Building Peace by Intercultural Dialogue Construction de - TamPub

Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto (eds.)

Building Peaceby Intercultural

Dialogue

Construction de la Paixpar le DialogueInterculturel

Building Peace by Intercultural Dialogue

Construction de la Paix par le Dialogue Interculturel

Tampere Peace Research InstituteOccasional Paper No. 97, 2008

Building Peace by

Intercultural Dialogue

Essays in Honour of Professor Tuomo Melasuo on the Occasion of his 60th birthday

Construction de la Paix par

le Dialogue Interculturel

Mélanges en l’honneur de la 60èmeanniversaire du Professeur Tuomo Melasuo

Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto (editors éditeurs)

Tampere Peace Research Institute TAPRIFI-33014 University of Tampere, Finlandwww.uta.fi/tapri

© Authors & TAPRI

Layout: Kirsi HenrikssonCover design: Katri WalleniusProofreading: Joan Löfgren, Tiina Kanninen, Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto

ISBN: 978–951–706–212–1ISSN: 0355–5577

Printed by Gummerus PrintingJyväskylä 2nd edition

Institut de Recherche de la Paix à Tampere TAPRIFI-33014 Université de Tampere, Finlandewww.uta.fi/tapri

© Auteurs & TAPRI

Mise en page : Kirsi HenrikssonRéalisation de couverture : Katri WalleniusRévision de langage : Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto

ISBN: 978–951–706–212–1ISSN: 0355–5577

Imprimé par Gummerus PrintingJyväskylä2ème édition

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CONTENTS

CONTENU

Tabula Gratulatoria.............................................................................................................9

Introduction (in English & en français)

Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto................................................................................15

1Algeria: Past, Present, Future

Algérie: Passé, Présent, Avenir

Algerian women in movement: three waves of feminist activism

Valentine M. Moghadam....................................................................................................21

«Le mal vient de l’extérieur»: les socialistes français et le problème

algérien

Kirsi Henriksson.....................................................................................................................49

La diplomatie algérienne au XXIè siècle

Lotfi Boumghar.....................................................................................................................67

Algeria nuoren silmin

Karim Maiche.........................................................................................................................73

2Peace Research – Development Studies:

Approaches to Conflicts and Development

Recherche sur la paix – Études du développement : approches sur conflits et développement

Who is progressive today? Thoughts on sustainable development

in a globalized but unjust economy

Jan Otto Andersson..............................................................................................................83

Quo vadis kehitys(maa)tutkimus?

Pertti Multanen.....................................................................................................................91

Peace and democracy in Wilhelm Bolin’s political philosophy

Jyrki Käkönen.........................................................................................................................99

How many wars, how many dead, how many peace deals?

Unto Vesa.............................................................................................................................115

A troubled relationship: peace research and emancipation

Tarja Väyrynen....................................................................................................................127

Touch and vision

Frank Möller.........................................................................................................................135

3Cultural and Political Encounters in the Mediterranean

Rencontres culturels et politiques autour de la Méditerranée

Tuomo Melasuo, un finlandese per il Dialogo euro-mediterraneo

Salvatore Bono....................................................................................................................149

Réflexions sur le processus de Barcelone 1995–2008

Paul Balta.............................................................................................................................157

Les deux rives de la Méditerranée : toujours les mêmes asymétries

Ahmed Driss.........................................................................................................................165

Les enjeux méditerranéens de la crise européenne

Jean-Robert Henry.............................................................................................................175

Barcelonan prosessista Välimeren Unioniin – mihin sillä pyritään?

Risto Veltheim.....................................................................................................................183

Cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean: where is the common

ground?

Traugott Schoefthaler.......................................................................................................193

Islamic Cairo imagined: from a historical city slum to a time machine for

tourism?

Susanna Myllylä.................................................................................................................215

Economic challenges facing Jordan within the Euromed context

Seyfeddin Muaz..................................................................................................................235

What kind of security policies between the Maghreb, the US and the EU?

Ulla Holm..............................................................................................................................245

4Occidentalism – Orientalism: Approaches to Otherness

Orientalisme – Occidentalisme : approches sur l’altérité

From Orientalism to Occidentalism

Hassan Hanafi.....................................................................................................................257

Islam, Europe, Occident : combats pour un humanisme commun

Mohammed Arkoun..........................................................................................................267

The implications of Arab Islamic influence on the Italian Renaissance for

the Europeanization of Europe’s Muslims today

Peter Gran.............................................................................................................................303

Islamism: amity and enmity

Mehdi Mozaffari.................................................................................................................319

The Prophet’s tradition or modernity of the state – the case of Turkish

hadith project

Sylvia Akar............................................................................................................................329

The secularising force of engaged religion: reflections on Iranian and

Egyptian Islamism

Bjørn Olav Utvik..................................................................................................................335

Globalised Islam and the Alliance of Civilizations

Kirsti Westphalen...............................................................................................................349

Authors – Auteurs............................................................................................................357


Tabula Gratulatoria

Esa Aallas

Aulis Aarnio

Sylvia Akar

Matti Alestalo

Jan Otto Andersson

Luigi G. de Anna

Esko Antola

Claude Anttila

Osmo Apunen

Caterina Arcidiacono

Mohammed Arkoun

Saâd Baddou

Paul Balta

Salvatore Bono

Olavi Borg

Anasse Bouhlal

Lotfi Boumghar

Inga Brandell

Michele Brondino

François Burgat

Michele Capasso

Louis Clerc

Ahmed Driss

Sauli Feodorow

Tuomas Forsberg

Yves Gambier

10


Tabula Gratulatoria

Peter Gran

Sinikka Hakala

Hassan Hanafi

Risto Heiskala

Kirsi Henriksson

Jean-Robert Henry

Nils G. Holm

Ulla Holm

Zabrina Holmström

Vesa Jaakkola

May Jayyusi

Pirjo Jukarainen

Martti Julkunen

Pirkko Julkunen

Matti Jutila

Veli-Pekka Järvinen

Jorma Kalela

Nora Kalso

Tiina Kanninen

Kari Karanko

Ari Kerkkänen

Matti Klinge

Jukka Kultalahti

Olli Kultalahti

Anitta Kynsilehto

Christian Krötzl

Jyrki Käkönen

Rilli Lappalainen

Marnia Lazreg

11


Tabula Gratulatoria

Marko Lehti

Liisa Liimatainen

Pertti Luntinen

Mikko Lohikoski

Joan Löfgren

Ahmed Mahiou

Karim Maiche

Helena Manninen-Visuri

Tuomas Martikainen

Pekka Masonen

Simon Mercieca

Timo Moberg

Valentine M. Moghadam

Mehdi Mozaffari

Seyfeddin Muaz

Pertti Multanen

Juhani Mylly

Susanna Myllylä

Frank Möller

Anssi Männistö

Arto Nokkala

Kaarle Nordenstreng

Kari Norkonmaa

Jussi Nuorteva

Matti Ojanperä

Jussi Pakkasvirta

Heikki Paloheimo

Samu Pehkonen

Franco Rizzi

12


Tabula Gratulatoria

Allan Rosas

Lars Rudebeck

Antti Rytövuori

Helena Rytövuori-Apunen

M’hammed Sabour

Sylvain Sagne

Traugott Schoefthaler

Tarja Seppä

Jorma Sipilä

Timo Soikkanen

Gianluca Solera

Ilkka Taipale

Maaret Tervonen

Maila-Katriina Tuominen

Rauni Turkia

Klaus Törnudd

Bjørn Olav Utvik

Katri Wallenius

Krista Varantola

Tapio Varis

Olli Vehviläinen

Risto Veltheim

Unto Vesa

Lars Wessman

Kirsti Westphalen

Knut S. Vikør

Keijo Virtanen

Pekka Visuri

Kyösti Vuontela

13


Tabula Gratulatoria

Ulla Vuorela

Tarja Väyrynen

Kaarlo Yrttiaho

Kaj Öhrnberg

Markku Äärimaa

Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland

Donnerska Institutet, Stiftelsen för Åbo Akademi

Poliittisen historian laitos, Turun yliopisto

Suomalais-Ranskalainen Teknillistieteellinen Seura

Suomen Lähi-idän instituutin säätiö

Suomen rauhantutkimusyhdistys

Suomen Unesco-toimikunta

Tampereen yliopiston tukisäätiö

Ulkopoliittinen instituutti

Universitá del Mediterraneo

Yhteiskuntatutkimuksen instituutti, Tampereen yliopisto


Introduction

Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto

The building of peace through intercultural dialogue is a recurring theme we have identified in Tuomo’s work. Rather than using “peace-building” in its conventional form, by our choice of building peace we wish to highlight the long-term dimensions of evolving peaceful relations. This can hardly be achieved without intercultural dialogue, understood as open and respectful engagement in the exchange of views by groups and individuals from different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. Intercultural dialogue is ultimately about people; about persons coming from different backgrounds who are willing to come together, share ideas and engage in dialogue with each other in a constructive spirit of mutual respect and understanding. It thus stands in opposition to rejection and violence.

At the present day of intercultural and intracultural relations, in which peace is mostly forgotten while trying to achieve “security” in its different forms, peace research provides critical tools to analyse these complex relations. As we see it, Tuomo entered peace research via the Third World movement, tiersmondisme, which was closely connected to the decolonisation process. From this context raises also Tuomo’s interest towards the development studies. His approach to formerly colonized countries has always been that of equal opportunities and respect which, sadly, are still missing in relations between “North” and “South.”

Algeria is the country that first caught Tuomo’s attention and it is the country that he has followed closely ever since. Along with his specific interest in Algeria, North Africa and Middle East have been close to his heart. Instead of focusing on polarized conflicts, he has always emphasised different ways of building bridges across the Mediterranean. Indeed, Tuomo has been the most prominent Finnish personality in advocating the Mediterranean partnership. The current forms of Euro-Mediterranean partnership or the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean as the title for this multilateral cooperation currently stands is one form of bridge-building across the Mediterranean. In enhancement of the cultural cooperation in the area, the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures was established in 2005. Here, Tuomo was selected as a member of the Advisory Council, and

16 Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto


he was also nominated as the coordinator for the Finnish National Network for the Anna Lindh Foundation since the beginning. In addition, Tuomo has been present in the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) and the FEMISE-network, thus being the person who is perhaps the most familiar with the different forms of cooperation across the Mediterranean within the Euro-Mediterranean mega-region.

This Festschrift has been composed with two main intentions: to thematically handle some of those versatile topics that Tuomo has worked on during his career; and to reveal the extensive international network that Tuomo has been knitting during these years, helping also his students to connect into this network. It is time to acknowledge his work as an “unofficial diplomat” of Finland especially in the Mediterranean region.

We wish to thank all the people who responded positively to our call and were willing to contribute to this volume. In fact, there were many more colleagues of Tuomo who would have liked to contribute, but due to lack of time were not able to do so. We also thank their support and kind words.

Moreover, we would like to thank those involved in making this publication real. From the Tampere Peace Research Institute and the Finnish Peace Research Association we want to thank Frank Möller, Unto Vesa and Samu Pehkonen. For their patient proof-reading work we thank Joan Löfgren and Tiina Kanninen and, for the elegant cover design, Katri Wallenius. The biggest hug goes to Leena, Emilia and Miina Melasuo, however, for their support in disseminating the information about this Festschrift to Tuomo’s friends and colleagues all over the world.


Introduction

Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto

Construire la paix par le dialogue interculturel est le thème que nous avons identifié dans l’œuvre de Tuomo. Au lieu d’utiliser la consolidation de la paix dans son sens conventionnel, par notre choix pour construire la paix nous voulons souligner les dimensions de long terme dans l’évolution des relations pacifiques. Cela ne peut se faire que difficilement sans le dialogue interculturel, c’est-à-dire l’engagement ouvert et respectueux à l’échange des points de vue par les groupes et les individus des origines ethniques, culturelles, religieuses et linguistiques différentes. Le dialogue interculturel, il s’agît tout d’abord des personnes humaines; des personnes humaines qui, malgré leurs histoires particulières se rencontrent et engagent en dialogue dans un esprit de respect et compréhension mutuelle. Donc, il s’oppose au rejet de l’autre et à la violence.

L’heure actuelle des relations interculturelles et intraculturelles qui oublie souvent la paix en se focalisant sur la « sécurité » dans ses formes différentes, pourrait profiter des méthodes critiques de la recherche de la paix afin d’analyser ces relations complexes. Comme nous le voyons, Tuomo entra la recherche de la paix par le mouvement tiers-mondiste, qui était étroitement lié au processus de décolonisation. C’est ce contexte qui l’a amené aussi vers les études de dévéloppement. Son approche sur les pays anciennement colonisés a toujours été l’une de l’égalité et du respect qu’on ne trouve malheureusement pas souvent dans les relations entre le « Nord » et le « Sud ».

Algérie est le pays qui a capturé l’attention de Tuomo au premier, et il ne l’a quittée depuis. Son intérêt spécial sur l’Algérie est lié à un intérêt plus vaste à l’Afrique du Nord et au Moyen Orient. Au lieu de se concentrer simplement sur les conflits divisés, il a beaucoup insisté sur les possibilités de construire des ponts à travers la mer méditerranéenne. En tant que la personnalité avec le plus de connaissance ainsi que d’espoir par rapport au Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen, Tuomo a été le porte-parole de la coopération trans-méditerranéenne en Finlande. Il a été nommé au conseil consultatif de la Fondation Anna Lindh pour le Dialogue entre les Cultures ainsi que le coordinateur du Réseau National de Finlande de la Fondation Anna Lindh

18 Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto


dès la naissance de la Fondation en 2005. En tant que membre des différents réseaux de coopération tels que Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) et le réseau Femise, il est la personne qui est peut-être le plus au courant de différentes formes de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne autour la mega-région.

Ce Festschrift a été composé avec deux intentions majeures : afin de traiter thématiquement une partie de la variété des thèmes sur lesquels Tuomo a travaillé pendant son carrière ; et afin de rendre visible le réseau international extensif que Tuomo a soudé pendant son carrière, en aidant aussi ses étudiants de se lier à ce réseau. Il est temps de rendre hommage à son travail en tant qu’un « diplomate officieux » de la Finlande spécialement dans la région méditerranéenne.

Nous voulons remercier chaleureusement toutes les personnes qui ont répondu positivement à notre appel et qui ont contribué à cet ouvrage. Les collègues de Tuomo qui auraient voulu contribuer mais qui ne l’ont pas pu faute du temps sont encore plus nombreux. Nous les remercions aussi pour leur soutien et gentillesse.

Nous remercions aussi ceux qui ont aidé à faire cette publication une réalité. De l’Institut de Recherche de la Paix à Tampere et de l’Association Finlandaise pour la Recherche de la Paix, nous voulons remercier Frank Möller, Unto Vesa et Samu Pehkonen. De leur patience dans le travail de relecture, nous remercions Joan Löfgren et Tiina Kanninen, ainsi que Katri Wallenius pour le design élégant de la couverture. Le plus grand remerciement est destiné à Leena, Emilia et Miina Melasuo pour leur soutien dans la distribution de l’information sur ce Festshcrift aux amis et collègues de Tuomo autour du monde entier.


Algerian women in movement:

three waves of feminist activism

Valentine M. Moghadam

The Middle East and North Africa region is better known for its authoritarian forms of governance and for Islamist movements than it is for women’s movements. And yet the region is rife with women’s mobilizations of various kinds, from development-oriented NGOs and service organizations to research institutes and women’s rights groups. In keeping with Tuomo Melasuo’s longstanding interest in Algeria, this paper examines three waves of Algerian women’s collective action since the 1980s: against the new family code in the immediate post-Boumedienne period; against the Islamist movement and le terrorisme of the 1990s; and for gender justice in the new millennium. Little known outside a relatively restricted francophone community of scholar-activists, the Algerian women’s movement not only undermines continued stereotypes about the absence of independent mobilizations in the Arab region but also confirms the main postulates of social movement theories. We begin with a conceptual framework that links demographic changes and the “political opportunity structure” to the articulation of grievances and the emergence of women’s mobilizations, a framework that can be used to understand both the rise of women’s movements on a world scale and the emergence of nationally-based activism such as that in Algeria. This is followed by an overview of the relevant historical events in Algeria, and a more detailed examination of the three waves of women’s mobilizations and activism and their broad social and political implications.

Conceptual framework: structures, grievances, and

mobilizations

In their cross-national and comparative study of women’s movements during the 20th century, Chafetz and Dworkin situate the impetus for “female revolt” and opportunities for gender-based mobilization within broad socio-demographic changes. Especially important is female educational attainment as well as participation in the urban work force, which provides women with increasing expectations, an emergent gender consciousness, and a

22 Valentine M. Moghadam


clearer understanding of societal constraints, injustices, and opportunities. Education, employment, and smaller households give “modernizing women” more time for other public activities and the capacity to make demands on governments for equality, autonomy, and empowerment. Research has found that the observation of gaps and disparities among women’s legal status, social positions, and aspirations leads to the articulation of grievances and collective action of various types.1

Also helpful in understanding the emergence of the new feminist movement in Algeria is social movement theorizing. This body of research has given rise to the concept of the “political opportunity structure,” which pertains to the broad political (but also economic and social) environment in which grievances emerge, collective action is possible, and movements and organizations can take shape. The concept revolves primarily around the nature of the state and its relations to society, and key questions pertain to the openness versus closed nature of the state; unity versus cracks within the political elite; and the presence or absence of elite allies for emerging movements.2 At the same time, the reality of globalization has compelled theorists to examine global or transnational opportunities for social movement organizing, including norm diffusion by international organizations and the proliferation of all manner of non-governmental organizations in the context of a changing global political economy.3

Of particular relevance here is the global women’s rights agenda, the product primarily of advocacy sponsored by the United Nations since the Decade for Women (1976–1995) and advanced by the four world conferences on women that took place between 1975 and 1995. Also part of the making of the global women’s rights agenda was the adoption by governments of international conventions and norms on women’s equality, human rights, and empowerment – including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Women. Creating a global opportunity conducive to transnational advocacy of all kinds, including cross-border women’s

1 Chafetz & Dworkin 1986; Rothbard Margolis 1993; Moghadam 1998, esp. ch. 8.2 Other key elements within social movement theorizing are mobilizing structures (the capacity to mobilize financial and human resources and build organizations), and framing processes (the interpretive, cultural, discursive, and symbolic aspects of movement-building). See McAdam et al. 1996.3 See Edwards & Hulme 1992; Smith et al. 1997; Keck & Sikkink 1998; see also Boli & Thomas 1997.

23Algerian women in movement


organizing and networking, the international agreements and conferences have provided space, legitimacy, and funding for women’s rights and human rights organizations, as well as other types of NGOs.4 Thus, when the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité was formed by feminists in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the run-up to the Beijing conference, the group was able to draw on the emerging global women’s rights agenda, as well as funding from German foundations, to advance its case for an egalitarian family code. Moreover, the Collectif relied on the support of other transnational feminist networks, notably Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML), which had formed in 1984 in opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and discriminatory family laws.

The formation of the Collectif took place in the regional context of the emergence of an array of women’s organizations. In previous work I have identified seven types of organizing and mobilizing that took place by women in countries of the Middle East and North Africa. (1) Service organizations are the oldest type; they include charitable organizations and they have a largely “welfare” approach; (2) professional associations seek equity for their members within the profession and the society; many of their members are feminists who are also members of human rights or women’s rights organizations; (3) women’s organizations affiliated to political parties are the women’s affiliates of ruling and non-ruling political parties; (4) worker-based and grassroots women’s organizations are concerned with the welfare and equity of women workers and seek to empower women as workers. As such they are oriented towards meeting the practical needs of women workers rather than any explicitly feminist goals; (5) development and women-in-development NGOs provide technical assistance and expertise on issues related to sustainable development, and implement projects on income-generation and micro-enterprises for poverty-alleviation, literacy and education, health, family planning, and community development; in the current lexicon they seek economic empowerment for women, though not necessarily within a feminist frame; (6) development research centers and women’s studies institutes are usually national-based but are increasingly conducting transnational research activities, especially in North Africa; they sometimes engage in feminist activism, and feminists may be found among their staff; (7) human rights/women’s rights organizations have the most transformative potential, are most likely to experience state harassment, and are the ones where feminist goals are most explicit.5

4 Moghadam 2005.5 Moghadam 1998, ch. 8.



In understanding the emergence of the Algerian feminist movement and its various waves since the early 1980s, therefore, we note the relevance of the political opportunity structure at both national and global levels, the existence of the global women’s rights agenda, and the capacity for collective action on the part of a population of educated and employed women. Also important in shaping the contours of that movement are the evolution of Algeria’s political culture and the legal status of Algerian women, to which we now turn.

Historical background: national liberation, patriarchy, and

women

The colonial and anti-colonial experience in Algeria has had a deep and abiding impact on national identity and on gender relations. For this reason, and in order to provide a historical background to our examination of the three waves of women’s activism in Algeria, we begin with the French seizure of Algeria in 1830.

