. (p. 50)

Frankfurt raises this issue because he worries about thedamaging consequences of a declining respect for truth.Bullshitting, in his view, constitutes a greater threat to truththan lying. For unlike bullshitters, liars at least care what thetruth is. Frankfurt defines bullshit as a lack of concern fortruth, writing that “indifference to how things really are . . .[is] the essence of bullshit” (p.34). Consequently, if we reallycare about truth, Frankfurt reasons that we should condemnbullshitters even more than liars. But of course that’s notwhat happens: more often than not, we let bullshit slide.Frankfurt wonders why this is the case, though he doesn’ttry to explain it himself. This essay takes up Frankfurt’sunanswered question.

Page 45: Bullshit and Philosophy

Tolerable Bullshit

Assume Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit is correct: bullshitresults from a lack of concern for truth. Now put thatdefinition together with Miller’s insight that truth is notalways our primary goal in conversation. It follows that muchof what we say on a daily basis is bullshit. But does it alsofollow that we should change our ways? Not always. Farfrom merely tolerating bullshit, we often value it as anindispensable resource.

For example, Miller offers a trenchant analysis of thesocial point of apology. We teach our children to apologizeby forcing them to say things they don’t really mean. Truth,in this context, is the last thing we want. A true descriptionof my son’s state of mind after hitting his sister would gosomething like this: “I hurt her because I wanted to.” In placeof this accurate account, we teach him to say that he’ssorry. Perhaps someday he’ll mean it. In the meantime, heat least learns that hitting will not be tolerated. Plus, hissister gets to see him humbled for his wrongdoing. Millerexplains the dynamic:

Q: What is the substance of the satisfaction to thewronged person in an unfelt apology? A: The painit costs the apologizer to give it.... Apology is a

Page 46: Bullshit and Philosophy

ritual, pure and simple, of humiliation. (Faking It,p. 88)

In characterizing apology as a humiliation ritual, Miller by nomeans rejects or discourages it. Quite the contrary, hesees that injurers must pay for their wrongs or they willnever learn to stop committing them. Like many othercases of moral instruction, the teaching of the art of apologysacrifices truth for more immediately worthy goals,including peace and character building.

Miller doesn’t mention what coerced recitations he visitsupon the child who receives the apology, but in my housethe victim is forced to say she accepts the apology. Shedoesn’t mean it, either. But the message of the exchange isclear: hostilities are at an end, and further escalation will notbe tolerated. Hopefully someday they will learn to settletheir differences civilly, even sincerely. As Miller notes,however, it’s foolish to hold out for sincerity in the shortterm. If you have any doubts about that, consider the motherwho told me that she does not make her son apologizeunless he means it. I think it’s fair to anticipate that he willnot learn to mean it on his own whenever proper mannersdictate. Nor will he learn the importance of faking it whennecessary, as remains indispensable well into adulthood.Marital spats would more frequently escalate to divorce if itweren’t for faked apologies. Public figures who make“offensive” remarks must master the form of apology as away of acknowledging, if not fully embracing, the legitimacyof the offended parties’ perspective.

Page 47: Bullshit and Philosophy

Learning when and how to apologize is one chapter inthe book of good manners. Like apology, politeness ingeneral sacrifices truth for peace and comfort. Miller againastutely points out both the fakeness and the virtue ofpoliteness:

Politeness doesn’t need an excuse; fakery isopenly admitted to lie at the structural core of thevirtue. Politeness is immune to many forms ofhypocrisy because a certain benign form ofhypocrisy is precisely its virtue . . . at relatively littlecost, it saves people from unnecessary pain insocial encounters. (Faking It, p. 35)

Saving people pain often deserves more importance than aconcern for truth. If we strictly apply Frankfurt’s definition ofbullshit, according to which bullshit manifests anindifference to truth, it follows that bullshit constitutes thegreater part of civility.

Not all bullshit is motivated by delicate manners,however. Take advertising. We tend to tolerate bullshitadvertising, and it isn’t out of politeness. One reason for ouracceptance is entertainment value. For example, theadvertisements during the Super Bowl famously receive asmuch attention as the game itself. And it’s not just bullshitadvertising that pleases. The student newspaper at myuniversity ran an editorial decrying communist professorson campus. The piece could hardly have been more silly,despite the serious intentions of the author. As I discovered

Page 48: Bullshit and Philosophy

in class discussions, many of the students were delightedby the piece because it was bullshit. They thought it wasfunny, and accordingly preferred it to a soberly arguedtreatment of a relevant topic.

Like politeness, however, entertainment cannot be the fullexplanation of our tolerance of bullshit. Public relationsdraws on many of the same tricks as advertising, butfrequently without the entertainment value. A deeperexplanation of our tolerance for bullshit in advertising andpublic relations is our respect for the ends they serve. Weunderstand the importance of making a buck, and don’tbegrudge the professional the most effective means to doso. When a public relations consultant presents Exxon as aleader in protecting the environment, or a political hackspins a legislative failure as a successful compromise,they’re just doing their jobs. Were we in their place, wewould want the same dispensation.

And it turns out many of us are in their place. A hugeproportion of the professions involve selling or representingsomething. It’s not always about greed and power, either.Even those whose efforts serve loftier goals than bare profit—like teachers, fund-raisers for charity, and militaryrecruiters—would be hobbled if they eschewed bullshittingin favor of unembellished truth-telling. Furthermore, whenfaced with competition, to insist on truth when it doesn’t sellis not just naïve, it’s a losing strategy. To forego the use ofbullshit is thus to settle for being a loser. We prefer winnersto losers. And we don’t want to be losers ourselves byforbidding ourselves a winning gameplan.

Page 49: Bullshit and Philosophy

However much we respect effectiveness, we don’t allowany and all means to an end, even when the end is agreedon all sides to be a valuable one. We outlaw outright lying,even in advertising. How do we draw the line? Why do wesympathize with the liar’s victim, but not the bullshitter’s?Look at it this way: we can either sympathize withbullshitters or their victims. The bullshitters have a job to doand skillfully apply the most effective means to do so. Thevictims, in contrast, allow themselves to be mentally lazyand blinded by desire. They’re suckers. We may pitysuckers, but we certainly don’t respect them. Our contemptfor suckers reflects the judgment that anyone taken in by aline of bullshit deserves their fate.

Page 50: Bullshit and Philosophy

Intolerable Bullshit

Bullshit doesn’t always get a warm reception. That’sbecause indifference to truth frequently causes trouble.Think of the last time you “called bullshit.” It probably wasn’tabout something you were prepared to tolerate. In ordinaryuse, the charge of bullshit most commonly comes up whenwe can’t be bothered to take something seriously, or whenwe’re treated unfairly.

We often call bullshit when faced with something weregard as ridiculous, irrelevant, or misguided. We therebydeclare an intention to ignore the speaker—to refuse totake his efforts at justification seriously. I can sadly providean example in which I was the target of such an accusation.I presented a talk entitled “The Structure and Function ofBullshit” at a “philosophy slam,” which is an opendiscussion guided by a speaker who defends acontroversial position against the crowd. These events takeplace in the back room of a coffeehouse and bar popularwith the counter-cultural set. One of the attendees told meafterwards of a brief conversation he had with a few of theregulars who were outside for a smoke. They asked himwhat was going on inside. Without mentioning the topic, hetold them it was a philosophy slam. Their response: “That’sbullshit.” Such uses of the term indicate an unwillingness to

Page 51: Bullshit and Philosophy

listen based on a disdainful expectation that nothing is tobe gained from doing so.

Disdain gives way to indignation when bad reasonsaffect more than just our patience. Because of its tenuousconnection to truth, bullshit makes a poor justification forimportant decisions. Bullshit reasons are bad reasons, andwe feel indignant when mistreated for bad reasons.Consider the song “Shut up” by The Black Eyed Peas. Aftera verse describing a typical happy courtship, the malesinger recounts the decline of the relationship while thefemale singer provides the commentary:

But then something got out of hand.You started yelling when I was with friends,Even though I had legitimate reasons.

Bullshit!You know I have to make them dividends.

Bullshit!

The girlfriend has a point. Her man is full of shit and sheknows it. (Incidentally, the terms “bullshit” and “full of shit”correlate: to say that someone is full of shit is an informal(albeit circular) way to explain why what they say is bullshit,and a warning to expect more of the same.) The problem,from her perspective, is that he’s hiding his truemotivations. If he truly loves her, she feels, he should wanther to be with him. Even if there is some truth to his“legitimate reasons,” he’s ditching her when he couldinclude her. She feels indignant because her boyfriend’s

Page 52: Bullshit and Philosophy

effort to “explain” adds insult—the contemptuous judgmentthat he can manipulate her—to the injury of leaving herbehind. She calls bullshit to express her indignation, and towarn him that she won’t stick around if such treatmentcontinues.

Now imagine you get passed over for a promotion atwork. The boss tells you that your candidacy was givencareful consideration, but they were looking for more of aproactive team-builder—someone to bring fresh ideas intothe organization. But you can’t help noticing that the lessqualified person hired for the job came over from thecompany where the boss used to work. The boss’srationalization of the decision is bullshit. The reasons sheprovided are not completely irrelevant to the task ofjustifying her decision, but they miss the mark badly bothbecause they are not the real reasons for the decision andbecause, even if they were, you judge that they shouldn’t begiven as much weight as your more extensive experienceand qualifications. Her reasoning has the form of rationalargument, but it falls badly short of genuine justification. Thecase fits Frankfurt’s definition because the boss’srationalization shows a lack of concern for the truth, in thatthe boss fails to communicate the true reasons for thedecision. But the deeper problem here is that, even if theboss has sincerely convinced herself of the truth of herargument, the reasons given don’t justify the decision.Maddeningly, however, there is nothing you can do about it.Except to say that it’s bullshit.

Political speech deals with issues that affect our lives in

Page 53: Bullshit and Philosophy

ways we have even less control over than our ownpromotion at work. George Orwell’s work makes thisproblem a central theme. His novel Nineteen Eighty-Fourimaginatively illustrates the danger of unchecked bullshitfrom government authority. He also addressed the problemin a non-fiction essay, “Politics and the EnglishLanguage.”9 In that essay, Orwell decries the decline of theEnglish language, and blames politics for it. Political writingmust be bad writing, he argues, because only bad writingcould “justify” the actions of government:

In our time, political speech and writing are largelythe defense of the indefensible. Things like thecontinuance of British rule in India, the Russianpurges and deportations, the dropping of theatom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended,but only by arguments which are too brutal formost people to face, and which do not square withthe professed aims of the political parties. Thuspolitical language has to consist largely ofeuphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudyvagueness. (p. 136)

Orwell was referring to mid-twentieth-century times, but thesituation has not improved. Our taste for euphemismcontinues to be fed with terms like “smart bomb,” “collateraldamage,” “surgical strike,” and “friendly fire,” which are alleuphemistic ways to talk about killing. A recent cable newssegment entitled “Fighting Terror” showed an American

Page 54: Bullshit and Philosophy

fighter jet pulverizing an Iraqi hut. It struck me that “terror”was an odd description of a hut, and that nothing could bemore terrifying than a dive-bombing fighter jet.

Why do we tolerate this kind of bullshit? The reasonsscouted in the previous section continue to have theirweight: politeness makes us hesitant to puncture the posesof authority, inflated rhetoric makes for more entertainingnews programming, and effective waging of war requiresrhetorical posturing. History shows that these reasons oftenfall short of justifying our toleration. There are also lessrespectable reasons at work. Orwell offers one of them:

[Modern writing] consists in gumming togetherlong strips of words which have already been setin order by someone else, and making the resultspresentable by sheer humbug. The attraction ofthis way of writing is that it is easy. (p. 134)

The same attraction underlies widespread acceptance ofsuch writing. Absorbing and repeating what we hear ismuch easier than thinking about it. It’s easier for mediaoutlets to repeat government spin than to seek a moredirect description of the kind Orwell favors. Plus, in a mediamarket, consumers would probably not sustain a newsprogram following Orwell’s principles. Finally, if bullshit isthe language of power, as Orwell’s analysis suggests, thento go along with bullshit is to go along with power. Powercan be very persuasive.

The problem is that the powerful do not always use their

Page 55: Bullshit and Philosophy

force of persuasion in ways that serve one’s own valuesand interests. Thus the need for vigilance against bullshit: tobe effective in pursuing your own goals, you have to avoidbeing taken in by a line of bull that, upon examination,works against those goals. The danger here is the samewhether you fall for the bullshit of others or start believingyour own. Consider the advertising case. An effectiveadvertiser rigorously gathers demographic andpsychographic data about potential customers, as well asstudying competitors’ products and tactics. If bullshit worksin a given ad, it’s because of its effect on the customer, noton the advertiser. The advertiser should know why and howthe ad works rather than buying the pitch himself or herself.The most effective bullshitters know the truth, including thetruth about when to bullshit and when to give the straightshit. The instrumental effectiveness of bullshit thuspresupposes and exploits the instrumental effectiveness oftruth: to enjoy the benefits of bullshitting without succumbingto the dangers of being bullshitted, a lively concern for thetruth must be constantly maintained.

Indeed, one of the biggest dangers of bullshit in politicsis that politicians will come to believe their own bullshit.When they do, their policies often fail because publicsupport alone does not make a policy work whenimplemented. The same is true at the individual level.Convincing yourself of the excellence of your plans does notsuffice for success (notwithstanding the advice ofmotivational speakers). At this point, however, it’snecessary to consider how it’s even possible to believe

Page 56: Bullshit and Philosophy

one’s own bullshit. For bullshit, as Frankfurt understands it,requires both a bullshitter, who intentionally disregards thetruth, and a potential dupe. How can a single person playboth roles?

Page 57: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit and Self-Deception

The paradox of believing your own bullshit parallels theparadox of self-deception. If a deceiver by definition knowsthat the belief he induces is false, it’s hard to see how hecan convince himself that the selfsame belief is true.Reflection on the parallel between self-deception andbelieving your own bullshit sheds light on the debatebetween Cohen and Frankfurt about the nature of bullshit.Indeed, one man’s self-deception is another man’s bullshit.

In his book Self Deception Unmasked (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2001), Alfred Mele argues thatself deception should not be understood on the model ofinterpersonal deception. In interpersonal deception, thedeceiver does not believe the claim that he hopes hisvictim will accept as true. If self deception were to fit theinterpersonal model, then the self-deceived person wouldhave to play both roles, both affirming and denying thesame belief. Mele takes this consequence to show that theinterpersonal model fails. For self deception happens quitefrequently, and belief in outright logical contradictions rarelyseems involved.

A husband may self-deceptively maintain the belief thathis wife is faithful, despite contrary evidence that wouldcause an unbiased person to be suspicious (p. 57ff). It

Page 58: Bullshit and Philosophy

makes little sense to suggest that his self-deceptionconsists in his first believing that his wife is unfaithful,followed by an unconscious effort to suppress this belief infavor of the (simultaneously held?) belief that she is faithful.No: his problem is that he masks the evidence of herinfidelity from himself, not that he manipulates himself afterhaving accepted it. Mele maintains that psychologicalprocesses such as motivated misinterpretation of evidenceand selective evidence gathering explain self-deceptionmuch more plausibly than the interpersonal model.

One of the most common forms of self-deception is aninflated self-image. Mele opens his book by citing thestatistic that ninety-four percent of university professorsbelieve that they are better at their jobs than their averagecolleague (p. 3). In the face of a statistic like this, I think it’sfair to guess that most people also overestimate howthoroughly justified their beliefs are. Our cuckoldedhusband may sincerely believe he has reviewed the dataobjectively. Similarly, half-baked prejudices often comealong with the demonstrably false conviction that theevidence has been duly considered. For example, I wasrecently informed that smart boys are smarter than smartgirls. Although Frankfurt tends to suggest that bullshitting isthe sort of thing that must be done on purpose, exampleslike these show that a lack of concern for truth can bepresent unintentionally because we deceive ourselvesabout the adequacy of our reasons. Particularly when itcomes to entrenched prejudices, it can be difficult for aperson to see that what he believes bears little if any

Page 59: Bullshit and Philosophy

connection to the truth.G.A. Cohen actually notices that self-deception can

cause acceptance of bullshit, but doesn’t make it central tohis definition. In attempting to explain why people like hisyounger self put up with unclarifiable texts by AlthusserianMarxists, Cohen postulates “a blend, perhaps, of ‘cognitivedissonance reduction’ and ‘adaptive preference formation’. . . [that is] at work quite widely.”10 Because thesepsychological processes make it possible to producebullshit unintentionally, Cohen criticizes Frankfurt forfocusing too much on the state of mind of the bullshitter:

[It] is neither necessary nor sufficient for every kindof bullshit that it be produced by one who isinformed by indifference to the truth, or indeed, byany other distinctive intentional state. (p. 130)

Cohen concludes that Frankfurt’s “process-centered”definition of bullshit, which focuses attention on the state ofmind of the bullshitter, must be replaced by an “out-putcentered” definition that attends to features of the bullshititself. Cohen fastens upon unclarifiability as the distinctivetrait of bullshit.

While Cohen is right that it’s a mistake to require thatbullshit be produced by a person who is aware of her ownlack of concern for truth, his attempt to focus on the productrather than the process cannot work. For example, considerthe case of an avid fan of conservative talk radio. He“learns” many things on his program, including that the

Page 60: Bullshit and Philosophy

French are an irrational and ungrateful people, and thatliberals have an anti-Christmas agenda. There is nothingunclarifiable about these claims, but they are mostassuredly bullshit.

To avoid admitting that bullshit can be producedunintentionally, Frankfurt reasons that repeating second-hand bullshit can’t make you a bullshitter any more thanrepeating second hand lies makes you a liar.11 So inFrankfurt’s view the radio fan’s pronouncements are onlywarmed over bullshit, deriving their status from the radiohost’s intentional indifference to truth. However, the typicalstudent of talk radio does not restrict himself to repeatingwhat he hears. He will go beyond the conclusions of his on-air mentors, arguing for conclusions of his own. Perhaps hefavors nuking the French, or punishing by law anyone whorefers to Christmas trees as Holiday trees. If anyone wereto challenge his commitment to truth, he would (as hismentors have trained him to do) take offense and write offthe challenger as a dupe of the liberal media. He’s not inthe same league as the radio host, who knowinglydissembles. But his intellectual sloppiness can’t shield himfrom the accusation of bullshit. Rather, as a result of self-deception, he believes his own bullshit.

Page 61: Bullshit and Philosophy

Blameless Bullshit

Frankfurt probably doesn’t care to defend self-deceivedtalk radio fans. But he has a deeper reason to object to theidea of unintentional bullshit. Even in the absence of self-deception, some people fail badly to get at the truth. Wenow reject whole conceptual systems, like alchemy, that noone at the time suspected of incoherence. For example,Isaac Newton studied alchemy, and he was no intellectualslouch. Frankfurt refuses to classify hopeless theories likealchemy as bullshit to protect serious theorists like Newtonfrom being called bullshitters:

It seems inappropriate to insist that thosestatements were always bullshit. Characterizingsomething as bullshit is naturally construed asseriously pejorative, and in the kind of case I haveimagined, the opprobrium is not warranted.(“Reply to G.A. Cohen,” p. 343)

Frankfurt is right that we shouldn’t condemn Newton as abullshitter, but we now know that alchemy is bullshit. Thepoint of calling alchemy bullshit is not to slam men likeNewton, but to excuse us from taking it seriously. In fact,that’s the same reason we dismiss the rants of both the talk

Page 62: Bullshit and Philosophy

radio fan and his on-air mentor as bullshit—so we don’thave to pay attention to them. The charge, to be justified,requires that the methods involved are so unpromising theycan be safely ignored. Otherwise, the person who callsbullshit is unjustified in adopting an attitude of disdain and,ultimately, disinterest. To call something bullshit in thepejorative sense is thus to marginalize it, to exclude it fromthe status of serious discussion.

Cohen’s attack on the Althusserians illustrates thismarginalizing function. He recognizes that they do notintentionally disregard the truth in the way Frankfurtcondemns, and he doesn’t want to base his objection onthe contentious and insulting claim that all Althusserians areself-deceived. But he regards their methods as hopelesslyobscure. So he shifts the focus from their moral characterto their theories:

. . . these moral faults should not be our primaryfocus. For reasons of courtesy, strategy, andgood evidence, we should criticize the product,which is visible, and not the process, which is not.(p. 336)

Pace Cohen, it’s just not possible to call bullshitcourteously. In rejecting the product, one necessarily rejectsthe process that led to it and the persons using theprocess. The process in question at this point, however, isnot psychological, but methodological. Adopting ahopeless method justifies marginalization whether one’s

Page 63: Bullshit and Philosophy

adoption results from self-deception or, as in the case ofNewton, blameless ignorance of future science.

Return now to the talk radio fan. Exposing his self-deception is one good way to back up the accusation ofbullshit. Another way to justify dismissing his claims is tocriticize his methods directly. Taking views on testimony isa method. It’s a respectable method to the extent that one’ssources are respectable. When those sources adopt poormethods, such as the “method” of cherry-picking facts tosupport a political agenda, the result is bullshit. And it’sbullshit to repeat the results not only because what isrepeated is bullshit, but because the method of arriving atthe opinion in question is not to be trusted. Warmed overbullshit is not merely a stale imitation of the original, but afresh deposit that compounds the methodological faults ofthe original.

Shifting the focus from psychological processes tomethodology allows us to recognize Cohen’s insight thatbullshit can be produced unintentionally, without giving upon Frankfurt’s point that the way bullshit is producedmatters most. Adopting this shift has its costs, however: theconcept of bullshit becomes more contentious to applybecause evaluating a methodology is a difficult matter,even in principle. For example, the Althusserians can becounted on to respond to Cohen by arguing that theirmethods clarify rather than obscure the study of politics.Calling names cannot settle this dispute. For one thing,sometimes the inadequacy of a method can only berevealed by providing a new and better alternative, like

Page 64: Bullshit and Philosophy

modern chemistry stands to alchemy. Even in moreimmediately tractable cases, the method as a whole, ratherthan a discrete variable like intentional indifference to truth,must be evaluated. Sometimes this is easy to do, as withthe talk radio fan. In other cases, however, the jury is likelyto remain out indefinitely. Consider the status of philosophy.

Given the difficulty of settling on reliable methods, wemust admit that avoiding self-deception does not suffice foravoiding bullshit. Sometimes, through no fault of our own,we unintentionally end up with bullshit beliefs. Frankfurt’sear cannot tolerate this conclusion because he finds theaccusation of bullshit necessarily pejorative. However, hisreservations can be met by considering a parallel example:the term “killer.” It verges on oxymoron to talk of blamelesskillers. We typically reserve the term “killer” for murderersbecause terms like “killer” connote intention. Indeed, thesuffix “-er” is the staple device for forming the name ofoccupations, like “lawyer,” “gambler,” “dancer,” and so forth.Similarly, we use the same suffix and its cognates toclassify sinners by their sins, as in “liar,” “cheater,” and“adulterer.” However, even if it’s true to say that onlymurderers count as killers, plenty of people kill withoutmurdering.

Consider the difference between two drivers who eachkill a pedestrian: the first driver runs up on the sidewalkwhile reading a book; the second driver drives safely butthe doomed pedestrian darts out between parked cars.The first driver’s negligence makes him criminally liabledespite the fact that we find it awkward to call him a killer.

Page 65: Bullshit and Philosophy

Calling the second driver a killer is worse than awkward: itwould be positively cruel under the circumstances becausehe is completely blameless and, indeed, to be pitied.However, the impropriety of calling either driver a killersadly does not change the fact that the pedestrians werekilled. The term “bullshitter” is similar. Frankfurt’s intentionalbullshitter is paradigmatic because of his consciousdisregard for truth. The self-deceived talk radio fan issimilar to the negligent driver. He doesn’t mean to spreadbullshit, but he negligently adopts the method ofembellishing radio propaganda. Finally, people like Newtonare similar to the blameless driver: their theories may haveproven over time to be bullshit, but they cannot be accusedof self-deception or any other serious intellectual fault. Theterm “bullshit” remains pejorative, but the opprobrium restswith the theory, not the people who propound it.

Page 66: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit and Truth

If I’m right, bullshit results from the adoption of lamemethods of justification, whether intentionally, blamelesslyor as a result of self-deception. The function of the term isto emphatically express that a given claim lacks anyserious justification, whether or not the speaker realizes it.By calling bullshit, we express our disdain for the speaker’slack of justification, and indignation for any harm we sufferas a result.

Although everyone who calls bullshit is concerned withjustification, they aren’t always concerned with truth. Aperson’s values inevitably inform his perception of whatcounts as a lame justification. Thus, because he valuestruth so deeply, Frankfurt calls bullshit whenever he seestruth disregarded. But many people call bullshit when othervalues than truth are threatened. For example, a bottom-lineoriented businessman will reject discussions of businessethics as bullshit. If the government investigates his dodgyaccounting practices, he’ll indignantly condemn theinvestigation as bureaucratic bullshit. Truth is not the issuefor him. Rather, he directs his disdain and indignationtoward obstacles impeding his cash flow.

The same dynamic explains why so many people thinkphilosophy is bullshit: they may only be interested in money,

Page 67: Bullshit and Philosophy

or in entertainment. Bullshit and Philosophy excluded,philosophy rarely entertains. Even those who do care abouttruth may be interested in more narrowly technicalquestions, like how to develop medical therapies usingstem cells. For such people, philosophical and ethicalquestions constitute an annoying distraction from the truthsthat interest them. And the endless cycle of debate withinphilosophy frustrates people who just want to know theanswer and get on with their lives. Finally, it must beadmitted that a lot of philosophy obscures the truth ratherthan capturing it. At the very least, proponents of differentmethodologies within philosophy will direct that accusationat each other. I’m guessing the Althusserians think Cohen’sbrand of Marxism is bullshit, too. Likewise, a linguist mightreject this essay (and Frankfurt’s) as bullshit on the groundsthat any serious investigation of words must be based onempirical methods rather than the philosophers’ armchairmethod of reflecting on a few examples.

Given all this disagreement about what’s bullshit andwhat’s not, should we adopt a subjective definition ofbullshit, according to which bullshit is whatever elicits theemotional reactions of disdain and indignation? I don’t thinkso. In the end, although Frankfurt is wrong to neglectunintentional examples of bullshit, he is right that bullshitresults from a lack of connection with truth. Methodologicaldisagreements may be difficult to resolve, but they areamong the most important disagreements. Likewise, thereare few more serious arguments than arguments over whatgoals we should be seeking. Frankfurt rightly notes that

Page 68: Bullshit and Philosophy

skepticism about justification in these areas is one reasonthere is so much bullshit (On Bullshit, p. 64). He goes on todeftly show that retreating to subjectivism can’t work,ending his essay with the memorable line, “sincerity itself isbullshit” (On Bullshit, p. 67). We can also put the point thisway: the idea that truth doesn’t matter is bullshit. However, itdoesn’t follow, as Frankfurt assumes, that the properresponse is to eradicate every instance of bullshit. Rather,bullshit must be recognized for what it is, and restricted totruly justifiable uses.

How do we do that? Not by just bullshitting our waythrough. Justifying the preference for bullshit over truth in agiven situation requires an ability to tell the differencebetween the two. Likewise, we’ve already seen thateffective use of bullshit for instrumental purposes, as inadvertising, presupposes a lively respect for truths aboutthe attitudes of one’s target audience and suchlike. Thus,there can be no justification for wholesale indifference totruth, even if one’s primary goals are instrumental.Furthermore, to pretend that no justification need be offeredfor adopting purely instrumental goals, like the bottom-lineoriented businessman considered above, is itselfunjustifiable. If we conceal the lameness of our reasonsfrom ourselves, we end up self-deceptively believing ourown bullshit, or manipulated by the bullshit of others. In bothcases, it’s our own goals and interests that areendangered. Orwell recognized as much: his quest toreverse the decline of the English language stemmed notfrom a grammatical puritanism, but from deep concerns

Page 69: Bullshit and Philosophy

from a grammatical puritanism, but from deep concernsabout abuse of power and exploitation. His crusadeagainst bad writing is a contribution to ethics more thanliterary criticism. I’ll close my chapter by endorsing Orwell’sadvice:

If you simplify your English, you are freed from theworst follies of orthodoxy. You cannot speak anyof the necessary dialects, and when you make astupid remark, its stupidity will be obvious, even toyourself. (p. 139)12

Page 70: Bullshit and Philosophy

2

A Defense of Common Sense

CONSUELO PRETI

When it comes to bullshit, we know it when we hear it. Butthat’s not good enough for philosophers. Philosophersdon’t roll eyes—shrug—move on when it comes to gettingto the bottom of something.

When confronted with something both as familiar andwidespread as bullshit—when something looks as if thereisn’t much more to be said about it—that’s whenphilosophers kick into gear. When it comes to bullshit, it’snot that we don’t get it; we get it alright, every day and fromall corners. But the way in which we are acquainted with itfalls short of being the whole story. We know bullshit whenwe hear it, but that doesn’t mean we are pro-bullshit. Thereis certainly something about bullshit we could do without.So the trick is to give a clear set of distinctivecharacteristics for something to be bullshit, and, at thesame time, reveal what it is about bullshit that we could

Page 71: Bullshit and Philosophy

lose, and, maybe, what we can do about it.In his seminal essay On Bullshit, Harry Frankfurt—who

reminds us that an analytic philosopher, in particular, has aspecial concern for the clarification of concepts—says thathe aims, as a philosopher in that tradition, to clarify theconcept of bullshit. Frankfurt argues that the differencebetween bullshit and lying is that bullshit doesn’t care aboutdistorting the truth. Distorting the truth is, after all, a way ofrespecting and keeping a relation to the truth, so as to steerus away from it. Instead, according to Frankfurt, it is all thesame to bullshit whether or not what it asserts is true.Bullshit’s lack of concern for truth and falsity is at the heartof its nature and represents its threat to core values ofcivilization; its insidiousness comes from the way itdepends on scorning the difference between what is, or isnot, the case.

G.A. Cohen, in his analysis of Frankfurt’s essay (Chapter8 in this volume), adds to Frankfurt’s conception thecategory of specifically academic bullshit, which, he claims,differs from lay bullshit in its disregard for meaning ratherthan in its disregard for truth. Cohen resists the view thatthere is one criterion for bullshit, and argues that thedifficulty in giving a consistent criterion across all the casesof what we can and do call bullshit rests on the differencebetween what constitutes bullshit in itself and whatconstitutes the production of it. Bullshit in itself, Cohenargues, is characterized by semantic obscurity. Thebullshitter, on the other hand, disregards or disdains the

Page 72: Bullshit and Philosophy

truth. The former type of bullshit is independent of theintentions of a speaker; the latter is characterizedessentially by the speaker’s intentions.

Both Frankfurt’s and Cohen’s analyses, I believe, leaveout a third element, essential to bullshit: its audience.Bullshit needs our compliance, and there is somethingabout bullshit that succeeds in getting that compliance;bullshit, I think we all know, has a sneaky appeal. After all,bullshit, as Frankfurt points out, is in it for something—andso, it needs us to go along. I think that academic bullshit, byCohen’s criterion, is also in it for something, and it alsoneeds us to play along. So: what is bullshit in it for, and howdo we end up playing along? It seems pretty clear thatbullshit tries to sell us something: but not, I think, just thethings it is used to promote (Prada shoes, a date, an A, areputation, the buzz). Bullshit, rather, employs indirect butpowerful means: what it tries to do, I would suggest, is sellus on our own estimation or judgment of what matters.

Getting the Dior handbag or the invite to Mar-a-Lagomatters. The guy who bullshits us into going to bed withhim, or worse, giving him tenure, has made himself matter.Our own estimation of things matters to us, of course, formany reasons. When bullshit succeeds, it succeeds,mainly, by making our own estimation of what mattersmatter more than anything else.

We can see how this would cover bullshit in the academyas well. Academic bullshit also tries to sell us onsignificance: the intellectual import and status of itspronouncements. Anyone who slogged through graduate

Page 73: Bullshit and Philosophy

school is familiar with the psychological tension Cohendescribes: the hours spent poring over some obscure text,justifying the hours of work by believing—even arguing—that the work in question is deeply important and terriblyprofound; the more so, because of its obscurity.

There is another type of bullshit in the academy, by theway, that Cohen doesn’t discuss: the type thatcharacterizes the decision-making process. This isn’tunique to the academy, of course, but there does seem tobe something particularly fetid about the atmosphere there,which tends to characterize the kinds of justification thatacademics give for their decisions, particularly with respectto the merit of the work of others. A disdain or disregard forthe truth would seem to be precisely the right way todescribe it, consistent with Frankfurt’s analysis.

Bullshit is definitely a drag. It’s even more of a drag nowthat it looks as if it involves, for its success, our ownshameful desires to be flattered, feel important, and bemade much of as arbiters of significance. But does bullshitreally undermine the ‘core values of civilization’? Is this acall to arms? I’m going to argue that (1) bullshit is amenace, in the street and in the seminar room; (2) it doesundermine one of the core planks of civilized society; butthat (3) that we can identify it and oppose it; and, moreover,that we should. Neither meaning nor truth may matter tobullshit, on the face of it, but what I would like to investigatehere is the possibility that something does: what matters tobullshit is that it should make something matter to us.

For the incentive to resist bullshit we can reach back to

Page 74: Bullshit and Philosophy

one of the pioneers of early twentieth-century philosophy,G.E. Moore, and the philosophical common sense he hascome to represent. Moore, in person and in deed, showsus in unexpected ways what it is about bullshit that is themost dangerous, and how we might resist it. Much of thehistory of Anglo-American philosophy through the twentiethcentury has built on aspects of Moore’s method; here, I willsingle out one element of it: his commonsense anduncompromising commitment to caring about truth andmeaning. This concern, we will argue, is probably the besttool that we can deploy today against the various forms ofbullshit that importune us, both in the culture and in theseminar room.

Page 75: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Truth Matters

But wait. Isn’t all this just a little quaint? Nobody everthought that academics were exactly plugged into the realworld, after all; and the irony of a group of card-carryingeggheads holding forth on bullshit, of all things, isunmistakable. Easy does it, everybody. Surely bullshit isjust one of the costs of doing business; we get it, we’re notthat threatened by it; it’s not such a big deal. Isn’t it a bitmuch to call it a threat to civilized society?

Well, no, as a matter of fact. It is just that kind of attitudethat seems to illustrate the kind of menace we join withFrankfurt and Cohen to plant a flag against. If we havegotten to the point—and there are many ways in which itseems we might have—where we think that it’s silly orquixotic (at best) even to think in terms of truth, respect fortruth, credibility, or even related concepts like character andintegrity, the disease has taken hold. So, if this is so, andthis is bad, is there anything we can do about it? Andwhere, exactly, should we start?

We can start with an example. Consider the case ofJames Frey, a pitiful (and frankly boring) substance abuser,who wrote up an account of his addiction and recovery. Theaccount was shopped around as fiction, found no takers,and was reconsidered—and marketed—as a memoir.

Page 76: Bullshit and Philosophy

Frey’s book, A Million Little Pieces, did a respectablebusiness, but then, when Oprah Winfrey—perhaps theclosest thing to the Zeitgeist in human form—chose it forher Book Club in October, 2005, sales went into thestratosphere. Everybody felt good about supporting andbeing a part of a story arc that in American culture,particularly, has legs: surrender, degradation, realization,recovery; and, of course, inspiration.

Except not much of it was true. But if what Frey wrotewas sold as a memoir, then the issue of its truth isimportant, since—philosophical aside—if it didn’t happen,you can’t remember it, though you can pretend to, or thinkyou can. So far, so good. But isn’t this just lying? Fraud?Stupidity? Greed? Where’s the bullshit, specifically, in this?Recall that Frankfurt claims that bullshit lies (so to speak),mainly, in intention. If x just doesn’t care whether what hesays is true, then x is bullshitting. A liar cares about thetruth, honors it, so to speak, by intending to steer us awayfrom it. So if Frey and his publishers’ intent was to palm offa series of made up events as truth, he lied and theycommitted fraud; but if it didn’t matter to them one way oranother, then they were bullshitting (and, as Cohen makesclear, you can both bullshit and lie).

But we don’t know, beyond question, what their intentionswere. We do know, however, what Oprah’s were—whenshe said, memorably, that it was irrelevant whether Frey’sstory was true. What mattered was that it stood as aninspiration, that it affected people, that it was an important

Page 77: Bullshit and Philosophy

story.13

Whether the story was true was irrelevant? It didn’tmatter? It didn’t matter that the things that were meant to bean inspiration didn’t actually happen? Or, if they did, theydidn’t happen quite the way they were inspiring us? Pausefor philosophical reflection. Maybe something doesn’t haveto be true to be inspiring. We could find strength andexample from all sorts of sources, and the fact that theexamples stand as sources of inspiration is distinct fromwhether they have to be true (the Bible, say). So Frey gaveus an inspiring account of dragging himself back from thebrink of addiction, and just because it wasn’t true doesn’tmean it wasn’t inspiring.

But that doesn’t seem entirely right. The key question ina case like this is: what inspires us? If the inspiration I cullfrom your story is tied to the assumed truth of the account,then to discover that the account was made up means thatthe organ of inspiration is corrupted. I can be inspired by atale of woe to be a better person, say, but if what inspiresme in your tale of degradation and recovery is that you weredegraded and did recover, then to discover that you weren’tdegraded or didn’t recover sabotages the inspirationaleffect of your story on me. In other words, if I know thatPrince Charming didn’t really awaken Sleeping Beauty witha kiss, but am inspired by the story to continue to believe intrue love, I have, by my own lights, adapted the story tosomething about which I am motivated independently tobelieve anyway. But if I think that your specific story S is

Page 78: Bullshit and Philosophy

true, and I am inspired by it, then to discover it isn’t true, isto discover that there is nothing in it by which to beinspired.

The issue here, therefore, isn’t that Frey made his storyup; it was Oprah’s own avowal that it didn’t matter whetheror not he had been lying. The volte-face that occurred whenshe went head to head on her turf with Frey, holding him toaccount, and chastising him for his deception, was as goodan example as any of the menace of bullshit.14 When Oprahsaid “I made a mistake and I left the impression that thetruth does not matter. And I am deeply sorry about that,because that is not is what I believe,” she summed up thecore of the problem with bullshit: the truth matters, and itshould matter. If bullshit threatens to turn Oprah’s head,after all, we are in deep shit. Apparently, it did matter: hisdeception made her look like a bullshitter. Her owncredibility suddenly became the story, as she belatedlyseemed to realize. And loss of credibility should matter.

There is a philosophical question running under thisdiscussion, which, a little uncharacteristically for aphilosophical subject, made a national splash, thanks toOprah: is disdain for truth worse than distorting it? Frankfurtand Cohen, who both argue that it is, seem vindicated bythe train-wreck that Oprah narrowly avoided with hereleventh-hour grab at moral high-mindedness in the face ofthe growing scandal. If both Frankfurt and Cohen are right,the menace wrought by bullshit takes place on the inside,where any kind of respect for what’s true and what’s false

Page 79: Bullshit and Philosophy

starts to look downright expendable. Accepting, or beingcomplacent to (or worse, colluding with) a disdain for adistinction between truth and falsity is not so innocuous—becoming inured to it is to stop caring about what’s trueand what’s not, or even worse, to stop caring that it’s notOK to stop caring about what’s true and what’s not. So thedanger of bullshit is that it will grow increasingly resistant totreatment, so much so that we won’t even notice that westopped caring about truth and falsity. And this starts tolook more and more like something we should be worriedabout.

In order to counter bullshit effectively—beyond justrecognizing it—we need to turn it against itself. Bullshit,after all, has one significant weakness: it needs to bebelieved or accepted. Its assertion, though annoying, maynot be a problem we can solve head on. To be believed oraccepted, however, it does need us to co-operate. Bullshitdoesn’t care about the truth, but bullshit has to care aboutwhether we care about the fact that it doesn’t. Truth doesn’tmatter to bullshit, but it matters to bullshit that bullshit can bemade to matter to us. If we care more about the truth, then afortiori we care less about bullshit. The less we care, theless hold it has over us—and bullshit, according toFrankfurt, is instrumental. It needs to find a way to beconvincing and to make us care. If we care more abouttruth, bullshit will not succeed by not caring about truth. So ifwe resist caring about the assertions of bullshit—and beingimmune to its temptations—we might be able to undermine

Page 80: Bullshit and Philosophy

it, to no small degree.What we could use now—perhaps one lesson of l’affaire

Frey—is a genuine inspiration. The history of philosophyhas delivered plenty of examples of the intellectuallyrigorous, and the detachedly rational, but perhaps fewerexamples of the kind of thing we’re looking for: a resolutecarer about the truth and meaning. Luckily, both Frankfurt’sand Cohen’s discussions suggest some illuminating linksto the early twentieth-century philosopher George EdwardMoore (1873–1958). Moore, it turns out, is the philosopherspecifically known for having introduced to philosophyprecisely the “special concern” for the clarification ofconcepts that Frankfurt explicitly tells us he takes as hismission, and that Cohen could regard as a foil, in the righthands, to academic bullshit.

G.E. Moore might never have felt that it was entirelyappropriate to respond to a muddled formulation of somephilosophical concept or argument by actually snorting theword “bullshit,” but Moore would be thoroughly opposed toanything so dishonorable as bullshit. Add to this Moore’scharacter and his passion for truth, and he emerges as apotent force against bullshit, one we can find ways toemulate.15

Page 81: Bullshit and Philosophy

“What Exactly Do You Mean?”

Moore was an undergraduate at Trinity College,Cambridge, from 1892 to 1896; in 1898 he was awarded asix-year fellowship, which he held at Trinity until 1904. Heleft Cambridge until 1911, when he returned to TrinityCollege as a lecturer, retiring as Professor in 1939. Alongwith his contemporary as an undergraduate, BertrandRussell, and with his colleague at Trinity from 1929 to 1939,Ludwig Wittgenstein, Moore is credited with establishingwhat is now colloquially (if not entirely accurately) known asanalytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy is known, veryroughly, for its approach to the problems of philosophy asproblems of meaning. Clarification and analysis ofmeanings, or concepts, was held to be the key to solvingphilosophical problems, some of which, it was surmised,would even dissolve upon clearer formulation.

Moore’s most important and long-reaching achievementin the history of twentieth-century philosophy, however, washis seemingly casual and sui generis demolition of thephilosophical tradition frequently dismissed, if sometimesin caricature, as Hall-of-Fame-worthy bullshit: AbsoluteIdealism, the view that one way or another, the ultimatenature of reality is mental. Both Moore and Russellproduced early work that demonstrates a leaning toward

Page 82: Bullshit and Philosophy

Idealism. But in 1899 Moore published a paper entitled“The Nature of Judgment,” in the journal Mind, whichdecisively repudiated any idealist metaphysics (particularlywith respect to the nature of thought and its objects), andwhich opened up a new front against the problems ofphilosophy. Russell himself credited Moore with havinginitiated what he calls the ‘revolt’ against Idealism of theiryouth, and the approach introduced by Moore and Russellafter 1899 in their work established a methodology still verymuch dominant today in analytic philosophy.

In 1903 Moore published perhaps his most well-knownwork, titled Principia Ethica, a book whose effect was soprofound on the young men who arrived as undergraduatesat Cambridge in 1902, and who later formed the core of theBloomsbury group, that they referred to it as their religion.Moore did not share Russell’s occasionally maliciousflamboyance; and Wittgenstein early on wounded Moore sodeeply with his impatience and prickliness that they did notspeak for nearly twenty years. Moore has been describedby Russell, Leonard Woolf, and John Maynard Keynes ashaving a purity of character without comparison, a smiledescribed as “lovable,” and a simplicity, ingenuousness,and directness that impressed itself completely andlastingly on those who knew him. Russell, in hisautobiography, writes:16

In my third year . . . I met G.E. Moore, who wasthen a freshman, and for some years he fulfilledmy ideal of genius. He was in those days beautiful

Page 83: Bullshit and Philosophy

and slim, with a look almost of inspiration, andwith an intellect as deeply passionate asSpinoza’s. He had a kind of exquisite purity. Ihave never but once succeeded in making him tella lie, that was by a subterfuge, ‘Moore’, I said, ‘doyou always speak the truth?’ ‘No,’ he replied. Ibelieve this to be the only lie he ever told.

Woolf, for his part, is fulsome about the aspects of Moore’spersonality that resonate significantly here:17

. . . Moore was a great man, the only great manwhom I have ever met or known in the world ofordinary, real life. There was in him an elementwhich can, I think, be accurately called greatness,a combination of mind and character andbehavior, of thought and feeling which made himqualitatively different from anyone else I have everknown.... he had a passion for truth . . . Moorecould never tolerate anything but truth, commonsense, and reality . . . he had an extra-ordinaryprofundity and clarity of thought, and he pursuedtruth with the tenacity of a bulldog and the integrityof a saint.

These personal qualities appeared to have beeninstrumental to the evolution of the method most associatedwith Moore, usually known as the method of commonsense. Much of the evaluation of the effect of Moore, in the

Page 84: Bullshit and Philosophy

words of his friends, at least, makes reference to it. JohnMaynard Keynes,18 for example, writes:

It was all under the influence of Moore’s method,according to which you could hope to makeessentially vague notions clear by using preciselanguage about them and asking exact questions.It was a method of discovery by the instrument ofimpeccable grammar and an unambiguousdictionary. ‘What exactly do you mean?’ was thephrase most frequently on our lips. If it appearedunder cross-examination that you did not meanexactly anything, you lay under a strong suspicionof meaning nothing whatever . . .

In practice, victory was with those who couldspeak with the greatest appearance of clear,undoubting conviction, and could best use theaccents of infallibility. Moore at this time was amaster of this method—greeting one’s remarkswith a gasp of incredulity—Do you really thinkthat, an expression of face as if to hear such athing reduced him to a state of wonder verging onimbecility, with his mouth wide open and wagginghis head in the negative no violently that his hairshook. Oh! He would say, goggling at you as ifeither you or he must be mad; and no reply waspossible.

Page 85: Bullshit and Philosophy

Now, Moore occasionally went, at least in his ownestimation, a little too far. At the beginning of the third of aset of lectures that Moore delivered in 1898,19 he says:

I believe I owe you a public apology for mybehavior during part of the discussion lastThursday. To one gentleman, in particular, I doowe such an apology. In the heat of the moment Icertainly entertained, and implied by my words,the belief that one question which he addressedto me was not due to any serious difficulty felt byhim, with regard to the matter in question . . . Myfeeling was that the question was merely avexatious one, was indeed only momentary, butthat does not excuse it.

Apparently, if anything could send Moore to immoderatelengths (for him), it was bullshit; here in the case of aquestion he believed was not intended as genuine. It wasdifficult for Moore, as we see here, to tolerate with too muchequanimity even the possibility that someone would botherto raise a question without being seriously interested in itsformulation or outcome. This, I think, is a key to adaptingMoorean attitudes as resistance to bullshit. So let usanalyze what form this immunity could take today andstrengthen it against our susceptibility to bullshit.

Page 86: Bullshit and Philosophy

Let’s Stop Bullshitting Ourselves

Moore’s friends and acquaintances were entirelyunanimous on his goodness—the essence, after all, of onewe look to for inspiration. But the descriptions of Moore’scharacter as ‘saintly’ and ‘pure’, though no doubt charming,may tempt the reader into suspecting they lack a certainpracticality. Surely a Moorean attitude is impossible, today,to resurrect. After all, Moore and his cohorts were productsof an era so entirely bygone that it might appear fruitlesseven to attempt to harness a Moorean attitude to anything,let alone something as seemingly steeped in the modernas bullshit, as least as far as its current pervasivenessgoes. Keynes notes something of this in his memoir:20

I have said that we were amongst the first toescape from Benthamism. But of anothereighteenth-century heresy we were theunrepentant heirs and last upholders. We wereamong the last of the Utopians, or meliorists asthey are sometimes called, who believe in acontinuing moral progress by virtue of which thehuman race already consists of reliable, rational,decent people, influenced by truth and objectivestandards, who can be safely released from the

Page 87: Bullshit and Philosophy

outward restraints of convention and traditionalstandards and inflexible rules of conduct, and left,from now onwards, to their own sensible devices,pure motives and reliable intuitions of the good . .. It did not occur to us to respect the extra-ordinaryaccomplishment of our predecessors in theordering of life . . . It was not only that intellectuallywe were pre-Freudian . . . I still suffer incurablyfrom attributing an unreal rationality to otherpeople’s feelings and behavior . . . There is onesmall but extraordinarily silly manifestation of thisabsurd idea of what is ‘normal’, namely theimpulse to protest . . . I behave as if there reallyexisted some authority or standard to which I cansuccessfully appeal if I shout loud enough . . . Butthis is why I say that there may have been just agrain of truth when Lawrence said in 1914 that wewere ‘done for’.

A sharp eye on the essence of the Moorean attitudedirectly connect us to Frankfurt’s charge that bullshit is athreat to civilization—note the melancholy ‘done for’ at theend of Keynes’s remarks, above. What the Mooreanattitude has, and what we might think about deploying moreexplicitly, is his dispassionate respect for the truth such thatit considers any attitude that falls short—such as disdain fortruth—as a disgrace. Moore himself is the ideal, to be sure;someone in whom philosophical insight, character, andaction were seamlessly blended; an emissary, perhaps,

Page 88: Bullshit and Philosophy

from that possible world where bullshit has withered for lackof collaborators. But I think there are elements of theMoorean attitude that are accessible and realistic and thatnow is as good a time as any to man up and face bullshitdown. I suggested above that bullshit has an uncanny wayof selling us on ourselves, so to speak. I will close byspelling this out more clearly, adding a sense of theMoorean attitude of common sense to counter it, as the titleof this essay suggests.21

People have been bullshitting one another since thedawn of time, to be sure, but something that bothFrankfurt’s and Cohen’s analyses suggest, and that wecould be more aware of, is that bullshit can be deflated.Bullshit, as we have seen, doesn’t care one way or anotherwhether what it expresses is true, or even strictlymeaningful. It does care, however, about getting us to fall inwith it. Bullshit has to care about something: it has to careabout us and what we care about. If we care more aboutthe difference between truth and falsity, bullshit will find iteasier to take hold. So, to resist it, all we need to do ismake a resolute stand on the difference between what istrue and what isn’t.

Easier said than done, perhaps—which of us reallythinks that our estimation of truth is shabby orquestionable?. But it may come as no surprise here that thepractical solution to this will be to adopt a philosophicalattitude—in particular, a Moorean attitude. Consider thispassage from Moore’s “A Defence of Common Sense,”

Page 89: Bullshit and Philosophy

where his asperity firmly conveys that when it comes tobullshit, even in philosophy, enough is enough:

In what I have just said, I have assumed that thereis some meaning which is the ordinary or popularmeaning of such expressions as ‘The earth hasexisted for many years past.’ And this, I am afraid,is an assumption which some philosophers arecapable of disputing. They seem to think that thequestion ‘Do you believe that the earth hasexisted for many years past?’ is not a plainquestion, such as should be met either by a plain‘Yes’ or ‘No’ or by a plain ‘I can’t make up mymind,’ but is the sort of question which can beprop-erly met by ‘It all depends on what you meanby “the earth” and “exists” and “years”: if you meanso and so, and so and so, and so and so, then Ido; but if you mean so and so, and so and so, andso and so, or so and so, and so and so, and soand so, or so and so, and so and so and so andso, then I don’t, or at least I think it is profoundlydoubtful’. It seems to me that such a view is asprofoundly mistaken as any view can be.

Moore didn’t suffer bullshit gladly, and we can do thesame. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, asthe platitude goes. What Moore’s resistance against formsof what we’d call bullshit takes as a priority is clarity. Mooreshows us that a doggedness about getting clear about the

Page 90: Bullshit and Philosophy

content of an utterance or statement to get to the bottom ofwhat it could really mean can really pay off—say, in theindisputable effect of revealing the characteristic scorn forthe difference between truth and falsity that bullshit purveys.The scorn for truth that characterizes bullshit, after all, mustbe masked in various ways, or bullshit itself would run therisk of imploding. So, on top of disingenuous vagueness,equivocation, downright incoherence, and a whole host ofother tactics for skirting the truth, what bullshit really needsis for us to be less inquisitive, less analytical, lessdetermined to follow along and scrutinize its claims. Bullshitneeds us, but we don’t need bullshit. So to thwart it, wemust instead adopt the ‘tenacity of a bulldog’, that Woolfdescribes as the characteristic of a Moorean pursuit ofclarity and truth; especially, it goes without saying, withrespect to ourselves.

So my suggestion for resisting bullshit is the adoption ofthe critical stance, characteristic of philosophy, toward anyclaims on our mental lives; our beliefs and certainties,including the ones that characterize our deepestconvictions about ourselves and our ability to tell truth fromfalsity. G.E. Moore is an example of a philosopher wholived the method that he is best known for in his work andwho connected a philosophical method to everyday life.Moore may have been iconic in this regard, to be sure, buthis method is adaptable to us, and to now. It’s commonsense that bullshit has to care about something. But it’salso just common sense to realize that caring about thedistinction between what’s true and what’s false matters a

Page 91: Bullshit and Philosophy

lot to us. If we care more about the truth, then bullshit has tofind another way. But now bullshit has to care whether wecare about the truth, and so it more or less undermines itsown position, withering away from the inside out, so tospeak. This is the paradox of bullshit; both street andacademic. Truth and meaning don’t matter to bullshit; butbullshit has to make itself matter to us. So what matters tous is going to have to matter to bullshit. If it matters to us notto scorn the difference between truth and falsity, and if itmatters to us to take the search for clarity in our conceptsand statements seriously, bullshit ends up on a short leash.And, thanks to Moore, we now have a strategy to keep itthere. Enough, indeed, is enough. What exactly do youmean?

Page 92: Bullshit and Philosophy

3

The Pragmatics of Bullshit, IntelligentlyDesigned

GEORGE A. REISCH

Harry Frankfurt admits that his definition of bullshit leavesus with a puzzle. It has to do with the difference betweenbullshitters and liars. Liars, Frankfurt says, must payattention to truth, if only to avoid speaking it. Bullshittersdon’t. They are essentially indifferent to whether or not whatthey say is true. They just don’t care and their indifferencemay be infectious. That is why Frankfurt takes bullshit to beespecially dangerous and socially corrosive. It looms abovemodern culture as “a greater enemy of the truth than liesare.” 22

If that’s so, then bullshitters, more than liars, should befeared and punished in our culture. But that’s not the way itis. In fact, it’s the reverse. We are generally more tolerantof bullshit than lies. When he first wrote On Bullshit,

Page 93: Bullshit and Philosophy

Frankfurt posed this fact as a puzzle, an “exercise,” for hisreaders to figure out (p. 50). Today, some twenty yearslater, the puzzle remains unsolved. During a radio interviewabout On Bullshit, Frankfurt said:

One of the questions I’m still puzzled by is that weseem to have a much more benign attitude towardBS than we have toward lying.... The liar isregarded . . . as a bad person; what he does isalmost criminal.... Whereas BS we accept; we’retolerant of it. We may turn away from it with anirritated shrug, but we don’t react to it with thesame kind of vehemence and anger that liesfrequently invoke and I really don’t understand justwhy that is.23

In philosophy, an unsolved puzzle can be a good sign. It canmean that our understanding of things is rightly movingforward into new, unfamiliar territory. But it can also indicatethat we’ve fallen into a trap, possibly one of our ownmaking. That’s what has happened with Frankfurt’sdefinition of bullshit. He took a wrong turn in formulating hisdefinition and the result has saddled him (and us) with thispersistent, misleading puzzle.

What we need is a different definition of bullshit. I willoffer one here that is quite different from Frankfurt’s, partlybecause it rests on a distinction between the semantic andthe pragmatic analysis of language. Making that distinctionclear will be worth the effort, however, because the

Page 94: Bullshit and Philosophy

definition of bullshit that results accounts for thoseexamples of bullshit that Frankfurt points to and solves thispuzzle. It provides some good reasons, that is, for why weare more tolerant of bullshit and bullshitters, properlyunderstood, than we are of lies and liars.

Page 95: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Example of Intelligent Design

Another reason my definition of bullshit is different fromFrankfurt’s is that it is inspired by the Intelligent Design (ID)movement—an example of bullshit that Frankfurt could nothave used when he wrote On Bullshit in the mid-1980s. IDwas then merely a gleam in the eyes of its founders andleaders. By now, however, ID is well known for its criticismsof evolutionary theory and its claim that organisms are toocomplex to have evolved solely under the influence ofnatural evolutionary processes. Instead, ID’s supportersinsist, science itself indicates that the history of life on earthinvolved intervention by some supernatural “intelligentdesigner.” When scientists finally accept this fact, they say,biology will be transformed and our understanding of life onearth will be greatly advanced.24

Why should these claims be taken as a typical illustrationof bullshit? On the face of it, they are similar to otherspecies of well-recognized bullshit in politics, publicrelations, and advertising—what Frankfurt calls “the mostindisputable and classic paradigms of the concept” p. 22).Like these, ID speaks to us insistently and urgently. Just asthe advertiser needs us to buy her product, the politicianneeds our vote, and the public relations specialist needs usto accept his view of things, the ID movement needs us to

Page 96: Bullshit and Philosophy

support and approve its proposals for biology and high-school science teaching. Like politicians and advertisers,moreover, ID claims that it is in our interest to do so. Justas your laundry will be cleaner with the right detergent, yourchild’s education will benefit from bringing ID into the publicschool classroom and “teaching the controversy.”

Another reason we should take ID to be a typicalinstance of bullshit is that bullshitters, as Frankfurt puts it,are usually “trying to get away with something” (p. 23). Therecent history of the ID movement suggests what it might betrying to get away with. It descended from the explicitlyreligious program known as “creation science,” whichclaims that the Bible presents accurate scientificinformation about the world. But, in the 1980s, efforts tointroduce creation science into public school classroomswere defeated in the courts on constitutional grounds. So,in the 1990s, largely inspired by Philip Johnson’s bookDarwin on Trial, the ID movement arrived to rescue thecreationist cause by presenting a new, strictly scientific andphilosophical criticism of evolutionary theory. Accordingly,the literature of ID is filled with references to technicalconcepts from philosophy of science, theoretical debates inbiology, and ID’s own, favorite concepts like “specifiedcomplexity,” “irreducible complexity,” and “black boxes.”25

There is reason to suspect, however, that ID’s efforts tobe scientific and theoretically sophisticated are primarilyefforts to appear non-religious. There is no doubt that ID’sleaders have religious and evangelical beliefs and

Page 97: Bullshit and Philosophy

motivations, but they typically distinguish these from theirclaimed roles as scientists or philosophers of science.Philip Johnson, for instance, appears to put on and take offhis vestments according to his audience. To scientists andphilosophers, he speaks of technical matters involvingevidence, logic, and theories of scientific progress. Heargues that science has not actually discovered that thehistory of life is guided solely by naturalistic, evolutionaryprocesses. Instead, Johnson insists, science has merelyassumed the truth of naturalism and is now mentallystraight-jacketed.

When speaking to religious or evangelical audiences,however, this complaint about the controlling naturalistic“assumptions” of evolutionary theory sometimes appearsalongside other, very different claims about the customsand values of modern culture:

Our nation is undergoing an epidemic ofillegitimate births, with rates of illegitimacy amongwhites now soaring to 28 percent while ratesamong inner city blacks in some areas are over80 percent. The majority of these illegitimatebirths are to teenagers.

The American version of modernism does notaspire to obliterate theism, as Soviet Marxismdid, but to marginalize it and thus render itharmless. Modernism is established in the sensethat the intellectual community, usually invoking thepower of the federal judiciary and the mystique of

Page 98: Bullshit and Philosophy

the Constitution, vigorously and almost alwayssuccessfully insists that law and public educationmust be based upon naturalistic assumptions.26

In this article, titled “Is God Unconstitutional: TheEstablished Religious Philosophy of America,” Johnson’scriticisms of “naturalistic assumptions” become part of amuch larger campaign against cultural “modernism” and itstolerance of sexual promiscuity, materialism, atheism andother things—including Darwinian evolution—thatevangelical Christian audiences tend to find repugnant.

It appears, then, that the ID movement is trying to getaway with promoting specific, Christian cultural beliefs andvalues in secular, public schools—just as the creationscience movement attempted. Hoping to succeed wherecreation science failed, however, Johnson and others havecreated a disguise, a cover, for this promotion in the formof an elaborate intellectual critique of biological theory.Beneath its outward packaging, that is, ID is a kind ofcreationism, the promotion of which in public schoolclassrooms is forbidden by the United States Constitution.Thus went the opinion of Judge John E. Jones, who wrotein his decision in the case of Dover, Pennsylvania vs.Kitzmiller, that “ID is a religious view, a mere re-labeling ofcreationism, and not a scientific theory.”27 Since theKitzmiller case was the first major legal hurdle that the IDmovement faced, it would appear that, as the saying goes,this here bullshit won’t fly.

Page 99: Bullshit and Philosophy

A Definition of Bullshit—New andImproved!

If the ID movement counts as bullshit, then Frankfurt’sdefinition is in error. For advocates of ID are plainly notindifferent to truth, as Frankfurt’s definition requires. Wecan leave open the question of whether and to what extentJohnson and his followers are sincerely concerned aboutthe truths of biological science and natural history. But thereis little doubt that they take themselves to be deeplyconcerned with other truths—rotten truths, they believe—about modern culture and “modernism.” Johnson, in fact, isconcerned not only to address these particular truths but toelevate regard for truth itself in popular culture. One of theproblems with “modernism,” Johnson says, is this:

What modernism may lead to is a growing doubtthat there is any such thing as objective truth, witha consequent fragmenting of the body politic intoseparate groups with no common frame ofreference . . . The great need of the 21st centurymay turn out to be a unifying vision, and I do notthink that science will be able to provide it.

Frankfurt and Johnson, it turns out, both care about the

Page 100: Bullshit and Philosophy

status of truth in our culture and share the view that we arebecoming dangerously indifferent to it.

Now, this comparison may seem idiotic. What aChristian, evangelical reformer like Johnson and an IvyLeague philosopher like Frankfurt mean by “truth” may bequite different. Precisely so—and this tells us what is wrongwith Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit. Frankfurt himself failedto take into account the fact that our collective beliefs aboutwhat is true—about the world, about how it works, about ourplace in it—are extremely diverse and often contradictory.Instead, he writes of the truth to which bullshitters areallegedly indifferent as if it were a single, comprehensive,or unitary truth. Throughout On Bullshit he mentions “thetruth” (pp. 30, 33, 40, 47, 51, 56), “the true” (p. 56), and theidea of an “accurate representation of reality” (p. 32) as ifeveryone—bullshitters excepted—not only cares about truthbut further agrees about what “the truth” is, about “howthings really are” (pp. 30, 34).

