Bulgarian Views on a Durable Peace

Bulgarian Views on a Durable PeaceAuthor(s): X.Source: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 23, No. 62 (Jan., 1945), pp. 63-68Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4203657 .

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BULGARIAN VIEWS ON A DURABLE PEACE

GEOGRAPHY has always played a predominant part in the events shaping Bulgaria's destiny. Tucked away in the south-eastern corner of Europe,

between the Danube and the Black Sea, across the main land routes from Western Europe to Constantinople and the Middle East, she has been and still is a strong bridgehead for the defence of the Straits and the Eastern Mediter- ranean, or alternatively a standing threat to the security of that important area. Throughout the course of a long and troubled past, Bulgaria's choice has been between becoming part of the area's strategic defence and being the spearhead of attack against it. Not entirely by pure chance, the rare periods of enduring peace enjoyed by Bulgaria in the past have occurred when she was integrated into this system of defence; but she never played that part of her own free will, and this may well have been the source of many of her troubles. In point of sober political fact, it was again for reasons of geography that, after a costly war, Russia liberated Bulgaria from Turkish rule in 1877. The Treaty of San Stefano that concluded that war would have made of Bulgaria a strong political and military unit, including the most substantial parts of the Balkan peninsula and reaching down to the AEgean Sea and the near approaches to Constantinople. For obvious reasons, the Great Powers in Western Europe were not prepared to accept a Russian advanced position of this strength, so dangerously near the Straits and commanding the important military and commercial routes to the Middle East. The Treaty of San Stefano underwent a wholesale revision at the Berlin Conference where Lord Beaconsfield was instrumental in bringing matters back to a more plausible shape. Bulgaria emerged as a diminutive principality, between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains, formerly under the Sultan's suzerainty. The southern half of the country, between the Balkan and the Rhodope Mountains, became a semi- autonomous province under somewhat mitigated Turkish rule, and was called Eastern Rumelia.

This solution, though disposing of the diplomatic difficulties of the moment, did not prove a lasting one. In I885 Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia declared their reunion under the Bulgarian ruler Prince Alexander of Battenberg. Encouraged by some of the Great Powers, Serbia reacted by immediately marching her troops into Bulgaria. In spite of military successes which took Bulgaria's ill-equipped army far into Serbia, the war ended without any advantage for Bulgaria, but the reunion with Eastern Rumelia had become an accomplished fact.

The Berlin settlement in 1878 left Macedonia and Thrace under Turkish authority. Although Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece had conflicting claims on parts of these territories, the three Balkan countries eventually made a secret military Alliance in 1912 and soon attacked Turkey. By the end of the year the Turks had lost Macedonia and the western part of Thrace. The Balkan allies quarrelled about the spoils and, in spite of the provision in their Alliance to submit disputes to the Tsar of Russia, in June, 1913, Bulgaria suddenly attacked the Serbs who were still her allies. Serbia, Greece and soon Roumania and Turkey fell upon Bulgaria and would have made an end of her but for the Great Powers' intervention. The Peace of Bucharest took away from Bulgaria considerable slices of territory, including the Southern Dobrudja which was given to Roumania. Bulgaria's relations with her neighbours became worse than ever, and when the European war broke out in I914, it was clear to all informed observers that she was not going to miss the opportunity for recovering territories lost in I913. At the end of the war, Bulgaria had to give back more than these territories.

1 This paper is by a highly qualified Bulgarian observer, who prefers for the present to remain anonymous.

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The last stage of the European War meant for Bulgaria military mutiny and a peasant revolution. Since the disappointing outcome of the Balkan wars in 1913, the majority of the peasant soldiers had lost faith in the judgement of the country's political rulers and when disaster came once again in September, 1918, the peasants' indignation broke into mutiny and open revolt against the authorities at the front and farther back at home. Having paid the heavy cost of a policy of ruthless nationalism, the organised peasantry, when it came to power after the war, was eager to put an end to militarism, to the so-called " national aspirations ", and to live in peace with the other Balkan countries. In spite of persistent attempts at repressing this frame of mind, it survived and provided a broad popular basis for the movement of resistance to the Government's pro-German policy since I939. The active support of these peasants, in conjunction with the genuine and widespread feeling of sympathy for Russia, made it possible to overpower the pro-German army officers and administration, and to send the bulk of the Army to fight against the Germans, a few weeks ago.