In contrast to their colonial policy in Morocco after 1912 and Tunisia after 1882, the French in Algeria sought to dismantle Islamic institutions, including the economic infrastructure and the Islamic cultural network of lodges and schools. By the turn of the century, there were upwards of half a million French-speaking settlers in Algeria, and by 1930 European competition had ruined most of the old artisan class. Small shopkeepers such as grocers and spice merchants survived, but others suffered severely from the competition of the petits colons. Industrialization in Algeria was given a low priority by Paris during the interwar period. Local development and employment-generation were severely hampered, and there was considerable unemployment and male migration of the native population. Fierce economic competition, cultural disrespect, and residential segregation characterized the French administration.6

In this context, many Algerians regarded Islam and the Muslim family as sanctuaries from French cultural imperialism. The popular reaction to the mission civilisatrice was a return to the land, religion, and family, the foundations of the old community. To many Algerian men in particular, the unveiled woman represented a capitulation to the European and his culture; she was a person who had opened herself up to the prurient stares of the foreigners, a person more vulnerable to (symbolic) rape. The protection and

6 See Metz 1994.



seclusion of women were seen by Algerians as a necessary defense against the French cultural onslaught.7

The anti-colonial movement and its political and military organizations absorbed some of this thinking. When the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) and the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) were formed, there was no explicit provision for women to assume political or military responsibilities. Nonetheless, military exigencies soon forced the officers of the ALN to use some women combatants. Upwards of 10,000 women participated in the Algerian revolution. The overwhelming majority of those who served in the war were nurses, cooks, and laundresses. But many women played in indispensable role as couriers, and because the French rarely searched them, women were often used to carry bombs. Among the heroines of the Algerian revolution were Djamila Bouhired (the first woman sentenced to death), Djamila Bouazza, Jacqueline Gerroudj, Zahia Khalfallah, Baya Hocine, and Dkoher Akrour. Women who fought and did not survive the war of liberation included 20-year-old Hassiba Ben Bouali, killed in the Casbah, and Djennet Hamidou, who was shot and killed as they tried to escape arrest. She was seventeen. Yamina Abed, who was wounded in battle, suffered amputation of both legs.8

One emancipatory development during the national liberation struggle was the admittance of unmarried women into the ranks of the FLN and ALN and the emergence by default of voluntary unions unencumbered by family arrangements, presided over by an FLN officer. (This was poignantly depicted in a scene in Pontecorvo’s brilliant film Battle of Algiers.) Alya Baffoun notes that during this “rather exceptional period of struggle for national liberation,” the marriage of Djamila Bouhired to an “infidel” non-Muslim foreigner was accepted by her community.9

After independence, the September 1962 constitution made Islam the official state religion but also guaranteed equality between the sexes and granted women the right to vote. Ten women were elected deputies of the new National Assembly and one of them, Fatima Khemisti, drafted the only significant legislation to affect the status of women passed after independence. Intended to encourage more education for girls, the Khemisti law raised the minimum age of marriage for girls to sixteen (though the draft

7 Knauss 1987.8 Cherifati-Merabtine 1994.9 Baffoun 1982, 234. Djamila Bouhired married Jacques Vergès, the French lawyer who was specialized in political trials.



bill had originally stipulated age nineteen). In this optimistic time, when heroines of the revolution were being hailed throughout the country, the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA) was formed. Indeed, one consequence of the Algerian revolution and of women’s role in it was the emergence of what Cherifa Bouatta and Doria Cherifati-Merabtine call the “moudjahidate model of womanhood.” The heroic woman fighter was an inspiration to the 1960s and 1970s generation of Algerians, particularly Algerian university women.10

But another, more patriarchal tendency was at work during and after the revolution. One expression of this tendency was the pressure on women fighters during the liberation struggle to marry and thus prevent gossip about their behavior. Moreover, despite the incredible sacrifices of Algerian women, and although the female militants “acceded to the ranks of subjects of history,” the Algerian revolution was subsequently cast in terms of male exploits, and the heroic female feats received relatively little attention.11

Following independence, and in a display of authoritarianism, President Ben Bella proceeded to ban all political parties. The Federation of the FLN in France, which had advocated a secular state, was dissolved; the new FLN general secretary, Mohammed Khider, purged the radicals – who had insisted on the right of workers to strike – from the union’s leadership. And of women, Khider said: “The way of life of European women is incompatible with our traditions and our culture … We can only live by the Islamic morality. European women have no other preoccupations than the twist and Hollywood stars, and don’t even know the name of the president of their republic.”12 In a reversal of the political and cultural atmosphere of the national liberation struggle, patriarchal values became hegemonic in independent Algeria. In this context, the marriage of another Algerian, Dalila, to a foreigner was deemed unacceptable. Dalia’s brother abducted and confined her “with the approving and silent consent of the enlightened élite and the politically powerful.”13

Patriarchal socialism

Thus, notwithstanding the participation of upwards of 10,000 women in the Algerian revolution, their future status was already shaped by “the imperative

10 Bouatta 1994, 18–39; See also Cherifati-Merabtine 1994.11 Bouatta 1994.12 Quoted in Knauss 1987, 99.13 Baffoun 1982, 234.



needs of the male revolutionaries to restore Arabic as the primary language, Islam as the religion of the state, Algeria as a fully free and independent nation, and themselves as sovereigns of the family.”14 In the 1960s, marriage rates soared for teenaged girls; in 1967 some ten percent of Algerian girls were married at age fifteen; at age twenty, 73 percent were married. The crude fertility rate was 6.5 children per woman. The Boumedienne government’s policy on demographic growth was based on the belief that a large population was necessary for national power. It was, therefore, opposed to all forms of birth control unless the mother had already produced at least four children.15 The government also was confident in the capacity of its oil-based economy to support a large population. By the end of the Boumedienne era in 1979, Algeria was home to a huge population of young people. Some 97 percent of Algerian women were without paid work, officially regarded as homemakers. While Algeria’s gender ideology favored domestic roles for women, patriarchal gender relations were reinforced by the economic situation of high male unemployment and underemployment, and the absence of a diversified economy or of labor-intensive industries. By this time, too, the UNFA had become the women’s auxiliary of the FLN, devoid of feminist objectives.

In the 1970s and the 1980s, some women candidates were elected to provincial and local assemblies and a few were appointed to ministerial and sub-ministerial positions, but the Algerian political class was overwhelmingly male, and women were greatly under-represented in political decision-making positions.16 The Algerian professional class included women in such occupations as doctor, nurse, teacher, university professor, and – significantly – judge. But most Algerian women were classified as homemakers, did not take part in gainful employment, and had no access to economic resources or income. By the 1990s, women aged 15–65 were only 8 percent of the labor force. Even accounting for underenumeration of women in the rural sector and in the urban informal sector, this figure was not only extremely small by international standards, but it also was small by regional standards,

14 Knauss 1987, xiii.15 Knauss 1997, 111.16 In 1987, women were only 3.3 percent of those at the ministerial level of government, and 0.0 percent at the sub-ministerial level. At the national assembly they constituted only 2 percent. These figures increased in 1994 but were still low: 7 percent of parliamentarians, 7.7 percent of those at the sub-ministerial level of government, and 3.6 percent of ministerial level positions. Data from The World’s Women 1995: Trends and Statistics, Table 14, 172.



and far below the female share of the labor force in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco.17 Reasons are to be found in both political economy and culture. Algeria’s economic concentration in the oil and gas sector – which favored capital-intensive technologies deployed by men – was a principal reason for the under-representation of women in the labor force. The very high birth rate in Algeria tended to reduce the size of the employed population – male and female alike – while increasing the size of the dependent population. Finally, as noted, the leaders of post-colonial Algeria saw “the liberation of women from work” and the expansion of the Muslim family within a Third World socialistic framework as a symbol of Algeria’s new national identity.

At the same time, state-sponsored education had produced a generation of Algerian women who would become a restive force for progressive social change in Algeria and create the new women’s movement. In 1990, 20 percent of the teaching staff and about half the teaching force at lower levels were women.18 These were the women who loudly and visibly challenged the Chedli Bendjedid government’s conservative family code in 1981, who confronted the Islamist movement in the 1990s, and who went on to lead new mobilizations for gender justice at the start of the 21st century.

The new women’s movement: 1980s and 1990s

The Algerian women’s movement in its first wave emerged in the period following the December 1978 death of the long-time leader Colonel Houari Boumedienne. The immediate post-Boumedienne period was marked by a conservative move at women’s expense, in line with a shift away from Algerian

17 See Moghadam 1998, chapter 3.18 Even so, Algerian women’s educational attainment was not significant, given the country’s wealth. In 1990, nearly 80 percent of women above the age of 25 were illiterate (compared with 50 percent of the men 25 years and older). At lower age groups the figures were better, but even so, fully 37.8 percent of young women aged 15–24 were illiterate in 1990 (compared with only 13.8 for men). See The World’s Women 1995: Trends and Statistics, Table 7, 100. Khalida Messaoudi, the Algerian feminist activist and government official, has noted that in post-colonial Algeria, education was free but not compulsory. See Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 30. The same book contains a fascinating description of the travails of education in Algeria during the 1970s, when the program of Arabization was first implemented through the importation of teachers from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – not all of whom were competent in their subject-areas. See the discussions in chapters 4 and 7 in Messaoudi & Schemla 1995.



socialism and towards a market economy, and in response to the growing Islamist tendency in the region. Just two months after Boumedienne’s death, the Ministry of Justice announced the creation of a commission to draft a Family Code. On 8 March 1979 some 200 university women convened an open meeting at the industrial workers’ union headquarters in Algiers to demand the disclosure of the identity of the members of the commission, and to express their concerns and demands. Significantly, they called themselves “the commission of women who work at the university” and defined themselves as workers rather than as professionals, partly as a homage to the waning socialist heritage and partly to underscore their identity as employed women.19 In January 1980 the government of Chadli Bendjedid handed the embryonic feminist movement a new issue to protest against, when it abruptly prohibited Algerian women from leaving the country without guardian permission. According to Khalida Messaoudi, a math teacher and one of the organizers of the women’s protests, on March 8, 1980: “We organized a huge general assembly and decided to demonstrate in the streets, demanding that the order which hampered women’s freedom of movement be definitively lifted. The government retreated: the ministerial order was cancelled.”20 Messaoudi adds that at this time, when it became clear that the UNFA could or would do nothing to protest the government, the first independent women’s collective was formed, consisting of about 50 women.

The introduction of the draft Family Code alarmed many middle-class Algerian women, who saw it as an attempt to placate a growing Islamist tendency by institutionalizing second-class citizenship for women. The 1981 proposal offered six grounds for divorce on the part of the wife, allowed a woman to work outside the home after marriage if specified in the marriage contract or at the consent of her husband, and imposed some restrictions on polygyny and the conditions in which the wives of a polygynous husband were kept. Algerian feminists responded quickly: “They gathered in front of the parliament building to reject the process of drawing up and adopting laws without a preliminary consultation of the most concerned.”21 The feminists joined with the moudjahidates – women veterans of the war of liberation – and demonstrated together on the 3rd of December 1981. On 21 January 1982, the group issued a six-point demand, calling for: monogamy; the unconditional

19 Knauss 1987, 130.20 Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 49.21 Bouatta 1997, 5.



right of women to seek employment; the equal division of family property; the same age of majority for women and men; identical conditions of divorce for men and women; and effective protection of abandoned children.22

The debate over the family code and the presence of the moudjahidates forced the government to withdraw its proposal, but an even more conservative revision was presented in 1984 and quickly passed by the National Assembly before much opposition could resurface.23 In the revised code, Algerian women lost their right to contract marriage – they now had to be given in marriage by a wali (guardian). Provisions for divorce initiated by women were sharply curtailed, as were the restrictions on polygyny; fathers became the sole guardians of children, and women were given an unequal share in inheritance. The only positive aspect of the new family code was that the minimum marriage age was raised for both women and men (to 18 and 21, respectively). Feminists objected that the Family Code contravened the equality clauses of the Constitution, the Labor Code, and international conventions to which Algeria was a signatory.24 Protests were again organized, but given the fact that the bill had already passed, they had little impact.

This first wave of the Algerian feminist movement was preoccupied with the Family Code. Despite the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the growing influence of Islamism in Algeria, the new feminist movement did not focus its energies on fundamentalism until the late 1980s and into the 1990s. Still, the significance of this first cycle of women’s protests was clear. As Khalida Messaoudi puts it:

“Apart from the Berber cultural movement, it has been women – yes, women, and they alone – who have been publicly questioning the F.L.N. since 1980–81 and demanding that universal principles be enforced. Do you realize what holding four demonstrations in quick succession to demand freedom, equality, and citizenship represents in a country where no one talks about the Algerian personality except as something forged by Islam and Arabism?”25

Among the new organizations created during the period of the struggle around the Family Code, l’Association pour l’Egalité des Droits entre les Femmes et les Hommes (known as Egalité) was established in May 1985, with

22 Bouatta 1997; See also Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 50.23 See the description of these events in Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 51–52; See also Entelis & Arone 1994, 173–233.24 Cherifati-Merabtine 1994; Bouatta 1997.25 Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 57.



Khalida Messaoudi as its first president. Also prominent in the group was Louisa Hannoun, a Trotskyist and women’s rights activist. Cherifa Bouatta, a participant in the movement, succinctly summarizes the origins of Algerian feminism:

“Under the shadow of the one-party system, the political monolith, some women attempted to create spaces of independent expression through cultural and trade union groups. Psychology students created a working group and a cine-club. In Oran, study and reflection workshops on Algerian women were organized in early 1980, with contributions from historians, economists, sociologists and psychiatrists. The proceedings of these workshops were published and the organizers created a women’s journal ISIS. Other groups were then created, such as the moudjahidates collective and groups that studied and criticized official proposals for a new Family Code. This latter effort gave life to the women’s movement, and is indeed regarded as the spark that led to the emergence, the objective and the strategies of Algeria’s feminist movement.”26

Against ”intégrisme”

The Bendjedid government was pursuing market reforms in addition to its adoption of a conservative family law.27 Austerity measures combined with political frustration directed at the FLN led to the riots of October 1988, in which young people played a prominent role. The riots in turn ushered in a brief period of political liberalization, which saw the increasing popularity of the Algerian Islamist movement that later called itself the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). Algerian feminists were alarmed by statements emanating from Islamist leaders such as Ali Belhadj, who declared that “the natural place for a woman is at home” and that “the woman is the reproducer of men. She does not produce material goods, but this essential thing that is a Muslim.”28 The new feminist groups were opposed to the electoral reforms that legalized religious-based parties such as the FIS, a legalization that contravened the constitution. The leadership of the FIS proceeded to

26 Bouatta 1997, 4.27 The Bendjedid government also encouraged – or at least, turned a blind eye to – the participation of young Algerian men in the Mujahideen movement in Afghanistan, where Islamists were waging a war against the Soviet-backed government in the 1980s. It is said that many members of the FIS and the GIA were or went on to become Islamist volunteers in Afghanistan.28 Cited in Mahl 1998.



issue statements condemning the anti-fundamentalist women as “one of the greatest dangers threatening the destiny of Algeria” and branding them “the avant-garde of colonialism and cultural aggression.”29

Unfortunately, the fundamentalist agenda of the FIS was supported by a segment of the female population, and in April 1989 a demonstration of 100,000 women in favor of Islamism and sex-segregation shocked the anti-fundamentalist women. But this display also spawned a network of anti-fundamentalist feminist groups. When Egalité seemed to equivocate over the nature of the fundamentalist uprising, Khalida Messaoudi left to form another organization, l’Association pour le Triomphe des Droits des Femmes. In this second wave of the Algerian feminist movement, the struggle against fundamentalism took center stage.

The FIS was committed to introducing Sharia law, which it claimed was superior to Western-style civil codes. Hijab would be introduced, ostensibly to free women from the prying eyes of men. According to one FIS leaflet: “The hijab is a divine obligation for the Muslim woman: It is a simple and modest way to dress, which she has freely chosen.” How something can be an obligation and freely chosen is not explained. Other leaflets claimed that women are under attack from “pernicious Westernization” and that “a woman is above all a mother, a sister, a wife or a daughter.” Even the participation of women in sports was seen as immoral and corrupting. When Hassiba Boulmerka won the 1,500 meters at the World Athletics Championships in Tokyo in August 1991, becoming only the second Arab woman ever to receive a major sporting title, she was hailed by the Algerian sports minister, Leila Aslaouni, by President Chadli Bendjedid and Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, and by many of her compatriots. However, fundamentalist imams affiliated to the FIS united to pronounce kofr, a public disapproval of her from the nation’s mosques. The object of their disapproval was the fact that Boulmerka had run before the world’s eyes “half-naked” – that is, in regulation running shorts and vest.30

To the government’s consternation the FIS made major electoral gains during the December 1991 parliamentary elections, and the government moved to annul the elections and ban the FIS. Chadli Bendjedid – now reviled by feminists and leftists – was removed in January 1992 and replaced by Mohamed Boudiaf, who opposed not only the fundamentalists but also corruption within the FLN. He was assassinated just five months later. In March

29 Bennoune 1995, 197.30 Moghadam 2003, 170.



of that year, when an Algerian court decided to ban the FIS, the court ruling was read by Judge Ziani, a woman judge who could not have held her position under a FIS government. The banning of the FIS was supported by many Algerian feminists, despite their distaste for the authoritarian government. Launching a second cycle of protests, Algerian feminists held demonstrations against the FIS and the establishment of an Islamic state. They had been alarmed when during the latter part of the 1980s the fundamentalists began to bully and attack women who lived alone or were unveiled. It was as if they were anticipating the terrorism that was to be carried out by the FIS and the GIA in the 1990s.

The cancellation of the election results was met with extreme violence, with much of the terror carried out by the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armée, GIA). At the height of the political turmoil in the early 1990s pitting the government and military against Islamist extremists, Algeria’s economic and political transition appeared uncertain, and the state seemed on the verge of collapse. Algeria’s feminists were caught between “the devil and the deep blue sea” – le pouvoir and intégrisme. While highly critical of the patriarchal and authoritarian state that had introduced the Family Code, they focused their political energies against misogynist and violent intégrisme, which they regarded as the harbinger of a fascistic theocracy. As Messaoudi put it, feminists and democrats reject “a state based on divine law” and desire “a state based on rights.”31

31 Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 142. There is no doubt that the Algerian government carried out its own killings of suspects, real or imagined. But the available evidence suggests that the terror was initially launched by the FIS. Indeed, the roots of Islamist terror may be traced back to Mustafa Bouyali’s Armed Islamic Algerian Movement, which for five years led violent attacks on the representatives of the state in the first half of the 1980s. See Malley 1996, 245; For details on the misogyny, anti-semitism, and anti-democratic statements of the FIS, see Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, chapters 9–11; On the killings, kidnappings, and rapes of women during the 1990s, see also Flanders 1998, 24–27. Finally, as to whether the FIS was “forced” into the position it took because its victory had been stolen, it is well to compare its response to that of Turkey’s Islamist Refah Party years later. When the Refah Party was declared dissolved by the Turkish military in 1998, the leadership chose a non-violent and political response: to regroup under another name. In any event, the vicious verbal and physical attacks on women and girls carried out by the FIS and GIA – as well as the killings of journalists, foreigners, and priests and nuns – cannot be justified.



Islamist terror

After shooting to death one young woman in April 1993 and decapitating a mother and a grandmother in separate incidents early the next year, the GIA issued a statement in March 1994 classifying all unveiled women who appeared in public as potential military targets – and promptly gunned down three teenaged girls.32 The violence against women escalated during that year, and included kidnappings and rapes. Women were denounced in mosques by imams and fatwas were pronounced against them, condemning women to death. Lists of women to be killed were pinned up at the entrance to mosques.33 March 1995 saw an escalating number of deaths of women and girls. Khalida Messaoudi was officially condemned to death by the fundamentalists and forced to live underground. Zazi Sadou, who had founded the Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocrates in 1993 and took public positions against theocracy and authoritarianism, was similarly put on an Islamist death list. Nabila Diahnine, an architect and president of the feminist group Cri de Femmes, was assassinated in February 1996 while on her way to work in the northern city of Tizi Ouzou.34 Women took to the streets to protest the sexual violence and the threats against unveiled women, as well as the military government’s inability to protect women. After one public protest in the spring of 1994, the independent newspaper Al Watan wrote: “Tens of thousands of women were out to give an authoritative lesson on bravery and spirit to men paralyzed by fear, reduced to silence. – – The so-called weaker sex – – refused to be intimidated by the threats advanced by ‘the sect of assassins’ [Islamists].”35

General Liamine Zeroual, the country’s new president, committed himself to working with the opposition. Berber organizations and new democratic associations similarly condemned the terror while also protesting the government’s incapacity. The outcome of the November 1995 elections showed that the government retained popular support. The government was again vindicated by the June 1997 general elections, though fewer people participated in these and there was much criticism of electoral rigging and government authoritarianism.

Throughout, Algerian feminists remained active and staunch opponents of Islamism and of terrorism. In a 1995 interview, while still living underground

32 Bennoune 1995.33 Mahl 1998.34 Sherkat 1997, 19–23.35 World Press Review 1994, 34.



after her death sentence, Khalida Messaoudi’s courage and political acumen were in full display:

“More than 80 people a day are being killed by Islamic fundamentalists. – – Intellectuals, teachers, writers, thinkers – these are the people killed because it is they who defend traditional notions of liberty. But sometimes simple citizens are killed, too, randomly, just for the purpose of terror. One day ordinary people may decide to say ‘No’ to the fundamentalists’ ambitions and they want to avoid that happening. They kill women who oppose their views of how we should behave. They cannot allow difference. That is why they insist on veils to cover the difference. They are fascists who claim Allah is on their side and that they are marching under the banner of righteousness. – – The Islamic movement is not an opposition to the Government; it is in fact the best way for the one-party state to reconstitute itself. That is not to say that the fundamentalists don’t have a popular base. After years of one-party rule people are desperate and many feel the FIS will make a difference. They [the FIS] just want to be the new dictatorship. If necessary they will compromise and absorb members of the FLN Government into their ranks. But it will simply be the old one-party state with a new face.”36

Mobilizing women and building feminist organizations

The period 1989–1994 saw the formation of a number of active feminist organizations, including l’Association Indépendante pour le Triomphe des Droits de la Femme (Triomphe); l’Association pour l’Emancipation des Femmes (Emancipation); l’Association pour le Défense et Promotion des Femmes (Defense et Promotion); Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocrates; Cri de Femmes; Voix des Femmes; El Aurassia; SOS Femmes en Détresse. The objectives of the Algerian women’s rights organizations included some that are fairly representative of the Middle East and North Africa region and others that specific to the Algerian case: the abolition of the Family Code; full citizenship for women; enactment of civil laws guaranteeing equality between men and women in areas such as employment and marriage and divorce; abolition of polygamy and unilateral male divorce, equality in division of marital property.

During the 1990s Egalité focused on information and awareness campaigns around the Family Code, with a view to mobilizing support for its abolition.

36 Swift 1995.



It organized seminars on such themes as “democracy and the principle of equality” and campaigned for political parties who defend women’s rights. It convened annual general assemblies and was said in 1995 to have around 500 members mostly between the ages of 35 and forty.37 Triomphe likewise organized conferences around the Family Code as well as a series of workshops and lectures on the situation of women, and it published a legal guide for women. In 1995 it was said to have about 200 members mostly between the ages of 25 and 40. Emancipation organized roundtables on subjects such as women’s employment and representations of women in textbooks; exhibitions of photographs and paintings; film debates. According to Cherifa Bouatta, the membership numbered about 150 and consisted largely of the former members of the women’s cine-club, students, and workers. Defense et Promotion engaged in activities similar to those of Egalité, Triomphe, and Emancipation: debates and conferences on the Family Code and campaigns for women’s legal awareness, cultural activities, workshops on women’s employment, and the promotion and sale of goods made by women. In 1995 it had about 500 members mostly aged between 30 and 50 years.

Throughout the 1990s, these and other organizations participated in a variety of national and international independent initiatives on violence against women, including a March 1994 tribunal in Algeria “to judge symbolically the responsible Islamists and the former president of the Algeria Republic for their crimes against humanity.” All the women’s groups built coalitions to organize street demonstrations in Algeria to defend democracy and the citizenship of women.38 The Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Democrates (RAFD) became active in documenting human rights violations, particularly those by Islamists against women, and in collecting women’s testimonies. It produced a publication entitled Algérie réveille-toi, c’est l’an 2000! – a compilation of news articles about the atrocities – and filed a civil action suit in Washington, D.C. against the FIS and its U.S. representative, Anwar Haddam. The RAFD was part of the network Women Living Under Muslim Laws, and its founder, Zazi Sadou, received an award in 1997 from the U.S.-based network Women, Law and Development International, in recognition of her work for Algerian women’s human rights. After the onset of le terrorisme, this and other feminist groups advanced the slogan “No dialogue with the fundamentalists.”39

37 Bouatta 1997.38 Women, Law and Development International Bulletin 1998, 4.39 Mahl 1998; See also Women, Law & Development International Bulletin 1998, 4.