In fact, we often disagree about how things really are,and this can make it difficult to determine whether this orthat example of bullshit that we may encounter comes fromsomeone who does not care about truth (as Frankfurtclaims is the case) or from someone who does indeedcare about truth, albeit truths that we simply do notrecognize. In fact, as the example of ID illustratesprominently, bullshitters conceal not some indifference totruth but instead a commitment to other truths and, usually,an agenda or enterprise that they take to be inspired or

Page 101: Bullshit and Philosophy

justified by those other truths. For many possible reasons,however, they do not want us to see these truths to whichthey are committed. Our knowledge of these other truths,the bullshitter may fear, will prove embarrassing ordamaging to them or their cause. Or it may render theirclaims less persuasive and less effective. In some cases,revealing these truths would show that their project is in factillegal or, as in ID’s case, unconstitutional.

This pluralism about truth is crucial for understandingbullshit. An effective bullshitter will make use of the diversebeliefs and convictions that populate our world. She will bequite aware that a person or group does not share thetruths that undergird her agenda, so she will configure herprogram within or alongside an altogether different kind ofprogram that, she believes, her audience will applaud andembrace—just as the ID movement places its specificevangelical goals inside what appears to be a crusade toimprove science education. If all goes well, her targets willfind that outer, visible project so appealing, they will agreeto it and unwittingly go along with what has been cloakedinside, as well. Only later—after, for example, the newtextbooks have come in and talk in the biology labincreasingly turns to topics in the Bible—will some of thesetargets recognize that they have been duped.

Page 102: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Truth in Bullshit

Even stock examples of bullshit show that bullshitters arenot indifferent to truth. Consider Frankfurt’s example ofcollege “bull sessions.” Here, he says, “the participants tryout various thoughts and attitudes . . . without it beingassumed that they are committed to what they say” (p. 36).The statements made “are like bullshit by virtue of the factthat they are in some degree unconstrained by a concernwith truth” (p. 38). Language’s grip on truth may be relaxedhere, but that relaxation actually serves other truths andideals that are very important to the average undergrad.These include truths about one’s self image, one’s socialreputation, and to what degree the apple of one’s eye isactually impressed by the very real possibility (asimmortalized in the film Animal House) that a complete,self-contained universe exists within a single atom ofsomeone else’s fingernail. What makes such conversationsbullshit-like is not their casual regard for “the truth” butrather the use of casual, hyperbolic, or inconsequentialclaims to unobtrusively probe or promote other truths orconcerns.

The same holds for advertisers and politicians who drawour attention ostensibly to one set of truths and purposeswhile in fact quietly engaging us about different matters.

Page 103: Bullshit and Philosophy

The person who writes the slogan used to advertise alaundry detergent, or who designs the packaging to displaythat slogan, probably does not care about how well thatdetergent cleans your clothes, even though that is what thewords on the package would appear to be about. But thatdoes not mean that those words and phrases are truth-indifferent bullshit. Effective advertising and productpackaging rests on truths embraced within the advertisingindustry about how graphic design, word associations,celebrity endorsement and other devices speak toconsumers’ thoughts about themselves—their self-image,social aspirations, and feelings of belonging and groupidentity. Politicians are also adept at conducting two (ormore) conversations at once with their constituencies. Oneinvolves policy and issues, but another, as any professionalcampaign manager will tell you, involves clothes, postures,hairstyles, rolled-up sleeves and gestures, all of which arecarefully orchestrated in an attempt to make voting groupsfind a candidate personally likeable.

Bullshit, then, consists in the orchestration of at least twodifferent concerns and corresponding types of engagementbetween bullshitter and bullshitee, one concealed within ordownplayed alongside the other. The two may appear to beunrelated and unconnected—as different as PhilipJohnson’s claims about evolutionary theory and his hoped-for dismantling of cultural “modernism.” But the bullshitterhas co-ordinated them in an effort to maximize his or herchances of accomplishing certain practical goals. Thepolitician who hopes to gain your vote may reason that

Page 104: Bullshit and Philosophy

even if you don’t agree with what he says about the issues,you may nonetheless vote for him because his clothes andmannerisms appeal to you. The auto advertiser hopes thateven if you don’t understand the engineering innovationsspelled out in her advertising copy, you will want to appearsuccessful, attractive, and happy, just like the modelsdriving the car in the ad.

Whatever configuration these two engagements take,however, the phenomenon that Frankfurt takes to beessential to identifying bullshit—its indifference to truth—iseither absent or only partly in play. In some cases, bullshit’sovert message may be some kind of nonsensicalsmokescreen or a display of bluster and bluff that, indeed,even the bullshitter would regard as unconnected to truth.But even in those cases, such smokescreens typicallyserve to hide the motivations and truths that the bullshittergenuinely cares about. In other cases, the bullshitter’s overtmessage may be a small, selected piece of the largerproject he is trying to get away with, much as ID’s attemptsto criticize Darwinian evolutionary theory on strictlyintellectual, scientific grounds can be understood (as PhilipJohnson’s comments suggest) as one small part of a moregeneral effort to promote a supernatural, religious worldview in public culture.

Page 105: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Truth about Semantics

Why does Frankfurt propose a definition of bullshit whichfocuses on the properties of the bullshitter’s speech andstops short of inquiring into these larger, ulterior goals thatbullshit usually serves? Part of the answer, I suspect,involves the difference between semantic and pragmaticanalyses of language. Semantics concerns properties oflanguage such as meaning, truth or falsity—relations, thatis, between words and sentences, on the one hand, and thethings or states of affairs they describe or refer to, on theother. Much of modern analytic philosophy is dedicated tothe semantic analysis of language and difficult questionsabout meaning, reference, and truth.

Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit crucially involvessemantics insofar as bullshitters, as he defines them, don’tcare whether or not their utterances are true. But some ofhis examples of bullshit also point to the pragmatic aspectsof language. To see these, we must expand our picture oflanguage to include not just meaning and truth but also theuses and purposes to which language may be put.Frankfurt’s example of a politician extolling the virtues of anation on some national holiday, for instance, takesspecifically into account the politician’s hope to use lofty,feel-good words and phrases for a specific purpose that

Page 106: Bullshit and Philosophy

has nothing to do with those things he’s speaking about,such as liberty and the founding of a great nation. Rather,he hopes to use this language to make his audience likehim (pp. 16–18).

Decades ago, pragmatics was taken to be just asimportant as semantics for a philosophical understandingof language. Even philosophers who specialized insemantic analysis of language, such as Rudolf Carnap,took it for granted that any “complete theory of language”must take into account pragmatic studies of how languagecan be used by persons in specific contexts.28 Though fewphilosophers would object to Carnap’s remark, philosophyitself evolved to favor semantic studies of language to theexclusion of pragmatics. There are many plausible causesfor this—ranging from the sheer complexity of howlanguage can be used, for example, to the vogue foracademic specialization throughout intellectual life in thetwentieth century. Whatever the causes, this neglect ofphilosophical pragmatics is obvious. Thumb through TheCambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by RobertAudi, for example, and you will find twenty-six entriesbeginning with the word ‘semantics’, but only sevenbeginning with ‘pragmatic’ or ‘pragmatism’.

If any complete theory of language must take pragmaticsinto account, so too must any viable theory of bullshit. Thedistinctive mark of bullshit that I have been describing is anessentially pragmatic, and not semantic, feature oflanguage. It lay in the use of language to achieve certain

Page 107: Bullshit and Philosophy

goals or create certain effects which remain hidden fromthe person or persons to which the bullshit in question isdirected. This is not to say that semantic aspects oflanguage are not involved in producing or understandingbullshit. We can easily imagine our patriotic orator caringvery much about the truth of certain things—like whether ornot his audience is eating up his declarations as much ashe hopes they will. But if we seek to understand the heart ofbullshit we need to turn to pragmatics and not semantics.

Once we do, the definition of bullshit that results is quitedifferent from both Frankfurt’s and Cohen’s.29 And it showsthat the difference between their definitions of bullshit—Frankfurt’s concerning truth and Cohen’s concerningmeaning—is narrow. Both seek the defining characteristicsof bullshit in semantics. But we learn more about bullshit bydefining it as an essentially pragmatic phenomenon.

From the bullshitter’s point of view, it springs from apragmatic aim to co-ordinate two (or more) distinctconcerns or conversations and to use one as a cover orcontainer for the other. From the recipient’s point of view, itis pragmatic insofar as its chances for success dependupon its being received and recognized as a pragmatic,goal-seeking enterprise. Bullshit will be more effective tothe extent that the two concerns it joins together wouldotherwise be regarded by the target audience asindependent, unconnected, and having very different aimsand purposes. The more different those two concernsseem to be, the less likely it will seem that, for example, ascience-education advocate could turn out to be a soul-

Page 108: Bullshit and Philosophy

science-education advocate could turn out to be a soul-saving evangelical in disguise, a news report on televisioncould turn out to be a government-produced segmentdistributed to promote some initiative, or your neighbor thedentist who recommends some particular brand of lawnfertilizer could turn out to be a “word-of-mouth” advertisingagent for the fertilizer company in question.

Page 109: Bullshit and Philosophy

Solving Frankfurt’s Puzzle, or, Baseball,Hot Dogs, Apple Pie, and Bullshit

Construing bullshit as an essentially pragmaticphenomenon, finally, allows us to solve Frankfurt’s puzzle.Overlooking this difference between semantics andpragmatics, in fact, creates Frankfurt’s puzzle. On his view,recall, the liar states something that he knows to be falseand the bullshitter states something without caring whetherit is true or false. Both the liar and the bullshitter, that is, sinagainst the semantics of truth. Yet, there appears no goodreason for why we let one, but not the other, off the hook soeasily.

Once we recognize that the bullshitter does not sinagainst semantics, however, the puzzle disappears. For theliar and the bullshitter are now understood to be doingdifferent things. The liar attempts to mislead us about truth,about how things really are, but the bullshitter attempts tomanipulate us by cloaking the kinds of effects that hewants his speech and his enterprise to have. He sins,rather, against the pragmatics of language by making itappear that his speech is designed to have one kind ofeffect (such as advancing science education, or makingyour laundry cleaner) while his conscious aim is to bring

Page 110: Bullshit and Philosophy

about a different kind of effect (such as promotingevangelical Christianity, or making money for his client).

Taking bullshit to be an essentially pragmatic, and notsemantic, affair, we can see right away that we have manyreasons for treating liars and lies differently from bullshittersand bullshit. For starters, lies can be dangerous in waysthat bullshit usually is not because they can thwart ourneeds, sometimes our vital needs. When you have a badcold, for example, and you cannot tell whether the coffee-milk at work has soured, you need to ask someone about itand you need them to tell you the truth. If they lie it will ruinyour coffee, if not your morning.

Bullshit, on the other hand, engages us differently.Instead of responding to our own needs and concerns, itseeks to create needs or perceptions with which it canmanipulate us. The difference is important, for it explainswhy we can ignore bullshit safely but lies only at our peril.Without a gullible, believing audience, after all, bullshit canhave no effect. So, when that guy in the office comes roundto chat about Darwin being completely wrong and biologybeing due for a scientific revolution that will finally admitsupernatural forces in science, you are likely to respondwith all the indifference his appeal deserves: “Sure, Darwin.Whatever. Hey, do you happen to know if the milk in therefrigerator is still good today?”

This is not to say, however, that we can be indifferentabout bullshit because bullshit is indifferent to truth. Rather,we can be indifferent to it precisely because we are awareof its attempt to pragmatically manipulate truth (or truths)

Page 111: Bullshit and Philosophy

of its attempt to pragmatically manipulate truth (or truths)and make one kind of appeal or engagement appear to bea very different kind of engagement. So understood, thequestion this bullshit presents to us is not whether thisbullshit is true, false or respectful of the distinction, butwhether or not it will succeed in its pragmatic attempt todisguise one kind of engagement as another. Will itcontinue to enlist bullshit-believing supporters andadvocates?

This leads to a second, moral reason for why we goeasier on bullshit and bullshitters. Unlike the liar, whodeliberately obscures what he takes to be true, bullshittersmay often be honest and sincere. The common expressionthat a person “believes his own bullshit” is of some usehere, the believing bullshitter having no appreciation for themanner in which bullshit’s component parts have beenfashioned to fit together. Philip Johnson, for example, isprobably not a sincere bullshitter in so far as he speaksabout the different parts of his agenda for the ID movementin isolation from each other, using different language anddifferent rhetorical styles for the appropriate audiences. Butthose who are lured to ID by its talking-points (such as theclaim that biology is wracked by “controversy” over theadequacy of evolutionary theory) may have no idea thattheir impressions rest on strategizing, wordsmithing, issue-framing, and public relations. So, when your annoying co-worker comes by with his daily update about the immanentcollapse of Darwinism, you may even begin to feel sorry forhim. He’s been duped, taken-in. He is not even an active

Page 112: Bullshit and Philosophy

bullshitter, for he is merely passing along the bullshit that hehimself fell for. There, but for the grace of some criticalthinking, go I.

In some circumstances, we may even sympathize withactive, deliberate bullshitters. Shortly after Judge Jones’sruling that ID is concealed creationism, for example, IDorganizer Stephen Meyer publicly defied this ruling byasserting the opposite: “Contrary to media reports,” hewrote, “intelligent design is not a religious-based idea, butinstead an evidence-based scientific theory about life’sorigins—one that challenges strictly materialistic views ofevolution.”30 Artists and playwrights know that this kind ofsupreme confidence fascinates us. Here, we are not farfrom the boundless, American optimism shared by ArthurMiller’s Willy Loman, Al Pacino’s bank robber in Dog DayAfternoon, and the positive-thinking salesmen in DavidMamet’s Glengary Glen Ross, ever-sure that things arelooking up for them, that their big deal is just a phone callaway—but, of course, only if they play it just right. In ID’scase, this optimism would seem to lie behind its knack forsuccessive reinvention, with “Intelligent Design” rescuingthe failed creation-science movement, and now (it appears)a new program, “Critical Analysis of Evolution,” waiting inthe wings to rescue the faltering ID campaign.31 With justthe right language, and just the right kind of public relationscampaign, creationists seem to think, they will eventuallytake the world by storm. Until they do, however, failures willalways be viewed as minor setbacks and attributed to

Page 113: Bullshit and Philosophy

misunderstandings, inaccurate “media reports,” andanything but the fundamental incoherence of the plan or thedubious quality of the product in question. Here, thebullshitter is concerned about truth in a slightly different way:he clings to the bullshit he originally created to deceiveothers in a bid to avoid the bitter truth of his own failure ordefeat.

Finally, we tolerate bullshit because it indirectlyexpresses basic cultural values that we admire and uphold.That tolerance does not extend to bullshit’s insincerity, ofcourse, but it does extend to the myriad beliefs, practices,and discourses that serve as bullshit’s raw materials. Wereit not for the relentless efforts of ID’s devotees tocommandeer high school biology classes, for example,most scientists, educators, and philosophers would noteven take pains to criticize the movement or its claims.Like the many cultures and subcultures that dot the modernlandscape, ID-advocates are free to cultivate their ownunderstandings about “how things really are,” and, in theUnited States, at least, they enjoy constitutional and civilprotections to speak their minds. We may regret that theypromote their own agendas duplicitously and at theexpense of other people’s concerns and practices, but wecan hardly regret this pluralism and variety itself.

Page 114: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Case for Purism about Bullshit

So, if bullshit taps into our sympathies for others who havebeen taken in, and reflects the myriad beliefs and agendasthat make modern life go, you might think that our culture isknee-deep in it. You’d get the same impression from thecommon use of the word ‘bullshit’. Yet that impressionwould be wrong. One implication of this pragmaticdefinition of bullshit is that there’s really not quite that muchof it about. It has a specific pragmatic structure, does notcome into being by accident, and is certainly not veryeffective unless it is crafted with good measures ofcreativity and pragmatic intelligence in the use of language.All that is obscured, however, by our casual use of“Bullshit!” or “That’s just bullshit” to express disagreement,disapproval, or disappointment about, more or less,anything at all.

But if you look at things from any bullshitter’s point ofview, all this vagueness and misidentification of bullshit is agood thing. The less discerning we are about bullshit, theless able we are to identify the real thing when it comesalong. So, when your significant other announces that yourrelationship is over, for instance, you should not say “that’sbullshit!” It’s not. Yes, saying “Gee, that’s very bad news forme. I’m sorry to learn of it” doesn’t seem appropriate to the

Page 115: Bullshit and Philosophy

occasion. But bad news is not bullshit. Nor is a WhiteHouse official’s claim that the citizens of some oil-richnation, but for its controlling dictator, are eager to embraceWestern-style democracy and economic markets. Theseare just announcements which—semantics, again—may betrue or false, credible or incredible, clear or unclear. Theyare not bullshit.

Bullshit, instead, is your significant other’s effort to partways through very different means—such as conversationsabout feeling misunderstood, or smothered, or somethingfeeling “not right”—that just might lead to a mutual, blame-free breakup. Bullshit, instead, is being informed that thisdictator possesses nuclear weapons and soon plans to usethem on allies and neighboring nations. Indeed, I suspect itwill only be possible to understand the seemingly magicalpower of language to persuade and manipulate individualand popular opinion when we begin to appreciate bullshitas a specific and precise creation, like a poem orsymphony with multiple, interconnected layers of meaningthat are intelligently designed and artfully orchestrated.32

Page 116: Bullshit and Philosophy

4

Bullshit and the Foibles of the Human Mind,or: What the Masters of the Dark Arts Know

KENNETH A. TAYLOR

Public discourse in our times is in many ways debased. Itcontains a depressing stew of bullshit, propaganda, spin,and outright lies. The sources of these debasements aremany. Those who seek to distract, manipulate, scam ormislead have full and easy access to the instruments ofmass representation, communication and persuasion,while those who aim merely to speak the truth, no matterhow discomforting or inconvenient, or to advocate for hard,but necessary choices struggle to be heard.

Political discourse is the outstanding example.Politicians and their handlers typically subject us to anunrelenting stream of manipulative, mendaciousmisinformation, designed to mobilize the angry anddishearten the sober. We are seldom treated asdemocracy’s primary and essential stakeholders, hardlyever treated to an honest, systematic and fair-mindedexploration of the issues that face us, the cost and benefitsof the available alternatives, or the real potential winners

Page 117: Bullshit and Philosophy

and losers of our policy choices. And politics is by nomeans the only contributor to the debasement of the publicsphere. We are enticed by the hypnotic techniques ofcontemporary marketing into ever more buying andconsumption, with hardly a concern for the downside costsof that consumption. Night after night on the so-called news,we are numbed by stories that momentarily titillate orshock, but seldom offer meat for sober reflection or lastingenlightenment.

It would be easy to lay blame for the debased state ofpublic discourse in our times squarely and solely on theshoulders of those who purvey this endless stream ofpropaganda, bullshit, spin and outright lies. Certainly, inthese times, the production of bullshit, propaganda, andspin have been exquisitely honed into high, if dark, arts.33

Nor is it altogether surprising that the bullshitting arts, as Iwill call the whole lot, should have reached such exaltedheights. Given a putatively open public square, in whichcompeting interests must freely contend for control of themeans of shared representation and persuasion, thebullshitting arts could not dominate without being highlydeveloped, insidious and infectious.

In a totalitarian state, by contrast, these arts can afford toremain crude and underdeveloped. Such a state exercisesexclusive control over the means of public representationand persuasion. And it reserves onto itself the right tobludgeon citizens into at least the pretense of belief whenofficial bullshit and its cousins fail to persuade of their ownpowers. Where the bullshitting arts are not backed by the

Page 118: Bullshit and Philosophy

power to bludgeon, they must stand entirely on their ownand win dominance over the means of publicrepresentation and persuasion through their own art andartifice. Though one might antecedently have hoped that inan open marketplace of ideas, good discourse wouldspontaneously drive out bad, the purveyors of bullshit haveproven themselves more than adequate to the seeminglydaunting task of dominating large swaths of themarketplace. Over the air, on the printed page, in publicdebate, even in the lecture halls of the academy, bullshitconfronts us at every turn.34

But the purveyors of bullshit, propaganda, spin and theoutright lie cannot sell what we do not buy. So the fault forthe pervasiveness of bullshit must lie partly within ourselves.The human mind is a powerful instrument, one of naturalselection’s most amazing products. It’s the creator of art,science, and philosophy. It has spawned complex forms ofsocial life and a dizzying variety of cultural formations. Yet,for all its astounding cognitive and cultural achievements,that very same mind not only produces, but is regularlytaken in by bullshit, propaganda, spin, and the outright lie.Our susceptibility to these is, I shall argue, deeply rooted inthe very architecture of the human mind. The human mind isafflicted with certain built-in architectural foibles and limitsthat render it permanently susceptible to a host ofmanipulations. Wherever there are humans cogniz-ing,there is bound to be a niche for the bullshit artist, forpurveyors of easy and comforting falsehoods or half-truths.

Page 119: Bullshit and Philosophy

To be sure, no one self-consciously and explicitly says toherself, “That is pure bullshit, but I will take it at face value,nonetheless.” Like its cousins, the outright lie or the self-serving spin, bullshit works best when we don’t recognize itor acknowledge it for what it is. It’s most effective when weare blind to its effects. This is not to deny that wesometimes do willingly, if not quite knowingly orconsciously, co-operate with the bullshit artist, the spinner,or even the liar. Allowing oneself to be taken in by amisrepresentation, but not quite consciously so, is,perhaps, an effective means of self-deception, onerequiring less torturous mental gymnastics than the whollyself-driven variety. But even granting our propensity tobelieve the comforting falsehood over the discomfortingtruth, it is not altogether easy to explain why there is so verymuch bullshit and other forms of misrepresentation around,why we are so often taken in by it, and why we find it sohard to distinguish bullshit from its contraries. I address thebulk of this essay to these questions and focus on just a fewof the many foibles of the human mind that render it liable tobe taken in by bullshit and other forms ofmisrepresentation.

Page 120: Bullshit and Philosophy

Some Cognitive Foibles of the HumanMind

In recent decades, cognitive and evolutionary psychologistshave logged a depressing catalog of the foibles of thehuman mind. For all our amazing cognitive achievementsas a species, human cognition turns out to be a bewitchingstew of the good and the bad. We are subject toconfirmation bias, prone to self-deception, and bad atmany and diverse forms of reasoning—including statisticalreasoning, reasoning about conditionals, and theassessment of risks and rewards.

Consider the run-up to the war in Iraq. Many putativelyauthoritative voices in the administration and the media toldus repeatedly that we would be welcomed as liberators,that stockpiles of WMD were present in Iraq, that Iraq boresome vague connection to 9/11, that the war would bequick, cheap, and largely financed by Iraqi oil. Far off centerstage, a few dissenting voices could be heard whisperingthat none of it was so. By and large, the public ignoredthose voices and bought the tale they were told by theputatively more authoritative voices shouting from centerstage. I am not at present concerned with what led towidespread acceptance of the initial tale in the first place,but rather with the persistence of belief in that tale long after

Page 121: Bullshit and Philosophy

an ever-increasing body of evidence spoke decisivelyagainst it. Though belief in the wisdom of the war is at thiswriting far less widespread than it once was, there is nodoubt that for a long while certain falsehoods held a vice-grip on the minds of many in ways that rendered thosebeliefs at least temporarily impervious to any subsequentdisconfirming evidence.

This vice-grip reflects what social psychologists callconfirmation bias—the tendency to notice and seek outthings that confirm one’s beliefs, and to ignore, avoid, orundervalue the relevance of things that would disconfirmone’s beliefs.35 Confirmation bias is not a merelyoccasional affliction of the human mind. It’s deeplyingrained and endemic to it. Confirmation bias helps toexplain the imperviousness of already adopted beliefs tocontravening evidence and it also helps to explain ourtendency to overestimate our own epistemic reliability. Ifone believes some proposition, then one typically will alsobelieve that one has good reason for believing that veryproposition. We tend, that is, not to believe that our beliefsare ungrounded or ill-formed. And we tend to reject not justevidence inconsistent with already adopted beliefs, butalso evidence that would tend to challenge our ownepistemic reliability or authority. So if one believes Bush’srationale for the Iraq war, then one will tend also to believethat it is perfectly reasonable to believe Bush’s rationale,that one was not being duped or deceived into believingthat rationale, and that any reasonable person would shareone’s belief. Such confidence, even when undeserved, will

Page 122: Bullshit and Philosophy

one’s belief. Such confidence, even when undeserved, willlead one to reject not just evidence suggesting that whatBush said was false, but any evidence suggesting that onewas foolhardy or in some ways irrational in accepting thatrationale. By the lights of the true believer, the person whorejects Bush’s rationale for the war is not just mistaken butirrational, or in some way self-deceived. It is not thebeliever who is a dupe or a fool, but the unbeliever. But thedeeper point is that any evidence that the skeptic mightmuster to try to convince the true believer otherwise is, ineffect, antecedently discounted before the argument everbegins.

Confirmation bias helps to explain our doggedresistance to changing our beliefs.36 But it may appear thatconfirmation bias must play only a negligible role in theinitial formation of new beliefs. As such, it may appear tobe of little aid to the propagandist or the bullshit artist ingaining initial leverage over our beliefs. Though there is acertain truth to this, we should not underestimate the extentto which confirmation bias aids the spread of bull. One hasonly to consider the rise of information cocoons like FoxNews, right wing talk radio, Air America, and thefragmented and unruly blogosphere. Information cocoonssystematically promote a certain narrow range of views andoutlooks and systematically misrepresent or excludealternative points of view and competing sources ofevidence. That more and more Americans self-consciouslyseek their news and information from information cocoonsis the direct result of confirmation bias run rampant. Though

Page 123: Bullshit and Philosophy

the creators of such cocoons are merely responding to ourown self-generated demand, they are nonetheless able toexert great influence over public discourse through theirhighly skilled management of such cocoons. Once aninformation consumer’s confirmation bias has led her togive herself over to the managers of an information cocoon,she has, I suggest, made herself easy pickings for thepropagandist, the spinner, and the bullshit artist.

There are, to be sure, a host of foibles of the mind thatmore directly and immediately affect the initial formation ofour beliefs—and preferences—rather than just the doggedmaintenance of them. I have in mind our susceptibility toframing effects on the formation of beliefs andpreferences.37 Imagine that the US government ispreparing for an outbreak of the Avian flu. Suppose thatwithout intervention the disease is expected to kill, say, sixthousand people. Two alternative programs to combat thedisease have been proposed. The exact scientificestimates of the consequences of each program are asfollows:

If Program A is adopted, two thousand people willbe saved.If program B is adopted, there is one-third chancethat six thousand people will be saved and a two-thirds chance that no one will be saved.

When experimental subjects are asked to choose betweenthese programs, seventy-two percent choose program A,

Page 124: Bullshit and Philosophy

while twenty-eight percent choose program B.Notice that the “expected return” in lives saved of the two

programs is identical. So why are subjects not indifferentbetween the two programs? Because we tend to be riskaverse when we choose between outcomes all of whichhave a positive expected return. That is, people tend toprefer a sure thing to a risky thing of equal or greaterexpected return when both expected returns are positive.This means that people tend to prefer the certainty ofsaving two thousand lives over an alternative that riskslosing more lives, even if that alternative involves thepossibility that more lives will be saved. In preferring A to B,people assign disproportionately greater weight to the twothousand additional lives that might be lost than to theadditional four thousand lives that might be saved bypursuing program B.

Now consider an alternative scenario that is typicallypresented to a different set of experimental subjects. Asbefore, the government is preparing for an outbreak of theAvian flu. Two programs are being contemplated inresponse to the outbreak. The exact scientific estimates ofthe effectiveness of the programs look like this:

If program C is adopted, four thousand people willdie.If program D is adopted, there is a one-thirdchance that no one will die and a two-thirdschance that six thousand people will die.

Page 125: Bullshit and Philosophy

Presented with a choice between programs C and D,seventy-eight percent of experimental subjects will chooseprogram D, while twenty-two percent choose program C.Again, the expected return, this time in lives lost, is identicalon the two programs. And again, we might wonder whysubjects should prefer plan D to plan C. The answer is thatpeople tend to be risk seeking with respect to losses. Thismeans that people tend to prefer pursuing the chance thatno one will die—even if it pursuing that chance meansrunning the risk of more deaths—to the certainty that fewerwill die. In preferring D to C, people are, in effect, assigningdisproportionately less weight to the two thousandadditional lives that might be lost than to the four thousandadditional lives that might be saved by pursuing plan D overplan C.

What is striking about these results is the fact thatprogram C and program A are identical programs. Theyare merely described differently—one in terms of lives lost,the other in terms of lives saved. If we pursue program A,two thousand people will be saved. But that just means thatfour thousand will die who otherwise might not have.Exactly this set of outcomes is envisioned by program C.Similarly, programs B and D also envision the same exactoutcomes, with just the same probabilities. But B describesthose outcomes in terms of lives saved, while D describesthose outcomes in terms of lives lost. It seems painfullyobvious that whatever rational basis there can be forpreferring A to B, or vice versa, obtains equally well for thechoice between C to D. But over and over again,

Page 126: Bullshit and Philosophy

choice between C to D. But over and over again,experimenters find the choice between equivalentscenarios to be highly sensitive to the way in which thechoice is framed.

Our sensitivity to the way a set of alternatives is “framed,”together with our insensitivity to that which is invariantacross different ways of framing the same set ofalternatives provides powerful leverage for purveyors ofspin, propaganda, and bull. To take a not altogether fancifulexample, imagine two politicians, Smith and Jones. Smithwants to convince the voters that program A (that is, C)ought to be pursued. She wants to do so because programA will be highly beneficial to a pharmaceutical company thathas made significant contributions to her campaign. On theother hand, because a certain medical supply company willbenefit highly from program D (that is, B) Jones wants toconvince the voters that program D (that is, B) ought to bepursued. Smith knows that if she succeeds in framing thechoice in terms of potential lives saved, she has a betterchance of swaying the voters. Jones knows that if shesucceeds in framing the issue in terms of potential liveslost, her arguments have a better chance of swaying thevoters. Neither has an incentive to point out the frame-invariant regularities. Both have an incentive for exploitingour susceptibility to framing effects. To that extent, they co-operate in jointly misleading the voter into thinking that hehas been subject to a real debate about competing optionsfairly and dispassionately considered. In reality, he hasbeen no more than fodder in a war over the framing of the

Page 127: Bullshit and Philosophy

issues.38

Another kind of framing effect has to do with simple if-then reasoning. Human beings have a complexunderstanding of the causal structure of the world, more sothan any other creature on this planet. It would not beunreasonable to expect that we as a species must berather adept a simple if-then reasoning. Not just ourunderstanding of the causal structure of the physical world,but all of social life would seem to be founded on ourcapacity for if-then reasoning. But, surprisingly, we are notas adept at such reasoning as one might antecedently haveexpected. Consider the so-called Wason selection task.That task tests for the ability to falsify conditionalhypotheses. Here is a typical experimental set-up. Subjectsare given four cards. They are told that each card has anumber on one side and a letter on the other. They areasked to name those cards and only those cards whichshould be turned over in order to determine whether thefollowing rule is true or false of these four cards:

If a card has the letter D on one side, it has thenumber 3 on the other

D

Page 128: Bullshit and Philosophy

A

3

7

Applying straight-forward propositional logic, the correctcards are the D card and the 7 card. If a D is on the otherside of the 7, then the rule is falsified. If anything other thana 3 is on the other side of the D card, the rule will befalsified again.

Subjects perform remarkably poorly on this task.Typically, less than twenty-five percent of subjects give thecorrect choice. Indeed, in some version of Wason’s originalexperiment this was as low as five percent. The mostfrequent choices are that only the D card need be turnedover or that the D card together with the 3 card should beturned over. The 7 card is seldom chosen by subjects.

Page 129: Bullshit and Philosophy

Moreover, subjects are remarkably resistant to training onthis task. If shown the correct response for a particular run,they get the point, but they seem to lack the ability togeneralize to new runs of essentially the same task.

Notice that turning over the 3 card cannot falsify the rule.Whatever is on the other side of the 3 card is consistentwith the rule. So there is a weak sense in which the 3 cardmight be thought to “confirm” the rule. Perhaps that is whysubjects tend to turn it over. So we may be seeing our oldfriend confirmation bias rearing its head again.

The persistent inability of subjects to perform well on thisand other tests that would seem to require little more than acertain minimal logical acumen has tempted many toconclude that human cognition is irredeemably irrational.But that conclusion is hasty and crude. For one thing,whatever can be said for the rational powers of this or thatindividual mind, our amazing cognitive achievements as aspecies suggest that human cognition, taken as a whole,must be one of natural selection’s most consequentialinnovations. Only the first advent of sexual reproduction, Isuspect, was more consequential. I do not mean to denythat most of us probably are destined for some degree ofcognitive mediocrity. But the real key to our cognitivesuccess as a species rests, I conjecture, on our evolvedcapacity for culture. Where cultural mechanisms function tospread the benefits of one or more individual’s cognitiveinnovations and successes to others, it is not necessarythat everyone be an Einstein, Newton or Leonardo. Ineffect, our shared capacity for shared culture enables the

Page 130: Bullshit and Philosophy

many to free-ride on the cognitive achievements of the few.This is a fortunate fact indeed and another testament tonatural selection’s sheer brilliance at mind-design.

Even granting that many or most of us may be cognitivefree-riders on the astounding cognitive achievements of thefew, it would still be a mistake to conclude too hastily thathuman minds are irredeemably irrational. Sometimes, infact, our sensitivity to framing effects works to give ourminds a greater semblance of rationality. For example,performance on Wason Selection Tasks is known toimprove dramatically when the conditional in question is“re-framed” in terms of something like a social contract.You are a bartender. Your task is to see that there is nounderage drinking. That is, you must see to it that thefollowing conditional is true: If someone is drinking beer,then she must be older than 21. Which cards should youturn over?

drinking beer

drinking coke

Page 131: Bullshit and Philosophy

25 years old

16 years old

From a purely logical point of view, this problem has exactlythe same structure as the earlier one. Nonetheless,subjects perform significantly better on the second versionof the task than on the first.

Some evolutionary psychologists have concluded on thebasis of this sort of data that natural selection has endowedthe human mind with a special purpose “cheater detection”module. 39 Since the making and enforcing of socialcontracts of vary-ing scope and complexities is no doubt acore human competence, it would not be at all surprising ifwe were somehow naturally and specially adapted to beable to determine swiftly and reliably whether a contractwas being respected or violated. Still, it is striking that weare apparently unable to generalize, to transport whatworks in a given problem domain to different but structurallysimilar problem domains. The evolutionary psychologistconcludes, partly on the basis of such inability, that our

Page 132: Bullshit and Philosophy

minds are not general-purpose problem solving machines.Rather, they were specifically adapted to solve specificcognitive problems that were of recurring significance in theenvironments for which we are evolved. Often thoserecurring problems came with what we might call built-inframes that enabled certain structures in our mind to quicklyand effortlessly recognize the kind of reasoning that had tobe applied. In his book, How the Mind Works (New York:Norton, 1997), Stephen Pinker puts it nicely:

No organism needs content-free algorithmsapplicable to any problem no matter how esoteric.Our ancestors encountered certain problems forhundreds of millions of years—recognizingobjects, making tools, learning the local language,finding a mate, predicting an animal’smovements, finding their way—and encounteredcertain other problems never—putting a man onthe moon, growing better popcorn, provingFermat’s last theorem. The knowledge that solvesa familiar kind of problem is often irrelevant to anyother one. The effect of slant on luminance isuseful in calculating shape but not in assessingthe fidelity of a potential mate. The effects of lyingon tone of voice help with fidelity but not withshape. Natural selection does not care about theideals of liberal education and should have noqualms about building parochial inferencemodules that exploit eons-old regularities in their

Page 133: Bullshit and Philosophy

own subject matters. (p. 304)

If this is right, then it is not altogether surprising that at leastsome framing effects actually improve the functioning of thehuman mind. And that conclusion provides some groundsfor hope that if we could always but frame matters rightly,much cognitive detritus might well be swept away. Onceagain, we see that for good or for ill, he who controls theframe may well control all.

Page 134: Bullshit and Philosophy

Reclaiming the Public Square

Our all-too brief examination of just a few of the manycognitive foibles of the human mind supports both a bleakconclusion and a more hopeful one. The hopeful conclusionis that our minds appear to be finely tuned instruments, welladapted for solving the plethora of recurrent cognitivechallenges that were endemic in the information processingenvironments of our hunter-gather progenitors. To theextent that contemporary information processingenvironments match those in which we were designed tofunction, our cognitive capacities serve us well.Unfortunately, the modern world subjects human cognitionto stresses and strains unlike anything encountered on theancient savannah. We are bombarded with information andmisinformation in a dizzying variety, often intentionallyframed in ways unsuited for our natural cognitivecapacities. The mismatch between our cognitive capacitiesand the informational environments in which we now findourselves partly explains both why there is so much bull,spin, and propaganda about, and why we are so oftentaken in by it.

Now it bears stressing that the fundamental cognitivearchitecture of the human mind was fixed eons ago on theancient savannah. So my claim is not that contemporary

Page 135: Bullshit and Philosophy

humans, as such, are any more or less susceptible tobullshit and other forms of misrepresentation than humanshave ever been. Our minds are as they have always been.Only our circumstances have changed. Nor do I wish todeny the evident powers and achievements of the evolvedhuman mind. The long march of human history hasdecisively established what a wondrous instrument thehuman mind is. It has scaled great cognitive heights. It haspeered deeply into the innermost secrets of the naturalworld; it has given rise to cultures and to social formationscomplex and various; and it has even plumbed the depthsof its own operations.

Lest I be accused of nostalgia for some bygone cognitiveorder, let me stress that I am fully aware that in every ageand epoch, the mind has produced a profuse abundance ofcognitive detritus. In every age of humankind, superstition,illusion, and falsehood of every variety has existed alongside the highest art and deepest knowledge that the agehas mustered. Moreover, we are blessed to live at a timewhen human beings collectively have scaled greatercognitive heights than humans ever have before. We seefar more deeply into the workings of everything natural andhuman. So how could it possibly be that there is morecognitive detritus about in our own times?

The answer is, I think, twofold. First, the masters ofbullshit, propaganda, and spin have paradoxically beenaided by our improved the understanding of the workings ofthe human mind. In our times, the masters of the dark artsare astute students of the enduring foibles of the human

Page 136: Bullshit and Philosophy

mind. Second, the means of public representations andpersuasion available to the masters of the dark arts have avastly greater reach and efficacy than they have ever had.Consequently, in our own times, the masters of the darkarts are vastly more effective than their predecessors couldhave dreamt of being.

I don’t mean to say that those who seek a hearing forsweet reason in the public square have no weapons of theirown. The battle must be waged on at least two differentfronts. First, it must be waged in the trenches of education.We must seek to instill in our children distaste for alldogma, an enduring suspicion of all easy and comfortingfalsehoods. We must instill in them an insatiable appetitefor unyielding argument, a propensity to seek out andconfront even the most disquieting evidence, even if doingso would undermine their or our most cherished beliefs.They must learn never to take at face value frames that aremerely given. They must learn the skills of re-framing, thehabit of asking after that which is invariant acrossalternative frames. If our children are educated in this way,their minds will provide far less fertile ground for the spreadof bullshit.

Though such a mind-by-mind slog in the trenches ofeducation is necessary, it will not suffice. In addition, wemust reconfigure the very means of public representationand persuasion. In our times, a narrow, self-serving elite,interested mostly in its own power, wealth and prestigeenjoys a certain privileged access to the means of publicrepresentations and persuasion. We must seek to diminish

Page 137: Bullshit and Philosophy

that access by all the ways and means available to us—viathe fragmented and unregulated internet, via politics, in stillunoccupied small niches of the mass media. The purveyorsof institutional and official bullshit will of course not yieldeasily. They are powerful, clever, and determined.Moreover, experience bears ample witness to the fact thatgood discourse does not spontaneously drive out bad.Neither, however, will bad discourse wither on its own. Ifbullshit is to be driven from the public square, only thosewho seek more than bullshit can drive it out. So let thebattle be joined.

Page 138: Bullshit and Philosophy

5

Bullshit and Personality

SARA BERNAL

Some bullshit is public and political. Other bullshit is moreprivate, arising in interpersonal interactions. Yet otherbullshit is more private still, arising within a singleindividual: people sometimes bullshit themselves.

Many of those of us who oppose the war in Iraq see thepresent cultural moment as one particularly rich in bullshit.But in this era of heightened public bullshit, private bullshitshould not be overlooked. It seems to me that bullshit is atthe core of many of the problems encountered and createdby those afflicted with so-called personality disorders—those who have certain severe problems with navigatingthe social world.40 Accordingly, I will propose an analysis ofbullshit that may be usefully applied to the psychology ofpersonality disorders, and perhaps more widely inpsychiatry.

My analysis takes Harry Frankfurt’s justly famous account

Page 139: Bullshit and Philosophy

as a point of departure. The departure is rapid: I disagreewith his main contention, that bullshit is essentiallyunconnected to a concern with truth. I think many corecases of bullshit are better captured by an account onwhich bullshit has a stronger connection to the truth thanFrankfurt countenances. What‘s more, applying this notionof bullshit to personality disorders tells us somethinginteresting about why their core features lead to socialdifficulties, and sheds light on them in other ways as well.

Page 140: Bullshit and Philosophy

Does the Bullshitter Pay Attention to theTruth?

Frankfurt claims that an “indifference to how things reallyare” is of the essence of bullshit. Bullshitters say whateverthey need to say to achieve a certain purpose, withoutregard for the truth of what they say. Thus for him, bullshit isvery different from lying:

Both in lying and in telling the truth people areguided by their beliefs concerning the way thingsare . . . Someone who lies and someone who tellsthe truth are playing on opposite sides, so tospeak, in the same game . . . The bullshitter . . .does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liardoes, and oppose himself to it. He pays noattention to it at all. (On Bullshit, pp. 59–61)

While this may be true in some instances, Frankfurt fails toacknowledge that in the typical case, the bullshitter isstrongly connected to the truth via a desire to obscure aspecific part of it. This desire may be more or lessconscious. The bullshitter may have that part of the truth inmind clearly or fuzzily, or it may be in some mentalcompartment to which she has no immediate conscious

Page 141: Bullshit and Philosophy

access.Consider a prototypical case of bullshit: the

undergraduate who knows that she has nothing thoughtfulor deep to say on an assigned essay topic, and that heropinions are not as well informed by the course material asthey should be, but who aims to prevent her instructor fromrealizing all this by throwing up a screen of verbiage. Shemay be clearly aware of the awkward facts behind herscreen. Or she may just know “deep down” that there is amess behind it, so that she is not surprised if her ruse failsand her grade is poor. Undergraduates do sometimesbullshit with malice aforethought. Sometimes, however, astudent may proceed less calculatingly, but still bemotivated by a desire to get an A that she knows is notreally deserved. In such cases we cannot make sense ofthe student’s behavior except by reference to thisunconscious (or partially conscious) motive.

The bullshitter in this example, in both its variants, is likea liar in that she seeks to conceal from her audience somepart of the truth (the mess behind her screen). She is unlikethe liar in that she need not be clearly aware of this goal.She is unlike the liar also in that her method is indirect: shedoes not directly deny the truth behind her screen, butrather contrives various ways of implicating the contrary ofthat truth. Her bullshit is contained not in any singleassertion within her essay, but rather by things like apompous tone, a reluctance to get to the point, and generalwindiness. Thus her method bears out Frankfurt’sobservation that a lie is a “more focused act” than an

Page 142: Bullshit and Philosophy

instance of bullshit.One may bullshit not only by using indirect means to get

one’s audience to believe the opposite of some part of thetruth that one finds inconvenient, but also by simplydistracting the audience from that part. In this second type,the bullshitter is again concerned with the truth in that she ismotivated by a desire to conceal a specific part of it, andagain this desire may be conscious or not.

Page 143: Bullshit and Philosophy

Two Modes of Bullshit

Advertising and politics are replete with the two kinds ofbullshit I’ve just distinguished. Two examples follow.

Page 144: Bullshit and Philosophy

a. Indirect Implication of Falsehood

Newport cigarettes are advertised with the phrase “alivewith pleasure.” This phrase is emblazoned on billboardsalong with images of young, beautiful and (so far as I know)mostly African-American people in situations of luxuriousleisure, such as on a yacht.

This ad campaign aims to plant in its audience the beliefthat representative smokers of Newports are healthy,vibrant, and wealthy, and that smoking Newports is abadge of membership in this select group. The truth is thatrepresentative smokers of Newports are poor, unhealthyAfrican-Americans who live in the rough neighborhoods inwhich these billboards are so obnoxiously displayed.

Page 145: Bullshit and Philosophy

b. Distraction

The Bush administration used dubious intelligence reportsabout Iraqi efforts to obtain yellowcake uranium from Niger,suggestions that Saddam Hussein was somehowconnected with 9/11, and various other red herrings todirect our attention away from a key fact: they had anantecedent intention, and perhaps something like a plan, toinvade Iraq no matter what.

I do not imagine that these are all the kinds of bullshitthere are, but they are two kinds worth paying attention to.Before moving on to further illustrations, I should note somefeatures of this two-part conception.

First, as I’ve said, bullshit is connected to the truth in away that Frankfurt does not acknowledge. The bullshittermust at some level pay attention to the truth, or else herbullshit is not likely to succeed. The “indirect means” of type(a) must, in order to be effective, be somehow vetted fortheir ability to jointly implicate a specific falsehood. Thedistractors of type (b) must lead the audience away from aparticular bit of truth, so the bullshitter—or something inher—must be cognizant of what that bit of truth is, or shemay end up with something that leads towards it rather thanaway. Bullshit of both types must be framed in sensitivity toa certain painful bit of the truth, or it will conceal that bit only

Page 146: Bullshit and Philosophy

by dumb luck.That said, I can agree with an emended version of

Frankfurt’s claim that the bullshitter “pays no attention at all”to the truth. For a bullshitter can say anything and everythingthat distracts her audience—except, of course, the truth thatshe wants to hide! Or she can say anything and everythingthat jointly implicates the opposite of the truth she wants tohide. That is, her utterances must be checked (at somelevel) not for their correspondence with the facts, but fortheir tendency to distract from, or to implicate the contraryof, certain key facts. So the emended version of Frankfurt’sclaim is this: the bullshitter must pay attention to just onekey part of the truth, namely the part she wants to hide. Callthis her target.

Second, bullshit on my conception is related to lying asfollows. The bullshitter always differs in her method from theliar: she never denies the target directly and explicitly, butinstead distracts or contrives to indirectly implicate thecontrary of the target. In the case of fully consciousbullshitting, the differences end there. Just like the liar, onewho bullshits consciously has clearly in mind a target truththat she knows she wants to hide. That cannot be said ofone who bullshits unconsciously, who therefore differs fromthe liar in more than her method. Thus the similarity to lyingof any given case of bullshit depends on where it falls onthe spectrum of conscious awareness. (Recall that I amcountenancing degrees of awareness, so that “fullyconscious” and “unconscious” are two ends of a spectrum.)

Third, since the bullshitter as I’ve painted her may not be

Page 147: Bullshit and Philosophy

aware of her wish to obscure her target, my story dependscrucially on the assumption that there are unconsciousmotives. In the typical case, like that of the bullshittingstudent, she is at least dimly aware of her motive (andhence of her target) as she frames her bullshit, and maybecome more clearly aware of it in hindsight—after shegets a poor grade on her essay, for instance. But again, thebullshitter may be completely unaware of her obscuringmotive.

I cannot describe the operation of the bullshitter’sunconscious motive, but I can say a bit more to defend theclaim that it is there, however it operates. The idea of anunconscious motive is of course not new. Neither is it theexclusive property of Freudians who would associate themotive with some bodily orifice. It is an idea with somecurrency in the neuroscience of today: it is commonly heldthat the bizarre confabulations of some neurology patientscan be understood only by reference to unconsciousmotives.

Consider, for instance, some fascinating and well-knownresults about split-brain patients.41 These are patientswhose corpus callosum has been surgically severed inorder to treat their severe epilepsy. The corpus callosum isa thick band of fibers connecting the two hemispheres ofthe brain. When it is cut, the hemispheres cannotcommunicate with each other, which can result in bizarreinternal conflicts for the patient. One sort of test that wasdone on these patients was to show a picture to onehemisphere and ask for a report from the other. This is

Page 148: Bullshit and Philosophy

done by showing a picture to one side or the other of apatient’s visual field: pictures on the left project to the righthemisphere, and vice versa.42

It is the left hemisphere that talks—that side is primarilyresponsible for language. Thus when a split-brain patientsees a picture in her left visual field, and she is asked tosay what she sees, she has a problem: the information is“stuck” in the non-talking (right) hemisphere. Patients in thissituation reacted in a number of different ways: some wouldjust frown and shake their heads; others could at least saywhat the picture was not of. Some, however, would makeup stories about their own reactions to what they wereshown: they would confabulate. It is these cases that arerelevant to the present point.

To take just one example, a picture of a naked womanwas presented to one patient’s left hemisphere, then herright. When it was presented to the left hemisphere, thepatient giggled, then accurately described what she saw.When it was presented to the right hemisphere, she smiledmischievously and began to giggle. When asked what wasso funny—and this is the startling part—she said, “I don’tknow . . . nothing . . . Oh, that funny machine” (Gazzaniga1970, p. 106). Such confabulations are often understood byneuroscientists in terms of an overarching unconsciousmotive to maintain a stable and internally consistent world-view.43

What incoming information might threaten the stability orconsistency of the giggling split-brain patient’s world view?

Page 149: Bullshit and Philosophy

She has just giggled unaccountably. To uphold her beliefthat she is a sane, rational person who does things forreasons, and reacts appropriately to situations, she mustsomehow explain away the fact that she has just giggledslyly for no apparent reason, like a madwoman. Her target,then, is that she has just done something that appearscrazy, nonsensical, bizarre. She has an overarching motive—an unconscious one—to maintain her image of herself asa sane, rational person. Her unexplained giggling threatensthat world view, since it looks like the behavior of amadwoman. So she has a second motive, derived from thefirst, to explain her giggling as something quite sane andrational (Who wouldn’t laugh at “that funny machine”?). It iscommonly accepted that patients who confabulate in thisway have some such unconscious motive, though there isas yet no fully worked-out, generally accepted story abouthow this motive operates. Thus my own claim ofunconscious motives is in good company—in this regard atleast.

Fourth, while bullshit à la Frankfurt seems to be a largelyverbal affair, the misleading and distracting of bullshit as Iconstrue it may be achieved by non-verbal as well as verbalmeans.44 The photos that appear in Newport ads provideone example; I’ll discuss further examples below.

Fifth, bullshit as I construe it may occur intrapersonally.That is, you can bullshit yourself in either of the ways I’vedistinguished. The person who distracts from a painful partof the truth and the distractee may be one and the same;the person who contrives to implant a belief contrary to that

Page 150: Bullshit and Philosophy

the person who contrives to implant a belief contrary to thattruth may be the same person in whom the belief isimplanted. Such self-bullshitting is a species of self-deception. Indeed, it may be all that self-deception is.Whether that is so is a large question on a rich topic (self-deception), and I cannot answer it here.

There are, however, some differences between self- andother-bullshitting. Conscious self-bullshitting is lessstraightforward than conscious bullshitting of others, ifindeed it is possible at all. This is so for the same reasonthat explicitly lying to yourself is impossible. To do that youwould have to be fully aware of some proposition p and atthe same time assert not-p to yourself with the intention ofgetting yourself to believe not-p—an endeavor that wouldseem futile in the face of your established belief that p. Toconsciously self-bullshit you would have to deviouslyattempt to get yourself to believe not-p, though you are fullyaware of p’s truth, either by implicating not-p or bydistracting from p. This may be possible,45 but your ownclear awareness of p introduces a difficulty with self-bullshitting about p that is absent from other-bullshittingabout p. But having noted this complication, I can set itaside, as the cases of self-bullshitting I shall consider arenot fully conscious.

Finally, it is an advantage of my account that, unlikeFrankfurt’s, it has application in psychiatry. In particular, itnicely frames some key features of personality disorders.

Page 151: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit and Personality Disorders

Some people have bullshit deeply embedded in theirpersonalities. Everyone knows that politics and advertisingare replete with bullshit. It is not as widely appreciated thatcertain problematic personalities are also goldmines ofbullshit. Indeed, so far as I know the concept has neverbeen applied in any systematic way to personalitypsychology (or elsewhere in psychiatry, for that matter). Yetif you examine the strategems that characterize personalitydisorders, the bullshit fairly leaps out at you.

Page 152: Bullshit and Philosophy

What Is a Personality Disorder?

A personality disorder is defined in the DSM-IV (the currentDiagnostic and Statistical Manual, the bible of psychiatry)as “an enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviorthat deviates markedly from the expectations of theindividual’s culture.” 46 To count as having such a disorder,one must have difficulties in two or more of the followingareas: perception of the social world and one’s place in it;appropriateness and range of emotional responses; socialinteraction; and impulse control. The problematic patternmust be inflexible, and must be manifest in a broad rangeof situations. It is especially distinctive of personalitydisorders, among psychiatric disorders, to cause troubleand pain not just for the afflicted but for those around her aswell.

Personality disorders are standardly characterized asencompassing maladaptiveness in several domains. First,they comprise maladaptive traits. These traits are normal,healthy traits taken to an extreme degree, and sometimescombined in especially problematic ways. Thus,conscientiousness taken to an extreme degree becomesobsessive-compulsiveness; very low trust combined withhigh hostility becomes paranoia. The mal-adaptivemotivation characteristic of personality disorders isexemplified in the antisocial personality’s complete lack of

Page 153: Bullshit and Philosophy

motivation for intimacy. Maladaptive patterns in perceiving,interpreting, and planning—aspects of cognition—are alsoubiquitous in personality disorders. The afflicted areespecially challenged when it comes to perceiving andinterpreting the social world: each personality disorder ismarked by distorted perception of others and impairedsocial judgment. Each personality disorder is alsocharacterized by some abnormal and maladaptive patterno f emotion: extreme volatility, perhaps, or an extreme ofone emotion such as anger. Finally, the self-concept of adisordered personality tends to be out of whack: often, shedoesn’t know quite who she is, lacking a clear, stablesense of herself; or her self esteem is either excessive ordeficient.

The DSM-IV lists ten personality disorders, arranged intothree clusters: the erratic cluster, often characterized byunpredictable or violent behavior; the anxious cluster,characterized by fear and distress; and the eccentriccluster, characterized by social awkwardness ordisengagement. Brief descriptions of the disorders, drawnmostly from the DSM-IV, are supplied below. Sub-typesare sometimes recognized, but the DSM-IV lists only thebasic or “pure” type.

Here’s a clue to where the bullshit lurks in the followinglist. Where the afflicted is herself out of touch with some keyaspect of reality, or where her stock behavior tends to leadothers to false beliefs, bullshit is often found.

Page 154: Bullshit and Philosophy

Antisocial personality disorder (erratic). Thesepeople have little concern for others. They aregenerally impulsive and irresponsible, and oftenviolent. They feel no guilt over the suffering theycause to others. The textbook case of antisocialpersonality disorder is a violent, crafty, andremorseless criminal. They need not be violent,however: the Enron crew, for example, exhibitantisocial behavior in spades.47 They are conartists of a sort, and many con artists arediagnosable as antisocial. Antisocials oftenpossess a glib, superficial charm, which allowsthem to take advantage of the unwary.Borderline personality disorder (erratic). Theborderline personality is always riding some kindof roller coaster: her emotions, relationships, andself-image are all marked by wild instability. Theycan shift rapidly from idealizing to demonizing apartner or friend. They are terrified ofabandonment, and can become very aggressivewhen they see it on the horizon. They are alsoprone to harming themselves in the face of real orimagined impending abandonment Suicidalgestures are common in this type; threats ofsuicide (“if you go, I’ll kill myself”) are still morecommon.

Page 155: Bullshit and Philosophy

Histrionic personality disorder (erratic).Histrionics are recognized by their franticattention-seeking, inappropriate sexualprovocativeness, and excessive displays ofemotion. They are generally uncomfortable whenthey are not the center of attention. They areseductive and flirtatious in situations where suchbehavior is inappropriate—in professionalsettings, for instance. The textbook case is afemale undergraduate who often visits maleprofessors during office hours, devoting her timethere to talking about herself in a general way,rather than to legitimate academic business.48

Histrionic women often wear too much makeup,and dress in clothes that are too sexy and bright.Histrionic men, for their part, are often hyper-macho, boasting of success at work or sexualexploits. Histrionics are shallow in various ways:opinions, friends, and projects may be taken upwith great enthusiasm, then quickly dropped. Buttheir enthusiasm can be magnetic: they oftenpossess a kind of meretricious charm.

Narcissistic personality disorder (erratic). Thenarcissist has an inflated sense of her ownimportance and accomplishments.Correspondingly, she undervalues theaccomplishments of others. When their

Page 156: Bullshit and Philosophy

accomplishments threaten to outshine her own,she responds with violent envy. She has a strongsense of superiority, and she is elitist: the onlypeople worthy to be her associates are thosewhose gifts and accomplishments are in the sameexalted realm as her own. She requiresadmiration and special treatment from thosearound her. She expects lavish praise andrecognition, and may angrily mete out punishmentto those who deny her her rightful obeisance. Self-centered as she is, she has little attention left overfor the needs and desires of others, into whichshe lacks insight. Narcissists are often wildlyambitious, and better-functioning ones can bequite successful.

Avoidant personality disorder (anxious).Avoidant personalities have an inferioritycomplex. They believe steadfastly that they areinadequate. They cannot abide criticism—it callsattention to their shortcomings, which theyimagine to be severe—and will go to greatlengths to avoid it. This results in their leading veryrestricted lives: potentially rewarding activitiesand relationships are shunned out of fear that theywill open the door to criticism.

Dependent personality disorder (anxious). Theseindividuals believe that they are incapable of

Page 157: Bullshit and Philosophy

taking care of themselves. They require constantreassurance from others, which makes it difficultfor them to work independently. Since theydepend so heavily on others, they will generallytake a submissive line, suppressing any dissentthey might feel, in order to keep the peace. Inextreme cases this can lead to their withstandingphysical abuse in order to hang on to a“caregiver.”

Obsessive-Compulsive personality disorder(anxious). Obsessive-compulsives arepreoccupied with order: rules, lists, schedules,and all manner of details are very often on theirmental front page. Their perfectionistic pursuit oforder leaves little time for relations with others,which relations are stunted by this neglect.Leisure activities have little appeal. Obsessive-compulsives are hard-working to a fault. Their ownstandards are so high that they have difficultydelegating tasks to others, who are likely to aimfor a lower standard. They are generally verystubborn in their insistence on their own hyper-orderly way.

Schizoid personality disorder (eccentric).Schizoids are intensely solitary, eschewingfriendship, often drifting out of contact even with

Page 158: Bullshit and Philosophy

immediate family, and taking jobs that minimizetheir contact with others. Their emotional lives arevery restricted: they come off as cold andaffectively flat, and take pleasure in few activities(if any). Sexual relations with others hold nointerest for them. They appear indifferent to praiseand criticism: if reprimanded for some aspect oftheir job performance, for instance, they’ll return a“does not compute” sort of response.

Schizotypal personality disorder (eccentric).Schizotypals are close relatives of schizoids.49

But while the schizoid is indifferent to the socialworld, the schizotypal regards it with suspicionand fear that verges into paranoia. This does notconduce well to social relations with others, whichare generally absent from their lives. While theschizoid evinces no affect at all, the schizotypaltends to evince inappropriate affect: a smile inresponse to a sad story, for instance.Schizotypals are recognized by their odd beliefsand superstitions, clairvoyance and telepathybeing special favorites. They often report unusualperceptual experiences, such as seeing thefuture.

Paranoid personality disorder (eccentric). Theparanoiac needs no introduction. Universal

Page 159: Bullshit and Philosophy

distrust is her signature. Utterly benign socialgestures may be interpreted as insulting,threatening, or otherwise sinister. Imagined slightsbecome the occasion for grudges that are heldindefinitely. A paranoiac’s romantic partner hasher work cut out for her, as she will often be theobject of pathological jealousy. Those whoquestion the irrational beliefs of paranoiacsgenerally meet with extreme hostility andcombativeness, which may turn violent.

This, then, is our cast of colorful characters. Notice that it isof the essence of a personality disorder to be rigid.Afflicted individuals will try the same strategy over and over,regardless of its success or failure in the past. Since thestrategy is deployed reflexively, rather than with sensitivityto the situation at hand, it tends to fail. Thus for them lifebecomes like a “bad one-act play that repeats again andagain” (Personality Disorders, p. 14).

Some of the disorders are diagnosed more frequently inmen, others in women: thus diagnosed antisocials aremuch more likely to be men, dependents and histrionics tobe women. But it is not clear that these patterns ofdiagnosis reflect the truth, since the evidence regarding theepidemiology of personality disorders is questionable.50

Also, at least some of these patterns are changing:diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder in womenappear to be on the rise. For these reasons I have chosento treat the disorders as gender-neutral.

Page 160: Bullshit and Philosophy

Some Examples of Bullshit inPersonality Disorders

Recall that bullshit of both the types I’ve identified may bedirected to others or to oneself. I’ll lay out examples ofother-directed bullshit first, then move on to the self-directed variety.

Other-Bullshitting. I’ll start with the first type of bullshit Iidentified, in which the bullshitter contrives some indirectmeans of implicating, by word or deed, the contrary of thetarget truth that she would like to hide. The glib charmtypical of the antisocial provides an especially dangerousexample. Her charm tends to lead people to believe thatshe is a nice person, while she is in fact a dangerous, nastypiece of work. She does not come right out and say “I amnot a nasty piece of work,” of course; her charm is whatleads her hapless victims to believe that, and to implicitlytrust her. This makes it easier for her to take advantage ofthem.