There would be no exaggeration in stating that the common people and most of the " intelligentsia " in Bulgaria realise by. now the absurdity of the nationalist policy aiming at a " Greater Bulgaria-from the Danube to the AEgean ". The country's complete isolation in the middle of the Balkans, its coming into armed conflict with all Great Powers, including Russia and Germany, have shown clearly the implications of that policy. It is felt by all now that, in the Balkans at any rate, small countries cannot frame and follow their own foreign or economic policy : the actual course of such policies depends in practice on the policy of the Great Powers interested in the area.-

It has been confirmed once again during the war that quarrels between Balkan countries can be created and/or fostered, as well as prevented or settled by energetic action of the Great Powers. The outcome of pre-war policies of autarky and economic nationalism convinced even the common man that, when pursued by Balkan States, such policies only increase their helplessness in time of political emergency: it is clear to everybody that if Bulgaria has come to " lend " Germany goods and services to the amount of seven times the pre-war budget receipts of the Sofia Government, the policies followed in the pre-war years and since the war had to do something with that shocking situation.

The most important, perhaps, of all lessons Bulgaria has learned during this war is that there can be no neutrality for a country in her geographic position and, at the same time, that hitching her coach to one Great Power's engine is likely to result in the coach being smashed before the engine has accomplished its appointed course. This lesson does not lead to any positive line of policy, but it undoubtedly has had a sobering effect on the mentality so often observed in political circles, according to which good diplomacy consists in playing off one Great Power against another in order to secure results without due regard to the general interests of the Balkans or to weighty issues at stake in or near that region.

What then, may be the average Bulgarian's idea of the conditions for a durable peace ? As far as the scanty information available allows us to form a judgement, the average Bulgarian is not aware of certain important aspects of the Great Powers' present European policy. German propaganda has deliberately and rather skilfully spread confusion over these issues, and the propaganda of the Allies-with the frequent exception of Russia-has not dealt with them in a clear and consistent way. It seems probable that, in their ignorance of the intricacies of inter-Allied relationships in other parts of the world, people in Bulgaria are inclined to over-simplify the interplay of forces, interests and influences in this part of Europe. Were the average Bulgarian more fully informed on these matters, his probable views on durable peace might be roughly as follows:

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(a) The Balkans should become an area of joint or at least coinciding interests of Great Britain and Russia. With the fading out of Germany, Britain will be one of the eternal pair of forces at play between the Danube and the Dardan- elles. If Britain and Russia can come to terms, for a length of time, over a joint, or concerted, or interlocking scheme for the strategic defence of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, then peace in the Balkans will become a practical possibility. On the other hand, lack of understanding and co-operation between Britain and Russia in this part of the world would lead straight back to the old state of affairs in Bulgaria; perhaps even to something worse, since this war has made it obvious that for defending efficiently the whole " neuralgic area "-Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East-the interested Great Power or its trusted ally must hold firmly the airfields along the Danube and south of the Balkans mountains.

(b) Germany must be prevented from embarking again on political or economic scheming in the Balkans, which schemiig is bound to'result in expansion towards the " neuralgic area ". Russia, or Great Britain, or both will again come to grips with that expansion, and Bulgaria, before becoming the Great Powers' battlefield, will again be an arena of political intrigue and internal strife.

(c) At the same time, it is essential that the considerable consuming capacity of Central Europe for Balkan products should be maintained: it would be difficult to find sufficient permanent outlets for these products elsewhere. The ideal would be a Central Europe economically prosperous but keeping within the framework of a code of behaviour enforced by timely and resolute action of the Great Powers.

(d) Russia is likely to prove a most powerful factor in the area-politically and, to a growing extent, economically also. The post-war progress of her planned transition from agriculture to industry may yield increasing purchasing power to the bulk of her people; this would enable the Soviet authorities to purchase enough Balkan goods to pay for Russia's exports of raw materials, agricultural Mlachinery and other manufactured goods badly needed by the Balkan countries. In such a case, the much shorter trade .-outes will prove a great advantage, especially for goods carried in bulk. Moreover, as Russia will be in great need of man-power, she may open her door to emigrant labour, especially from the Slavonic countries in the Balkans where agricultural and general unemployment is permanent. Should things develop in this way, Russia's influence over the Balkans would certainly take deep roots and grow from year to year. If future Russian statesmen-are not far-sighted enough to resist the temptation to follow Germany's path in this part of Europe, suspicion and apprehensions on the part of the other Great Powers will once again lead to war. It is the fervent hope of every thoughtful Bulgarian that these matters will be carefully considered and exhaustively discussed in full factual knowledge of the situation, when the general peace conditions are framed and the long- term relations between Britain and Russia are built up. In economic matters, no less than in politics, treaties -and agreements will have to be made to work and to be kept working after the documents have been signed and ratified.

