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Confidential. © 2020 IHS Markit®. All rights reserved.Confidential. © 2020 IHS Markit®. All rights reserved.

Piracy MonitorMonthly update on piracy risk to commercial shipping in the Gulf of Guinea,

off Somalia, and the Malay Peninsula

24 November 2020

Changes since last update on 27 October are highlighted in red

IHS Markit has recorded more than 2,100 piracy attacks

since 2006. The full data is available on request in an

Excel file for Piracy Monitor subscribers.

Confidential. © 2020 IHS Markit®. All rights reserved.

Executive Summary

2

Gulf of Guinea

3.4VERY HIGH

The piracy risk score for the Gulf of Guinea remains at

Very High 3.4, to which it was increased from High 3.3 in

December 2019. The sustained high level of attack

attempts reported in recent months shows no sign of

reducing. The main risks are crew kidnap for ransom,

and theft of ships’ stores and/or personal property,

rather than cargo theft.

Somalia

Malay Peninsula

2.1ELEVATED

The piracy risk score for the Somalia risk area remains

at Elevated 2.1, to which it was reduced from Elevated

2.2 in September 2019, taking account of the sustained

reduction in attempts at piracy by small numbers of

Somalia-based pirates, invariably deterred by the

presence of onboard armed security and the use of

evasive measures.

1.9ELEVATED

The general piracy risk score for the Malay Peninsula

remains at Elevated 1.9, at which it was set in April

2020. The risk for cargo theft from oil tankers off the

Malay Peninsula remains at Low 0.4, to which it was

reduced from Moderate 0.8 in October 2018, given the

sustained absence of attacks targeting tankers for cargo

theft since September 2017.

1 1 1

52

14

1

5 2 31 1 1

3

6

5

5

4

2

3

12 3 2

5

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1 13

1 2 1 1 1 2 10

2

4

6

8

10

12

12 3 2 2 3 2 1 22

2

4 22

1

2 1

11

4

1

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

November 2020Number of piracy attacks by month

Failed Attacks

Successful Attacks

Unknown

6-Month Rolling Average


• Most piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is conducted

in Nigerian and other territorial waters,

targeting tankers, other cargo vessels, minor

support vessels and oil rigs. The main

motivation is kidnapping for ransom and/or

theft of ship or personal property. Tankers

have also been targeted for oil theft.

• Incidents of piracy are likely to be more

frequent between November and January

when conditions in the Gulf of Guinea are

calm enough for pirates to operate mother

ships further out at sea, where it is more

difficult for the Nigerian navy to spot them.

• The last fully successful oil theft was on 5

August 2016, from a berthed tanker at Apapa,

Lagos, Nigeria.

3

Gulf of Guinea


RISK ASSESSMENT:

VERY HIGH 3.4

Photo by Jason Florio/Corbis via Getty Images


4

Gulf of Guinea - Data Insights

Main Motives (successful attacks in last 12 months)

Kidnap for Ransom 82% (28 attacks)

Petty Theft 15% (5 attacks)

Cargo Theft 3% (1 attack)

Vessel Hijack 0% (0 attacks)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

200

8 Q

1

200

8 Q

2

200

8 Q

3

200

8 Q

4

200

9 Q

1

200

9 Q

2

200

9 Q

3

200

9 Q

4

201

0 Q

1

201

0 Q

2

201

0 Q

3

201

0 Q

4

201

1 Q

1

201

1 Q

2

201

1 Q

3

201

1 Q

4

201

2 Q

1

201

2 Q

2

201

2 Q

3

201

2 Q

4

201

3 Q

1

201

3 Q

2

201

3 Q

3

201

3 Q

4

201

4 Q

1

201

4 Q

2

201

4 Q

3

201

4 Q

4

201

5 Q

1

201

5 Q

2

201

5 Q

3

201

5 Q

4

201

6 Q

1

201

6 Q

2

201

6 Q

3

201

6 Q

4

201

7 Q

1

201

7 Q

2

201

7 Q

3

201

7 Q

4

201

8 Q

1

201

8 Q

2

201

8 Q

3

201

8 Q

4

201

9 Q

1

201

9 Q

2

201

9 Q

3

201

9 Q

4

202

0 Q

1

202

0 Q

2

202

0 Q

3

202

0 Q

4

Unknown Success Failed 3-Year Rolling Average

Long-term Trend (number of piracy attacks by quarter)