The suicidal gestures of borderline personalities providea second example. Consider the standard case, in which asuicide attempt is provoked by a real or imagined threat ofabandonment by a romantic partner. With this maneuver,the borderline seeks to make her partner believesomething like: my relationship with you in particular is so

Page 161: Bullshit and Philosophy

something like: my relationship with you in particular is soimportant to me that life without it is not worth living for me.The partner who believes that would presumably be lesslikely to leave. The truth is that, since borderlines oftenvacillate between idealizing a romantic partner and holdinghim in contempt, the person who is supposedly soimportant as to be utterly indispensable may be ridiculedand rejected shortly thereafter. And the relationship is notlikely to last; the partner will likely soon be replaced withanother, with whom the pattern will be repeated.

Histrionic personality disorder is marked by “shallowopinions.” A typical histrionic may, for instance, declare acertain writer to be brilliant, despite having little knowledgeof her work. Easy come, easy go: she’ll relinquish theopinion before too long. In an unwary audience, suchdeclarations might implant the belief that the histrionic is adeep thinker, while she is in fact the opposite.

The case of narcissism is a bit trickier than the others inthe Erratic cluster, but a certain sub-type of the disorder,compensating narcissism, provides an illustration. Whilethe pure narcissist has a genuinely high opinion of herself,this type seeks to conceal a core of low self-esteem with acharade of superiority. She will, for instance, tirelesslyinflate and call attention to her own accomplishments, butunlike the pure narcissist she lacks the conviction that theyamount to such a big deal. She depends on accoladesfrom others to counteract her own self-doubt. Thus hercharade of superiority, her demands for obeisance andspecial treatment, can be seen as indirectly implicating the

Page 162: Bullshit and Philosophy

contrary of the painful target truth: that she is not such agrand personage. She generally has some glimmering ofher own modus operandi; this painful truth is somethingshe tends to be dimly aware of.

As for bullshit of the distracting variety, the sexualprovocativeness of the histrionic furnishes a clearillustration. By such means as revealing clothing, bodylanguage, eye-batting, veiled invitations, flattery, or coydouble-entendres, the histrionic distracts attention from herown flaws. The titillation she achieves in this way serves toblind her audience to the fact that she is getting more thanher rightful share of attention—more than she would get ifher audience saw things clearly. Unfortunately for thehistrionic, this sort of behavior can make her especiallyvulnerable to sexual victimization.

Self-Bullshitting. I’ll begin, again, with the falsehood-implicating type, which in the case of self-bullshitting is theless common variety. There is a type of paranoid known asa fanatic who is a close cousin of the compensatingnarcissist. They are described as having “run hard intoreality,” a collision which shatters their narcissistic self-image. They cope with the pain that results by retreatinginto fantasy: they portray themselves as superheroes pittedagainst an evil world. Their target, then, is the fact that theyare not extraordinary. The fantasies they construct containimplicit denials of this fact. The construction of such afantasy can also distract them from a from harsh reality;thus both types of bullshit are perhaps combined in thisinstance.

Page 163: Bullshit and Philosophy

instance.The self-bullshitter excels particularly at self-distraction.

Two types of avoidant personalities supply illustrations. Thephobic species of avoidant combines “pure” avoidant withsome dependent features. Being dependent, she investsher trust and her sense of self in some significant other, andlives in terror of the loss of that relationship. The phobicstrategy is to displace her anxiety from its true object—thesignificant other, possible loss of same—to some concreteobject or situation: the dog next door, elevators, drowning,what have you. This distracts her from her real problem.

The self-deserting avoidant deals with her intense socialdiscomfort by retreating into fantasy. This allows her toescape from immediate discomfort, and when the strategyis deployed generally it allows her to escape herself, whichshe finds to be pathetically inadequate. Strangely, suchavoidants are generally aware to some extent of using suchtactics, and their use of fantasy gradually becomes lesseffective in shielding them from what they believe to be thepainful truth of their inadequacy. Like the use of fantasyfound in the fanatic paranoid, this one arguably combinesboth types of bullshit.

Self-distracting is also popular with dependentpersonalities. For instance, in the interest of securing andmaintaining a valued relationship, dependents of anaccommodating sort contrive to distract themselves fromany doubts or grievances they might have about therelationship, which would lead to inner conflict. Sodistracted, they are able to put a happy face on things, and

Page 164: Bullshit and Philosophy

avoid acknowledging the conflict.Finally, one function of the obsessive-compulsive’s

preoccupation with details, rules, lists, and the like is todistract her from her own anxiety about big-picture issuesthat might be the source of legitimate concern. Byimmersing herself in details, she distracts from largerissues: the compass of her anxiety is only as big as theniggling little thing she’s presently focused on. In this wayshe can lose the dangerous forest for the (relativelyunthreatening) trees.

Page 165: Bullshit and Philosophy

Patterns in Personality Bullshit

Here are some things to notice in this survey. I haveidentified an example of bullshitting for eight of tendisorders—multiple examples, in some cases. The bullshit-strategems I have described are, in most of the foregoingcases, defining characteristics of the personality disorderin question. That is, the glib charm of the antisocial, theprovocativeness and shallow opinions of the histrionic, theobsessive-compulsive’s devotion to rules and details, etc.,are all what you might call first-rank symptoms ofpersonality disorders, and if I am right they may beunderstood in terms of bullshit. In the remaining cases thestrategems identified are defining characteristics of one ormore sub-types of the basic disorder.51 Thus, while “eachof us contributes his share” (On Bullshit, p. 1) to thecollective bullshit of our culture, as Frankfurt says,pathological personalities are notably reliable andgenerous in their contributions.

However, bullshitting is notably absent from most of theEccentric cluster. I can see no examples of either type, self-or other-directed, in the behavior of the schizoid or theschizotypal. 52 Happily, plausible explanations of this gapare not far to seek. First, in the case of the schizoid at least,there is a marked flatness of affect: she comes across ascold or emotionally absent. In all the cases of bullshit I’ve

Page 166: Bullshit and Philosophy

just described, the bull-shitter is motivated by a desire toavoid the pain she would feel upon meeting her target truthfull in the face. If you lack the capacity to feel that sort ofpain, then you have no motive for bullshitting. Second,successful bullshitting requires a certain level of“mindreading” facility: you need to have some capacity topredict what effects your words and deeds will have on thebeliefs of your audience, and you need to choose wordsand deeds that will have the desired effect. Schizoids andschizotypals may lack the requisite mindreading facility:they may be too socially disengaged to bullshit.53

Bullshitting of others is most characteristic of the Erraticcluster, while self-bullshitting is most characteristic of theAnxious cluster. The other-bullshitting is more likely to be ofthe falsehood-implicating type, while the self-bullshitting ismore likely to be of the distracting type. This is not terriblysurprising, since people don’t like getting bullshitted byothers, and those in the Erratic cluster are easiest todislike. That said, remember that a person with apersonality disorder is afflicted; harmful and infuriating asher bullshit may be, it is also a personal tragedy for her.

Page 167: Bullshit and Philosophy

Perfect Partners: Bullshit and DistortedSocial Perceptions

The paranoiac imagines threats and insults where there arenone; the histrionic inhabits a world full of ardent admirers;the borderline sees abandonment on the horizon; theschizoid seems not to understand praise and blame. Eachpersonality disorder is marked by some distortion or otherabnormality in the perception of the intentions, desires, andfeelings of others—of social reality. Now, if yourperceptions are distorted or otherwise inaccurate, or verydim, then you will be farther from the truth than you would beif you saw things clearly. Meanwhile, the bullshitter may putdistance between herself and the truth intentionally,depending on how aware she is of her target and herinterest in obscuring it. Thus impaired perceptions andbullshit both serve to distance one from the truth. Since bothare characteristic of personality disorders, it’s natural towonder whether these two ways of distancing oneself fromthe truth somehow reinforce each other. I think there isreinforcement in both directions.

Poor social perception can increase one’s opportunitiesfor relatively low-effort bullshitting, as follows. Owing todistortions, gaps, and other problems with her perception,the disordered personality simply sees less of social reality

Page 168: Bullshit and Philosophy

than normal people do. Remember that on my story, thebullshitter may be clearly aware of her target, dimly aware,or quite unaware, and all grades in between. Recall alsothat in the first case the bullshitter is just like the liar inhaving a deceptive intention (though her method isdifferent). Unless you are given to intentional deception, it iseasier to bullshit if you are not aware of your target than ifyou are. For if you are not aware of it, you can framedistractions and ways of implicating the contrary withoutfeeling the sting of conscience that willful deception wouldordinarily provoke. (That is, anyhow, what it would provokein the case of other-bullshitting. In the case of self-bullshitting, awareness of your target would tend to provokecognitive dissonance, since what you are trying to hidefrom yourself is staring you right in the face.) Among theparts of the social truth the disordered personality does notsee are parts that are potentially painful and inconvenient—parts that she might have an interest in obscuring. So shehas more “easy targets” than a normal person would.

In just the same way, it is easier to bullshit aboutsomething you are only dimly aware of than something youare clearly aware of. In addition to just missing parts ofsocial reality to a greater-than-average degree, and tosystematically distorting remarks, actions and gestures, itis common for disordered personalities to perceive onlydimly those parts of social reality that they do see—to haveglimmerings of the truth. Two instances of bullshit alreadydiscussed provide illustrations: the compensating

Page 169: Bullshit and Philosophy

narcissist has some glimmering that she carries on acharade of superiority, and the self-deserting avoidant hassome glimmering that she is escaping into fantasy.

If this story about facilitation is correct, then somesubstantial fraction of the bullshit that is found in disorderedpersonalities is causally downstream of their distortedsocial perception. Notice further that this is a two-waystreet: bullshit—of the self-directed kind, at least—canworsen the impairment of social perception. For if you hidefrom yourself those parts of the social truth that you can seeat first, your social perception gets even worse, in that youthen simply see less of social reality.

Page 170: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Threat Posed by Bullshit

My findings about bullshit in personality disorders havesome notable implications concerning the kind of threatbullshit poses. First, bullshit threatens good social relations.

I have claimed that pathological personalities areespecially good bullshitters, generally speaking. They arealso known for their distorted perceptions of social reality—which, like bullshitting, serve to distance them from the truth.Meanwhile, their relations with others are especially likely tobe messed up in some systematic way: the antisocialexploits people, the borderline lurches wildly from oneunstable relationship to the next, the dependent is a burdento those around her, the paranoiac imposes pathologicaljealousy on her partner, and so forth. Indeed, some suchimpaired social functioning is of the essence of personalitypathology; what better criterion to use in deciding whether apersonality is pathological?

The disordered personality’s problems with the truthcontribute greatly to her problems with people. Herbullshitting, and the distorted perceptions that help it along,are surely key contributors to her messed-up socialrelations. This is just a bit of common sense. People do notlike getting bullshitted, so those who are given to bullshittingothers easily become personae non gratae; it can be very

Page 171: Bullshit and Philosophy

exasperating to deal with someone in the grips of self-directed bullshit; and it is difficult to communicate withsomeone who is given to distorting what you say and do.

It’s a platitude, though one that is forgotten all too often,that good, sound human relationships thrive ontruthfulness. But this suggests a stronger principle: goodrelationships thrive on truth.54 If either party fails to seethings clearly—basic, important things concerning who sheis and what she wants, and the same basic facts about theother party—then the relationship is likely to flounder. Thiscan result not only from deliberate deception, but also fromthe involuntary disconnection from the truth that poorperception brings. If either party wittingly or unwittinglyhides some such important parts of the truth through bullshitor outright lying, the relationship is gravely threatened.

Personality pathology is marked by lousy social relations,and the bullshitting of the disordered personality helpsexplain why her relations with others are lousy. I promisedat the outset that applying my notion of bullshit topersonality disorders could shed some light on how theircore features can lead to social difficulties. I have nowmade good on that promise: impaired social cognition, acore feature of personality pathology, facilitates bullshit,which—among other elements of the disorderedpersonality’s behavior—tends to ruin her social relations.

Among the most interesting and provocative claimsabout bullshit that Frankfurt makes is that it is a greaterenemy of the truth than lies are. This is supposed to be

Page 172: Bullshit and Philosophy

because “through excessive indulgence in [bullshitting],which involves making assertions without paying attentionto anything except what it suits one to say, a person’snormal habit of attending to the ways things are maybecome attenuated or lost” (On Bullshit, p. 60). Since Ithink the bullshitter does pay attention to the truth—at somelevel, in any case—I cannot agree. Still, like Frankfurt I thinkbullshit is an enemy of the truth in a way that lies are not—but a different sort of enemy than he described.

The threat I have in mind stems from the fact thatbullshitting can be unconscious while lying cannot. Thehabitual liar, like the habitual bullshitter, gradually obscuresmore and more bits of the truth. But generally speaking, it iseasier to make a habit of bullshitting than of lying,because outright deception ordinarily provokes a sting ofconscience. Where bullshitting is less than fully conscious,this sting is less than fully sharp, and is therefore a weakerdeterrent.

Bullshit thus poses a sort of threat to the truth that lyingdoes not pose, or does not pose to the same degree. Thisdoes not imply that the total threat it poses to the truth isgreater than that posed by lying, for lying may pose threatsto the truth that bullshit does not pose. But these arequestions about the comparative moral status of bullshitand lies, and that is a topic for another day.55

Page 173: Bullshit and Philosophy

6

Performing Bullshit and the Post-SincereCondition

ALAN RICHARDSON

Page 174: Bullshit and Philosophy

Mission Statement

This essay, aspiring to be one of the world’s bestphilosophy essays, will prepare readers tobecome exceptional theorists of bullshit, promotethe values of a rigorous and sustainablephilosophical community, and be an example ofoutstanding research serving the people of BritishColumbia, Canada, and the world.

Harry Frankfurt’s goal in On Bullshit was “to articulate,more or less sketchily, the structure of [the] concept” ofbullshit (p. 2). But, he left many things for his followers to do.For one, he set aside the question of attitude (theoreticallyif not practically)—that is, he expressed various attitudestoward bullshit even as he left unanswered the question ofwhy our attitude toward it differed from our attitude towardlying.

Frankfurt left “as an exercise for the reader” the “problemof understanding why our attitude toward bullshit isgenerally more benign than our attitude toward lying” (p.50). He also did not “consider the rhetorical uses andmisuses of bullshit” (p. 2). This essay attends to theseunconsidered points, since bullshit’s rhetorical purposes

Page 175: Bullshit and Philosophy

are exactly where its value lies and where we must seek toilluminate our attitudes toward it. Bullshit is, as we know, allwell and good in its proper place. But it tends to transgressthat place and crowd out other aspects of life.

Page 176: Bullshit and Philosophy

Shitty Attitudes: On the Use and Misuseof Bullshit in Life

Let’s begin by using a charming anecdote of Frankfurt’s toamend his own account of bullshit. It is a story of LudwigWittgenstein as friend, offered by Fania Pascal (p. 24):

I had my tonsils out and was in the Evelyn NursingHome feeling sorry for myself. Wittgenstein called.I croaked: “I feel just like a dog that has been runover.” He was disgusted: “You don’t know what adog who has been run over feels like.”

Frankfurt does not exhibit much patience withWittgenstein’s sour and unsympathetic response, but theanecdote does aid in his diagnosis of bullshit as speechunconcerned with truth; Frankfurt finds Wittgenstein’sannoyance to lie in Wittgenstein’s sense that Pascalspeaks in full knowledge that she does not know what sheis talking about.

Fair enough. If Wittgenstein had been a cruder man, theconversation could have gone this way:

FP: I feel just like a dog that has been run over.LW: Bullshit! You don’t know what a dog that has

Page 177: Bullshit and Philosophy

been run over feels like.

But, notice that Pascal, in the context of a discussion abouther health, had to utter something about her physicaldiscomfort for Wittgenstein to get upset in this way—simplyuttering something she was not in a position to know (“I feeljust like the oldest living inhabitant of the nearest planet toAlpha Centauri,” for example) would not have induced sucha response. Wittgenstein’s response, warranted or not, isattuned to the way in which the specific thing Pascal didsay not only went beyond what she could know but alsosought to elicit sympathy for her suffering. Indeed, themore given Pascal is to complaint or hypochondria, themore sympathy we have for Wittgenstein. The declarationsof suffering among such people are often bullshit. (Indeed, itis only in rare cases, such as when a doctor asks us todescribe a pain, that our reports of how much pain we arein are primarily information reports.) Bullshit is not simplyany speech unconcerned with truth, then, but rather speechthe truth of which is irrelevant but which aims to evokesome sort of positive attitude toward the speaker.56

If we take up the first-person situation, we get similarresults. In planning to write a joint grant proposal, I can sayto a colleague: “Here we have to add some bullshit aboutthe training opportunities the grant will afford to graduatestudents. I have some boilerplate on that that I can importfrom another grant I have written.” I am willing to call thisportion of our proposal bullshit precisely because it is

Page 178: Bullshit and Philosophy

meant to express a positive attitude toward the educationof graduate students and, thus, to get the adjudicators tolike the proposal, even though my own attitude for oragainst graduate education need not be accuratelyexpressed by what I write. Or, again, consider the followingsort of exchange, after a department meeting:

GARY: (nervous and pale, his upper liptrembling) I didn’t know that you thought so highlyof the Dean.ALAN: Oh, that was just bullshit; I wanted toappeal to the high opinion others have of him inorder to pass the motion on hiring that Thomist Iwant to hire.

Here we see a key difference between lying andbullshitting. If I was praising the Dean in order to win overhis fans in my department for my side of an argument abouthiring, I am not really lying in expressing something that isnot my true attitude toward the Dean. My attitude toward theDean was not the point of what I was saying about theDean; I was engaged in something else entirely. Knowingmy intention, you could not successfully accuse me oflying.57 Nonetheless, the remarks made about the Deanare relevant to the situation; I couldn’t have recruitedsupport for my favored candidate by saying nice thingsabout the local ice hockey team, even if my colleagues likethe team better than they like the Dean, the team beingirrelevant in the situation at hand.

Page 179: Bullshit and Philosophy

irrelevant in the situation at hand.Similarly, when I complain that the son of a friend does

not know how to disguise his disappointment at thepresents I give him, I am complaining that this child has notlearned courtesy conventions that are the nearest kin tobullshit. The sort of honesty involved in saying, straight-away, “I hate this stupid sweater” is not warranted in thegift-receiving situation, if the gift was itself offered in goodfaith. (Compare the case of your older brother, who seemsto give you only joke presents. After thirty years of this, youmight say, “Why do you keep giving me this bullshit?” Hehas failed the sincerity conditions of gift giving; his is aseries of bullshit acts, raising questions about the nature ofyour relationship.) We don’t want him to lie and say “Thankyou for this sweater; I love it,” but we’d like him to becourteous and say “Thank you for this sweater.”

So, the sort of bullshit that one recognizes as bullshit andseeks (as Wittgenstein did in relation to Pascal) to deflateis more than saying X without being a position to know thatX. In addition, X and the utterance of X are meantsomehow to reflect well on the speaker. This contrasts withthe sort of bullshit that is offered as entertainment or to killtime among those who mutually understand theconversation they are in not to be an attempt to conveyaccurate information. Thus, I think, contrary to Frankfurt (p.11), that at least the sort of bullshit that evokes “That’sbullshit” as a response does have pretentiousness as aconstitutive element. But, not all bullshit is liable to evokethat response. Indeed, some bullshit is stock-in-trade andwhen well-crafted discharges a legitimate function.

Page 180: Bullshit and Philosophy

when well-crafted discharges a legitimate function.

Page 181: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit as a Condition of Life

Bullshit, therefore, is vastly more widespread than straight-out lying. Bullshit is a sort of misdirection; lying is direct andto the point. Students lie when they say they tried to turn intheir papers but the office was closed; they bullshit whenthey come to office hours to offer up excuses for why theycould not possible turn in their papers on the due date.What they say in such circumstances is rarely evidentlyfalse (if it were, it wouldn’t work), it is simply a story puttogether in such a way as to get them what they really want,which is an extension. They do this by evoking sympathy fortheir circumstances, which have to be plausibly true and,importantly, hard to check.

Bullshit is in fact so ubiquitous that one cannot engage insome activities without engaging in bullshit. Consider grantproposals again. These require a sort of breathlessdiscussion of how ground-breaking and exciting yourresearch is, how it requires a hundred thousand dollars todo, how fabulous it will be to have research assistants (whowill do your photocopying and be paid fifteen thousand ayear for the privilege), and so on. Proposal writers knowthat this is all bullshit, but generically-necessary bullshit;proposal readers know it, too. Readers discount andignore exactly what the writers put in as the bullshit

Page 182: Bullshit and Philosophy

component. But, no one will succeed if she does not put inthe bullshit. One must perform certain values in a grantproposal even though they count for nothing. (It is like figureskating, which requires compulsory figures but doesn’tcount them.) This is the equivalent of Frankfurt’s pompousFourth of July speaker (pp. 16–18): patriotism is the orderof the day on the Fourth of July in the United States, and noone takes expressions of patriotism offered on that dayseriously precisely because on that day they are utterly proforma. Nonetheless, no Fourth of July orator can safely setpatriotic themes aside. That would be a spectacularmistake in judgment and value, a confession of a profoundignorance of the very genre.

The grant proposal and the Fourth of July oration are,indeed, bullshit genres. Another bullshit genre, perhaps themost important in academic life, is the letter of reference.All letters of reference are unreliable as guides to thegenuine virtues of the applicants. Yet straight-out lying(“Mortimer invented the Internet, and his oils hang in theLouvre”) would be counter-productive. Confident assertionsof bullshit have to be on points on which legitimatedisagreement is widely accepted and on which standardsof evidence can be expected to diverge. Thus, I can writethat “Mortimer’s Ph.D. thesis offers a counterfactualaccount of causation that is a significant contribution to ourunderstanding of causation” without fear that I haveengaged in gratuitous and counter-productive bullshit.Indeed, if I am Mortimer’s advisor, I am supposed to write

Page 183: Bullshit and Philosophy

this, even though the number of Ph.D. theses in philosophythat are significant contributions to anyone’s understandingof anything is vanishing small.

A reader’s bullshit detector might start sounding if I say,however, something like “Mortimer’s contribution is themost significant contribution to the understanding ofcausation since Hume.” Such a claim is almost alwaysover-the-top even within a genre in which bullshit isexpected; I have here entered the terrain of gratuitous anddamaging bullshit. I must write bullshit but not induce myreaders to say “That’s bullshit” in response.58

So, we have the beginning of an answer to one questionFrankfurt left as an exercise for his reader: Our attitudetoward bullshit is more benign because there are variousthings we do in which we cannot succeed without the rightamount of bullshit. Moreover, there are other activities inwhich attitudes and acts that are close kin to bullshit(courtesy, for example) are necessary for the maintenanceof civility. Honesty is rarely the best policy in cases in whichhonesty is not the whole point of the enterprise. That is whybullshit is everywhere; it is dishonesty without tears.

The interesting questions begin just when we recognizebullshit’s ubiquity. Letters of reference are a bullshit genre,so in order to write a good letter of reference for Mortimer Iwill have to bullshit. Yet, it is, it seems, not hard to imaginea world in which a letter of reference is simply an honestappraisal. Such a world might seem more functional thanour world, since it is harder to evaluate bullshit accuratelyand effectively than it is to evaluate the truth. So how did the

Page 184: Bullshit and Philosophy

letter of reference become a bullshit genre? This, it seemsto me, is a question for sociology and for rhetoric.Philosophers should be a bit chary about venturing a priorianswers to such questions, but there are real conceptualdifficulties that a bit of philosophy can help with here, even ifit cannot wholly sort them out.

An answer that suggests itself immediately appeals tofree-riders. If everyone else is truthful about his or herstudents while I bullshit about mine, mine will do better onaverage than they ought to do (provided I bullshit well). Sothe letter of reference genre tends towards bullshit. But thisis not sufficient. My students might do better in getting intograduate school than they should if I bullshit and no oneelse does. But, my bullshit will not make them succeed ingraduate school.59 So, if my assessments are bullshit whileeveryone else’s are not and, thus, my students get in tobetter schools than they should, the sanction should quicklycome to rest on me—my students are worse than my letterslet on, and my letters will quickly come to be regarded asbullshit.60

At this point, now that we have seen that bullshit oftenmatters and may be unavoidable, I begin to want todistance myself even more from Frankfurt’s account ofbullshit. Bullshit in bullshit genres like letters of reference is,as Frankfurt concedes (pp. 22–23), well-crafted. I writeletters that are dishonest in a sense, but I do not writethings that are false; I do care that my claims are “trueenough” or, to use Stephen Colbert’s coinage, “truthy.” I

Page 185: Bullshit and Philosophy

write “Mortimer will be an asset to any PhD program thataccepts him; I recommend him without reservation”precisely because if I were honest that I do worry that hispersonal reticence will make him ill-suited to the pressurecooker of some departments, he will not get in—not just tothose departments but to others in which he will do well. Itick the “top ten percent” box if it is the highest oneavailable or the “top five percent” box if that one is,because I am not certain what either really means when theissue is “takes initiative” and the damage of puttingMortimer in the second rank is much higher than thedamage of over-estimating him. Indeed, letters of referencecan be extraordinarily well-crafted. Sometimes I wish my“without reservation” to be seen as bullshit. But I do notwrite my reservations into the letter; they appear inprecisely how I do and do not say some things.

So, I do not think that free riding is the origin of bullshitgenres—since it is counter-productive. Much more likely, itseems to me, is the fact that the letter of reference has notmultiple audiences but multiple interested parties. I need tobe able to say with plausibility to the student that I havewritten him a good letter, to the departments that receivethe letter that I have written them something that accuratelyexpresses (not, reports) the strengths and weaknesses ofthe candidate, and to myself, that I have not lied or beendishonest (in any way that goes beyond the dishonesty ofthe genre itself). My ability to say these things with aplausible modicum of truth requires just the right amount ofbullshit in the letter. Bullshit often arises in this way: I wish to

Page 186: Bullshit and Philosophy

recruit my colleagues to a cause, so I appeal to their valuesin arguing for the cause; thus, I offer an argument I myselfdo not believe or endorse. I have to craft this just right,however, so that I don’t lose, say, my colleagues whodistrust the Dean when appealing to those who do trusthim. The better I can do this, the more well-honed is theperformative nature of argument. I have learned to usearguments I neither endorse nor believe to recruit peopleinto doing what I want to happen for other reasons entirely. Ihave become a highly effective bullshitter—a politician, acourtier.

Thus, given the nature of the act and to whom that act isresponsible, the fate of reference letter writing to be abullshit genre is sealed—and our imagined world of honestletters of reference disappears. The details of how bullshitwill be deployed are still open. British letters are rhetoricallyless inflated than American letters. They still strongly smellof bullshit, however, although of a more genteel andinstitution-based variety. (The candidate is less praisedthan her American counterpart; but, her college atOxbridge, good heavens, has been pumping out intellectualdeities for centuries.) Moreover, the enormity of theAmerican system and its diffuseness mean that letterreaders often do not know the letter writers and the bullshitquota goes up the more personal trust goes down. (If I knowProfessor X and know that he knows me and we have adecent relationship, I can write in a more honest tone,relying on his ability to read my intent.)

Page 187: Bullshit and Philosophy

The World as Will to Bullshit

So, in this our world, bullshit is unavoidable. So far thatseems a depressing conclusion. But the most depressingaspect is yet to come. There is bullshit in the world, but itdoes not yet get to the core of what bothers so many today—the sense that bullshit is increasing, that a sort of smugdishonesty is overtaking everything, even where it is notneeded.

One of my local video stores posts, prominently, thefollowing customer service guarantee:61

Each of us at Ballbreakers is empowered,authorized, and committed to serving you.

The service there is not notably better than anywhere elsein retail. If one has a complaint, moreover, the guaranteedoes not cause the staff to take you very seriously and seekto remedy the situation. No, the guarantee serves for themas evidence that they have already done all that couldreasonably be expected and that you, the customer, mustbe a crank.

Another prominent example in the lives of many of theauthors in this book is the recent rise of the university“mission statement” and “academic plan.” Universities have

Page 188: Bullshit and Philosophy

existed for hundreds and hundreds of years, but within thepast twenty or so, their administrators have come to feelthat someone (who?) needs to know better what theiruniversities are trying to do, hence, the university missionstatement. Mission statements cannot be honest: “We aimto provide a good postsecondary education subject to theconstraints under which we operate” just doesn’t inspire.So, instead, we have hundreds of universities that “aim tobe one of the leading universities in the world” or to be“world-class.” Here, for example, is the mission statementof my employer, The University of British Columbia62:

UBC’S VISION FOR THE 21STCENTURY

The University of British Columbia, aspiring to beone of the world’s best universities, will preparestudents to become exceptional global citizens,promote the values of a civil and sustainablesociety, and conduct outstanding research toserve the people of British Columbia, Canada,and the world.

OUR MISSION

The University of British Columbia will provide itsstudents, faculty, and staff with the best possible

Page 189: Bullshit and Philosophy

resources and conditions for learning andresearch, and create a working environmentdedicated to excellence, equity, and mutualrespect. It will cooperate with government,business, industry, and the professions, as well aswith other educational institutions and the generalcommunity, to discover, disseminate, and applynew knowledge, prepare its students for fulfillingcareers, and improve the quality of life throughleading-edge research.

The graduates of UBC will have developedstrong analytical, problem-solving and criticalthinking abilities; they will have excellent researchand communication skills; they will beknowledgeable, flexible, and innovative. Asresponsible members of society, the graduates ofUBC will value diversity, work with and for theircommunities, and be agents for positive change.They will acknowledge their obligations as globalcitizens, and strive to secure a sustainable andequitable future for all.

Everyone knows that very few universities can be “one ofthe world’s best”63; everyone knows therefore that thesemissions are, by and large, impossible and often, as in thecase of UBC’s, just silly. More importantly, becauseeveryone knows that, everyone knows that these are notreally the missions of the universities at all. But every yearhuge pots of money go into carefully crafting more and

Page 190: Bullshit and Philosophy

more bullshit mission statements.I have written to administrators of my home institution,

objecting to some things in the academic plans. Mymissives look like this: “You say that a strong faculty is theuniversity’s chief asset and that, thus, you are committed tomaking the working conditions as good as they must be toattract and retain a strong faculty. Yet, you started knockingdown the neighboring wing of my building in January—rightat the beginning of our second term—and it is, inconsequence, almost impossible for me to work in myoffice. Surely, what you say about a strong faculty is true butyour actions are not in accord with your pledge.” Theresponse, should there be one, is invariably puzzled. Theadministrator, much like our video store employees notedabove, seems to think that the commitment to doing what isbest for the faculty, having been made, is automaticallyfulfilled. The response has the form: “We have made thatpledge. Therefore, we are doing everything we can to retaina strong faculty. You must be a crank and a prima donna.”The desire to make me see my own crankiness is soingrained that almost invariably these responses go out oftheir way to say that “all other feedback received on thismatter has been positive.” That I know that, too, to be false(since I know my colleagues well enough to know I am notalone) is again not to the point. Increasingly, it is hard forme to figure what the point really is.

The video store and the university administration point totwo phenomena. The first is the explosion of bullshit genres.University missions and customer service commitments

Page 191: Bullshit and Philosophy

University missions and customer service commitmentshave not been and need not be matters of bullshit; yet, now,increasingly they are. Even more disturbing than thisexplosion of bullshit is the phenomenon of self-fulfillingbullshit: “We have treated you well in the very act ofpledging to treat you well; now, piss off.” This last is an oddsort of new-fangled performative bullshit. Its mark is acommitment that is taken to be fulfilled simply in virtue of itshaving been made.64

Consider the video store employee who acts as if he hasfulfilled his commitment to treating you with respectbecause it says on the prominently-displayed pledge thathe will treat you with respect. If he genuinely believes this,then he does not understand that the conditions underwhich commitments are undertaken are different from thoseunder which they are fulfilled. A commitment involvesconditions both for its proper issuance and for its fulfillment,but these are (except in a few self-referential cases like “Ihereby promise to make a promise”) distinct. You have nottreated me well by saying that you will. You have placedyourself under an obligation to treat me well, whichobligation you might not otherwise have had. I do not havecomplete say over whether that obligation has been fulfilled,but my sense that it has not is, on the face of it, evidencethat it has not been. Moreover, no one whose commitmentto treat me well is genuine will cite the fact that theypledged to treat me well as evidence that they have.

Performative bullshit has the form of a commitment, but itis not a real commitment. There are two options, however,

Page 192: Bullshit and Philosophy

regarding its dishonesty. In the first case, the personperforming bullshit might genuinely believe that she ismaking a real commitment. I am not certain that this everhappens. The second case, so it seems to me, is thusuniversal or nearly so. In this case, the person knows hehas not really made the commitment but acts as if it is ineffect in order to make it impossible to get anywhere. Thus,the video store employee does not really believe that hehas treated you well because he has pledged to do so.However, if he takes his good treatment of you to havebeen discharged in the pledge to be good to you, thenthere is no place from which you can issue a complaint thathe need take seriously. If a university administrator acts asif pledging to do everything it takes to retain her faculty isitself doing everything that it takes, then no faculty membermay properly complain to her about mistreatment.Mistreatment continues as before, but the ground hasshifted so that it becomes illegitimate to claimmistreatment.

Performative bullshit is the source of much of the sensemany of us have that the world is making us crazy. Whereasa public performance of a genuine commitment wouldprecisely make it easier to demand that it be fulfilled, thepseudo-commitment of performative bullshit removes theground for that demand. And the realm of performativebullshit goes well beyond commitments of various sorts.65

As applied to arguments, performative bullshit directs thatan argument be taken as a good argument by virtue ofhaving been offered as a good argument.

Page 193: Bullshit and Philosophy

Thus, if George W. Bush argues on the basis offabricated intelligence that Saddam had weapons of massdestruction and, thus, that the USA has to go to war againstIraq, he attempts to defuse any objections to the argumentsimply by pointing out that the argument was offered as agood argument.66 If it is discovered that the intelligencewas false, this does not touch the argument, performed asbullshit, which remains good because it was the profferedreason. For those for whom it is impossible to maintain thata false reason is a good reason, another bullshit reasoncan be fabricated (defeating Al-Qaeda, expanding freedomand democracy—take your pick). The entire sequence ofreasons, whose truth does not matter and whoseconnection to whether the USA should go to war does notmatter, has caused the deaths of countless people anddestabilized the entire region. It has, moreover, furtherdamaged the whole business of honestly and sincerelyoffering and demanding reasons for political action. Truereasons might be able to contend with faulty reasons, but ina world of performative bullshit, all bets are off. The sincereperson ends up diligently sifting through arguments thatwere never meant to be taken seriously in the first place.

We live in a world in which arguments are profferedwhich not only do not present the genuine reasons anaction was undertaken but also deny the very existence ofgenuineness in the realm of reasons. We live in a world inwhich commitments are publicly made not only without anyintention to fulfill them but also with the intention that the

Page 194: Bullshit and Philosophy

public issuance of them will prevent anyone from claimingthat they were not fulfilled. In such a world, sincerity is noteven possible. Indeed, irony in the strict dramatic sense isnot possible, for, having become the spectators in thedrama of our own lives, the emptiness of our own gesturesis clear to us. Even cynicism, since it posits ulteriormotives, is not possible—there are only pseudo-motives,lacking even sincere self-interest.

Page 195: Bullshit and Philosophy

Overcoming Overwhelming Bullshit

In a bullshit world, no one succeeds like the bullshitter. Imean the person whose very being is constituted frombullshit. There are such people. Consider the administratorwhose whole job is to craft and then endorse the bullshitmission statement for a university. Whatever the universitydoes, it does. But then someone adds the imprimatur ofThe Mission, which says of what was done that it was doneso that the university will be “world class.” The wholeprofessional being of this person is to add the bullshit thatserves as the locus of value of the acts of the university.Absent the bullshit, this person would have no role. Thebullshit being present, this person creates ourcontemporary replacement for genuine value, the pseudo-value that inheres in actions that must, constitutively, havevalue simply for having been done. This person does nothide what she really wishes to do beneath thesmokescreen of the mission; there are simply actions andthen the ritual claim that they were done for the mission.

Our problem is not that a bullshit world is unstable, butprecisely that it is inherently stable. If every employee-customer interaction is an instance of good customerrelations because the bullshit pledge of customersatisfaction proclaims it so, then disrupting this situation is

Page 196: Bullshit and Philosophy

very difficult. Customers, who began only by asking forsomething more from the person who is “helping” them,come to be seen as subject to “rage,” and this providesone more opportunity to serve the customer by not servingher.

Suppose, however, you are not happy about living in abullshit world. Are there any remedies? If sincerity has beendrained out of a situation, can it be put back in? There isone strategy in the field that seems to be of someconsequence: flat-out, self-evident bullshit that outperformsits covert competitors. This is the Jon Stewart gambit: Wewill offer a news show that clearly is made-up and that yetdoes a better job of presenting the news than most of itsalternative “serious” sources. Here bullshit comes full circle:By self-consciously flouting the conventions of truth-tellingand making it clear that he does not care about the truth—and yet doing a better job at revealing that truth, Stewartreminds us what those conventions were for and revealssomething about how they’ve been perverted. Bullshitters incovering themselves with faux virtue are notable for theirlack of humor. In a bullshit world, humor becomes thesincerest form of unconcern for the truth, the only form ofconcern for the truth still available.

But, what if bullshit or comedy are for you an insufficientlyinspiring pair of alternatives. Suppose you would like moreoptions than the insincere sincerity of Fox News and thesincere insincerity of The Daily Show. I can think only ofone option. Consider the university mission statement andimagine what it would be like to take the task of writing one

Page 197: Bullshit and Philosophy

seriously. Imagine you genuinely believe that in light of thecurrent world situation the mission of higher educationneeds to be rethought. You might have questions such asthese in mind: Is it possible to export democracy to parts ofthe world in which fundamental religious beliefs precludethe possibility that, in the words of the Declaration ofIndependence, “governments are instituted among Men,deriving their just powers from the consent of thegoverned”? Or, given that the principles of higher educationhave derived, since the eighteenth century, fromEnlightenment ideals, can we either recover Enlightenmentideals we can endorse or reorient higher education in apost-Enlightenment world?

Crafted with such questions in mind, a mission statementwould not look like a corporate pledge to maximize profitsor a sports team’s pledge to win a championship. It wouldseriously have to enunciate a new cultural mission forhigher education and seek to make that mission bothpalatable and possible to our citizens. If we cannotsincerely endorse currently culturally available values, thenwe must fundamentally rethink those values. If we lack thecourage or the ability to do that, then all we are left with, andall we deserve, is bullshit.67

Page 198: Bullshit and Philosophy

7

The Importance of Being Earnest: APragmatic Approach to Bullshitting

CORNELIS DE WAAL

One of the tasks Frankfurt sets himself in On Bullshit is tosketch, as he phrases it, “the structure of [bullshit’s]concept” (p. 2). Frankfurt’s approach is largely that of anordinary-language analysis of what people are trying to say—or do—when they use the word. I agree with Frankfurtwhen he says that ‘bullshit’ is a generic term of abuse thatis applied to a very vague and open-ended range ofepistemic phenomena, but I aim to explore, further thandoes Frankfurt, that most interesting aspect of bullshit: theintention with which it is created. This is a paper onbullshitting rather than bullshit.

To get a better grip on bullshitting I will compare it withsituations where people are genuinely interested in figuringout how things really are, and situate it among otherepistemic ventures that are illicit or unproductive. Part of

Page 199: Bullshit and Philosophy

the reason behind the prevalence of bullshitting and theease with which it is accepted is a lack of confidence thatgenuine inquiry is worth pursuing, or even possible.Admittedly there are other reasons why people bullshit,such as epistemic sloth or the need to voice one’s opinionon matters one is only marginally familiar with. Butcontrasting bullshitting with the modest but honest attemptto figure out how things really are seems to me profitable. Inbrief, what distinguishes bullshitting from genuine inquiry isa difference of intention.

Page 200: Bullshit and Philosophy

Two Tauroscatological Schools

G.A. Cohen’s excellent article, “Deeper into Bullshit”(Chapter 8 in this volume) marks the beginning of twodistinctive schools in bullshit thinking. Cohen separateswhat he calls Cohen-bullshit from Frankfurt-bullshit. He alsoobserves, not without satisfaction, that one doesn’t need aFrankfurt bullshitter to generate Cohen bullshit. Cohenpoints to several differences between the bullshit he isinterested in and the bullshit he sees Frankfurt addressing.

The key difference between the two, however, is thatwhereas Cohen focuses on bullshit as a product,irrespective of how it is generated, Frankfurt concentrateson the act of bullshitting itself. I will call these twoapproaches to bullshit the structuralist school and theintentionalist school because of their respective emphasison structure and intention. Since in the intentionalist schoolwe are speaking of the act of bullshitting, intention refers tothe reason, motive, or purpose with which the act isengaged in, like courting a woman with the intention tomarry her, or approaching a tourist with the intention tosteal her purse.

Within the intentionalist school the focus is on thebullshitter, not the bullshit. The essence of bullshitting is thatthe bullshitter does not care about the truth of his

Page 201: Bullshit and Philosophy

statements, because he is indifferent to how things reallyare, or because he believes that whatever he says doesn’treally make a difference. Often, but not always, thebullshitter tries to hide his indifference to truth. When thebullshitter is publicly hostile to “those old-fashioned prigswho still hold on to the notion of truth”68—a view that is invogue in certain relativist, postmodernist, and neo-pragmatist circles—this indifference may even be openlyflaunted. Within the intentionalist school the bullshit thatresults is only of secondary interest; it is simply what we getwhen people bullshit. What counts is the intention of theproducer.

At face value it seems that intentionalists fail toappreciate that one person’s bullshitting can generateanother person’s insight. This suggests that intentiondoesn’t guarantee bullshit, as the intentionalists claim. Wemay call this the insight problem. I think, though, that theinsight problem is best treated as a case of unintendedconsequences—like someone dodging an unpleasant taskby reading this essay instead is an unintendedconsequence of me writing it. The intentionalist can arguethat just as I cannot take any credit for having helpedsomeone dodge a particular task, the bullshitter cannottake any credit for what value others might see in what heexcretes. I will return to this a bit later.

Within the structuralist school, in contrast, the focus issquarely on the bullshit. On this view whether somethingcounts as bullshit has little to do with the intention with whichit is generated, but depends wholly on its intrinsic features.

Page 202: Bullshit and Philosophy

For instance, a piece of writing that is “unclarifiablyunclear,” Cohen observes, is bullshit, no matter what itsauthor’s intentions were or what went through his headwhen he wrote it (p. 130). To determine whether a certaintext is bullshit, one must analyze the text, not speculateabout the intentions of its author. True, those intentions mayexplain how the bullshit came to be, but in the end thoseintentions are irrelevant to the question what makessomething bullshit. Bullshitting and bullshit are on this viewlogically independent. Someone who is bullshitting mayunwittingly produce brilliant insights, while someone who isgenuinely concerned with truth but who happens to havebeen hanging around with the wrong crowd, may become averitable fountainhead of jargonistic bullshit. For thestructuralist, what counts as bullshit is determined by itsstructure, or the lack thereof, and not by how it is produced.

There are a few, admittedly rather uneven reasons why Ifeel more attracted to the intentionalist school. One of theseis that much has already been written about Cohen bullshit,albeit under different names, and that various strategieshave already been developed to separate bull fromknowledge. These include, among others, Descartes’sinsistence on clear and distinct ideas, the verificationistprinciple of the logical positivists, and the pragmatists’pragmatic maxim. To these can now be added the Cohen-Brown test, on which something is bullshit when it is just asplausible as its negation (p. 132). The intentionalist school,in contrast, brings in something important that till now hasbeen almost entirely ignored.

Page 203: Bullshit and Philosophy

A second reason for favoring the intentionalists’approach is that although I agree with Cohen that thebullshitter can generate genuine knowledge, even if only byaccident, I am not so sure that this exempts it from beingbullshit. Take a physician and a sham astrologer whorespectively make a false and a true prediction about thedeath of a certain celebrity—the physician after physicallyexamining her and studying her medical record, theastrologer by consulting Tarot cards which he does notreally believe in and which he doesn’t quite know how toread. Should we abstain from calling the astrologer’sconclusion bullshit simply because it turns out his predictionwas the right one? My view is that we should still call itbullshit because of how the claim was generated. That theclaim happens to be true, or that important segments of theargument are innovative, carefully crafted, or make sense,is another matter. Even when the bullshitter just happens toget it right, it remains bullshit until someone who is notbullshitting has gone over it, affirmed it, and therebytransformed it into knowledge.

This gets us back to the insight problem. Preciselybecause the focus is on intention, the product of oneperson’s bullshitting can be another person’s insight, justas one person’s trash can be someone else’s treasure.The claim that a certain chair cannot be at once trash andtreasure mistakenly assumes that these are qualitiesintrinsic to the object, on a par with the chair being wobblyor the chair being extended in space. The structuralist

Page 204: Bullshit and Philosophy

school takes this stance: calling something bullshit is verymuch like calling a chair wobbly. The intentionalist schooldenies this. Just as calling something trash has to do withthe attitude that is taken towards it, calling somethingbullshit has to do with the intention with which it isgenerated, and not with any of its intrinsic qualities. Just asno chair is trash in and of itself, no claim or argument isbullshit in and of itself. In fact, the discovery that one’sbullshitting is taken by someone as genuine insight cancome as quite a shock to the bullshitter, as happened withWilliam Perry’s undergraduates who bullshitted their waythrough an exam and later discovered that they got an A forit.69 Of course none of this means that no claim or argu-ment can be plain nonsense in and of itself. But nonsenseneed not be bullshit.

Page 205: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Epistemic Imperative

To get a better grip on bullshitting, I will contrast it withgenuine inquiry. For the purpose of this paper I will interpretinquiry (including, but not just including, genuine inquiry) asany activity that leads to knowledge claims that are in someaspect new to those participating in the activity. Now it maybe argued that the bullshitter, who doesn’t care about thetruth of what she is arguing for, cannot possibly be engagedin inquiry, so that contrasting bullshit with inquiry ismisguided. However, because bullshitting and inquiring arealternative ways of responding to questions that are posedor problems that are raised, the two can be compared andcontrasted. Someone who is bullshitting about whethercigarette smoking causes lung cancer, or whetherhomosexuals should be allowed in the army, stands in thesame arena as those who really seek to know whethersomething is true or whether something should be allowed.To the untrained ear the genuine inquirer and the bullshittermay be indistinguishable. In fact, the bullshitter, who is farmore flexible because she is much less restricted in whatshe can say, may even be the most convincing. In short,bullshitting and inquiring are sufficiently similar to warrantcomparison.

There is another reason why contrasting bullshitting with

Page 206: Bullshit and Philosophy

genuine inquiry is insightful. Even the most avid bullshitter isnot likely to accept bullshit from others in matters that are ofreal importance to him. For instance, when he is feelingsick he wants not bullshit, but the doctor to genuinely inquireinto his ailment. Bullshitting, prevalent as it may be, isessentially a free-rider problem. Bullshitters are like peoplethat hop on the bus without buying a ticket. One can only dothis as long as others pay for the busses to go. The same istrue for bullshitting. With the exception of areas of nopractical importance (such as metaphysics or literarycriticism), bullshitting can flourish only in an environmentthat is secured by people who do more than just bullshit.

Contrasting bullshitting with genuine inquiry also puts uson track to cure it. A general loss of faith in the verypossibility of genuine inquiry, or in the possibility of genuineinquiry in certain areas (often extending to everythingexcept the hard sciences), is an important cause of theprevalence of bullshit.

To understand genuine inquiry we ought to turn to thepragmatists, and especially to Charles Sanders Peirce,whose philosophical importance is increasinglyrecognized. For the pragmatists, knowledge is generatedthrough our interaction with a world that poses realproblems that generate living doubt. Hence, inquiry takesthe form of problem-solving, and any conception ofknowledge that banishes knowledge from the world inwhich we live is firmly rejected. Because of its focus onaction, pragmatism is a natural fit for the intentionalistschool.

Page 207: Bullshit and Philosophy

Following Peirce, I define genuine inquiry as any inquirythat is fueled by the desire to find true answers to thequestions one is asking, or involved (perhaps indirectly) inasking. Peirce defined science that way.70 To definescience in terms of the scientific method, as was donetraditionally, was for Peirce to put the cart before the horse.If inquiry is conducted with the right attitude, methods thatfurther that inquiry will evolve naturally in the course of thatinquiry. The use of scientific method by itself doesn’tguarantee that inquiry is conducted with the right attitude,as the pseudo-inquirers may be more successful inreaching their goals when they use methods developed byscientists. In short, what makes something scientific is notthe correctness of the conclusions, nor the methodsemployed, but the attitude with which it is conducted. Theresulting conception of science is a very broad one. Itincludes any inquiry that is engaged with a genuine desireto find true answers to the questions one is asking. Thusconceived, it encompasses the work of homicidedetectives who want to find the murderer, philologists whoseek to recover the meaning of an ancient text, politicianswho want to know which health plan best serves the public,and car mechanics who are looking for the cause of asuspicious rattle.

What characterizes genuine inquiry is neither itsmethods, nor its results, but the attitude with which it isconducted. Inquiry should be engaged in with a genuinedesire to find true answers to the questions that are being

Page 208: Bullshit and Philosophy

asked. Taking this posi-tion does not commit us, however,to the view that we can solve all the questions we canpossibly ask. It doesn’t even commit us to say that anyparticular question we ask must be solvable merelybecause we were able to formulate the question. All itcommits us to is that when we try to answer a particularquestion we proceed from the notion—or the postulate, ifyou will—that that question can be answered, and hencethat we direct our inquiry in such a way as to find thatanswer. One possible outcome of that inquiry might be thatthe question was ill-posed, which may lead to itsabandonment or point to a new question that seems tohave better prospects. Formulating better questions is oneway of advancing our knowledge.

To truly counter the bullshitter, however, we must showthat genuine inquiry is not a pipedream, but somethingattainable. One thing that keeps genuine inquiry within ourreach is that its aim is not something grand and abstract,like “discovering the whole truth,” but, modestly, findinganswers to the questions that are actually being asked.This raises the question of what it is to answer a question.Staying close to the intentionalist stance, we can say that aquestion is answered (or resolved) when the doubts thatinitiated the question have been satisfied. This may raisean eyebrow or two, since at least on the face of it thecorrectness of an answer seems independent of what theinquirer believes it to be, something that is borne out by thefact that occasionally (if not to say often) people are quitesatisfied with a wrong answer.

Page 209: Bullshit and Philosophy

Several things can be said about this. Whether theanswer he comes up with is mistaken or not, once theinquirer has satisfied himself that he has found the answer,he will stop inquiring. Put differently, the satisfaction of theinquirer brings the inquiry to conclusion. Subsequentdoubts about this answer can cause the same inquirer, orothers, to reopen the investigation until everyone is againconvinced that the right answer has been reached, and theninquiry once again comes to a close. Such new doubt canemerge when new facts come to light, or when the questionis looked at with fresh eyes. For many of our questions thisis a long and torturous process, sometimes involvinggenerations of inquirers.

This account of inquiry also points at something else:inquiry is a deeply social enterprise. Given our assumptionthat the inquirer is really interested in uncovering the rightanswer, reasonable doubt expressed by others, especiallywhen they are peers, is powerful fuel for rekindling doubt. Infact, interaction with others is often the only way thatpersonal biases, quirks, lacunae, etc., can be ironed out.

The above claim that the answer to the question must beindependent of what the inquirer thinks it to be ismisleading. What is really meant is that the answer is notdetermined by what the inquirer believes it to be. However,we can maintain the opposite: the answer that solves thepuzzle will determine, or at least influence, what the inquireris going to conclude if he is interested in finding thatanswer and if he is given enough time to complete theinquiry. Put differently, whereas the doubt that generates

Page 210: Bullshit and Philosophy

inquiry. Put differently, whereas the doubt that generatesthe question can be seen as the efficient cause of inquiry,the answer can be considered its final cause; it is thattoward which genuine inquiry directs itself. Pragmatistseven go a step further. Rejecting any view as meaninglesson which truth is made into something that is in principleunattainable, they argue that the answer that would beagreed upon in the long run by the community of allinquirers is the truth with respect to that question.71 There isno more to truth than that. It is called the final opinion, in thatneither new facts nor fresh eyes can elicit any doubt that theanswer that has been reached is indeed the right one. Wedo not need to go that far for our purpose—which is merelyto show that wherever the outcome matters genuine inquiryis superior to bullshitting—but it does show that a robusttheory on which genuine inquiry is truth-indicative ispossible.

Remaining with the pragmatists a little, we can say thatalthough for countless questions the moment a final opinioncould be reached lies infinitely far in the future, there arealso countless questions for which we have alreadyreached such an opinion or for which such a final opinion isin our reach. However, at the same time, since we arehuman and hence fallible, there is no guarantee that in anyactual case the answer we have reached, and have cometo agree upon, is correct. Hence, though we can say thatmany of our answers must be true (how else could wesurvive?), we cannot point at any single one of them andsay with certainty that the answer to that particular question

Page 211: Bullshit and Philosophy

is true. Consequently dogmatism, which maintains thatthere are certainties we can identify and build upon, goesout the window.

This, however, by no means forces us into skepticism, asis often assumed. The skeptic concludes from the fact thatwe can doubt any of our answers that we can doubt all ouranswers. But that simply doesn’t follow. From the fact that apassenger can occupy any vacant seat in the train it doesnot follow that she can occupy them all. The viable thirdoption that presents itself here is that of the fallibilist, whoargues that though we can trust many of our beliefs to betrue, we cannot single out any particular belief as true. Thefallibilist is like someone who is building a house in aswamp. Though none of the foundation poles hit solidground, all of them combined keep the house firmly inplace. Hence, whereas skepticism undermines the verypossibility of knowledge, fallibilism does not.

The above, very brief discussion of inquiry allows us torecast the scientific attitude in terms of a general epistemicimperative:

When engaging in inquiry we should alwaysproceed upon the hope that there is a true answerto the questions we ask and act from a desire tofind that answer.

Page 212: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Problem with Bullshitting

Where there’s an imperative there are ways it can beviolated. Bullshitting is one such violation, but there areothers. Let us look at a few. Peirce, who inspired theimperative, directed most of his own criticism against whathe called “sham reasoning.” In sham reasoning, the intent isnot to find true answers to the questions asked, but to findfacts that will support a conclusion that is already believed.Creationism, which uses science specifically to support thepreconceived notion that the universe is created literally asexplained in the Old Testament, is a paradigm case ofsham reasoning. The creationist already knows the answer.His attention is focused on finding the facts that support itand refuting the arguments that deny it. The creationist,however, genuinely believes that the theory of evolution iswrong. It has to be wrong because its conclusions arewrong. Hence, the creationist isn’t bullshitting. In contrast tothe bullshitter, the creationist cares about how things reallyare. However, he is not a genuine inquirer either, becausethe conclusion is set beforehand and isn’t negotiable.

A different type of violation—one that Susan Haack hasdubbed “fake reasoning”—occurs when the inquirer is notconcerned with finding the right answer, but with someulterior goal, one that is related to the inquiry but is in

Page 213: Bullshit and Philosophy

essence extraneous to the question that is being inquiredinto.72 An inquirer who receives funding from a largecorporation has a strong incentive to produce work thatgives the results her sponsors want hear. Someone who isworking toward a conclusion, not because he thinks it is theright answer, but because it will give him fame, save hiscareer, bring in research money, land him votes, etc., is afake reasoner. A marketing campaign that tailors claimsabout the benefits of a product to scenarios that maximizethe company’s profit is engaged in fake reasoning as well.A special kind of fake reasoning is that which is designedto absolve the reasoner of responsibility. We can find thiswith cold-blooded murderers who plea temporary insanity,corporations that seek to avoid damage claims, andpoliticians that smooth over the gap between what theypromised and what they actually did.

Note that the fake reasoner need not actively doctor theresults. The influence of ulterior goals can take place at asubconscious or even at an unconscious level. The fakereasoner is also not a bullshitter. The issue is not that hedoesn’t care about the truth, as with the bullshitter, but thatthere are certain other goals that he cares about more. Heis not a genuine inquirer either, as finding the right answersis not his highest priority. Sure, his reasoning may beshaky, he may twist language, massage his statistics, orembrace logical fallacies with vigor, but all that does notmake him a bullshitter, at least not in the intentionalistschool. The fake reasoner per se still believes in genuineinquiry and departs from it only because of other reasons

Page 214: Bullshit and Philosophy

inquiry and departs from it only because of other reasonsmore pressing in his eyes—the inquiry being only one ofseveral balls that are being juggled.

A third violation is that of prematurely dismissing theinquiry as going nowhere, so that the answer to thequestion we are asking is a defeatist “we’ll never know.”This is the approach of the skeptic. But there is a differencebetween being convinced that there is no truth and notcaring whether what one says is true. Consequently, theskeptic too is no bullshitter.

So, what then is bullshitting? What makes someone abullshitter—at least in the intentionalist school of Frankfurtand others—is that he doesn’t care about the truth or thecorrectness of his statements, either because of a totalindifference to how things really are, or because of thebelief that whatever he says makes no difference at all, hisvoice being only one in a sea of others, many of whichmore powerful, and all clamoring for attention.73 The salesclerk who doesn’t care about the company she works for,and who tells her customer that the shoes she is tryingreally look great on her without paying any attention towhether they do or not, is bullshitting. There is no motivationto get things right, nor to deceive; there isn’t even anyulterior motive. In bullshitting claims are made, judgmentscast, arguments presented, all with the unbearablelightness of those who are free of any responsibility orcommitment, even if it is a freedom that is rooted in aprofound sense of impotence or insecurity.

A lack of faith in genuine inquiry, intellectual laziness,

Page 215: Bullshit and Philosophy

being forced to speak on issues one knows too little about,all contribute to a culture of bullshitting. And it is a culturethat can very well feed on itself. Bullshitting invariably invitesmore of it. It would be a mistake, however, to limit one’ssearch for bullshitting only to spent scientists, oilypoliticians, or slick marketers. When philosophy itself isboldly identified, per Richard Rorty, with “carrying on theconversation” and truth is defined as “what your peers willlet you get away with,” even the perennial search forwisdom is being reduced to mere bullshitting. What thismeans is not just that what some philosophers say isjargonistic, obscure, or meaningless, but that evenphilosophers are not immune to losing the desire to reallysearch for answers to the questions they are raising. Thetemptation to just blurt out what sounds good and the powerof whatever sounds good to find willful ears (generallyincluding one’s own) is just too great.

Not all violations of the epistemic imperative are sosimple and straightforward. They can be blended, and evencombined, with genuine inquiry. The fake reasoner whodoesn’t care what people think, or who has lost all respectfor his audience, may resort to bullshitting when trying tobridge the gap between the results he needs and theresults inquiry would bring him. He makes factual claimsand explanations without caring whether they are true orfalse, whether they make sense or not, or whether they areeven convincing. The same can be said for the shamreasoner who seeks to defend his holy truths in a politicalarena where he is faced with an audience that steadfastly

Page 216: Bullshit and Philosophy

refuses to see things as he sees them. Also the genuineinquirer may engage in bullshitting when playing the gameof keeping corporate sponsors, university administrators,or grant agencies happy, furnishing them with facts,findings, and arguments he doesn’t himself believe. Onecan even bullshit about bullshitting. 74 It’s important,however, to keep such second-order bullshitting separatefrom first-order bullshitting. Otherwise one runs the risk oflosing the child with the bathwater, as when one woulddismiss excellent research because of the bullshitting withwhich its findings were made public.

In light of the above, one might still argue that there aresome situations where bullshitting is productive, and thateven within genuine inquiry there is a proper place and timefor it. Frankfurt’s discussion of the bull session points in thisdirection (pp. 34–37). Bullshitting could be interpreted ascreating the right atmosphere for inquirers to vent newhypotheses they feel unsure about or draw wild analogiesthat contain a potential key for further progress. However,there remains an important difference betweenbrainstorming, however creative, and bullshitting. Returningonce more to the central premise that drives theintentionalist school—that what makes something bullshit isthe intention with which it is generated—we can say thatwhat distinguishes a brainstorm session from an evening ofbullshitting is that the participants in the former areinterested in discovering something, a desire that isaltogether absent among bullshitters. Bullshitting lacks theopenness of mind and the ability to adapt in face of new

Page 217: Bullshit and Philosophy

openness of mind and the ability to adapt in face of newinsights that are essential for anything to be taken seriouslyor as worth pursuing. True, what bullshitters excrete may onoccasion prove useful to others, but that’s an accidentaland unintended consequence. Taken in that way, listeningto someone bullshit is no more part of inquiry thanserendipitously hitting upon some insight while browsingtabloids or while mindlessly driving through town.

Page 218: Bullshit and Philosophy

So Why Bullshit?

Having distinguished bullshitting from genuine inquiry aswell as from sham and fake reasoning, and having saidsomething about why people engage in those activities, thequestion remains: Why do people bullshit? Why do peoplemake epistemic claims without caring whether they aretrue? Leaving pure epistemic sloth aside and with nopretense of being exhaustive, I will say a little about two(mutually reinforcing) reasons why people bullshit: thesocial pressure to speak on any issue (often combined withthe notion that whatever one says makes no difference),and a lack of faith in the possibility—or the usefulness—ofgenuine inquiry. Because I have separated bullshitting fromsham and fake reasoning, some motives often attributed tothe bullshitter properly belong to the sham or the fakereasoner.

Within a liberal democratic society, as Frankfurt notes,every individual is expected to be a responsible citizen whois able to instantly voice an opinion on countless pertinentand not so pertinent issues (p. 63). This expectation goesback to the Cartesian rejection of authority and theEnlightenment’s appeal that everyone should think forhimself. However, when the situation is such that one isforced, or conditioned, to speak with conviction on many

Page 219: Bullshit and Philosophy

issues one knows little about, one will be unable to alwaysspeak from a genuine desire to find true answers. For onething, there simply isn’t the time. Moreover, in cases whereone is not directly affected there is little motivation to do so.Being relatively detached from the issues one is voicingopinions about, and finding that one’s voice is just oneamong many, has the liberating effect that what opinion isbeing voiced does not make any difference. Hence, there’sno real need to be concerned about the truth of what one issaying.

In addition to the feeling that one does not need toengage oneself in genuine inquiry for many of the issuesone is asked or feels compelled to voice an opinion about,there is the belief that genuine inquiry is far too romantic anideal to be worthy of actual pursuit. Generally, such aprophylactic pessimism follows the disillusion caused by afailed search for certainty. I hope that the above account ofgenuine inquiry, which makes no reference to somethinglike “Truth with a capital T,” and with its fal-libilistic stance,makes a sufficient case to counter this type of bullshitter.