Like other organizing women in the Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere in the Global South, Algerian feminists are products of the country’s social development: they are urban employed women, mostly with higher education, although some working-class women have participated in the feminist organizations. Many Middle Eastern feminists (e.g., Iranian, Turkish, Palestinian) began as members of left-wing organizations, but what is distinctive about the Algerian women’s movement is the extent to which the feminist movement was dominated by left-wing women – which may account for its audacity and organizational capability. When Egalité was formed in 1985, many of its officers and members were associated with the Socialist Organization of Workers (OST, Trotskyist tendency). Many members of Emancipation belonged to the PST (Socialist Workers Party), and those of Défense et Promotion belonged largely to the PAGS (Parti de l’Avant-Garde Socialiste, or the Communist Party). As Bouatta explains:

“The founding members of the women’s movement are, in their majority, influenced by the ideology of the Left. They all come from socialist parties. They are mostly academics, students, workers, and union representatives. They convey a message of an emancipatory project based on the equality of the sexes, employment and education, which are considered as the main criteria of women’s promotion and socialization. They matured under the shadow of the one-party system in its socialist phase. They are women of the post-independence who were fortunate to have access to education and training. They do not consider the day of liberation as very distant. They identify with the moudjahidates whom they see as the first to have cracked the patriarchal system.”40

Algerian women activists became known for their trenchant critiques of both the state and fundamentalism. At the height of the Islamist terror, Saida Ben Habylas, a teacher and official Algerian representative to a UN-sponsored regional meeting that took place in Amman in November 1994, gave an impassioned speech denouncing the violence against women.41 In a newspaper interview, she boldly emphasized the complicity of both the state and the FIS:

“The history of the FIS and other terrorist groups is a series of alliances with a corrupt “politico-financial mafia” that helped bring about the economic and social inequalities in Algeria during the 1970s and 1980s.

40 Bouatta 1997, 15.41 My observation at the pre-Beijing Amman meeting, November 1994.



– – Political pluralism and democracy could have meant exposure of corruption of the old order. This old order allied themselves with the FIS in the 1980s and agreed to ‘share power’. There was a deal.”42

Notwithstanding its disruptive nature, Algeria’s economic and political crisis, along with the constitutional reforms of 1989, opened the gateways to an incipient civil society and saw a large number of independent interest groups emerging as political parties.43 Henceforth the government would have to tolerate, respond to, and interact with non-governmental organizations. The conciliatory stance of the state and cracks in the unity of the political elite favored the proliferation of non-governmental organizations. Azzedine Layachi describes how interaction between the state and elements of the nascent civil society intensified after 1993, and he lists those non-government organizations, professional associations and parties that were represented in meetings with the High State Council.44 Missing from the list, however, is the array of women’s organizations that emerged in Algeria during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Bouatta, there were 20 women’s associations in the first national meeting of the women in late 1989 and in 1993 perhaps as many as 24, according to the author of a document published by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities that year. These included women’s studies and research associations such as Aicha, Dafatir Nissaiya, and Fondation Nyssa; feminist organizations such as those mentioned above; women-in-development organizations such as Femmes, Environment, Développement; social-professional associations such as SEVE which sought to promote and assist women in business, and a number of service and delivery organizations.

Not only was the new women’s movement among the principal social movements of 1990s Algeria, but Algerian feminists became more visible and more prominent in the established political structures. One outcome of the 1997 municipal and parliamentary elections was the election of 11 women to the National Assembly, among them several well-known activists and feminists. The emergence of a feminist politics critical of both fundamentalism and the state shaped the composition and orientation of the newly-elected women. Among them were Louisa Hannoun, leader of the Workers Party, Khalida Messaoudi, who joined the Rally for Culture and Democracy, and

42 Cited in Bennoune 1995, 194.43 Entelis & Arone 1994, 211.44 Layachi 1995.



Dalia Taleb of the Socialist Forces Front.45 All three women were known for their radicalism. Indeed, Hannoun was dubbed “Algeria’s shining star” by the Algerian press, which also deemed her one of the only “two real men” in Algeria – the other being the recently-released former leader of the FIS, Abassi Madani.46 Alongside Algeria’s political tragedies in this period were the paradoxes and ironies of gendered politics, including the designation of activist women as “men.”

During its first and second waves, Algeria’s new feminist movement was unified in its condemnation of the family code and of fundamentalists, and effective links were developed with international feminists, transnational feminist networks, and European foundations. The movement was active within the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité, and took part in the research that led to the publication of books on the legal status of women in North Africa, issued by the Morocco-based Editions le Fennec. WLUML and the Center for Women’s Global Leadership, a feminist think tank at Rutgers University in the United States, sponsored the participation of Khalida Messaoudi at the UN’s World Conference on Human Rights, which took place in Vienna in June 1993, where she testified on Islamist terrorism before the Women’s Tribunal. Two years later, the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité was the major organizer behind the “Muslim Women’s Parliament” at the NGO Forum which preceded the Beijing Conference.47 Their participation at the Beijing conference, as well as the preparation and translation of several books, were made possible by funding from German foundations.48 In 1997, Rhonda Copelon, director of the International Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York and a well-known international women’s rights activist lawyer, filed a suit in the U.S. on behalf of RAFD and Algerian women victims of terror, with the participation of WLUML. The defendants were the FIS and Anwar Haddam,

45 The Workers Party is Trotskyist. The RCD’s goals are “secularism, citizenship, a state based on rights, the repeal of the Family Code, recognition of Algeria’s Berber dimension, social justice, educational reform, etc.” (Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 94); Likewise, the Socialist Forces Front stands for democracy and Berber rights. 46 Danesh 1997, 10. 47 My observations at the NGO Forum in Huairou and discussions with participants. See also their documents: Women in the Maghreb: Change and Resistance; One Hundred Measures and Provisions for a Maghrebian Egalitarian Codification of the Personal Statute and Family Law [sic].48 Personal communication, Emil Lieser of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Cairo, 7 July 2008.



the so-called “representative-in-exile” of the FIS in the United States.49 These are but some examples of how Algerian feminists collaborated with other North African feminists and with international feminist groups; and they made effective use of the global women’s rights agenda in condemnations of patriarchal laws and political Islam.

Cracks in the movement appeared in the new century, however, in the context of post-conflict “normalization” during the presidency of Abdelazziz Bouteflika. Louisa Hannoun’s tendency to placate the Islamic opposition irked many Algerian feminists, as did Khalida Messaoudi’s assumption to the position first of advisor to the president and then as cabinet minister, which was seen as compromising her independence.50

Toward gender justice: third wave priorities

The new century brought with it a certain normalization of the political scene in Algeria, along with efforts by the political authorities to bring about an end to the intense political and ideological schisms that had developed in the 1980s and 1990s. President Bouteflika made several moves to change directions in Algeria: in addition to seeking greater integration in the world economy and – after 11 September 2001 – participation in the global “war on terror,” he promised to reward women for their sacrifices and collective action in the previous decade, and he sought to “close the chapter” on Algeria’s violent past through a peace charter, an amnesty, and a referendum. Thus in the summer of 2002, he appointed an unprecedented five women to his cabinet (including Khalida Messaoudi) and put in place mechanisms for an evaluation of the family code with a view toward reform. Whereas feminists had fervently demanded “no dialogue with the terrorists,” the government of President Bouteflika desired national reconciliation, even if it meant an amnesty for the armed militants of the past. These developments brought with them new priorities for the women’s movement. The third wave of the Algerian feminist movement has been characterized by a demand for gender justice in the form of (1) protests against the referendum and amnesty, (2) a new mobilization for an egalitarian family code, and (3) attention toward ending violence against women and sexual harassment at the workplace. We consider each in turn.

49 Flanders 1998, 27; and Kirshenbaum 1998, 25. Disclosure: I wrote an affidavit on behalf of the suit. The plaintiffs did not win the case but felt that the experience had been important politically.50 Personal communications from two Algerian women’s rights activists, Limassol, Cyprus, July 2000 and Vienna, Austria, October 2000.



In addition to the continuing work of the Collectif, new organizations have become prominent, such as CIDDEF (Centre d’Information et de Documentation sur les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme). The Wassila network began in 2000 and consists of women’s NGOs (including SOS Femmes en Détresse) and individual professionals, many of whom are psychologists addressing post-conflict traumas (such as Cherifa Bouatta and her Societé pour l’Aide Psychologique, la Recherche et la Formation). Le Centre d’Ecoute et d’Assistance aux Femmes Victimes d’Harcèlement Sexuel is a counseling service hosted by the country’s main trade union, the UGTA. The network and campaign 20 Ans Barakat (20 Years Is Enough) is a coalition of Algerian women’s organizations calling for the abrogation of the old family code and its replacement with an egalitarian law. Most of these organizations also are opposed to the outcome of the civil war of the 1990s – or le terrorisme – and to the way the government has handled it.

President Bouteflika’s civil harmony law in July 1999 offered immunity or reduced sentences to members of armed groups who gave up their arms and disclosed their actions, but it soon became a blanket amnesty for crimes by all who declared they had repented. This came to be opposed by feminist groups and families of the disappeared. While most of the 200,000 dead and 8,000 disappeared of Algeria’s civil war were men, it was women who formed new organizations dedicated to opposing the blanket amnesty. In his 2005 charter for peace and reconciliation, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika sought to “close the chapter” on Algeria’s violent past. The referendum of 29 September 2005 was based on a simple proposition – were people for or against peace?51 There were Algerians within the country and in the diaspora who found the wording deceptive enough to boycott the referendum, but it won the majority of votes cast.52

Many Algerians remain embittered by the experience and perhaps none more so than feminists who were on death lists or forced to live underground in the 1990s. Some wished for a South Africa-like Truth and Reconciliation process; others felt it would amount to impunity for murderers. One published account includes the following sentiments: “Truth and reconciliation on the South African model wouldn’t work here: we Algerians aren’t made like that.” And: “I want peace, but not this peace with impunity that the charter is forcing on us. In South Africa it wasn’t like

51 Kristianasen 2006.52 While employed at UNESCO in 2005, I spoke with approximately 15 Algerians who were opposed to the referendum.



this.”53 It is clear that feelings remain strong concerning the events of the 1990s.

Turning now to the campaign against the family law, which feminists have referred to as un text infamant et dégradant, it will be recalled that President Bouteflika promised to reform it. In order to accelerate the reform, the coalition 20 Ans Barakat was formed on 8 March 2003, almost twenty years after the passing into law of the Family Code. One of the founders is Akila Ouared, a well-known moudjahidate, who has called the Family Code “Algeria’s dishonor, an insult to women.” Some of the coalition members have been present on the political scene since 1984, such as Triomphe, SOS Femmes en Détresse, Défense et Promotion, and Pluri-elles Algeria. Framed in the language of international women’s rights and secular feminism, the coalition’s petition asserts that “la question du statut égalitaire des femmes en Algérie, et au delà, celle de leur reconnaissance pleine et entière en tant que citoyennes, est une question essentielle et urgente de l’Algérie d’aujourd’hui et de demain” and notes that Tunisia and Morocco have introduced reforms for gender equality.54 The coalition helped effect amendments to the family code in February 2005, and included a change to the nationality law to allow Algerian women married to foreigners to pass on their nationality to their children. With the amendments, marriage is now consensual; relations between spouses are equal; in a divorce whichever parent has care and control becomes the guardian; and the father must provide a decent home for the mother and child.

At this writing, however, activists object to the retention of guardianship (wali) over women, polygamy, and unequal family inheritance, which remains two-thirds to sons and one-third to daughters. One argument is that such clauses are insulting to women’s dignity. Another is that they are irrelevant and at odds with the social reality, given that women are increasingly helping to support their families. Polygamy, moreover, is rare – although at 5.5 percent of the population, more prevalent in Algeria than in Morocco.55 Nadia

53 Kristianasen 2006. I have also discussed the matter with four Algerian feminist activists, none of whom felt that truth and reconciliation were feasible or desirable.54 See http://20ansbarakat.free.fr/petition.htm; See also http://famalgeriennes.free.fr/declarations/APEL_decl_111203.html and http://20ansbarakat.free.fr/, last accessed 25 July 2008.55 See Guide to Equality in the Family and in the Maghreb, by Collectif 95 Maghreb-Egalité 2005, 66. This is an authorized translation of Dalil pour l’égalité dans la famille au Maghreb (Collectif, 2003).



Aït-Zaï, a lawyer and professor of law at Algiers University and a director at CIDDEF, is quoted as saying of the family code: “It could have been abolished. – – Parliament was supposed to vote on the amendment. Instead, Bouteflika had it quietly passed as a presidential decree. As a jurist, I find the reform incoherent: it’s got one foot in modernity, the other in the past.”56

Another set of priorities for the women’s movement in its third wave pertains to domestic violence, family abuse, and workplace harassment. Early in the new century, the Collectif 95 conducted a survey on violence against women, and publicized its disturbing findings on the extent of the problem and the persistence of anachronistic ideas concerning husbands’ privileges. Algerian President Bouteflika referred to the survey in his International Women’s Day address of 2002. Shortly thereafter, work began on establishing the country’s first counseling center, and several others were subsequently set up.

Le Centre d’Ecoute et d’Assistance aux Femmes Victimes d’Harcèlement Sexuel is housed at the UGTA and financed by the trade union. The Centre was born following a consciousness-raising campaign of the National Commission of Women Workers and of human rights groups, and in December 2003 the Center’s director Soumia Salhi also started a hotline for women victims of sexual harassment. At the same time, Algeria passed a law against workplace sexual harassment.57 Since the Center’s opening, there have been thousands of calls from women victims and supporters, though critics say that the majority of calls from victims have no follow-up: “The bravest women register a complaint but don’t follow through. They prefer a change of work.”58

IDDEF, SOS Femmes en Détresse and other women’s NGOs that are part of the Wassila network address an array of issues related to women’s rights to dignity and a life free of sexual and family violence. Incest and the problems of unwed mothers are also taken up. One account notes that CIDDEF works on “abortion, a taboo subject. At present only therapeutic abortion is permitted. One of the problems is that contraception is available to married women but not to the unmarried, widows or divorcees, who deal with these issues illegally, often abroad.” The Wassila network holds workshops on the above topics, convenes a weekly clinic for children, and publishes papers. In an interview with Le Monde Diplomatique, Louisa Aït Hamou, a lecturer at Algiers

56 Cited in Kristianasen 2006.57 See her interview on http://www.categorynet.com/v2/index.php/content/view/4518/400, last accessed 12 February 2007. See also http://www.afrol.com/articles/15853, accessed June 2008.58 http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/femmes/harcelement_sexuel.htm.



University, explains that the network provides professional help, engages in reflection about the country and its future, and takes action:

“We are breaking the silence on taboo subjects: sexual aggression against women and children, family violence, rape, battered women, economic violence. Take Hassi Messaoud, a new oil-rich city: 30 women went to work there, where working women are unusual. The local imams accused them of being prostitutes and, in 2001, they were raped and knifed. One was buried alive. Wassila, with other NGOs, ended the long silence over this and supported the women in their search for justice, though only three of the 30 dared attend the appeal court on 3 January 2005.”59

In October 2004, the National Popular Assembly adopted an amendment to the Algerian penal code; it condemns men guilty of sexual harassment to a prison sentence. Sexual harassment is now an offence; it is defined as abusing the authority conferred by one’s function or profession in order to give orders to, threaten, impose constraints or exercise pressure on another person for the purpose of obtaining sexual favors. A person convicted of this offence is subject to imprisonment of two months to one year and a fine of 50,000 to 100,000 dinars.60 But, according to the chairperson of the Algerian League of the Human Rights Boudjemâa Ghechir, “les mentalités restent le principal obstacle qui continue d’empécher les victimes de harcelement sexuel de se plaindre.”61 Thus a challenge is to encourage women to break the wall of silence as well as to ensure enforcement of the law. This is the new phase of the campaign by the UGTA’s Women’s Commission, the Wassila network and other advocates for women’s rights and gender justice.

Conclusions

Among the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria is one of the most instructive case studies of feminist activism. Although women played prominent roles in the national liberation movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the rise of a radical women’s movement and of feminist organizations was a feature of the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas Algerian women were once intimately connected to the project of national liberation

59 Cited in Kristianasen 2006.60 http://www.unfpa.org/parliamentarians/news/newsletters/issue59.htm.61 http://www.wluml.org/french/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-347521. “attitudes remain the main obstacle preventing complaints by sexual harassment victims.”



and post-colonial state-building through a version of Arab socialism, the new women’s movement extricated itself from those projects to demand rights, equality, and security – and all in the language of secular feminism. However, they never separated themselves from the project of building a modern and progressive Algerian polity; rather, they have insisted that women’s rights are necessary for the achievement of democracy and modernity.

The new women’s movement in Algeria emerged in the context of a growing international women’s movement, economic crisis and restructuring, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the weakness of the state. It has been sustained by a population of educated and employed Algerian women with social and gender consciousness. The attack on women’s legal status in the immediate post-Boumedienne period triggered the initial mobilizations, which have been sustained over time in the form of various organizations, coalitions, and campaigns. Coalition-building with other progressive civil society organizations, as well as alliances with political elites, have helped the women’s movement grow and achieve policy successes. The global women’s rights agenda has provided additional legitimacy, while transnational feminist networks and European foundations have offered resources necessary for the movement’s wider reach.

In examining the evolution of the Algerian feminist movement, this paper has identified three waves: the struggle against the new Family Code in the early 1980s; the struggle against fundamentalism and Islamist terror in the 1990s; and a multi-pronged struggle for gender justice in the new century. Characteristics of the women’s movement include a propensity to build and sustain organizations and networks; effective coalition-building, both within Algeria and transnationally (especially within the Maghreb); engagement with government, domestic policies and laws, and the global women’s rights agenda; and a rather remarkable fearlessness. In all three waves, feminists have advanced powerful critiques of patriarchy and authoritarianism, whether of the state or of Islamic fundamentalism, and have drawn attention to the importance of rights and equality to democratization and national advancement. As such, Algerian feminism and the new women’s organizations can only be regarded as key players in the country’s democratic transition. They constitute a significant part of the emergent civil society, and they give new meaning to concepts of citizenship, human rights, and political participation.



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« Le mal vient de l’extérieur » : les socialistes

français et le problème algérien

Kirsi Henriksson

La politique du Parti socialiste français vis-à-vis la question algérienne entre 1945 et 1957 révèle des discours parallèles qui s’expliquent par le contexte colonial, par l’exercice du pouvoir ainsi que par l’héritage idéologique de la France de 1789. D’une part les socialistes voulaient avancer les valeurs de l’émancipation parmi leurs camarades algériens, mais d’autre part ils pratiquaient une politique socialiste coloniale pour faire étape au nationalisme parmi ces mêmes camarades « musulmans ». Pour donner un exemple des discours parallèles chez les socialistes français, nous allons analyser brièvement comment les socialistes ont saisi les causes derrière « le problème algérien ». Il paru d’être plus facile de s’expliquer que le mal venait de l’extérieur que constater la culpabilité de la realité coloniale inégalitaire étant la cause véritable de la guerre d’Algérie.

Sétif sonne l’alarme mais la Toussaint surprend

En mai 1945, des nouvelles inquiétantes parviennent de la région de Constantine. Les manifestations du 1er mai 1945, organisées par la Confédération générale du travail, la CGT, tourneraient à la confrontation violente entre manifestants algériens et population européenne. L’affrontement culmina lors de la révolte qui commença à Sétif le 8 mai 1945, jour de la signature de l’Armistice. Les jours suivants, le mouvement insurrectionnel s’étendit aux campagnes et aux villes de la région : Bône, Guelma, Batna. Une centaine d’Européens furent tués ce qui entraîna une répression très violente. Les troupes françaises sous le commendement du général Duval, épaulées par l’aviation et la marine, firent officiellement 1165 victimes algériennes, mais, d’après différentes sources, le nombre des Algériens tués oscille entre 6 000 et 80 000.1 A la suite des événements, le leader du Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) Messali Hadj fut exilé à Brazzaville et

1 Melasuo 1999, 365 ; Pervillé 2002, 112. Les nationalistes parlent de 45 000 morts, les oulémas de 80 000 à 85 000 morts, la presse française de gauche estime d’abord entre 6 000 et 8 000 le nombre des victimes, puis de 15 000 à 20 000.

50


Kirsi Henriksson

Ferhat Abbas des Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté, l’AML, détenu jusqu’au 16 mars 1946.2

Pour les Français de la métropole, la « révolte » de Sétif en 1945 est incompréhensible au moment même où la France fête sa libération. André Mandouze, historien, chrétien de gauche et militant actif, raconte un souvenir personnel sur Sétif :

« Quand, rédacteur en chef de Témoignage chrétien, j’ai consacré alors tout un numéro à la Victoire, il m’était nullement venu à l’idée que la fin de la guerre mondiale célébrée par la France coïncidait jour pour jour avec ce qui, en fait, était le premier signe (pratiquement passé sous silence) du déclenchement assez prochain d’une autre guerre d’un autre genre ; celle très précisément d’Algérie. »3

Pourtant, le climat d’allégresse après la Libération fut justement à l’origine des sentiments d’enthousiasme parmi les Algériens. On alla même jusqu’à encourager les Algériens à espérer une libération prochaine dans les pages du Populaire, le journal principal du Parti socialiste français (SFIO). Les promesses d’une liberté n’était pas du verbiage pour la SFIO qui bâtit la Quatrième République avec le plus grand sérieux. Par exemple, à la première page du Populaire en septembre 1944, Pierre Bloch avertit les pétainistes d’Alger que l’Algérie était considérée comme le prolongement de la France et qu’ainsi les musulmans n’étaient pas en dehors du grand courant de liberté qui avait soulevé la France.4

La soif de liberté n’est pourtant pas considérée comme la cause principale des « incidents de Sétif ». En général, la presse propose des explications telles que la situation matérielle, les difficultés de ravitaillement et les prélèvements alliés5. Dans le Populaire du 12 mai 1945 on veut résoudre le problème par l’envoi de blé en Algérie6. Un seul journal, Combat, publie à partir du 13 mai 1945 six articles d’Albert Camus qui mettent l’accent sur les causes sociales et politiques mais avec prudence, sans prendre parti :

« Devant les événements qui agitent aujourd’hui l’Afrique du Nord, il convient d’éviter deux attitudes extrêmes. L’une consisterait à présenter

2 Fauvet 1959, 155.3 Mandouze 1998, 176.4 Pierre Bloch: « Regards sur l’Algérie », Le Populaire du 10 septembre 1944, 1.5 Ageron 1984, 33.6 J. M. : « Sauvons l’Afrique du Nord. Du blé aux populations affamées », Le Populaire du 12 mai 1945, 1.