Source: IHS Markit © 2020 IHS Markit

Threat to Crew (last 12 months)

51%(22 of 43)

5 7 170Likelihood of boarding

for underway vessels

if targeted

Crew members

killed

Crew members

injured

Crew members

taken hostage

Note: Data for latest quarter may be incomplete


5

Gulf of Guinea - Geospatial Insights


6

Gulf of Guinea - Most Recent Attacks(Identified Merchant Vessels Only)

AM DELTA

General Cargo Vessel

16 November 2020: At 44 nautical miles south of Brass in the Niger Delta, at least six armed men boarded the

Ghana-flagged general cargo vessel 'AM DELTA', abducting five crew, believed to be Ghanaian nationals; the

onboard communications and navigation equipment were reported to have been damaged.

JANE

Tanker

11 November 2020: At 05:12N–002:35E, eight armed pirates, onboard a skiff, opened fire and attempted to board

the Marshall-Islands flagged underway tanker 'JANE', damaging the bridge and accommodation area; they gave

up the chase when the master commenced evasive manoeuvres.

BOB BARKER

Fisheries Patrol Vessel

9 November 2020: At 04:26N-002:42E, at least seven armed pirates in a skiff attempted to approach the

Netherlands-flagged fisheries patrol vessel 'BOB BARKER’, but gave up the chase after 10 minutes when

Beninese guards onboard fired warning shots.

LA BOHEME

Tanker

9 November 2020: At 04:45.42N-002:26.83E, pirates in two skiffs opened fire and attempted to board the

Marshall-Islands flagged tanker 'LA BOHEME’, but later aborted the attack when the master and the crew

commenced evasive manoeuvres; vessel and crew were reported safe.

TORM ALEXANDRA

Tanker

7 November 2020: At 03:31N-002:34E, armed pirates boarded the Singapore-flagged underway tanker 'TORM

ALEXANDRA’, but fled when anti-piracy preventive measures were adopted; the Benin Navy dispatched a patrol

boat, and the Italian Navy dispatched a frigate and helicopter; the crew were reported safe.

WESLEY

Tanker

7 November 2020: At 03:35.9N–004:36.3E, seven armed pirates attempted to board the Marshall-Islands flagged

underway product tanker 'WESLEY’, but gave up the chase when the armed team onboard displayed weapons

and fired three warning shots; the crew were reported safe.

NAFELI II

Tanker

4 November 2020: At 02:43.92N–006:02.81E, at least six armed pirates boarded the panama-flagged tanker

'NAFELI II', stole ship's stores and destroyed bridge equipment before fleeing; the alarm was raised and local

authorities were notified; a security vessel was dispatched which later escorted the crew to a safe port.


• Piracy off the coast of Somalia has reduced

significantly in recent years, and now targets

mainly small fishing vessels; attacks against

larger commercial vessels are usually deterred

or aborted due to the presence of onboard

armed security.

• Piracy is likely to remain at the current low level

in the 12-month outlook, because syndicates

operating in north-eastern Somalia are focused

on more profitable and less risky criminal

activities onshore.

• The hijack of the tanker ‘Aris 13’ in March 2017

is still the most recent hijack of a commercially

significant vessel.

7

Somalia


RISK ASSESSMENT:

ELEVATED 2.1

Photo by Mohamed Dahir/AFP via Getty Images


8

Somalia - Data Insights


Vessel Hijack - (0 attacks)

Kidnap for Ransom - (0 attacks)

Petty Theft - (0 attacks)

Cargo Theft - (0 attack)


0%(0 of 14)



if targeted

Crew members

killed

Crew members

injured

Crew members

taken hostage

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

200

8 Q

2

200

8 Q

3

200

8 Q

4

200

9 Q

1

200

9 Q

2

200

9 Q

3

200

9 Q

4

201

0 Q

1

201

0 Q

2

201

0 Q

3

201

0 Q

4

201

1 Q

1

201

1 Q

2

201

1 Q

3

201

1 Q

4

201

2 Q

1

201

2 Q

2

201

2 Q

3

201

2 Q

4

201

3 Q

1

201

3 Q

2

201

3 Q

3

201

3 Q

4

201

4 Q

1

201

4 Q

2

201

4 Q

3

201

4 Q

4

201

5 Q

1

201

5 Q

2

201

5 Q

3

201

5 Q

4

201

6 Q

1

201

6 Q

2

201

6 Q

3

201

6 Q

4

201

7 Q

1

201

7 Q

2

201

7 Q

3

201

7 Q

4

201

8 Q

1

201

8 Q

2

201

8 Q

3

201

8 Q

4

201

9 Q

1

201

9 Q

2

201

9 Q

3

201

9 Q

4

202

0 Q

1

202

0 Q

2

202

0 Q

3

202

0 Q

4






9

Somalia - Geospatial Insights


10

Somalia - Most Recent Attacks(Identified Merchant Vessels Only)