When addressing the issue of the prevalence of bullshit itmay be fair to say that the Enlightenment’s narrow focus onindividuals has made bullshit its natural outcome, as itleaves every individual to fend for himself in anoverwhelming epistemic landscape. Put differently, oneway of looking at the prevalence of bullshit is that it is theprice we are paying for the Cartesian-style epistemicemancipation that developed into a linchpin of the ideologyof modernity, an ideology that situates knowledge within the

Page 220: Bullshit and Philosophy

individual and makes any appeal to authority suspect.Hence, the best way to counter bullshitting is to restore

confidence in genuine inquiry and insist that people be inearnest when they make epistemic claims. Confidence ingenuine inquiry also alleviates the need to be able to speakon any and every issue, as it allows one to rely on the workof others. Scientists work like this. Unless there is goodreason to doubt the work of their colleagues in other fieldsof research, they take the results they obtained at facevalue, assuming that they are the product of genuineinquiry.

Now one might object that by focusing on inquiry I did notcast my net wide enough, because there is more to life thaninquiring into things, even if we include sales clerks helpingcustomers find the right shoes. May there then not be someother function of bullshitting that is not a violation of theepistemic imperative? Take, for instance, the formulaic “It’snice to see you!,” which is not intended to reveal or concealthe speaker’s real feelings, nor to convince the addresseeabout the true nature of those feelings, but rather to makethe addressee feel at ease. It could be argued that theclaim’s truth value doesn’t matter for that, so there’s is noneed for any of those involved to concern themselves withthe claim’s truth value, thereby making bullshittingpermissible.

In response to this, it might be suggested that this is nota case of pure bullshitting but that it is bullshitting for acause, and that the claim “It’s nice to see you!” is in effect apurported product of inquiry, even if this inquiry amounts to

Page 221: Bullshit and Philosophy

little more than a reflection upon one’s feelings. With theformulaic “It’s nice to see you!” this inquiry is simply notengaged in because no matter what the inquiry wouldreveal about our feelings toward that person, the beststrategy remains to say “It’s nice to see you!” That is whatbest serves the purpose that is deemed more important,which is to ease our interaction with that person—making ittechnically a case of fake reasoning. What this comesdown to is the belief that it is not always best to be earnest.Just as there may be situations where it is better to lie,there may be situations where it is better to bullshit.

Alternatively, take the case of a few friends that are justhaving a good time by horsing around a bit for fun. Theirbullshitting serves no other purpose than that they enjoydoing it; it plays a role not unlike that of playing Scrabble orsome other game. However, since we are still dealing witha situation that involves passing off claims as knowledge,however casually, it satisfies the broad definition of inquirygiven before, on which inquiry encompasses any activitythat leads to knowledge claims that are in some aspectnew to those participating in the activity. Such cases ofhorsing around can be defended, though, by arguing that insituations where the conclusions reached do not matter, theenjoyment of the activity can overrule the epistemicimperative. Yes, bullshitting too has its aesthetic appeal.

The fact that these two cases can be interpreted in termsof inquiry doesn’t prove that all cases of bullshitting can besatisfactorily interpreted that way. Personally, I doubt thatthis can be done. What it does show, however, is that

Page 222: Bullshit and Philosophy

looking at bullshitting from the perspective of inquiry givesus a viable framework through which to interpret andevaluate bullshitting. A better understanding of bullshittingmay be a first step, not only towards detecting andidentifying bullshit, but also towards countering orpreventing it when it is inappropriate.

Page 223: Bullshit and Philosophy

II

The Bull by the Horns

Defining Bullshit

Page 224: Bullshit and Philosophy

8

Deeper into Bullshit

bullshit n. & v. coarse sl. - n. 1 (Often as int.)nonsense, rubbish. 2 trivial or insincere talk orwriting. - v. intr. (-shitted, - shitting ) talknonsense; bluff. bullshitter n.

—Oxford English Dictionary

It is just this lack of connection to a concern withtruth—this indifference to how things really are—that I regard as the essence of bullshit.

—Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit, pp. 33–34

Page 225: Bullshit and Philosophy
Page 226: Bullshit and Philosophy

1 Without the Shit of the Bull

Harry Frankfurt’s essay “On Bullshit” is a pioneering andbrilliant discussion of a widespread but largely unexaminedcultural phenomenon. Upon being honored by an invitationto contribute to a volume that celebrated his work,75 Idecided to focus on Frankfurt’s work on bullshit, partlybecause it is so original and so interesting, and partlybecause bullshit, and the struggle against it, have played alarge role in my own intellectual life. They have played thatrole because of my interest in Marxism, which caused meto read, when I was in my twenties, a great deal of theFrench Marxism of the 1960s, principally deriving from theAlthusserian school.

I found that material hard to understand, and, because Iwas naive enough to believe that writings that wereattracting a great deal of respectful, and even reverent,attention could not be loaded with bullshit, I was inclined toput the blame for finding the Althusserians hard entirely onmyself. And when I managed to extract what seemed like areasonable idea from one of their texts, I attributed to itmore interest or more importance (so I later came to see)than it had, partly, no doubt, because I did not want to thinkthat I had been wasting my time. (That psychologicalmechanism, a blend, perhaps, of “cognitive dissonance

Page 227: Bullshit and Philosophy

reduction” and “adaptive preference formation,” is, Ibelieve, at work quite widely. Someone struggles for ageswith some rebarbative text, manages to find some sense init, and then reports that sense with enthusiasm, even thoughit is a banality that could have been expressed in a coupleof sentences instead of across the course of the dozens ofparagraphs to which the said someone has subjectedherself).76

Yet, although I was for a time attracted toAlthusserianism, I did not end by succumbing to itsintoxication, because I came to see that its reiteratedaffirmation of the value of conceptual rigor was not matchedby conceptual rigor in its intellectual practices. The ideasthat the Althusserians generated, for example, of theinterpellation of the individual as a subject, or ofcontradiction and overdetermination, possessed a surfaceallure, but it often seemed impossible to determine whetheror not the theses in which those ideas figured were true,and, at other times, those theses seemed capable of justtwo interpretations: on one of them they were true butuninteresting, and, on the other, they were interesting, butquite obviously false. (Failure to distinguish those opposedinterpretations produces an illusory impression ofinteresting truth).

No doubt at least partly because of my misguidedAlthusserian dalliance, I became, as far as bullshit isconcerned, among the least tolerant people that I know.And when a set of Marxists or semi-Marxists, who, like me,had come to abhor what we considered to be the obscurity

Page 228: Bullshit and Philosophy

that had come to infest Marxism—when we formed, at theend of the 1970s, a Marxist discussion group which meetsannually, and to which I am pleased to belong, I was gladthat my colleagues were willing to call it the Non-BullshitMarxism Group: hence the emblem at the head of thisarticle, which says, in Latin, “Marxism without the shit of thebull.” (The group is also called, less polemically, and as youcan see, the September Group, since we meet eachSeptember, for three days.)

Page 229: Bullshit and Philosophy

2 Two Species of Bullshit

I should like to explain how this chapter reached its presentstate. I read Frankfurt’s article in 1986, when it firstappeared. I loved it, but I didn’t think critically about it.

Having been asked to contribute to the present volume, Ireread the article, in order to write about it. I came to realizethat its proposal about the “essence” of bullshit workedquite badly for the bullshit (see Section 1 above) that hasoccupied me. So I wrote a first draft which trained counter-examples drawn from the domain of the bullshit thatinterests me against Frankfurt’s account. But I then realizedthat it was inappropriate to train those examples againstFrankfurt, that he and I are, in fact, interested in differentbullshits, and, therefore, in different explicanda. Frankfurt isinterested in a bullshit of ordinary life,77 whereas I aminterested in a bullshit that appears in academic works,and, so I have discovered, the word “bullshit”characteristically denotes structurally different things thatcorrespond to those different interests. Finally, and,belatedly, I considered, with some care, the Oxford EnglishDictionary (OED) account of “bullshit”, and, to my surprise, Idiscovered (and this was, of course, reassuring) thatsomething like the distinct explicanda that I had come to

Page 230: Bullshit and Philosophy

distinguish are listed there under two distinct entries.78

So, instead of citing cases of the bullshit that interestsme in disconfirmation of Frankfurt’s account, I now regard itas bullshit of a different kind.79 Which is not to say that Ihave no criticism of Frankfurt’s treatment of the kind ofbullshit that interests him.

Frankfurt is partly responsible for my original,misdirected, approach. For he speaks, after all—see thesecond epigraph at the beginning of this article—of the“essence” of bullshit, and he does not acknowledge that theexplicandum that attracted his interest is just one flower inthe lush garden of bullshit. He begins by saying that theterm ‘bullshit’ is very hard to handle, analytically, but, as weshall see, he rather abandons caution when he comes tooffer his own account of it.

Consider, then, the OED reading of ‘bullshit’:

bullshit n. & v. coarse sl. - n. 1 (Often as int.)nonsense, rubbish. 2 trivial or insincere talk orwriting.80 - v. intr. (-shitted, -shitting) talknonsense; bluff. bullshitter n.

The bullshit that interests me falls under definition 1 of thenoun, but the bullshit that interests Frankfurt is closer towhat’s defined by definition 2 of the noun. And that isbecause of the appearance of the word ‘insincere’ in thatsecond definition of ‘bullshit’. In definition 2 of the noun‘bullshit’, bullshit is constituted as such through being the

Page 231: Bullshit and Philosophy

product of discourse governed by a certain state of mind. Inthis activity-centered definition of bullshit, the bull,conceptually speaking, wears the trousers: bullshit isbullshit because it was produced by a bullshitter, or, at anyrate, by someone who was bullshitting at the time. Bullshitis, by nature, the product of bullshitting, and bullshitting, bynature, produces bullshit, and that biconditional, sounderstood that ‘bullshitting’ enjoys semantic primacy, istrue of Frankfurt’s view of the matter.81

Definition 1, by contrast, defines ‘bullshit’ withoutreference to the bullshit-producer’s state of mind. Thedefect of this bullshit does not derive from its provenance:almost any state of mind can emit nonsense or rubbish,with any old mix of sincerity and its lack. Here the shitwears the trousers, and if there are indeed “bullshitters,”and “bullshittings,” that correspond to the bullshit ofdefinition 1, then they are defined by reference to bullshit:but it may be the case, as I meant to imply by that ‘if’, thatthe words ‘bullshitting’ and ‘bullshitter’ don’t have a stableplace on this side of the explicandum divide.82 Howeverthat may be, definition 1 supplies an output-centereddefinition of the noun: the character of the process thatproduces bullshit is immaterial here.

Note, moreover, how the alternatives in the brief entry onthe verb ‘to bullshit’ match alternatives 1 and 2 in thedefinition of the noun (even though that entry isn’t, as itperhaps should have been, sub-numbered ‘1’ and ‘2’). Onecan “talk nonsense” with any intentions whatsoever, but one

Page 232: Bullshit and Philosophy

cannot unknowingly or inadvertently “bluff”: bluffing is a wayof intending to deceive. (I’m not sure, by the way, that thedictionary is right in its implication that it suffices forbullshitting, in the non-bluff sense, that you produce bullshit,in sense 1: innocent producers of bullshit might be said notto be bullshitting when they produce it.83)

It is a limitation of Frankfurt’s article that, as we shall see,he took for granted that the bull wears the semantictrousers: he therefore focused on one kind of bullshit only,and he did not address another, equally interesting, andacademically more significant, kind. Bullshit as insinceretalk or writing is indeed what it is because it is the productof something like bluffing, but talking nonsense is what it isbecause of the character of its output, and nonsense is notnonsense because of features of the nonsense-talker’smental state.

Page 233: Bullshit and Philosophy

3 Bullshit and Lying

At the beginning of his article, Frankfurt describes acomplexity that afflicts the study of bullshit:

Any suggestion about what conditions arelogically both necessary and sufficient for theconstitution of bullshit is bound to be somewhatarbitrary. For one thing, the expression bullshit isoften employed quite loosely—simply as ageneric term of abuse, with no very specific literalmeaning. For another, the phenomenon itself is sovast and amorphous that no crisp andperspicuous analysis of its concept can avoidbeing procrustean. Nonetheless it should bepossible to say something helpful, even though itis not likely to be decisive. Even the most basicand preliminary questions about bullshit remain,after all, not only unanswered but unasked. (pp. 2–3)

I have no problem with Frankfurt’s first remark, to wit, that“bullshit” has a wide use in which it covers almost any kindof intellectual fault. To circumvent this problem, to identify aworthwhile explicandum, we could ask what ‘bullshit’

Page 234: Bullshit and Philosophy

denotes where the term does carry (as Frankfurt impliesthat it sometimes does) a (more or less) “specific literalmeaning,” one that differs, in particular, from the meaningscarried by words that are close to ‘bullshit’, but instructivelydifferent in meaning from it, such as the word ‘horseshit’,which, at least in the United States, denotes, I believe,something characteristically produced with lessdeviousness than characterizes the production of (OED-2)bullshit. And I think that, for one such meaning, Frankfurthas provided an impressively discriminating (though not, aswe shall see, fault-free) treatment: much of what he saysabout one kind of bullshit is true of it but false, for example,of horseshit.

Frankfurt’s second remark, about the difficulty caused bythe fact that “the phenomenon itself is so vast andamorphous,” is more problematic. Notice that this remark ismeant to be independent of the first one (hence the words‘For another . . .’), as indeed it must be, since nophenomenon could be thought to correspond to ‘bullshit’where it is an undifferentiated term of abuse. In making thisremark, Frankfurt must suppose, if, that is, he supposes, ashe appears to do, that he will command the reader’sagreement, that the reader has some “specific, literalmeaning” of ‘bullshit’ implicitly in mind. But that is extremelydoubtful, partly because it is a gratuitous assumption (and,indeed, as the OED reveals, a false one) that ‘bullshit’ hassome single “specific, literal meaning.” In a word: how canwe be expected to agree, already, that bullshit is “vast” and“amorphous,” when no specification of ‘bullshit’ has yet

Page 235: Bullshit and Philosophy

“amorphous,” when no specification of ‘bullshit’ has yetbeen provided?

However that may be, Frankfurt leaves these preliminaryproblems behind, and plunges right into his subject, byreviewing, refining, and developing a definition that MaxBlack once gave of ‘humbug’ (which is close to bullshit ofthe OED-2 kind), and then by commenting on an exampleof real or feigned rage expressed by Ludwig Wittgensteinagainst (putative) bullshit uttered by Fania Pascal.

Emerging from the Black and Wittgenstein discussions,Frankfurt very surprisingly says, that “the essence of bullshit. . . is . . . lack of connection to a concern with truth—. . .indifference to how things really are” (pp. 33–34), wherethat indifference (see the Frankfurt passage quoted in theparagraph that follows here) is concealed by the speaker.It’s the word ‘essence’ that surprises me here: it seemed tobe implied by Frankfurt’s preliminary remarks that the term‘bullshit’, considered comprehensively, denotes no onething whose essence one might try to specify,84 andFrankfurt had not in the interim indicated a particular regionof bullshit, whose bullshit might, perhaps, be identified byan essence.

Frankfurt later elaborates his definition as follows:

This is the crux of the distinction between him [thebullshitter] and the liar. Both he [the bullshitter] andthe liar represent themselves falsely asendeavoring to communicate the truth. Thesuccess of each depends upon deceiving usabout that. But the fact about himself that the liar

Page 236: Bullshit and Philosophy

about that. But the fact about himself that the liarhides is that he is attempting to lead us away froma correct apprehension of reality; we are not toknow that he wants us to believe something hesupposes to be false. The fact about himself thatthe bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that thetruth-values of his statements are of no centralinterest to him; what we are not to understand isthat his intention is neither to report the truth nor toconceal it. This does not mean that his speech isanarchically impulsive, but that the motive guidingand controlling it is unconcerned with how thethings about which he speaks truly are. (pp. 54–55)

Notice that, when Frankfurt elaborates what is supposed tobe a proposal about bullshit, he speaks not of “bullshit” butof the “bullshitter.” This confirms that it is the bull that wearsFrankfurt’s trousers. But he wrongly takes for granted thatthat is the only important or interesting bullshit that there is.

Now, in the light of the semantic promiscuity of ‘bullshit’that was discussed at the outset of this section, it was, so Ihave suggested, unwise of Frankfurt to cast his claim asone about the “essence” of bullshit, as he does in the pp.33–34 passage. He should have submitted hisindifference-to-truth thesis as an attempt to characterize (atleast) one interesting kind of bullshit, whether or not thereare other interesting kinds of it. Let us assess his thesis assuch, that is, not with the ambitiously generalizing statusthat Frankfurt assigns to it, but as an attempt to

Page 237: Bullshit and Philosophy

that Frankfurt assigns to it, but as an attempt tocharacterize one kind of bullshit, and, in particular, anactivity-centered kind of bullshit. I return to the distinctbullshit-explicandum , which corresponds to OEDdefinition 1, in Section 4 below.

Consider Frankfurt’s statement, with which we mayreadily agree, that

The realms of advertising and of public relations,and the nowadays closely related realm ofpolitics, are replete with instances of bullshit sounmitigated that they can serve among the mostindisputable and classic paradigms of theconcept. (p. 22)

I find it hard to align this remark with Frankfurt’s proposalabout the essence of bullshit: advertisers and politiciansare often very concerned indeed “to lead us away from acorrect apprehension of reality” (p. 55) and to design whatwe might well call “bullshit” to serve that end (yet the quotedp. 55 words are used by Frankfurt to characterize thepurpose of liars as opposed to bullshitters). Is it not aproblem for Frankfurt’s proposal about the essence ofbullshit that those whom he designates as paradigmbullshitters engage in a great deal of what is not, forFrankfurt, bullshitting?

Frankfurt might say (as he must, to sustain his proposal)that, when advertisers and politicians seek to cover up thetruth, they are doing something other than bullshitting. Butwhen we are inclined to agree with Frankfurt that

Page 238: Bullshit and Philosophy

advertising and politics supply paradigms of bullshit, it isnot the subset of their doings to which his proposal pointsthat induces our inclination to agree. I think we are inducedto agree partly because we recognize at least some lying tobe also bullshitting.85 Frankfurt’s contrast between lyingand bullshitting is malconstructed, and he erred, I believe,because he failed to distinguish two dimensions of lying,which we must separate if we are to determine therelationship between lying and Frankfurt’s bullshitting.

Standardly, a liar says what he believes to be false: let uscall all that his standard tactic (or, for short, his tactic). Liarsalso standardly seek to deceive their listeners about somefact (other than the fact that they disbelieve what they say):we can call that the liar’s (standard) goal. And normally aliar pursues the stated goal by executing the stated tactic:he says something that he believes to be false in order toinduce his listener to believe something false. (Usually, ofcourse, what I have called the liar’s “standard goal” is notalso his ultimate or final goal, which may be to protect hisreputation, to sell a bill of goods, to exploit his listener, orwhatever.86 But the liar standardly pursues such furthergoals by pursuing the goal which liars (as I have said)standardly seek. None of these further goals distinguish theliar from non-liars.)

Now, what I have called the “standard tactic” and the“standard goal” of lying can come apart. Consider whatwas one of Sigmund Freud’s favorite jokes:

Page 239: Bullshit and Philosophy

Dialogue between two travelers on a train fromMoscow: “Where are you going?”“To Pinsk.”“Liar! You say you are going to Pinsk in order tomake me believe you are going to Minsk. But Iknow you are going to Pinsk. So whom are youtrying to fool?”87

Suppose that the first traveler’s diagnosis of the purpose ofthe second traveler’s uttering ‘To Pinsk’ is correct: let ustherefore call the second traveler ‘Pavel’ (because of the‘P’ in Pinsk), and let us call the first traveler ‘Trofim’. On theindicated supposition, Trofim is right to call Pinsk-boundPavel a liar, since, as Frankfurt says, the liar is someonewho tries “to lead us away from a correct apprehension ofreality” (p. 55), and that’s what Pavel is trying to do toTrofim. The peculiarity of the present example is that Pavelhere seeks to deceive by telling the truth. Pavel does not, inmy view, lie, on this occasion, but he nevertheless proveshimself to be a liar. Pavel’s goal is the standard goal of theliar, but his tactic, here, is to speak the truth. (The importantand entirely non-verbal point is that the standard goal andthe standard tactic of lying lose their normal associationhere, not whether Pavel is lying, or telling a lie, etc.)

A converse case, in which the standard tactic subservesa non-standard goal, would go as follows. Pavel knows thatTrofim knows that Pavel habitually lies, at any rate when itcomes to disclosing his intended destinations. But, on thepresent occasion, it is very important to Pavel that Trofim

Page 240: Bullshit and Philosophy

present occasion, it is very important to Pavel that Trofimshould believe the truth about where Pavel is going. SoPavel, once again traveling to Pinsk, says that he is goingto Minsk, precisely because he wants Trofim to believe thetruth, which is that Pavel is going to Pinsk. I don’t know, orvery much care, whether Pavel thereby lies, but he is nothere “attempting to lead [Trofim] away from a correctapprehension of reality,” save with respect to his own stateof mind: he wants him to think he’s trying to get Trofim tobelieve something false, when he’s not.

We must, accordingly, distinguish two respects in whichliars characteristically traffic in falsehood. Liars usuallyintend to utter falsehoods, while intending that they bethought to be speaking truthfully; but that is quite separatefrom their standard goal, which is to cause amisrepresentation of reality in the listener’s mind.

What is the bearing, if any, of this distinction, onFrankfurt’s distinction between lying and bullshitting?

The root difficulty for Frankfurt’s bullshitting-lyingdistinction, the difficulty underlying the problem with hisadvertiser example, is that, while Frankfurt identifies the liarby his goal, which is to mislead with respect to reality, heassigns no distinctive goal to the bullshitter, but, instead,identifies the bullshitter’s activity at the level thatcorresponds to what I have called the liar’s tactic. Thestandard liar pursues his distinctive goal by asserting whathe believes to be false and concealing that fact. Frankfurt’sbullshitter asserts statements whose truth-values are of nointerest to him, and he conceals that fact. But Frankfurt

Page 241: Bullshit and Philosophy

assigns no distinctive goal to the bullshitter that woulddistinguish him from the liar. And, in fact, Frankfurt’sbullshitters, as he identifies them, have no distinguishinggoal: they have a variety of goals, one of which can beprecisely to mislead with respect to reality, and that,indeed, is the goal of bullshit advertising.88 Advertisers andpoliticians spew a lot of bullshit, and they indeed seek toinduce false beliefs about reality, but those are not, asFrankfurt must have it, separate but, typically, coincidentactivities on their parts.

The failure to distinguish the level of tactic from the levelof goal runs throughout the discussion. Frankfurt writes at p.47 (my emphasis):

Bluffing too is typically devoted to conveyingsomething false. Unlike plain lying, however, it ismore especially a matter not of falsity but offakery. This is what accounts for its nearness tobullshit. For the essence of bullshit is not that it isfalse but that it is phony.

The problem is that this falsehood is at the level of tactic,whereas phoniness is at the level of goal. If bluffing is likebullshit, that is partly because bullshitting, too, is oftendevoted to conveying something false—although often notby saying that false thing itself.

As Frankfurt says, the bullshitter may not care whether ornot what he says is true. But Frankfurt has confused thatwith the bullshitter’s not caring whether his audience is

Page 242: Bullshit and Philosophy

caused to believe something true or false. That explains anerror that Frankfurt makes about the Fourth of July oratorwhom he describes at pp. 16–18 (my emphases)89:

Consider a Fourth of July orator, who goes onbombastically about “our great and blessedcountry, whose Founding Fathers under divineguidance created a new beginning for mankind.”This is surely humbug . . . the orator is not lying.He would be lying only if it were his intention tobring about in his audience beliefs which hehimself regards as false, concerning such mattersas whether our country is great, whether it isblessed, whether the Founders had divineguidance, and whether what they did was in fact tocreate a new beginning for mankind. But theorator does not really care what his audiencethinks about the Founding Fathers, or about therole of the deity in our country’s history, or the like.At least, it is not an interest in what anyone thinksabout these matters that motivates his speech.

It is clear that what makes Fourth of July orationhumbug is not fundamentally that the speakerregards his statement as false. Rather . . . theorator intends these statements to convey acertain impression of himself. He is not trying todeceive anyone concerning American history.

The orator’s unconcern about truth is, mistakenly, identified

Page 243: Bullshit and Philosophy

The orator’s unconcern about truth is, mistakenly, identifiedat the level of his goal, rather than, in line with p. 55, merelyat the level of his immediate tactic. For the bullshittingorator, as Frankfurt describes him, might well care a lotabout what the audience thinks about the FoundingFathers.90 If the orator had been Joseph McCarthy, hewould have wanted the audience to think that the “newbeginning” that the Founding Fathers “created” shouldpersuade the audience to oppose the tyranny supposedlythreatened by American Communism. The fact that it is not“fundamental” that “the speaker regards his statements asfalse” in no way implies that “he is not trying to deceiveanyone concerning American history.” (Similarly,advertisers may not care whether or not what they say istrue, but they do care about what their audience is causedto believe, or, rather, more generally, about the thought-processes that they seek to induce in people.91)

Page 244: Bullshit and Philosophy

4 Bullshit as Unclarifiable Unclarity

Unlike Frankfurt’s bullshitting, lying is identified in terms ofthe defect at which it aims, namely, falsehood. We clarifywhat a liar is by reference to falsehood, rather than theother way around; we do not, that is, when asked tocharacterize what falsehood is, say that falsehood is what aliar aims to say. In parallel, we might, unlike Frankfurt, seekto clarify what a bullshitter is by reference to what he aimsat, to wit, bullshit. We might start with the shit, not with thebull. And that would induce us to consider OED definition 1(“nonsense, rubbish”) the one that fits the bullshit thatinterests me, rather than the bullshit that interests Frankfurt.My bullshit belongs to the category of statement or text. It isnot primarily an activity but the result of an activity (whetheror not that activity always qualifies as an activity ofbullshitting.92)

A liar who tries to say something false may inadvertentlyspeak the truth, whether or not he is then lying, and whetheror not what he then says is a lie. And there is also theopposite case in which an honest person, by mistake,speaks falsely. The bullshit that interests me is relevantlyparallel. I countenance a bullshitter who has tried, but failed,to produce bullshit—what comes out, by accident, is goodsense—and I also countenance a lover of truth who utters

Page 245: Bullshit and Philosophy

what he does not realize is bullshit. A person may avow, infull honesty, “I’m not sure whether what I’m about to say isbullshit.” These are not possibilities for the bullshit thatinterests Frankfurt. But they are possibilities. So the bullshitthat interests Frankfurt doesn’t cover the waterfront.

A person who speaks with Frankfurtian indifference tothe truth might do so yet happen to say something true,and, in at least one sense of the term, the one that interestsme, what he says could not then be bullshit.93 And,oppositely, an honest person might read some bullshit thata Frankfurt-bullshitter wrote, believe it to be the truth, andaffirm it. When that honest person utters bullshit, she’s notshowing a disregard for truth. So it is neither necessary norsufficient for every kind of bullshit that it be produced by onewho is informed by indifference to the truth, or, indeed, byany other distinctive intentional state.

The honest follower, or the honest confused producer ofbullshit, may or may not count as a bullshitter,94 but she iscertainly honest, and she certainly utters (one kind of)bullshit. There exists bullshit as a feature of utterances thatdoes not qualify as bullshit by virtue of the intentional stateof the utterance’s producer (although that state may, ofcourse causally explain why the bullshit is there, and/or whywhat’s there is bullshit).

But what is that feature of utterances? One thing it canbe, at least to a first approximation, is what the OED callsit, to wit, nonsense. But what particularly interests me is acertain variety of nonsense, namely, that which is found in

Page 246: Bullshit and Philosophy

discourse that is by nature unclarifiable, discourse, that is,that is not only obscure but which cannot be renderedunobscure, where any apparent success in rendering itunobscure creates something that isn’t recognizable as aversion of what was said. That is why it is frequently anappropriate response to a charge of bullshit is to set abouttrying to clarify what was said. (Think of attempts tovindicate Heidegger, or Hegel. The way to show that theyweren’t bullshitters is not by showing that they cared aboutthe truth, but by showing that what they said, resourcefullyconstrued, makes sense. Those who call them bullshittersdo not doubt that they cared about the truth, or, at any rate,it is not because of any such doubt that they think Hegeland Heidegger were bullshitters. 95 That Frankfurt issueisn’t the issue here.)

Something is unclarifiable if and only if it cannot be madeclear, but I shall not try to say what “clear” means in thisessay. (I’m inclined to think it’s not possible to do so, in anilluminating way.) Note, however, that there are relevantlydifferent forms of unclarity, all of which have bearing here.There is the unclarity of a sentence itself, and then there isthe unclarity as to why a certain (possibly perfectly clear)sentence is uttered in a given context: So, for example, themeaning of Wittgenstein’s “If a lion could speak, we wouldnot understand him” is in one way perfectly clear, but itmight nevertheless be judged obscure, and unclarifiablyobscure, by one who doubts that it carries, in context, agraspable point. There is also the unclarity of why one

Page 247: Bullshit and Philosophy

statement should be taken to lend credence to anotherstatement. And there are no doubt other pertinentunclarities too.

Note that it is not an objection to the proposed sufficientcondition of bullshit that different people might, in the light ofdifferent background beliefs, impose different standards ofclarity, and, therefore, identify different pieces of texts asbullshit. Some of the people might, of course, be wrong.

I emphasized “one thing it can be” three paragraphsback because defects other than unclarifiable unclarity cansuffice to stigmatize a text as bullshit. I focus on this varietyof the phenomenon because it commands a greateracademic following than other varieties do. In the variousvarieties of bullshit, what is wanting, speaking verygenerally, is an appropriate connection to truth, but not, asin Frankfurt’s bullshit, as far as the state of mind of theproducer is concerned, but with respect to features of thepiece of text itself. Unclarifiably unclarity is one suchfeature. Rubbish, in the sense of arguments that are grosslydeficient either in logic or in sensitivity to empiricalevidence, is another. A third is irretrievably speculativecomment, which is neither unclear nor wanting in logic, suchas—David Miller’s excellent example—“Of course,everyone spends much more time thinking about sex nowthan people did a hundred years ago.”

I focus on unclarifiable unclarity in particular inpreparation for a further inquiry into bullshit that addressesthe question why so much of that particular kind of bullshit isproduced in France. This kind of academic bullshit, unlike

Page 248: Bullshit and Philosophy

the two contrasting types of bullshit, be they academic ornot, mentioned in the previous paragraph, comes close tobeing celebrated for its very unclarity, by some of itsproducers and consumers. What some of them certainlycelebrate is a disconnection with truth: in what perhapsranks as the consummation of the development of unclarity-type bullshit, a consummation that Hegel might have called“bullshit risen to consciousness if itself”, truth is, in muchpost-modernism, expressly disparaged.

Although I foreswear a definition of ‘clarity’, I can offer asufficient condition of unclarity. It is that adding orsubtracting (if it has one) a negation sign from a text makesno difference to its level of plausibility:96 no force in astatement has been grasped if its putative grasper wouldreact no differently to its negation from how he reacts to theoriginal statement. The deliberate bullshit published by AlanSokal97 no doubt comes out as unclarifiable, by thatcriterion. Note that this test does not apply to the differentsorts of bullshit reviewed a couple of paragraphs back,and, being a merely sufficient condition of unclarifiability, itdoes not characterize all cases of the latter either.

An objection that faces my account is that it appears toclassify good poetry that isn’t bullshit as bullshit, since apiece of good poetry may be unclarifiable. A tempting wayof acquitting such poetry of the charge of bullshit is byreference to its designation as poetry, rather than as somesort of contribution to knowledge in a more straightforwardsense. But then the same text would be bullshit or not

Page 249: Bullshit and Philosophy

according, Frankfurt-like, to its, as it were, intentionalencasement, and I am trying to characterize an intention-independent sense of the term.

An unclarifiable text can be valuable because of itssuggestiveness: it can stimulate thought, it can beworthwhile seeking to interpret it in a spirit which toleratesmultiplicity of interpretation, and which therefore denies thatit means some one given thing, as a clarifiable piece of textdoes. So let us say, to spare good poetry, that the bullshitthat concerns me is not only unclarifiable but also lacks thisvirtue of suggestiveness.98 (I am sure that many academicbullshitters get away with a lot of bullshit because some oftheir unclarifiabilia are valuably suggestive, and thereforenot bullshit. Their readers then mistakenly expect more, ormost, of it to be so.)

So much by way of a preliminary attempt to identify thebullshit that interests me. But what reading of ‘bullshitter’, ifany, corresponds to the bullshit that I have tried to identify?Producers of Cohen-bullshit are clearly not by naturebullshitters, in Frankfurt’s sense, though Frankfurt-bullshitters often produce Cohen-bullshit, at least in theacademy. Rather, I would say that the word ‘bullshitter’ thatcorresponds to my bullshit has two readings. In one of itsreadings, a bullshitter is a person who is disposed tobullshit: he tends, for whatever reason , to produce a lot ofunclarifiable stuff. In a second acceptable reading of theterm, a bullshitter is a person who aims at bullshit, howeverfrequently or infrequently he hits his target.99 (Notice that

Page 250: Bullshit and Philosophy

other nouns that signify that their denotations engage in acertain activity display a similar pair of readings: a killermay be a being that tends to kill, with whatever intention orlack of it (a weed-killer, for example, is a killer, and amerely careless human stomper on flowers is a (flower-)killer); or he may be a being who intends to kill, whether ornot he ever does). Aim-(Cohen)-bullshitters seek and relyon unclarifiability, whereas innocent speakers of bullshit aremerely victims of it. Aim-bullshitters resort to bullshit whenthey have reason to want what they say to be unintelligible,for example, in order to impress, or in order to givespurious support to a claim: the motives for producingbullshit vary. (And just as a person might sometimes kill,without being a killer in either of the senses I distinguished,so a person who is in neither of the senses I distinguisheda bullshitter might, on occasion, produce bullshit.)

What about the verb, ‘to bullshit’? Does the producer ofmy bullshit, always bullshit when she produces bullshit, asFrankfurt’s does? I see no reason for saying that aninnocent does, especially if she’s not even a disposition-bullshitter. But an aim-bullshitter who produces bullshitindeed bullshits.100

Page 251: Bullshit and Philosophy

5 Bullshit as Product and Bullshit asProcess

It matters that bullshit can come in the non-intention-freighted form by which I am exercised. For there is, today,a great deal of my kind of bullshit in certain areas ofphilosophical and semi-philosophical culture, and if, as weshould, we are to conduct a struggle against it, the sort ofstruggle that, so one might say, Alan Sokal hasinaugurated,101 then it is important not to make falseaccusations, and not, therefore, for example, to chargepossibly innocent traffickers in bullshit of lacking a concernfor truth, or of deliberately conniving at obscurity.102 Ourproper polemical target is bullshit, and not bullshitters, orproducers of bullshit, as such. So while it’s lots of fun, forpeople like me, who have a developed infantile streak, totalk about bullshit, and even just to write ‘bullshit’, over andover again, in an academic article, there is nevertheless, inmy opinion, something important at stake here, and thecharacter of what is at stake makes the bullshitter/bullshitdistinction important.

To prevent misunderstanding, let me add that I dobelieve that there is quite a lot of aiming at obscurity in theproduction of philosophical bullshit, and a lot, to boot, in this

Page 252: Bullshit and Philosophy

region, of lack of concern with truth.103 But these moralfaults should not be our primary focus. For reasons ofcourtesy, strategy, and good evidence, we should criticizethe product, which is visible, and not the process, which isnot.104

Page 253: Bullshit and Philosophy

9

The Unity of Bullshit

GARY L. HARDCASTLE

Our topic is bullshit, of course, and it goes almost withoutsaying that in reflecting on our bullshit-rich practices, and onthe various concepts we use to describe them, we’ll bemaking use of philosophy. Since reflection and tinkeringwith concepts is part of our practice as well, in thinkingphilosophically about bullshit we have every chance (and by‘we’ I mean ‘I’) of actually engaging in bullshit (that is,“bullshitting”). Perhaps without even knowing it, or, perishthe thought, caring. So there’s not just philosophy afoot, butirony as well. Fair warning.

Yet think about bullshit we must. Not just because this isa volume of essays on bullshit, and not just because I’m acontributing editor to that volume facing, for this very paper,a ridiculous deadline, the missing of which will obligate meto purchase a very expensive French dinner for another ofthe volume’s contributors (nor has it escaped my attention

Page 254: Bullshit and Philosophy

that these conditions are themselves ideal for thepromulgation of bullshit, so the bullshit-risk I’m running ineven attempting this essay is, shall we say, immense).

No, the reason we must talk about bullshit is simplybecause (a) it’s a fixture in our lives, and (b) we’d rather itwasn’t. That is, we find bullshit—not always, but oftenenough—obnoxious and, occasionally, intolerable. Andunder exactly these conditions arises, inexorably, thatoldest genre of talk: complaint. As in, “What’s with all thisbullshit?!” (but in Sumerian).

Fortunately, not all our bullshit talk is complaint.Everyone, from me to all but the most cynical among us,nurses the hope that with a bit of care, a bit of insight, a bitof resolve, and a bit of luck, we could reduce, nay,eliminate, the amount of bullshit in our own lives, nay, in thelives of everyone we deal with, nay, in everyone. Or, if noteliminate, maybe overcome the bullshit. And it’s that hopethat sends us off, personally, in our families, andoccasionally in our communities, on anti-bullshit campaignsof various scales, with limited success but nearly unlimitedexpectations of success. Preliminary to these campaigns,and usually in conjunction with them as well, we settle onwhat it is exactly we’d like to eliminate. And that involves acertain amount of talk very different in kind from complaint.It involves marshalling examples, crafting definitions,designing a strategy, anticipating resistance, measuringsuccess, and articulating some sort of exit strategy (thatlast one optional in the United States).

Page 255: Bullshit and Philosophy

The talk is usually just thought, of course—talk toourselves. But occasionally someone climbs on stage,takes a deep breath, and lets the rest of the world, or atleast everyone who is listening, in on her plan. When onetoo many “Customer Service Specialists” consigned theearnest and hard-working Laura Penny, a Canadian writerand writing instructor, to one too many “AutomatedCustomer Service Facilities,” the result was an anti-bullshitdeclaration pedestrian in sentiment but celestial ineloquence. The ending of Penny’s Your Call Is Important toUs: The Truth About Bullshit genuinely touches me:

You, Gentle Reader, are probably not one of thepowerful malefactors of great bullshit, so all of thishuffing and puffing is kind of like chastising kidsfor poor attendance at school. The kids who arecongenitally un-there aren’t around to hear youchew them out.

But in the event you are a perpetrator (and youknow in your heart of hearts if you are), I say untoyou: Shame. Shame! Have you no sense ofdecency? You take names in vain, and sendlegions of vain names into the world. And whenyou fuck with English, you are money-changing inmy temple.105

How much bullshit do you suppose it takes to get a writinginstructor to write that? A lot, I’m imagining. Go Laura!

It’s been some time since a philosopher worked up a

Page 256: Bullshit and Philosophy

It’s been some time since a philosopher worked up acomparable head of steam, but let’s note that this sort oftalk about bullshit—devising definitions, crafting strategies,countering resistance, and so on—is one thingphilosophers do regularly, as a matter of profession andsometimes as a matter just of professional habit. And everyso often one philosopher makes such headway againstbullshit, or at least comes to believe that such headway hasbeen made, that his or her particular anti-bullshit projectattracts the attention not just of other philosophers but ofregular people. This happened most recently with HarryFrankfurt’s On Bullshit, a bona fide bestseller.

On Bullshit is a charming (if skinny) book with a catchytitle, and partly because of this, no doubt, it enjoyed twenty-six weeks on the New York Times bestseller list, wheredashes demurely obscured its title’s naughty bit. And sinceFrankfurt’s book had circulated as a paper for some yearsbefore its promotion to book, other philosophers—notablyG.A. Cohen, whose “Deeper Into Bullshit” is included in thisvolume (pp. 117–135)—had something to say aboutbullshit. Philosophically speaking, 2005 was a very goodyear for bullshit, and so was 2006.

We should celebrate both On Bullshit’s enormoussuccess, and the immanent delivery of yet more relatedphilosophical work (including the book you’re holding rightnow), to the public that professional philosophy all too oftenforgets. We should celebrate it not as the long-awaitedreturn of the philosopher kings to the public debate (or evento Rolling Stone) but simply as an occasion for philosophy

Page 257: Bullshit and Philosophy

to join the discussion taking place more or less all the timeoutside the realm of philosophy departments, classrooms,and conferences. If Frankfurt’s book shows anything, it’sthat philosophers, as much as anyone else, want to knowwhat’s with all the bullshit. Actually, we even have a fewideas.

Frankfurt’s idea (as many, if not all, the chapters in thisvolume will point out) is that bullshit is a certain kind ofnegligence, specifically, negligence of truth. This notion iswell-expressed in a distinction Frankfurt draws betweenbullshit and lying: the liar cares about the truth (and wants tosteer us away from it), while the bullshitter doesn’t give ahoot about the truth so long as she can bullshit her waythrough to the promotion, the donation, the grade, the vote,the sale, or sometimes—let’s be honest—just the end ofthe conversation. The bullshitter’s utter disregard for thetruth Frankfurt deems more offensive than the liar’sperverse regard for the truth. “Bullshit,” as Frankfurt puts it,“is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are” (On Bullshit,p. 61) because, Frankfurt seems to believe, our livingtogether in relative peace and harmony demands of eachof us that we mind the truth.

Incidentally, this leaves Frankfurt with the puzzle of whywe seem, at a first glance at least, to be so much moretolerant of bullshit than lying (a puzzle several others take upin this very volume). If bullshit is so corrosive, one wouldthink it would get the blunt end of our moral cudgel; yet welet a lot of bullshit slide. As to the different question of why

Page 258: Bullshit and Philosophy

there is so much bullshit, Frankfurt suggests that we in thedemocratic West have backed ourselves into having tohave a view about everything, no matter how little informedwe might be, and that under these conditions a disregardfor the truth becomes a rather attractive strategy for gettingthrough the day (for an extensive discussion of this point,see Mark Evans’s contribution to this volume). Democracy,it appears, breeds bullshit.

Frankfurt’s ideas about bullshit are not the only ones onthe table. There’s also G.A. Cohen’s. Cohen finds fault withFrankfurt’s “indifference thesis” insofar as the various aimsattached to bullshitting include some that requiremisdirection with respect to reality, that is, lying. And ifsome lying is bullshitting, Frankfurt’s claim that bullshittingis entirely different from lying must be, well, wrong. Cohencites advertisers (whom Frankfurt tags producers ofclassic, paradigm bullshit) as bullshitters, and notes that,like liars, they are keen to steer us away from the truth. Themistake, as Cohen has it, lies in confusing the bullshitter’snot caring “whether or not what he says is true” with his “notcaring whether his audience is caused to believesomething true or false” (pp. 127–28). Cohen claims thatthe bullshitter’s negligence of the truth of what he says sitsalongside an obsession for the truth about what othersbelieve. Advertisers, to continue the example, care not atall if the new Ford Humiliator is the best-built or mostreliable SUV but loads about the truth of what we believeabout it.

Page 259: Bullshit and Philosophy

A second complaint of Cohen’s cuts deeper. He claimsthat Frankfurt’s account of bullshit is incomplete. It missesout on an important, and different, kind of bullshit. Infocusing “on one kind of bullshit only,” writes Cohen,Frankfurt

did not address another, equally interesting, andacademically more significant, kind. Bullshit asinsincere talk or writing is indeed what it isbecause it is the product of something likebluffing, but talking nonsense is what it is becauseof the character of its output, and nonsense is notnonsense because of features of the nonsense-talker’s mental state. (pp. 121–22)

On Frankfurt’s concept of bullshit, the bull, to borrowCohen’s expression, “wears the trousers”; bullshit iswhatever we get from the bull. What we need, according toCohen, is a bullshit- (rather than a bull-) centered account ofbullshit—an account of bullshit or nonsense independent offacts about the person serving it up (such as, for example,her mental state). And Cohen delivers an admittedlypreliminary account of bullshit in this sense, one thatemphasizes as a sufficient condition of bullshit its“unclarifiable unclarity” (p. 131). Something, a sentence forexample, is unclarifiable “if and only if it cannot be madeclear.” It’s disappointing that Cohen declines to say what‘clear’ means —and, indeed, he lets on that he doesn’tthink it’s even “possible to [say what ‘clear’ means], in an

Page 260: Bullshit and Philosophy

illuminating way” (p. 131). But it’s an ironic disappointment,so at least we have that.

Frankfurt and Cohen each have some ideas aboutbullshit, then, and, not surprisingly, they are at odds. My ownidea about bullshit consists, I hesitate to divulge, in addingyet more ideas about bullshit to the mix, in the hope ofresolving what appear to be irresolvable differencesbetween Frankfurt’s idea and Cohen’s. This strategy ofsimplifying the conceptual stew by adding more things to itstrikes many (my students especially) as a bit perverse. Butit is in fact a reliable (and, partly for that reason, quitepopular) way to actually make progress in these sorts ofmatters, especially when the ideas added to the mix havegarnered decent reviews on the intellectual stage; whenthey have, that is, a respectable intellectual ancestry.Determining this strategy’s success in the particularinstance of this paper I leave as an exercise for the reader.

The ideas I’ll be bringing to bear on the schism betweenCohen and Frankfurt are the ideas associated with logicalpositivism—the premier, passionate, remarkablysuccessful, and altogether thoroughly entertaining anti-bullshit philosophical program of the 1920s and 1930s (itsend met, tragically but not surprisingly, at the hands of twoof the twentieth century’s premier bullshit programs,European fascism and the Red Scare106). There are clearparallels between logical positivism and contemporary anti-bullshit programs,107 and, in fact, I’m surprised that so farso few, Frankfurt included, have either noticed the parallel

Page 261: Bullshit and Philosophy

or drawn upon it to add to the current discussion.108 But nomatter; perhaps this book, and even this essay, is a start.

The logical positivists were not shy about bringing thehammer down on bullshit, but as often they described whatthey were up to in the appropriately positive terms ofpromoting unity among all the domains of genuineknowledge. Their idea was that the unity of science meantmaking clear the connections various domains ofknowledge bore to one another, and that that led toeradication of the hidden depths and dark recesses thatcould serve as massive underground bullshit bunkers.“Unity of science!” they sang, warbling ‘science’ in its verygeneral, distinctly German, sense. So using the logicalpositivist’s own ideas about bullshit, its source, and itseradication to unify Frankfurt and Cohen’s accounts, as Iintend, invokes, it seems to me, good anti-metaphysicalkarma.

Page 262: Bullshit and Philosophy

No Bullshit, Please, We’re Austrian

Now the logical positivists railed against metaphysicsrather than bullshit. If you happen to be worried that thepositivist’s metaphysics isn’t Frankfurt’s (or Cohen’s)bullshit, then I aim to allay your worries by showing how thelogical positivist’s metaphysics unites Frankfurt’s, andCohen’s, bullshit. The most famous instance of positivisticrailing against metaphysics, I believe, is Rudolf Carnap’s1932 “Overcoming Metaphysics through the LogicalAnalysis of Language.”109 Philosophers know this essay asthe one in which the young Rudolf Carnap takes the thenfar-better established German philosopher MartinHeidegger to task for writing, on p. 34 of his 1929 Was IstMetaphysik?, “Das Nichts selbst nichtet,” that is, ‘Thenothing noths’.110 Here was a choice bit of metaphysics,Carnap noted, and just the sort of thing that we ought toovercome (rather than ponder, examine, debate, or refute)by sober, and rather elementary, logical analysis of thesentence itself. Carnap’s essay is hardly the only instanceof a logical positivist assault upon metaphysics, but (recallmy ridiculous deadline) it’s the only one I’ll consider here.There is on the ontological horizon a succession ofinteresting articles and books with titles like “Neurath onBullshit,” “Reichenbach on Bullshit,” “Quine on Bullshit,” and

Page 263: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit,” “Reichenbach on Bullshit,” “Quine on Bullshit,” andso on, and someone (other than myself) ought to writethem.

Carnap’s target, and the target of the logical positivistsgenerally, was meaningless utterances, but not justmeaningless utterances. Carnap is interested in the muchmore interesting topic of meaningless utterances that canbe, and often are, presented as and widely understood tobe meaningful—their utter-ers might, for example, presentthem (falsely) as though they had a meaning, or the peoplewho read or hear such utterances might believe (again,falsely) that they have a meaning. Such utterances arepseudo-sentences, and Carnap’s claim is thatmetaphysics consists precisely of such pseudo-sentences.Spelling this out means, first, giving an account of what it isfor an utterance to have meaning (thereby identifying what itis for it to be meaningless as well) and, second, explaininghow it is that meaningless utterances could ever beconfused with meaningful ones—how, we might say,metaphysics happens. Perhaps it’s not hard, having saideven just this little, to see how Carnap’s approach tometaphysics might incorporate both Cohen’s bullshit-centered notion of “unclarifiable unclarity” and Frankfurt’sidea that bullshit is a certain intention, characterized by thedisregard for the meaning of what one says (and, by thatfact, for the truth). Both are afoot in the metaphysics Carnapbegs us to overcome.

Examples work wonders for Carnap. He invites us toimagine an encounter with someone using the word ‘teavy’,

Page 264: Bullshit and Philosophy

a new word, or at least a word new to us:

In order to learn the meaning of this word, we askhim about its criterion of application: how is one toascertain in a concrete case whether a thing isteavy or not? Let us suppose to begin with that weget no answer from him: there are no empiricalsigns of teavy-ness, he says. In that case wewould deny the legitimacy of using this word. If theperson who uses the word says that all the samethere are things which are teavy and there arethings which are not teavy, only it remains for theweak, finite, intellect of man an eternal secretwhich things are teavy and which are not, we shallregard this as empty verbiage. (p. 64)

The meaninglessness of ‘teavy’ stems, Carnap holds, fromthe fact that what Carnap calls the term’s elementarysentences—sentences with the form “x is teavy” (such as‘This world is teavy’ or ‘My brother is teavy’)—cannot bededuced from other sentences. At the time, this meant forCarnap that the elementary sentences could not beverified.111

Utterances, as opposed to terms, can be meaninglessas well, even when all the terms they contain aremeaningful. There are trivial cases (Carnap offers ‘Caesaris and’), but also cases like ‘Caesar is a prime number’,which might at first glance be taken as meaningful. Thislatter category contains pseudo-statements, things that

Page 265: Bullshit and Philosophy

aren’t statements but might initially be taken to be (inCarnap’s world, margarine, which isn’t butter but can bepassed off as butter, would be pseudo-butter).Meaningfulness for utter-ances, as for words, amounts to acertain disconnectedness to other claims: we cannot, inprinciple, bring evidence to bear on the meaninglessexpression, either for it or against it. Carnap offers asexamples of these Heidegger’s ‘We find the nothing’ and‘We know the nothing’; ‘The nothing noths’ wins specialCarnapian exasperation points for being not just ameaningless arrangement of terms, but for having amongits terms a meaningless one to boot, the pseudo-verb ‘tonothing’ (p. 71).

Page 266: Bullshit and Philosophy

A Little Carnap in Everyone

Carnap’s notion of meaninglessness, his main diagnostictool in his battle against metaphysics, is a much moreprecise rendering of “unclarifiable unclarity,” Cohen’s maindiagnostic tool in his battle against bullshit. This is why I amgenuinely surprised that Cohen doesn’t mention Carnap or,for that matter, any of the logical positivists. I believe theparallel is confirmed by a careful, sustained, reading ofCohen’s paper alongside Carnap’s; but, really, that’s thesort of thing one ought to do in private.

But I will offer a consilience that bolsters my claim. Cohenoffers nonsense as an example of bullshit, and by‘nonsense’ he means not merely unclear discourse butdiscourse that can’t be made clear: the mark of suchunclarity is that “any apparent success in rendering itunobscure creates something that isn’t recognizable as aversion of what was said” (p. 130). This manner ofidentifying the unclarifiable by its disconnectedness toother statements or texts is just Carnap’s strategy forisolating the meaningless. For Carnap, it is not as thoughthere are antecedently meaningful sentences, andconnecting a new sentence to one of these somehowinfects the former with the latter’s meaning. The idea,rather, is that something is meaningful just in bearing the

Page 267: Bullshit and Philosophy

right (presumably, logical) relation to other assertions ortexts. And it’s the same for Cohen: it’s not as though thereare clear sentences out there, the clarity of which seepsinto other sentences if we position the latter correctly.Clarity is a matter of bearing the right relation to otherclaims. So it’s a demonstration of profound unclarity if, intrying to show a sentence’s connection to others, youinevitably mangle the claim with which you began into“something that isn’t recognizable as a version of what wassaid.” This shows that there was no such connection tobegin with.

On Carnap’s account, then, our language holds, for us, itsusers, a danger. For in allowing for the formulation ofnonsense words and meaningless expressions it allows usto lapse into bullshit. Carnap frequently mentions thepossibility of being “misled,” or “seduced,” by our language,and he means misled or seduced into metaphysics. Butthat is not the only danger. Because our language allows forthe formulation of pseudo-words and pseudosentences, itis a powerful and effective tool that can be exploited bythose whose aims are served by misdirection or theobfuscation of truth short of lying, that is, by bullshitters inthe Frankfurtian sense. By the very fact that they presentmeaningless statements as meaningful they express theirdisregard for the truth, and by the fact that they uttermeaningless statements they can’t be lying; they are, afterall, saying nothing.

In this regard, consider these two more passages fromCarnap’s essay, each of which emphasizes the intention of

Page 268: Bullshit and Philosophy

the metaphysician—the bullshitter, as I read it. The firstinvites us again to imagine a new term, ‘toovy’ this time,which, in contrast to ‘teavy’, is meaningful:

Let the sentence “this thing is toovy” be true if andonly if the thing is quadrangular.... Then we willsay: the word “toovy” is synonymous with the word“quadrangular.” And we will not allow its users totell us that nevertheless they “intended” somethingelse by it than “quadrangular”; that though everyquadrangular thing is also toovy and conversely,this is only because quadrangularity is the visiblemanifestation of toovyness, but that the latter itselfis a hidden, not itself observable property. Wewould reply that after the criterion of applicationhad been fixed, the synonymy of “toovy” and“quadrangular” is likewise fixed, and that we areno further at liberty to “intend” this or that by theword. (p. 64)

For Carnap, the example is intended to show that themeaning of a term is exhausted by the deductiverelationships the term’s elementary sentences bear to othersentences; anyone who claims for a term a meaning notcaptured by those deductive relationships cannot beoffering us a meaning at all. But the example tells us as wellabout the intentions Carnap clearly thinks are tangled upwith metaphysics. We too would dismiss anyone whocontinued to profess additional meaning for ‘toovy’ after its

Page 269: Bullshit and Philosophy

synonymy with ‘quadrangular’ had been laid bare. What’sher problem?!? Absent appeals to absurdity, comedy, oridiocy (three well-known bullshit-defeaters deserving ofmuch more philosophical attention), such flagrant disregardfor meaning can be explained only by concluding that it wasnever the toovy-talker’s intention to convey information to usin the first place, or even steer us away from someinformation (to, that is, lie). She must have wanted toaccomplish some other end for which uttering suchpseudostatements would be of use. ‘Toovy’ was ameaningful term all along, but in her disregard for the term’smeaning the toovy-talker was engaged in metaphysics . . .that is, bullshitting.112

The second passage I have in mind, in which Carnapcomments on the intentions behind metaphysics, comes,interestingly enough, in the context of Carnap’s answer tothe question of why there is so much metaphysics, and whywe seem to put up with it—confirmation, incidentally, of myview that Carnap and Frankfurt are talking about the samething. “How could it be,” Carnap asks, “that so many men inall ages and nations, among them eminent minds, spent somuch energy, nay veritable fervor, on metaphysics if thelatter consisted of nothing but mere words, nonsensicallyjuxtaposed?” (p. 78). How, indeed? What’s with all thismetaphysics?

Carnap’s answer is that metaphysics is a consequenceof a desire to express some “general attitude towards life”(Lebenseinstellung) combined with a mistaken impression

Page 270: Bullshit and Philosophy

that an attitude (towards life or anything else) is a state ofaffairs, that is, the kind of thing that can be expressed by adeclarative sentence. An attitude towards life can beexpressed, but only in art, poetry, or music; to attempt itsexpression in assertions, as though the attitude were not anattitude but a state of affairs, is futile.113 “Thus in the caseof metaphysics,” Carnap writes, “we find this situation:”

Through the form of its works it pretends to besomething that it is not. The form in question isthat of a system of statements which areapparently related as premises and conclusions,that is, the form of a theory. In this way the fictionof theoretical content is generated, whereas, aswe have seen, there is no such content. It is notonly the reader, but the metaphysician himselfwho suffers from the illusion that the metaphysicalstatements say something, describe states ofaffairs. The metaphysician believes that he travelsin territory in which truth and falsehood are atstake. In reality, however, he has not assertedanything, but only expressed something, like anartist. (p. 79)

On its face, this diagnosis renders metaphysics ratherbenign. That is a strength, of course, if the question is whywe tolerate it. And as far as the parallel with bullshit goes, itgives us another answer to the question of why bullshit isboth ubiquitous and tolerated. To wit: bullshit arises when

Page 271: Bullshit and Philosophy

people have something they want to get across and areconfused, perhaps but not always culpably so, about whattools are appropriate to that task.

But alongside these somewhat contented observationsabout metaphysics, and bullshit, in our life, there is ofcourse a critical current in Carnap, and Frankfurt, and wecan’t afford to miss it. Carnap describes the case in whichthe metaphysician as well as his audience is under theillusion that his utterances make sense, but there are, asCarnap was more than aware, cases in which themetaphysician, but not the audience, is under no suchillusion. After all, metaphysics can only “pretend to besomething that it is not” if behind the metaphysicalutterance is a metaphysician pretending to say something,knowing at the same time that he is not. This is bullshit,Frankfurt-style, pure and simple. It’s more egregious, ofcourse, to the extent that the metaphysician-bullshitterpropagates the illusion in his followers even after we’vecalled him on his insolence regarding the meaninglessnessof his utterances or, in Frankfurt’s phrase, regarding thetruth-value of his claims. Heidegger was a metaphysicianbefore Carnap penned “Overcoming of Metaphysicsthrough Logical Analysis of Language,” but hismetaphysical bullshit was more offensive after Carnapcalled him on it. Ditto, mutatis mutandis, for modern-dayFrankfurt bullshitters. On Bullshit’s placement on the NewYork Times bestseller list not only sold a pile of books; itraised the moral stakes on people who don’t care about the

Page 272: Bullshit and Philosophy

truth of what they say.

Page 273: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Unity of Bullshit

Recall that Cohen employed a rather useful metaphor todistinguish his view from Frankfurt’s: Frankfurt’s account ofbullshit focuses upon the bull, and his, Cohen’s, starts fromthe bullshit. In light of our discussion of Carnap’s anti-metaphysical program and my promise to unify Frankfurt’sand Cohen’s account, it will pay to return to the metaphor.

There is a certainly a distinction to be drawn between abull and bullshit, and between bullshit and the bullshitter.But, my local veterinarians assure me, a bull that doesn’tshit is no bull, at least not for long. And it takes, as DavidHume might put it, no nice metaphysical head to realize thatwe get bullshit from a bull, not necessarily of course, but infact, in this world and all the close possible ones. Cohen’smetaphor not only serves his purpose, but it ought toremind us that the two sides of bullshit, Frankfurt’s andCohen’s, are two sides of one thing. There are in this worldthose whose have ends that are served by a misuse oflanguage, and whose desires trump or even eradicate anyconcern they might have had for the meaning or the truth ofwhat they say. These are Frankfurtian bullshitters, and sobe it. But we also have a tool, a language, that is amenable,perhaps even suited for, just the sort of misdeedsbullshitters have in mind. All of us have, or can, fashion

Page 274: Bullshit and Philosophy

Cohen-style bullshit on demand, and so be that. Combinethe two and you have fodder for books like this one andLaura Penny’s, and for that matter for the many, many,conversations held today that included the phrase “This issuch bullshit.” Carnap, of course, didn’t know from Frankfurtand Cohen in 1932, but he knew bullshit. His approach to itgave us the intellectual goods on offer today from Frankfurtand Cohen, and then some.

Ah, but what to do? Is it any solace to have one accountof bullshit over two, if our aim at the start was, implicitly atleast, to get rid of the bullshit? The question of how torespond to bullshit is more pressing, and depressing, whenwe realize not just that the bullshit tide is rising, with norecess in sight, but that all those enthusiastic bullshit-eradication programs of yore, logical positivism included,have that rather embarrassing odor of ambition-cum-failure.In this context, the very end of Laura Penny’s book mightlook at a first glance like the quintessential twenty-firstcentury post-whatever reply to bullshit: a none-too-hearty“Oh, well.”

But that’s just a first glance. Here’s a suggestion that maysound less antique and more plausible the more ourintolerance for bullshit and its perpetrators grows. Ouranalysis of bullshit as one part tool (a language amenableto misuse) and one part intention (to put something over bymeans of that tool) invites a strategy oddly familiar toadvocates of gun control: control the gun. In this case, ofcourse, it’s control the language, the tool that bullshitter’semploy. No one, not Frankfurt, Carnap, Cohen, or Penny,

Page 275: Bullshit and Philosophy

employ. No one, not Frankfurt, Carnap, Cohen, or Penny,suggests that we will eradicate from our midst those withintent to bullshit; indeed, sometimes that very enemy is us.Bullshitters are inevitable. But we can take in hand the toolthe Frankfurtian bullshitter turns to, and needs: ourlanguage. This taking in hand need not be the fashioning ofthe ideal language that Carnap and many (though, notably,not all) of the Vienna Circle imagined, or even theconceptual clean up Cohen calls for.

Again, I’m moved by the last line of Penny’s book, and Idon’t mean the choice verb. The language we use, Englishor whatever, is ours, together, and each of us bearsresponsibility for its misuse and abuse in our presence.When one of us misuses it, placing it in the employ ofbullshit, it is no prissy matter of grammar or style that is atstake but a common temple being defaced. Your task,gentle reader, is to stand at the door of the temple. This canmean writing a book, or an essay, or a letter, or a blog, butit will also and more often mean holding a sign, raising ahand, casting a vote, or interrupting a conversation.

