2
Washington, DC Target: Museum Attack Type: Small Arms (Executed) Dallas, TX Target: Bank branch in commercial office building Attack Type: Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (Disrupted) Silver Spring, MD Target: Commercial office building Attack Type: Small Arms/ Hostage/IEDs (Executed) Catonsville, MD Target: Military Recruiting Center Attack Type: Vehicle-borne IED (Disrupted) Washington, DC Target: Pentagon Attack Type: Small Arms (Executed) Washington, DC Target: Pentagon Attack Type: IED via remote- controlled aircraft (Disrupted) Tampa, FL Target: Commercial Retail Complex Attack Type: Vehicle-borne IED and Small Arms (Disrupted) Chicago, IL Target: Bar/Restaurant Attack Type: Vehicle-borne IED (Disrupted) New York, NY Target: Federal Reserve Bank Attack Type: Vehicle-borne explosive device (Disrupted) Washington, DC Target: U.S. Capitol Building Attack Type: Firearms/suicide vest (Disrupted) Oak Creek, WI Target: Religious Worship Center Attack Type: Small Arms (Executed) Oakland, CA Target: Bank branch in commercial office building Attack Type: Vehicle-borne IED (Disrupted) JUN 2009 SEPT 2009 SEPT 2010 DEC 2010 MAR 2010 SEPT 2011 JAN 2012 FEB 2012 AUG 2012 SEPT 2012 OCT 2012 FEB 2013 (U) First Responder Response Considerations: (U//FOUO) Conducting periodic exercises with building authorities and interagency partners will help responders tailor a coordinated response to the unique security characteristics of the site and increase efficiency during an emergency. Engagement with partners may address a number of issues including: » (U//FOUO) Building emergency response plans that identify the key staff members to assist and advise first responders as well as their roles and responsibilities during crisis; » (U//FOUO) Interior building control points which may limit responder access to areas and affect the rapid deployment of tools and equipment; » (U//FOUO) Building access control systems: the availability of master keys or swipe cards to provide full access and/or entry into restricted areas; » (U//FOUO) The existence of exterior building security measures which may affect the placement of response vehicles or the ability to ventilate building and rescue victims; » (U//FOUO) Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors to maintain situational awareness and to assist with accountability and evacuation of building occupants; and » (U//FOUO) Suspicious activity reporting training to building staff and tenants to help identify and disrupt potential preoperational activity or actual attacks. (U) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Homeland Counterterrorism Division, the Field Analytic Support Taskforce, the FBI Directorate of Intelligence, and the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector first responders in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States. Coordinated with the I&A Homeland Counterterrorism Division, Terrorist Tactic and Targets Branch; the Transportation Security Administration, Office of Intelligence and Analysis; National Protection and Programs Directorate, the Office of Infrastructure Protection; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, US Fire Administration. (U) All US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at [email protected], [email protected], or [email protected]. (U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS. IA-0035-14 UNCLASSIFED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Open Publicly accessible buildings—such as hotels, movie theaters, shopping malls, and places of worshipwhere security may be limited to passive measures such as: » Intrusion alarms » Recorded CCTV » Key cards for after-hour access and elevator use » Limited visible security Controlled Commercial buildings—including sightseeing attractions and office or apartment buildings—may or may not require: » Key cards or identification for entry » Visitors be announced and given badges » Central mailroom and package screening » On-site security Restricted Government buildings—including those owned or leased by federal, state, local, or tribal governments—are more likely to have strong access restrictions in place, such as: » Requiring photo identification and badges for entry » Requiring visitors be pre-approved and escorted » Personnel and package screening » Armed security UNCLASSIFED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) Building Security Measures May Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists (U//FOUO) Facility security measures, such as interior control points or exterior barriers, may require first responders to adjust normal protocols and procedures to operate rapidly during emergencies. The timeline below is an overview of attacks and plots against US-based facilities with varying levels of security. The diversity of tactics and targets used underscores the need for interagency exercises and training that incorporates multiple scenarios to account for building security measures likely to be encountered. 6 December 2013 (U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx. (U) Report Suspicious Activity FIRE LINE INTELLIGENCE FOR FIRE, RESCUE, AND EMS In Collaboration with the JCAT UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

Building Security Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists Report

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Page 1: Building Security Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists Report

Washington, DCTarget: MuseumAttack Type: Small Arms (Executed)

Dallas, TXTarget: Bank branch in commercial office buildingAttack Type: Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (Disrupted)

Silver Spring, MDTarget: Commercial office building Attack Type:Small Arms/ Hostage/IEDs(Executed)

Catonsville, MDTarget: Military Recruiting CenterAttack Type: Vehicle-borne IED (Disrupted)