(e) In her own interest and in the interest of all concerned, Bulgaria should not be allowed to relapse into her customary isolation in the middle of the Balkans. Isolated, she will always be a wedge driven into any structure of concerted defence or other co-operation, and will again have to pay the penalty for that. Her meagre resources and low standard of life also call for some kind of association with her neighbours for the purpose of securing a better basis for a common action of reconstruction and development of the Balkans. Bulgaria can be made to join a Balkan Union based on flexible economic and functional, rather than rigid political ties with all her neighbours: a group of two or three only of the Balkan countries would immediately lead to forming a " counter group " and split the Balkans into two hostile camps. For obvious

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reasons, a Balkan Union could be called into life only if there is preliminary and continuous agreement on this point between Russia and the other Great Powers concerned. Even before this war, there was in Bulgaria a strong popular support for a Balkan understanding. Official propaganda has consistently obscured the issue and stifled every genuine expression of good will in this direction. Nationalist extremism is not rooted in the feelings of the masses, but in the minds of badly " educated" politicians, job hunters and military officers. These people will count little immediately after the war while the bitter lessons will still be fresh in everybody's memory.

(f) A good method to avoid Balkan quarrels would be to set up an inter- national Council of Arbitration consisting. of the great and smaller countries directly interested in the.Balkans. Political and economic disputes between the Balkan States should be compulsorily brought before the Council whose procedure ought to be simple, quick and flexible. The Great Powers have at their disposal enough means of enforcing compliance with the Council's decisions, as well as of securing timely recourse to the Council in every case.

(g) There can be little doubt that, in the minds of very many Bulgarians, the late King Boris was personally responsible for the conduct of Bulgaria's foreign, affairs and for 'the consequences of the Alliance with Germany, the occupation of Greek and Yugoslav territory and for declaring war- on Great Britain and America. Many blame him also, though with apparently less solid ground, for the development of extremist nationalism and for his skilful fore- stalling of attempts at setting up true representation of the people in the Govern- ment since Stamboliisky's death in I923. Whether the monarchy as a form of government wilr survive these strong currents of popular opinion, is a question impossible to answer at the present juncture. It is at least open to doubt whether this issue will be allowed to remain a really internal affair in Bulgaria: the perennial considerations of geography and strategy might well make the issue a question of foreign as well as of home policy.

-(h) Apart from the short-lived Balkan Alliance made in I912 for the special purpose of war against Turkey, the only genuine and consistent efforts to live on good terms with the other Balkan countries were made by the peasant Government under Alexander Stamboliisky (I919-23). Judging by its conduct of home and foreign affairs with that aim constantly in' view, one might find enough ground for believing that the nationalistic trends which resumed their progress after the peasants' Government was overthrown, could have been held in check, if the majority of the population had been more adequately represented in Parliament and allowed more actual influence on the decisions of the Governments which followed. Whatever the future form of government in Bulgaria may be, a true and effective representation of the mass of its people will be of real importance, because it is likely to act as a brake on courses of policy advocated and supported by relatively small sections promoting their own interests or what they imagine to be the "glory and greatness" of the country, without much regard to the well-being of its people. Lack of close touch with the inadequately represented mass of the population has led even intelligent and well-meaning people to think of the nation as of an abstract entity distinct from the six and a half million men, women and children who are the nation.

(i) When- discussing the social-political aspect of post-war problems in Bulgaria, it is important to bear in mind that all political parties have been precluded by law from displaying any public activity, ever since I934. Although Parliament has been formally kept in being, as a matter of fact it has been a body of representatives returned on the basis of officially " approved " lists by voters who were forbidden to cast their votes as members of a Party. Politically important sections of the population (including large numbers of electors whose ideas and feelings were "to the Left", i.e. against extreme nationalism and Fascism) were reduced to virtual opposition, outside Parlia- ment. A widening rift occurred between the electorate represented in the