It’s a daily, mundane, thankless, and unending task, but itwill be the way out when the alternative becomes too muchbullshit to bear. Take some heart that you will be joined, inspirit if not in corpus, with Carnap’s robust colleague, OttoNeurath, who impressed upon his wide audience that theshape of the world around is the result not of reasonsbeyond our control—pseudorationalism, Neurath called thisidea—but of our own choices.114 It really is up to us.

Page 276: Bullshit and Philosophy

10

Raising the Tone: Definition, Bullshit, andthe Definition of Bullshit

ANDREW ABERDEIN

I always love that kind of argument. The contrary ofa thing isn’t the contrary; oh, dear me, no! It’s thething itself, but as it truly is. Ask any die-hard whatconservatism is; he’ll tell you that it’s truesocialism. And the brewers’ trade papers: they’refull of articles about the beauty of truetemperance. Ordinary temperance is just grossrefusal to drink; but true temperance, truetemperance is something much more refined.True temperance is a bottle of claret with eachmeal and three double whiskies after dinner.115

Bullshit is not the only sort of deceptive talk. Spuriousdefinitions, such as those quoted above, are anotherimportant variety of bad reasoning. This paper will describesome of these problematic tactics, and show how HarryFrankfurt’s treatment of bullshit may be extended to analyzetheir underlying causes. Finally, I will deploy this newaccount of definition to assess whether Frankfurt’s

Page 277: Bullshit and Philosophy

definition of bullshit is itself legitimate.

Page 278: Bullshit and Philosophy

Semantic Negligence

Frankfurt’s principal contribution to the study of bullshit isthe distinction he draws between the bullshitter and the liar.Whereas the liar represents as true something he believesto be false, the bullshitter represents something as truewhen he neither knows nor cares whether it is true or false(On Bullshit, p. 55). As Frankfurt amply demonstrates, thisindifference is much of what we find most objectionableabout bullshit. The liar has a vested interest in the institutionof truth-telling, albeit a parasitical one: he hopes that hisfalsehoods will be accepted as true. The bullshitter mayalso hope to be believed, but he himself is not muchbothered whether what he says is true, hence his disregardfor the truth is of a deeper and potentially more perniciouscharacter.

Our outrage is conditioned on our being the objects of adeception. When we know what the bullshitter is up to wecan be much more indulgent. As the comic novelist TerryPratchett observes of two of his characters, “they believedin bullshit and were the type to admire it when it wasdelivered with panache. There’s a kind of big, outdoor sortof man who’s got no patience at all with prevaricators andfibbers, but will applaud any man who can tell anoutrageous whopper with a gleam in his eye.”116 The

Page 279: Bullshit and Philosophy

gleam in the eye is essential here: it is this complicitybetween bullshitter and audience which constitutes the “bullsession” (On Bullshit, p. 34). Only when it escapes from thebull session and masquerades as regular assertion isbullshit deceptive; however, the insidious nature of thisdeception degrades the commitment to truth upon whichpublic discourse depends.

One way of characterizing Frankfurt’s innovation is as theintroduction of a new category of linguistic misbehaviour,which we might call ‘semantic negligence’. It is this conceptwhich enables him to distinguish the bullshitter from the liar.In British and American common law, a civil claim fornegligence arises when the defendant has a duty of care tothe plaintiff which he neglects to exercise, thereby harmingthe plaintiff. Here the deceptive bullshitter has a duty to tellthe truth; neglecting this duty harms his audience if theycome to believe his false statements. His indifference as tothe truth value of his statements, that is whether they aretrue or false, a meaning-related or semantic property, maythus be termed semantic negligence. Lying involves ahigher degree of culpability, since the liar convinces hisaudience of falsehoods intentionally, not just foresee-ably.Frankfurt’s insight is that conventional accounts ofdeception provide no middle ground between this higherlevel of culpability and complete innocence, and thereforeno room for many familiar forms of deceit, such as bullshit.My contention is that semantic negligence may arise withrespect to features of meaning other than truth value, andas such may be used to disentangle a wide variety of

Page 280: Bullshit and Philosophy

deceptive dialectical practices. Furthermore, semanticnegligence is itself a matter of degree. The legalunderstanding of negligence acknowledges that theassociated culpability can range from inadvertence to willfulblindness. We may generalize Frankfurt’s position furtherby recognizing that some instances of semantic negligenceare worse than others. In assessing the gravity of semanticnegligence we should ask questions such as ‘Howforeseeable was it that deception would arise?’ and ‘Howmuch at fault is the speaker in not foreseeing this?’.

Page 281: Bullshit and Philosophy

A Caricature History of Semantics

My argument will draw on themes from the philosophy oflanguage, chiefly the pioneering German logician GottlobFrege’s disambiguation of the naive understanding of‘meaning’. In what may be considered the primal momentof analytic philosophy, Frege drew a threefold distinctionbetween Sinn, Bedeutung, and Färbung, or sense,reference and tone. The sense of a term is what weunderstand if we understand what the word means. Thereference, however, is the thing which the word picks out.Hence, as Frege explains, “a proper name (word, sign,combination of signs, expression) expresses its sense,[but] stands for or designates its reference. By employing asign we express its sense and designate its reference.”117

For example, the sense of ‘the longest river in the world’ isjust what we understand by the words in this phrase.Clearly, having that understanding does not depend onknowing what the reference is (the River Nile, all fourthousand miles of it), let alone on having seen the river inquestion. The last of Frege’s three divisions, tone, is theleast familiar: it may be defined as that aspect of themeaning of an expression that is irrelevant to the truth valueof any sentence in which it may occur. In languages withlarge vocabularies, like English, it is often possible to

Page 282: Bullshit and Philosophy

restate a phrase using different words, but preserving bothsense and reference. Continuing with the earlier example,consider ‘Earth’s lengthiest natural watercourse.’ Thechange here is one of tone.

Frege’s distinction between sense and reference wasnot entirely original. Many earlier philosophers, perhaps asearly as Aristotle, drew similar distinctions between theseaspects of the meaning of a word or expression. In thiscontext the terminology ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ is oftenused instead of sense and reference respectively. Withproper nouns, and definite descriptions, like the example inthe last paragraph, the terminology coincides exactly. Withother sorts of noun, “concept nouns” as Frege calls them,sense and intension have the same meaning, but thereference is to the concept under which the members of theextension fall. The value of distinguishing between thereference and extension of a concept noun is mostapparent when talking about short-lived or rapidlypropagating things. Expressions such as ‘snowflake’,‘mayfly’, or ‘web page’ have constantly changingextensions, but more or less fixed references. Byconcentrating on reference rather than extension, we candisregard superficial changes of this kind. Frege’sapproach was innovative in several respects, most of whichgo beyond the scope of this article, and has had a profoundinfluence on subsequent philosophy. A crucial insight ofFrege’s is that sense cannot be reduced to reference:different terms can have the same reference, but differentsenses. In his well-known example, ‘the evening star’ and

Page 283: Bullshit and Philosophy

‘the morning star’ both refer to the same object, the planetVenus, although the senses of these phrases are clearlydistinct. Indeed, it was a genuine scientific discovery in theancient world when it was realized that these two familiarsights were one and the same. Without the distinctionbetween sense and reference we would be unable todescribe this discovery.

Frege’s formalizing project required the suppression oftone: “separating a thought from its trappings” as he putsit.118 Tone is the part of meaning from which we mustabstract before logical analysis can begin. This abstractionis essential to the representation of inference in terms oflogical form—that is, formal logic. For example, ‘and’ and‘but’ are formalized in the same way, despite theirdifference in tone. (Consider ‘He is a patriot and supportsthe government’ versus ‘He is a patriot but supports thegovernment’.) This is entirely appropriate for the logic ofmathematics, which was Frege’s primary concern, sincetone is seldom of significance in mathematical reasoning.

What is nuanced in the master can become dogmatic inthe pupils. Many of Frege’s successors sought to extendtone-free logical analysis to natural language. Amongstmore popular writers this idealism could becomeextremism. Consider, for example, the psychologist RobertThouless’s claim that “We must look forward to the daywhen the thinking about political and international affairs willbe as unemotional and as scientific as that about theproperties of numbers or the atomic weights of elements.”

Page 284: Bullshit and Philosophy

Whereas many logicians attempt to treat the terms ofnatural language as though they were tonally neutral,Thouless hopes to eliminate altogether “Such words as‘progress’, ‘liberty’, ‘democratic’, ‘totalitarian’, ‘reactionary’,‘liberal’, ‘freedom’, . . . .”119 This Orwellian scenario exhibitsthe limitations of Frege’s program. Although enormouslysuccessful in the formalization of technical language, andan inescapable foundation for any study of natural usage, ithas little to say about tonal properties which play asubstantial part in ordinary discourse. Thouless’sprocrustean fantasy of excising from our language what ourlogic cannot analyze is a desperate remedy diametricallyopposed to the real solution: taking tone seriously. Furtherprogress in the study of natural argumentation will requireus to rehabilitate this repressed element. We shall see thatthis project is foreshadowed in the Yale ethicist CharlesStevenson’s account of what he called persuasivedefinition.

Page 285: Bullshit and Philosophy

Persuasive Definition

As introduced by Stevenson, a persuasive definition (PD)of a term “purport[s] . . . to alter the descriptive meaning ofthe term . . . but . . . not make any substantial change in theterm’s emotive meaning.” 120 Although he coined theterminology, Stevenson was not the first person to spot thisphenomenon. Indeed he quotes the memorable attack onPD from Aldous Huxley’s Eyeless in Gaza with which webegan. Stevenson also introduced the converse stratagem,persuasive quasi-definition (PQD), in which the emotivemeaning of a term is altered without changing thedescriptive meaning. When PD is discussed in logictextbooks it is usually treated as though it were invariablyfallacious.121 However, this betrays the hostility to tone wediagnosed in the last section. As Stevenson recognized,many cases of PD are much less objectionable: thedifficulty is in drawing a principled distinction betweenharmless and malign instances of PD. Stevenson’s accountof PD is couched in unfamiliar terms: ‘descriptive’ and‘emotive’ meaning. These reflect his understanding of themeaning of an expression as a dispositional property ofthat expression, representing its potential to cause apsychological response in its hearer or utterer (p. 54).Descriptive and emotive meanings are then distinguished

Page 286: Bullshit and Philosophy

as provoking cognitive or emotive psychological responsesrespectively. Few if any modern philosophers would findthis account even remotely congenial. Detailed criticismwould be out of place here, although we can observe thatthe account is closely related to the emotivist theory ofethics, sometimes called the Boo-Hurrah Theory, on whichethical terms, such as ‘good’, are merely expressions of anemotional attitude. That Stevenson’s ethical and semantictheories have fallen out of fashion may explain thecomparative neglect of PD. However, we shall see that thisconcept is independent of the theoretical context in whichStevenson articulated it.

Specifically, Stevenson’s definition of PD may berestated in Fregean terms as changing the sense orreference of a term, while representing the tone asunchanged. Replacing the slippery distinction betweenemotive and descriptive meaning with that between sense,reference and tone has several advantages, besides therescue of PD from its theoretically suspect origins. Firstly,tone is not just emotive. It can also, for example, be jargon-laden (with any number of different jargons), bureaucratic,politically correct, affectionate, poetic, boorish,metropolitan, circumspect, dated, or many other things.Secondly, a threefold distinction provides for a more fine-grained analysis of dubious definition-like activity than thesimple binary of PD and PQD. Table 1 distinguishes thesixteen different possibilities that can arise from changing (

) or keeping fixed (—) the sense, reference and tone of aterm, as well as the term itself.

Page 287: Bullshit and Philosophy

Table 1 Options for Change

We can also begin to see how the concept of semanticnegligence which we derived from Frankfurt’s discussion ofbullshit may be used to distinguish good from bad PD. Thepersuasive definer represents the tone of his redefinedterm as unchanged: this may or may not be negligent ofhim. He might be justified in believing the tone will notchange, making his usage unobjectionable. He mightrealize that the tone will be dramatically affected by theredefinition, in which case he is unlikely to expect his move

Page 288: Bullshit and Philosophy

to be accepted. Or he may be negligent as to whether thetone is faithfully preserved. This strategy is not overtlydeceptive, since the tone could be unchanged. Rather, thespeaker’s lack of control over the tone, and indifference asto its eventual disposition, makes his utterancesemantically negligent. In this respect it is analogous tobullshit, not lying.

In our discussion of semantic negligence we suggestedthat different degrees of negligence are possible,depending on the risk of deception occurring and howmuch at fault the speaker is in not foreseeing thatdeception would result. Aphoristic definitions, such as “By‘work’ I mean action done for the divine”122 and perhapsHuxley’s “Conservatism is true socialism,” are usually sosurprising or paradoxical that they are unlikely to be trulydeceptive. Many other definitions are inseparable from thetheories which produce them: as Stevenson observes, “Tochose a definition is to plead a cause” (p. 210). There’s noreason to accept such definitions unless one is convincedby the arguments with which the theory is defended. Thissituation is common in scientific contexts, where it istypically unproblematic: good practice requires the definerto make the theoretical indebtedness of his definitionsexplicit. Definers in natural language are likely to be lessscrupulous, hence their interlocutors may be misled intoendorsing the conclusions of arguments they would notjudge sound, were they to be given a fair opportunity toappraise them. The resulting deception may be deliberate,but is just as likely to be inadvertent: it is easy to confuse

Page 289: Bullshit and Philosophy

oneself as well as others with this sort of definition. Suchbehaviour is less culpable than outright deceit, just asbullshit is less blameworthy than lying, but as with bullshit, itis also peculiarly pernicious since it degrades thestandards of discourse.

Page 290: Bullshit and Philosophy

Broadening the Analysis

In the previous section I introduced and clarified thedefinition of PD and suggested how it may be related tobullshit. I shall develop this account further below, but first Iwill explore the relationship between PD and a variety ofallied phenomena, all of which may be included within thesame analysis, thereby broadening our understanding ofsemantic negligence.

Page 291: Bullshit and Philosophy

Low and High Redefinition

As commonly used, these terms describe the redefinition ofan expression so as to include extra cases (lowredefinition) or exclude existing cases (high redefinition).Hence they are defined solely in terms of what wouldhappen to the reference of the expression if the redefinitionwere successful. However, the change in reference willtypically be effected by a change of sense, since that is theprincipal means of redefining a term. Moves of this kindpartially coincide with PD, although the two should not beconfused: PD can occur without a change of reference, aswe shall see, and not every change of reference is PD.Strictly speaking, only one of low and high redefinition needbe addressed, as each can be defined in terms of theother. A low redefinition of a term is a high redefinition ofthe complement of that term, and vice versa. (Thecomplement of a term is the term under which everythingnot falling under that term falls.) For example, consider themotorist who, upon conviction for drunk driving, argues thathe is not a real drunk driver, but had just been caught outafter a miscalculated drink. (One too many doublewhiskies, perhaps.) His argument could be understood asa high redefinition of ‘drunk driver,’ or a low redefinition of‘non drunk driver,’ so as to include the driver in question.This example could also be understood as PD, since the

Page 292: Bullshit and Philosophy

motorist wishes to avoid the stigma, that is the pejorativetone, of ‘drunk driver,’ which he hopes will remain fixed ashe effects his self-serving redefinition. The motorist mayhave convinced himself that his redefinition is just, but onlyby a wilfull blindness to its departure from conventionalusage.

Page 293: Bullshit and Philosophy

The No-True-Scotsman Move

Suppose that some traditionally minded Scot averred that‘No Scotsman takes sugar with his porridge’. Whenconfronted with incontrovertible evidence that one HamishMacTavish of Inverness does exactly that, he may retreat tothe qualified statement ‘No true Scotsman takes sugar withhis porridge’. A shift of this sort, christened the No-True-Scotsman Move by the British philosopher Antony Flew, isa special case of low or high redefinition. 123 What makesit special is that, since the reference of ‘Scotsman’ hasbeen redefined specifically to exclude Scotsmen who takesugar with their porridge, the new statement is not only true,it is true of necessity. Whereas the original claim saidsomething bold and potentially false about the world, thenew claim is equivalent to ‘No Scotsman who does not takesugar with his porridge takes sugar with his porridge’,which must be true, but says nothing at all. Since thespeaker’s motivation is presumably to preserve thepositive tone he associates with ‘Scotsman’, his move maybe seen as PD. However, the real danger is that the twostatements look and sound much alike, and may beconfused, giving the impression that the originalcontentious statement is true, even though it has beenclearly falsified. This is as likely to result from carelessnessas from outright deceit, making this another instance of

Page 294: Bullshit and Philosophy

semantic negligence, here with respect to either thereference of ‘Scotsman’ or the truth value of the originalstatement. Thus, if the speaker continues to behave asthough his original statement were true, he is exhibitingclassic Frankfurt bullshit.

Page 295: Bullshit and Philosophy

Monster Barring

The Hungarian philosopher of mathematics Imre Lakatosdistinguished several colorfully labeled possible responsesthat may be made to a counterexample which seems torefute a cherished conjecture. One of the least helpful ofthese, ‘monster barring’, consists in the “sometimes deftbut always ad hoc redefinition” of crucial terms, by whichmeans any counterexample can be eliminated.124 We cansee that this technique, gerrymandering a term to protect aclaim from any possible refutation, is comparable to Flew’sNo-True-Scotsman Move. However, Lakatos’s accountsituates monster barring within a family of relatedtechniques, some of which are more productive. Forexample, ‘exception barring’ addresses counterexamplesby restricting the scope of the conjecture so that it is nolonger falsified. Explicit restatement of this kind, as in ‘NoLowland Scotsman takes sugar with his porridge’ perhapsavoids the pitfalls of the No-True-Scotsman Move bymaking explicit the theoretical commitments of the speaker.

Page 296: Bullshit and Philosophy

Dissociation

This is a very wide-ranging category under which much ofthe above may be subsumed. It may be defined as thesplitting of a concept into two, thereby replacing the termwith two qualified terms which divide the reference of theoriginal term between them (New Rhetoric, p. 411). Manydifferent pairs of qualifiers can arise, although the mostinfluential is that of ‘real’ versus ‘apparent’. In the‘Scotsman’ example the use of ‘true Scotsman’ may beunderstood in this way, as may Huxley’s explicitdissociation of ‘ordinary’ from ‘true’ temperance. Indeed,the Belgian rhetoricians Chaim Perelman and LucyOlbrechts-Tyteca, in whose work dissociation originates,observe that PD is characteristically a special case of thedissociation of reality from appearance (New Rhetoric, p.447). Dissociation can be explicit and well-motivated, inwhich case it is not only legitimate but indispensable tocomplex thought. However, it can also be deployed inpursuit of an unearned advantage in argument. In suchcases the dissociating arguer talks as though the tone mustremain attached to the part of the concept he hasdesignated as real, but he has no way of ensuring this,making his behaviour semantically negligent.

Page 297: Bullshit and Philosophy

Courtesy Meaning

This phrase was coined by the classicist and philosopherR.G. Collingwood to describe the use of an expressionchosen for its “emotional colouring” rather than its“descriptive function.”125 Collingwood’s specific concernwas the use of ‘art’ to describe what might better be called‘entertainment’. He sees this usage as motivatedprincipally by the positive associations, or tone, the wordpossesses. This may be understood as a special case ofPD, since the reference of the term is adjusted while thetone remains fixed, although the usage which Collingwooddescribes is unlikely to be expressed as a definition. Thechoice of terms for their courtesy meaning is clearlysemantically negligent, since the chooser gives no thoughtto the sense of the term.

Page 298: Bullshit and Philosophy

Euphemism

Replacing a word which is perceived as malign in tone witha new expression intended to preserve the sense andreference while resetting the tone to neutral or benignassociations is a tactic of some antiquity. The ancientGreeks thought it politic to refer to the Furies as the‘Eumenides’ or ‘Kindly Ones’, lest the notoriously shorttempers of these vengeance demons be provoked. Ofcourse, ‘bullshit’ itself has had many euphemisms, including‘humbug’, ‘balderdash’, ‘poppycock’, or ‘bunk’ (On Bullshit,p. 5). In modern times, euphemism is familiar frompolitically correct usage, such as ‘sex workers’ or indeed‘persons presenting themselves as commodity allotmentswithin a business doctrine’ for ‘prostitutes’, as well asgovernment or military language, such as ‘superpromptcritical power excursion’ for ‘nuclear meltdown’.126 Theproliferation of both these categories of euphemism hasbeen a source of much concern.127 However, as thefeminist critic Germaine Greer observes, “It is the fate ofeuphemisms to lose their function rapidly by associationwith the actuality of what they designate, so that they mustbe regularly replaced with euphemisms for themselves.”128

This phenomenon, which has been termed the “euphemismtreadmill” 129 is a common one—consider the sequence ofterms which have been used to refer to minorities of race or

Page 299: Bullshit and Philosophy

sexual orientation. The process can only be arrested whenunderlying attitudes towards the individuals underdiscussion improve: the comparative stability of ‘gay’ and‘black’ suggest some recent progress. In most PC andnukespeak usage, however, the underlying attitudes areunchanged, and the euphemism tends to backfire just asGreer describes.

Page 300: Bullshit and Philosophy

Backfire

To see how a definition can backfire, we must firstdistinguish the various ways in which it may be attempted.We can see from Table 1 that each of PD and PQD nowcorresponds to three distinct options, and that there areseveral other possibilities. We shall discuss each of themin turn.

The null case a, in which nothing changes, represents theideal of pure description which dictionary definitionspurport to offer. PD corresponds to the cases b, c and d. Inmost of the examples of PD discussed above a change ofsense is used to bring about a change of reference,making such cases instances of d. However, in b only thereference changes. It might be argued that this cannothappen. When we (re)define a term the aspect of itsmeaning which we can most easily affect is its sense, sothe simplest way of changing the reference of a term is tochange its sense. If this were the only way of changing thereference, then b, as well as f, j and n, would never occur.However, as we saw in the drunk driver example, arguerscan attempt to exclude an individual from the scope of thereference of a term while ostensibly preserving the sense.Such attempts may fail, and certainly exhibit semanticnegligence, but the intent is to change the reference alone.

Page 301: Bullshit and Philosophy

Conversely, in c only the sense is changed. This may beless typical than d, but real world cases exist. One such isthe so-called Model Law definition of ‘pornography’, statedby the radical feminists Catharine MacKinnon and AndreaDworkin as “the sexually explicit subordination of women,graphically depicted, whether in pictures or in words.”130

The aim of the proposed law was to criminalize existingpornography. So, although the definition changes theconventional sense of ‘pornography’, it was not intended toalter the reference. Presumably the tone was also intendedto remain the same, or perhaps to become even morecondemnatory. This definition also provides an insight intothe propensity of PD to backfire. Sceptics of MacKinnonand Dworkin’s theory of pornography may wonder whetherwomen are ever ‘subordinated’ by pictures or words, ormore generally whether all the material conventionallyidentified as pornography has this effect. The concern isthat MacKinnon and Dworkin were negligent in notsufficiently securing the reference of the term they sought toredefine: their definition relies on an argument about theeffect of pornography which not everyone finds convincing.This is borne out by the subsequent fortunes of the ModelLaw. Although ruled unconstitutional in the United States, asimilar definition has entered Canadian law, where it hasled to raids on gay bookshops but has had limited effect onmainstream pornography.131 Hence the effect of the newdefinition, although intended as c, ended up as d: thereference drifted to include materials to which it was not

Page 302: Bullshit and Philosophy

intended to apply, while excluding much of what it wassupposed to cover.

Persuasive quasi-definition (PQD) is dual to PD: as wehave defined it, it occurs when the tone changes but eitherthe sense or reference remains the same, that is cases e, fand g. As observed above, the easiest aspect of meaningto change directly is the sense. Changing the tone is moredifficult. It may be attempted without changing the othercomponents of meaning: an instance of e, as in therehabilitation of abusive terms such as ‘queer’. Note thatredefinitions of this kind must proceed indirectly, by usingthe term in contexts liable to encourage an association withthe desired tone, or “by gestures, tones of voice, orrhetorical devices such as similes and metaphors”(Stevenson, p. 278), since the tone of a term cannot just bestipulated. It is also possible, as in cases f and g, to bringabout a change in tone through a change in sense orreference. This may be deliberate, but can also happeninadvertently when a would-be persuasive definer losescontrol of the tone he is hoping to keep fixed. This sort ofbackfire can also result in case h, which we may call‘degenerate definition’, since it does not preserve anyaspect of the term’s meaning.

Even degenerate definition can be deliberately pursued.For example, consider the technical meanings attributed byeconomists and sociologists to expressions such as‘unproductive labour’ or ‘conspicuous waste’.132 In eachcase the definer not only departs from the standard sense

Page 303: Bullshit and Philosophy

and reference, he also professes to use the terms withouttheir conventional pejorative tone. In practice, that toneswiftly creeps back, even in the works of the definers,making this usage PD, a backfire from h to d.

An example which shows both how PD can be usedlegitimately and successfully, and how it can backfire intoPQD, or degenerate definition, occurs with the definition of‘rape’. The crime of rape has been recognized for manycenturies. Over the course of this history both its sense andits reference have evolved substantially: a process whichsome modern commentators see as not yet satisfactorilyconcluded. We cannot hope to recount this narrative in fulldetail, and will concentrate on three major theories of rape,each of which produces a distinct definition. On thetraditional theory, rape is a property crime. In societieswhere women were seen as belonging to men, rape wasunderstood as an injury one man does to another byinterfering with the reproductive activity of his women.133

On the liberal theory, rape is sex without consent. This isthe definition which is most familiar in the modern world.However the traditional theory cast a long shadow: it liesbehind the marital rape exemption clause which was to befound in the rape laws of the United Kingdom and mostU.S. states as recently as the 1980s (Defining Reality, p.53). On the radical theory, rape is a “terrorist institution” bywhich the male sex subordinates the female (“Rape andPersuasive Definition,” p. 449). The radical feminists whodefend this theory seek to “redraw the line between so-

Page 304: Bullshit and Philosophy

called normal (heterosexual) intercourse and rape” byreplacing or substantially redefining the criterion of consent(p. 450).

There are two changes of definition here: one historical,from the traditional to the liberal definition, and onehypothetical, from the liberal to the radical. The tone hasremained largely intact throughout: always negative,although perhaps increasingly so, as societal attitudeschange. The adoption of the liberal definition seems tohave begun as case c: a change of sense which preservedthe traditional reference—at some theoretical cost, sincethe required marital exemption clause is unjustifiable on theliberal theory. Over time this theoretical tension wasresolved with the abolition of that clause, thereby changingthe reference of ‘rape,’ and making the cumulative changean instance of d. Each step was stable, and did notbackfire, because not only was the new definition backedby a coherent theory, but that theory was argued forsuccessfully by the proponents of the definition.

The proponents of the radical definition are also aimingfor d, albeit in one step, as they propose not only a newsense, but also a much wider reference. They hope that thiscan be accomplished without any reduction in the negativeforce of the tone. However, one recurring criticism of theirmove is that such reduction is inevitable, and thereby“trivialize[s] legitimate rape, and mocks those women whohave been truly brutalized” (“Rape and PersuasiveDefinition,” p. 438). The sometime radical feminist KeithBurgess-Jackson dismisses this concern as question-

Page 305: Bullshit and Philosophy

Burgess-Jackson dismisses this concern as question-begging, since it presumes that the new cases falling underthe redefined reference of ‘rape’ are not as bad as theoriginal cases, which he says the radical theory denies.However, this response is itself question-begging: itassumes that the whole theory will be adopted, not just thedefinition of one word: ‘rape’. But, as the rhetoricianEdward Schiappa reminds us, “Putting new laws on thebooks does not ensure that all individuals responsible forenforcing those laws will immediately assimilate the newdefinitions and categories” (Defining Reality, p. 60). Theeffect on society as a whole is likely to be even morediffuse, especially for a theory as sharply at odds withconventional wisdom as the radical feminists’. Thus it ispredictable that, even if a radical feminist definition of‘rape’ was enacted into law, the conventional moralweighting of the new cases would persist, thereby dilutingthe tone. Thus the definition would backfire from d to h.

The remaining lines in Table 1 correspond to caseswhere the term itself has changed. There are several waysof bringing this about. Euphemism, if successful,exemplifies case m: the new term has a new tone, butpreserves sense and reference. The sort of backfirecharacteristic of the ‘euphemism treadmill’ is a shift to casei: the tone reverts to that of the old term. Euphemism, asconventionally understood, involves a very specific changein tone, from pejorative to neutral or laudatory. However,case m covers all shifts of tone, including those that go inthe opposite direction (‘dysphemisms’) and those which

Page 306: Bullshit and Philosophy

are oriented on an entirely different basis. Euphemism (anddysphemism, and other such changes) can beaccompanied by other shifts in meaning. For example,‘visually impaired,’ although used as a euphemism for‘blind’ has a somewhat different sense and reference,taking it in the direction of case p.

The results of dissociation, understood as producing twonew terms from one old term, can be found amongst thesame cases as euphemism. Characteristically, the two newterms will correspond to a pair of distinct cases, where oneof the terms is intended to preserve the original tone, whilethe other covers circumstances incompatible with that tone.Thus one of the pair will be drawn from lines i through l andthe other from lines m through p. For example, ‘ordinarytemperance’ and ‘true temperance’, understood as adissociation, would correspond to lines m and lrespectively. ‘Ordinary temperance’ preserves the senseand reference of ‘temperance,’ but by implication lacks itspositive tone; ‘true temperance’ keeps the tone, but onHuxley’s account, nothing else.

Page 307: Bullshit and Philosophy

Good Definitions

How can backfire be avoided? Can PD ever be usedsafely, and if so, when? We have seen that a properaccount of definition should have regard to the sense,reference and tone of the term at issue. Semanticnegligence with respect to any of these components of themeaning of a term can lead to backfire, and the perniciousconsequences outlined in the last section. Bad practice is,however, easier to describe than good practice, which wemight term ‘semantic diligence’. Describing the duediligence required for a satisfactory definition is a topic witha long and inglorious history.134 The emphasis is often onthe pursuit of an ‘essence’ of the concept being defined:so-called ‘real’ definitions accurately track the essence,whereas other definitions are merely ‘nominal’. This talk ofessences made some sense for Plato and Aristotle, inwhose works it was first deployed, as it reflects theirbroader metaphysical commitments. However, for modernthinkers who do not share those commitments, and even forthose who do, it is very hard to defend: the most that can bemade of essence is that it “is just the human choice of whatto mean by a name, misinterpreted as being ametaphysical reality” (Definition, p. 155).

Aristotle is also the source of a conventional list of rules

Page 308: Bullshit and Philosophy

for good definitions which has recurred with surprisinglylittle variation in generation after generation of logictextbooks right up to the most recent editions. Althoughsome of these rules, such as ‘avoid circularity,’ may have amodest but valuable role to play in an account of thesemantic diligence necessary for good definition, othersare either couched in metaphysically discredited terms:‘state the essential attributes,’ or incompatible with properconsideration of tone: ‘avoid figurative language’.

The crucial point is that practices such as PD, whichseek to stipulate some aspect of the meaning of anexpression, are disguised arguments. It is common in allbranches of knowledge for an initially contentiousidentification to be transformed into a definition. Forexample, consider the definition of ‘planet’ as ‘satellite ofthe sun’. However, this is the hard-won result of protractedconsensus building. We saw above how this was essentialto the widespread acceptance of the liberal definition of‘rape’. Semantically negligent definitions are parasitical onthis process: they foreclose argument about doubtfulidentities by disguising them as definitions. Hiddenarguments are difficult to criticize—but also easy to ignore.Thus the semantically negligent definer may gain short-termrhetorical advantage by disguising his arguments asdefinitions, but risks the backfire effect, which is a directconsequence of his neglect of the full meaning of hisredefined expression. For a definition to be semanticallydiligent any concealed arguments must be made explicit toall parties. Moreover, if the proposers hope for their

Page 309: Bullshit and Philosophy

definition to prevail, these arguments must be won.Conversely, this explication must be absent for anaccusation of malign PD, or similar semantic negligence,to be just.

Page 310: Bullshit and Philosophy

Is Frankfurt’s Definition of ‘Bullshit’ ItselfPD?

Having employed an insight derived from Frankfurt’sdefinition of bullshit to clarify our understanding of definitionin general, and PD in particular, we are now in a position toclose the circle by asking whether this definition is PD, andif so whether it is malign. ‘Bullshit’ clearly has a stronglypejorative tone, which Frankfurt intends to preserve. Byoffering a new, stipulative definition of ‘bullshit,’ Frankfurtchanges the sense of the term. This in turn affects itsreference: some cases that qualify as Frankfurt-bullshitwould not meet the demotic definition of the term. Forexample, one might tell a critically injured person that “Helpis on its way,” despite having no idea whether this was true,because one was hoping for the best, and did not wish toneedlessly demoralize someone clinging to life. There arealso common uses of ‘bullshit’ which are outside the scopeof reference of Frankfurt-bullshit, as discussed by Cohen(“Deeper Into Bullshit,” pp. 119–120). So, as an instance ofcase d from Table 1 , Frankfurt’s definition of ‘bullshit’ isclearly PD.

For Frankfurt’s definition to be semantically diligent itneeds to be defended by an explicit argument, as it clearlyis, with particular attention to the points at which it departs

Page 311: Bullshit and Philosophy

from conventional usage. As regards the first of these, the‘Help is on its way’ cases, an argument could be made onthe grounds of theoretical simplicity for including themwithin the scope of reference of ‘bullshit,’ but suitablyqualified to indicate their good intentions. Somethingsimilar already applies to lying: we distinguish ‘white lies’as lies to which the generally pejorative tone of ‘lie’ shouldnot apply. As Frankfurt observes, bullshit is a “vast andamorphous” phenomenon upon which “very little work hasbeen done” (On Bullshit, p. 3), so we should not besurprised that fresh distinctions such as this still need to bedrawn. The omissions identified by Cohen are harder todefend. If Cohen’s dissociation of the “bullshit of ordinarylife” from the “bullshit that appears in academic works” isdefensible (“Deeper into Bullshit,” p. 119), then Frankfurthas a hard case to answer. However, that does not makehis definition semantically negligent, but rather indicatesthat the last word on bullshit will not be written for some timeyet.135

Page 312: Bullshit and Philosophy

11

Different Kinds and Aspects of Bullshit

HANS MAES and KATRIENSCHAUBROECK

The publication and subsequent popularity of HarryFrankfurt’s On Bullshit has inserted a rather conspicuousand somewhat comical point of discontinuity in thephilosophy sections of many bookstores. For here we havea small, unassuming book with ‘Bullshit’ printed on theoutside but lacking the quality of bullshit on the inside.

The exact opposite, one cannot fail to notice, is true of somany other books sold under the heading of ‘philosophy’today. Books like Chakra Balancing Kit: A Guide toHealing and Awakening Your Energy Body , The HiddenMessages in Water Crystals, Numerology Helps You toMaster Your Relationship and to Find the Right Career, orAstrology: A Cosmic Science appear in the samebestseller lists and sometimes even on the same bookshelf

Page 313: Bullshit and Philosophy

as On Bullshit—almost as if they are put there on purposeto illustrate the unusual topic of Frankfurt’s philosophicalstudy and his claim that bullshit is indeed “the most salientfeature of our culture.”

When Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit was first publishedas an essay in 1986, no one could have predicted thephilosophical sensation (and hilarious situation) it wouldcause in twenty-first-century bookstores. The original essaywas received in much the same way as most academicarticles are received, that is, without attention from press orpublic. The essay did, however, provoke discussion amongfellow philosophers; one admiring but critical response isespecially worth mentioning since it puts some ofFrankfurt’s claims in a new perspective.

In “Deeper Into Bullshit” G.A. Cohen gives credit toFrankfurt’s “pioneering and brilliant discussion of awidespread but largely unexamined cultural phenomenon,”but he also raises some doubts about the scope ofFrankfurt’s account (Chapter 8 in this volume). Frankfurt’sdefinition, says Cohen, does not cover all types of bullshit.On the contrary, “the explicandum that attracted[Frankfurt’s] interest is just one flower in the lush garden ofbullshit” (p. 120). So, “On Bullshit” is really only about onekind of bullshit. Other flowers in the “lush garden of bullshit”remain unexamined, and Cohen’s principal aim in “Deeperinto Bullshit” is to identify and define a very specific kind ofstercore tauri, to be found in academic circles, butaltogether ignored by Frankfurt.

Page 314: Bullshit and Philosophy

Harry Frankfurt on Bullshit

People who produce, package, or sell bullshit, saysFrankfurt, are in some way comparable to slovenlycraftsmen. They are not really paying attention to the qualityof their product. There’s some kind of laxity in their work,though this laxity cannot be equated with inattention todetail or carelessness in general. What is lacking in theprime examples of bullshit, to be found in “the realms ofadvertising and of public relations, and the nowadaysclosely related realm of politics” (p. 22) is not concern fordetail—political spin doctors, for instance, often dedicatethemselves tirelessly to keeping every tiny thing undercontrol—but concern for the truth. According to Frankfurt,the essence of bullshit lies in a “lack of connection to aconcern with truth—[an] indifference to how things reallyare” (p. 33). To be sure, advertisements and politicalspeeches may contain true statements but they willnevertheless strike us as bullshit as soon as we realize thatthe person who produces these statements could not careless whether his statements are true or not, as long as theyhave the desired effect. As such, it is a feature of thebullshitter’s state of mind, namely his indifference to truth,that is crucial to the production of bullshit.

This is not the whole story, however. While an

Page 315: Bullshit and Philosophy

indifference to truth is an essential ingredient of bullshit, it isnot the only ingredient, according to Frankfurt. The case ofso-called “bull sessions” illustrates this. In a bull session,Frankfurt explains, people try out thoughts and attitudesabout various aspects of life (relationships, religion, and soforth) in order to discover how others respond and how itfeels to say such things, without it being assumed that theyare committed to what they say.136 These discussions maybe very animated and significant, but they are typically not“for real.” Thus, bull sessions are “like bullshit by virtue ofthe fact that they are in some degree unconstrained by aconcern with truth” (p. 37). But they are not bullshit. Frankfurtis very explicit about this: “The statements made in a bullsession differ from bullshit in that there is no pretence thatthis connection [between what people say and what theybelieve] is being sustained” (p. 38, italics added). Bullshit,by contrast, always involves a particular form of pretence ordeceit. This is the second essential ingredient of bullshit.

Does this mean that the bullshitter is a liar? Notnecessarily. Admittedly, both the liar and the bullshitter try todeceive people through misrepresentation but Frankfurtpoints out that there is a significant difference. The liaressentially misrepresents the state of affairs to which herefers or his beliefs concerning that state of affairs. Thebullshitter, on the other hand, may not deceive people, oreven intend to do so, about either the facts or what he takesthe facts to be. What he says may very well be true. So,unlike lying, bullshit is not a matter of falsity. It’s rather amatter of fakery or phoniness.

Page 316: Bullshit and Philosophy

matter of fakery or phoniness.The bullshitter essentially deceives people about his

enterprise. His audience is not to understand that he isutterly disinterested with how things really are and that hisintention is not to report the truth. Frankfurt’s example of aFourth of July orator, who bombastically prates about theachievements and divine blessings of his country, servesas a good illustration. “He is not trying to deceive anyoneconcerning American history. What he cares about is whatpeople think of him. He wants them to think of him as apatriot” (p. 18). So, what the orator misrepresents is not aparticular state of affairs but rather his particular state ofmind. The truth-value of his statements is of but marginalinterest to him; winning votes is his prime concern.However, he cannot and does not admit this openly.Frankfurt calls this tendency to misrepresent what one is upto an “indispensably distinctive characteristic” (p. 54) of thebullshitter, making it as central to the concept of bullshit asthe tendency for indifference as to how things really are.

In order to tell a lie, says Frankfurt, one needs to knowhow things really are or one must at least think that oneknows what’s true. It’s clear by now that this does not holdfor bullshit. The bullshitter does not have to keep his eye onthe facts, whereas the liar must do precisely that in order toconceal the facts. That is why, according to Frankfurt, lyingdoes not render a person unfit for telling the truth in thesame way that bullshitting does. The biggest problem withbullshit, so to speak, is not that the bullshitter hides the truth,but rather that he does not even remember where he put it.Hence, Frankfurt’s striking conclusion that “bullshit is a

Page 317: Bullshit and Philosophy

Hence, Frankfurt’s striking conclusion that “bullshit is agreater enemy of the truth than lies are” (p. 61) and hisappeal to oppose bullshit wherever it may be found, indefense of a civilization built upon a concern for truth.

In Frankfurt’s analysis, then, the bullshitter is (i)unconcerned about the truth but also (ii) concerned abouthiding this fact and thus (iii) morally reprehensible. We willnow challenge all three of these claims.

Page 318: Bullshit and Philosophy

A Different Take on Bullshit

In the first part of his book, Frankfurt describes a ratherintriguing conversation to illustrate his account of bullshit.Fania Pascal, Wittgenstein’s Russian teacher, received acall from Wittgenstein when her tonsils had just been takenout. Pascal relates: “I croaked: ‘I feel just like a dog that hasbeen run over.’” He was disgusted: “You don’t know what adog that has been run over feels like.”137 Frankfurt explainsWittgenstein’s strong reaction to Pascal’s innocent remarkas follows: “To the Wittgenstein in Pascal’s story, judgingfrom his response, this is just bullshit.” (p. 29)

Given Frankfurt’s own account of bullshit, this diagnosisseems problematic. For one of the essential ingredients ofbullshit is clearly missing. Fania Pascal is not hidingsomething or deceiving someone and there seems to beno fakery or phoniness involved. So why should herstatement be interpreted as bullshit?

Frankfurt might reply that it should, in fact, not beinterpreted as bullshit and that it is only Wittgenstein whothinks that Pascal is talking bullshit. Frankfurt seems to takethis stance when he says: “It seems extraordinary, almostunbelievable, that anyone could object seriously to whatPascal reports herself as having said” (p. 25) and“Wittgenstein’s reaction . . . is absurdly intolerant” (p. 31).

Page 319: Bullshit and Philosophy

So, Frankfurt himself seems unconvinced that Pascal’sutterance is bullshit. But Wittgenstein thinks it is—that’s thepoint. Should we assume then that Wittgenstein thinks thatPascal is deceiving people about her enterprise or hidingsomething? If we hold on to Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit,we should. But this assumption is plainly false.Wittgenstein’s objection does not amount to an accusationof either fakery or phoniness. That is not what bothers him.Another explanation is needed.

Fania Pascal is not concerned with how things really are,that much seems certain. She obviously does not know,except in the most vague sense, how a run-over dog feels.Nevertheless, she employs the image to describe her ownstate of mind. This mindlessness is what bothersWittgenstein. He finds her indifference to the truthobnoxious and clearly sees this as sufficient ground fordiscarding her remark as plain bullshit. Wittgenstein, weknow from various sources, was extremely demandingwhen the truth was concerned. In philosophical discussions,but also in daily life, one should never trifle with the facts, hethought. One should always try to get things right. Thisnotorious exact-ingness probably explains whyWittgenstein almost never engaged in playful “bullsessions” or chitchat, not even when this was part of alanguage class (Fania Pascal recalls how hard it was tofind a suitable subject for a conversation with Wittgenstein:“The conversation lessons were excruciating. We sat in thegarden. With the utmost impatience he rejected any topic Iwould suggest . . . To him they were all absurd, non-topics”

Page 320: Bullshit and Philosophy

(p. 29). It also explains why he was so “disgusted” withPascal’s remark. Pascal was playing fast and loose withthe facts and did not even make an attempt to get thingsright. Wittgenstein found this intolerable.

There is something slightly absurd about this intolerance,as Frankfurt rightly points out. Most of us would notdisapprove of, let alone express disgust at a loose remarklike Pascal’s. It’s easy to understand why. Most of us do notshare Wittgenstein’s exacting standards. We do not alwaysexpect people to be as accurate and precise as humanlypossible. Sure, Pascal is “cutting corners” like a slovenlycraftsman, but who doesn’t, once in a while? Besides, thepurpose of conversation is not always to give an accuratedescription of reality. People sometimes say things just tobe funny, agreeable or sociable. In many conversations, it’snot so important what one is saying, but rather that one issaying something and talking to someone. It is aboutmaking the other feel comfortable, for instance, and notabout trying to get things right.

A certain amount of sloppiness in our speech may betolerated, but this does not mean it goes undetected. Mostpeople, when pressed, would acknowledge that Pascal’scomparison of her own feelings to those of a run-over dog,is bullshit. Yet they do not seem to mind as much asWittgenstein. They do not think this sort of bullshit isunforgivable or unreasonable. Being intolerant in thisrespect, that would be unreasonable.

If this diagnosis is correct, Frankfurt’s account has to berevised in at least two ways.

Page 321: Bullshit and Philosophy

First, pretence is not an essential ingredient of bullshit.Fania Pascal’s utterance, for instance, qualifies as such,though there is no element of deceit or fakery involved. Amere indifference to the truth is apparently all that isneeded.

Of course, a speaker will often try to conceal his ownindifference when he knows that his audience is veryconcerned about how things really are. A politician, forexample, who is primarily interested in getting re-electedinstead of getting things right, has to hide this fact. Thebullshit he sells will usually be accompanied by pretenceand deceit. However, this combination is not inevitable.Just imagine a politician who is fed up with all the fakeryand phoniness and starts talking bullshit openly, withouthiding his complete indifference to the truth. The audiencewill probably feel shocked and the outcry, “Bullshit!” will beheard everywhere. Yet, in contrast with the Fourth of Julyorator mentioned by Frankfurt, this speaker is not hidingwhat he is up to. Thus, in Frankfurt’s view, his speechcannot count as bullshit. This is a very counterintuitiveconclusion.

Frankfurt’s distinction between bullshit and bull sessionsis just as counterintuitive. For suppose one would ask theparticipants in a playful bull session what they were doing.A natural response would be: “We are just talking bullshit.”Likewise, people witnessing a bull session will readilyacknowledge that bull sessions consist mainly of bullshit.Frankfurt ignores this and claims there is a fundamentaldifference between bullshit and bull sessions. This

Page 322: Bullshit and Philosophy

distinction, centered around the presence or absence ofpretence, is inevitably artificial. After all, as Frankfurtobserves, the term ‘bull session’ is most likely anabbreviation or sanitized version of ‘bullshit session’ (p.38).

Second, bullshit is not always a bad thing. Although theterm is typically used to express indignation, irritation ordisapproval, bullshit is not always offensive. Frankfurt findsthis particularly hard to understand. He is genuinely puzzledby the fact that “our attitude toward bullshit is generallymore benign than our attitude toward lying” and leaves it“as an exercise for the reader” to find out why this is so (p.50). Perhaps the answer is not so difficult. Why is ourattitude towards bullshit, resulting from a manifestindifference to the truth, so benign in many circumstances?Because in many circumstances the concern for truth andaccuracy is not—and should not be—our primary concern.For instance, it is not our main concern, and rightly so,when someone is in terrible pain and in need of acomforting conversation. Wittgenstein’s failure toappreciate this makes him, in Frankfurt’s own words,“absurdly intolerant.”

A bit of bullshit from time to time might even be a goodthing. That is what the old butler Stevens in KazuoIshiguro’s The Remains of the Day comes to realize whenhe is reflecting on the practice of “bantering,” or ascontemporary Americans would call it, “bullshitting”:

There is a group of six or seven people gathered

Page 323: Bullshit and Philosophy

just a little way behind me who have aroused mycuriosity a little. I naturally assumed at first thatthey were a group of friends out together for theevening. But as I listened to their exchanges, itbecame apparent they were strangers who hadjust happened upon one another here on this spotbehind me. . . . It is curious how people can buildsuch warmth among themselves so swiftly.... Irather fancy it has [something] to do with this skillof bantering. Listening to them now, I can hearthem exchanging one bantering remark afteranother. It is, I would suppose, the way manypeople like to proceed. In fact, it is possible mybench companion expected me to banter with him—in which case, I suppose I was something of asorry disappointment. Perhaps it is indeed time Ibegan to look at this whole matter of banteringmore enthusiastically. After all, when one thinksabout it, it is not such a foolish thing to indulge in—particularly if it is the case that in bantering liesthe key to human warmth.138

Indeed, we should perhaps look at the whole matter ofbullshitting more enthusiastically than Frankfurt does. As ameans to lay contact with others or keep the conversationgoing, it can be a source of human warmth and a blessingrather than a curse. Hence, we are not so sure that theworld would be a better place without it. Just imagine thatevery conversation were to be informed by a strong

Page 324: Bullshit and Philosophy

concern for the truth. Conversations would be terriblyfatiguing. For as Oscar Wilde once said: “The truth is rarelypure, and never simple.” This is probably one of thereasons why Wilde himself was not too concerned abouttruth and accuracy in conversation. And we may be thankfulfor that. The world would certainly be a duller place withoutWilde’s splendid witticisms and epigrams, nearly all ofwhich are brilliant examples of bullshit.139

In “Concealment and Exposure,” Thomas Nageldiscusses another case of “benign bullshit”: “If I say, ‘Hownice to see you’, you know perfectly well that this is notmeant as a report of my true feelings: Even if it happens tobe true, I might very well say it even if you were the lastperson I wanted to see at just that moment.”140 Despite anobvious lack of concern for the truth, Nagel makes the casefor polite formulae like this. “The first and most obviousthing to note . . . is that they are not dishonest, because theconventions that govern them are generally known. If I don’ttell you everything I think and feel about you, that is not acase of deception, since you don’t expect me to do so” (p.6). Furthermore, polite formulas are a sine qua non of astable society as they leave a great range of potentiallydisruptive material unacknowledged and therefore out ofplay. Nagel certainly seems to have a point. Polite bullshitis often to be preferred to truthful expressions of hostility,contempt, derision, sexual desire or aversion.

What about Frankfurt’s most central claim, however, thatthe essence of bullshit is an indifference towards truth?

Page 325: Bullshit and Philosophy

A Different Kind of Bullshit

According to Frankfurt, the most distinctive feature ofbullshit is one situated in the speaker’s state of mind. Thebullshitter is indifferent and hides this indifference.However, it would appear that an utterance often qualifiesas bullshit purely as a result of certain of its objectivefeatures independent of the speaker’s stance. Thissuggests that there is another kind of bullshit that should beexplained not by reference to the state of mind of theproducer but rather by pointing to certain salient features ofthe “product” itself.

This is the basic idea of G.A. Cohen’s response toFrankfurt. In “Deeper into Bullshit,” Cohen notes thatFrankfurt’s definition of the “essence” of bullshit does not sitwell with the kind of bullshit that concerns him the most,namely the bullshit abundant in certain academic circlesand best exemplified by the French continental tradition.This sort of bullshit cannot be explained by reference to theindifference or insincerity of the producer. After all, some ofthe most hideous examples appear to be the result ofhonest academic efforts. What is missing in these cases isan appropriate connection to the truth, not as far as thestate of mind of the producer is concerned but with respectto features of the texts themselves. More specifically, it is

Page 326: Bullshit and Philosophy

the “unclarifiable unclarity” of those philosophical orsociological texts, says Cohen, that constitutes their highbullshit content.

An unclarifiable text is not only obscure but is incapableof being rendered unobscure, at least in a text that could berecognized as a version of what was originally said. Ahelpful trick is this: add or subtract a negation sign from atext and see whether that makes any difference to itsplausibility. If not, Cohen says, one may be sure that one isdealing with bullshit (p. 132). Unsurprisingly, he concludeshis analysis in the same way as Frankfurt, with a call tooppose and expose bullshit whenever possible. Academicdiscourse should always aim for the truth, and texts that areso obscure that the question of truth becomes irrelevant area threat to any serious academic enterprise.

Now that we have a basic distinction between two kindsof bullshit, Frankfurt-bullshit and Cohen-bullshit, we can askthe question: does this distinction enable us to classify allthe “flowers in the lush garden of bullshit”? In other words, isevery instance of bullshit necessarily an instance ofFrankfurt-bullshit or Cohen-bullshit? To answer thisquestion, let us return to books like Chakra Balancing Kito r The Hidden Messages in Water Crystals orNumerology Helps You to Master Your Relationship andto Find the Right Career or Astrology: A Cosmic Science .Do we have a convincing account now of the specific kindof bullshit to be found in these pseudoscientific works? Itdoes not appear so.

Page 327: Bullshit and Philosophy

The plethora of pseudoscientific nonsense, though widelyrecognized as a paradigm of bullshit (if you Google‘astrology and bullshit’, for instance, you get 290,000 hits),remains surprisingly unharmed by the attacks of Frankfurtand Cohen. Neither provides an appropriate explanationfor this form of bullshit. Firstly, pseudoscientists typicallyhave a firm and sincere belief in their practice and go togreat lengths to prove the truth of the doctrines theyendorse. They are not indifferent to the truth, quite thecontrary. Thus, Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit does notseem to apply. But Cohen’s definition falls short as well, forthe predictions and statements of pseudoscientists areoften very specific and explicit as opposed to unclear orunclarifiable. Just think of astrologers predicting anearthquake or hurricane on a specific date or bogushealers providing a detailed diagnosis and assessment ofa patient’s condition.

Here’s a serious lacuna in the literature on bullshit. Notonly is pseudoscientific bullshit very prominent and visible,there is also no doubt that the bullshit of pseudoscientists isat least as damaging and therefore as deserving of strictscrutiny as the bullshit produced by advertisers oracademics. After all, how many people are really affectedby the philosophical impotence targeted by Cohen? Andhow many people are nowadays really deceived byadvertisers? (In fact, people often seem to expect “goodbullshit” from these professionals rather than completetruthfulness . . .) Pseudoscience, though sometimes aninnocent pastime, is known to have a large and damaging

Page 328: Bullshit and Philosophy

impact on the lives of many and to pose a threat to thecredibility of science, medicine and even politics. Theseeffects certainly warrant further investigation into the what,how, and why of this third kind of bullshit.

But this is not the right place to carry out that kind ofinvestigation. For one thing, it would necessitate a detailedaccount of the nature of pseudoscience which would gobeyond the scope of this chapter. However, we do want todraw attention to a short, pertinent remark made by Cohen.After discussing unclarifiability as the key component ofbullshit, he briefly identifies “arguments that are grosslydeficient either in logic or in sensitivity to empiricalevidence” as another possible source of bullshit (p. 131).

These features, insensitivity to evidence and fallaciousreasoning, must be central to any analysis ofpseudoscientific bullshit. Admittedly, this characterizationremains rather vague. But as a general rule, and in order toavoid bullshit, we believe it is better to be vaguely right thanprecisely wrong.

Page 329: Bullshit and Philosophy

III

It’s All Around Us

Bullshit in Politics, Science, Education, and the Law

Page 330: Bullshit and Philosophy

12

The Republic of Bullshit: On the Dumbing-Up of Democracy

MARK EVANS

Harry Frankfurt claims that “bullshit is unavoidablewhenever circumstances require someone to talk withoutknowing what he is talking about” (On Bullshit, p. 63). Hethen suggests that democracy may be especially prone tothe production of bullshit because it fuels “the widespreadconviction that it is the responsibility of a citizen in ademocracy to have opinions about everything, or at leasteverything that pertains to the conduct of his country’saffairs.”

It is the most popularly received wisdom about politicsthat politicians and others close to the exercise of power—media commentators, lobbyists, and suchlike—areinordinately disposed to pollute the polity with bullshit. It ismuch more unusual and arresting to contend that the‘ordinary citizens’ are also somehow responsible for some

Page 331: Bullshit and Philosophy

of democratic political culture’s less edifying elements,particularly with respect to Frankfurt’s very specificconception of bullshit as discourse which is essentiallyindifferent to the truth: bullshitters, for him, don’t really evencare that they don’t know what they are talking about.141

For many, to claim such a thing would be not onlyarrogantly and offensively patronising but also afundamental assault on democracy itself. The ordinarycitizens are democracy’s heroes: the people who areultimately sovereign in the land, who graciously bestow thetrust of office on those few of their number who haveconvinced them through the rigors of public debate of theirfitness to rule, and who revoke that grant when they judgetheir representatives to have failed them. Their plain, goodcommon sense is, at the heart of its self-image,democracy’s very lifeblood. It’s the basis on which citizensare to be honored, equally, as masters of their own politicalfates. Their elected politicians may be prone to bullshit andother misdemeanours, but democracy survives their failings—so the story runs—because of its genius in its ultimateempowerment of the ordinary citizens.

So to say, with Frankfurt, that democracy itself actuallyencourages citizens to bullshit looks like a critical blow toone of its justificatory props. If such bullshitting isn’t alreadybad enough in itself, the propensity to bullshit would alsoindicate a crucial degradation, if not total lack, of the criticalacumen required to guard against other, perhaps moredevastating forms of deformity in political life which thriveon untruth. And yet . . . there is something very reminiscent

Page 332: Bullshit and Philosophy

on untruth. And yet . . . there is something very reminiscentof the Emperor’s new clothes here. Hasn’t Frankfurt simplydared to utter something which is, when we pluck up thecourage to query the treasured commonplaces ofdemocratic life, really rather obvious? Hasn’t it actuallybeen said from democracy’s very inception onwards, bythose who share Plato’s insight that political understandingis an expertise that we cannot possibly all share?

I shall call this claim “the Frankfurt thesis,” and I arguethat it should be taken very seriously. But, even settingaside democracy’s own rosily optimistic mythology, somemight immediately object to the thesis. Suspecting that it isparadoxically manifesting an indifference to the truth all ofits own, they might claim that, in contemporary democracy,the fact of the matter is not that citizens don’t care about thetruth. The real crisis democracy faces is that, nowadays,citizens just don’t care about politics. And many who makethis observation central to their understanding ofdemocracy would reject the idea that it connotes politicalincompetence on the citizenry’s part. Rather, they wouldsay that apathy or indifference is generally rooted in a well-founded cynicism about a system that so consistently failsto provide good government: why should citizens caremuch about, and engage with, a process that apparentlycannot deliver what they would wish of it?

This alternative view can be called “the cynicism thesis”and I think that, actually, both are partly right. Adopting themthus does not turn one into an anti-democrat; the theses arearguments about, not against, democracy, and the point of

Page 333: Bullshit and Philosophy

elaborating them is to analyse how we might tackle theproblems they identify. In fact, many supporters of thecynicism thesis have urged that what we need is moremeaningful opportunities for citizens’ participation (whatpolitical theorists today often refer to as ‘deliberativedemocracy.’) And they would highlight modern informationand communications technology as the means by whichgreater and more informed participation can be realised.

The Frankfurt thesis shows—if it is valid—that matterscannot be as simple as that—and this is good reason forthrowing such an uncomfortable argument into the debateabout the health of democracy.

Page 334: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshitting and Lying in Politics

The full elaboration of the Frankfurt thesis will require otherconceptions of ‘bullshit’ to supplement Frankfurt’s own, butwe can begin with his ‘indifference-to-truth’ definition to seehow we might use ‘bullshit’ both polemically andconceptually in political analysis. It’s probably fair to saythat when people condemn their politicians as bullshitters,they generally haven’t made Frankfurt’s distinction betweenbullshitting and lying.142 For him, in contrast to bullshitting,the act of lying is premised upon knowledge of, andconcern for, the truth: the liar knows what is true and isconcerned to conceal it (On Bullshit, p. 33).

Most politicians probably do tell lies some of the time,and some perhaps do tell lies a lot of the time. And it isbelief in the truth of this claim that often gives rise tosupport for the cynicism thesis, basing its rejection ofpolitical engagement on the assumption that ‘all politiciansare liars and hypocrites, only in politics for their own selfishends no matter what lofty goals and concerns they pretendto have’. Less subtle articulations of this view treatpoliticians almost as if they are a sub-species of humanity(or a species of sub-humanity) defined by its congenitaldisposition to lying and incompetence. But it’s surelyimplausible to think that the modus operandi of politicians

Page 335: Bullshit and Philosophy

is to apprehend the truth and then systematically attempt toconceal it, all the time, as ‘Frankfurt-lying’ would have it.

Many different kinds of people go into politics, and formany different kinds of reason, at least some of which aresincerely based on principled commitment; and it is anywayincredible to believe that everyone in the political processcan consistently muster the peculiar psychological energiesnecessary literally to live by lying in the way many seem toassume politicians must.143

This isn’t to deny, however, that political behavior anddiscourse is beset with evasion, prevarication, dissemblingand other forms of disconnection to the truth: what Frankfurthas given us, with his conception of bullshit, is a way ofcharacterising this without misleadingly sweeping it into theoverly narrow category of ‘lying’. To appreciate its utility inthis regard, let us also equip ourselves with G.A. Cohen’sdistinction between “aim-bullshitters”—those whoseconsciously entertained goal it is to produce bullshit—and“disposition-bullshitters,” who are unintentionally prone, forwhatever reason, to produce bullshit. On Frankfurt’sdefinition, liars are always ‘aim-liars’, so to speak, but notall bullshitters aim to bullshit (see Chapter 8 in this volume).

Consider what can retrospectively be seen as a classicstatement of political bullshitting provided by George Orwellin Nineteen Eighty-Four’s account of Winston’s work in theMinistry of Truth:

Day by day and almost minute by minute the pastwas brought up to date. In this way every

Page 336: Bullshit and Philosophy

prediction made by the Party could be shown bydocumentary evidence to have been correct, norwas any item of news, or any expression ofopinion, which conflicted with the needs of themoment, ever allowed to remain on record.All history was a palimpsest, scraped clean andreinscribed exactly as often as was necessary. Inno case would it have been possible, once thedeed was done, to prove that any falsification hadtaken place.... Even the written instruction whichWinston received . . . never stated or implied thatan act of forgery was to be committed: always thereference was slips, errors, misprints ormisquotations which it was necessary to put rightin the interests of accuracy. But actually he thought. . . it was not even forgery. It was merely thesubstitution of one piece of nonsense for another.Most of the material that you were dealing withhad no connexion with anything in the real world,not even the kind of connexion that is contained ina direct lie.144

What’s of particular interest here is how the routinizedproduction of falsehood converts what might have startedout as lying into bullshitting: the truth becomes essentiallyforgotten in the process of telling whatever story is told toserve the regime’s purposes. To see this, we should realizethat Winston might actually insert a truth in one of his daily

Page 337: Bullshit and Philosophy

corrections to the historical record of The Times. But it isn’tthere because it’s true, or believed to be false, and theinstitutionalized rewriting of history is deliberatelyundermining the capacity—and, crucially, the willingness—to distinguish between the true and false. (The Party aimsto destroy the very distinction, of course.)