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Les socialistes français et le problème algérien

comme tragique une situation qui est seulement sérieuse. L’autre reviendrait à ignorer les graves difficultés où se débat aujourd’hui l’Algérie. »7

La revue trotskiste, Quatrième Internationale est encore plus franche en condamnant la « sanglante répression qui a suivi les événements du 8 mai 1945 et qui a coûté la vie à plus de 15 000 indigènes »8.

A la recherche des coupables, les socialistes algériens tinrent plusieurs réunions pour discuter de la responsabilité des promoteurs du mouvement. Le plus étonnant est que les socialistes adoptèrent sans critique la version communiste du « complot fasciste » comme facteur explicatif des événements du Constantinois.9 Même la présence sur place du gouverneur général Yves Chataigneau (septembre 1944–février 1948), un socialiste, ne garantit pas une connaissance « objective » de la situation. Mostefa Benbahmed, le député socialiste de Constantine, dénonce pour sa part les agissements dangereux des oulémas et du PPA, et les méfaits de ces groupements au sein du scoutisme musulman et parmi les modérés réformistes.10 Le journal Fraternité, organe de la SFIO en Algérie, déplore l’action de « certaines élites » sur les masses musulmanes et reconnaît la cruauté des émeutiers. Il souhaite que l’on sache « différencier la grande majorité des masses indigènes, avec les mauvais bergers qui les ont guidées un moment ».11

Les socialistes en métropole suivaient le débat des socialistes en Algérie. Le lien est visible dans la position adoptée par le Populaire à la fin mai 1945 : il y a quelques « mauvais bergers » dont la création, « le nationalisme algérien » est encore « factice » et ne s’impose pas à l’idéal des masses misérables et incultes. Il valait mieux pourtant réagir ; l’accent est mis sur la rapidité des réformes matérielles et culturelles: « il n’y a plus un mois à perdre ».12

7 Camus dans Todd 1996, 378–380.8 Quatrième Internationale, septembre 1945, cité dans Ageron 1990, 425–426.9 Ageron 1984, 30.10 « Les partis européens », Rapport mensuel d’information sur l’activité dans le Département de Constantine du 22 mai au 22 juin 1945, CIE, préfecture de Constantine, F/60/871, CARAN.11 « Les Partis européens : Fraternité », Rapport mensuel d’information sur l’activité dans le Département de Constantine du 22 mai au 22 juin 1945, CIE, préfecture de Constantine, F/60/871, CARAN.12 J. M. : « Les troubles d’Algérie, II: Les agitations du Monde Arabe », Le Populaire du 29 mai 1945, 1–2.

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Kirsi Henriksson

Les réformes rapides sont bien au centre de l’attention lors du premier débat du comité directeur de la SFIO sur le problème algérien qui eut lieu le 18 décembre 1945, après l’élection de la première Assemblée constituante. Dans son exposé, André Philip, président de la commission de la Constitution, s’interroge sur la place de l’Algérie au sein de la communauté française. Le problème algérien est donc traité dans le contexte du passage de l’Empire vers l’Union française. Après la discussion, le comité directeur conclut qu’il y aura pour l’Algérie le même régime que pour les autres régions françaises.13

Pourtant, en ce qui concerne Sétif, le comité directeur n’en parle la première fois qu’en juillet 1946, après le rapport de Robert Verdier sur le congrès interfédéral socialiste SFIO de l’Afrique du Nord, tenu à Alger les 13 et 14 juillet 1946.14

La réaction des socialistes au lendemain de Sétif fut donc modérée. Une fois qu’ils commencèrent à réaliser l’ampleur de la situation, ils se tournèrent vers des réformes plutôt assimilationnistes pour améliorer et résoudre le problème algérien ; la France de 1945 n’était pas prête à renouveler son régime colonial avec la même vitesse que, par exemple, les Anglais. Selon Roger Quilliot

« – – les Français, à quelque formation politique qu’ils appartiennent, n’imaginent pas un instant qu’ils pourraient suivre la voie britannique, celle qui mène à l’indépendance des Indes. Et les représentants des territoires d’outre-mer n’osent pas, pour leur part, porter aussi loin le regard – – ».15

En février 1946, le groupe parlementaire socialiste à l’Assemblée constituante est prêt à absoudre les mauvais bergers algériens, et à suivre le conseil de Charles-André Julien : « Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas et le cheikh Brahimi seront moins dangereux comme délégué, place de Beauvau, que comme martyrs de la cause nationaliste »16. Les députés socialistes algériens, Raoul Borra, Maurice Rabier et Abderrahmane Bouthiba déposent un projet d’amnistie générale à l’Assemblée nationale. Au cours du débat parlementaire sur l’amnistie, Rabier affirme que ce projet mettra « fin aux malentendus » et effacera « les rancœurs dangereuses qui ne pourraient que compromettre

13 Le débat est cité dans Pervillé 198, 447–448.14 Réunion du Comité directeur le 17 juillet 1946, cité dans Pervillé 1987, 448.15 Quilliot 1972, 149–150.16 Charles-André Julien : « C’est à Paris qu’il faut résoudre les problèmes nord–africains », Le Populaire du 7 juin 1945, 1–2.

53



gravement l’union plus que jamais nécessaire des populations françaises et algériennes ». Abderrahmane Bouthiba fait confiance au ministre de l’intérieur socialiste, André Le Troqueur, pour faire accepter sans restrictions les mesures d’amnistie politique, générale, « pour faire régner en AFN un climat de justice et pour montrer à l’Algérie le vrai visage de France ».17

Dans les motifs de l’amnistie on essaie de comprendre les causes des « malentendus » même si on répète les mêmes arguments présentés un an avant. Maurice Rabier rappelle « la propagande suspecte » des ennemis de l’Ordonnance de mars 194418 qui avait crée une psychose de peur en Afrique du Nord et qui fut à l’origine des événements de mai 1945. Cette campagne inhumaine et aveugle avait produit le « débordement de haine subite et terrible des événements tragiques de mai 1945 ». Outre cette propagande, Rabier allègue que derrière la souffrance, la détresse physique et morale, la rancœur et le mécontentement se trouvent « la misère et l’exploitation des indigènes par les gros colons, la famine, le mauvais outillage, et surtout le racisme qui ne nous fait pas honneur ». L’amnistie fut votée le 1er mars 1946, après un long discours d’André Le Troquer qui évoque le double souci du gouvernement : assurer l’ordre et la protection des biens légitimes, mais, en même temps, faire confiance à la compréhension et à la solidarité des indigènes.19

La conséquence principale de Sétif était donc une approche réformatrice, mais on était alarmé du fait que la frustration grandissait même au sein des Algériens modérés, prêts à verser dans l’action violente des nationalistes les plus radicaux. Le débat, même très faible, parmi les socialistes en France et en Algérie fait croire qu’il exista une capacité d’être au fait des réalités coloniales. Pourtant, presque 10 ans après, les bombes du premier novembre 1954 sur la région de l’Aurès constituent encore une surprise pour les socialistes, sans parler de l’administration française de l’Algérie ou du renseignement

17 « Compte rendu d’activité du groupe parlementaire socialiste à l’Assemblée nationale constituante, février 1946 : Séances du 28 février et du 1 mars 1946 », Bulletin intérieur SFIO, No. 11, Février–Mars 1946.18 L’Ordonnance du 7 mars 1944 régla le statut des « Français musulmans d’Algérie ». Environ 85 000–90 000 Algériens musulmans recevaient la citoyenneté française à part entière. (Ageron 1984, 25–26)19 « Compte rendu d’activité du groupe parlementaire socialiste à l’Assemblée nationale constituante, février 1946 : Séances du 28 février et du 1 mars 1946 », Bulletin intérieur SFIO, No. 11, Février–Mars 1946.

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militaire20. La situation au Maroc et en Tunisie semble alors plus préoccupante et ce n’est qu’au mois de décembre 1954 que les chefs militaires et les services de renseignement commencèrent à envisager la possibilité d’une insurrection gagnant peu à peu toute l’Algérie.21

La surprise socialiste en face de l’insurrection peut être expliquée en partie par un silence qui avait précédé les événements algériens. Au début des années 1950, l’Algérie n’occupe plus les débats des socialistes, après l’intervalle chaud autour du Statut de l’Algérie de 1946 à 1949 et, surtout, après la démission du gouverneur général socialiste, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen en 1951. La gestion de l’Algérie passe sous le contrôle des radicaux avec les gouverneurs généraux Roger Léonard et Jacques Soustelle. Pierre Commin et Edouard Depreux avaient pourtant proposé en juin 1949 que le Comité directeur de la SFIO consacrât une séance à l’étude du problème algérien et à la situation du Parti en Algérie,22 mais le débat se fit attendre jusqu’au 8 décembre 1954. Entre temps, l’Algérie ne fut mentionnée qu’à l’occasion de problèmes ponctuels.23 La faiblesse de la SFIO après la défaite électorale de 1951 préoccupait les militants socialistes plus que la situation algérienne. Un bref débat sur les travailleurs immigrés eut pourtant lieu après les incidents du 14 juillet 1953 à Paris où 6 travailleurs algériens avaient été tués pendant la commémoration de la Révolution française.24

En Algérie, les socialistes prétendaient bien connaître les sentiments de la population algérienne. Un an avant la Toussaint, Maurice Rabier, le député socialiste d’Oran, fait l’éloge de la vigilance socialiste en constatant qu’au moins le parti socialiste a eu « le mérite de suivre depuis longtemps, en analysant sainement l’évolution de la situation coloniale, les revendications des musulmans algériens ».25 Nous n’avons pas trouvé de témoignages de cette vigilance dans le discours socialiste en Algérie ; on n’y trouve aucune analyse profonde sur la détérioration de la situation intérieure. Pourtant, en

20 Yves Courrier dans son ouvrage Les fils de Toussaint (1969) décrit bien la surprise totale causée par le 1er novembre 1954.21 Jauffret dans SHAT 1998, 668–669.22 « Réunion du 22 juin 1949 », Compte rendu des réunions du Comité directeur SFIO, OURS.23 Pervillé 1987, 455.24 Réunion du Comité directeur SFIO le 22 juillet 1953, cité dans Pervillé 1987, 456.25 Maurice Rabier: « L’Algérie, son statut, son avenir », Revue socialiste, no. 69, juillet 1953, 138–145.

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novembre 1954, au cours du débat sur la fixation de la date d’interpellation du gouvernement sur sa politique en Afrique du Nord, Rabier constate que « la flambée nationaliste et xénophobe que vient de connaître l’Algérie ne nous a point surpris ».26

Plus d’un mois avant le début de l’insurrection algérienne, Mostefa Benbahmed constate devant l’Assemblée nationale pendant le débat sur la situation au Maroc et en Tunisie que « jamais l’Algérie a été aussi calme ». Il fait référence à l’éclatement du Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques, le MTLD en été 1954, qui, croyait-il, allait mettre fin à l’activité radicale en Algérie. Même s’il exista un « drame tunisien » ou un « drame marocain », Benbahmed ne veut pas parler de « drame nord-africain » qui pourrait inclure aussi l’Algérie.

« Les problèmes de l’Algérie sont absolument autres: l’Algérie est française, l’Algérie constitue trois départements français, et j’en veux un peu, non pas à mes collègues d’origine européenne, mais à mes collègues du premier collège – puisque nous avons deux collèges en Algérie – d’avoir osé, pour les besoins de leur thèse, parler de crainte en ce qui concerne la santé morale de cette Algérie. »27

Les socialistes en Algérie ne saisissent pas l’ampleur et la profondeur du mécontentement algérien même après l’insurrection. Le Congrès fédéral socialiste d’Alger le 7 novembre 1954 constate qu’il s’agit « des remous politiques qui agitent à nouveau l’Algérie ». L’allusion à Sétif est donc faite. Le secrétaire général algérois Briffa ne veut pas culpabiliser toute la population algérienne et il réclame un « châtiment impitoyable des auteurs et des responsables des actes de terrorisme, mais des seuls coupables ».28 Maurice Rabier affirme à ses co-députés à l’Assemblée nationale que « c’est facile dans un pays où on peut circuler librement, d’établir un ensemble léger d’une ou deux centaines d’hommes ».29 En général, les événements sont considérés

26 « Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, séance du 12 novembre 1954 », AAN, 4959–4960.27 « Interpellation de Mostefa Benbahmed, 1ère séance du 27 août 1954 », AAN, 4332.28 « Renseignement par le commissaire divisionnaire, chef de la police des renseignements généraux du district d’Alger (A. Touron), au sujet de l’activité de la SFIO, le 8 novembre 1954 », Dossier 155: Partis et mouvements, SFIO, 10 Cab Léonard, GGA, CAOM.29 « Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, séance du 12 novembre 1954 », AAN, 4959–4960.

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comme des actes relevant du terrorisme et le coupable encore en décembre 1954 est le MTLD30.

Le Comité directeur de la SFIO attendit jusqu’au 8 décembre 1954 pour ouvrir son premier débat sur l’Algérie troublée. L’Oranais Joseph Begarra y exposa clairement les origines des attentats. A son avis, il s’agissait d’une question politique derrière le « gros malaise » algérien.

« Plus sérieux [que la non-application du Statut] est le retournement de l’opinion publique algérienne qui se trouve attirée vers une politique d’intégration de l’Algérie à la Métropole avec suppression de tout ce qui différencie l’Algérie de la Métropole. Les Algériens tiennent à être des citoyens français, sans restriction de droits ni de devoirs. »

Les remèdes que Begarra propose, c’est de suivre la situation de très près et, en attendant, de prendre sur le plan économique et social, les mesures les plus urgentes.31

Ces remèdes montrent bien que le problème algérien fut considéré comme un problème intérieur dont la solution se trouvait dans les réformes intérieures. Pourtant, plus la situation s’aggravait, et surtout après la reprise du pouvoir par les socialistes en janvier 1956, plus on commençait à chercher des causes extérieures à ce malaise. Et le processus de la décolonisation à grande vitesse servait d’excuse pour un complot étranger.

Déjà en mai 1954 les socialistes s’inquiétèrent de l’effet Diên Biên Phu, c’est-à-dire des conséquences de la défaite militaire française en Indochine au prestige de la France. Au cours d’une réunion algéroise le 10 mai 1954, Briffa craignit que « l’affaire Diên Biên Phu soit exploitée par certains partis pour stimuler un réveil du sentiment national dans le but de créer un climat politique propre à leurs desseins ». Il redoute aussi que l’affaire ait de graves conséquences pour l’Algérie où ces événements sont ressentis avec plus d’acuité que dans la Métropole.32

30 « Rapport à M. le commissaire principal, chef de la police des renseignements généraux du district de Constantine le 4 décembre 1954: réunion privée de la section de Bône le 3 décembre 1954 », Dossier 155: Partis et mouvements, SFIO, 10 Cab Léonard, GGA, CAOM.31 « Begarra dans la réunion du Comité directeur le 8 décembre 1954 », Compte rendu des réunions du Comité directeur SFIO, OURS.32 « Renseignement par le commissaire Divisionnaire, chef de la police des renseignements généraux du district d’Alger, au sujet de l’activité de la SFIO, 12 mai 1954 », Dossier 155: Partis et mouvements, SFIO, 10 Cab Léonard, GGA, CAOM.

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La thèse d’une menace extérieure est persistante aussi bien chez les modérés, les radicaux, les républicains sociaux, les gaullistes que parmi les socialistes : le problème algérien relève donc de l’ordre public33. Les camps antagonistes de la guerre froide dictaient l’attitude des socialistes vis-à-vis du mouvement de libération coloniale en Afrique et en Asie. Mais en Algérie, il y avait un autre mal extérieur qui menaçait l’Algérie française: le nationalisme arabe.

Les échos de la décolonisation dans le monde arabe

Pendant le processus de la décolonisation, jusqu’à l’indépendance de l’Algérie en 1962, la France reste plus ou moins suspecte pour le monde arabe. Même si les indépendances du Maroc et de la Tunisie en 1956 montrent la volonté de la France de reconnaître la souveraineté des pays arabes, la longue guerre d’Algérie maintient les relations dans un mauvais état jusqu’à sa fin. Aussi les positions favorables des socialistes français envers Israël ne concilient-elles pas la critique du monde arabe avec la politique française.34 Par exemple, pour Jules Moch, Israël était le modèle d’un socialisme incarnant les progrès techniques et politiques dans une région dominée par le fanatisme.35

La véritable menace extérieure était Gamal Abd el-Nasser et le rôle central de l’Egypte dans le monde arabe. L’administration politique et militaire en Algérie ainsi que les gouvernements français étaient convaincus que l’Egypte avait participé activement à la préparation de l’insurrection algérienne. Le fait que la proclamation du Front de libération nationale (FLN) pour l’indépendance nationale est transmise le 31 octobre 1954 à partir du Caire ne dissipe pas les doutes. L’envoi plus ou moins régulier des armes aux rebelles ainsi que l’asile donné au Caire aux chefs nationalistes algériens irritent aussi les socialistes français.36

Aussi le personnage de Nasser soulevait-il des passions insoupçonnées parmi les leaders socialistes, hantés par ce nouveau « Hitler ». Le Ministre résidant en Algérie, Robert Lacoste explique le danger présenté par Nasser au Conseil national de la SFIO en juin 1956 :

« Les fellaghas [algériens] sont au service d’un idéal qui nous déroute : un idéal d’asservissement, car il s’agit de la conquête arabe, sous

33 Harbi 1998, 25–29.34 Buffotot 1987, 505, 508; Voir sur ce sujet Balta & Rulleau 1973.35 Mechoulan 1999, 404–405.36 Philip 1957, 149; Quilliot 1972, 641–643.

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le drapeau égyptien, du monde musulman en Afrique. Il s’agit de quelque chose qui ressemble vraiment à un nouvel hitlérisme. Ce qui est en vue, ce n’est pas en effet la création de démocraties nouvelles indépendantes, c’est la création de sortes de sultanats arabes fondés sur une société théocratique, autoritaire, communautaire, fondée aussi sur la haine des races. »37

La nationalisation de la Compagnie du Canal de Suez par le gouvernement égyptien le 26 juillet 1956 afin de financer la construction du barrage d’Assouan, ne diminue pas les tensions franco-égyptiennes. Au contraire, le gouvernement français durcit sa position pour empêcher un « nouveau Munich ». Surtout le secrétaire général de la SFIO et le président du Conseil de 1956 à 1957, Guy Mollet – qui considérait l’ouvrage de Nasser, La Philosophie de la révolution, comme l’héritier de Mein Kampf de Hitler – ne voulait aucun « compromis avec l’expansionnisme d’un dictateur ».38 En coopérant avec les Anglais, Mollet voulait éviter le précédent consentement humiliant qui avait eu lieu en 1939 à Munich devant Hitler. Les troupes franco-anglaises avec le soutien d’Israël, malgré l’opposition des Américains, commencèrent l’invasion de l’Egypte à la fin d’octobre 1956. L’hostilité des USA et de l’Union soviétique porta pourtant ses fruits et la dernière expédition de l’hégémonie européenne au Moyen Orient est rapidement stoppée par une résolution de l’ONU le 6 novembre 1956.39

Par l’expédition de Suez, l’Angleterre et la France perdirent définitivement leur prestige devant le monde arabe. Nasser devint un héros, un symbole de l’émancipation des peuples arabes. André Philip regrette qu’on ait « fait une réalité d’un pan-arabisme qui, jusqu’ici, n’existait que dans l’esprit de quelques intellectuels extrémistes. » En Afrique et en Asie eut lieu « l’explosion d’un mouvement nationaliste, exprimant avec Le Caire une solidarité totale. Partout, les peuples ont eu le sentiment que le colonialisme occidental était leur seul ennemi. »40 Deux ans plus tard, Mollet, humilié, prend « toute la responsabilité de l’opération de Suez ». Il pense pourtant « avoir rempli son devoir international » en envoyant les troupes françaises en Egypte pour

37 « Le discours de Robert Lacoste sur la politique de pacification en Algérie, Conseil national SFIO de Puteaux les 9 et 10 juin 1956 », Les Cahiers du propagande socialiste, No. 21, 1956.38 Mollet 1958, 31–34.39 Oikarinen 1999, 174–175, 182–183; Ferro 1994, 401–409.40 Philip 1957, 159–161.

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confronter « le racisme pan-arabe, la haine de l’Occident et le fanatisme religieux ».41

Ce qui avait été dangereux dans l’action de Nasser, c’était donc sa position nationaliste arabe. L’analyse d’André Philip exprime bien la complexité du nationalisme dans la pensée socialiste :

« Ce nationalisme [de Nasser], qui était au début le réflexe sain d’un peuple cherchant à conquérir son indépendance, a pris de plus en plus la forme d’une mystique réactionnaire, militariste – –. Ce nationalisme exacerbé a conduit ainsi à un détournement des maigres ressources disponibles vers des buts non économiques. »42

Pour avoir une perception plus profonde de ce mal qui vient de l’extérieur, il faut analyser le discours socialiste sur le nationalisme arabe en Algérie ainsi que ses rapports à la situation algérienne.

La hantise du nationalisme arabe en Algérie

Un mois avant le début de l’insurrection algérienne, les militaires français en Algérie considéraient l’Association des ‘Ulamā’ Musulmans Algériens, l’AUMA, comme représentante d’un nationalisme arabe dangereux en l’accusant de faire « une vive propagande en faveur de l’Arabisme et de l’Indépendance du Peuple algérien ». En fait, la surprise du 1er novembre était en partie possible puisque l’administration porta son regard de surveillance sur les oulémas :

« L’Association des Oulémas, par l’action de ses professeurs sur les jeunes, par sa propagande à base de religion effectuée devant de larges auditoires à l’occasion des nombreuses manifestations qu’elle organise, contribue plus encore que le PPA-MTLD à développer au sein de la population musulmane d’Algérie, l’idée de l’Indépendance Nationale. »43

La surveillance s’explique aussi par le fait que la doctrine de l’AUMA était liée à l’évolution du réformisme musulman dans le monde arabe ; l’idéologie des oulémas comportait donc des caractères externes, analysés par les contemporains comme un « panislamisme » et un « panarabisme ».

41 Mollet 1958, 31–34.42 Philip 1957, 142.43 « Synthèse de renseignements, mois d’août 1954 », EMI, 2e bureau, dans SHAT 1998, 502.