STOLT APAL

Tanker

17 May 2020: At 13:43N-053:7.4E in the Gulf of Aden, armed perpetrators in two speedboats attacked and

opened fire on the British-flagged chemical tanker 'Stolt Apal'; the onboard armed security team returned fire,

disabling one skiff and ending the chase; the ship's bridge sustained minor damage, but no injuries were reported.

MONTE URBASA

Crude Oil Tanker

3 March 2020: At 14:02N-052:35E, the crude oil tanker ‘Monte Urbasa' was reportedly approached by three small

craft, one of which was unmanned; the skiffs later moved away when anti-piracy preventive measures were

adopted by the crew members.

HAIZEA LAU

Fishing Support Vessel

3 May 2019: Off the coast of Somalia, suspected pirates, in a skiff, approached the Seychelles-flagged fishing

support vessel ‘Haizea Lau’, but later gave up the chase when the fishing vessel managed to flee at full speed.

SHIN SHUEN FAR 889

Fishing Vessel

21 April 2019: The Chinese Taipei flagged fishing vessel 'Shin Shuen Far 889' was reportedly approached by two

skiffs which aborted the attack when Armed Private Maritime Security Contractors (APMSC) onboard displayed

their weapons.

TXORI ARGI

Fishing Vessel

21 April 2019: At 00:57S-048:39E, the fishing vessel 'Txori Argi' was fired upon by one skiff when it went to aid

the fishing vessel 'Adria' in an attack launched by two skiffs and a Yemeni fishing dhow used by the pirates as a

mothership; a security team onboard the Adria returned fire, forcing the skiffs to retreat.

ADRIA

Fishing Vessel

21 April 2019: At 00:29S-048:36E, the fishing vessel 'Adria' was approached by two skiffs and a Yemeni fishing

dhow used by the pirates as a mothership; a second trawler 'Txori Argi' went to its aid and was fired upon by one

of the skiffs; a security team onboard the Adria returned fire, forcing the skiffs to retreat.

STENA IMPERIAL

Tanker

3 November 2018: At 13:04N-043:09E, two skiffs, with four to five persons onboard each, approached the tanker

‘Stena Imperial' twice, but later gave up the chase when a security team onboard fired warning flares; the crew

and the vessel were reported safe.


Maritime Security Transit Corridor

The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) extends into the Red Sea from the Internationally Recommended Transit

Corridor (IRTC), through the Bab al Mandeb Strait and west of the Hanish Islands. All vessels are recommended to use

the MSTC to benefit from military presence and surveillance.

11

Source: https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2017/09/06/guidance-on-maritime-security-transit-corridor/

https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2017/09/06/guidance-on-maritime-security-transit-corridor/


• All piracy incidents reported in the past two

years involved petty theft of valuables from the

crew or spare parts from the engine room, or

theft of scrap metal from open barges.

• Kidnap for ransom or hijacking of vessels for

cargo theft remain unlikely in the one-year

outlook. Perpetrators very rarely carry firearms

and often abort attacks once the crew is alerted

to their presence.

• The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to trigger an

increase in piracy in the Singapore Strait and off

the Malay Peninsula over the coming months,

as unemployment and sudden loss of income

are likely to drive a greater number of

individuals towards piracy.

12

Malay Peninsula


RISK ASSESSMENT:

ELEVATED 1.9

Photo by Yuli Seperi/Getty Images

RISK ASSESSMENT:

LOW 0.4

Cargo Theft from Oil Tankers

The last successful attack involving oil theft from a

tanker, the ‘Joaquim’, was in the Malacca Strait on 8

August 2015. On 6 September 2017, 900 tonnes of

diesel were siphoned off the product tanker ’MGT 1’

off northern Malaysia.