As Orwell’s satire suggests, totalitarianism provides themost obvious examples of ideologies and regimesattempting to embed themselves not simply in a web of lies—because that implies the truth remains, in its consciousconcealment, as a potentially refuting presence in theirmidst—but in a morass of bullshit, where the premium is onadherence to their tropes and to the tales they tell tolegitimate themselves and their actions, removing anynotion that there could be a genuine realm of factsunderneath by which the veracity of what are forwarded astruth-claims could actually be tested. The ‘interests of theworking class’, the ‘manifest destiny of the superior race’,the ‘wise guidance’ of the party, or ‘the great leader’, whenintoned often enough as mantras, become criterial of‘reality’, manipulable to explain away anything and insulatedfrom the very conceptual possibility of facts which wouldexpose their bankruptcy. (I think it is implausible, forexample, to think that racists are typically liars in theFrankfurtian sense. They dogmatically persist in their views,impervious to, and hence essentially uninterested toconfront, the facts which could undermine their beliefs.145)Hence, when Vàclav Havel famously campaigned, inCommunist Czechoslovakia, to “live in truth” he is actually

Page 338: Bullshit and Philosophy

Communist Czechoslovakia, to “live in truth” he is actuallybest understood as calling for a political order which did notrequire one to live in this kind of political bullshit. Suchtotalitarianism aims at bullshit and many of its haplessvictims become disposed to reproduce it even as theymistakenly think themselves already to be ‘living in truth.’146

Without implying any degree of moral equivalencebetween them and totalitarianism, I claim that an analogousdisengagement with the truth is evident in the belief-systems and the practices of liberal democracies and theirgovernments. It is no less pertinent for its tragicobviousness to cite the Bush Administration’s notorious“weapons-of-mass-destruction” story told to justify theinvasion of Iraq in 2003 as a prime example of suchbullshit.

When we consider its demonstrably false elements, wemight reasonably conclude that some outright lies wereindeed told in the construction of that case. But I doubt thatBush, Rumsfeld, Rice, Powell, and their many vocallieutenants and supporters were always consciously lying.Rather, they manifested a quintessentially bullshittingdisconnection to, and disinterest in, the truth, or in theevidence to the contrary of their intentions that pointed totruths about WMDs in Iraq which they wished to resist. Andwhen the facts to the contrary became too visible to ignore,the bullshitting shifted tack to suggest other supposedjustifications were also in place all along: ‘humanitarianintervention’, ‘democratisation’ and suggestions, made

Page 339: Bullshit and Philosophy

both directly and indirectly, of Saddam Hussein’s complicityin the 9/11 attacks.

These examples of ordure may have issued from aim-bullshitters who consciously sought to deflect concerns forthe truth (for example: the ‘humanitarian’ justification maynot be a lie as such, but the post-war insistence on itsstrength as a justification may be intended to divertattention away from the fact of the failure of the originalofficial justification: a post hoc ‘rejustifica-tion’). But there’sno reason to think that such tales were not or could not alsobe spun with the sincerity of those who were merelydisposition-bullshitters.

The point is that, just as totalitarian mythologies do, thestory took on a life of its own: it had to, insofar as thedecision to invade was not something which, for the BushAdministration and its allies, could be allowed to stand orfall on the evidence. What might indeed have started as lie-telling gradually slipped free of reality altogether in a waythat lying doesn’t. What mattered was that, from theAdministration’s perspective, some justification for theinvasion had to remain in play; what was actually the caseon the ground, so to speak, was not essentially germane.(The same refusal to face relevant facts is evident in itsclaim that the invasion has not been subsequentlydisastrous for Iraqi society.147)

Page 340: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Myth of the ‘Well-Informed’ Citizen

At this point, a supporter of the liberal-democratic statusquo might object that the Iraq invasion is just a one-off, andnot therefore evidence of a systematic propensity to bullshitas is present in totalitarian regimes. But even if they fall wellshort of totalitarian proportions it is hardly difficult to comeup with other examples of such bullshitting on the part of justabout every liberal-democratic government. (The partisanbelief that it is obviously only ‘the other side’ that bullshits isitself bullshit.) This is evidence that can be adduced insupport of a claim that liberal democracy as a form ofpolitical order functions in a way that disposes those in, andaround, power to bullshit—and if we rested content with thatclaim, we might be tempted to conclude that the cynicismthesis is well on the way to vindication. For on this basisone could perhaps plausibly surmise that the reason forsuch a prevalent disposition to bullshit is that politiciansinvariably have a lot that they wish to hide. Theirdissimulation becomes so routine that they cease to tell liesas they retreat into a self-justificatory fantasy-land of bullshitwhose illusions have to be propped up by ever greaterpiles of the stuff.

To insist again, Frankfurt-thesis advocates don’t denythat politicians produce lots of strikingly malodorous

Page 341: Bullshit and Philosophy

bullshit. But they would warn against the frequent tendencyto be so overcome by its pungency as to fail to discern itsother sources. Not only do we have their claim (a): thatcitizens do their own fair share of (Frankfurt-) bullshittingabout politics, but we can also extend the thesis as statedthus far with a further claim (b): that democracy exhibits atendency to produce other, non-Frankfurt forms of bullshitwhich act to reinforce the Frankfurt-bullshitting of citizens.

Substantiating (a) first: it is obvious that not all citizensare political cynics, or are as cynical as they like to thinkthemselves to be. Many of them buy into the bullshit of theirpoliticians in their own ‘understanding’ of the political worldand doubtless do their own bit to embellish and propagateit. Indeed, it’s plausible to suggest a rule of thumb that,insofar as the citizens in question know even less about thefacts with respect to which politicians are bullshitting, theyare therefore more likely to be bullshitting whenever theyconfidently offer political opinions and evaluations. Now, thekey to the Frankfurt thesis is not simply to understand whycitizens formulate and voice such opinions but also tograsp why they tend to do so with such confidence.

An explanation for this runs as follows. The political worldand the choices that have to be made therein are incrediblycomplex, very difficult to grasp and negotiate. The idea thateven its essentials can be properly understood by anyonelacking a high degree of intellectual ability and trainedexpertise is frankly absurd. But electoral democracy has toresist acknowledgment of this truth: in both its theory andpractice it assumes a degree of political competence on

Page 342: Bullshit and Philosophy

practice it assumes a degree of political competence onthe part of the citizenry—in the ideal of the ‘well-informed’citizen—that it does not (indeed cannot reasonably beexpected) to possess. Citizens are effectively encouraged,indeed they often feel themselves obligated qua citizens, toformulate what often turn out to be incorrect, over-simplifiedor otherwise flawed views on a whole range of issueswithout a concern for these failings being properlyaccommodated in either the mindset or the institutionalembodiment of democratic deliberation.

The electoral need to pander to such views surelyaccounts for a significant amount of the bullshit spewedforth by politicians. For when they campaign for votes theyare forced, consciously or not, to present things in termsthat citizens can understand (and of course many of themdo not in fact possess much more than their voters in theway of such expertise anyway). 148 Candidates for officehave to attempt to pull off a very delicate balancing trick.They have to (a) offer a sufficiently compelling critique oftheir opponents along with (b) an equally compellingaccount of what they would do in office instead, all the while(c) saying and (d) doing a host of things to try to co-opttypically dissimilar groups of supporters into what they hopeto be a winning coalition, and (e) explaining away whateveractions and statements in their past (no matter how recentor distant) might cause them personal and/or politicalembarrassment.

Sometimes they will deal with such difficulties bydodging the crucial issues, for example by pretending that

Page 343: Bullshit and Philosophy

certain concerns are of great importance when in fact, theyare not—a strategy which has the effect (intended orotherwise) of deflecting critical attention to those issueswhich are really important (the ‘politics of distraction’). Orthey confront the political world with dogged (sometimes‘fundamentalist’) adherence to a simplistic set ofideological nostrums and a refusal (again, intended or not)to contemplate the possibility that they might fail to explainthat world and orient us satisfactorily in it. And of course theflow of this bullshit is hardly stemmed once election time isover . . .

Anyone who has actually studied politics—beyond thesuperficial, more-or-less partisan ephemera reproduced inthe media to the more coolly detached, scrupulous andtheoretically rigorous writings from academia, say—is fullyaware of how simplistic and naive (and, to that degree,deluded) much everyday (‘real-world’149) political discoursetends to be. And the point is that it has to be: not, perhaps,in every respect as actually manifest, but over-simplificationis a functional necessity for democracy. Citizens indulge inthe same kind of bullshit as politicians when they affirmsuch over-simplified views, and its metaphorical stenchbecomes more noxious the more doggedly such views areaffirmed in defiant indifference to the facts which wouldreveal the suppressed complexities.150 As alreadysuggested, even acceptance of the cynicism thesis maysometimes be based on bullshit: most citizens fail properlyto pursue the question as to why politicians always seem

Page 344: Bullshit and Philosophy

incapable of delivering their campaign promises, oftenresting content with the assumption that this must be downto their personal characters rather than being indicative offar more profound systemic problems in the polity.Depressingly, what keeps this whole system going in thewake of such a judgment is invariably more of the same:other campaigners feed on this ‘diagnosis’, promising tobe a ‘different sort of politician’, trotting out platitudes ongovernance designed to accord with the voters’ own ‘plaincommon sense’—which is in fact usually a highlyfragmentary, partial and ill-informed experience of theworld, very poorly equipped to deal with political realities.When this leads to what could be called the ‘GovernorSchwarzenegger Syndrome’, perhaps this is not tooserious: but dangerous demagogues and fundamen-talisms also thrive in such circumstances.

Yet all of this can hardly be said to be a fair criticism ofthe citizens in question, if it is wholly unreasonable toexpect them all to have the time and competence properlyto understand politics. I certainly don’t think that democracyproduces a lot of aim-bullshitters amongst the citizenry andI share Cohen’s preference to focus critically on the product—the bullshit—rather than its producers. And even if, onthese lines, we agree with Winston Churchill that “the bestargument against democracy is a five minute conversationwith the average voter,” we’re not committed to rejectingdemocracy altogether (We have a reason instead to adoptChurchill’s belief that “democracy is the worst form ofgovernment except for all the others that have been tried

Page 345: Bullshit and Philosophy

from time to time.”) But we shouldn’t shy away from theobservation that some of democracy’s problems arise fromthe bullshitting misapprehensions of political reality thatcitizens as well as politicians manifest.

Page 346: Bullshit and Philosophy

‘Dumbing-Up’: Some Distortions ofDemocratic Equality

All of this is not to say that we cannot increase currentlevels of knowledge and critical appreciation of politicalrealities and arguments among the citizenry as a whole(although the present argument would be hoist by its ownpetard if it thought this partial amelioration was an easything to achieve). But now we must confront claim (b)’sdeepening of the Frankfurt thesis, for this proposes thatthere are certain obstacles in democratic culture even tomodest proposals for improvement which again are difficultto own up to in a democracy.

Although one of modernity’s defining moments was theconversion of ‘democracy’ from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ thing, manydefenders of democracy in modern times havenevertheless peddled highly elitist conceptions of who isactually fit substantially to engage in politics: for them,democracy works only if an elite political class is largely leftalone to rule, barring the occasional election to keep themin check. But apart from any other reservation we mighthave about this as an ideal, such ‘democratic elitism’ isclearly prone to internal tensions: how can any such elitismbe reconciled with the principle of equal respect forcitizens, on which democracy is founded? The problem that

Page 347: Bullshit and Philosophy

claim (b) draws our attention to, however, is that thistension has in recent times been ‘resolved’ in ways that aredetrimental to the very modest kind of purely intellectualelitism needed in the fight against bullshit.

To explain: elitists have traditionally feared thatincreasing the voice of the ordinary citizens in politics, andculture more widely, would inevitably lead to a dumbing-down in those spheres, such is the mediocrity of the latter’scompetence and tastes. There has been a powerfulreaction against this view in the name of democraticequality, but one form it has taken has challenged the veryidea of the objective standards invoked to distinguish, forexample, good and bad, right and wrong, or sophisticatedand mediocre, beliefs and judgments. ‘Equal respect’leads to the relativist game of ‘I’m valid, you’re valid: we’reall entitled to our opinions’, wherein having ‘an equal right toexpress an opinion’ becomes conflated with the claim of‘equal validity of whatever opinion is expressed’ (where‘validity’ means ‘equal intellectual merit’).151 And no matterwhat nonsense this may legitimate, the anti-elitist aim is toraise everyone’s view to some level of substantive equalworth: it is, in effect, a dumbing-up.

Such vulgar relativism is famously easy to dispatch in thefabled Philosophy 101 course and, perhaps morepertinently, those who think that they affirm it consistentlycan very often be shown not to do so absolutely. Few suchputative relativists, when pushed on the matter, are happyto play the equal-validity game with the serial murderer’s,

Page 348: Bullshit and Philosophy

rapist’s, or child-molester’s conceptions of the good life.Some will readily embrace the idea that there are clearobjective standards of evaluation for performance andachievement in sport and art, say, without thinking thatthose who objectively achieve less are thereby deniedequality of respect as people. But many do not apply thisidea to the evaluation of specifically political views. In aputatively democratic way—which actually leaves out thecrucial deliberative element of democratic discourse—itseems to be enough for opinions to be aired and left tostand as they are. From such a perspective, any argumentabout one’s views against those of others—as anythingmore constructive than mere ‘sounding off’—is pointless:nothing is bullshit (or, if something is, then everything is).152

Frankfurt-bullshit has a natural bedfellow in relativismand, to remove it from political discourse, we must retrievethe democratic ideal of equal respect from the relativistclutch that has taken such a strong hold on it.

Those who prefer to think of the situation in politicalculture as a dumbing-down might describe such relativismas an obvious product of ignorance: overwhelmed andembarrassed by the complexities of politics, perhapsjealous of those few who seem more capable of getting togrips with them, the ordinary citizen—encouraged by adistorted reading of what democratic equality implies—reacts by stubbornly refusing the possibility of suchqualitative distinctions in political knowledge. But thisquasi-Nietzschean story of democratic ressentiment, of

Page 349: Bullshit and Philosophy

‘timid little people’ dragging us all down to some lowly,facile common cultural denominator, fits rather poorly withthe dumbed-up self-images of the age. I agree with LauraPenny’s belief that we live in “an era of unprecedentedbullshit production” (Your Call Is Important to Us, p. 1). Anda significant amount of it is, I submit, the result not of a timidbut an assertive, indeed aggressive, demand of equalvalidity in the discourse of multifarious spheres in sociallife.

Part of the phenomenon I have in mind is exemplified bythe peculiarly ‘in-your-face’ form of ‘respect’ that many wishto command today (sometimes ironically at the expense ofany respect they might show for others). But I wish tohighlight another aspect to it, which is much moreresponsible for bullshit. As societies become ever morecomplex it is only to be expected that types of knowledgemultiply and the division of labor becomes ever deeper. Oldhierarchies of knowledge and expertise are bound to bedisplaced: but there is an underlying but striking resistanceto the idea that what arises in their place is a new hierarchyof expertise, in the following sense. Almost every field ofhuman endeavor, almost every profession, no matter howhumdrum, increasingly indulges in its own forms ofdiscourse and ‘knowledge’, its own professions of‘expertise’. This is exhibited by the pseudo-intellectualjargon so many of them increasingly spout. In other words,expertise has in a sense become ‘democratized’, and in away that threatens to hollow out the very notion of‘expertise’: everyone is an expert in something. We know

Page 350: Bullshit and Philosophy

that some types of bullshitter pretend to an expertise orexperience that they do not in fact possess. But in thedemocratization of expertise we encounter others who arepretending to be experts in something that is not in fact amatter of ‘expertise’ at all. To posit any causal link betweenthis and democratic equality of respect is probably tooversimplify quite seriously its provenance. But thisphenomenon comports well with the relativizingunderstanding of such respect and, I suspect, it provides apowerful cultural bolster to the insulation of ordinarycitizens’ political views from expert critique, and morewidely to the toleration of bullshit in politics and, indeed inmany other spheres of life.

My example of this phenomenon is the ‘management-speak’ that the growth of the ‘American business model’ ofeconomic organisation has fostered; it has particularpertinence here insofar as its paradigms have been usedradically to redesign not just direct economic activity butmuch modern governance and indeed many other socialinstitutions and practices more generally (who, to take justone small example of it, can get away without a ‘missionstatement’ nowadays?) Much of it—as I’m sure readerswho are not utterly complicit with it will readily agree—isfatuously pretentious and overblown. But it provides succorfor those who are complicit with it: they can show off their‘expert’ familiarity with a putatively privileged set ofdiscursive terms that masquerade as referents forsupposedly complex matters which mimic genuineintellectual complexity and profundity but which are not, in

Page 351: Bullshit and Philosophy

intellectual complexity and profundity but which are not, intruth, complex at all. Some of it is undoubtedly bullshit insomething like Frankfurt’s sense. The word ‘downsizing’,for example, is, I suspect, deliberately chosen to overlookthe facts about the human cost of the policies it denotes.But here is an area which requires other conceptions ofbullshit to get its full measure as a dissembling discourse.

So, to identify more fully the targets in the struggleagainst bullshit, we need to expand on the typologies ofbullshit provided by Frankfurt and Cohen. For futureelaboration and analysis, then, I would suggest thefollowing. In addition to (1) ‘Frankfurt-bullshit’, indifferenceto truth, and that proposed by Cohen (2): unclarifiableunclarity, discourse which is not only unclear, but whosemeaning cannot be rendered clear even on analysis, wehave:

( 3 ) : clarifiable unclarity: discourse which over-complicates the expression of claims that can be muchmore straightforwardly expressed.153

Bullshit (4) might be plain, straightforward rubbish:discourse that is plainly deficient in logic, coherence orfactual grounding.

Bullshit (5) is irretrievable speculation: discourse thatmay be perfectly clear, and might not be rubbish but iscrucially lacking in any plausible means of verification.

Bullshit (6) is pretension or over-portentousness:discourse which may or may not be superficially complexbut which over-intellectualises the straightforward, theobvious, sometimes even the trivial and banal.

Page 352: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit (7) includes evasion, elision, insincerity,procrastination and other forms of dissembling indiscourse that fall short of lying, which is very common in,though hardly exclusive to, politics.154

Page 353: Bullshit and Philosophy

Philosophy versus Bullshit

The various forms of bullshit that have dumbed-updemocratic culture and paradoxically drowned out the voiceof genuine expertise in political conversation have sourcesand effects that lie well beyond politics as well, of course.The battle against them will have to be fought on manyfronts, and with a variety of weapons. My own smallcontribution to the struggle includes a call to restoreobjective standards to our political arguments, and arespect for such standards in evaluating their quality. Thishas elements of an intellectual elitism in that such respectwill incorporate greater acknowledgment of the authority ofcertain people to lead certain debates, not only with theirgreater factual knowledge but also their greater acumen incritically analysing the interpretations and arguments madein politics than we find in, say, partisan mediacommentary.155 But this implies no extra social or politicaladvantages for them. When I say that they are to ‘lead’debates, I signify the intention that these should continue tobe democratically inclusive; I am not advocating a politicaldiscourse in which the elite only talks to itself and henceeffectively monopolises input into the political process.

If one suspects that such an arrangement would still bevery much ‘us-and-them’—the handful of experts versus the

Page 354: Bullshit and Philosophy

mass of distinctly inexpert citizens—then we shouldconsider how such a gap might be narrowed. For even ifcitizens will never all have high levels of political expertise,that is no reason to rest content with the low levels of criticalpolitical understanding many of them currently possess.Certainly, liberal democracies should think about how they‘train’ the citizens of tomorrow in their ‘citizenship’, or‘civics’, school education to see how political knowledgemight be deepened and critical acumen sharpened. Inorder to develop thus as citizens, people have to learnmore of the Socratic skills of self-examination: to recognisehow their own views may be imperfect, and how one maygo about refining them.

More generally, I propose that an anti-bullshit discursiveculture may develop if there is greater practice of, andrespect for, the techniques of a good old-fashionedanalytic-philosophical style, which prizes clarity ofexposition and rigor of analysis in pursuit of truth and the‘best argument’ objectively understood. A tutor of mine atOxford, one of analytic philosophy’s spiritual homes, oncetold me that analytic philosophy was “a very good bullshitdetector.”

The expertise I have in mind, then, will exemplify this styleand will aspire not only to command respect and acquireintellectual (‘opinion-leading’) authority in its competentexecution of analytic-philosophical critique but also toprovide models of, and standards for, analysis andargument that others should want to try to share. It’s a smalltragedy for democracy when the taste and aptitude for this

Page 355: Bullshit and Philosophy

kind of philosophical discourse is confined to the ivorytowers of academia. For such philosophy would seem tobe a prime tool in tackling, in its variegated forms, bullshitnot just in politics but in all other spheres of life.

It is thus highly regrettable that the analytic-philosophicalstyle has very many critics in philosophy itself, nowadays;many philosophies overtly want to eschew truth, objectivityand clarity. For this reason, as Cohen points out, in thestruggle against bullshit it is not enough to have anenthusiastic mass or ‘lay’ audience for philosophy per se inorder to increase people’s bullshit-spotting capabilities.Too much philosophy nowadays exhibits one or more of theforms of bullshit,156 and this may be partly due to the desireto produce interesting, arresting, ‘fashionable’ ideas for animpressionable lay audience to consume: ‘being lay, thataudience will read philosophy only if it is interesting’, hesuggests, and this does not necessarily mean ‘beinginterested in truth.’157

When for whatever reason “truth is not even aimed at,false, or rather, untrue theses abound’ and typically ‘theyare protected against exposure by obscure statementand/or by obscure defense when they are challenged: sobullshit, too abounds” (p. 39). So a philosophical culturehas to have the right kind of philosophy in order to bedisposed against bullshit.

When we consider just how important truth is in politics(as indeed it is in most other areas of our lives), and howthe forms of bullshit degrade our political and social life, it

Page 356: Bullshit and Philosophy

seems simply absurd to embrace styles of philosophywhich disparage truth (whether in aim-bullshitting manner ornot) and end up contributing to the clogging of ourdiscourse and ‘understanding’ with bullshit. Apprehensionof hard and uncomfortable truths, and clear and rigorouslysophisticated thinking about their resolution, are absolutelyvital as we confront the huge, and hugely perplexing,problems in the world today.

But the presence of bullshit in our political discourseseverely problematizes our efforts to grasp them. Much ofthis bullshit is the product of the politicians, but the politicalbullshit of the citizens themselves also significantlyobscures accurate perception of these tough challenges.The Frankfurt thesis helps us to focus on its source andhence to ponder its resolution. As such, it deserves muchgreater attention; for certainly one thing it would bepotentially catastrophic to do is to use the ubiquity ofbullshit as an excuse to adopt instead the crippling inertiawhich can so easily become the natural upshot of thecynicism thesis.158

Page 357: Bullshit and Philosophy

13

Political Bullshit and the Stoic Story of Self

VANESSA NEUMANN

Bullshit is not, as it is popularly misconstrued, hot air—theremaining exhalation after speech is done. Far from it.Bullshit is a certain kind of speech, intended to distract orobfuscate in a general way, in order to achieve a desiredeffect—often one that is nonrational and emotional, whereemotions become reasons for a course of action.

Bullshit is fertile ground for philosophical investigationbecause it is intentional and identity-forming. Either ofthese conditions would suffice to make it a subject ofphilosophical interest; both together make it an importantmatter for investigation.

Bullshit is particularly useful and interesting in the arenaof political discourse, where it is most often recognized bythe general public. Its familiarity and pervasiveness inpolitics are good reasons to examine bullshit in the politicalcontext. However, political bullshit has important

Page 358: Bullshit and Philosophy

consequences that it would be a mistake to overlook.

Page 359: Bullshit and Philosophy

How to Analyze Bullshit

Two major strategies have emerged in the definition ofbullshit, and each has its proponents. Mine is neither ofthese. The first strategy is to discuss the agent-relativeaction of bullshitting, addressing the question of what it is tobullshit—or, the related question of how one knows whensomeone is bullshitting. The second strategy is to identifybullshit by its content: what is bullshit or the related (but notequivalent) question of how one can spot bullshit. HarryFrankfurt is the main proponent of the first strategy andG.A. Cohen of the second.

As Cohen demonstrates (“Deeper into Bullshit”),Frankfurt defines bullshit in reference to the agentproducing the bullshit—namely, the bullshitter. Bullshit isdefined in reference to the speaker’s intent to conceal thefact that the truth-values of his statements are of no centralinterest to him.159 As Cohen rightly points out, in Frankfurt’stheory the bull wears the trousers. Cohen offers a differentdefinition of bullshit that makes reference solely to itscontent. In essence, he tries to make the shit wear thetrousers.

As Cohen sees it, the main difference between hisapproach and Frankfurt’s is that Frankfurt’s bullshit isconcerned with utterances in everyday life. This sort of

Page 360: Bullshit and Philosophy

bullshit corresponds to the second definition in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary (“trivial or insincere talk or writing”) and,for Frankfurt, its primary locus is the activity and its essenceindifference to truth. Cohen, in contrast, argues that hisbullshit is concerned with utterances in the academicsetting, and corresponds to the first definition in the OxfordEnglish Dictionary (“nonsense, rubbish”). Cohen takesbullshit’s primary locus to be output and its essence to beunclarifiability. Producers of Cohen bullshit may not bebullshitters, as they may not have the intent Frankfurt’srequires—they may not be insincere, though their product isnonsense. Frankfurtian bullshitters, likewise, may or maynot produce Cohen bullshit: they may be insincere butsucceed only in producing “nonsense, rubbish.” Still, theirintent to deceive makes them bullshitters.

Cohen makes no secret of the fact that there is a reasonfor these divergent approaches: they are concerned withdifferent contexts. While Cohen is concerned to identify anderadicate bullshit in the academic context, Frankfurt isconcerned to identify bullshit and bullshitters in ordinary life.Cohen wants to examine bullshit in the academic setting,and he deems the identification of content a morepromising strategy on two counts. First, it is morediplomatic or courteous—and less agent-relative. Second,it is more practical, since content is more easily identifiedthan intention, although, as Cohen grants, identification ofcontent may indeed lead to an identification of strategy.“For reasons of courtesy, strategy and good evidence,” he

Page 361: Bullshit and Philosophy

writes, “we should criticize the product, which is visible, andnot the process, which is not. We may hope that success indiscrediting the product will contribute to extinguishing theprocess” (p. 135n).

Frankfurt and Cohen do not exhaust the intellectuallandscape of bullshit. My concern is a third, largelyunnoticed, context: the mechanism of bullshit—how it worksand what its effects are, irrespective of whether we areconfronted with Cohen bullshit or Frankfurt bullshit. Cohengrants that “the word ‘bullshit’ characteristically denotesstructurally different things that correspond to thosedifferent interests” (p. 119, italics in original). The setting orcontext therefore affects the form of bullshit. There is arelation that is critical to this third strategy: the relationbetween speaker and listener—between bullshitter andbullshittee.

This alternative way of looking at bullshit helps us seehow bullshit typically works in political discourse. Whatmakes a speaker or writer (I’ll here use ‘speaker’, for short)initiate or spread bullshit? How does it work on the listeneror reader (I’ll here use ‘listener’, for short)? We will see thatbullshit plays a significant role in political discourse, andthat, as such, it is difficult to extricate.

In politics, bullshit distracts or obfuscates, in order tocreate an impression that may or may not be true. I followFrankfurt in the contention that bullshit may or may not betrue, and that bullshit’s truth-value is irrelevant. It is not byvirtue of its falsity that a statement can be consideredbullshit. Even a true (or partly-true) statement may be

Page 362: Bullshit and Philosophy

bullshit. Even if true, a statement may be non-germane,irrelevant, or obfuscatory—thereby making it a primecandidate for bullshit. Bullshit therefore differs from lyingand resembles bluffing, though it is not bluffing. Often,bullshit is a mix of true and false statements, the mixturedetermined to suit the purpose of the bullshit in question.

In politics, purpose is crucial for analyzing bullshit. Thebetter it fulfills its purpose, the better the bullshit. There areseveral possible purposes, but they fall into two broadcategories. The first typical purpose of political bullshit is todepict the speaker as someone different (‘better,’ given thecircumstances) than she is. It is usually intended to identifythe speaker as someone desirable to the listener. This isfamiliar from the personal and the political arena: “I’m oneof you,” or “I am what you need or want.” This is familiarfrom electoral campaigns, but also from politicalcommentary. The second purpose is to identify groups ofpeople, usually to specify a target or justify a politicalcourse of action—as in the Orientalist or structuralistapproach: “They are different from us, so we should treatthem like this.” From slavery to the war on terrorism to theracially-underpinned left turn in South American politics, thissecond purpose is pervasive—and dangerous.

Bullshit is difficult to extricate from political discoursebecause it is so useful: it serves the interests of so manydifferent groups. Both sides of a debate resort to bullshit,and bullshit gives them power over the parameters of thedebate. A prominent example of this is the pervasive use ofmoral language, without the attendant commitment to moral

Page 363: Bullshit and Philosophy

constraints. Moral language is used to praise and condemnactions, and those who perform them, as just and unjust,virtuous or vicious, or just plain right or wrong. The speaker(a politician especially) seeks to score points with herconstituency by putting forth the narrowest judgmentswithout providing the underpinning normative commitmentsthat might constrain her future actions. Such talk, rather thanilluminating a framework for morally acceptable behavior, isdesigned to make the speaker appear superior to somecompetitor, while giving the speaker wiggle room for thefuture.

Take the common example of one politician condemninganother for accepting a free trip or other favor from acorporate entity. The second politician is condemned asbad or corrupt, without any further explanation of whyaccepting such a favor is bad, or of what it is that is morallycompromising. Avoiding such an analysis or fundamentaldiscussion then allows the speaker to “wiggle out” of futureaccusations of a similar sort by citing various allegeddifferences: “Well, my case is different, because thecorporation in question is different, the type of favor isdifferent,” and so forth. So, the speaker can appear morallyconcerned and, even, to speak for morality itself (not unlikespeaking on behalf of God, espousing what is surely“God’s will”), although she does not say anything that wouldconstrain her from accepting a different sort of bribery.Here, moral language is used solely to advance personal orgroup interests—not to illuminate ethics in politics. Morallanguage is reduced to a tool in the competitive struggle for

Page 364: Bullshit and Philosophy

political advantage.The stakes are high. The struggle for political advantage

is a winner-take-all game. Surely the power of one agent isconstrained by the relative power of other agents, and thisin turn is constrained by a system of procedural checks andbalances. However, since the rules are themselves subjectto revision by those in power, the struggle for politicalpower is a struggle for control over the rules of the game.Bullshit is the main tool for the ultimately unconstrainedstruggle for the flexible and malleable rules of politicalpower.160

There’s a distinction worth making here. In the context ofpublic political discourse we get both kinds of bullshit: thekind custom-crafted by those deviously intending toobfuscate and the kind innocently repeated by those toouncritical to recognize bullshit, who often seize upon bullshitthat strikes a chord with them or fits some self-image ornarrative they embrace.

Page 365: Bullshit and Philosophy

Stories Shape Our Feelings

Bullshit’s role in political narratives gives it one of its mostinteresting features. Bullshit links images and types whichare both familiar and fascinating, and so taps into culturalprototypes. It uses familiar expressions to convey mentalimages, and leaves an impression that achieves thespeaker’s goal.

A narrative, or story, is not merely an interpretiveframework superimposed on otherwise disconnected acts,images, impressions and emotions. As Peter Goldieargues, a person’s narrative is that person’s life insofar asit is understood as a sequence of meaningful andemotional episodes.161 The narrative structures of our livesthemselves shape and color how we understand and howwe feel about particular episodes in the past, and how wewill perceive and interpret episodes in the future. Narrativealso shapes how we view others, their lives and theirattendant worthiness, and how they relate to us and affectour lives. In short, it forms our understanding of our place inthe world.

The narrative is therefore much more than the merestringing together of impressions and emotions into acoherent structure. The narrative structure itself shapes ourfeelings towards objects and, by extension, to particular

Page 366: Bullshit and Philosophy

episodes. It’s largely due to an event’s location in thenarrative that we feel the way we do about something orsomeone. When asked why we feel as we do aboutsomeone or something, we often say, “Well, there’s a storybehind it.” It’s this background story that gives the emotionits content—we wouldn’t feel anything if there weren’t astory. So the relation of an event or emotional episode to anarrative is symbiotic; it flows both ways. The episodesshape the narrative of which they are a part and give itmeaningful content, and the narrative shapes the content ofthe emotion we experience. As the narrative and thebackground story evolves, so do our emotions.

To understand how bullshit functions in this light, we needto look at the nature of emotions themselves. As Goldieshows, emotions relate to values in important ways. First,emotions give epistemic access to values. If I feel love orfear, for example, then there is something that I love or fear(p. 4). This is a stronger claim than saying merely thatemotions have aboutness or ofness. This is demonstratedby the fact that emotions can be phrased as transitive verbsof the standard form, ‘A Fs B’, where B is the object pickedout by the emotion-verb F experienced by the person A.“An object of an emotion, in this sense, could be aparticular thing or person (that pudding, this man), an eventor an action (the earthquake, your hitting me), or a state ofaffairs (my being in an aeroplane)” (p. 17). Emotionsthereby reveal the people, objects, events, and states ofaffairs we value, positively or negatively—the ones we wantand the ones we wish to avoid. There is a caveat here,

Page 367: Bullshit and Philosophy

though, that applies to any intentional state.

First, the object of the emotion has to be identifiedin a sufficiently fine-grained way to capture whythe person feels that emotion about that object:Oedipus might be delighted he married Jocasta,but would not be delighted that he has married hismother. Secondly, the object of an emotion neednot exist. Jimmy might be afraid of theAbominable Snowman, when there is no suchcreature. (p. 18)

Emotions, finally, are not created in a void: there aresignificant conceptual relations between emotions and thebeliefs that ground them. I fear losing the man I lovebecause I believe that my life would be substantiallyimpoverished without him. If I believed I would be better offwithout him, I probably would not have the same fear.Perhaps this is an assessment rather than a belief? Thenconsider a different example. I might be angry at seeinganother woman with a coat like mine if I believe it’s mineand she has stolen it. I wouldn’t feel the same anger if Ibelieve she has simply bought it at the same shop, ratherthan stolen mine; I would find it an amusing coincidence.

Martha Nussbaum believes that the narrative of anemotion is in fact the narrative about judgments.162 Thesejudgments are about things important to us that we do notfully control—both the lack of control and the importanceare implicit in the intense experience of an emotion. This is,

Page 368: Bullshit and Philosophy

in fact, the Greek Stoic view of emotions. Not only areemotions intentional in that they point at their object, butthey are deeply intentional in the way they are internal andencompass a set of beliefs about the object. These beliefspertain to the value of the object. The object is seen(believed, judged) to be important. “So there seem to betype-identities between emotions and judgments; emotionscan be defined in terms of judgment alone” (p. 196).

Emotions also shape values. Pride, vanity andresentment are predispositions, but they are also emotionsthat shape what we value, what is important. If I’m proud, Iwill value respect or independence or both. If I’m vain I willvalue praise and attention. If I’m resentful, I will value storiesof perceived rivals brought low. These emotions and theirattendant value are not disruptive of a life’s narrative, butvery much part of it. The triumvirate of emotion, judgmentand narrative is as old as philosophy itself. The Greekconcept of eudaimonia, commonly mistranslated as‘happiness’, encompasses them. In eudai-monistic theory awell-lived life (mistranslated as a ‘happy’ life) is one thatincludes all those things to which the agent ascribesintrinsic value—all that the person deems important in herlife, without which she would not consider her life complete(p. 190).

Imagination, and the dynamic character of judgingourselves, takes place against the background of narrative(p. 51): “what would my life be like with/without/if . . . ?” Theevaluation of importance is, as mentioned above, shapedby the narrative and pushes the agent’s cognition towards

Page 369: Bullshit and Philosophy

an object, itself assessed within the framework of thenarrative. “When we have an emotion,” Goldie says, “weare engaged with the world, grasping what is going on inthe world, and responding accordingly.” That’s why “theemotions can be educated” (p. 48). Goldie gives theexample of how children are raised to have an appropriate,and proportionate, response to appropriate stimuli: “thiswarrants sympathy,” “this should make you proud,” and soon. As we will see, the most dangerous of political bullshittries to educate our emotions by telling us what shouldmake us proud or patriotic, angry or frightened.

These processes are a part of every life: the ebb andflow of one’s life and reason, one’s narrative. The power ofbullshit is that it can be used to tell us what should beeudaimonistically included among our feelings, wants, andneeds. It tries to make us desire and long for things we hadnot previously considered. In other words, it tells us whatphilia should be important to us. It tells us what we shouldconsider our civic duty, what we should covet and—ultimately—who we are with respect to those around us.The special problem with bullshit, however, is that it gets itspower by appealing to and motivating that part of us that isbase and non-rational. In that respect, it degrades us. Let’slook at some examples from international politics.

Page 370: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit Around the Globe

The sentence ‘we are waging a war on terror’ is specificallydesigned to elicit a strong and specific emotional response—not to give any further facts, elicit a debate, or giveethical justifications for actions. It is useful here to parse outthe mechanism of this phrase, one word at a time. First,there is the ‘we’. This is a clear identification of a group vis-à-vis another group: ‘we’, not ‘they’, not ‘others’. If thelistener is engaged in the activity (here, fighting in the waron terror—more on this in a second), then the listener isincluded in the group. If she is not, then she is not in thegroup—and may be, possibly, on the other side of theconfrontation (maybe even an ‘enemy combatant’, to useanother popular and vague phrase). Second, this us-versus-them feeling is reinforced by the imagery of waginga war, which conjures visceral reactions of patriotism(possibly jingoism) and a call to violent and unquestioningaction. If we are at war, then we must join our compatriots—and fight without questioning our orders. This is very usefulfor those seeking extra powers and a curb on civil libertiesin order to wage this war.

Last, but not least, there is that word ‘terror’—notterrorism or terrorists, as these would be too specific forthe bullshit purpose at hand. ‘Terror ists’ would designate

Page 371: Bullshit and Philosophy

individual people who are defined with reference to specificactions. Our attention would then turn to these individualsand perhaps look at them closely to see if they fit thatcategory and are being judged accurately. ‘Terror ism’would designate a type of action: again, something that canbe defined and specified—perhaps as the murder ofinnocent civilians, who are at least innocent in the sensethat they are not the individuals that perpetrated whateveroffense has come to be the excuse for violence.

‘Terror’, on the other hand, is suitably vague. It is anemotion and figures powerfully, even universally, in humannarratives. We have all know terror from childhood, whenwe were terrified of being punished or of the bogeyman.The ‘war on terror’, then, is a ‘war’ on an emotion? ‘We’ willvanquish this extreme form of fear?’ Again, ‘we are waginga war on terror’ is a bullshit phrase not because we are notundertaking a course of action to end terrorism. That wouldcertainly be a laudable cause. It is a bullshit phrasebecause it is a narrative that evokes emotions, rather thanthe thought and discussion wise, democratic policy andmilitary decisions require. It teaches us to fear some vagueOther, ‘terror’, and, by tapping into our deep-seated cravingfor security, urges us to hunt this bogeyman Other.

Whether it is ‘the war on terror’ or ‘Western imperialism’,parties in international conflicts or standoffs will use bullshitto persuade their followers to support their actions ratherthan engage in a lucid debate about the underpinning moralcommitments. For instance, the United States governmentdoes not explain why such extraordinary resources and

Page 372: Bullshit and Philosophy

curbs on civil liberties are justified to eliminate somethingthat even in 2001 caused only 0.13 percent of all deaths inthe US. Likewise, the militant Muslims calling for jihad onall Westerners on the premise that this “jihad is God’s will”do not elucidate how they are able to know (and espouse)God’s will to murder innocents (a term used even byOsama bin Laden in his Ummat Daily interview ofSeptember 28th, 2001, where he denied involvement in the9/11 attacks) especially within a religion that explicitlyforbids the murder of women and children even in warfare.Neither the militant Muslim terrorists nor the Bushadministration fighting them has addressed how bombingor torturing people who are not the ones that actuallyinflicted harm (whether to Palestinians or New York City)will bring peace or end fear.

We can see, therefore, precisely how political bullshitdegrades us. On the one hand, it seeks to shape our valuesin a manner that circumvents our treasured human faculty tobe moved by ideas. It appeals to our emotions and avoidsengaging those faculties of reason and debate that makeus human. The call to spread democracy, for example, lullsus into feeling that it is our civic duty to share our freedom,but it says little about whether the people in fact wantdemocracy or how such an intervention is to be justified. Totell one’s constituency that the administration’s task is tospread democracy, without any discussion of how such a“spread” is to be justified or undertaken, is to insult theintelligence of the constituency.

On the other hand, as this example suggests, bullshit has

Page 373: Bullshit and Philosophy

On the other hand, as this example suggests, bullshit hasan almost irresistible pull because it so effectively appealsto our baser impulses. It can give us a strong sense ofidentity and importance as we become players in thenarrative of others—and they in ours. If we’re lucky, they willview us as valuable—especially if we are spreadingdemocracy or God’s will. In this way, bullshit plays a largerole in current claims of nationalism, liberty, anddemocracy. It is used to unite, to band together, and alsopersuade.

This is not to say that we do not or should not have a rolein the world, for I concur with Richard Haass that given thepresent global situation the United States has a role andindeed an opportunity to define a moment in history, anopportunity it is missing.163 This is an opportunity todiscuss and define, an oppor-tunity too precious to besquandered on the bullshit of obfuscation and suppresseddebate. Yet as long as we derive a strong sense of identityfrom bullshit, we will be hard-pressed to eradicate it.

This, of course, presents a challenge for the consumer ofbullshit, namely, to ascertain the speaker’s intent and tosurmise the speaker’s state of mind. Does the speakerintend to obfuscate? This is no simple task, but one that iscertainly facilitated by the Cohen strategy: identifying thecontent will lead to an eradication of the process, anderadicate it we must, if we are to maintain our humandignity and maintain our capacity to reason and be movedby ideas, especially the ideas of right and wrong that allowus to lead lives we value.

Page 374: Bullshit and Philosophy

14

Bullshit at the Interface of Science andPolicy: Global Warming, Toxic Substances,

and Other Pesky Problems

HEATHER DOUGLAS

In recent public discussions about the use of science inpolicy-making, confusion has bred bullshit. The interfacebetween science and policy is notoriously difficult, requiringtechnical competence and political savvy. At this difficultboundary, the need for quality science advice remains apressing concern.

Ever since Plato’s parable about the stargazer as expertnavigator for the ship of state in The Republic,governments have grappled with the problem of how to getaccurate and reliable expert advice on technical matterscentral to policy-making. In recent decades, as the scope ofgovernment concern has expanded and the need fortechnical advice becomes more acute, the debatesurrounding the quality of science advice for policy-makinghas shifted, from excluding pseudoscience, to worries over“junk science,” to the most recent concern over “politicized

Page 375: Bullshit and Philosophy

science.” These shifts, however, merely rephrase the samequestion: On whom should we rely for expert advice? Thequestion is not easily answered, and the resulting confusionallows bullshit to proliferate.

Two different kinds of bullshit flourish at the science-policy interface. The first trades on the complexities ofevidence and technical detail on which many substantivepolicy choices rest—complexities that make it easy toconfuse the public about the extent of uncertainties andcontravening evidence in particular cases. This leads to apervasive kind of bullshit in which statements are made thatare not false, and thus not lies, but are deeply misleading.Operators on the interface can propagate these true butmisleading statements, thus building support for desiredpolicy choices.

The second kind of bullshit is more pervasive. It occurswhen critics of scientific claims suggest that the evidenceon which a decision is based is insufficient to support thedecision. What makes this argument bullshit in most casesis that it often presupposes that we have a universalstandard of evidential support which all claims must meet inorder to be “scientific.” Yet there is no such standard—particularly in cases where one must take into accountevidence from multiple sources—and thus any appeal tosuch a standard is pure bullshit. Usually, what the criticreally thinks is that the evidence is insufficient in this caseto overcome their concerns about the implications of theclaims, particularly if the claim is wrong and is accepted (orcorrect and is rejected). The consequences of error, of

Page 376: Bullshit and Philosophy

making an inaccurate empirical claim with politicalimplications, is what is of concern to the critic, but ratherthan discuss these concerns openly, the critic simplydeclares that the evidence available does not meet thestandards of “sound science” or is an example of“politicized science.” This move confuses genuine cases ofjunk or politicized science from cases where burdens ofproof are disputed, helping only to obscure the issues atstake.

Both of these kinds of bullshit are prevalent indiscussions of science and policy-making, and they will bedifficult to eliminate. The technical and esoteric nature ofmuch of the evidence on which policy is based will makethe first kind of bullshit attractive to anyone seeking to scorepolitical points in a science-based dispute. Constantvigilance is the only remedy. The second kind of bullshit ismore amenable to cure, but only if we adjust our ideasabout scientific reasoning to emphasize the weighing ofevidence, uncertainty, and the consequences of error.Unfortunately, this will make science-based policy debatesmore complicated, and the temptation to oversimplifythings and assume the existence of a universal standard ofproof will always have an allure, especially in our sound biteage. Bullshit is more compact, portable, and convenientthan full and open discussion.

Page 377: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit of the Isolated Fact

In many policy disputes that depend on technical orscientific backgrounds, a welter of facts are relevant to theissue at hand. Even in the relatively simple cases ofregulating toxic substances, for example, one needs toknow the details of animal toxicology studies, whether therehave been any accidental human exposures studied, whatis known about the biochemistry of the substance, and howhumans are currently exposed and to what levels. Thiswelter of facts must then be considered in total to figure outwhether and how to regulate a substance. Missing just onecrucial piece of the puzzle can throw the whole picture off.For example, if a chemical causes liver cancer in rats, andis consumed by many people (although no studies ofhuman effects have been conducted), it would seemprudent to regulate the chemical. But if one also knows thatthe rats have a substance in their livers that interacts withthe chemical of concern to produce their cancers, asubstance that is absent in humans, one will likely be muchless alarmed. One must have as much of the availablepicture as possible.164 But having that takes a lot of work todevelop, takes time to present to others, and even worse,may undermine the political outcome you desire. It’s mucheasier in these inherently complex cases to pick and

Page 378: Bullshit and Philosophy

choose one’s facts rather than grapple with all of theavailable evidence.

Cherry-picking one’s facts, thus producing bullshit of theisolated fact, is particularly problematic in the case of theclimate change debate. If the case of toxic substancesseems complex, the case of global climate changemagnifies this complexity many times over. Here we needto reflect upon past climate and its variability, currentclimate measurements, and future climate projections,which need to take into account as much of the earth’senergy dynamics as possible. At the same time, we needaccurate descriptions of atmospheric chemistry andphysics, including the particulars on the many greenhousegases that have been identified.165 All this complexity is inplace before one even begins to address the possibleeffects of climate change on human and natural systems. Itis little wonder that with such a complicated issue and suchhigh stakes, the lure of selecting particular facts, even trueones, that in isolation prove totally misleading, is sotempting.

One example of this selectivity, and the bullshit thatresults, can be found in the use of recent climate records inthe debate over climate change. Modestly reliable globaltemperature readings became available in the latenineteenth century, as climate data collection locationsspread across the globe and regular sea surfacetemperature data began to be taken. The temperaturerecords based on this data indicate a climate warming

Page 379: Bullshit and Philosophy

from 1890 to 1940, and then a climate cooling from 1940to 1975. In the mid-1970s, the earth began to warm againaccording to these records, and has continued to do so. Atfirst glance, this recent climate record does little to supportthe idea that humans, in producing greenhouse gases, arewarming the climate. The early warming periodcorresponds to a modest increase of greenhouse gasproduction, but greenhouse gas production really went upafter 1940, when the cooling began. This means that theworld warmed during the smaller increase in greenhousegases, and then cooled during the larger increase ingreenhouse gases. If humans were influencing the climatebetween 1940 and 1975, why were global temperaturesdropping?

This was a legitimate scientific question during the1980s. Although global temperatures had begun to riseagain by the mid-1970s, why temperatures had droppedduring one of the most intensive periods of industrialexpansion—and the accompanying increase ofgreenhouse gas productions—was unclear. In the early1990s, however, as more research was completed on thefunctioning of the global climate, scientists discovered theimportance of aerosols for the climate. Aerosols areparticulates, including dust and sulfates, that cool theatmosphere. They tend to be short-lived in the atmosphere,washing out after a few days (or a few years at most), buttheir impact on global climate can be dramatic. Researchon aerosols allowed climate modelers to successfullypredict the amount of global cooling that would follow from

Page 380: Bullshit and Philosophy

predict the amount of global cooling that would follow fromthe eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in June 1991, an eruption thatspewed significant quantities of aerosols into theatmosphere.166

Volcanoes are not the only important source for aerosolshowever. The burning of fossil fuels also producesaerosols, aerosols that not only cool climate, but can causeacid rain. When we became concerned about acid rain inthe 1970s and began to reduce the release of sulfates intothe atmosphere (using “scrubbers” on smokestacks), wereduced the amount of aerosols that could cool the climate.The excess aerosols left in the atmosphere washed out in afew years, and when combined with the continued build-upof greenhouse gases, the warming trend reappeared. Thus,the increased industrial output from 1940 to 1975 producedboth more greenhouse gases and more aerosols. Thecooling effect of the aerosols likely masked the warmingeffect of the greenhouse gases during this period, and withthe reduction of aerosol releases by industry, the warmingtrend re-emerged. The longer-lasting greenhouse gaseswere finally having their impact.

Including the fact of aerosols in one’s understanding ofclimate records could be inconvenient, but ignoringaerosols produces bullshit. The research on aerosols waswidely available by 1993. Several prominent articles andessays had appeared in Science, the foremost journal forscientific research in the United States.167 The researchwas summarized for a more popular audience in ScientificAmerican in 1994.168 While questions remained about the

Page 381: Bullshit and Philosophy

precise impact of aerosols on the climate, aerosols hadbecome an important part of understanding the climate anda likely explanation for the decrease in global temperaturesbetween 1940 and 1975. Anyone who honestly participatedin the climate change debate was aware of this crucialscientific development.

Yet skeptics of global warming continued to point to the1940–1975 decline in temperature as being out of syncwith what one would expect were humans really changingthe climate. For example, in his essay from The True Stateof the Planet, published in 1995, Robert Balling Jr.reinforces his skepticism over human-caused globalwarming by pointing to the lack of warming between 1940and 1975.169 As he complains about how pre-1990 modelspredict more warming (based on greenhouse gasincreases) than was actually measured, he fails to mentionthe research on aerosols and their masking effect. Thisslight omission was probably unnoticed by the casualreader, but it allowed Balling to suggest that the entireglobal warming scenario was poppycock. Such is theeffectiveness of isolated fact bullshit.

Fred Singer is probably the most egregious spreader ofthis brand of bullshit for the global climate change debate.In a series of essays published in newspapers and otherpublic sources, Singer repeatedly casts doubt on thereliability of climate models because of this warming, thencooling trend in the temperature record.170 He nevermentions the possibility that human-produced aerosols

Page 382: Bullshit and Philosophy

might account for this record, nor that research wascontinuing on the topic. And the bullshit spread beyondSinger and Balling. In his report in Toronto’s Globe andMail newspaper in 1997, Guy Crittenden cited Singer andBalling as two of the “four horsemen of the nonapoca-lypse,” giving heavy credence to Singer and Balling’sclaims, emphasizing the pre-1940 warming trend.171 Somuch the worse for public debate about climate change.

This is not to say that there were no problems with globalclimate models and the theory of climate change in the1990s, or that they are all settled today. One concern wasthe discrepancy between land-based and satellitetemperature readings of the planet. Satellites launched inthe late 1970s had been collecting temperature data forover a decade, but the results did not square with ground-level temperature readings. The satellite data showedalmost no warming where the ground level readingsshowed significant warming for the period 1980–1995.

Skeptics legitimately made much of this discrepancy,which was quite baffling to climate scientists. Indeed, thesatellite data, coming from the purity of space,uncontaminated by human error or local land-use changes,seemed to have a prima facie claim to greater reliability.Eventually, however, closer examinations of the datarevealed that the satellite data agreed with the ground-levelreadings after all.172 The absolute reliability of satellitedata, both in terms of instrumental purity and ability tocapture global temperature accurately, could not be

Page 383: Bullshit and Philosophy

sustained. When the systemic errors of satellite readingswere accounted for, and the raw data properly processed,there was a steady and significant warming trend. Althoughthis re-examination of satellite readings has been widelypublicized among scientists (with articles and news storiesi n Science and a National Academy report on the issue,cited in footnote 9), we can expect some skeptics to onceagain ignore this development as they claim that the earthis not really warming.

This bullshit of the isolated fact, the selected emphasison particular data, is seductive. Science is a continuallychanging body of knowledge, and few can claim to be fullyup-to-date on any given issue. Even scientists working inthe field have difficulty in maintaining a cutting-edgeawareness of every new piece of evidence, of every newinterpretation. By bringing forth an isolated fact, andignoring the complexities that undermine the desiredsignificance of that fact, bullshitters play upon ourintellectual limitations. They may succeed in some cases,but repeated emphasis on the isolated fact—especiallyafter new evidence and its significance have been placedin prominent scientific outlets (such as Science, Nature, ora National Academy report)—is to show oneself to beplaying a disingenuous intellectual game. As HarryFrankfurt suggests, it is to reveal oneself to beunconcerned with the truth. It is to show that one is willing tospread bullshit to win.

Page 384: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit of Universal Standards

While isolated-fact bullshit trades on the impossibility ofstaying well-informed about every technical issue central tomodern governance, universal standards bullshit has amore philosoph-ical source. Rather than showing a lack ofconcern for available evidence as with the isolated factbullshit, universal standards bullshit appeals to anonexistent standard of proof for science. It assumes thatthere is one standard met by all scientific claims worthy ofthe name, and that we can tell what is sound science orgood science from what is junk science or bad science (ornon-science or pseudoscience) by simply checking withthis standard. Lately, the universal standards bullshit hasfound new employ in bolstering arguments about thepoliticization of science. This is a disturbing trend,increasing not only the spreading of this bullshit, but alsoobfuscating crucial issues in the use and misuse of sciencein political life.

Where does a sense of universal standards in sciencecome from? Most likely, it comes from the way most of uswere taught science in school—from a textbook. Thetextbook lays out the complexities of science, both theoryand fact, and then uses exercises at the end of eachchapter to test our comprehension. How to apply the newly

Page 385: Bullshit and Philosophy

learned science to the specific case in the problem can bea challenge, but we were all reassured that there is a rightanswer, if not in the back of the book, then in the back ofthe teacher’s book. This leads us to think of science as ablack-and-white affair of facts, organized by theories intoconcrete knowledge. Occasionally, textbooks may hint atthe frontiers of science, where the theories and facts arenot so well nailed down. But they generally make sciencelook like a done deal, ready to be applied to any problemsituation. And the answers are all there, in the back of thebook.

Any honest look at science in action, however, showsthat things are far messier. For many problems, even theexperts disagree over which theory to apply, and how toapply it. And, frustratingly, most of our science policy issuessit in areas like this where science is developing andtextbooks have yet to be written. While some facts areundisputed—indeed that something is undisputed amongscientists is the only reliable marker that it is a scientificfact—there is much that remains controversial. Universal-standards bullshit assumes that there is some thresholdthat any body of evidence must meet before it is “scientific”and “proven” and only then can we act on it. It assumesthere is a universal standard of proof that allows someideas into the vaulted halls of science, and keeps the restout. What I want to suggest here is that not only is there nosuch standard, but that we don’t want one. Thus appealingto this standard as if it both existed and could solve all ofour problems at the science-policy interface perpetuates a

Page 386: Bullshit and Philosophy

pernicious form of bullshit.Appeals to the universal standard of proof appear in

criticisms of politicized science from all sides. The Union ofConcerned Scientists, in their report on Scientific Integrityin Policy-Making, rightly points to suppression of evidenceand the refusal to release studies as examples ofpoliticizing science.173 If the evidence cannot be madepublic and discussed, then science’s open forum of debateis severely compromised. But the report also considers theweighing of uncertainty by the Bush administration to be apoliticization of science. It says that “Bush administrationspokespersons continue to contend that the uncertainties inclimate projection and fossil fuel emissions are too great towarrant mandatory action to slow emissions” (p. 5). If this ispoliticizing science, however, then there must be someobjective universal threshold that once passed make theuncertainties irrelevant.

But there is honest debate about both the level ofuncertainty in climate projections (although that uncertaintyis generally decreasing each year) and about what level ofcertainty we would need to have to warrant mandatory fossilfuel use reductions. The latter choice is clearly a politicaldecision, and depends on how protective one wants to beof the fossil fuel industry versus the global climate’sstability. We might lambaste the Bush administration forvaluing the former too much over the latter, but any appealto some universal standard of proof, a nonexistent ideal, toaddress this issue would be bullshit.

Page 387: Bullshit and Philosophy

A similar example can be found in the introductorychapter of the volume Politicizing Science,174 in whichMichael Gough, in providing an overview of the book, writesthat:

The authors of the chapters . . . describescientists masking policy decisions as ‘scientific’,and politicians labeling politically driven decisionsas scientific, attempting thereby to place themoutside the realm of political discussion, debate,and compromise. But this is an illusion. All policymatters involving human health and theenvironment are political. The more that politicalconsiderations dominate scientificconsiderations, the greater the potential for policydriven by ideology and less based on strongscientific underpinnings. (p. 3)

This sounds like a useful unmasking of politicized science,but only until one asks what those strong scientificunderpinnings are supposed to be. When is a body ofevidence enough to be considered “strong”? Surely wewant evidence to serve as one basis for our decisions, butis evidence alone sufficient? Even Gough admits it is not.He writes a few pages later that Karl Popper has informedus science requires two things: hypothesis formation andhypothesis testing175 (Gough p. 12). He then claims thatneither models underlying predictions of human cancerrates nor climate change models can be tested. (The ability

Page 388: Bullshit and Philosophy

to predict the cooling following the eruption of Mt. Pinatubomentioned earlier can be considered a fair short-term testof climate models.)

Yet hypothesis formation and testing are not sufficient forsomething to be an acceptably strong scientificunderpinning for a policy decision. The crucial issue isusually how much evidence and testing there has been,what kinds of testing have been done, and whether theavailable evidence is enough. Deciding that it is enough isin part a political decision, as it requires the weighing of theacceptability of uncertainty. Gough is implicitly relying upona non-existent universal standard of proof for science, onethat he never articulates or defends. Thus is it easy to claimthat those who attempt to martial evidence in favor ofincreased regulation have failed to provide sufficientlystrong evidence. Unnamed universal standards can alwaysbe adjusted higher when desired.

Why is there not one standard of proof, one hurdle forevidence before a claim becomes credible and scientific?In part, it is because the evidence that supports claimsabout the world comes in so many different forms. Theevidence that would support a claim of causation about achemical substance causing cancer in a mammal(evidence from animal toxicology and perhapsbiochemistry) looks quite different from evidence that wouldsupport a claim about a geological causal process thatleads to certain mountain formations. Even statisticalsignificance claims, arguably a “gold standard” in science(commonly thought to be p < 0.05 or a less than a one-in-

Page 389: Bullshit and Philosophy

(commonly thought to be p < 0.05 or a less than a one-in-twenty chance that the results are spurious) are notuniversally applicable. Not all evidence is statistical, andsome studies require more stringent or less stringentstandards for the results to be “statistically significant.”Among different disciplines and fields, what it takes toconvince the scientists in those fields will vary, dependingon what they already take to be accepted knowledge andaccepted techniques. As the adage goes, extraordinaryclaims require extraordinary evidence. But what anextraordinary claim is can vary with disciplinary backgroundand personal experience.

Perhaps we could standardize all this complexity, andrequire that scientists keep to a single standard forsufficient evidence. One could argue that drug testing hasdeveloped such standards—that a statistically significantresult from a double-blind control study with placebos is thestandard that must be met. But does this standard makesense for climate studies, for example, where there is noalternate earth on which to experiment? These studiesinvolve predictions about how perturbations will affect theclimate, and such predictions provide useful checks onclimate models. But a simple model for controlledexperiments when applied to environmental sciences isneither accurate nor helpful. Also, consider whether theuniversal standard employed by the Food and DrugAdministration (FDA) is really so simple. Even with thisstandardization of study type, the FDA must still decidewhether the study was conducted with an appropriate

Page 390: Bullshit and Philosophy

sample of people, and whether the study ran for longenough, to support the claims made for the drug. And itmust decide whether the apparent risks of a new drug areoutweighed by their benefits, a judgment made in thecontext of other medications available. So even with theapparently standardized approach to evidence, judgment inweighing the risks and benefits of error is needed. Thequestion will still remain, is the evidence enough?

No universal answer to this question is availablebecause the contexts in which these judgments must bemade vary so widely. Whether the evidence available issufficient depends in large measure on what the risks areof getting it wrong. These risks arise because of theuncertainty inherent in the enterprise of science, uncertaintythat is endemic and unavoidable (although reducible). Evenif uncertainty is similar in two cases, the risks of error varywith the claim being examined and the context of the claim.Consider a few everyday examples. Suppose I told you Ithought it likely that your gas tank gauge was off, and thatyou would run out of gas on the way home. The risk of errorin rejecting my claim is not terribly huge. It would beinconvenient for you to run out of gas, but probably not life-threatening. You would want to know exactly why I thoughtthis about your as gauge, on the basis of what evidence,and decide whether it really was enough to get you to takethe car directly to a mechanic rather than wait and see foryourself. On the other hand, if I told you I thought there was abomb in your car, the slightest amount of evidence wouldsuffice to get you to think twice about driving it, just as the

Page 391: Bullshit and Philosophy

mere presence of an unattended package at a majorairport can cause terminals to be evacuated.

Decisions at the interface of science and policy are nodifferent. If you care deeply about climate stability and notmuch about the economic health of oil companies, lessevidence will be needed to convince you that we havesufficient reason to act to curtail climate change—that thescientific underpinnings are strong enough. If, on the otherhand, you care deeply about the health of oil companiesand not much about climate stability, far more evidence willbe needed to convince you that the we have sufficientevidence to act. Decisions about uncertainties are political(and ethical), and thus the decision that evidence issufficient is a political decision.