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Les échos de la décolonisation du monde arabe inquiètent certains socialistes. Raoul Borra intervient à l’Assemblée constituante en août 1946 et met en garde les députés sur le panarabisme, ce faux guide vers l’émancipation. A son avis, c’est la France de 1789 qui est le véritable guide vers l’émancipation, pas le panarabisme qui séduit « les mystiques qui confondent trop souvent la politique avec la religion ».44 Il existe aussi des voix divergentes sur ce sujet. Le socialiste Arrès-Lapoque, en analysant la situation au Maroc, ne voit pas en 1947 que l’islam pourrait éveiller le sentiment nationaliste en Afrique du Nord. Il écrit dans le journal Masses que « – – l’islam pas plus que la chrétienté au Moyen-Age n’est capable de provoquer l’éveil d’une conscience nationale. » A son avis, le Monde Arabe est « un mythe inventé par la diplomatie britannique depuis trente ans ».45

Malgré la surveillance, les nationalistes algériens continuent à manifester leur attachement au nationalisme arabe. Par exemple, les députés du groupe parlementaire du MTLD, Ahmed Mezerna, Mohammed Khider et Haouès Boukkaddoum déclarent en février 1950 dans une lettre au président du conseil, Georges Bidault, que :

« La nation algérienne est sœur de la nation égyptienne. Elle l’est au même titre que les autres pays arabes et musulmans. Des liens puissants et indissolubles l’unissent aux héritiers de cette incomparable culture, mère de la civilisation occidentale, qu’est la culture arabe – –. »46

Au vu de cette déclaration, il est donc assez compréhensible que des policiers et militaires français aient eu plus tard, pendant la guerre, une attitude réservée devant les liaisons entre les nationalistes algériens et l’Egypte de Nasser.

Cependant la caractéristique du nationalisme arabe en Algérie est qu’il ne constituera jamais qu’une source supplémentaire d’inspiration pour un nationalisme typiquement algérien.47 Le journal Algérie Libre affirme l’identité algérienne des militants du MTLD en septembre 1953, en opérant un choix entre les camps de la guerre froide:

44 « Interpellation de Raoul Borra, 1ère séance du 23 août 1946 », AN constituante, 3273–3275.45 Arrès-Lapoque: « Le problème marocain », Masses, Nos. 9–10, Juin–Juillet 1947.46 « A la lettre des parlementaires français adressée à M. Bidault, les députés MTLD répondent : La Nation algérienne est soeur de la Nation égyptienne, lettre à Georges Bidault le 13 février 1950 », Algérie libre, No. 9, le 15 février 1950, 4.47 Remaoun 1991, 5.

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« Ce dont nous sommes certains, c’est que les Algériens, avant de tourner leurs regards vers l’Est ou vers l’Ouest, pensent tout d’abord et avant tout à l’Algérie, à leur pays. Et s’il arrive aux Algériens de s’intéresser à l’extérieur, avant de porter leurs yeux sur l’URSS ou la Chine, il les porte sur les pays frères d’Egypte, du Pakistan, d’Indonésie ou de l’Inde beaucoup plus proches et plus solidaires d’eux que d’autres pays. »48

Avec la montée de la violence en Algérie, le discours des hommes de gauche vise de plus en plus le nationalisme arabe comme étant la cause principale de la situation algérienne. Georges Combault, vice-président de la Ligue des droits de l’homme écrit en mai 1955 que « notre démocratie ne saurait céder au fanatisme arabe qui organise le terrorisme, ni tolérer le contre-terrorisme »49. La résolution sur l’Afrique du Nord par le Comité central de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, réuni le 3 octobre 1955, poursuit dans la même voie:

« – – la Ligue met en garde: les Français d’origine métropolitaine contre la politique de la force, désormais impuissante à rien résoudre – la population musulmane, contre les fureurs aveugles d’un soi-disant « nationalisme arabe », déguisement d’un fanatisme inspiré du dehors, intolérant et rétrograde. »50

Les socialistes français discutent beaucoup sur le nationalisme arabe pendant le Congrès national de la SFIO à Lille, l’été 1956. Max Lejeune est très sévère à l’endroit du nationalisme arabe qui a un rapport étroit avec l’islam politique. Il légitime l’activité de l’armée française en Algérie en attaquant le « panarabisme » qui « soulève dans l’Algérie tout le vieux fanatisme de l’Islam. » Pour lui, l’Algérie n’est pas une partie du monde arabe et il défend la nature kabyle du pays : « Le monde arabe est un conquérant, c’est le nomade qui a détruit la forêt ».51

Tous les socialistes ne sont pas prêts à accepter le fait qu’il existe un acteur étranger derrière le problème algérien. Par exemple, le député

48 « Réponse à Liberté », Algérie libre, No. 78, le 4 septembre 1953.49 Georges Combault: « En Algérie », Les Cahiers des droits de l’homme, Nos. 6–7, Juin–Juillet 1955, p. 78. Cet article a paru la première fois dans Droit de Vivre, le 31 mai 1955.50 « Résolution sur l’Afrique du Nord par le Comité central de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, 3 octobre 1955 », Les Cahiers des droits de l’homme, Nos. 8–10, Septembre–Octobre–Novembre 1955, 88–89.51 « Intervention de Max Lejeune, séance du 29 juin 1956 », Compte rendu du 48e Congrès national SFIO, du 28 juin au 1 juillet 1956, Lille, OURS.

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socialiste Maurice Rabier trouve qu’il y a bien des causes intérieures et extérieures derrière le problème algérien : « – – On dit des événements d’Algérie: C’est l’étranger qui les conduit. – – L’étranger n’aurait jamais pu se mêler de nos affaires en Algérie si un état de fait propice à l’immixtion n’y avait existé. »52 Au cours du débat en octobre 1955 sur la prolongation de l’état d’urgence en Algérie, Rabier définit le « caractère interne du mal » qui est composé par le mécontentement sur le plan politique (inapplication du statut de l’Algérie); sur le plan social (salaires bas, chômage, non-emploi provenant à la fois de la poussée démographique et d’un manque d’industries locales); et sur le plan économique avec le maintien du pacte colonial.53 Par sa critique Maurice Rabier vise la politique du gouvernement Faure – les socialistes sont alors dans l’opposition.

Au cours du débat à l’Assemblée nationale sur « Programme de réformes et mesures de sauvegarde en Algérie », en mars 1956, Jean Montalat, socialiste et rapporteur de la Commission de l’intérieur, constate que l’Algérie est un « problème intérieur, mais également [un] problème international puisque nous avons à faire face à un mouvement panarabe, panislamique dirigé du Caire par Nasser et ses amis.»54 Le ton a changé dû au fait que les socialistes participent au pouvoir ministériel.

Robert Lacoste, le ministre résidant en Algérie, intervient dans le même débat qui finira par le vote des pouvoirs spéciaux en Algérie. Lui n’accepte pas l’argument que le problème algérien soit seulement une question interne: « – – La rébellion algérienne ne peut cependant être considérée du seul point de vue de l’intérieur. – – Instrument mal conscient d’un nouvel impérialisme qui vise le monde arabe, le nationalisme algérien est déjà sous tutelle. »55

Malgré la critique au sein du Parti socialiste après l’expédition douteuse de Suez ne fait pas changer l’avis du secrétaire général et le président du conseil. En répondant à la critique devant le tribunal de l’Assemblée nationale le 20 décembre 1956, Guy Mollet avoue que « les origines du drame algérien se trouvent en Algérie même » mais il ne nie pourtant pas les liens entre les

52 « Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, 2e séance du 28 juillet 1955 », AAN, 4438–4440.53 « Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, 1ère séance du 13 octobre 1955 », AAN, 5083–5084.54 « Interpellation de Jean Montalat, 1ère séance du 8 mars 1956 », AAN, 746–747.55 « Interpellation de Robert Lacoste, 1ère séance du 8 mars 1956 », AAN, 759–763.

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problèmes égyptien et algérien. A son avis l’attitude de l’Egypte avait compliqué le problème algérien.56

Le véritable caractère du problème algérien continue de préoccuper les socialistes français jusqu’à l’indépendance de l’Algérie. L’explication des discours parallèles se trouve en partie dans l’exercice du pouvoir qui produit des discours contradictoires. Même si « la trahison de la gauche française a fait couler beaucoup d’encre »,57 l’histoire franco-algérienne nous offre plusieurs exemples sur la difficulté de faire avancer « la démocratie » ou « l’émancipation » universelle en exerçant en même temps le pouvoir suivant son propre modèle.

Références

Archives et sources diverses

AAN : Annales de l’Assemblée Constituante 1946 et Annales de l’Assemblée Nationale, Débats parlementaires 1946−1962.

Bulletins intérieur de la SFIO, 1945−1957.

CAOM: Centre des Archives d’Outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence:

Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie GGA: 10 Cab, Cabinet Roger Léonard (avril 1951−janvier 1955).

CARAN: Centre des Archives Nationales, Paris:

F/60/871 Algerie: situation politique generale, nationalisme, neonationalisme, Comité de l’Afrique du Nord.

Compte rendus des Congrès nationaux SFIO, 1944−1957.

Compte rendus des réunions du Comité directeur de la Parti socialiste SFIO, 1946−1957.

56 « Discours du Président du Conseil Guy Mollet, séance du 20 décembre 1956 », AAN, 6174–6175.57 Jean-Claude Vatin a constaté ce fait déjà en 1972. (Vatin 1972, 899)

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SHAT (1998) : La Guerre d’Algérie par les documents, Tome 2, Les portes de la guerre: des occasions manquées à l’insurrection, 10 mars 1946−31 décembre 1954. Documentation établie sous la direction de Jean-Claude Jauffret, avec la collaboration de Henri Baudoin, Jean Roucaud, Alain Porchet. S.H.A.T., Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre.

Journeaux

Algérie libre : « Par le peuple et pour le peuple », journal clandestin du PPA, directeur Messali Hadj, 1949−1954.

Cahiers des droits de l’homme, Revue mensuelle, directeur Emile Kahn, 1955−1958.

Cahiers du propagande socialiste. Supplément à la Documentation socialiste, 1955−1956.

Masses, Revue mensuelle d’action prolétarienne par le Mouvement International socialisme et libérté, secrétaire général Marceau Pivert, directeur René Lefeuvre, 1946−1947.

Le Populaire de Paris, Organe sociale du Parti socialiste SFIO, 1935−1958.

La Revue socialiste, Revue de culture politique et sociale, publiée par le Parti socialiste et le Cercle d’Etudes Socialistes Jean Jaurès, directeur Albert Thomas, 1946−1959.

Bibliographie

Ageron, Charles-Robert (1984) : « Les troubles du Nord-Constantinois en mai 1945: une tentative insurrectionnelle? », Vingtième siècle, revue d’histoire, no. 4, octobre.

Ageron, Charles-Robert (1990) : « De l’Empire à la dislocation de l’Union française (1939–1956) », Histoire de la France coloniale 1914–1990. Paris: Armand Colin.

Balta, Paul & Claudine Rulleau (1973) : La politique arabe de la France de Gaulle à Pompidou. Paris: Editions Sindbad.

Buffotot, Patrice (1987) : « Guy Mollet et la défense. Du socialisme patriotique au socialisme atlantique », dans B. Ménagér et al. (éds.) Guy Mollet, un camarade en république. Presses Universitaires de Lille.

Fauvet, Jacques (1959) : La IVe République. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard.

Ferro, Marc (1994) : Histoire des colonisations des conquêtes aux indépendances, XIIIe-XXe siècle. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

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Harbi, Mohammed (1998 [1984]) : 1954, la guerre commence en Algérie. Editions Complexe.

Mandouze, André (1998) : Mémoires d’outre-siècle, tome 1: d’une résistance à l’autre. Editions Viviane Hamy.

Mechoulan, Eric (1999) : Jules Moch, Un socialiste dérangeant. Bruxelles: Bruylant.

Melasuo, Tuomo (1999) : Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954 (L’évolution politique de l’Algérie du 19ème siècle au début de la guerre de libération 1954), Research Report No. 85. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Insitute.

Mollet, Guy (1958) : Bilan et perspectives socialistes. Librairie Plon.

Oikarinen, Jarmo (1999): The Middle East in the American Quest for World Order. Ideas of Power, Economics, and Social Development in United States Foreign Policy, 1953−1961. Helsinki: SKS, Bibliotheca Historica 47.

Pervillé, Guy (1987) : « La SFIO, Guy Mollet et l’Algérie de 1945 à 1955 », dans B. Ménagér et al. (éds.) Guy Mollet, un camarade en république. Presses Universitaires de Lille.

Pervillé, Guy (2002) : Pour une histoire de la guerre d’Algérie 1954−1962. Paris: Editions A. et J. Picard.

Philip, André (1957) : Le Socialisme trahi. Paris: Librairie Plon.

Quilliot, Roger (1972) : La S.F.I.O. et l’exercice du pouvoir 1944-1958. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, Collection ’Les Grandes Etudes Contemporaines’.

Remaoun, Hassan (1991) : Du mouvement national à l’état indépendant: le couple unité maghrébine-unité arabe dans le discours politique algérien. URASC, Université d’Oran.

Todd, Olivier (1996): Albert Camus, une vie. Paris : Editions Gallimard.

Vatin, Jean-Claude (1972) : « Conditions et formes de la domination coloniale en Algérie (1919−1945) », Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques RASJEP, Vol. IX, No. 4, Décembre 1972, 873−906.


La diplomatie algérienne au XXIè siècle1

Lotfi Boumghar

« Dire de Tuomo qu’il est le plus Méditerranéen des Nordiques serait une lapalissade, aussi à travers cette modeste contribution, c’est au plus

méditerranéen d’entre nous que je souhaite rendre hommage ».

Depuis l’accession à son indépendance en 1962, l’Algérie a connu de profondes mutations, certaines ont même occasionné des ruptures, voire des fractures dont les blessures ne se sont pas à ce jour totalement cicatrisées.

Dans ce contexte, il est important de relever que la diplomatie algérienne est restée attachée à certains principes fondamentaux au-delà des nécessaires repositionnements dictés par les grands bouleversements qu’a connu et que connaît encore la scène géostratégique mondiale.

Pour comprendre l’attachement de l’Algérie à ces principes dans son action internationale, il est nécessaire d’opérer un retour aux sources pour montrer comment la diplomatie algérienne moderne est née dans le sillage de la lutte contre la colonisation.

Aux sources de la diplomatie algérienne moderne

Comme tout appareil voué à l’action internationale, la diplomatie algérienne est déterminée par un certain nombre de facteurs d’ordre géographique et géopolitique sur lesquels nous reviendrons ultérieurement.

Au-delà de cette donnée, le fait que la diplomatie algérienne dans son acception contemporaine soit née et se soit développée dans le cadre de la lutte armée de libération nationale a profondément marqué les options de la politique étrangère algérienne après l’indépendance.

En effet, comment comprendre l’importance de l’attachement de l’Algérie aux principes du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, si on ignore que la diplomatie algérienne a forgé son identité dans le combat pour la reconnaissance de ce droit au peuple algérien lui-même ?

1 Les idées développées dans la présente contribution n’engagent que leur auteur.

68 Lofti Boumghar


Par ailleurs, l’attachement quasi viscéral de l’Algérie au respect de la légalité internationale trouve son fondement dans le même contexte historique.

Toute une génération de diplomates algériens a été nourrie à ces principes et à ces valeurs, des principes et des valeurs, qui ont été transmis aux nouvelles générations, à qui incombe aujourd’hui la responsabilité de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre l’action internationale de l’Algérie.

Une politique étrangère constante malgré un environnement

en pleine recomposition

Depuis l’indépendance, l’Etat et la société en Algérie sont passés par deux phases principales :

une première phase de 1962 à 1988 marquée par une omniprésence 1. de l’Etat et une gestion centralisée de l’économie ;

de 1988 à nos jours, avec l’entame d’une transition duale vers la 2. démocratie et vers l’économie de marché.

Cette deuxième phase a vu la survenance dans la violence terroriste qui a ébranlé les fondements de l’Etat républicain et constitué une grave menace à sa pérennité.

Au-delà des transformations internes propres à l’Algérie, la diplomatie algérienne s’est également adaptée aux changements majeurs enregistrés sur la scène géostratégique mondiale depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin jusqu’à l’apparition des prémices d’un monde à nouveau multipolaire en passant par le règne de l’hyperpuissance américaine.

Face à tous ces facteurs endogènes et exogènes, la diplomatie algérienne s’est adaptée, s’est redéployée sans jamais s’éloigner des principes qui constituent la substance même de son action tant au plan régional qu’international.

Il nous paraît hautement significatif que malgré tous les changements et les turbulences qu’a connus l’Algérie dans un passé récent, la diplomatie algérienne s’est singularisée par une constance dans le choix et les actions.

Une des raisons qui peuvent expliquer cet état de fait est que la politique étrangère fait l’objet d’une approche consensuelle de la part d’une grande majorité d’acteurs et de citoyens algériens.

Si un tel constat s’avère juste, il mériterait d’être souligné en raison de l’absence en Algérie d’un réel débat sur les options fondamentales de la politique étrangère, ce qui pourrait laisser penser que, instinctivement, la

69La diplomatie algérienne au XXIè siècle


diplomatie algérienne a fait sienne la conception que se fait l’imaginaire populaire de l’action extérieure de son pays.

Une dimension arabe, méditerranéenne et africaine affirmée

De par sa position stratégique au carrefour de l’Europe, de l’Afrique et du monde arabe, la diplomatie algérienne doit s’assumer des responsabilités régionales importantes et entretenir des relations de confiance, qui lui aménagent des marges de manœuvre et des capacités d’influence dans le contexte régional et sous régional.

Dans ce cadre, l’Algérie a développé des relations multiformes avec le monde arabe caractérisées ces dernières années par une forte connotation économique comme en témoigne le volume important des investissements arabes en Algérie.

La Méditerranée a toujours constitué un centre d’intérêt essentiel pour l’Algérie au regard des liens historiques, culturels et humains qui unissent l’Algérie à nombre d’Etats méditerranéens, au Nord comme au Sud.

Depuis avril 2002, l’Algérie est liée à l’Union européenne par un accord d’association qui est entré en vigueur le 1er septembre 2005.

Attachée au renforcement des liens entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée, l’Algérie a été représentée au plus haut niveau à la réunion marquant l’avènement de l’Union pour la Méditerranée, tout en soulevant certaines interrogations concernant notamment le mode de financement des projets qui seront retenus dans ce cadre.

Par ailleurs, l’Algérie entretient des rapports continus avec l’OTAN dans le cadre du dialogue méditerranéen initié par cette organisation.

Ce dialogue a permis la mise en œuvre de nombreuses actions communes aussi bien militaires que civiles.

Le dialogue informel dans le cadre des 5 + 5 a toujours suscité un intérêt particulier chez les autorités algériennes, qui ne manquent pas une occasion pour souhaiter son développement.

En effet, nombre d’observateurs considèrent que l’espace géopolitique que constitue la Méditerranée occidentale présente une homogénéité de nature à permettre la mise en place de partenariat avancé entre les pays concernés.

L’Afrique constitue une autre dimension importante de l’action de la diplomatie algérienne, et cela sous différents prismes :

70 Lofti Boumghar


l’Afrique en tant que continent recélant d’importantes potentialités à explorer et à développer, et l’initiative du partenariat pour le développement de l’Afrique (NEPAD), dont l’Algérie est l’un des pays promoteurs, qui soulève beaucoup d’espoir, malgré un manque de visibilité sur les projets concrets et surtout le manque d’engagement des bailleurs de fonds extra-africains ;

l’Afrique en tant que zone de vulnérabilité avec la multiplication des conflits de basse intensité, la prolifération du trafic d’armes et l’apparition du terrorisme comme menace majeure contre les peuples de la région.

Dans ce cadre, la diplomatie algérienne s’est évertuée à réunir les conditions du retour de la sécurité et de la paix sur le continent et notamment dans la zone sahélienne, comme en témoignent les efforts inlassables déployés en vue de régler des différends internes notamment dans les pays voisins du Mali et du Niger.

L’Algérie œuvre à ce que l’Afrique puisse prendre en charge sa sécurité, et réunir par elle-même les conditions de sa stabilité et de son développement.

Un souci permanent de diversification

Les observateurs et les analystes tentent régulièrement d’inscrire l’Algérie dans un jeu d’alliances et leurs conclusions sont souvent démenties par les faits.

Une des constantes de la diplomatie algérienne réside dans sa quête de garder une indépendance, malgré les contraintes qu’imposent les nouveaux facteurs intervenus au plan international.

Pour comprendre ce souci d’indépendance, il faut remonter à la tradition de non-alignement qui a constitué au temps de la guerre froide un pilier fondateur de la politique étrangère de l’Algérie.

Au nom de ce principe de non-alignement, l’Algérie a refusé hier comme aujourd’hui d’accueillir des bases étrangères sur son sol et a veillé à diversifier ses relations politiques, économiques et militaires sur une base pragmatique.

Cette référence historique permet de comprendre pourquoi l’Algérie veille à ne pas s’enfermer dans une relation exclusive, et développe une action de dialogue politique et de coopération envers les différents centres de rayonnement de par le monde.

71La diplomatie algérienne au XXIè siècle


Une attention particulière semble être accordée aux Etats émergents et notamment aux Etats continents, tels la Chine, l’Inde ou le Brésil, résultat probablement d’une analyse stratégique et prospective, qui veut que le centre de gravité du monde se déplacera dans un futur proche vers ces pays.

Ce choix qui nous paraît très visible renvoie également à une référence historique représentée par l’importance de la coopération Sud–Sud, elle-même, résultante de l’appui et du soutien affirmés de nombreux pays du Sud à la Révolution algérienne.

L’action économique ou le défi futur pour la diplomatie

algérienne

S’il est possible de soutenir que l’action politique de la diplomatie algérienne offre des garanties de visibilité et de continuité de nature à rassurer ses partenaires, cette diplomatie forgée dans un contexte de lutte politique, éprouve des difficultés à assumer la dimension économique de sa mission, qui revêt aujourd’hui une importance croissante.

Il est convenu que l’une des principales vulnérabilités de l’Algérie réside dans sa dépendance quasi-totale vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures. Sur cette base, la promotion des exportations hors hydrocarbures constitue depuis plus de deux décennies une préoccupation majeure des pouvoirs publics en Algérie.

C’est ainsi que l’appareil diplomatique algérien s’est vu assigné une mission de promotion de la production algérienne et de la destination « Algérie » en matière d’investissement et de tourisme.

Force est de constater que jusqu’à ce jour, cette mission n’est pas totalement assumée et ce, de notre point de vue, pour deux raisons principales :

une raison psychologique qui fait que l’action économique est 1. considérée comme moins noble et moins importante que l’action politique ;

un manque de professionnalisme en la matière en raison d’un profil 2. inadapté à cette mission du personnel diplomatique.

Il y a lieu de souligner à cet effet, qu’un effort salutaire de diversification des profils en matière de recrutement du personnel diplomatique a été entrepris ces dernières années. Il pourrait produire des résultats positifs si les moyens adéquats sont mis à la disposition des personnels affectés à cette mission.

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En conclusion, il est possible de soutenir que le défi, qui attend la diplomatie algérienne à l’orée de ce XXIè siècle, se résume à développer ses capacités à s’adapter aux mutations rapides que connaît le monde, et surtout à renforcer le segment économique de son action au service du développement économique de l’Algérie.