Washington, DC Target: PentagonAttack Type: Small Arms (Executed)

Washington, DC Target: PentagonAttack Type: IED via remote-controlled aircraft (Disrupted)

Tampa, FL Target: Commercial Retail ComplexAttack Type: Vehicle-borne IED and Small Arms (Disrupted)

Chicago, ILTarget: Bar/RestaurantAttack Type: Vehicle-borne IED (Disrupted)

New York, NYTarget: Federal Reserve Bank Attack Type: Vehicle-borne explosive device (Disrupted)

Washington, DCTarget: U.S. Capitol BuildingAttack Type: Firearms/suicide vest (Disrupted) Oak Creek, WI

Target: Religious Worship Center Attack Type: Small Arms(Executed)

Oakland, CATarget: Bank branch in commercial office building Attack Type: Vehicle-borne IED (Disrupted)

JUN 2009 SEPT 2009 SEPT 2010 DEC 2010 MAR 2010 SEPT 2011 JAN 2012 FEB 2012 AUG 2012 SEPT 2012 OCT 2012 FEB 2013

(U) First Responder Response Considerations:

(U//FOUO) Conducting periodic exercises with building authorities and interagency partners will help responders tailor a coordinated response to the unique security characteristics of the site and increase efficiency during an emergency. Engagement with partners may address a number of issues including:

» (U//FOUO) Building emergency response plans that identify the key staff members to assist and advise first responders as well as their roles and responsibilities during crisis; » (U//FOUO) Interior building control points which may limit responder access to areas and affect the rapid deployment of tools and equipment; » (U//FOUO) Building access control systems: the availability of master keys or swipe cards to provide full access and/or entry into restricted areas; » (U//FOUO) The existence of exterior building security measures which may affect the placement of response vehicles or the ability to ventilate building and rescue victims; » (U//FOUO) Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitors to maintain situational awareness and to assist with accountability and evacuation of building occupants; and » (U//FOUO) Suspicious activity reporting training to building staff and tenants to help identify and disrupt potential preoperational activity or actual attacks.

(U) Prepared by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Homeland Counterterrorism Division, the Field Analytic Support Taskforce, the FBI Directorate of Intelligence, and the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team. This product is intended to assist federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector first responders in effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist attacks against the United States. Coordinated with the I&A Homeland Counterterrorism Division, Terrorist Tactic and Targets Branch; the Transportation Security Administration, Office of Intelligence and Analysis; National Protection and Programs Directorate, the Office of Infrastructure Protection; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, US Fire Administration.

(U) All US person information has been minimized. Should you require the minimized US person information, please contact the I&A Production Branch at [email protected], [email protected], or [email protected].

(U) Warning: This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). This document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need to know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized critical infrastructure and key resource personnel and private sector security officials without further approval from DHS.

IA-0035-14

UNCLASSIFED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OpenPublicly accessible buildings—such as hotels, movie theaters, shopping malls, and places of worship—where security may be limited to passive measures such as:» Intrusion alarms» Recorded CCTV» Key cards for after-hour access and elevator use» Limited visible security

ControlledCommercial buildings—including sightseeing attractions and office or apartment buildings—may or may not require: » Key cards or identification for entry » Visitors be announced and given badges » Central mailroom and package screening » On-site security

Restricted

Government buildings—including those owned or leased by federal, state, local, or tribal governments—are more likely to have strong access restrictions in place, such as: » Requiring photo identification and badges for entry » Requiring visitors be pre-approved and escorted » Personnel and package screening » Armed security

UNCLASSIFED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) Building Security Measures May Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists (U//FOUO) Facility security measures, such as interior control points or exterior barriers, may require first responders to adjust normal protocols and procedures to operate rapidly during emergencies. The timeline below is an overview of attacks and plots against US-based facilities with varying levels of security. The diversity of tactics and targets used underscores the need for interagency exercises and training that incorporates multiple scenarios to account for building security measures likely to be encountered.

6 December 2013

(U) To report suspicious activity, law enforcement, Fire-EMS, private security personnel, and emergency managers should follow established protocols; all other personnel should call 911 or contact local law enforcement. Suspicious activity reports (SARs) will be forwarded to the appropriate fusion center and FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force for further action. For more information on the Nationwide SAR Initiative, visit http://nsi.ncirc.gov/resources.aspx.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

FIRE LINEINTELLIGENCE FOR FIRE, RESCUE, AND EMSIn Collaboration with the JCAT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2: Building Security Impact Emergency Response to Attacks by Violent Extremists Report

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CLASSIFICATION:REV: 12 July 2013Product Serial Number:

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