This is not to say that science can’t be politicized. It can.One can suppress evidence, by either refusing to record itbecause one doesn’t like it, or by refusing to allow it to bepublished. One can refuse to allow politically unpopularviews to be pursued. One can ignore studies one doesn’tlike, or fire people who produce the “wrong” results. Onecan surround oneself with pseudo-experts who only saywhat one wants to hear. Science can be detrimentally andcatastrophically politicized. Yet, there is no standard forhow much evidence is enough to settle a scientific dispute.The only standard we have is that we should consider allthe available evidence. How much evidence we needbefore a claim is sufficiently well-supported to be scientific,to enter the canons of science, changes with the context. Toappeal to a non-existent universal standard of proof in

Page 392: Bullshit and Philosophy

science is bullshit.

Page 393: Bullshit and Philosophy

Combatting the Two Kinds of Bullshit

With the ever-increasing importance of scientific ortechnical expertise as a basis for policy-making, it’s notsurprising that we are increasingly confronted with theproblem of how to ensure quality in that advice. How do wemake sure we are hearing all the available evidence? Howdo we ensure that the debates occurring among expertsare not being distorted by political pressure to not saysome things, or to say others, because it pleases certainpowers? How do we know whom to trust?

Isolated-fact bullshit plays upon our inherent intellectuallimitations that keep us from being fully informed and up-to-date on all the important issues of our time. As long aspolitical operators want to win debates no matter the cost,this kind of bullshit will occur. Those who refuse toacknowledge fair criticism of their claims, that they areignoring key work, should be rejected as intellectuallydishonest. While we can exclude dishonest operators fromthe academic forum, the public forum must remain open toall. Fred Singer can continue to write commentaries restingon the isolated fact, and some newspapers will publishthem, spreading the bullshit. Only those who follow theparticular issue closely are likely to notice the spreading ofbullshit in these cases, bullshit that is borne of selective

Page 394: Bullshit and Philosophy

omission and emphasis. Even those who spread suchbullshit may not realize the nature of their claims, as theclaims often wear an apparent obviousness.

But universal standards bullshit can be permanentlyundermined once we recognize that there are no suchthings. We should be asking about the strength of evidenceand the risks of error for science-based policy, rather thanwaiting for something to become “scientific” or text-bookscience. With a more robust discussion on these terms,perhaps isolated-fact bullshit will lose some of its appeal aswell. When we get used to expert disagreement, andunderstand better its causes, settling a debate on the basisof one expert raising one isolated fact might be recognizedfor the naive approach it is. We can only hope this wouldreduce the bullshit in the end.

Page 395: Bullshit and Philosophy

15

Rhetoric Is Not Bullshit

DAVID J. TIETGE

I begin my discussion of the role of rhetoric in modernsociety with an aphorism: Rhetoric isn’t devious anduntrustworthy; those are features reserved for languageitself. This is a distinction, however, that is lost on the publicat large, whose perception of the word ‘rhetoric’ renders itsynonymous with ‘bullshit’.

Several years ago, I conducted an admittedlyunscientific, journalistic experiment for a course inrhetorical theory I was teaching at the time. Over the courseof three-and-one-half months (the length of a typicaluniversity semester), I encountered some 156 occasionsvia print, radio, and television where the term ‘rhetoric’occurred. Of these, only once did the user of the word seemto understand what rhetoric really was. In all otherinstances, the person employing the word used it only in themost unfavorable sense, for example, “John Kerry is

Page 396: Bullshit and Philosophy

attempting to use rhetoric to disguise his true agenda,” or“The rhetoric in the Senate was thick regarding theproposal of the new bill.”

The one case in which the user understood the meaningof ‘rhetoric’ was an interview of the comedian, GeorgeCarlin, conducted by Jon Stewart. Stewart had askedCarlin why his comedy routines so often centered onlanguage (a very good interview question, in my opinion), towhich Carlin responded that he was, in essence, arhetorician; it was his job to unpack the meaning behindwords, and this process often had comic results. He saidhe was a performer, and as such, a focus on language wasimperative to his success or failure. By reflecting on thispractice, he had also demonstrated that he was equallycognizant of the theoretical process that drove his craft.

The decline of rhetoric as a central humanistic disciplinein both public and academic circles has been one of thegreat intellectual tragedies of the last couple of centuries.The common perception of rhetoric as a mode of discourselacking substance, of being the epitome of emptyembellishment, is prevalent in popular and politicalrepresentations of it, as evidenced in its frequentappearance in phrases like “once one gets past therhetoric” or “all rhetoric aside.”176 In the twentieth century,the privileged status of rhetoric in the Trivium of the SevenLiberal Arts came to be regarded as ancient history, to besupplanted by “purer,” more material intellectual pursuits inthe sciences. Rhetoric, like its close disciplinary cousin,philosophy, has been relegated in the public mind to the

Page 397: Bullshit and Philosophy

ever-growing realm of “bullshit,” reflecting an error inunderstanding of what scholars do when they practicerhetoric, and even more profoundly, what they do when theyuse rhetoric as a tool for critically decoding discourse. Atthe same time, members within academe regularlychallenge modern rhetorical studies as too broad andinterdisciplinary—lacking the prestige of specialization.Academicians outside of rhetoric usually see rhetoric onlyas an archaic study of how to persuade through theinstructional lenses of Aristotle or Cicero. Taken together, itis surprising that the popular and the academic perceptionsof rhetoric have not managed to bury it altogether.

In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Rather thanfading quietly into the past as some academicanachronism like philology, rhetoric is fast becoming one ofthe more popular humanistic studies in many majorAmerican universities today. How can it be that, while thepublic at large claims to distrust rhetoric, and academicsoutside of fields like English or Communication see it onlyin reductionistic or archaic terms, rhetoric is thriving as afield of study, especially at the graduate level?177 Oneanswer may be that initiating students into the scholarly andprofessional activities that rhetoric enhances—just as theyare exposed to its breadth of scope—reveals to them howunfair and inaccurate these popular impressions are. Manycome to realize that rhetoric enables a command oflanguage, and that if one controls language, one has power—that is, they come to realize that “bullshit” is a marketable

Page 398: Bullshit and Philosophy

talent, and an understanding of rhetoric allows one to morecarefully cultivate one’s skills in this timeless human ability.

We live, it would appear, in something like a societalparadox. Rhetoric—taken to be expertise in “bullshit”—isethically suspect, yet we value it in practice. Judging fromthe salaries and prestige of lawyers, politicians, universitypresidents, and advertising executives, we value it quitehighly. One must wonder, then, why rhetoric has inheritedsuch a poor reputation. I will attempt to sort this out byexplaining the value of and use of rhetoric in popular cultureand society; and show that our own intellectual history andrhetorical activity supports a place for rhetoric in education,the professional world, and our daily lives. This two-pronged approach will help dispel a popular “truth-falsity”dichotomy, according to which we think of statements orbeliefs as either true or false, regardless of the complexityand gray areas that rhetoric shows us are always involved.

Page 399: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Problem (and Politics) of Rhetoric

This may seem to fall outside the purview of rhetoric as it istraditionally understood by most academics, what is knownas rhetorica utens. But the contemporary study of rhetoricis more than what most academics understand as theAristotelian “art of persuasion”; it is rhetorica docens, thetheoretical treatment of words used to discover howlanguage means among different agents, motives, culturaland social idiosyncrasies, and external events. While somemight argue that Aristotle was as philosophically interestedin the nature of language as he was in instructing how itcould best be used, his most influential work on the subject,On Rhetoric, is ultimately a “how-to” primer on the use ofrhetoric as a civic tool. He identifies many principles andconstructs many definitions, but there is no real effort toview rhetoric as anything but a practical mechanism foreffective speaking. Aristotle himself coined the distinctionbetween utens and docens, but he was far moreconcerned with the former.

Aristotle’s prejudice has survived him. We are mostlyignorant of rhetoric as a tool for communication, andentirely ignorant of it as a set of methods for textualanalysis. The most likely explanation for this cites the massmedia and the political pundits who carelessly toss around

Page 400: Bullshit and Philosophy

the word in only its most uncomplimentary form. The punditswho display their contempt for rhetoric may in fact be usingthe word ‘rhetoric’ in a rhetorical way. That is, they may wellunderstand that the public’s erroneous understanding of theword is occasion to use it to reinforce the associations thepublic already has for it. Rather than correct this error, it iseasier to perpetuate it, taking advantage of the fashionablepreference for “plain” language. In this regard politiciansare among the most adroit insofar as they criticize rhetoricwhile relying upon it heavily for their own advancement.Everyone else uses “mere rhetoric,” the pundit of themoment tells us, as if effective use and understanding oflanguage were something to “get beyond” or “overcome.”

For a good example of how one can both disdainrhetoric and utilize it for political gain, consider a statementby George W. Bush regarding Supreme Court nomineeSamuel Alito: “My hope of course is that the Senate bringdignity to the process and give this man a fair hearing andan up-or-down vote on the Senate floor.” 178 Bush, long aproponent of what he considers “plain speech,” wouldperhaps not recognize the rhetorical layers of thisstatement, but they exist. The first is his “hope” that theSenate will “bring dignity to the process,” the suggestionbeing that any attempt to extend debate (by filibuster, forinstance) would be undignified. The statement is odd for itimplies that democracy itself, which relies on opendiscussion of important decisions, is undignified. Such anunpatriotic sentiment cannot be what Bush intended hislisteners to hear, so we have to consider more layers to

Page 401: Bullshit and Philosophy

listeners to hear, so we have to consider more layers tofigure out what’s going on.

Bush also appeals to the notion of a “fair hearing.” Butthis is a subjective term, depending upon individual beliefsand tolerances. Edward Kennedy’s and Samuel Alito’sdefinitions of fair, for instance, surely differ considerablydepending on who may be getting the criticism at themoment. What about this “up-or-down vote”? It’s aninteresting requirement and is no doubt related to the issueof “fairness” as well as to the public image that helped bringBush two presidential elections. Bush is widely seen, thatis, as a man of few words—a man of action who does notwish to waste time sallying the pros and cons back andforth all day. Either vote with the confirmation or against it,the statement suggests, but do not, above all, be indecisiveor contemplative about it. For careful, thorough debate,after all, would effectively delay and possibly derail hisnomination. The real thrust of Bush’s statement, then, issomething more like the reading of it suggested by the fauxnewspaper, The Onion, which headlined “Bush UrgesSenate to Give Alito Fair, Quick, Unanimous Confirmation,”as if any outcome besides the one Bush hoped for wouldbe unfortunate and undignified.179

In this way, rhetorical scrutiny of language allows us tosee past the glittering generalities in language and get toan authentic meaning, both in regard to what is beinganalyzed and to the analyst in question. It should be clear,for example, that I do not like Bush and do not agree withhis politics. I assure you that I deliberately made no attempt

Page 402: Bullshit and Philosophy

to obscure this (much less with “mere rhetoric”), because Iwant to emphasize that subjectivity need not compromisethe integrity of the reading. Subjectivity is part of language,especially language that reflects beliefs and stronglyguarded convictions. All language reflects both personaland collective orientations—some are just more obviousthan others. In the case of science, the ethos of scientificobjectivity can, in fact, aid the rhetor in achieving thenecessary persuasion or identification, since people areless likely to question the integrity of a system of knowledgewith a reputation for objectivity. Yet even science, like everydiscursive instrument, relies on words that are impreciseand ambiguous.

Page 403: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Truth about Postmodernism

One issue that helps obscure the universality of rhetoric,and thus promotes the pejorative use of ‘rhetoric’, is thepopular tendency to oversimplify the “truth-lie” dichotomy. InThe Liar’s Tale: A History of Falsehood , Jeremy Campbellreminds us that the reductionistic binary that separates truthfrom falsity is not only in error, but also that the thoroughlyunclear and inconsistent distinction between the true andthe false has a long, rich cultural history.180 Those doingmuch of the speaking in our own era, however, assume thatthe dividing line between truth and untruth is clear and,more significantly, internalized by the average human.Truth, however, is an elusive concept. While we can citemany examples of truths (that the sky is blue today, that thespoon will fall if dropped, and so forth), these depend ondefinitions of the words used. The sky is blue because‘blue’ is the word we use to describe the hue that we havecollectively agreed is bluish. We may, however, disagreeabout what shade of blue the sky is. Is it powder blue?Blue-green? Royal Blue? Interpretive responses to externalrealities that rely on definition (and language generally)always complicate the true-false binary, especially when webegin to discuss the nature of abstractions involved in, say,religion or metaphysics. The truth of ‘God is good’ depends

Page 404: Bullshit and Philosophy

very heavily upon the speaker’s understanding of God andthe nature of goodness, both of which depend upon thespeaker’s conceptualization, which may be unique to him,his group, or his cultural environment, and thus neither clearnor truthful to other parties.

Is this rampant relativism? Some might think so, but it isperhaps more useful to suggest that the Absolute Truthsthat we usually embrace are unattainable because of thesecomplexities of language. Some cultures have seen thelinguistic limitations of specifying the Truth. Hinduism haslong recognized that language is incapable of revealingTruth; to utter the Truth, it holds, is simultaneously to make itno longer the Truth.

Note here the distinction between capital ‘T’ truth andlower-case ‘t’ truth. Lower-case truths are situational, evenpersonal. They often reflect more the state of mind of theagent making the utterance than the immutable nature ofthe truth. They are also temporally situated; what may betrue now may not be in the future. Truth in this sense ispredicated on both perception and stability, and,pragmatically speaking, such truths are tran-sitional and,often, relative. Capital ‘T’ Truths can be traced back at leastas far as Plato, and are immutable, pure, and incorruptible.They do not exist in our worldly realm, at least so far asPlato was concerned. This is why Plato was so scornful ofrhetoric: he felt that rhetoricians (in particular, the Sophists)were opportunists who taught people how to disguise theTruth with language and persuasion. Whereas Platoimagined a realm in which the worldly flaws and corruption

Page 405: Bullshit and Philosophy

of a physical existence were supplanted by perfect forms,the corporeal domain of human activity was saturated withlanguage, and therefore, could not be trusted to reveal Truthwith any certainty.

Contemporary, postmodern interest in truth and meaningturns the tables on Plato and studies meaning and truth inthis shifting, less certain domain of human activity.Campbell cites many thinkers from our philosophical pastwho helped inaugurate this development, but none is moreimportant than Friedrich Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, humanshave no “organ” for discerning Truth, but we do have anatural instinct for falsehood. “Truth,” as an abstractiontaken from the subjectivity of normal human activities, wasa manufactured fiction that we are not equipped to actuallyfind. On the other hand, a natural aptitude for falsehood isan important survival mechanism for many species. Humanbeings have simply cultivated it in innovative, sophisticated,ways. As the rhetorician George A. Kennedy has noted, “indaily life, many human speech acts are not consciouslyintentional; they are automatic reactions to situations,culturally (rather than genetically) imprinted in the brain orrising from the subconscious.”181 Our propensity forappropriate (if not truthful) responses to situations issomething nourished by an instinct to survive, interact,protect, and socialize. Civilization gives us as many newways to do this as there are situations that requireresponse.

This is why Nietzsche carefully distinguished Truth from abelief system that only professed to contain the Truth. Ken

Page 406: Bullshit and Philosophy

Gemes notes that Nietzsche co-ordinated the question ofTruth around the pragmatics of survival,182 an observationechoed by Kennedy, who provides examples of animalsthat deceive for self-preservation. Camouflage, forexample, can be seen in plants and animals. Many birdsimitate the calls of rival species to fool them to distractionand away from their nests or food sources. Deception, itseems, is common in nature. But Nietzsche took doctrinalTruth (note the “T”) to be one of the most insidiousdeceptions to occur in human culture, especially as it isarticulated in religions. It is not a basic lie that is beingpromulgated, but rather a lie masquerading as the Truthand, according to Nietzsche, performing certain functions.Truth, that is, is a ritualized fiction, a conditionmanufactured for institutions and the individuals who controlthem to maintain their power.

Page 407: Bullshit and Philosophy

Rhetoric and Bullshit

Truth, deception, control over others. This survey of rhetoricthus brings us close to the territory that Harry Frankfurtexplores in On Bullshit. For Frankfurt, however, bullshit haslittle to do with these complexities about truth and Truth thatrhetoric helps us identify. Indeed bullshit, for Frankfurt, haslittle do with truth at all, insofar as it requires an indifferenceto truth. Does this mean, then, that language that is notbullshit has settled the matter of truth and has access totruth (or Truth)? Does this lead us to a dichotomy betweentruth and bullshit that is similar to the dichotomy betweentruth and falsity that postmodernism criticizes? It may seemthat postmodernism has little place in Frankfurt’s view,insofar as he rejects “various forms of skepticism whichdeny that we have any reliable access to objective reality,and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing howthings truly are” (p. 64). Indeed, postmodernism is oftenvilified as the poster child of relativism and skepticism.

Yet postmodernism is far subtler than a mere denial of“objective reality.” Postmodernism claims, rather, thatreality is as much a construct of language as it is objectiveand unchanging. Postmodernism is less about rejectingbeliefs about objective reality than about the intersectionbetween material reality and the human interpretations of it

Page 408: Bullshit and Philosophy

that change, mutate, and shift that reality to our ownpurposes—the kind of small-t truths that Nietzscheaddressed. The common complaint about post-modernism,for example, that it denies “natural laws,” forgets thathumans noticed and formulated those laws.Postmodernism attempts to supply a vocabulary todescribe this kind of process. It is not just “jargon,” as is sooften charged; it is an effort to construct a metalinguisticlexicon for dealing with some very difficult and importantepistemological questions.

And, not surprisingly, so is rhetoric. Constructinglanguage that deals with the nature of language is a uniquehuman problem. It is meta-cognition at its mostcomplicated because it requires us to use the sameapparatus to decode human texts that is contained in thetexts themselves—that is, using words to talk about words,what Kenneth Burke referred to in The Rhetoric of Religionas “logology.”183 In no other area of human thinking is thisreally the case. Most forms of intellectual exploration involvean extraneous phenomenon, event, agent, or object thatrequires us to bring language to bear upon it in order toobserve, describe, classify, and draw conclusions about itsnature, its behavior, or its effect. For example, scientificinquiry usually involves an event or a process in the materialworld that is separate from the instruments we use todescribe it. Historical analysis deals with texts as a matterof disciplinary course, yet most historians rarely questionthe efficacy or the reliability of the language used to conveyan event of the remote (or, for that matter, recent) past.

Page 409: Bullshit and Philosophy

an event of the remote (or, for that matter, recent) past.Even linguistics, which uses a scientific model to describelanguage structure, deals little with meaning or textualanalysis.

Law is one of the closest cousins of rhetoric. Words arevery much a part of the ebb and flow of legal wrangling, andthe attention given to meaning and interpretation is central.Yet, even here, there is little theoretical discussion abouthow words have meaning or how, based on such theory,that meaning can be variously interpreted. Law is moreconcerned with the fact that words can be interpreteddifferently and how different agents might interpretlanguage in different ways. This is why legal documents areoften so unreadable; in an attempt to control ambiguity,more words (and more words with specific, technicalmeanings) must be used so that multiple interpretationscan be avoided. If theoretical discussions about howlanguage generates meaning were entered into theequation, the law would be impossible to apply in anypractical way. Yet, to understand legal intricacies, every lawstudent should be exposed to rhetoric—not so they canbetter learn how to manipulate a jury or falsify an importantdocument, but so they understand how tenuous and limitedlanguage actually is for dealing with ordinary situations.Moreover, nearly every disciplinary area of inquiry useslanguage, but only rhetoric (and its associated disciplines,especially philosophy of language and literary /culturalcriticism, which have influenced the development of modernrhetoric considerably) analyzes language using a

Page 410: Bullshit and Philosophy

hermeneutical instrument designed to penetrate the wordsto examine their effects—desired or not—on the peoplewho use them.

What, then, qualifies as “bullshit”? Certainly, as I hope Ihave shown, rhetoric and bullshit are hardly the same thing.They are not even distant cousins. When a student begins apaper with the sentence, “In today’s society, there are manythings that people have different and similar opinionsabout,” it’s a pretty good guess that there is little ofrhetorical value there. About the only conclusion a readercan draw is that the student is neither inspired nor able tohide this fact. This is the extent of the subtext, and it couldconceivably qualify as bullshit. In this sense, Frankfurt’scharacterization of bullshit as “unavoidable whenevercircumstances require someone to talk without knowingwhat he is talking about” (p. 63) is a useful differentiation.

But aside from these rather artificial instances, if bullshitdoes occur at the rate Frankfurt suggests, we have anarduous task in separating the bullshit from moreinteresting and worthy rhetorical situations. We have all metpeople whom we know, almost from the moment ofacquaintance, are full of bullshit. It is the salesmansyndrome that some people just (naturally, it seems)possess. In one sense, then, poor rhetoric—a rhetoric oftransparency or obviousness—can be construed asbullshit. For the person with salesman syndrome is certainlyattempting to achieve identification with his audience; hemay even be attempting to persuade others that he isupright or trustworthy. But he fails because his bullshit is

Page 411: Bullshit and Philosophy

apparent. He is a bad rhetorician in the sense that he failsto convince others that he should be taken seriously, thathis words are worthy of attention and, possibly, action.

Bullshit is something we can all recognize. Rhetoric isnot. My remedy for this situation is simple: learn rhetoric.While students are required to take first-year compositionat most colleges and universities, the extent of their trainingin rhetoric is usually limited to the rhetorical “modes”—yetanother curricular misnomer which forces students to writepreordained themes that reflect “skills” like definition,comparison and contrast, process analysis, andnarrative.184 This is a far cry from teaching the extent ofrhetorical analysis. At best, this method creates an artificialenvironment in which to generate predetermined papersand ideas. At worst, it perpetuates the illusion that this ishow real writers really write. A better approach is to offerhypothetical situations that require a rhetorical response(for example, ask students to imagine that they are theprincipal of a high school with low test scores and arerequired to explain the problem to the parents). Havingstudents read model essays and deconstruct, edit, critique,or imitate these essays is also good. Yet another approachis to have students watch for occurrences of interestingrhetorical situations—to produce a “commonplace book” ofrhetoric. No matter how students learn to think about thelanguage they use and the language that dominates theirlives, as long as they are thinking about language, theyhave a better chance of not falling victim to bullshit. In thisage of the Internet, this is an important skill. However, since

Page 412: Bullshit and Philosophy

not everyone is a teacher or a student, the common citizenmust be diligent on her own.

If the trend in graduate humanities programs favoringrhetoric is any indication, interest in a theoreticalknowledge of language is on the rise. Likewise, sinceFrankfurt has opened the door for considering an issue thatwe can only conclude by its sheer popularity has somecultural currency in American society, we can also concludethat people have some genuine interest in the topic oflanguage. His is not the last word on the subject, however.Nor is it the first. Thinkers have been discussing and writingabout bullshit for millennia, and the service that Frankfurthas supplied is an opportunity for the general public to thinkabout bullshit on more than just a casual, colloquial level.However, it is equally important to bring rhetoric to thetable, if only because there is a remarkably vast gray areabetween what passes for Truth, truth, and what can bedismissed as bullshit, and this is the domain in whichrhetoric thrives. Without some ability to navigate this area,without some understanding of how language works, wecan only hope to avoid the pitfalls of bullshit by sheerchance.

Page 413: Bullshit and Philosophy

16

Just Bullshit

STEVE FULLER

On Bullshit is the latest contribution to a long,distinguished, yet deeply problematic line of Westernthought that has attempted to redeem the idea ofintellectual integrity from the cynic’s suspicion that it isnothing but high-minded, self-serving prejudice.185 To theircredit, some of history’s great bullshit detectors—thoughnot Harry Frankfurt nor his role model Ludwig Wittgenstein—have pled guilty as charged without hesitation. FriedrichNietzsche and his great American admirer, the journalistH.L. Mencken, who coined the euphemism “bunk,” come tomind. It helped that they were also cynics. They never heldback from passing moral judgment on those theydebunked. Moreover, both even tried to explain theadaptive advantage of specific forms of bullshit: Bullshittersmay be craven but they are not stupid. Jews, Christians,and Muslims—or, more precisely, their clerics—may lack

Page 414: Bullshit and Philosophy

any definitive proof of a transcendent deity, but the sheerpossibility of its existence does wonders to focus the mindand discipline the body in often politically effective ways.

Nietzsche’s and Mencken’s multifarious pronouncementsinvited others to judge them: Does either the mentallyunstable Nietzsche or the hard-drinking Mencken inspireconfidence in our ability to live in a bullshit-free world? Moregenerally, does the dogged pursuit of bullshit refine orcoarsen one’s sense of humanity or, for that matter, raise orlower one’s likelihood of recognizing the truth if confrontedwith it? For everyone who saw Nietzsche and Mencken asexposing false prophets, there were others who viewedthem as the ultimate Doubting Thomases. If bullshit is tooeasily found, and found to run too deep, the bullshitdetector’s own judgment is reasonably called into question.Henrik Ibsen’s classic dramas, The Wild Duck and HeddaGabler, explored this prospect in terms of the need for a“life lie.” For their part, both Nietzsche and Mencken havebeen dubbed “nihilists” by their detractors, who reverse theharsh light of truth to reveal the bullshit detector as a self-appointed absolutist who happens to take an unhealthyinterest in people whose minds he is incapable of eitherrespecting or changing. Scratch a nihilist, and you get adogmatist in exile.

The bullshit detector aims to convert an epistemicattitude into a moral virtue: Reality can be known only by theright sort of person. This idea, while meeting withwidespread approval by philosophers strongly tied to theclassical tradition of Plato and Aristotle, is not lacking in

Page 415: Bullshit and Philosophy

dissenters. The line of dissent is best seen in the history of“rhetoric,” a word Plato coined to demonize Socrates’sdialectical opponents, the Sophists. The Sophists wereprepared to teach anyone the art of winning arguments,provided you could pay the going rate. As a series ofsophistic interlocutors tried to make clear to Socrates,possession of the skills required to secure the belief of youraudience is the only knowledge you really need to have.Socrates famously attacked this claim on several fronts,which the subsequent history of philosophy has oftenconflated. In particular, Socrates’s doubts about thereliability of the Sophists’ techniques have been runtogether with a more fundamental criticism: Even grantingthe Sophists their skills, they are based on a knowledge ofhuman gullibility, not of reality itself.

Bullshit is sophistry under this charitable reading, whichacknowledges that the truth may not be strong enough byitself to counteract an artfully presented claim that is not somuch outright false as, in the British idiom, “economicalwith the truth.” In stressing the difference between bullshitand lies, Frankfurt clearly has this conception in mind,though he does sophistry a disservice by casting thebullshitter’s attitude toward the truth as “indifference.” Onthe contrary, the accomplished bullshitter must be a keenstudent of what people tend to regard as true, if only tocater to those tendencies so as to serve her own ends.What likely offends Frankfurt and other philosophers here isthe idea that the truth is just one more tool to bemanipulated for personal advantage. Conceptual

Page 416: Bullshit and Philosophy

frameworks are simply entertained and then discarded astheir utility passes. The nature of the offense, I suspect, isthe divine eye-view implicated in such an attitude—the veryidea that one could treat in a detached fashion the terms inwhich people normally negotiate their relationship to reality.A bullshitter revealed becomes a god unmade.

The theological overtones are deliberate. In the hierarchyof Christian sins, bullshit’s closest kin is hypocrisy, theofficial target of Nietzsche’s and Mencken’s ire. However,as Max Weber famously observed with regard to the rise ofcapitalism, Christians were not uniform in theircondemnation of hypocrisy. Some treated it more as anunfortunate by-product in the efficient pursuit of ends.Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography developed this positionwith striking explicitness.186 Indeed, Franklin modeled hisunderstanding of “economical with the truth” on theeconomy one might exercise in the use of any valuableresource. A lesson he claimed to have learned in life is thatone’s truthfulness should always be proportional to thedemands of the speech situation. It’s always possible tosay either too much or too little, speaking truthfully in eachcase, yet end up appearing as incompetent or dishonest.Such verbal misfirings benefit no one, though it may haveserved to represent some abstract sense of “truth.”

Franklin’s advice is often read as a counsel of cynicism,but it marked a crucial transition in the conception of thehuman mind from a passive receptacle to a creativeagency. Like many of the US founding fathers, Franklin’s

Page 417: Bullshit and Philosophy

Christianity veered toward Unitarianism, according to whichthe person of Jesus signifies that the human and the divineintellects differ in degree not kind. Just as the Biblical Godcommunicated with humans on a “need-to-know” basiswithout total revelation, in part to stimulate our own God-likepowers as free agents, so too should be the ethic thatgoverns secular human communication. The result is thatwe elicit from each other our own creative potential. Thesuccess of this injunction can be measured by advertising’scolonization of corporate budgets in modern times: Whatsells is ultimately not intrinsic to the product but one’s ideaof the product, which advertising invites the consumer toform for herself.

Whatever one makes of Franklin’s theology, it’s clear thatbullshitters qua hypocrites are rough cognitive equals ofliars and truth-tellers, not people who lack a specificcompetence that, were they to possess it, would inhibit theirpropensity to bullshit. I stress this point because bullshitdetectors gain considerable rhetorical mileage by blurringthe epistemic and ethical dimensions of the phenomenonthey wish to root out. Often this involves postulating apsychologically elusive state of integrity. To be sure, inthese democratic times, bullshit detectors are rarely soovert as to declare that bullshitters lack “good character,”which might suggest something objectionable, let aloneunprovable, about the bullshitters’ upbringing or evengenetic makeup.187

But the same impression can be conjured by other

Page 418: Bullshit and Philosophy

means. For example, ten years ago, Alan Sokal notoriouslyargued that French literary philosophers and their Americanadmirers would not have so easily inferred postmodernconclusions from cutting-edge mathematical physics hadthey been scientifically literate: If you knew more, or werebetter trained, you would behave better.188 But notice what“behave better” means: It is not that the Francophilephilosophers should have derived anti-postmodernconclusions from cutting-edge science. Rather, accordingto Sokal, they should have refrained from drawing anyconclusions whatsoever, since the science does not speakdirectly to the wider cultural issues that interest theFrancophile philosophers. (This position is harder tomaintain with a straight face when such great scientists asBohr and Heisenberg seem to have crossed the linethemselves.)

Thus, while it is convenient to focus on the lightly veiledincompetence of bullshitters, bullshit detectors areultimately disturbed by what they take to be the lack of self-discipline revealed by the bullshitter’s verbal camouflage.When venturing into terrain yet to be colonized by arecognized expertise, where “true” and “false” are notclearly signposted, bullshitters assert authoritatively ratherthan remain silent. What accounts for this difference inattitude? A distinction borrowed from Kant andconventionally used to understand the history of earlymodern philosophy comes to mind: Bullshitters and bullshitdetectors examine the same uncertain knowledge situation

Page 419: Bullshit and Philosophy

from, respectively, a rationalist and an empiricistperspective. Bullshitters see the resolution of uncertainty interms of selecting one from a number of alreadyimaginable alternatives, whereas bullshit detectors seeksome externally caused experience—a.k.a. evidence—todetermine where lies the truth. I shall argue that thescientific method is largely a “dialectical synthesis” of thesetwo attitudes, by which I mean that each cancels out theexcesses of the other to produce a more powerful form ofknowledge than either could provide alone.

Page 420: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit as a Call to Open-Mindedness

Bullshit detectors take comfort in the fact that the timerequired to master a body of knowledge virtuallyguarantees the initiate’s loyalty to its correspondingpractices and central dogmas. Moreover, the overarchingdiscipline may have been crafted over the years to renderas difficult as possible the contrary “truth” a bullshitter mightwish to advance. In Thomas Kuhn’s hands, this tendencywas enshrined as “normal science.” According to Kuhn, aradical alternative to the scientific orthodoxy must await theself-destruction of the dominant paradigm, which may takea very long time, as ill-defined conceptual objections (a.k.a.bullshit) struggle against the paradigm’s made-to-orderempirical successes. Equally, the self-transformation frompotential critic to compliant subject is a matter of reducingwhat social psychologists call “cognitive dissonance”: Howcould all that scientific training effort have been in vain,especially once it has resulted in a secure social identityand (perhaps less secure) means of employment? Themathematician Blaise Pascal’s famous wager is a verygeneral version of this line of thought: We should bet ourlives on God’s existence by adopting a Christian lifestylethat would then make us receptive to any signs of divinepresence, should they ever appear. As in science, so too in

Page 421: Bullshit and Philosophy

religion: Discovery favors the prepared mind.But what if it were made easier to assert and challenge

knowledge claims without having to undergo the personaltransformation required of, say, doctoral training? In theabsence of such institutionalized immunity to bullshit, theresult would be a Sophist’s paradise. Truth would bedecided on the day by whoever happens to have thestronger argument or survives some mutually agreed test.Never mind prior track records or prima facie plausibility:Show me here and now. The scientific method wasdeveloped largely in this frame of mind, one deeplydistrustful of all forms of authority, be it based on acanonical text or some canonical representation ofcollective experience. This distrust fed on the frequentlyobserved failure of authoritative statements to accord withwhat one’s spontaneously thinks, feels, or experiences.

The signature moment in the Western tradition for thissentiment, which made the hearer’s conscience—and notthe speaker’s sincerity—the final court of appeal, was theguilt that Martin Luther continued to feel even after havingbeen exonerated of sin in the Catholic sacrament ofPenance. This provoked a more wide-ranging questioningof Catholicism’s royal road of ritual to divine salvation. Theresult was Protestantism’s greater tolerance for bullshit,with the understanding that everyone skates on thin ice inthis life. The phrase “playing it by ear” captures well theinevitably improvisational character of attending toconscience as a guide to truth. In the end, there is only onebullshit detector: God. Accept no substitutes.

Page 422: Bullshit and Philosophy

The bullshit detector believes not only that there is a truthbut also that her own access to it is sufficiently reliable andgeneral to serve as a standard by which others may be heldaccountable. Protestants appeared prepared to accept theformer but not the latter condition, which is why dissenterswere encouraged—or perhaps ostracized—to establishtheir own ministries. The Sophists appeared to deny theformer and possibly the latter condition as well. BothProtestants and Sophists are prime candidates for thespread of bullshit because they concede that we maynormally address reality in terms it does not recognize—orat least does not require it to yield straight “yes-or-no,”“true-or-false” answers. In that case, we must make up thedifference between the obliqueness of our inquiries and theobtuseness of reality’s responses. That “difference” is fairlyseen as bullshit. When crystallized as a philosophy of mindor philosophy of language, this attitude is known asantirealism. Its opposite number, the backgroundphilosophy of bullshit detectors, is realism.

The difference in the spirit of the two philosophies iscaptured as follows: Do you believe that everything you sayand hear is bullshit unless you have some way of showingwhether it is true or false; or rather, that everything said andheard is simply true or false, unless it is revealed to bebullshit? The former is the antirealist, the latter the realist,response. Seen in those terms, we might say that theantirealist regards reality as inherently risky and alwaysunder construction (Caveat credor!189), whereas the realist

Page 423: Bullshit and Philosophy

treats reality as, on the whole, stable and orderly—exceptfor the reprobates who try to circumvent the system byproducing bullshit. In this respect, On Bullshit may beusefully read as an ad hominem attack on antirealists.Frankfurt himself makes passing reference to thisinterpretation near the end of the essay (pp. 64–65). Yet, heappears happy to promote the vulgar image of antirealismas intellectually, and perhaps morally, slipshod, instead oftreating it as the philosophically honorable position that it is.

A case in point is Frankfurt’s presentation ofWittgenstein as one of history’s great bullshit detectors (pp.24–34). He offers a telling anecdote in which the Viennesephilosopher objects to Fania Pascal’s self-description asfeeling like a dog that has been run over. Wittgensteinreportedly told Pascal that she misused language bycapitalizing on the hearer’s easy conflation of a literalfalsehood with a genuine condition, which is made possibleby the hearer’s default anthropocentric bias. Wittgenstein’sobjection boils down to claiming that, outside clearlymarked poetic contexts, our intellectual end never sufficesalone to justify our linguistic means. Frankfurt treats thispoint as a timeless truth about how language structuresreality. Yet, it would be quite easy, especially recalling thatthis “truth” was uttered seventy years ago, to conclude thatWittgenstein’s irritation betrays a spectacular lack ofimagination in the guise of scrupulousness.

Wittgenstein’s harsh judgment presupposes that humanslack any real access to canine psychology, which rendersany appeal to dogs purely fanciful. For him, this lack of

Page 424: Bullshit and Philosophy

access is an established fact inscribed in a literal use oflanguage, not an open question answers to which afigurative use of language might offer clues for furtherinvestigation. Nevertheless, scientists informed by the Neo-Darwinian synthesis—which was being forged just at thetime of Wittgenstein’s pronouncement—have quitearguably narrowed the gap between the mental lives ofhumans and animals in research associated with“evolutionary psychology.” As this research makes moreheadway, what Wittgenstein confidently declared to bebullshit in his day may tomorrow appear as having been aprescient truth. But anyone holding such a fluid view ofverifiability would derive scant comfort from eitherWittgenstein or Frankfurt, who act as if English linguisticintuitions, circa 1935, should count indefinitely asdemonstrable truths.

Page 425: Bullshit and Philosophy

Wittgenstein: Ultimate Bullshit Detector—or Bullshitter?

Some philosophers given to bullshit detection are so usedto treating any Wittgensteinian utterance as a profunditythat it never occurs to them that Wittgenstein may havebeen himself a grandmaster of bullshit. The great bullshitdetectors whom I originally invoked, Nietzsche andMencken, made themselves vulnerable to critics byspeaking from their own self-authorizing standpoint, whichsupposedly afforded a clear vista for distinguishing bullshitfrom its opposite. In contrast, Wittgenstein adopts theclassic bullshitter’s technique of ventriloquism, speakingthrough the authority of someone or something else in orderto be spared the full brunt of criticism.

I use “adopts” advisedly, since the deliberateness ofWittgenstein’s rhetoric remains unclear. What was he tryingto do: To speak modestly without ever having quitecontrolled his spontaneously haughty manner, or toexercise his self-regarding superiority as gently as possibleso as not to frighten the benighted? Either way,Wittgenstein became—for a certain kind of philosopher—the standard-bearer of linguistic rectitude, where“language” is treated as a proxy for reality itself.

To the bullshitter, this description also fits someone

Page 426: Bullshit and Philosophy

whose strong personality cowed the impressionable intodistrusting their own thought processes. As with mostsuccessful bullshit, the trick is revealed only after it has hadthe desired effect and the frame of reference has changed.Thus, Wittgenstein’s precious concern about Pascal’saccount of her state of health should strike, at least somereaders today, as akin to a priest’s fretting over aparishioner’s confession of impure thoughts. In each case,the latter is struck by something that lies outside the box inwhich the former continues to think.

If Wittgenstein was a bullshitter, how did he manage totake in professed enemies of bullshit like Frankfurt? Oneclue is that most bullshit is forward-looking, andWittgenstein’s wasn’t. The bullshitter normally refers tothings whose prima facie plausibility immunizes the heareragainst checking their actual validity. The implication is thatproof is simply “out there” waiting be found. But is therereally such proof? Here the bullshitter is in a race againsttime. A sufficient delay in checking sources has salvagedthe competence and even promoted the prescience ofmany bullshitters. Such was the spirit of Paul Feyerabend’snotorious account of Galileo’s “discoveries,” whichconcluded that his Papal Inquisitors were originally justifiedin their skepticism, even though Galileo’s followerssubsequently redeemed his epistemic promissorynotes.190

In contrast, Wittgenstein’s unique brand of bullshit wasbackward-looking, always reminding hearers and readers

Page 427: Bullshit and Philosophy

of something they should already know but have perhapstemporarily forgotten. Since Wittgenstein usually confrontedhis interlocutors with mundane examples, it was relativelyeasy to convey this impression. The trick lay in immediatelyshifting context from the case at hand to what Oxfordphilosophers in the 1950s called a “paradigm case” thatwas presented as a self-evident standard of usage againstwhich to judge the case at hand. That Wittgenstein, a non-native speaker of English, impressed one or twogenerations of Britain’s philosophical elite with just thismode of argumentation remains the envy of the aspiringbullshitter. Ernest Gellner, another émigré from the oldAustro-Hungarian Empire, ended up ostracized from theBritish philosophical establishment for offering a cuttingdiagnosis of this phenomenon as it was unfolding. Hesuggested that Wittgenstein’s success testified to hisability to feed off British class anxiety, which was mostclearly marked in language use.191

Yet, after nearly a half-century, Gellner’s diagnosis isresisted, despite the palpable weakening of Wittgenstein’sposthumous grip on the philosophical imagination. Onereason is that so many living philosophers still ride onWittgenstein’s authority—if not his mannerisms—that todeclare him a bullshitter would amount to career suicide.But a second reason is also operative, one that functionsas an insurance policy against future debunkers.Wittgenstein is often portrayed, by himself and others, asmentally unbalanced. You might think that this would renderhis philosophical deliverances unreliable. On the contrary,

Page 428: Bullshit and Philosophy

Wittgenstein’s erratic disposition is offered as evidence forhis spontaneously guileless nature—quite unlike thecontrolled and calculated character of bullshitters. Bullshitfails to stick to Wittgenstein because he is regarded as anidiot savant. In contrast, bullshit detectors aim their fire atthose capable of making a strategic distinction in their ownminds between the current state of evidence and the stateof belief in which they would like to leave their interlocutors.We have seen this mentality before. It is best called by itsclassical name: “hypocrisy,” a word that derives from themasks actors wore in Greek dramas.

Page 429: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bullshit as Deferred EpistemicGratification

The bullshitter is the consummate hypocrite. This soundsdamning if you imagine that on the masked side of thehypocrite’s mental divide is a clear sense of where theweight of evidence lies. But if you imagine instead thatbehind the hypocrite’s mask lurks deep uncertainty aboutthe truth, then the outward image is a defiant, thoughpossibly doomed, gesture to inject some order into anotherwise chaotic world. At this point, some readers mightquery the wisdom of portraying bullshitters as heroicExistentialists, bluffing their way out of the abyss. After all,on most matters, don’t we usually have a reasonably clearsense of which way the evidence points? If so, the onlyrelevant decision is whether to admit, deny, or spin whatone believes. However, as might be expected, thebullshitter’s take on evidence is not so straightforward. It isinfluenced by the sophistic principle that to control themoment of decision is to control its outcome. The first lineof sophistry, then, is to call the question when the balanceof arguments is to one’s advantage. But provided sufficienttime, resources, and wit, the truth of any proposition couldbe demonstrated—or so the sophists presumed. Theproblem is that we are rarely afforded these luxuries, and

Page 430: Bullshit and Philosophy

so there is a strong temptation simply to declare for whatstrikes us now as most evident.

Bullshitters stress the impressionistic character of thisdecision, since contrary to promiscuous appeals to“reliability” in both philosophical and public discourse, weare usually in no position to assess the actual track recordsof those who would lay claim to our beliefs. We might beable to access a partial record or, more likely, recall ourpersonal experience, as colored by the vagaries ofmemory. Perhaps this is why epistemol-ogists haveincreasingly leaned on the quasi-moral concept of “trust,”and affiliated theological notions of “witness” and“testimony,” to make up the difference between our genuinestrength of feeling toward a proposition and the actualpaucity of our evidence in its favor.192 Under the benigninterpretation of the Scottish cleric Thomas Reid, the sparkof the divine in the human (a.k.a. common sense) ensuresthat, in the main, humans are reliable sources ofinformation. But under the more malign reading of thosetouched by the more heretical Kierkegaard, the prevalenceof such concepts simply betrays our cowardice, as wedelegate to others responsibility for beliefs we should takepersonally, admitting error when shown wrong butotherwise accepting modest credit for having expressedthem.193 In either case, by papering over the gap betweenevidence and belief, reliability would appear to be a bullshitconcept—a problem, of course, only for those like Frankfurtkeen on eliminating bullshit.

Page 431: Bullshit and Philosophy

It is possible to detect the bullshit in the bullshit detectorsby setting up an analogy between the epistemic economyof evidence and the moral economy of sensation.Evidence for what is true and false is typically described inthe same terms of “compelling experience” as sensationsof pleasure and pain. But why should we be so easilymoved by evidence in spheres of knowing, when mostphilosophers would not have us automatically succumb tosensation in spheres of acting? For example, Utilitarianism,the modern ethical theory most closely tied to a moraleconomy of sensations, explains welfare in terms of thedeferment of immediate gratification in favor of a moresubstantial good projected in the long term. Thus, theredistribution of income afforded by taxation insuresagainst our tendency to discount the value of our futureselves or, for that matter, future generations. Similarly, thebullshitter’s imperviousness to the current weighting of theevidence may be understood as an attempt to forgo theopportunity costs associated with discounting what mightturn out to be, in the fullness of time, a more promising lineof inquiry. Analogous to taxation here would be an“affirmative action” strategy that would handicap betterevidenced positions so as to give weaker ones a chance todevelop. As Franklin might put it, the virtue exemplified inboth the moral and the epistemic economies is prudence:the one saves for the future, whereas the other plays fortime.194

Page 432: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Scientific Method as a Search forthe Justice in Bullshit

The natural conclusion to draw from these considerationsso far is that bullshit abounds, not least among those keenon detecting and removing it. But must this be such a badthing? The success of Francis Bacon’s invention of thescientific method suggests that it might not be so bad, aslong as everyone admits upfront they are producing bullshit,and decisions about what is and is not bullshit are left to athird party. Bacon wrote as the top lawyer to England’sKing James I in the early seventeenth century, a period wenow describe as having been in great scientific andreligious ferment, though the difference between these twosources of unrest was not so clear at the time. Baconrealized as much. Radical religious thinkers often proposedand occasionally proved knowledge claims of generalscientific merit. Yet, they typically insisted that only thosesharing their religious commitments were fit to test andappreciate the validity of those claims. Bacon saw that thepublic interest was best served by devising a way to testthe validity of knowledge claims without having to acceptwhatever controversial metaphysical assumptions mighthave motivated the claimants. This procedure—thescientific method—was modeled on a trial, indeed, of the

Page 433: Bullshit and Philosophy

sort conducted in the inquisitorial legal systems ofContinental Europe, which Bacon admired.195

What distinguishes the inquisitorial from the accusatorialsystem traditionally favored in England is that the judge, asopposed to the plaintiff, frames the terms of the trial. Thistypically means that before a verdict is reached, the judgewill have conducted his own investigation of, say, whatcounts as normal conduct in the relevant sphere of life, inorder to determine whether the defendant is being held toan unreasonably high standard—or, equally, a reasonablestandard that few people actually meet. Thus, it is notsufficient for the plaintiff to prove her case on its merits. Inaddition, it must be clear that the defendant is not beingunfairly singled out for something that, for better or worse, isroutinely tolerated. After all, the defendant may be guilty ascharged but others are potentially guilty of much worse, inwhich case the judge must consider how—and whether—justice is served by making an example out of thedefendant.

A notorious recent example of how a shift from anaccusatorial to an inquisitorial perspective can significantlyaffect the disposition of a case is that of the politicalscientist Bjørn Lomborg, whose international best seller,The Skeptical Environmentalist, was brought before theDanish Research Council’s Committee on ScientificDishonesty by an entrepreneur in alternative energysources who held that Lomborg systematically distortedresearch findings in ways that undermined his business.

Page 434: Bullshit and Philosophy

(Lomborg’s basic message was that the future of the globalenvironment is not nearly as desperate as most ecologistsmake it out to be.) The plaintiff received major foreignsupport from, among others, Scientific American magazineand E.O. Wilson, founder of sociobiology and latter-daychampion of biodiversity. Lomborg was initially found guilty,but the verdict was overturned on appeal—indeed, the verypurpose of the Committee on Scientific Dishonesty wascalled into question—because it appeared that Lomborgwas unfairly targeted, given that in the field of environmentalstudies, the politicization of research is the norm not theexception. Lomborg was guilty of little more than havingextrapolated from the relevant statistical data a much moreoptimistic ecological forecast than usual. But all suchextrapolations are ultimately speculative and motivated toraise consciousness among research funders, policymakers, and the general public. In other words, no speciallegal action is necessary because these matters arealready fairly aired and debated, leaving audiences to drawtheir own conclusions.196

The history of the Lomborg case beautifully illustrateshow a legal proceeding can foster both the manufactureand removal of bullshit. The plaintiff held the defendantuniquely responsible for an event backed by the testimonyof impressive experts, while the defendant professed hisown purity of motive and questioned the politics of hisaccusers. Bullshit abounds here on both sides. In hisinquisitorial role, the judge (in this case, a panel) wasexpected to devise a test that would conclusively decide

Page 435: Bullshit and Philosophy

expected to devise a test that would conclusively decidebetween the two parties by virtue of incorporating theirshared assumptions and eliminating the ones they contest.Transferred to the scientific realm, this is what Bacon calleda “crucial experiment.” The great virtue of the crucialexperiment, as extolled by the various intellectualmovements that have traveled under the banner of“positivism,” is that it forces a clear distinction to be drawnbetween theory and method: A scientific society may bedivided by theories but it is united in method. But there isalso a political point about free expression close to theheart of democracy, what Karl Popper called the “opensociety”: Everyone can bullshit to their heart’s content, aslong as there is agreement on how to clean up after it.

I stress “free expression” because, as Franklin wouldhave been the first to observe, the relevant freedomincludes freedom to say what one believes needs to besaid, even if one does not quite believe it oneself. Somesignature moments of public intellectual life have beendefined in these terms. For example, when Émile Zolapublicly accused the French War Office of framing CaptainDreyfus (J’Accuse!), he had no more evidence than thecourt that convicted Dreyfus of treason. He simply readbetween the lines and took a chance that there was morethan met the eye. Zola turned out to be right, but it was onlyafter the confession of the perpetrators that he discoveredwhy. However, his pre-emptive declaration served tostimulate others to re-open the case, resulting in evidencethat corroborated Zola’s claims, all the while he was exiled

Page 436: Bullshit and Philosophy

in London. Zola’s fate was not so different from Galileo’s,whose house arrest after the Inquisition prompted naturalphilosophers across Europe to take up his hypotheses,which were finally vindicated in Newton’s PrincipiaMathematica.

However, Bacon’s vision has been realized onlyimperfectly. In particular, his idea that theory and methodshould always be distinguished in each case hasmetamorphosed into the idea they should be distinguishedthe same way in all cases. Thus, in the positivistimagination, the inquiring judge whose discretiondetermines how the distinction is anchored in each casecame to be replaced by a mechanical procedure that couldbe applied to all cases. To a large extent, this transition istraceable to the political failure of Bacon’s project. After all,Bacon envisaged a royally sanctioned science court,whereas the best a weakened English monarchy couldmanage after the Civil War was to charter a self-policingprivate body, the Royal Society of London, whose loyalty tothe Crown was demonstrated by its appeal to “method” toexclude potentially controversial matters from the outset.197

One feature of the original Baconian model that remainstoday has often proved a thorn in the side of the legalsystem: a liberal policy toward the admission of expertwitness testimony, much of which would be discounted ashearsay, if it came from the mouth of an ordinarywitness.198 This pro-bullshit policy, derided by some asproducing “junk science,” is in principle desirable, if only

Page 437: Bullshit and Philosophy

because even orthodox claims to reliable knowledge canrarely, if ever, be evidenced first hand. Such a policypositions the judge as an inquisitor empowered to set upan independent standard by which to detect bullshit in thecase at hand. However, if the judge sees herself as nomore than a referee between two adversaries, the typicalposition in Anglo-Saxon law, then the balance of argumentsas defined in the terms raised by the plaintiff is likely toprevail. Of course, this does not mean that the plaintiffautomatically wins her case, but if she happens torepresent the dominant viewpoint on the contested issue,that certainly increases her chances. Thus, Bacon’sintention may be undermined in practice.

In conclusion, consider a case in point: the string of UScourt cases concerning the disposition of evolution andcreation—and, more recently, Intelligent Design—in thehigh-school curriculum. A landmark ruling occurred in 1982,McLean v. Arkansas , in which the presiding judgeappealed to a philosophical definition of science, asprovided by Michael Ruse, to justify the exclusion ofcreationism from the science curriculum. This was the firsttime a judge did not simply defer to the weight of scientificexperts but, realizing that the nature of science itself was atissue in the case, tried to arrive at a standard that wasgenuinely neutral to the contesting parties. What mattershere is neither that the judge appealed to an oversimplifieddefinition of science, nor that his reasoning reinforced thegeneral pattern of court rulings against creationism. Rather,it is that he turned to a standard that even the creationists

Page 438: Bullshit and Philosophy

had to agree was reasonable. The judge managed to cutthrough the bullshit on both sides.

Unfortunately, his precedent has not stuck. In the recentcase, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, where Iserved as an expert witness, the judge’s ruling was basedlargely on a philosophically customized definition ofscience supplied by the plaintiffs with the blessing of theUS National Academy of Sciences. The definition was“customized” in that the operative doctrine, “methodologicalnaturalism,” while lacking a clear meaning withinphilosophy, was crafted specifically so as to excludeIntelligent Design theory and scientific creationism.199

While it is to be expected—and even encouraged—thatadversaries make arguments that put their case in the bestpossible light, justice is served by acknowledging thebullshit on both sides and cutting through it in an equitablefashion. This aspect of the Baconian legacy, where scienceand law meet, is all too rarely realized in cases where thetruth is deemed to rest witth the side whose bullshit is piledhigher and deeper.

Page 439: Bullshit and Philosophy

Our Distinguished Panel of IncomparableGeniuses

ANDREW ABERDEIN grew up in Liverpool, England, andearned a Ph.D. from the University of St. Andrews in Logicand Metaphysics. He has served as Lecturer in Philosophyat Edinburgh and is currently Assistant Professor of Logicand Humanities at Florida Institute of Technology. Hisexperience with bullshit dates to the day when, as a gulliblechild of about age five, he was taught in separate classesabout both dinosaurs and the Garden of Eden. Thecognitive dissonance propelled him into philosophy, andinto this volume.

SARA BERNAL is from Ithaca, New York. She has a B.A.from the University of Chicago and, by the time you readthis, a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Rutgers, the StateUniversity of New Jersey. She lives in St. Louis with herhusband, son, and cat, and teaches at St. Louis University.In her spare time she performs regularly as a moderndancer. Her most memorable early exposures to bullshitcoincided with early and frequent exposure to the work ofMel Brooks, whose stand-up philosopher Comicus (fromHistory of the World, Part I) inspired her. More recently shefinds herself fascinated by the way in which the exposure ofsome painful truth provokes people to spew extraordinarybullshit.

Page 440: Bullshit and Philosophy

G.A. COHEN was educated at McGill and OxfordUniversities where he obtained, respectively, the degreesof B.A. in Philosophy and Politics and B. Phil. in Philosophyin 1963. For twenty-two years he was a Lecturer and then aReader in Philosophy at University College, London. In1985 he became Chichele Professor of Social andPolitical Theory and a Fellow of All Souls, Oxford.Professor Cohen is the author of Karl Marx’s Theory ofHistory: A Defence (1978; expanded edition, 2000),History, Labour, and Freedom (1988), Self-Ownership,Freedom, and Equality (1995), and If You’re anEgalitarian, How come You’re So Rich? (2000). Cohenhas given lectures all over the world, including the TannerLectures at Stanford University in 1991 and the GiffordLectures at Edinburgh University in 1996. He was made aFellow of the British Academy in 1985. The bullshit that fora short while engulfed him, but from which he escaped, wasFrench bullshit, and in particular, the bullshit of Althusserand the Althusserians.

HEATHER DOUGLAS earned her Ph.D. in the History andPhilosophy of Science from the University of Pittsburgh in1998. She has since lived in Tacoma, as the PhibbsProfessor of Science and Ethics at the University of PugetSound, and in Knoxville, as Assistant Professor in theDepartment of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee.Her experience with bullshit began with intense discussions

Page 441: Bullshit and Philosophy

around the Douglas family dinner table. This early trainingin competitive discourse laid the foundations for an interestin both philosophy and bullshit. Being a “professional”philosopher these days, she keeps her sanity by discussingissues with her husband, Ted Richards, who is a greatbullshit detector, and by hanging out with her large dogs,who are terrible bullshitters, being stunningly honest andforthright creatures. She also likes to grow plants, which dovery well with large amounts of fertilizer.

MARK EVANS is currently Senior Lecturer in Politics,Department of Politics and International Relations,University of Wales, Swansea. He received his first degree(in Philosophy, Politics and Economics) from MansfieldCollege, Oxford, and his doctorate—which was on what hestill maintains to be a non-bullshitty concept of self-realization in political theory—from St. Antony’s College,Oxford. His ire against bullshit was first aroused in the mid-1980s when some of his student contemporaries, lookingforward to the wads of cash to be earned in business,started spouting management-bullshit speak. His decisionto stay in academia was bolstered by the hope that hewouldn’t have to put up with such stuff in his working life. Heis therefore mightily pissed off that it has now well and trulyinfected the running of universities, without it even beingtinged with the kind of ironic tone that would show that thepoor souls at the academic coal-face can’t possibly take itseriously.

Page 442: Bullshit and Philosophy

STEVE FULLER is Professor of Sociology at theUniversity of Warwick, England. He was first exposed tobullshit when he took courses in analytic philosophy as anundergraduate at Columbia University. There he ran acrosspeople who bluffly promoted the virtues of content-freeforms of reasoning. Over the years, he has come toappreciate the subtle virtues of this most rigorous form ofrhetoric, the bullshit that dares not speak its name: to wit,logic. He received his Ph.D. in the philosophy of sciencefrom the University of Pittsburgh, and through a career thathas extended over a dozen books on issues relating tosocial epistemology, he is nowadays associated withscience and technology studies, a field largely dedicated todemonstrating, if not celebrating, the bullshit behind whatpasses for authoritative knowledge in society these days.

GARY L. HARDCASTLE is Assistant Professor ofphilosophy at Bloomsburg University in centralPennsylvania, where he teaches philosophy of science,logic, and, if he is asked nicely, introduction to philosophy.His research interests include the philosophy of science,epistemology, and the history of American philosophy in thetwentieth century. He is the author of several articles inphilosophy of science and the co-editor, with AlanRichardson, of Logical Empiricism in North America(2003) and, with George Reisch, of Monty Python andPhilosophy (2005). Although he inhaled deeply the bullshit-rich culture and ethos of 1970s America, his most

Page 443: Bullshit and Philosophy

memorable encounter with bullshit is his father’spresentation of the teleological argument for God’sexistence as they drove together through the utterwasteland of Youngstown, Ohio, in 1978.

SCOTT KIMBROUGH, Associate Professor of philosophyat Jacksonville University, holds a Ph.D. in philosophy fromthe University of Pennsylvania and a B.A. in philosophyfrom Southwestern University. His experience growing up inTexas, among Texans who truly believe that their state issuperior and greet the presentation of contrary evidencewith an astonished blend of incredulity and contempt,convinced him that Frankfurt is wrong to deny that bullshitcan be produced unintentionally. His wife Tonia, aprofessional editor who frequently informs him of how badmost philosophical writing is, has kept him sensitive to whatFrankfurt calls “pretentious bullshit.”

HANS MAES received his PhD at the KatholiekeUniversiteit Leuven, Belgium, and is now affiliated with theUniversity of Kent, England, where he writes on issues inmoral theory and aesthetics. He is happily married toKatrien Schaubroeck—no bullshit.

Born in Caracas, Venezuela to an American mother and aCzech father with a Venezuelan passport, VANESSANEUMANN received her B.A. from Columbia University inEconomics and Philosophy. After stints in corporate

Page 444: Bullshit and Philosophy

finance and diplomacy, she returned to Columbia Universityfor her M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in moral political philosophyunder the tutelage of the John Rawls protégé, ThomasPogge. Dr. Neumann is currently Adjunct AssistantProfessor of political philosophy at Hunter College, CityUniversity of New York and sits on the advisory board of theInstitute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) at ColumbiaUniversity.

She also works with political think tanks, including theInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Preferringto spend her days mired in horseshit rather than bullshit, Dr.Neumann finds galloping across a field on horseback ahighly effective strategy for dealing with the stresses ofdaily life.

CONSUELO PRETI earned a PhD in philosophy from theGraduate Center at the City University of New York and isnow an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Collegeof New Jersey. Her interests run to the philosophy oflanguage and the philosophy of mind; she is the author ofOn Kripke and the co-author of On Fodor, both in theWadsworth Philosophers Series. She enjoys surfing, yoga,and English bull terriers, and when asked about her mostformative bullshit experiences she is too polite to mentionher first department meeting (and many subsequent ones).

GEORGE A. REISCH holds the title (for eight years now)in the All-Chicagoland Summarize Otto Neurath

Page 445: Bullshit and Philosophy

in the All-Chicagoland Summarize Otto NeurathCompetition. He received a Ph.D. from the Chicago Schoolof Communist Dance, where he created, produced, andperformed in “Fregenstein: Begriffsschrift and the Music ofABBA,” to wide accolades. He is also the author of manythings concerned with philosophy of science and its history,such as the book How the Cold War TransformedPhilosophy of Science (2005). At parties, he impersonatesGary Hardcastle impersonating Ludwig Wittgenstein (call800GoValidity for bookings). As for bullshit in popularculture, he thinks it all began with The Monkees.

ALAN RICHARDSON likes candlelit dinners, readingReichenbach to children at the public library, and longwalks on the beach in Vancouver, where he is Professor ofPhilosophy and Distinguished University Scholar in theDepartment of Philosophy at the University of BritishColumbia. He has a Ph.D. from the University of Illinois,Chicago Circle, and is the author, editor, and reader ofmany things with ‘logical empiricism’ in the title. He wroteCarnap’s Construction of the World (1997). Thisbiographical blurb is his most recent encounter with bullshit,although his earliest political memory is that of going to aNixon rally in Clifton Heights, Pennsylvania, in 1968,escorted by his father, who is, like his mother, a life-longRepublican.

KATRIEN SCHAUBROECK is assistant at the Center forLogic, Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Language

Page 446: Bullshit and Philosophy

at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven where she is writing adissertation on Harry Frankfurt and the debate on practicalreason. Her interests are in moral psychology, meta-ethics,and theories of practical reason.