Karim Maiche

Kysyin Tuomo Melasuolta kerran, mikä sai nuoren suomalaismiehen kiinnostumaan juuri Algeriasta. Hän kertoi matkustelleensa nuorempana Ranskassa ja törmänneensä ensimmäistä kertaa junassa maassa asuviin pohjoisafrikkalaisiin siirtolaisiin. Heidän kauttaan hän sai kipinän Välimeren eteläpuoleiseen alueeseen. Halu laajentaa maailmankuvaa ja näkökulmaa vallitsevan angloamerikkalaisen buumin keskellä herätti kiinnostuksen kolmansien maiden asioihin.

Opiskellessaan 1970-luvun alussa Uppsalan yliopistossa eteen avautui mahdollisuus lentää 400 kruunulla viikoksi Algeriaan. Ennen matkaansa hän kertoi kahlanneensa yli 10 000 sivua Algerian historiaa kolonialismin aikakaudesta maan itsenäistymistaisteluihin. Paluulippu jäi lopulta käyttämättä, kun matka venähti viikon sijasta kolmeen kuukauteen. Suomeen paluu onnistui kätevästi liftaamalla.

Väitöskirjansa Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954 esipuheessa Melasuo kirjoittaa, kuinka matkan aikana syntyi rakkaussuhde tähän Pohjois-Afrikan valtioon, joka on jatkunut tähän päivään asti. Toisaalta, jos rajoittaa Melasuon lämpimän suhteen Välimeren alueella pelkästään Algeriaan, ei tee oikeutta hänen koko tuotannolleen ja pyrkimyksilleen. Tuotantoa ei voi myöskään rajoittaa pelkästään suomenkieliseen julkaisutoimintaan. Keskityn artikkelissani kuitenkin vain lähinnä hänen Algeriaa koskevaan tutkimukseensa.

Tämän artikkelin välityksellä kiitän Tuomo Melasuota valtavasta työstä ja panoksesta, jonka hän on suomenkieliselle Välimeren alueen ja etenkin Algerian tutkimukselle antanut. Hänen työllään on ollut minulle suomalaisalgerialaisena opiskelijana valtavasti iloa ja hyötyä.

Algeriasta Suomeen

Minulta on kysytty Suomessa tuhansia kertoja, mistä olen alun perin kotoisin. Vastaan aina syntyneeni ja kasvaneeni Suomessa. Useimmiten vastaus ei riitä ja sama kysymys toistetaan kunnes kerron, että äitini on suomalainen ja isäni

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on syntynyt Algeriassa. Seuraavaksi minulta kysytään, ovatko vanhempani vielä yhdessä, asuuko isäni Suomessa ja olenko muslimi.

Algerian itsenäisyyssodan keskellä varttunut isäni pääsi 1960-luvun lopulla Leningradiin opiskelemaan. Siellä hän tapasi isoäitini mukaan työmatkalle lähteneen äitini. Siskoni synnyttyä he muuttivat ensin Algeriaan ja päätyivät vuonna 1977 Suomeen. Synnyin kaksi vuotta myöhemmin enkä usko, että olen ollut kovin vanha ymmärtäessäni, että isäni on eronnut joissain kohdin valtaväestöstä. Olen myös itse joutunut tummien piirteideni johdosta silmätikuksi vaaleiden suomalaisten keskellä.

Usein ihmiset määrittelevät kansalaisuuteni omien näkemystensä pohjalta: joidenkin mielestä olen isäni syntyperän johdosta algerialainen, toiset taas määrittelevät minut suomalaiseksi. Jos minulta kysytään, koen kai tässä kontekstissa olevani suomalaisalgerialainen. Isäni synnyinmaassa olen vieraillut säännöllisesti nuoresta asti. Olen vertaillut Suomea ja Algeriaa, suomalaisia ja algerialaisia, islamia ja kristinuskoa toisiinsa. Tähän mennessä ei vastaani ole tullut sellaisia ylitsepääsemättömiä kulttuurisia tai uskonnollisia eroja, jotka tekisivät näiden yhdessäelon mahdottomaksi.

Kerran jouduimme 1990-luvun alussa kuvaamataidon tunnilla tekemään työn, jossa Saddam Husseinin kasvot asetettiin keskelle maalitaulua. Koin aiheen erittäin kiusalliseksi ja ihmettelin, miksi isäni kehysti tekeleeni. Se roikkuu yhä hänen seinällään. Isäni historiankäsitys erosi usein siitä, mitä meille suomalaisessa koulussa kerrottiin. Olen myös ihmetellyt, miksi kouluhistoriamme alkaa usein Kreikasta ja jatkuu Roomaan. Se hyppää arabien imperiumin yli käsitteellä “pimeä keski-aika” ja jatkuu renessanssina löytöretkiin kolonialismin ja imperialismin käsitteiden sijaan päättyen lopulta maailmansotien jälkeen Neuvostoliiton hajoamiseen ja Euroopan unionin syntyyn. Mielestäni tällainen Eurooppa-keskeinen näkökulma historiaan ei tee oikeutta maailmanhistorian ymmärtämiselle, Välimeren kansoista puhumattakaan.

Välimeren alueen väestöt ja kulttuurit ovat muovautuneet ajan kuluessa ja jatkuvassa vuorovaikutuksessa keskenään. Algerian välimerellinen sijainti on tehnyt siitä osan maailman vanhimpia kulttuureja. Pitkän historiansa aikana se on kuulunut useaan eri kulttuurialueeseen. Algeria on ollut osa Karthagoa, Numidiaa ja Roomaa. Myös kristinusko sai jalansijaa maassa. Kristinuskon yksi merkittävimmistä teologeista, kirkkoisä Augustinus, syntyi nykyisen Algerian alueella. Rooman valtakunnan, vandaalien ja Bysantin jälkeen maahan saapuivat arabit erikokoisina aaltoina ja toivat mukanaan islamin.

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Algeriasta puhuttaessa useimmiten esiin nousee 132 vuotta kestänyt kolonialismin aikakausi osana Ranskan siirtomaaimperiumia, joka huipentui itsenäisyystaisteluun vuonna 1954. Itsenäisyys kahdeksan vuotta myöhemmin jätti maahan yksipuoluejärjestelmän. Tätä poliittista ja kulttuurista kehitystä Melasuo kuvaa yksityiskohtaisesti väitöskirjassaan. Demokraattiset uudistukset, jotka aloitettiin 20 vuotta sitten, ajoivat maan 1990-luvulla veriseen sisällissotaan. Arviolta 150 000 ihmisen arvellaan menettäneen henkensä. Ranskan miehityksestä vapautunut uusi eliitti ei ollut valmis luopumaan saavuttamistaan etuoikeuksista.

Algeriasta Suomessa tiedetään yleensä maan ensimmäinen presidentti Ahmed Ben Bella, algerialainen punaviini, kestävyysjuoksija Noureddin Morceli ja islamistien väkivallanteot. 1990-luvulla suomalainen media uutisoi Algerian väkivaltaisuuksista. Muutamia pitempiä, usein ranskan kielestä käännettyjä artikkeleita lukuun ottamatta, tapahtumista jäi mielikuva muslimien tekemistä raaoista murhista, joita maan hallitus pyrki estämään “kovalla kädellä”.

Syyskuun 11. päivän iskujen jälkeen maailma heräsi käsittelemään islamilaisten maiden nuorison radikalisoitumista globaalimmin ja syvemmin analysoiden. Usein väkivallan uskottiin kumpuavan islamista. Tapahtumia alettiin tarkastella sillä seurauksella, että muutamat muslimiystäväni katsoivat parhaaksi ajaa partansa välttääkseen ylimääräiset huomionosoitukset kadulla liikkuessaan. Algerian hallituksesta tuli merkittävä liittolainen USA:n johtamassa terrorisminvastaisessa sodassa “pahaa” vastaan, eikä sen kovia otteita enää arvosteltu. Ääri-islamilainen terrorismi nähtiin entistä laajemmin uhkana, jonka kukistamiseen oli käytettävä humanitääristen toimien sijaan sotilaallista voimaa.

Islam on melko väärinymmärretty uskonto myös Suomessa. Vielä 1970-luvun lopulla maahanmuuttajia oli maassa vain kourallinen ja yleistäen voisi todeta, että kaikki tunsivat toisensa. Heihin suhtauduttiin usein kunnioittavammin kuin 2000-luvulla. Nykyään tilanne on muuttunut, kun maahanmuuttajien määrä on ajan myötä kasvanut. Ennen lamaa Suomeen saapuneet somalit ja 1980-luvulla tulleet vietnamilaiset ovat vähitellen muiden maahanmuuttajien ohella muuttaneet suomalaisten asenteita ulkomaalaisiin: alettiin puhua “mokkanaamoista” ja “venepakolaisista”. Etenkin syyskuun 11. päivän tapahtumat ovat tehneet “hyvästä” paremman ja “pahasta” pahemman. Media käsittelee jatkuvalla syötöllä islamia omasta diskurssistaan. Islam rauhanuskontona nähdään usein vain ironisesti “rauhanuskontona” eikä esimerkiksi välineenä, jota kukin helposti käyttää

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omiin tarkoituksiinsa. Niin sanottujen länsimaiden terrorismin vastainen sota nähdään välttämättömänä toimenpiteenä maailmanrauhan edistämiseksi ja “oikeiden” arvojen säilyttämiseksi.

Olen huomannut, että minusta tulee usein Suomessa “suuri islamin puolustaja”. Algeriassa puolestaan löydän itseni puolustamassa kristinuskoa. En ymmärrä, mitä eroa on sillä, pääseekö Suomen isoäitini taivaaseen tai Algerian isoäitini paratiisiin. Olen kuullut tarinoita siitä, kuinka Suomen vaarini taisteli 50 asteen pakkasessa Karjalan kannaksella ja että yksi suomalainen vastaa kymmentä “ryssää”. Algeriassa puolestaan kerrotaan, kuinka vaarini taisteli 50 asteen helteessä ranskalaisia vastaan ja yksi algerialainen vastaa kymmentä ranskalaista. Kansat pyrkivät aina rakentamaan myyttejä historiallisista vaiheistaan.

Jos kysymys on kansakuntien identiteettien yhteen hiomisesta valtion tai liittovaltioiden turvallisuusintressien pohjalta, historian tutkimuksen kannalta asetelma on vähintäänkin harmillinen. Nykyinen trendi, joka pyrkii jakamaan Välimeren alueen keinotekoisesti keskeltä kahtia, ei tee oikeutta alueen historialle, nykytilanteen hahmottamisesta puhumattakaan. Melasuo kuvasi Välimeren etelä- ja pohjoispuolta joskus osuvasti saman kolikon kahdeksi eri puoleksi.


Vertaan usein elämääni ja suomalaista kasvuympäristöä ikäisteni serkkujen ja ystävien elämään Algeriassa. Koen tilanteeni etuoikeutetuksi heihin verrattuna useilla eri elämän osa-alueilla. Suomen koulutusjärjestelmä ja rauhallinen kasvuympäristö takaavat puutteineenkin paremmat mahdollisuudet itsensä toteuttamiselle ja kehittämiselle. Minulla on ollut etuoikeus matkustella, syödä terveellisesti ja kouluttaa itseäni. Entä jos olisin syntynyt ja kasvanut Algeriassa?

Algerialaisten nuorten tulevaisuuden toiveet ovat hyvin samanlaisia kuin nuorilla yleensä: työpaikka, matkustaminen, perheen perustaminen ja turvallisen tulevaisuuden tavoitteleminen kuuluvat algerialaisten nuorten haaveisiin. Hallitus ja imaamit eivät useinkaan pysty vastaamaan näihin toiveisiin. Työttömyysaste nousee Algeriassa lähes 14 prosenttiin, eli kaksinkertaiseksi Suomeen verrattuna. Neljäsosa maan väestöstä elää köyhyysrajan alapuolella. Työttömistä 72 prosenttia on alle 30-vuotiaita ja 85 prosenttia alle 35-vuotiaita. Monet nuoret kokevat, ettei Algeria hyväksy heitä ja ovat valmiita jättämään kotimaansa hinnalla millä hyvänsä. Tietoisina

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riskeistä, epävarmuudesta ja kärsimyksistä nämä immigraation kandidaatit, harragat, vaarantavat henkensä ylittäen Välimeren rantautuakseen Eurooppaan; Eldoradoon, jossa he uskovat pääsevänsä kiinni parempaan elämään. Nämä yritykset ovat 2000-luvulla yleistyneet1.

Varakkaiden elämä on tietenkin hyvin erilaista. Sidi Fedjin ja Tipazan hiekkarannat todistavat toisenlaisen Algerian puolesta. Maan pääkaupungissa kymmenet yöklubit kukoistavat islamistien iskujen pelosta huolimatta. Algeria on valtavien luonnonvarojensa ansiosta yksi Afrikan vauraimmista valtioista. Korkeiden öljyn ja kaasun hintojen seurauksena maahan on virrannut miljardeja dollareita. Käytetäänkö nämä rikkaudet valtion rakentamiseen ja tavallisten kansalaisten hyväksi, vai päätyvätkö ne maata hallitsevalle yläluokalle? Algerian tulevaisuus on monella tapaa epäselvä.

Algerian nykytilanteesta on vaikea saada kokonaiskuvaa tarkastelematta sen vaiherikasta historiaa. Etenkin kolonialismin vaikutus ja perintö puhuttaa yhä ja vaikuttaa vielä tänä päivänä esimerkiksi Ranskan ja Algerian suhteisiin. Ranskan valloitukset Algeriassa 1800-luvun alussa voidaan liittää laajempaan historialliseen kokonaisuuteen: kolonialismin ja imperialismin aikakauteen. Algerian väestötappio 40 valloitusvuoden kuluessa arvioidaan useaksi sadaksituhanneksi hengeksi. Hävinneen algerialaisen eliitin tilalle alkoi vähitellen muuttaa eurooppalaisia siirtolaisia, eikä algerialaista eliittiä haluttu kilpailemaan eurooppalaisten kanssa ja hidastamaan siirtokunnan kehitystä. Ranska otti parhaat viljelysalueet käyttöönsä ja algerialaiset joutuivat usein muuttamaan kurjiin saviasumuksiin. Maan kulttuuritaso laski jyrkästi, kun uskonnollisten instituutioiden ja veljeskuntaliittoutumien zaouiat ja koraanikoulut hävisivät.2

Algerian taloudellinen ja sosiaalinen kehitys ennen Ranskan miehitystä oli melko samanlainen kuin muuallakin Välimeren alueella: maan taloudellinen rakenne ja kansan enemmistön elintaso kestivät hyvin vertailun muiden Välimeren yhteiskuntien kanssa. Algerialaisten talonpoikien arvioidaan olleen samalla sivistystasolla kuin heidän maataan asuttamaan tulleiden ranskalaisten ja myöhemmin italialaisten, maltalaisten sekä espanjalaisten siirtolaisten. Sisäisesti maa oli vakaa ja yhteenotot olivat pikemmin heimojen sisäisiä kuin sosiaalisten luokkien välisiä, toisin kuin vaikkapa vallankumouksellisessa Ranskassa.3

1 http://www.ons.dz/index.htm.2 Melasuo 1999, 120–127.3 Lorcin 1999, 246, 249; Melasuo 1999, 61, 94–95.

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Melasuo kuvaa väitöskirjassaan Algerian itsenäistymispyrkimyksiä ja Ranskan tukahduttavia vastatoimia, jotka lopulta johtivat Algerian yksipuoluejärjestelmän syntyyn. Ranskan toimet vähitellen tuhosivat kansan sisäisen poliittisen pluralismin, ja jättivät ainoaksi vaihtoehdoksi aseelliseen vallankumouksen kautta itsenäisyyttä tavoittelevan liikkeen: Front de Libération nationale, FLN. Algerian itsenäistyessä maa oli suurten haasteiden edessä. Sen perinteinen koulutusjärjestelmä oli tuhoutunut. Miehistä lukutaidottomia oli 85 ja naisista 95 prosenttia4. Nopea väestönkasvu, sisäiset etniset kiistat ja rajariidat naapurivaltioiden kanssa ovat olleet vaikuttamassa Algerian nykyiseen tilanteeseen. Algerian viimeisimmät väkivaltaisuudet ovat paljolti myös pitkittyneen yksipuoluejärjestelmän seuraus.

Vierailu Tampereen rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuslaitoksella

Vuonna 2003 olin työharjoittelussa suomalaisessa kansalaisjärjestössä, jossa järjestin erilaisia tiedotustilaisuuksia itsenäiseksi valtioksi pyrkivän Länsi-Saharan tilanteesta. Marokko on miehittänyt Afrikan luoteisosassa sijaitsevaa Länsi-Saharaa espanjalaisten aloitettua alueelta vetäytymisen vuonna 1975. Algeria puolestaan on alueen itsenäisyysliike Polisarion suurin tukija ja näkee konfliktin osana dekolonisaatioprosessia. Konflikti on ajanut naapurusten suhteet koetukselle. Ystäväni Henri Onodera oli ennen muuttoaan Lontooseen sopinut Tuomo Melasuon kanssa, että Saharan konfliktista voisi järjestää keskustelutilaisuuden Taprin Välimeri-projektin tiimoilta. Suomeen saapui Polisarion Pohjoismaiden edustaja Lamine Yahiaoui sekä Länsi-Saharan naisjärjestön NUSW:in edustaja Mansoura Babouzid.

Soitin Tapriin Melasuolle, jonka olin aiemmin nähnyt puhumassa Algerian tapahtumista televisiossa. Hän alkoi välittömästi keskustella kanssani Algerian tilanteesta. Muistan, kuinka minua ärsytti, sillä olen yleensä tottunut kertomaan “tosiasioita” Algeriasta suomalaisille; Algeria ja siitä kertominen ovat osa identiteettiäni. Nyt keskustelu olikin hankalaa ja jouduin monella tapaa vastaanottajan roolin. Aiheista keskusteltiin muutenkin liian yksityiskohtaisesti. En ymmärtänyt, kuinka aihealueet joista puhuttiin, olisivat jotenkin mielenkiintoisia tai oleellisia Algerian kannalta. Toisaalta ajatusten vaihtaminen oli myös antoisaa, sillä hän tunsi niin hyvin molemmat minulle tärkeät kulttuurit. Näin ei ole tapahtunut elämäni aikana kovinkaan usein.

Lopuksi Melasuo lupasi lähettää minulle väitöskirjansa Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954. Mietin, kuinka joku on voinut tehdä

4 Ageron 1979, 531.

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väitöskirjan noin tylsästä aiheesta. Eikö olisi ollut paljon mielenkiintoisempaa perehtyä Algerian vapautussotaan kuin sitä edeltäneeseen aikaan? Sovimme joka tapauksessa Länsi-Saharan tilaisuuden järjestämisestä, ja kirja sai jäädä odottamaan vähäksi aikaa.

Tilaisuus onnistui hyvin. Paikalle saapui runsas joukko kiinnostuneita ja erilaisia mielipiteitä esitettiin hyvässä hengessä. Myös Marokon kanta sai luonnollisesti ymmärrystä. On muutenkin sääli, jos veljeskansat Algeria ja Marokko jatkavat kiistelyä Länsi-Saharasta, sillä nämä Pohjois-Afrikan amazighit on usein alistettu eri aikakausina alueen kansojen eripuraisuuksia hyväksi käyttäen. 1900-luvun alussa Ranskan miehittäessä Pohjois-Afrikkaa, Ranska mobilisoi algerialaisia kukistamaan Abd el-Krimin johtaman vasta-rintaliikkeen vuonna 1925. Taisteluihin lähetetty Algerian vaarini on kertonut, kuinka algerialaiset makasivat vallihaudoissa jalat pystyssä toivoen haavoittuvansa, ettei heidän tarvitsisi sotia marokkolaisia veljiään vastaan. Harvemmin olen nähnyt Suomessa asuvien pohjoisafrikkalaisten kiistelevän Länsi-Saharan tilanteesta. Sen sijaan he arvostelevat aika yksissä tuumin tasapuolisesti kotimaidensa poliittisia päättäjiä.

Muutaman vuoden kuluttua tilaisuuden järjestämisestä kiinnostuin orientalismista ja sitä ympäröivästä keskustelusta. Löysin sattumalta helsinkiläisestä antikvariaatista Melasuon vuonna 1984 toimittaman teoksen Wallinista Wideriin, jossa oli hyviä artikkeleita aiheesta. Ajattelin, että jos kerran hän on ollut mukana käsittelemässä orientalistista diskurssia jo 1980-luvun alussa, niin voisin ehkä sittenkin vilkaista hänen lähettämäänsä väitöskirjaa.

Teos olikin täynnä mielenkiintoisia lähteitä ja haastatteluita Algerian tutkimuksen huippunimistä ja poliittisista vaikuttajista lähtien. Sain myös vastauksia moniin minua aiemmin mietityttäneihin kysymyksiin. Kaiken lisäksi Algeriaa käsiteltiin jotenkin myös suomalaisesta lähtökohdista, joka sopi minulle hyvin. Toisaalta se tapaili hyvin niitä kansainvälisiä ja algerialaisia diskursseja, joiden kautta maasta usein kirjoitetaan. Aiheen valintakin osoittautui lopulta aika oleelliseksi nyky-Algerian ymmärtämisen kannalta. Ennen kaikkea kirjan alaviitteet toimivat hyvänä lähtökohtana jokaiselle, joka on kiinnostunut Algeriaa koskevasta tutkimuksesta.

Monella tapaa Algeria tarjoaa erinomaisen esimerkin monista Välimeren alueen historiallisista vaiheista. Maan väestön lukuisat identiteetit tarjoavat monta mielenkiintoista seikkaa pohdittavaksi ja sen historiallisia vaiheita voi heijastella myös muiden kolmansien maiden kehitykseen. Onkin ymmärrettävää, miksi nuori Melasuo aikoinaan aloitti Välimeren etelä-puolisten maiden tutkimusmatkansa juuri Algeriasta.

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Lähteet

Ageron, Charles Robert (1979): Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine. Tome II: De l’insurrection de 1871 au déclenchement de la guerre de libération (1954). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Lorcin, M. E. Patricia (1999). Imperial identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria. London: Tauris.

Melasuo, Tuomo (1999): Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954. Tampere: Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus.

L’Office National des Statistiques est l’Institution Centrale des Statistiques de l’Algérie. http://www.ons.dz/index.htm, May 2008.


Who is progressive today?

Thoughts on sustainable development in a

globalized but unjust economy

Jan Otto Andersson

My cooperation with Tuomo Melasuo goes back to the 1970s. At that time the future of the oppressed of the world fascinated and encouraged us. It was a time of progressive movements and experiments and of real hopes for a New International Economic Order. Tuomo, Jyrki Käkönen and I took interest in the activities of the Third World Economists, an organization that had held its first congress in Algiers, and was brought to Finland by Tuomo. The three of us participated in the second congress organized in Havana. The mood has changed a lot since then. The Third World does not exist anymore, neither does the organization, and few remember that the New International Economic Order once was a serious global issue that was killed by the monetarist and neoliberal counterrevolution in the early 1980s.