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Chamber and the electorate left out in the cold. Later on, when Professor Filov's Cabinet signed the Alliance with Germany (I March, I941) and Parlia- ment ratified that fateful decision, the split became still wider, though less apparent since the opposition had to go underground to avoid persecution. Party leadership, already on the decline in most of the political groupings, required -now a good deal of physical courage in addition to ability and skill. Few of the traditional leaders of the old Parties stood the severe test without flinching, especially when Bulgaria received territorial compensation for siding with the Axis. In more than one case, however, while Party leaders slipped, large numbers of the rank and file stood their ground and came to a clandestine understanding with other elements of the opposition throughout the country, which eventually coalesced into the collective structure of the " Fatherland Front "

This coalition might well prove now a formula of transition, but whatever its future might be, the old Parties as such have lost so much ground that, with the exception of the Communists and Agrarians, they have ceased to be really potent factors in Bulgaria's domestic political life. Developments in the field of foreign policy are bound to play a decisive part in the further shaping of the country's Party politics. It is to be hoped that the Party strongholds of intolerant nationalism and authoritarian aspirations have been dismantled for good, and that the main concern of Bulgaria's home politics in years to come will be with the people's welfare rather than with preparing the requisites for the fulfilment of Bulgaria's " historic mission ", or military supremacy in the Balkans. It would seem that such a trend of policy could be best secured by maintaining the broad " popular " basis on which home politics are working at present.

A larger and more real part played by the common people in the conduct of the country's affairs would achieve its purpose only if the popular education is put on a different and better basis: more factual and practical knowledge, less " adapted " history and pretentious hero-worship; more light on Bulgaria's real place in Europe, and on the importance of decent relations with her neighbours. For some twenty years past, the number of young people with university training has been much in excess of possible employment, and too many of them have drifted into useless Party politics, Fascist organisations and Govern- ment-sponsored "propaganda" formations on German and Italian models. A better balance between unproductive " intellectuals " and efficiently trained agriculturalists, industrial staff and workers, and business-men will not only improve the political aspect of Bulgaria's social life, but can contribute to the country's economic overhauling after the war.

The economic approach to this urgent problem might be more helpful than the search for purely educational solutions. A policy of economic development (possibly within the framework of a regional plan for the Balkans), if carried out with energy and consistency over a longer period, is likely to have cumulative effects in creating jobs for young people with university training, not only in trade, agriculture and industry, but also in public services and the administration. One of the vital needs of South-Eastern Europe is to enable the greatest number of its population to pay for essential goods and services available to the " common man " elsewhere. There will be little hope of lasting political improvement in this area as long as relatively large numbers of boys and girls can and do receive a twentieth-century education while the vast majority of the people (including many educated persons) can only afford to pay for a level of con- sumption not very much above that of the sixteenth century.

(j) The Bulgarian people, in its great majority, is clearly conscious of the wrong done by Bulgaria in this war. They know that heavy penalties will have to be paid for it. The retribution, however, should not result in making Bulgaria a permanent cripple nor in treating her more harshly than others who did the same thing or even worse than she did. By avoiding this and by acting firmly to keep Bulgaria within the Balkan fold, the Great Powers

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would do much for the securing of peace and order in the Balkans after the ink on 'the Treaties of Peace has dried.

It may prove a hard task to build the Balkan fold and to keep it together; but the difficulties inherent in the jigsaw-puzzle nature of the Balkans are likely to be greater if Bulgaria continues to be the missing piece, as it has been in the European War, the inner-war period and again in the present war. Bulgaria's *failure to see the enduring discrepancy between her real position in Europe and her own grossly ill-informed idea of that position are no doubt greatly to blame for the repeated blunders which have landed her in the mess where she is at present. But it cannot be denied that there were lengthy periods of time between 1926 and 1939 when genuine attempts at avoiding exclusive commit- ments came up against complete indifference and lack of interest on the part of Powers-great and smaller-who persisted in their belief that Bulgaria could not be expected to mend her ways and to seek salvation elsewhere than in the camp of her former Allies. The atmosphere is not likely to be very much different this time; and yet, for South-Eastern Europe as a whole, the only road clear of the well-known perils of the past leads through a political and economic structure of the Balkans which should make them an area of concerted policies of the Great Powers. With regard to Bulgaria, the question is not to forgive and forget, but to avoid repeating past mistakes and forestall future trouble. This could be achieved by devoting genuine interest to the idea of a Balkan Union and by making consistent efforts, on an agreed basis, for its translation into practical solutions. The part Great Britain can play in bringing about- such solutions needs no further emphasis.

X.

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Documents

Bulgarian Views on a Durable Peace