KENNETH A. TAYLOR is Professor of Philosophy andChair of the Department of Philosophy at StanfordUniversity, where he thinks about questions at theintersection of the philosophy of language and thephilosophy of mind (with an occasional foray into the historyof philosophy). He is the author of many papers in thephilosophy of language and philosophy of mind, as well asMeaning and Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy ofLanguage (1998) and Reference and the Rational Mind(2003). With his colleague John Perry he hosts PhilosophyTalk (www.philosophytalk.org), a weekly, one-hour radioseries that brings the richness of philosophic thought toeveryday subjects.

DAVID J. TIETGE is Assistant Professor in English andAssociate Director of Writing at Monmouth University inWest Long Branch, New Jersey. He has a Ph.D. in Rhetoricfrom Southern Illinois University at Carbondale and an M.A.in English Literature from Indiana State University. Hisscholarly interests include rhetoric theory, literary theory andcriticism, rhetoric of science, and history and culturalstudies, and he is the author of Flash Effect: Science andthe Rhetorical Origins of Cold War America (2002). His

Page 447: Bullshit and Philosophy

seminal experience with bullshit occurred before his firstmemory.

CORNELIS DE WAAL studied Economics andPhilosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, TheNetherlands. He learned to detect bullshit in the trencheswhile working as an editor and journalist for a glossyengineering magazine in Amsterdam. In 1992 heemigrated to the U.S. to begin a Ph.D. in philosophy at theUniversity of Miami in Coral Gables. Currently he isAssociate Professor at Indiana University PurdueUniversity Indianapolis, where he also directs thephilosophy graduate program. He is one of the editors ofthe Writings of Charles S. Peirce, a thirty-volume scholarlyedition that is being published by Indiana University Press.He is the author of books on Peirce and pragmatism, whichhe happily typed with two fingers (K is his favorite letter),and he is a culinary adventurer who likes to eat raw fish andred ants.

Page 448: Bullshit and Philosophy

Our Index, Exquisitely Crafted for YourIllumination

Page 449: Bullshit and Philosophy

absolute Idealism

Absolute Truths, as unobtainable

academic bullshit

and decision-making process

in France

as selling us on significance

adaptive preference formation

ad hoc redefinition

advertising. See also bullshit: in advertising

blurring fact and fiction in

alchemy

Alito, Samuel

Althusserian Marxism

critique of

Page 450: Bullshit and Philosophy

analytic philosophy

as antidote to bullshit

Animal House (film)

animals, deception in

antirealism, philosophy of

apology, social role of

Aristotle

on definitions

On Rhetoric

Audi, Robert

Page 451: Bullshit and Philosophy

Bacon, Francis

Balling, Robert, Jr.

The True State of the Planet

banter

belief formation, and framing effects

The Black Eyed Peas (band)

Black, Max

Bloomsbury group

Bohr, Niels

Bright Eyes (band)

bull sessions

bullshit

academic

in advertising

Page 452: Bullshit and Philosophy

amused contempt of

attitudes toward

audience of

bad reasons in

as bad rhetoric

benign

and bluffing

and bullshitter, distinction between

and bureaucracy

calling of

and civility

clarifiable unclarity in

cloaking in

in competition

as condition of life

Page 453: Bullshit and Philosophy

and confirmation bias

conscious

and context, importance of

danger of

deceit in

definition of

activity-centered

in dictionary

output-centered

as degrading public discourse

and democracy

disdain of

as dissembling

and distorted social perceptions

Page 454: Bullshit and Philosophy

distraction in

and framing effects

full circle

as genre

as good thing

and the human mind

and hypocrisy

increased amount of

reasons for

as indirect

as in it for something

as intentional

intentionalist school

insight problem of

and intentional states

Page 455: Bullshit and Philosophy

intolerable

intrapersonal

as irretrievable speculation

of isolated fact

in jargon

in justifying Iraq invasion

lacuna in literature on

as language of power

and lies, difference between

as loose term

and lying, comparing

and manipulation

mechanism of

methodological view of

Page 456: Bullshit and Philosophy

misidentification of

negligent

nonverbal

ordinary

as over portentous

performative

and personality disorders

and philosophy

in philosophy

and poetry, distinguishing

and politeness

in political speech

as appealing to base impulses

danger of

as degrading

Page 457: Bullshit and Philosophy

and moral language

power of

purposes of

pragmatics of

pretentiousness in

private

as product

professional

as pro forma

and Protestantism

and psychological processes

rationalization in

resisting

and rhetoric, as different

Page 458: Bullshit and Philosophy

rhetorical uses of

as rubbish

in science-policy interface

and self-deception

as selling us on significance

and semantics

and Sophists

as sophistry

specific structure of

and subjectivism

as statement/text

strategies in defining

structuralist school

structurally different types of

threat of, to good social relations

Page 459: Bullshit and Philosophy

toleration of, reasons for

as tool

and truth

attention to

awareness of

concern for

desire to obscure

in goal and tactic

indifference to

as irrelevant

not indifferent to

as ubiquitous

ulterior goals in

unconscious

Page 460: Bullshit and Philosophy

unintentional

and values

as unclarifiable unclarity

of universal standards

bullshit detector

bullshit in

as empiricist

as God

questioning judgment of

as self-authorizing

bullshit-free culture, dream of

bullshit genres, explosion of

bullshitter

as Existentialist

as hypocrite

Page 461: Bullshit and Philosophy

and liar

comparing

difference between

professional

as sophistic

tolerance of

types of

bullshitting

and brainstorming, difference between

culture of, factors leading to

and Enlightenment

first-order and second-order

and free-rider problem

functions of

Page 462: Bullshit and Philosophy

and genuine inquiry

difference between

lack of faith in

intentionalist school on

insight problem of

motives for

resisting, through genuine inquiry

social pressure for

structuralist school on

and truth, indifference to

bullshitting arts

bullshit world

resisting

stability of

Burgess-Jackson, Keith

Page 463: Bullshit and Philosophy

Burke, Kenneth

The Rhetoric of Religion

Bush administration

Bush, George W.

rhetoric in

Page 464: Bullshit and Philosophy

Campbell, Jeremy

The Liar’s Tale

Carlin, George

Carnap, Rudolf

on language, danger of

on meaning and meaninglessness

on metaphysics

Churchill, Winston

climate change debate, and bullshit of isolated fact

cognition, and social contracts

cognitive success, and culture

cognitive dissonance reduction

Cohen, G.A.

on academic bullshit

Page 465: Bullshit and Philosophy

on Althusserians

on bullshit

in advertising

as content

critique of his view

and intention

lying in

as product

as unclarifiable unclarity

and Carnap, parallel between

“Deeper into Bullshit”

and Frankfurt

differences between

unifying

Colbert, Stephen

Page 466: Bullshit and Philosophy

Collingwood, R.G.

confirmation bias

conversation, various purposes of

courtesy meaning

creationism, as sham reasoning

creation science

Crittenden, Guy

“crucial experiment”

cultural values, need to rethink

culture of bullshit, as socially corrosive

customer service guarantees, bullshit in

cynicism thesis, of democracy

Page 467: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Daily Show (TV show)

Das Nichts

definitions

backfiring of

degenerate

options for change in

persuasive

sense, reference, and tone in

as theoretical

democracy

and apoliticism

and cynicism

dumbing-up in

equal right and equal validity,

Page 468: Bullshit and Philosophy

confusion over

and ideal of well-informed citizen

improving quality of

and relativism

democratic skills, teaching of

Descartes, René

Meditations on First Philosophy

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM–IV)

dissociation, in definition

Dog Day Afternoon (film)

Dreyfus, Captain

Dworkin, Andrea

dysphemisms

Page 469: Bullshit and Philosophy

emotions

and beliefs

as intentional

and judgments

and values

Enlightenment

epistemic imperative

inquiry in

violations of

ethics, emotivist theory of

eudaimonia

euphemism

euphemism treadmill

backfire in

Page 470: Bullshit and Philosophy

evidence, and belief, gap between

Page 471: Bullshit and Philosophy

fake reasoning

as different from bullshit

fallibilism

Feyerabend, Paul

Flew, Antony

formal logic

Franken, Al

Frankfurt, Harry G.

on bull sessions

On Bullshit

as apropos

as attack on antirealists

on democracy

and the Enlightenment

Page 472: Bullshit and Philosophy

goal of

popularity of

reception of

on truth

on bullshit

and alchemy

in advertising

benign attitude toward

changing sense and reference of

complexity of studying

critique of his view

danger of

deceit in

and democracy

as enemy of truth

Page 473: Bullshit and Philosophy

essence of

of Fourth of July orator

as in it for something

as instrumental

as intentional

and lies/lying, difference between

in ordinary life

as phony

semantic and pragmatic aspects of

tolerance of

and truth, indifference to

and Cohen

differences between

unifying

Page 474: Bullshit and Philosophy

on The Daily Show

on deception, degrees of

in radio interview

Franklin, Benjamin

Autobiography

fraud, increase in

“free expression”

Frege, Gottlob

limits of, on natural language

on sense, reference, and tone

French Marxism

Freud, Sigmund

Frey, James

A Million Little Pieces

Page 475: Bullshit and Philosophy

Furedi, Frank

Page 476: Bullshit and Philosophy

Galilei, Galileo

Gellner, Ernst

Gemes, Ken

genuine inquiry

aim of

Glengarry Glen Ross (film)

global climate change, complexity of issue

Gödel, Escher, Bach

Goldie, Peter

Gough, Michael

Politicizing Science

Greer, Germaine

Page 477: Bullshit and Philosophy

Haack, Susan

Haass, Richard

Hegel, G.W.F.

Heidegger, Martin

What Is Metaphysics?

Heisenberg, Werner

horseshit

human mind

cognitive structure of

foibles of

humbug

Hume, David

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

A Treatise of Human Nature

Page 478: Bullshit and Philosophy

Hussein, Saddam

Huxley, Aldous

Eyeless in Gaza

Page 479: Bullshit and Philosophy

Ibsen, Henrik

Hedda Gabler

The Wild Duck

if-then reasoning, and framing effects

information cocoons

inquiry

definition of

as social activity

inquisitorial legal systems

inspirational stories, and truth

intellectual expertise, role of, in resisting bullshit

Intelligent Design (ID) movement

as bullshit

and concern for truth

Page 480: Bullshit and Philosophy

and creationism

as “getting away with something”

goals of

disguising

successive reinvention of

Iraq war, official reasons for

irony, impossibility of

Ishiguro, Kazuo

The Remains of the Day

Page 481: Bullshit and Philosophy

James I, King

Johnson, Philip

Darwin on Trial

on modernism

Jones, John E.

Page 482: Bullshit and Philosophy

Kant, Immanuel

Kennedy, Edward

Kennedy, George A.

Keynes, John Maynard

Kierkegaard, Søren

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District

Kuhn, Thomas

Page 483: Bullshit and Philosophy

Laden, Osama bin

Lakatos, Imre

language

pragmatic aspects of

semantics of

law, as cousin of rhetoric

Leary, Timothy

Leno, Jay

Leroy, J.T.

letters of reference, as bullshit genre

liars. See also bullshit: and lies

goal of

tactic of

Limbaugh, Rush

Page 484: Bullshit and Philosophy

Loman, Willy (character)

logical positivism

on metaphysics

on unity of science

Lomborg, Björn

The Skeptical Environmentalist

Luther, Martin

Page 485: Bullshit and Philosophy

MacKinnon, Catharine

Mamet, David

McCarthy, Joseph

McLean v. Arkansas

McLuhan, Marshall

Mele, Alfred

Self Deception Unmasked

Mencken, H.L.

method of common sense

Meyer, Stephen

Mill, John Stuart

Miller, Arthur

Miller, William Ian

on apology

Page 486: Bullshit and Philosophy

Faking It

on politeness

Moore, G.E.

Principia Ethica

Page 487: Bullshit and Philosophy

Nagel, Thomas

narrative, as structuring understanding

Newton, Isaac

Principia Mathematica

Nietzsche, Friedrich

Thus Spake Zarathustra

on Truth

Non-Bullshit Marxism Group

No-True-Scotsman Move

Nussbaum, Martha

Oberst, Conor

Olbrechts-Tyteca, Lucy

The Onion

“open society,”

Page 488: Bullshit and Philosophy

Orwell, George

Nineteen Eighty–Four

Page 489: Bullshit and Philosophy

Pacino, Al

Pascal, Blaise

Pascal, Fania

Peirce, C.S.

Penny, Laura

Your Call Is Important to Us: The Truth about Bullshit

Perelman, Chaim

performative bullshit

Perry, William

personality disorders

and bullshit

effect on social relations

distortion in

in DSM–IV

Page 490: Bullshit and Philosophy

maladaptiveness in

rigidity in

and self–distraction

types of

persuasive definition (PD)

backfiring of

and change of sense or reference

disguised argument in

and semantic negligence

and tone

persuasive quasi-definition (PQD)

changing tone in

philosophy

as anti-bullshit

and bullshit

Page 491: Bullshit and Philosophy

and bullshit

semantic studies in

philosophy of language

intension and extension in

sense, reference, and tone in

Pinker, Stephen

How the Mind Works

Plagiary (academic journal)

Plato

The Republic

on rhetoric

on Truth

politeness, role of

politicized science

and lack of universal standard of proof

Page 492: Bullshit and Philosophy

Popper, Karl Raimund

pornography

Model Law definition of

positivism

postmodernism

pragmatists, philosophical

on truth

Pratchett, Terry

product placement

professional bullshit

and pseudo-value

pseudoscience, as bullshit

pseudo-sentences

pseudo-statements

Page 493: Bullshit and Philosophy

public discourse, debasement of

Page 494: Bullshit and Philosophy

rape, changing definitions of

realism, philosophy of

redefinition, low and high

Reid, Thomas

reliability, as bullshit concept

republic of philosophia

rhetoric

as associated with bullshit

contemporary study of

as examining effects of language

learning

as metalinguistic

as misunderstood discipline

rhetorica docens

Page 495: Bullshit and Philosophy

rhetorica utens

Rich, Frank

risk aversion

Rorty, Richard

Ruse, Michael

Russell, Bertrand

Page 496: Bullshit and Philosophy

Schiappa, Edward

Schudson, Michael

science

inquiry in

lack of universal standard of proof in

and policy-making

confusion over

difficulty of

and context

science-policy interface, bullshit in

scientific attitude

scientific fraud

scientific method

and distrust of authority

Page 497: Bullshit and Philosophy

self-bullshitting

and personality disorders

and self–distraction

self-deception

and inflated self-image

paradox of

semantic diligence

semantic negligence

and backfire

semantics

September group

sham reasoning

as different from bullshit

“Shut Up” (song)

sincerity, impossibility of

Page 498: Bullshit and Philosophy

Singer, Fred

Singer, Peter

skepticism, philosophical

Socrates

Sokal, Alan

Sophists

split-brain patients

confabulation in

Stevenson, Charles

Stewart, Jon

Stoic view, of emotions

Strauss, Leo

Page 499: Bullshit and Philosophy

Thouless, Robert

tone, in language

Tonight Show (TV show)

truth

as fatiguing

as offense

pluralism of

as situational

value of, to good relationships

truth-lie dichotomy, as oversimplified

Page 500: Bullshit and Philosophy

Unitarianism

university mission statements, bullshit in

Utilitarianism

Page 501: Bullshit and Philosophy

Vienna Circle

as anti-bullshit

“Scientific World-Conception” (manifesto)

Page 502: Bullshit and Philosophy

Wason selection tasks

and framing effects

‘we are waging a war on terror’, parsing the mechanism of

Weber, Max

Wilde, Oscar

Wilson, E.O.

Winfrey, Oprah

Wittgenstein, Ludwig

bullshit in

Woolf, Leonard

word of mouth advertising

Page 503: Bullshit and Philosophy

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

Zola, Émile

Page 504: Bullshit and Philosophy

ALSO FROM OPEN COURT

Monty Python and Philosophy

Nudge Nudge, Think Think!

Edited by GARY L. HARDCASTLE and GEORGE A. REISCH

VOLUME 19 IN THE SERIES,POPULAR CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY®

With its logical paradoxes, clever wordplay, and focus onthe absurdities of life, the work of Monty Python appeals toeveryone with a philosophical bent, the more bent thebetter. Twenty-one surprising chapters by professionalphilosophers and amateur Python fans celebrate theintersection of rigorous, profound TV comedy and zany,madcap metaphysics. Surprise is the chief quality of thisbook. Surprise, provocation, and a fanatical devotion to theenlightenment of the masses ...

Page 505: Bullshit and Philosophy

“Monty Python fans like to think they’re smarter than mostpeople, and they’ll be delighted with this new book, whichproves it!”

—KIM ‘HOWARD’ JOHNSON

Author of The First 280 Years of Monty Python

“an entertaining treatise on how humor can illuminate thedeepest questions about ethics, morality, individualresponsibility, and other so-called ‘serious concepts’ (such as:‘Is the parrot dead or just resting?”).

—DAVID MORGAN

Author of Monty Python Speaks!

AVAILABLE FROM BOOKSTORES OR BYCALLING 1-800-815-2280

For more information on Open Court books, go towww.opencourtbooks.com

Page 506: Bullshit and Philosophy

1“On Bullshit” first appeared as an essay in The RaritanReview VI:2 (1986), and was then reprinted in Frankfurt’sThe Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 117–133. In 2005,“On Bullshit” was published as the book, On Bullshit(Princeton: Princeton University Press). Throughout Bullshitand Philosophy, all references to On Bullshit are to the2005 edition.

2Among the many books critical of the second Bushadministration are several by former Washington insidersand United Nations officials who offer first-hand accounts ofalleged manipulations of intelligence used to promote theIraq war. There is, for example, Richard A. Clarke’sAgainst All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror(New York: Free Press, 2004); John W. Dean’s Worsethan Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W.Bush (New York: Little, Brown, 2004); Scott Ritter andSeymour Hersh’s Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story ofthe Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN andOverthrow Saddam Hussein (New York: Tauris, 2005); andHans Blix’s Disarming Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2004).

3René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: WithSelections from the Objections and Replies (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 12. Emphasis inoriginal.

Page 507: Bullshit and Philosophy

4David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning HumanUnderstanding (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), p. 114.

5Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis.Translated as The Scientific Conception of the World. TheVienna Circle, and reprinted in S. Sarkar, ed., TheEmergence of Logical Empiricism from 1900 to theVienna Circle (New York: Garland, 1996), p. 321.

6Rudolf Carnap, “Überwindung der Metaphysik durchLogische Analyse der Sprache,” Erkenntnis 2 (1932): pp.219–241, translated as “The Elimination of Metaphysicsthrough Logical Analysis of Language” in A.J. Ayer, ed.,Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press, 1959), pp.60–81.

7Originally published in S. Buss and L. Overton, eds.,Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from HarryFrankfurt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), pp.321–339. Reproduced as Chapter 8 of Bullshit andPhilosophy. Throughout Bullshit and Philosophy, allreferences to “Deeper Into Bullshit” are to the work as itappears in this volume.

8Frankfurt himself has also replied briefly to Cohen: “Replyto G.A. Cohen,” in Contours of Agency, pp. 340–44. HereFrankfurt arguably cedes ground to Cohen’s critique, but

Page 508: Bullshit and Philosophy

maintains the significance of the intention-oriented bullshithe defined. Truth-indifferent bullshit, Frankfurt insists, muchmore than the kind of academic obscurity Cohen targets,threatens our “respect for the distinction between the trueand the false” on which the very “conduct of civilized life”depends (p. 343).

9The essay is in The Collected Essays, Journalism, andLetters of George Orwell, Volume 4 (Harcourt, Brace,1968), pp. 127–140.

10G.A. Cohen, “Deeper into Bullshit,” Chapter 8 in thisvolume, p. 118.

11See Frankfurt’s “Reply to G.A. Cohen,” in Contours ofAgency, pp. 340–44.

12Thanks to my colleague Erich Freiberger, who got mestarted on this topic, and my wife Tonia Cook Kimbrough,who improved an earlier draft and, in general, calls bullshitwhenever I have it coming.

13Oprah Winfrey, January 11th, 2006, during a CNNbroadcast of the Larry King Show.

14The Oprah Winfrey Show, January 26th, 2006.

15The difference between what Frankfurt cites as

Page 509: Bullshit and Philosophy

Wittgenstein’s reaction to suspected bullshit, with what I willclaim is Moore’s, is instructive.

16The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (London: Allenand Unwin, Volume 1, 1967), p. 61.

17Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880–1904(London: Hogarth, 1960), pp. 110–131.

18Keynes, Two Memoirs (New York: Hart-Davis, 1949), p. 85

19“Hedonism,” in Tom Regan, ed., The Elements of Ethics(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), p. 41

20“My Early Beliefs,” in Two Memoirs (pp. 88–100). ButWoolf takes exception to some aspects of Keynes’srecollections. D.H. Lawrence, mentioned in the passage,had met the young men at Cambridge at the turn of thecentury and was violently disgusted by what he thought wastheir lack of reverence, an interesting connection,conceptually, to the topic here.

21Moore’s “A Defence of Common Sense” was originallypublished in 1925 in J.H. Muirhead, ed., ContemporaryBritish Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin).

22On Bullshit, pp. 60–61.

23

Page 510: Bullshit and Philosophy

Frankfurt was interviewed on WBUR’s “On Point” (17thFebruary, 2005).

24A useful introduction to the ID movement and its critics isRobert T. Pennock, ed., Intelligent Design Creationismand Its Critics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,2001).

25Philip Johnson, Darwin on Trial (Washington, D.C.:Regnery, 1991). For writings on “complexity” and relatedconcepts in ID theory, see those by either Michael Behe orWilliam Dembski (readily accessible on the internet).

26Philip Johnson, “Is God Unconstitutional? The EstablishedReligious Philosophy of America,” 1996(www.arn.org/authors/johnson_articles.html).

27Memorandum Opinion, December 20th, 2005, DistrictCourt for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Documentnumber 342, p. 43.

28Rudolf Carnap, “Foundations of Logic and Mathematics,”International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1: 3(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 4.

29Cohen’s is “Deeper into Bullshit,” Chapter 8 in this volume.

30“Not by Chance,” National Post of Canada (1st December,

Page 511: Bullshit and Philosophy

2005).31

Lesson plans for teaching “Critical Analysis of Evolution” inhigh schools can be found at the creationist DiscoveryInstitute’s website, discovery.org.

32Special thanks to Gary Hardcastle for reading severaldrafts of this essay and never bullshitting me about theproblems he found.

33I use the term ‘bullshit’ for a broader range of phenomenathan Harry Frankfurt does. My focus here is less on one-on-one bullshit, and more on what we might call official,institutional bullshit.

34There is by now a vast and varied literature, written from avariety of scientific or political perspectives, on techniquesof mass persuasion and propaganda and on how and whyit works on the human mind. For a few recent and classicalexamples see Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Ageof Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse ofPersuasion (New York: Freeman, 1992); Edward S.Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent:The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York:Pantheon, 2002); Edward Bernays, Propaganda (NewYork: Ig, 2004 [1928]), and Philip M. Taylor, Munitions ofthe Mind: A History of Propaganda (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2003).

Page 512: Bullshit and Philosophy

35The psychological literature on confirmation bias is vast.For early studies documenting this phenomenon, see P.C.Wason, “On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in aConceptual Task,” Quarterly Journal of ExperimentalPsychology 12 (1960); P.C. Wason, “Reasoning,” in B.M.Foss, ed., New Horizons in Psychology I (Harmondsworth:Penguin, 1966). Among more recent studies see R.S.Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenonin Many Guises,” Review of General Psychology 2 (1998).

36Explaining why exactly we should be liable to confirmationbias at all is, of course, an entirely different matter. I will nottry to give an answer here.

37This example is adapted from a discussion in D.Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysisof Decision under Risk,” Econometrica (1979). Reprintedin Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

38George Lakoff has recently diagnosed American politicaldiscourse as a war over frames. See his Moral Politics:How Liberals and Conservatives Think (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2002).

39See L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, “Cognitive Adaptations forSocial Exchange,” in Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, eds.,

Page 513: Bullshit and Philosophy

The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and theGeneration of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1992) for an example of this approach.

40I do not mean to suggest that impairment of socialcognition is unique to personality disorders—impairedsocial cognition of various sorts is characteristic of autism,schizophrenia, and psychopathy, among others. But apersonality disorder is, in the first instance, a certain kind ofdifficulty with navigating the social world.

41See M.S. Gazzaniga, The Bisected Brain (New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970); and “The Split Brain inMan” Scientific American 217 (1967), pp. 24–29.

42More specifically, the picture is flashed for an interval ofless than one-quarter of a second. This ensures that thereis no time to saccade, so we can be sure that the picture isshown to just one hemisphere.

43V.S. See Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee, Phantoms inthe Brain (New York: Morrow, 1998).

44Frankfurt notes in passing that humbug, as glossed by MaxBlack—a precursor to his own notion of bullshit—“may beaccomplished by words or by deeds” (pp. 10–11). But it isnot clear that this is meant to be a feature of bullshit as heconstrues it.

Page 514: Bullshit and Philosophy

45You could start out with a clear awareness of p, but stillsucceed in distracting yourself from that painful truth,without actually unseating your belief; or you could inimplicating the contrary of p get yourself to question yourprevious confidence in p.

46R. Larsen and D. Buss, Personality Psychology (NewYork: McGraw-Hill, 2005), p. 608. American PsychiatricAssociation, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of MentalDisorders-IV, 1994.

47Thanks to Tom Oltmanns for pointing this out to me.

48S ee Personality Psychology and also Theodore Millon,Seth Grossman, Carrie Millon, Sarah Meagher, andRowena Ramnath, Personality Disorders in Modern Life,Second Edition (Hoboken: Wiley, 2004).

49The two disorders are thought to lie on a continuum, knownas schizotypy, with schizophrenia. There is some evidencefor genetic links among the three. Schizotypals are thoughtto be closer to schizophrenics.

50Thanks to Tom Oltmanns for this point.

51The sub-types I refer to in the foregoing are not officiallyrecognized by the American Psychiatric Association in the

Page 515: Bullshit and Philosophy

DSM-IV. I lean heavily here on Personality Disorders inModern Life, where they are recognized.

52Indeed, insofar as the “fanatic paranoid” is just paranoid, heis not a bullshitter; it is really his narcissist streak thatcontributes the bullshit.

53This story does not, I’m sorry to say, cover the apparentnear absence of bullshit from paranoid personalitydisorder.

54Thanks to Philip Robbins for helping me distinguish thesetwo.

55Many thanks to Tasmin Astor-Jack, Gary Hardcastle, TomOltmanns, and especially Philip Robbins for helpfulfeedback on an earlier version of this paper.

56Even false humility or self-abnegation is bullshit precisely tothe extent that we are meant to value the speaker ashumble via the act of uttering something falsely humble orself-abnegating. But more on performative bullshit below.

57That is, if you did accuse me of lying, I would rebut thecharge by reminding you of what you already know, namely,my intention. As George Reisch has stressed in Chapter 3of this volume, there’s more to bullshit than semantics.

58The most curious cases within the letter of reference genre

Page 516: Bullshit and Philosophy

are cases in which the sort of bullshit offered is outsidewhat is acceptable, not by being over the top but byviolating the genre conventions. If one reads in a letter ofreference that “Mortimer is like a cool breeze on a warmsummer evening,” one’s reaction is “What sort of bullshit isthis?,” suggesting that at the minimum it is the wrong sort ofbullshit.

59For that their own bullshit must suffice.

60If we are tempted to go for evolutionary explanations, wemight analogize bullshit to altruism and try to copyevolutionary explanations of altruism. Bullshit as biologicaladaptation, however, seems extraordinarily unlikely. I do notdoubt that somewhere someone is writing up “The Functionof Bullshit in a Hunter-Gatherer Society,” however; such isthe way of bullshit.

61The name of the store is altered to preserve anonymity; thepledge was still up on 19th April, 2006.

62This is from http://www.ubc.ca/about/mission.html.

63But suppose all universities are equally good, says one ofmy undergraduate philosophy students who has takenlogic. Well, then, there is no particular reason to sort theminto the very best and the also-rans.

64My remarks on performative bullshit owe much to John

Page 517: Bullshit and Philosophy

My remarks on performative bullshit owe much to JohnAustin’s classic, How to Do Things with Words(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1962).

65Examples can be multiplied: Canada, as a nation, seemsto engage in performative courtesy-bullshit, according towhich the universal belief (or claim) among Canadians thatthey are courteous is taken as evidence that they havebeen courteous in any given case: “No, sir, I cannot havebeen rude to you; I am Canadian.”

66I do not know whether Bush is utterly insincere, although thesmirk would indicate that he is. Leaving Bush aside, theinsincerity of the American media, both right and left, ispalpable. Could anyone maintain sincere outrage, night inand night out, for years the way our friends on Fox Newsand its rivals do? It’s not possible.

67Thanks to Judy Segal for comments on the earlier draft.Thanks to the editors for relevant inspiration and detailedcomments on earlier, shittier drafts.

68Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 86.

69William G. Perry, Jr., “Examsmanship and the Liberal Arts:A Study in Educational Epistemology,” Harvard College: ACollection of Essays by Members of the Harvard Faculty

Page 518: Bullshit and Philosophy

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1967),pp. 754–765; my conception of bullshitting differs fromPerry’s “bull,” however, in that the intention isn’t quite thesame.

70Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge,Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1931–58), 1:44(referenced by volume and paragraph number).

71Collected Papers, 5.407.

72See for example Susan Haack, Manifesto of a PassionateModerate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998),pp. 189–191.

73On Bullshit, pp. 33–36.

74Though not in the present volume.—Eds.

75This chapter appeared originally in Sarah Buss and LeeOverton, eds., Contours of Agency: Themes from thePhilosophy of Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge,Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 321–339. Forcomments on an earlier draft, I thank Malcolm Anderson,Annette Barnes, Jerry Barnes, Sarah Buss, Paula Casal,John Davis, Jon Elster, Cécile Fabre, Diego Gambetta,Grahame Lock, Ian Maclean, David Miller, Alan Montefiore,Michael Otsuka, Lee Overton, Derek Parfit, Rodney Peffer,

Page 519: Bullshit and Philosophy

Mark Philp, Saul Smilansky, Alan Sokal, Hillel Steiner,Tracy Strong, and Arnold Zuboff.

76As Diego Gambetta has pointed out to me, a mechanismmerits mention that is different from the “sunk cost” one thatfigures above. You can be so happy that you’ve gotsomething (after whatever amount of labour, or lack of it,you’ve expended) from someone who is reputed to beterrific that you overvalue it. In both mechanisms you misat-tribute the pleasure of getting something to the quality ofthe text you got it from.

77His essay begins as follows: “One of the most salientfeatures of our culture is that there is so much bullshit.Everyone knows this. Each of us contributes his share” (p.1).

78Frankfurt himself cites the OED, but mainly with respect tomeanings and uses of the word ‘bull’: he touches on itsdefinition of “bullshit” only in its use as a verb. I disagreewith his discussion of the entries he cites, but it would be animposition on the reader’s capacity to endure tedium toexplain why.

79Four differences between the kinds of bullshit that exerciseFrankfurt and me are listed in footnote 26 below. Theimport of those differences will emerge in due course, butthe reader will probably follow me better if he or sheglances ahead now to footnote 26.

Page 520: Bullshit and Philosophy

80‘Trivial’ is very different from ‘insincere’, partly because ithas weaker implications for the state of mind of thespeaker or writer. I shall take 2 with the accent on‘insincere’.

81Frankfurt certainly believes that a person bullshits if heproduces bullshit, since he thinks it a necessary conditionof bullshit that it was produced with a bullshitting intention.He (in effect) raises the question whether that intention isalso sufficient for bullshit at p. 9. But, although he doesn’texpressly pursue that question, his definition of ‘bullshit’(pp. 33–34), and its elaboration (pp. 54ff), show that heholds the sufficiency view as well. It is because Frankfurtasserts sufficiency that he can say (pp. 47–48) that a pieceof bullshit can be true.

82See, further, the last two paragraphs of Section 4 below.

83See, once again, the last two paragraphs of Section 4below.

84Does Frankfurt think that the phenomenon of “indifferenceto how things really are” is “vast and amorphous”? Surelynot. Then what, again, is he asserting to be “vast andamorphous,” in his second preliminary remark, which Icriticized two paragraphs back?

85I suppose all lying is insincere talk, and I do not think all

Page 521: Bullshit and Philosophy

I suppose all lying is insincere talk, and I do not think alllying is bullshitting: at least to that extent, the OED-2definition is too wide. But some lying is undoubtedly alsobullshitting, so Frankfurt’s definition of activity-centredbullshit is too narrow.

86Few liars care about nothing more than inducing falsebeliefs: that is the ultimate goal of only one of the eighttypes of liar distinguished by St. Augustine: see Frankfurt,p. 55.

87See Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, in TheBasic Writings of Sigmund Freud (New York: ModernLibrary, 1965).

88It is not, of course, the ultimate goal of that advertising,which is to cause (some of) its audience to buy what’sadvertised.

89Strictly, the orator’s oration is presented as an example ofhumbug, rather than bullshit. But it’s clear that Frankfurtwould also say that he is a bullshitter, precisely in virtue ofwhat makes him a purveyor of humbug, whatever differencebetween humbug and bullshit Frankfurt might want to affirm.

90I do not think Frankfurt means to be stipulating otherwise:we are meant to agree with what he says about the oratoron the basis of his initial, first-sentence of the passage,description of him. ‘Surely’, in the second sentence, would

Page 522: Bullshit and Philosophy

otherwise make no sense.91

Although this is not, again (see the text to footnote 12above), their ultimate goal.

92See the final paragraph of this section.

93Perhaps in contrast with Frankfurt’s sense, and certainly incontrast with what Frankfurt says about that sense (see pp.47–48).

94That question is addressed in the penultimate paragraph ofthis section.

95For the record, I do not believe that Hegel was a bullshitter,and I am too ignorant of the work of Heidegger to saywhether or not he was a bullshitter. But I agree with my latesupervisor Gilbert Ryle that Heidegger was a shit. I onceasked Ryle whether he had continued to study Heideggerafter he had written a long review of Being and Time thatwas published in Mind. Ryle’s reply: “No, because when theNazis came to power, Heidegger showed that he was ashit, from the heels up, and a shit from the heels up can’t dogood philosophy.” (Experience has, alas, induced me todisagree with the stated Rylean generalization.)

96This criterion of bullshit was devised by Professor Arthur J.Brown, to whom I am indebted.

97

Page 523: Bullshit and Philosophy

97In his wonderful spoof, “Transgressing the Boundaries:Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of QuantumGravity”—which was published as a non-spoof in thethereby self-condemning Social Text 46–47 (Spring–Summer, 1996), pp. 217–252.

98I am allowing that the unclarifiable may be productivelysuggestive, but I would not go as far as Fung Yu-lan does:“Aphorisms, allusions, and illustrations are . . . not articulateenough. Their insufficiency in articulateness iscompensated for, however, by their suggestiveness.Articulateness and suggestiveness are, of course,incompatible. The more an expression is articulate, the lessit is suggestive - just as the more an expression is prosaic,the less it is poetic. The sayings and writings of theChinese philosophers are so inarticulate that theirsuggestiveness is almost boundless” (A Short History ofChinese Philosophy [New York: Macmillan, 1960], p. 12).

99Michael Otsuka comments insightfully on a familiaracademic “case in which the two come apart: that is, inwhich someone is disposed to unclarifiable unclaritywithout aiming at it. Many academics (including perhaps anespecially high proportion of graduate students) aredisposed to produce the unclarifiable unclarity that isbullshit, not because they are aiming at unclarifiableunclarity, but rather because they are aiming at profundity.Their lucid utterances are manifestly unprofound, even to

Page 524: Bullshit and Philosophy

them. Their clarifiable unclear utterances can be renderedmanifestly not profound through clarification. But theirunclarifiably unclear utterances are unmanifestly notprofound. Hence it is safe for them to think that they areprofound. These utterances are not profound eitherbecause they are meaningful (in some subtle way, shouldthere be one, that is consistent with their unclarifiableunclarity) but unprofound or because they are meaningless.They are unmanifestly not profound because it is hard todemonstrate that they are not profound, given theirunclarifiability. By aiming at profundity, these academicstend to produce obscurity. But they do not aim at obscurity,not even as a means of generating profundity” (Privatecommunication, 2nd September, 1999).

100Let me now list some central differences between the twokinds of bullshit that I have distinguished:

101Initially in the article referenced in footnote 23, and thenmore comprehensively in Intellectual Impostures, which hewrote with Jean Bricmont (London: Profile, 1998).

102Consider this sentence from the work of Étienne Balibar:“This is precisely the first meaning we can give to the idea

Page 525: Bullshit and Philosophy

of dialectic: a logic or form of explanation specificallyadapted to the determinant intervention of class struggle inthe very fabric of history” (The Philosophy of Marx [NewYork: Verso, 1995]). If you read that sentence quickly, it cansound pretty good. The remedy is to read it more slowly,and you will then recognize it to be a wonderful paradigm ofbullshit: yet I know Balibar to be an honest thinker.

103The evidence assembled in Sokal and Bricmont’sIntellectual Impostures proves, so I think, the truth of thosebeliefs.

104We may hope that success in discrediting the product willcontribute to extinguishing the process. I try to contribute tothe project of discrediting the product in an unpublishedand unpublishable discussion of “Why One Kind of BullshitFlourishes in France,” a draft of which will be supplied uponapplication to me.

105Laura Penny, Your Call Is Important to Us: The Truthabout Bullshit (New York: Crown, 2005), p. 223.

106The good single-volume intellectual history of logicalpositivism before World War II is still to be written, but seeV. Kraft, The Vienna Circle: The Origin of Neo-positivism:A Chapter in the History of Recent Philosophy (New York:Greenwood, 1953); Michael Friedman, A Parting of theWays: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago: Open

Page 526: Bullshit and Philosophy

Court, 2000); and A. Richardson and R. Giere, eds.,Origins of Logical Empiricism (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1998). For the period after World War IIsee G. Hardcastle and A. Richardson, eds., LogicalEmpiricism in North America (Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 2003), and George A. Reisch, How theCold War Transformed Philosophy of Science: To the IcySlopes of Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2005).

107Ayer was logical positivism’s Laura Penny. WhetherFrankfurt is Rudolf Carnap and Cohen Hans Reichenbach(or vice versa) I leave as an extra credit exercise for AlanRichardson, subject to his agreement that we are all waitingfor Gödel.

108Although Cohen, in the last pages of an unpublishedaddition to his “Deeper Into Bullshit” devoted to theprevalence of bullshit in French intellectual culture, alludesoffhandedly to logical positivism’s alleged failure to attractFrench adherents. For that matter, it has been suggestedthat Rudolf Carnap’s 1932 “Überwindung der Metaphysikdurch Logische Analyse der Sprache,” (Erkenntnis 2(1932): pp. 219–241) (“Overcoming Metaphysics throughthe Logical Analysis of Language”), an essay famouslyrepresentative of logical positivism and one to which I willturn to below, ought to have been titled “OvercomingBullshit through the Logical Analysis of Language,”

Page 527: Bullshit and Philosophy

(presumably: “Überwindung der Mist durch LogischeAnalyse der Sprache”). Carnap’s essay was reprinted as“The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysisof Language” in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (NewYork: Free Press, 1959), pp. 60–81; I follow recent practicein preferring ‘overcoming’ for ‘Überwindung’.

109In Ayer, Logical Positivism, pp. 60–81.

110Martin Heidegger, Was Ist Metaphysik? (Frankfurt A.M.:Klostermann, 1929).

111Few would raise an eyebrow at an allegation ofmeaningless leveled at the made-up ‘teavy’, but Carnap ishappy to note some other terms that are “in the same boat”as ‘teavy’ as far as meaninglessness goes. These include,‘principle’, ‘essence’, ‘the Ego’, ‘the Infinite’, and (in onecommon use, at least) ‘God’ (p. 67).

112The reader can construct her own contemporary version ofthis example by replacing ‘toovy’ with ‘terrorist’, anotherterm the meaning of which has, I suggest, been toovied.

113Hence Carnap’s otherwise puzzling yet stinging intellectualassessment of metaphysicians (especially Heidegger) as“musicians without musical ability” and his (otherwiseequally puzzling but) laudatory endorsement of FriedrichNietzsche for writing Thus Spake Zarathustra as poetry

Page 528: Bullshit and Philosophy

(quality, apparently, notwithstanding), p. 80.114

See Otto Neurath, “The Lost Wanderers of Descartes andthe Auxiliary Motive (On the Psychology of Decision),” inNeurath, Philosophical Papers 1913–1946 (Boston:Reidel, 1983), pp. 1–12.

115Aldous Huxley, Eyeless in Gaza (London: Chatto andWindus, 1936) pp. 122–23.

116Terry Pratchett, Going Postal (London: Corgi, 2005) pp.280–81.

117Gottlob Frege “On Sinn and Bedeutung” (1892) in MichaelBeaney, ed., The Frege Reader (London: Blackwell,1997), p. 156.

118Gottlob Frege, “Logic” (1897) in The Frege Reader, p.239.

119Robert Thouless, Straight and Crooked Thinking (London:Pan, 1965), p. 15.

120Charles Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1944), p. 210.

121Douglas Walton, “Deceptive Arguments ContainingPersuasive Language and Persuasive Definitions”

Page 529: Bullshit and Philosophy

Argumentation 19 (2005), p. 173.122

The guru Sri Aurobindo, cited in Chaim Perelman and LucyOlbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise onArgumentation (Notre Dame: University of Notre DamePress, 1969), p. 444.

123Antony Flew, Thinking about Thinking: Or, Do I SincerelyWant to Be Right? (London: Fontana, 1975), p. 47.

124Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic ofMathematical Discovery (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1976), p. 23.

125R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1938), p. 9.

126Henry Beard and Christopher Cerf, The Official PoliticallyCorrect Dictionary and Handbook (London: Grafton,1992), pp. 48, 129.

127See, for example, the discussion of ‘nukespeak’ in EdwardSchiappa, Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics ofMeaning (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,2003), p. 131.

128Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch (New York: Farrar,Straus, 2002), p. 298.

Page 530: Bullshit and Philosophy

129Steven Pinker, “The Game of the Name,” New York Times(5th April, 1994), p. A6.

130Catharine A. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, In Harm’sWay: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1997), pp. 269–270.

131Tamsin Wilton, Finger-Licking Good: The Ins and Outs ofLesbian Sex (London: Cassell, 1996), p. 154.

132Adam Smith, cited by Stevenson, p. 215; Thorstein Veblen,cited in Flew, p. 77.

133Keith Burgess-Jackson, “Rape and Persuasive Definition,”Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1995), p. 444.

134Richard Robinson, Definition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1950),pp. 2–3.

135Precursors to this paper were delivered at St. Catherines,Ontario; St. Andrews, Scotland; and Oviedo, Asturias. I amgrateful for the comments I received, and for conversationswith Bruce Russell, Agnès van Rees, Douglas Walton, andthe editors of this volume.

136Think of the little girl, who, being told to be sure of her

Page 531: Bullshit and Philosophy

meaning before she spoke, said: “How can I know what Ithink till I see what I say?” See Graham Wallas, The Art ofThought (London: Watts, 1946).

137F. Pascal, “Wittgenstein: A Personal Memoir,” in R. Rhees,e d . , Recollections of Wittgenstein (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1984), p. 29.

138K. Ishiguro, The Remains of the Day (London: Faber andFaber, 1999), pp. 257–58.

139Conversely, Mr. Spock from Star Trek always appealed towhat is “logical” or “a fact.” And what a bore he was, as allthe other characters were always rolling their eyes at hishumorlessness.

140Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure,” in Nagel,Concealment and Exposure and Other Essays (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 6.

141On Bullshit, pp. 33–34. Specifically, Frankfurt would claimthat the paradigmatic bullshitter doesn’t care that hedoesn’t know in the sense that he is not interested inwhether what he says is true or not.

142The tendency not properly to distinguish ‘bullshitting’ and‘lying’ is evident in Laura Penny’s discussion of politics inYour Call Is Important to Us: The Truth about Bullshit

Page 532: Bullshit and Philosophy

(New York: Crown, 2005), Chapter 5. See also p. 1: the factthat “never in the history of mankind have so many peopleuttered statements that they know to be untrue” is offeredas a characterisation of “an era of unprecedented bullshitproduction.” This example is particularly noteworthy as onpage 5 Penny seems to embrace Frankfurt’s definition.

143The resistance to these facts on the part of some who clingto the cynicism thesis itself exhibits a bullshitting approachto the ‘understanding’ of politics in their refusal tocontemplate that politicians could be anything other thanshameless liars.

144George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Penguin,1954), pp. 39–40.

145Some might think it inappropriate to label the abhorrentdiscourse of totalitarianisms ‘bullshit’, because it mightseem to be too frivolously dismissive, too lightweight in itscondemnatory force, to capture its full repulsiveness.Certainly, in this regard to call something ‘bullshit’ oftenseems to be an expression of amused contempt. But evenif that is its rhetorical effect, it is worth noting that someforms of humor can constitute powerful strategies of attackagainst even the most appalling tyrants: see, forillustrations, some of the political jokes compiled by StevenLukes and Itzhak Galnoor, eds., No Laughing Matter(London: Penguin, 1987). The collection’s title gives theclue to the main point, however: such jokes only function as

Page 533: Bullshit and Philosophy

clue to the main point, however: such jokes only function asjokes when they, and their tellers and audiences,appreciate how profoundly non-funny their subject-matteractually is. Failure to appreciate this in jokes render them inbad taste, not funny—not jokes—at all.

146See ‘The Power of the Powerless’, in Vàclav Havel, OpenLetters (New York: Knopf, 1991), p. 132.

147The claim that bullshitting tactics were deployed in theattempt to justify the Iraq invasion, which I believe isincontrovertible, might not itself suffice to yield theconclusion that the invasion was therefore unjustified. Justbecause no non-bullshit justification was used does notmean none was available. However, though the presentanalysis rests on no specific view about that possibility, it isdifficult to resist the conclusion that the resort to bullshit is atleast prima facie evidence that there was no genuinejustification.

148Given this, it is perhaps no surprise to find, as thePrinceton Review did, that in the 2004 presidentialdebates, Bush spoke at a sixth-grade level of competence,whilst Kerry just about made it to seventh-grade level. Seewww.thedartmouth.com/article.php?aid=2004101502020.

149A term which itself often features in bullshitting conceptionsof politics.

150

Page 534: Bullshit and Philosophy

At its extreme, this fact-indifference parallels how Frankfurtviews a lot of advertising: “My presumption is thatadvertisers generally decide what they are going to say intheir advertisements without caring what the truth is.Therefore, what they say in their advertisements is bullshit”;Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to G.A. Cohen,” in Sarah Buss, LeeOverton, eds., Contours of Agency (Cambridge,Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002), p. 341.

151Frankfurt is keen to stress that relativism yields muchbullshit; On Bullshit, pp. 64–65.

152This uncritical sanctification of personal opinion may wellpartly explain the heightened prominence of ‘personality’issues and the ad hominem argument in political life: if youcan’t attack the argument, then attack the arguer.

153Criticising Cohen’s castigation of a sentence by EtienneBalibar as unclarifiable unclarity, Frankfurt plausiblyclarifies it: Frankfurt, “Reply to G.A. Cohen,” p. 342. But if itis clarifiably unclear, then it may still qualify as a differentform of bullshit.

154Along with Bullshit (2), Bullshits (4) and (5) are identified byCohen in Chapter 8 of this volume.

155I have in mind here something analogous to Peter Singer’sconception of the ‘moral expert’: see “Moral Experts,” in

Page 535: Bullshit and Philosophy

Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (London: FourthEstate, 2002), pp. 3–6.

156Some of this is identified (in the field of philosophy ofscience) and criticised in Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont,Intellectual Impostures (London: Profile, 1998).

157G.A. Cohen, “Why One Kind of Bullshit Flourishes inFrance,” manuscript, p. 33. I’m very grateful to Jerry Cohenfor permission to cite from this unpublished paper.

158These thoughts were first expressed at the political theoryworkshop in the Department of Politics and InternationalRelations, University of Wales, Swansea. The sessionmarked the visit of my ex-student Christine Stender, and Iam grateful to Christine not only for appreciating that therewas nothing personal to the choice of theme but also forsubsequent discussion. I’m also grateful for comments toJames Beard, Heidi Brown, Scott Bruning, Maria PazCalvo Felton, Alan Finlayson, James Hill, Sarah Moran,Richard Murphy and Richard Van Der Watt. I am deeplyindebted to George Reisch for excellent criticism of thepenultimate draft of this chapter. As always, Anne Evans’sscrupulous reading removed some of the inadvertentbullshit and other errors from the final version; thoseremaining are my own responsibility.

159On Bullshit, p. 33.

160

Page 536: Bullshit and Philosophy

160I thank Thomas Pogge for this insight.

161P. Goldie, Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 5.

162Martha Nussbaum, “Emotions as Judgments of Value andImportance,” in Robert C. Solomon, ed., Thinking aboutFeeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 184.

163R.N. Haass, The Opportunity: America’s Moment to AlterHistory’s Course (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

164And having a more complete mechanistic account may notreduce all the concern. For a real case with such complexity(regarding saccharin and bladder cancers in rats) see D.Guston, “Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure ofScience Policy Revisited: ‘Science in Policy’ and the USReport on Carcinogens,” Science and Public Policy 30:5(2003), pp. 347–357.

165Although carbon dioxide gets most of the attention, weshould also remember chlorofluorocarbons, nitrous oxide,methane, and of course, water. Each has a differentcapacity to trap heat, and a different average lifespan in theatmosphere, ranging from a few years to centuries.

166R.A. Kerr, (1993), “Pinatubo Global Cooling on Target,”

Page 537: Bullshit and Philosophy

Science 259 (1993), p. 594.167

See, for example, Volumes 255, 256, 258, 259, and 260.168

R.J. Charlson and T.M.L. Wigley, “Sulfate Aerosol andClimate Change,” Scientific American (February 1994),pp. 48–57.

169Robert C. Balling Jr. (1995), “Global Warming: MessyModels, Decent Data, Pointless Policy,” in R. Bailey, ed.,The True State of the Planet (New York: Free Press), p.91.

170“A More Sensible Approach to the Environment,” WallStreet Journal Europe (28th January, 1994), p. 10;“Climate Claims Wither Under Luminous Lights ofScience,” Washington Times (29th November, 1994), p.A18; “Is Man-Made Global Warming a ProvenEnvironmental Threat? No: Doomsayers Are Just Trying toScare Money out of Government,” Insight 11 (1995), p. 19;“The Global Warming Debate: ... Not ScientificConsensus,” Wall Street Journal (25th July, 1997), p. A14;and “Global Warming Is Not Happening,” Natural Science(29th January, 1998).

171Guy Crittenden, “The Day the Earth Warmed Up,” TheGlobe and Mail (22nd November, 1997), p. D1.

172

Page 538: Bullshit and Philosophy

R.A. Kerr, “Getting Warmer, However You Measure It,”Science 304 (2004), pp. 805–07; see also B.D. Santer etal., “Influence of Satellite Data Uncertainties on theDetection of Externally Forced Climate Change,” Science300 (2003), pp. 1280–84; and National Research Council,Reconciling Observations of Global Temperature Change(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000).

173Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity inPolicymaking: An Investigation into the BushAdministration’s Misuse of Science (2004). Available atwww.ucsusa.org.

174M. Gough, “Science, Risks, and Politics,” in M. Gough, ed.,Politicizing Science: The Alchemy of Policymaking(Washington, D.C.: Marshall Institute, 2003), pp. 1–25.

175Ironically, Gough lampoons philosophers at the end of hischapter, quoting Feynman: “Philosophers say a great dealabout what is absolutely necessary for science, and it isalways, so far as one can see, rather naive, and probablywrong.” Gough seems completely unaware that he hasundermined a key point made earlier in his chapter whenhe was relying upon philosopher Karl Popper.

176A salient example of this attitude is a review of Frankfurt’sOn Bullshit on Amazon.com that complains it “is filled withobvious rhetoric that makes the book sound scientific,

Page 539: Bullshit and Philosophy

when it is actually drivel.”177

Rhetoric and writing topped the list of programsexperiencing growth during the late 1980s, bestingprograms in creative writing, technical writing, and literatureand interdisciplinary studies. See Bettina J. Huber, “Recentand Anticipated Growth in English Doctoral Programs:Findings from the MLA’s 1990 Survey,” ADE Bulletin 106(Winter, 1993), pp. 45–60.

178Jesse Holland, “Senate to Open Alito NominationHearings.” Associated Press. Online 9th January, 2006.

179“Bush Urges Senate to Give Alito Fair, Quick, UnanimousConfi rmation,” The Onion (17th January, 2006).(http://www.theonion.com/content/node/44467)

180Jeremy Campbell, The Liar’s Tale: A History of Falsehood(New York: Norton, 2001).

181George A. Kennedy, Comparative Rhetoric: An Historicaland Cross-Cultural Introduction (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1998), p. 25.

182Ken Gemes, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth,” Philosophyand Phenomenological Research 52, pp. 47–65.

183Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in

Page 540: Bullshit and Philosophy

Logology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961).184

There are some important exceptions. At both theUniversity of Iowa and the University of Minnesota, forexample, students are required to take Rhetoric (offered bya Rhetoric, not English, department) in lieu of the usualrequired Composition courses. It would be interesting todocument the contribution to an education through acomparison of these different models.

185Plato’s unflattering portrayal of poets and Sophists markthe opening salvo in the philosophical war against bullshit,even though Plato availed himself of bullshit in promotingthe “myth of the metals” as a principle of social stratificationin his Republic. This doublethink has not been lost ontoday’s neo-conservative followers of Leo Strauss.

186An updated defense of Franklin’s position (“the civilizingforce of hypocrisy”) is Jon Elster, “Deliberation andConstitution Making,” in Jon Elster, ed., DeliberativeDemocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998), pp. 97–122.

187Nevertheless, the emerging literature in “virtueepistemology” courts just such uninhibited judgments. SeeLinda Zagzebski and Abrol Fairweather, eds., VirtueEpistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue andResponsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Page 541: Bullshit and Philosophy

188Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense:Postmodern Philosophers’ Abuse of Science (London:Profile, 1998).

189“Let the believer beware!”

190On this reading of Galileo, see Paul Feyerabend, AgainstMethod (London: Verso, 1975).

191Ernest Gellner, Words and Things: A Critical Account ofLinguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology (London:Gollancz, 1959). An academically sublimated form of suchlanguage-driven class anxiety remains in the discipline ofsociolinguistics, whose seminal researcher was BasilBernstein. His work is compiled in Class, Codes, andControl: Theoretical Studies towards a Sociology ofLanguage, three volumes (London: Routledge, 1971–77).

192A good collection of recent work on the epistemology oftestimony is the following special issue: Martin Kusch andPeter Lipton, eds., Studies in History and Philosophy ofScience 33: 2 (June 2002), Part A, pp. 209–423.

193Among those touched by Kierkegaard were not only theExistentialists but also the young Karl Popper. See MalachiHacohen, Karl Popper: The Formative Years, 1902–1945(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 83–

Page 542: Bullshit and Philosophy

84. I read Popper sympathetically as a “scientificexistentialist” in Steve Fuller, Kuhn versus Popper: TheStruggle for the Soul of Science (Cambridge: Icon, 2003),pp. 100–110.

194One way to look at the inter-temporal comparison of theevidentiary basis of knowledge claims in the present andthe imagined future is in terms of sacrificing a short-termadherence to “only the truth” in favor of “the whole truth” inthe long term. I discuss this as a trade-off betweencorrespondence and coherence theories of truth in SteveFuller, The Intellectual (Cambridge: Icon, 2005), pp. 51–60.

195On the influence of inquisitorial legal systems on Bacon,see James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidenceand Probability before Pascal (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2001), pp. 217–18.

196For an account of the Lomborg Affair, focusing on the legalissues, see Steve Fuller, “The Future of Scientific Justice:The Case of the Skeptical Environmentalist.” Futures 36(2004), pp. 631–36.

197On the early problematic institutionalization of Baconianideal, see William Lynch, Solomon’s Child: BaconianMethod in the Early Royal Society of London (Palo Alto:Stanford University Press, 2001).

Page 543: Bullshit and Philosophy

198See Tal Golan, Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: TheHistory of Scientific Expert Testimony in England andAmerica (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

199“Naturalism” is normally regarded as a metaphysicaldoctrine, a species of monism opposed tosupernaturalism. The doctrine has been historically hostileto monotheistic world-views for their postulation of atranscendent deity, resulting in an unforgivable dualism.This point joins, say, Spinoza and Dewey in common causeas naturalists, regardless of their many other differences.However, the prefix “methodological” softens the blow bysuggesting that only the conduct of science—not allaspects of human existence—presupposes naturalism.Even this is false, as any honest appraisal of themetaphysical realist (a.k.a. supernaturalist) strand in thehistory of science should make apparent. I participated inKitzmiller as a “rebuttal witness,” specifically to this bit ofbullshit that the judge ended up accepting without question.Philosophers have questioned both why adherence toscientific methodology requires naturalism and whyadherence to naturalism must remain merelymethodological. These two points are made, respectively,in Theodore Schick, “Methodological Naturalism versusMethodological Realism,” Philosophy 3: 2 (2000), pp. 30–37; Massimo Pigliucci, “Methodological versusPhilosophical Naturalism,” Free Inquiry 23 (2003), pp. 53–

Page 544: Bullshit and Philosophy

55.

Page 545: Bullshit and Philosophy

Volume 24 in the series, Popular Culture and Philosophy™

To order books from Open Court, call 1-800-815-2280, or visit ourwebsite at www.opencourtbooks.com.

Open Court Publishing Company is a division of Carus PublishingCompany.

Copyright ©2006 by Carus Publishing Company

First printing 2006

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,

mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior writtenpermission of the publisher, Open Court Publishing Company, a division

of Carus Publishing Company, 315 Fifth Street, P.O. Box 300, Peru, Illinois,61354-3000.

Printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bullshit and philosophy : guaranteed to get perfect results every time /edited by Gary L. Hardcastle and George A. Reisch.

p. cm.—(Popular culture and philosophy)

Summary: “Sixteen essays offer discussions, interpretations,

Page 546: Bullshit and Philosophy

and criticisms related to Harry G. Frankfort’s essay “OnBullshit” and other philosophical work on bullshit. Topics

addressed include: the definition of bullshit; the ethics andepistemology of bullshit; and the role of bullshit in

contemporary culture”—Provided by publisher.

Includes bibliographical references and index.eISBN : 978-0-812-69784-1

1. Truthfullness and falsehood. I. Hardcastle, Gary L. II. Reisch,

George A., 1962- BJ1421.B85 2006

177’.3—dc22

2006025918

Page 547: Bullshit and Philosophy

Table of ContentsPopular Culture and Philosophy®Title PageOn BullshitmaniaI - To Shoot the Bull?Chapter 1 - On Letting It Slide

Tolerable BullshitIntolerable BullshitBullshit and Self-DeceptionBlameless BullshitBullshit and Truth

Chapter 2 - A Defense of Common SenseThe Truth Matters“What Exactly Do You Mean?”Let’s Stop Bullshitting Ourselves

Chapter 3 - The Pragmatics of Bullshit, IntelligentlyDesigned

The Example of Intelligent DesignA Definition of Bullshit—New and Improved!The Truth in BullshitThe Truth about SemanticsSolving Frankfurt’s Puzzle, or, Baseball, HotDogs, Apple Pie, and BullshitThe Case for Purism about Bullshit

Chapter 4 - Bullshit and the Foibles of the Human Mind, or:What the Masters of ...

Page 548: Bullshit and Philosophy

Some Cognitive Foibles of the Human MindReclaiming the Public Square

Chapter 5 - Bullshit and PersonalityDoes the Bullshitter Pay Attention to the Truth?Two Modes of BullshitBullshit and Personality DisordersSome Examples of Bullshit in PersonalityDisordersPerfect Partners: Bullshit and Distorted SocialPerceptionsThe Threat Posed by Bullshit

Chapter 6 - Performing Bullshit and the Post-SincereCondition

Mission StatementShitty Attitudes: On the Use and Misuse of Bullshitin LifeBullshit as a Condition of LifeThe World as Will to BullshitOvercoming Overwhelming Bullshit

Chapter 7 - The Importance of Being Earnest: A PragmaticApproach to Bullshitting

Two Tauroscatological SchoolsThe Epistemic ImperativeThe Problem with BullshittingSo Why Bullshit?

II - The Bull by the HornsChapter 8 - Deeper into Bullshit

1 Without the Shit of the Bull2 Two Species of Bullshit

Page 549: Bullshit and Philosophy

3 Bullshit and Lying4 Bullshit as Unclarifiable Unclarity5 Bullshit as Product and Bullshit as Process

Chapter 9 - The Unity of BullshitNo Bullshit, Please, We’re AustrianA Little Carnap in EveryoneThe Unity of Bullshit

Chapter 10 - Raising the Tone: Definition, Bullshit, and theDefinition of Bullshit

Semantic NegligenceA Caricature History of SemanticsPersuasive DefinitionBroadening the AnalysisBackfireGood DefinitionsIs Frankfurt’s Definition of ‘Bullshit’ Itself PD?

Chapter 11 - Different Kinds and Aspects of BullshitHarry Frankfurt on BullshitA Different Take on BullshitA Different Kind of Bullshit

III - It’s All Around UsChapter 12 - The Republic of Bullshit: On the Dumbing-Up

of DemocracyBullshitting and Lying in PoliticsThe Myth of the ‘Well-Informed’ Citizen‘Dumbing-Up’: Some Distortions of DemocraticEqualityPhilosophy versus Bullshit

Chapter 13 - Political Bullshit and the Stoic Story of Self

Page 550: Bullshit and Philosophy

How to Analyze BullshitStories Shape Our FeelingsBullshit Around the Globe

Chapter 14 - Bullshit at the Interface of Science and Policy:Global Warming, ...

Bullshit of the Isolated FactBullshit of Universal StandardsCombatting the Two Kinds of Bullshit

Chapter 15 - Rhetoric Is Not BullshitThe Problem (and Politics) of RhetoricThe Truth about PostmodernismRhetoric and Bullshit

Chapter 16 - Just BullshitBullshit as a Call to Open-MindednessWittgenstein: Ultimate Bullshit Detector—orBullshitter?Bullshit as Deferred Epistemic GratificationThe Scientific Method as a Search for the Justicein Bullshit

Our Distinguished Panel of Incomparable GeniusesOur Index, Exquisitely Crafted for Your IlluminationALSO FROM OPEN COURTCopyright Page