In honor of Tuomo, this essay takes a look at the idea of progress yesterday and today. What does progress mean thirty years after the crumbling of the hopes of the 1970s?

My intention is to sketch the zeitgeist of three “centuries” by looking at the progressive and future oriented sides of each, especially that of our own: the century that started approximately 200 years after the French revolution. The account is limited to that part of the zeitgeist that characterizes the “Left” at each epoch.

The century following the French and American revolutions was an epoch of republicanism and liberalism. The Left was inspired by the idea of free and equal citizens who could arrange their personal lives as they wished. For progressives the market was a sphere of freedom and equal opportunity unfettered by monarchy, church, estates or guilds. The 19th century was also the Age of Industrialism and Capital depicted by Eric Hobsbawm. It ended with the imperial first wave of globalization. As described by Karl Polanyi, the liberal order had conjured up its own counter forces: cartels, trade unions,

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agricultural protectionism, chauvinistic nationalism, and a strong socialist movement.1

The following century was marked by the Left of the worker’s movement, social democrats and communists, but also by social liberals, who were not afraid of using the state to ensure rising living standards for the masses. Economic growth, full employment and social justice were key elements in the pursuit of welfare for all, and the state was seen as the main guarantor for achieving these goals. The short 20th century from 1917 to 1989 was indeed an Age of Extremes (Hobsbawm again), but its driving ethos was economic growth, social security and democracy. It ended with the neoliberal second wave of globalization.

Today, both the liberal capitalism of the first Left and the socialist statism of the second, have become difficult to associate with progress. As ideologies for the Left they have lost most of their appeal. The breakdown of the Soviet system on the one hand, and the growing discontent with the neoliberal Washington consensus on the other, has made the luster of both systems fade away. Even though the Scandinavian social democratic welfare regimes have succeeded astonishingly well in combining adaption to a global economy with strong welfare states, they have not become models for new progressive movements. They are still under pressure to remake or remove central parts of their social and economic institutions.2

One concept that has marked the progressive thinking of the present “third” century, in a way that would have been alien to the earlier two, is “sustainable development”. It was launched by the Brundtland-report Our Common Future in 1987. The new dimension is that the ecological limits must be taken into consideration when we look at the future of not only our different national societies, but of the globe as a whole. To the progressives of the first and the second centuries ecological considerations were with few exceptions peripheral. The republican liberals were convinced that they had proved Malthus wrong. Idealistic socialists as well as pragmatic trade unionists wanted to convince their followers that it was possible to provide decent jobs, proper wages and material security for all without having to bother about ecological limits; to do that was often considered to be reactionary.

1 There is a peculiar leftover from this original Left: “Venstre” – “Left” in English – is the leading Danish right-wing party today. It was founded in 1870. Another Danish party is “Radikale Venstre”, a social liberal party founded in 1905.2 Andersen et al. 2007.

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Thoughts on sustainable development

However, the precise sense of “sustainable development” is by no means clear. It came to be seen as a combination of economic, social and ecological sustainability. As “sustainability” was transposed from its ecological domain to include the economic and social spheres it turned too encompassing and vague – and therefore generally acceptable and toothless. What does the often used term “sustainable growth” really imply? Is social sustainability always a good thing, and if so, can it be treated as a synonym for social justice?

When trying to come to grips with the implications of sustainable development on a global level, we find it quite difficult to pursue all three goals simultaneously. We seem to be constrained to choose between three competing “progressive” alternatives, each of which combine two of the three dimensions, but ignores or downgrades the third one. I have called this “the global ethical trilemma.”3

The global ethical trilemma: Pick two – ignore the third

Mass consumption prosperity

Global Eco-efficient socialdemocracy capitalism

Global justice Ecological

sustainability

Red-green planetarism

The three corners of the triangle represent the three dimensions of sustainable development. A “sustainable economy” (at the top of triangle) is a prosperous economy, with growing opportunities and incomes. It endorses the “Western” consumerist way of life that has been held up as a model for poor “underdeveloped” countries, and also for not so poor, formerly “socialist”, countries. Global justice or “social sustainability” (at the south-west corner) implies a dramatic equalization of the living conditions between, as well as within, different parts of the world.

3 Andersson 2003.

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Some say that we already live in a “flat” world, implying that globalization has leveled the field of opportunities. However, the gaps are tremendous, and the “flatter” the world the less acceptable these gaps become. If we are to live peacefully in a world that is integrated through money, internet and other means of communication, the richest fifth cannot earn 70 times more than the poorest quintile. In terms of the prevailing market exchange rates this is the situation today.

The income differences are considerably reduced when we take into consideration the lower costs of living in the poor countries. However, even when calculated in terms of exchange rates that are adjusted according to local purchasing power, the gaps are formidable. The richest quintile gets 15 times more than the poorest. Such income gaps would not be tolerable, and do not exist in any single country. The flatter the world becomes the more important will the market exchange rates be, especially for the wealthy. Those who afford it can buy whatever they like from wherever they want. You can enjoy exotic adventures, fascinating foods, exclusive services, lush environments and promising investments far away from your home country. If you are moneyless you cannot even have a cup of rice at sale next door.

Ecological sustainability (the south-east corner) implies that the natural capital is regenerated. Ecological economists insist that the natural capital should be fully sustained; they call it “strong sustainability.” Environmental economists, who apply traditional economic methods to environmental problems, are less stringent and accept that natural capital can be consumed if there are man-made substitutes for it. For example, the concept of “genuine national savings” calculated by the World Bank, consider a loss of natural wealth to be sustainable if it is matched by investments in physical or human capital. This the ecological economists call “weak sustainability,” implying that in the long run the ecological limits must be respected, however much we build roads and factories, or however much we invest in education and health.

Practically all serious books and reports that treat the global situation today tend to fall into one of the three categories I have sketched out at the sides of the triangle. There are works that want to make globalization fair and that stress the justice and equity aspects in today’s world economy, but that only marginally reflect on the ecological limits to a prosperous and just world. Good examples of this “global social-democratic” approach are the ILO report A Fair Globalization and the World Bank development report Equity and Development.

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When our global ecological footprint exceeds the global biocapacity, indicating that we already consume too much of Earth’s renewable resources4, any serious study of world poverty and development should take this growing ecological deficit into account. The global social democratic agenda, as expressed for instance in the UN millennium development goals, is seriously threatened due to the high prices for food and oil.

Environmental economists stress the necessity to “internalize” the environmental costs; to put the “right price” on the environmental services5. Therefore clear property or user rights should be assigned, taxes be imposed, and markets be constituted that make consumers and polluters pay for the environmental damages they cause. This approach – if rigorously pursued – could maintain, and even improve, existing prosperity without threatening ecological sustainability. However, it would not solve the problems of global justice. Even if there were to be an initial equal distribution of the rights to consume and pollute, the danger that the poor would have to sell their rights to those who are richer is obvious. Thus the efforts to create an eco-efficient capitalism are progressive in relation to the current situation, but they might even worsen the injustice associated with the huge income gaps as the prices for water, food, energy and other necessities rise to their “right” levels.

The practical and ethical problems related to the build up of functioning and fair markets are legion. Authors such as Robert Kuttner, Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, have shown how limited our means are to create markets that take health, nature and coming generations into account6. That a free market for food can lead to catastrophic famines when world production is affected by changing weather conditions, such as El Niño, is well documented7.

The third possibility – combining global justice and ecological sustainability – I have labeled red-green planetarism. The term planetarism I have borrowed from Ele Alenius, a modest but courageous former political leader on the left, who in his old days has written two books in Finnish on the topic. Alenius is looking for a new civilization that would encompass the whole humanity and that would organize society in accordance with solidaristic and ecological principles8.

4 Global Footprint Network 2008.5 E.g. Arrow et al. 2004.6 Kuttner 1997; Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004.7 Davis 2001.8 Alenius 2000; 2005.

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Alenius is not alone in this search. A stream of books and articles is enriching the red-green approach. This literature is overtly critical of conventional economic growth and consumerism, but sometimes of capitalism as a system guided by the logic of accumulation and expansion. According to Joel Kovel “capitalism and its by-products – imperialism, war, neoliberal globalization, racism, poverty, and the destruction of community – are all playing a part in the destruction of our ecosystem.”9

Another planetarist critic of existing capitalism is James Gustave Speth, a longstanding leader of the American environmental movement. He quotes Paul Raskin, an initiator of the Great Transition Initiative.

“The emergence of a new suite of values is the foundation of the entire edifice of our planetary society. Consumerism, individualism, and domination of nature – the dominant values of yesteryear – have given way to a new triad: quality of life, human solidarity and ecological sensibility.”10

I find this value-triad to be in line with the global ethical trilemma presented here. If we put “quality of life” at the top corner, “human solidarity” at the south-west and “ecological sensibility” at the south-east corner, the trilemma appears much less threatening – even solvable.

Speth outlines the contours of a “post-scarcity planetary civilization” in which fulfillment, not wealth, would become the primary measure of success and well-being. Sustainability would become a core part of the worldview. He sets a broad, almost revolutionary, agenda for the environmentalist movement.

“[T]he environmental agenda should expand to embrace a profound challenge to consumerism and commercialism and the lifestyles they offer, a healthy skepticism of growthmania and a sharp focus on what society should actually be striving to grow, a challenge to corporate dominance and a redefinition of the corporation and its goals, a commitment to deep change in both the reach and the functioning of the market, and a commitment to building what Alperovitz calls “the democratization of wealth” and Barnes calls ‘capitalism 3.0’.”11

Alenius, Kovel and Speth have interesting precursors. We can find religious founders such as Buddha, political leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, socialists

9 Kovel 2007, back cover.10 Raskin quoted in Speth 2008, 205.11 Speth 2008, 225.

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such as William Morris, anarchists such as Pyotr Kropotkin, and philosophers such as Arne Naess. In a lecture called “The society of the future” delivered on the evening of the Bloody Sunday, November 13th 1887, William Morris expressed his views in an unswerving manner:

When our opponents say, as they sometimes do, How should we be able to procure the luxuries of life in a Socialist society? Answer boldly, We could not do so, and we don’t care, for we don’t want them and won’t have them; and indeed, I feel sure that we cannot if we are all free men together.

So, then, my ideal is first unconstrained life, and next simple and natural life. First you must be free; and next you must learn to take pleasure in all the details of life: which indeed will be necessary for you, because, since others will be free, you will have to do your own work.12

Of the three progressive alternatives outlined above – global social democracy, eco-efficient capitalism, and red-green planetarism – only the last satisfies the conditions for a new “third” Left. Its political future still looks rather slim – progressives in power positions tend to extol global social-democracy or eco-efficient capitalism – but it is the most honest alternative, since it takes the global ethical trilemma into account and openly asks for solutions that require deep changes in “Western” values and lifestyles.

References

Ackerman, Frank & Lisa Heinzerling (2004): Priceless. On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing. The New Press.

Alenius, Ele (2000): Että olisimme humaanin sivilisaation planeetta. Edita

Alenius, Ele (2005): Planetarismi maailmankehityksen rationaalisena perustana. Edita.

12 Morris 1979, 194.

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Andersen, Torben M. et al. (2007): The Nordic Model - Embracing globalization and sharing risks. The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA).

Andersson, Jan Otto (2003): ”Världsekonomins etiska trilemma”, in V.-M. Ritakallio (ed.) Riskit, instituutiot ja tuotokset. Esseitä hyvinvointitutkimuksen professori Olli Kankaan täyttäessä 50 vuotta. Sosiaalipoliittisen yhdistyksen tutkimus, nro 59, TCWR tutkimuksia nro 1, 1–17.

Andersson, Jan Otto (forthcoming): “International trade in a full but unequal world”, in A. Hornborg & A. Jorgenson (eds.) Global trade and environmental justice: New approaches to political ecology.

Arrow, Kenneth & al. (2004): “Are we consuming too much?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), 147–172.

Davis, Mike (2001): Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World. Verso Books

Global Footprint Network. http://www.footprintnetwork.org/index.php, June 2008.

ILO (2004): A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All. Report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization.

Jomo, K. S. & Jaques Baudot (2007): Flat World, Big Gaps. Economic Liberalization, Globalization, Poverty and Inequality. Orient Longman, Zed Books, Third World Network.

Kovel, Joel (2007): The Enemy of Nature. The End of Capitalism or the End of the World? Zed Books, Fernwood Publishing.

Kuttner, Robert (1997): Everything for Sale. The Virtues and Limits of Markets. Alfred A. Knopf

Morris, William (1979): Political Writings edited by A. L. Morton, Lawrence and Wishart.

Polanyi, Karl (1944): The Great Transformation. Beacon Press.

Speth, James Gustave (2008): The Bridge at the Edge of the World. Capitalism, the Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability. Yale University Press

UN (1987): Our Common Future. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development. Oxford University Press.

World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development.


Quo vadis kehitys(maa)tutkimus?

Pertti Multanen

Suomalaisella kehitysmaa- tai kehitystutkimuksella ja rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuksella on varmasti paljonkin yhteisiä juuria. Muutama vuosikymmen sitten syntyneinä tutkimusaloina molemmat nousivat uusina akateemisen tutkimuksen suuntauksina osin haastamaan perinteisiä akateemisen tutkimuksen aloja. Molemmat korostivat tutkimusotteensa monitieteistä luonnetta. Rajat ovat olleet joustavat myös siinä suhteessa, että samat tutkijat ovat uransa eri vaiheissa vaikuttaneet molempien tutkimusalojen piirissä.

Alojen vakiintuminen perinteisen akateemisen yhteisön kiinteiksi osiksi on ollut hidas, vuosikymmeniä kestänyt prosessi. Tutkimusalojen organisoituminen tapahtui pitkän aikaa yliopistojen normaalien tiedekuntarakenteiden ulkopuolelle sijoittuneissa erillislaitoksissa. Helsingin yliopistossa 1960-luvun loppupuolella ja 1970-luvun alussa ensin Interkont -ryhmän nimellä ja sitten virallisesti vuoden 1973 alusta konsistorin alaisena yksikkönä toimi Kehitysmaainstituutti -niminen erillislaitos. Tämä yksikkö siirrettiin vuoden 1992 alusta Helsingin yliopiston valtiotieteellisen tiedekunnan alaisuuteen ja vuoden 1997 alusta siitä muodostettiin tiedekunnan yksi ainelaitos. Saman vuoden 1997 alusta laitokselle perustettiin professorin virka, opetusalana kehitysmaatutkimus.1

Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimus organisoitiin opetusministeriön alaiseksi erillislaitokseksi, kunnes senkin tie vei kiinteämmäksi osaksi yliopistorakennetta Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskukseksi Tampereen yliopistoon. Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuksen professuurin perustaminen on omiaan vakiinnuttamaan tätä tutkimusalaa osaksi suomalaista akateemista rakennetta. Institutionaaliset ratkaisut eivät kuitenkaan merkitse sitä, että keskustelu tutkimusalan suunnasta ja painopisteistä, tai edes niiden oikeudesta olla olemassa itsenäisinä tutkimusaloinaan, olisi käyty loppuun.

Suomen Akatemiassa toimi ensimmäisen kerran vuonna 1974 määräaikainen kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto tieteen keskustoimikunnan alaisuudessa. Päivämäärällä 4.3.1975 tieteen keskustoimikunta julkaisi

1 Tarkemmin alkuvaiheista ks. Jerman 2001.

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muistion Kehitysmaatutkimuksen suuntaviivoja. Muistiossa viitataan muun muassa valtion tiedeneuvoston ohjelmaan Suomen tiedepolitiikan suuntaviivoja 1970-luvulla ja siteerataan sitä muun muassa seuraavasti: ”Erityisinä tavoitteina tulee olla, että yhteistyö edistää kehittyneiden ja kehittyvien maiden välisen eriarvoisuuden poistamista ja kansainvälisen jännityksen lieventämistä”.2

Muistiossa todetaan edelleen Suomen Akatemian tehtävinä seuraavaa: ”Tieteen keskustoimikunta katsoo, että kehitysmaatutkimuksen perustavoitteena tulisi olla kehittyneiden ja kehitysmaiden eriarvoisuuden poistaminen erityisesti niin, että se palvelee kehitysmaiden omia kehityspoliittisia päämääriä”. Jo tuolloin viitattiin siihen, että ”Keskustoimikunnan käsityksen mukaan Suomessa suoritettavan kehitysmaatutkimuksen tulisi liittyä maamme harjoittamaan kehitysyhteistyöhön, joskaan ei voida sulkea pois mahdollisuutta harjoittaa tutkimusyhteistyötä myös sellaisten maiden kanssa, jotka eivät kuulu maamme virallisen kehitysyhteistyön piiriin”.3

Samassa muistiossa ehdotetaan, että ”Tieteen keskustoimikunnan mielestä saattaisi olla tarpeellista perustaa keskustoimikunnan alaisuuteen pysyvä kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto tutkimus-, yhteydenpito- ja koordinointitehtäviin”4.

Kehitysmaatutkimus/kehitystutkimus

Kirjoitin lähes kaksi vuosikymmentä sitten opetusministeriön korkeakoulu- ja tiedeosaston julkaisemaan Korkeakoulutieto -lehteen artikkelin, jonka otsikkona oli ”Kehitysmaa- vai kehitysyhteistyötutkimusta”5. Tämän artikkelin ajatus oli pohtia kriittisesti suomalaisen kehitysmaatutkimuksen suuntaa. Vaikka aikaa on kulunut pari vuosikymmentä, on edelleenkin syytä kysellä mihin kehitysmaatutkimus on kulkemassa?

Perustavampi kysymys, joka tutkimusalan kasvun vuosikymmeninä on useasti esitetty, on, tarvitaanko yleensä erillistä kehitysmaatutkimusta – tässä paino termissä on sanalla ”maa”. Professori Marja-Liisa Swantz, joka vuonna 1981, tuolloin dosenttina, nimitettiin perustetun Kehitysmaainstituutin johtajan virkaan, totesi jo silloin mielipiteenään, että ”Kehitysmaainstituutin

2 Suomen Akatemia 1975, 1.3 Mt, 1–2.4 Mt., 13.5 Multanen 1990, 21–23.

93Quo vadis kehitys(maa)tutkimus?


nimenä pitäisi itse asiassa olla kehitysinstituutti6 ja alan tutkimusta ja opetusta kutsua kehitystutkimukseksi ja -opetukseksi”.7

Tämä pohdinta on kulkenut mukana kaikki menneet alan muotoutumisen vuosikymmenet ja professori Marja-Liisa Swantz on palannut teemaan useita kertoja viime vuosienkin aikana, muun muassa kehitysmaatiedon opiskelijoiden, KEHO ry:n, vuosijuhlassa marraskuussa 2006 pitämässään puheessa sekä kehitysmaatutkijoita yhdistävän tieteellisen seuran, Kehitysmaatutkimuksen seura ry:n, järjestämillä Kehitystutkimuksen päivillä keväällä 2007.

Kuten edellä olevassa kappaleessa esiin tulleista seurojen ja tapahtumien nimistä näkyy, termejä kehitysmaatutkimus ja kehitystutkimus käytetään sekä sekaisin että rinnan, pysähtymättä tarkemmin miettimään niiden eroja tai yhtäläisyyksiä. Myös Suomen Akatemian termistössä kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto on rahoittanut ja rahoittaa kehitystutkimusta. Onko kysymys vain semanttisesta epäselvyydestä?

Olen sitä mieltä, että tarkempi termien määrittely ja pohdinta olisi tarpeen ja varsin perusteltua. Yleinen ”kehitystutkimus” liittää alan tutkimuksen selkeämmin tieteenalakohtaiseen perustaan, toisen maailmansodan jälkeen lähinnä eurooppalaisissa maissa nousseeseen Development Studies -perinteeseen. Tässä on ja on ollut kysymys uuden tieteenalan noususta maailman muuttumisen myötä murtamaan vanhoja yliopistojen tieteenalarajoja.

Kehitysmaatutkimus viittaa rajauksensa mukaisesti vaihtuvaan ja muuttuvaan alueelliseen, kehitysmaiksi määriteltyihin maihin kohdistuvaan tutkimukseen ja on näin perusluonteeltaan monitieteistä tutkimusta, siis tutkimusala – ei tieteenala. Saattaa olla että aluetutkimuksen ajoittainen huono kaiku on vaikuttanut myös kehitysmaatutkimusta koskevassa keskustelussa ja saanut torjumaan tähän viittaavat määritelmät. Onko tämä samalla myös muodostanut esteen riittävän tutkimusmassan kokoamiselle monitieteiseen tutkimus- ja opetusyksikköön, onkin jo paljon perustavampi kysymys.

Laitoksen ja sen edustaman tutkimusalan nimeksi on kuitenkin vakiintunut termi kehitysmaatutkimus. Tällaisenaan ala on edelleenkin sekä ongelmakeskeinen että monitieteinen huolimatta siitä, että akateeminen tiedekunta- ja laitosrakenne onkin kasannut vahvoja paineita myös

6 Vrt. tutkimusalan englanninkielinen nimitys Development Studies.7 Swantz teoksessa Jerman 2001, 49.

94 Pertti Multanen


tieteenalan rakentamiseen nykyisen Helsingin yliopiston valtiotieteellisen tiedekunnan kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitoksen ympärille.

Kehitysmaatutkimuksen kasvukivut

Kehitysmaatutkimuksen alan kehittymisen pullonkaulat ovat vuosien varrella tulleet selvästi esille, tosin ajan mukana vaihtelevin painoarvoin. Näitä ovat olleet muun muassa jo aiemmin mainittu rakenteellisen vakiintumisen tai akateemisen toiminta- ja organisaatiomuodon löytämisen hitaus. Hitaus ei suinkaan ole johtunut niinkään alasta itsestään, vaan enemmänkin suomalaisen yliopistorakenteen jäykkyydestä korkeine tiedekunta- ja laitosrajoineen. Juuri näiden rajojen ylittämisen vaikeus estää edelleenkin monitieteisen tutkimusalan kasvun ja resurssien kokoamisen.

Tutkimusrahoituksen saaminen alalle on kautta vuosien ollut enemmän tai vähemmän ongelmallista. Kehitysmaatutkimuksen alalla ei koskaan ole ollut yksikköä, jonka virkarakenteessa olisi ollut pysyviä tutkijanvirkoja tai -toimia. Tutkimusrahoitus on aina pitänyt kerätä ulkopuolisista lähteistä.

Tärkein ulkopuolinen rahoittaja on ollut Suomen Akatemia. Akatemian kehitysmaatutkimuksen rahoitus on keskitetty kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaostolle. Ennen jaoston perustamista rahoitus kulki tieteellisten toimikuntien kautta. Jo vuonna 1974 lyhyen aikaa määräaikaisena toimineena ja 1980-luvun alkupuolelta lähtien ensin väliaikaisena ja sittemmin vakinaisena on tieteen keskustoimikunnan alaisuudessa toiminut kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto.