13

Malay Peninsula - Data Insights


Petty Theft 90% (19 attacks)

Cargo Theft 10% (2 attacks)

Kidnap for Ransom - (0 attacks)

Vessel Hijack - (0 attacks)


94%(34 of 36)



if targeted

Crew members

killed

Crew members

injured

Crew members

taken hostage

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

2013Q4

2014Q1

2014Q2

2014Q3

2014Q4

2015Q1

2015Q2

2015Q3

2015Q4

2016Q1

2016Q2

2016Q3

2016Q4

2017Q1

2017Q2

2017Q3

2017Q4

2018Q1

2018Q2

2018Q3

2018Q4

2019Q1

2019Q2

2019Q3

2019Q4

2020Q1

2020Q2

2020Q3

2020Q4






14

Malay Peninsula - Geospatial Insights


15

Malay Peninsula - Most Recent Attacks(Identified Merchant Vessels Only)

ATLANTIC DIANA

Bulk Carrier

9 November 2020: Around 5.7 nm northwest of Tanjung Pergam, Pulau Bintan in Indonesia, crew onboard the

Panama-flagged underway bulk carrier 'ATLANTIC DIANA' spotted a robber, armed with a knife, in the area of

steering gear and raised the alarm; a search operation was carried out and nothing was reported stolen.

LEFKADA

Bulk Carrier

9 November 2020: Around 5.4 nm southeast of Tanjung Ramunia, East Johor, crew onboard the underway

Liberia-flagged bulk carrier 'LEFKADA' spotted two robbers in the engine room locker and immediately raised the

alarm; during a search operation an oil spill equipment locker was found unlocked and a lifebuoy was missing.

ZENO

Tanker

8 November 2020: At 01:16N-104:12E, crew onboard the Liberia-flagged underway tanker ‘ZENO’ spotted three

robbers in the engine room and immediately notified the VTIS; a search operation was carried out and ship's

stores were reported stolen.

A RACER

Bulk Carrier

26 October 2020: At 01:14N-104:04E, five robbers boarded the Liberia-flagged underway bulk Carrier 'A RACER'

but fled empty-handed when the alarm was raised; none of the crew members were hurt and nothing was

reported stolen.

SEAJOURNEY

Bulk Carrier

25 October 2020: At 01:15N-104:05.8E, duty crewman onboard an underway Marshall Islands-flagged bulk

carrier ‘SEAJOURNEY’ spotted five robbers, armed with knives, in the engine storeroom and immediately raised

the alarm; seeing an alerted crew the robbers fled with engine stores; the VTIS was notified promptly.

IAN M

Bulk Carrier

14 October 2020: At 01:17N-104:20E, robbers boarded Liberia-flagged underway bulk carrier 'IAN M' and stole a

life ring and some welding rods before fleeing; the Port Operations Control Centre was notified promptly, and

search operation was carried out.

FSL NEW YORK

Tanker

13 October 2020: At 01:16N-104:15E, crew onboard the Singapore-flagged underway chemical tanker 'FSL NEW

YORK' spotted three robbers on the vessel and immediately raised the alarm and notified Port Operations Control

Centre; a search operation was carried out and nothing was reported stolen.


Appendix: Methodology

16


17

Sea area between 4°30'W 5°8'44.274"N

and 3°6'13.966"W 2°20'12.8"N in the west,

and 9°46'18.636"E 2°20'12.8"N

(Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea border) in

the east.

Sea area and to 65° E off the Somali

coast, bound to the north by latitude 23°30

N, and bound to the south by 12°S and in

the Red Sea by 14°N

Singapore Strait in its entirety and the

South China Sea bound at 4°N to the

north, 1°N to the south and 106°E to the

east’.

IHS Markit country risk analysts score risks based on their own expert understanding of the security and

political environment. In addition to in-house expertise and models, IHS Markit draws on experts in the

field and in-country sources with proven records of reliability. Our wide network of external analysts and

contacts gives us access to local, specific, and granular information.

Risk is scored on a 0.1-10 scale. The scale is logarithmic, with intervals of 0.1 magnitude. This range is

split into seven bands, ranging from Low to Extreme risk. Each score represents the average expected

level of risk over the coming year.

The full documentation of IHS Markit’s Violent Risk Methodology can be found here.

Risk Area Definitions

Risk Scoring Methodology

Gulf of Guinea Risk Area Somalia Risk Area Malay Peninsula Risk Area

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18

Contact

Columb Strack

Principal Analyst - Global Cargo Risk

IHS Markit Country Risk

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]