Toinen keskeinen rahoittaja on ollut ulkoasiainministeriön kehitysyhteis-työosasto, jonka organisaatio on myös vuosikymmenten mukana muuttunut useaan kertaan.

Myöhemmin mukaan kuvaan ovat tulleet vähäisemmässä määrin yksityiset säätiöt, EU:n sekä muun muassa YK:n alaisten kansainvälisten järjestöjen tarjoamat rahoituskanavat. Suomen Akatemia on kuitenkin säilyttänyt asemansa tärkeimpänä kehitysmaatutkimuksen alan rahoittajana. Viime vuosina opetusministeriön rahoittamat tutkijakoulut, jollainen toimii myös kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitoksella, ovat toki rahoittaneet alan jatkokoulutusta.

Ovatko hallinnolliset ratkaisut olleet oikeita?

Alan kokonaiskehityksen kannalta kriittinen tarkastelu paljastaa rahoituksen ongelmakohtia. Edelleenkin pidän ongelmallisena sitä, että varsinaisen



akateemisen tutkimuksen ja vaikkapa kehitysyhteistyötä suoraan palvelevan tilaustutkimuksen, tai tilauspohjalla toteutettavien selvitysten, raja hämärrettiin aikanaan päätymällä edelleen käytössä olevaan ratkaisuun, jolla ulkoasiainministeriön kehitysyhteistyöosaston tutkimusrahoitus siirrettiin Suomen Akatemian hallinnoitavaksi.

Tämä ajatus esitettiin tiettävästi ensimmäisen kerran ulkoasiain-ministeriön päivämäärällä 23.5.1984 nimittämän Kehitysmaatutkimuksen työryhmän mietinnössä, jonka se jätti ministeriölle tammikuussa 1985. Siteeraan mietintöä: ”Työryhmä esittää, että kehitysmaatutkimuksen koordinaation parantamiseen pyrittäisiin siten, että Suomen Akatemian kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaoston toimintaedellytyksiä parannettaisiin ja toimintaa kehitettäisiin. Aluksi jaoston kokoonpanoa esitetään laajennettavaksi lisäämällä ulkoasiainministeriön edustusta sekä nimittämällä edustajia muualtakin kuin Suomen Akatemian tieteellisistä toimikunnista sekä nimittämällä tarpeellista päätoimista henkilöstöä asioiden valmisteluun.”8

Suomen Akatemian ja ulkoasiainministeriön 1.7.1990 voimaan tulleella toimeksiantosopimuksella työryhmän ehdotukset pantiin käytäntöön. Suomen Akatemian kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto sai päätösvallan ulkoasiainministeriön tutkimukseen osoittamiin varoihin, ja vastapainoksi kehitysmaaosaston edustajat saivat edustuksen Akatemian jaostoon.9

Kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaoston julkaisemasta Kehitysmaatutkimuksen strategiasta käy ilmi, että strategiaa muotoiltaessa vuonna 1995 oli Suomen Akatemian hallinnoima kehitysmaatutkimuksen määräraha yhteensä noin 8 miljoonaa markkaa, josta viisi miljoonaa oli UM:n kehitysyhteistyövaroja ja noin kolme miljoonaa Akatemian määrärahaa.10

Voi vaikuttaa, ja monesta varmasti vaikuttikin siltä, että tässä oli kysymys käytännön työnjakoon liittyvästä rationaalisesta ratkaisusta. Mielestäni kysymys oli paljon suuremmasta tiedepoliittisesta ratkaisusta. Ratkaisulla sidottiin kehitysmaatutkimuksen rahoitus sekä kehitysyhteistyön tarpeisiin että tavoitteisiin ja samalla käytännössä rajoitettiin tutkimuksen kohdemaiden määrää.

Tiedepoliittisesti tämä ratkaisu merkitsi sitä, että suurin osa suomalaiseen kehitysmaatutkimukseen kanavoiduista varoista tuli kehitysmaiden

8 Ulkoasiainministeriö 1985, 13.9 Suomen Akatemia 1995, liite A/9.10 Mt, 4.

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auttamiseen ja globaalin eriarvoisuuden vähentämiseen tarkoitetuista kehitysyhteistyövaroista. Tässä voidaan kysellä jo ratkaisujen eettisyyden kestävyyttä. Tiedepoliittisesti ratkaisu oli epäilyttävä monestakin syystä. Tutkimuksen sitominen kehitysyhteistyöhön kavensi vahvasti tutkimuksen kenttää ja suuntasi sitä nimenomaan kehitysyhteistyötä palvelevaan soveltavaan tutkimukseen.

Ratkaisu toi politiikan vahvasti mukaan tutkimusmäärärahojen jakoon. Vaikka noina vuosina, kylmän sodan kaudella, asiaa ei mielellään myönnettykään on nyt maailman muututtua helppo nähdä, että kehitysyhteistyö politisoitui voimakkaasti kahtia jaetussa maailmassa. Kehitysyhteistyön politisoituminen toi samoja paineita myös tutkimuslaitosten sisään, Kehitysmaainstituutti ei tässä suhteessa ollut suinkaan poikkeus.

Suomen Akatemian kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto erotti jo vuonna 1981 julkaisemassaan muistiossa kehitysmaatutkimuksen kolme osa-aluetta: 1) Kehitysteoreettinen tutkimus, jonka keskeisiä tehtäviä on kehityksen yhteiskunnallisten ehtojen selvittäminen, alikehityksen luonteen ja syiden tutkiminen sekä vaihtoehtoisten kehitysmallien kehittäminen; 2) Kehitysyhteistyötä palveleva tutkimus, joka tukee kehitysmaiden yhteiskunnalliseen ja teknis-taloudelliseen kehitykseen tähtäävää suunnittelua ja toteutustyötä ja 3) Kehitysmaita koskeva aluetutkimus, joka lisää näitä maita koskevaa tietoa – niiden tarpeiden, voimavarojen ja ongelmien tuntemusta.11

Myöhemmät hallinnolliset ratkaisut tarkoittivat sitä, että ilman suurempaa pohdintaa siirrettiin kehitysmaatutkimuksen rahoituksen pääpaino sektorille 2, eli kehitysyhteistyötä palvelevaan tutkimukseen ja sekä kehitysteoreettinen että kehitysmaita koskeva aluetutkimus joutuivat huutolaispojan asemaan.

Nyt ajan kuluttua voi mielestäni pohtia sitä, mikä osuus kaikilla näillä edellä käsitellyillä ratkaisuilla on ollut siihen, että Suomesta edelleenkin puuttuu kriittiseltä massaltaan tarpeeksi suuri kehitysmaatutkimukseen keskittyvä laitos. Nykyisellään Kehitysmaainstituutti yhden professorin ja muutaman opettajan laitoksena ei vielä voi varmistaa alan kehitystä tulevaisuudessa.

Miten varmistaa alan kehitys?

Alan ulkopuoliset paineet yliopistojen laitoskoon kasvattamiseen ovat ajamassa kehitysmaatutkimuksen ja -opetuksen jälleen kerran hankalaan tilanteeseen. Lieneekö korrektia lainata omaa artikkeliaan, mutta mainitussa

11 Suomen Akatemia 1981, 2–3.



Korkeakoulutieto -lehdessä julkaisemassani artikkelissa esitin vuonna 1990 muun muassa seuraavaa: ”Tekisi mieli jälleen kerran heittää keskusteluun väite, että esimerkiksi Helsingin yliopistossa olisi varmasti mahdollisuuksia luoda hyvinkin vahva kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitos yhdistämällä hallinnollisesti samaan yksikköön nyt hajallaan eri puolilla yliopistoa ja monissa tiedekunnissa olevat kehitysmaita tutkivat ja kehitysmaaopetusta antavat yksiköt.”12

Nyt vaatimukset kasvattaa laitoskokoa useamman professorin yksiköiksi ovat pakottamassa ravistelemaan totuttuja rakenteita, laitos- ja tiedekuntarajat mukaan lukien. Vahvan kehitysmaatutkimuksen yksikön kokoaminen tuskin kuitenkaan onnistuu nykyisin omaksi tieteenalakseen määritellyn ja nykytilanteessa yhteiskuntatieteisiin sidotun rajauksen pohjalta. Kehitysteorioiden vaihtuvat muodit ja vallitseva kirjo eivät myöskään anna nykytilanteessa tukea vahvalle tieteenalan teoria- ja metodipohjalle.

Jättääkö tulevaisuuteen suuntautuva katse muuta vaihtoehtoa kuin palata alan organisoitumisessa ajatukseen monitieteisestä ja ongelmakeskeisestä tutkimusalasta, jonka sateenvarjon alle sopii monia eri tieteenaloja. Jo vuosikymmeniä sitten kehitysmaatutkimukselle asetettu tehtävä globaalin eriarvoisuuden vähentämisestä ei ole ainakaan tullut ratkaistuksi nykyisellä pohjalla, tilastojen valossa eriarvoisuus on päinvastoin lisääntynyt.

Jotta voitaisiin edes vakavasti pyrkiä globaalin eriarvoisuuden vähentämiseen, sen poistamisesta puhumattakaan niin väitän, että tarvitaan useiden eri tieteenalojen kiinteätä yhteistyötä. Yhteisesti määritellyn hyväksytyn tutkimusongelman ratkaisuun pyrkivä toiminta yhdistää nämä tieteenalat. Ja tällöin tarvitaan monitieteinen tutkimusala.

Tässä hahmotellussa monitieteisessä kehitysmaatutkimuksen kokonaisuudessa on rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuksella tulevaisuudessakin tärkeä paikka. Rauha ja kehitys kulkevat edelleenkin käsi kädessä.

12 Multanen 1990, 22.

Lähteet

Jerman, Helena (2001): Kehitysmaatiedon kolme vuosikymmentä. Raportti Helsingin yliopiston kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitoksen vaiheista. Helsinki.

Multanen, Pertti (1990):”Kehitysmaa- vai kehitysyhteistyötutkimusta”, Korkeakoulutieto, no. 4. Opetusministeriö: Korkeakoulu- ja tiedeosasto.

Suomen Akatemia (1975): Kehitysmaatutkimuksen suuntaviivoja. Tieteen keskustoimikunta. Muistio, 4.3.1975.

Suomen Akatemia (1981): Tieteen keskustoimikunnan asettaman kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaoston muistio. Suomen Akatemian julkaisuja 8.

Suomen Akatemia (1995): Kehitysmaatutkimuksen strategia. Kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto.

Ulkoasiainministeriö (1985): Kehitysmaatutkimuksen työryhmän mietintö. Helsinki.


Peace and democracy in

Wilhelm Bolin’s political philosophy

Jyrki Käkönen

War and peace attracted academic discourse in Finland in the 1870s: at least three studies were published, lectures were delivered, and books were written on the topic. There were basically two attitudes to war and peace in the debate, which may be termed Hegelian and Kantian. The direct influence of these traditions on later research remained modest. This essay is a brief introduction to the Kantian tradition. In particular, I introduce the ideas of Wilhelm Bolin (1835–1924), a Finnish philosopher in the materialist tradition and whose concept of peace closely reflects Kant’s pamphlet on perpetual peace.

Wilhelm Bolin has remained a relatively unknown philosopher in the shadow of the Finnish national philosopher Johan Wilhelm Snellman. In the 1970s a few young Finnish philosophers reinvented the almost forgotten Wilhelm Bolin1. The reading of Bolin’s production gives the impression that Bolin has remained unknown not because of the low quality of his philosophical thinking but rather for political reasons.

Although in his own lifetime, Bolin’s understanding of social reality did not represent the mainstream thinking, he has not been a totally forgotten figure. As a young scholar, Mikko Juva, who later became the archbishop of Finland, dealt with some of Bolin’s ideas first in his dissertation and later in 1950 in an article partly devoted to Bolin’s materialism2. Outside the academic world, a Finnish communist intellectual, Tuure Lehén, has also discussed Bolin’s philosophy in his book on materialists and idealists. Lehén refers to Bolin as a Finnish materialist whose thinking should be studied also in the academic world. Lehén was aware of Juva’s Bolin analysis. However, Lehén found Bolin first in Lenin’s philosophical notebook. In his notes, Lenin mentions Wilhelm Bolin as a Feuerbachian materialist and as a person who edited Feuerbach’s collected works.3

1 See Manninen 1976; Uusitalo 1977; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979.2 Juva 1950.3 Lehén 1964.

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When Bolin presented his master’s thesis at the University of Helsinki in 1856, the chair of philosophy had just been reestablished after its closing in 18524. Johan Wilhelm Snellman had been appointed to the professorship and in this sense Bolin became his student. Bolin was also the only student who presented his doctoral thesis to Snellman in 1860. However, Bolin never became a Hegelian philosopher neither a real student of Snellman. As a young master, Bolin studied in Germany, where he listened to Feuerbach’s lectures and became a friend of Feuerbach.5 Most likely it is just the Feuerbachianism which is the reason for forgetting Bolin in the Hegelian context which also was an ideological space for Finnish nationhood.

After Snellman became a senator and he left the University, Wilhelm Bolin acted for a while as a professor but he lost the permanent position in 1869 to his competitor Thiodolf Rein. This meant that both Finnish philosophy and political studies lost an interesting scholar. In the competition between Bolin and Rein, the question was about the choice between two different scientific approaches and worldviews. This is clear in Snellman’s own evaluation of the applicants. Snellman says about Bolin that he had not chosen the most successful scientific approach; i.e. the Hegelian one6. The choice was between two different orientations.

Bolin’s loss in the nomination process made him into an unknown and forgotten scholar. This is a very common destiny for scholars who have not been in the mainstream of academic research. Bolin got a personal professorship in 1870 as a complementary. However, Bolin never enjoyed his position as an extraordinary professor since students could not use his lectures in their studies. Therefore Bolin did not have any students and he quit after three years and left the academic world. This soft academic killing made an end of Bolin’s creative scientific carrier.

After Bolin left the faculty he became the chief librarian at the University of Helsinki library. The new position never did compensate for what Bolin lost in the academic world. Bolin was depressed about how he was received in the Finnish academic world. According to him, the nomination process reflected the spiritually closed and narrow-minded Finnish intellectual world.

4 The professorship in philosophy had been closed due to conservative Russian politics. The re-establishment of the chair in philosophy was one of the first signs of the liberalization of the Russian politics in Finland.5 See Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 234–236; Manninen 1980, 186–187.6 See Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 232; Manninen 1980, 188–189.

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Therefore Bolin was planning to move into the United States, as he wrote to Feuerbach. This reaction supports the argument that Bolin lost his interest in research.

This is even more explicit since as a librarian Bolin had good opportunities to go on in his research at least until he retired in 1912. In a way Bolin used his new position for academic work. In 1903–1911, together with an Austrian, Friedlich Jodl, Bolin edited Feuerbach’s collected works. During the same period Bolin edited Feuerbach’s letters for publication. And already in 1891 he published a study on Feuerbach and his influence on modern philosophy.

According to academic disciplines, Bolin’s works belong in philosophy. But all his studies deal with problems relevant to the social sciences from methodological and theoretical perspectives. Bolin’s first dissertation as well as his first major work deals with the problem of family as a social construction7. Although the first study is a conceptual analysis, Bolin’s methodology is explicit already in this work; the concepts he uses reflect the existing reality.

The next two of Bolin’s studies8 address some basic philosophical issues and they reflect the relation between the theory and praxis. In both of these studies freedom of the human will is an important aspect. This is also a central problem in Bolin’s more political major study. Bolin’s both mere philosophical studies have a methodological relation to his major work. According to Bolin, an important aspect of all social studies is to understand the totality first. Secondly, he stresses that practical reality is an essential aspect of all scientific thinking and studies. According to him, all philosophical or theoretical thinking has to reflect the practical reality or the social praxis9.

Bolin is important for political science since his major work Europas statslif och filosofins politiska läror (Political History of Europe and the History of Political Ideas). The work has altogether 800 pages. And it is the last innovative study Bolin carried out in his academic years. Bolin himself defined the work as a study of the historical reality of political life and how this reality has been interpreted in philosophical theories in different times10. This duality

7 These two works are Familjebegreppets utveckling ända till reformationen and Familjen (The Development of the Concept of Family until the Reformation, and The Family).8 Leibnitz ett förebud till Kant and Problemet om viljans frihet, kritiskt och logiskt undersökt (Leibnitz a forerunner to Kant, and The Problem of the Freedom of the Will, a critical and logical study).9 Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 233, 254; Manninen 1980, 1889.10 Bolin 1870, iii.

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is expressed in the title of the work. The time span of the work goes from Machiavelli to the 1860s.

Kant on war and peace

Although Bolin was a materialist philosopher, he adapted an important element also from Kant’s philosophy. For Bolin, freedom of will was an important imperative. Freedom of will is also an important element in Kant’s understanding of the possibility of perpetual peace. Therefore, a brief excursion into Kant is in order also in this essay. To begin with, I should point out that my main sources in the following understanding of the Kantian tradition in Finland are not the original writings of Kant. Instead, I have mostly relied on a detailed and well-arranged analysis by the Finnish scholar Mauri Noro11.

Freedom of will is a central element in Kant’s philosophy, so much so that the only way to understand his idea of eternal peace is through an understanding of what he means by freedom of will. Kant was convinced that there is no determinism in man’s social activity, but that it is man’s own will that determines his destiny12 and Bolin shared this understanding13.

Moral judgments in politics are possible only insofar as there is freedom of will. Otherwise all that would happen in human social life, including war, would only be a deterministic phenomenon. Kant makes it plain that he does not accept these views; therefore, active and conscious man plays a central part in his social theories.14 Freedom of the human will is also closely bound up with another important element of Kant’s philosophy: the categorical imperative.

Peace is in a way one of Kant’s categorical imperatives15; it is a maxim that man has to make a universal law by his everyday praxis.16 The categorical imperative also leads to the conclusion that war means destruction. Man does not, according to Kant, have the right to act destructively since it is

11 Noro 1979.12 Noro 1979, 53.13 See Manninen 1980, 189.14 Noro 1979, 51.15 In his Perpetual Peace Kant does not refer directly to peace as a categorical imperative. But peace is discussed in terms of a maxim that could become a universal law. And in Kant’s philosophy a maxim and a categorical imperative are connected.16 Noro 1979, 93.

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in violation of the laws of nature.17 The only way that conscious man can overcome his destiny is to work actively for peace. Applying Kant’s logic to security problems, we see the utter absurdity of armaments. While armaments no doubt enhance one’s own security, it undermines the security of others and therefore destabilizes the international system. So according to Kant’s logic, security can be guaranteed by disarmament18.

Freedom of will is a necessary precondition for politics as well. Politics, Kant said, is impossible without freedom of will. For Kant, too, peace is a state created by politics, which in turn suggests that the problem of the free human will is inseparable from the problem of peace. Also, peace is not possible without politics.19 Finally, it is important to realize that even for Kant peace is very definitely a utopian state20, but nevertheless a utopia that can be reached through human action. Perpetual peace is an end that has to be realized little by little.21 Kant did not believe that war was impossible, but quite the contrary that it was an inevitable and natural part of the development of the early inter national system.22 War is by no means a must in the advanced international system. Although Kant was not a pacifist, he thought that peace could be realized by praxis.23

Bolin as a scholar on politics and democracy

In order to understand Bolin’s concepts of peace and war, we have to make an excursion into his understanding of politics and democracy. According to Bolin, the function of political science is to find out the general regularities in social development and the causes of social phenomena. And this is his own goal in studying the political history of Europe. Bolin divides his work into two parts. The first one he calls the period of force and power and it stretches from Machiavelli to Spinoza. The second period begins with Milton and Bolin

17 Noro 1979, 79–80.18 Here I have to refer to the English School in international studies. This school has introduced three different international societies. One of them is the Kantian international society. Kantian society is revolutionary and based on solidarity instead of power provided by means of violence. See, for instance, Dunne 1998, 138–139; Noro 1979, 79–80.19 Noro 1979, 109–111.20 According to Kant, philosophers blissfully dream of perpetual peace (Kant 1991, 93).21 Noro 1979, 123.22 Noro 1979, 122–123.23 Parkinson 1977, 77–80.

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calls this period an epoch of strengthening justice and human freedom.24 The political philosophy of the epoch of force and power reflect the historical period in which absolute sovereigns united people into nations and modern states often by force25.

Bolin’s own understanding of the relation between philosophical thinking and political praxis defines his approach in the whole study. Throughout his work Bolin stresses the unity of the development of political systems and the development of political philosophy. Another basic idea in Bolin’s study is that the historical essence of the modern state is defined by the relation between the rulers and ruled. A change in this relation is the perspective Bolin is interested in the development of political systems. In Machiavellism and in the period when the modern state was being born the essence of a state was equal to the sovereign ruler and to his absolute power. From Machiavelli until Spinoza the state was impossible to understand without a ruler with absolute power. This sovereign kept the state together26.

The elements of the sovereign and the ruled changed radically both in praxis and in political philosophy during the period Bolin analyzed in his work. Already in Machiavellism and during the period of absolute power the essence of the state was closely connected to the relation between the rulers and the ruled. In this respect the state was not possible to equate with the prince27. And although Spinoza according to Bolin still represents the Machiavellian tradition, Spinoza already gives to people a legitimate right to rebel against a ruler who does not respect constitutional norms in the relation between the rulers and ruled. In this respect people are not only ruled objects but they become subjects in politics28. Finally, Humboldt in Bolin’s study equates civil society with the state and therefore people’s political actions make up the essence of the state.

According to Bolin the political elements as well as the state are socially constructed. They get their shape by people’s actions and they do not have any divine origin. This Kantian idea is explicit already in Bolin’s analysis of

24 Bolin 1971, 3–16; see also Uusitalo 1977, 332–335.25 See Bolin 1871, 10.26 Bolin 1870, 404.27 See Bolin 1870, 242.28 Bolin 1870, 397–398.

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Machiavelli. In Bolin’s understanding, Machiavelli was the first modern political philosopher who analyzed political and public action as they appeared in praxis without any reference to nonhuman powers.29

Above I have argued that the development of the people’s element – the political role of people – within the context of the development of modern state is in a central position in Bolin’s analysis. It is evident that this reflects Bolin’s own understanding of the development of politics and political systems. The development process of the practical and theoretical people’s element leads to a political system that is idealistic for Bolin. This system has allowed people to rule themselves and to define their destiny every day.

According to Bolin, Machiavelli begins the period during which the concept of the state essentially expanded from the sovereign to mean people within the state. Throughout his study Bolin stresses the strengthening of the element of the people, the political power of the people. In the historical process people became the subject of politics and finally the essence of the state30. Every citizen had to have his share in the power of the state but according to the capability of each person31. Simultaneously, as the people become the essence of the state, the state loses its original purpose, it withers away and people’s self-management realizes a complete political life32.

During the Reformation and in the political struggles connected to it the people’s element became an important aspect of political philosophy. This theoretical emancipation was explained by Bolin by pointing to the fact that in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation people really acted as subjects and rulers needed people’s involvement in the political struggle for power33. Therefore Bolin connects the idea of people’s sovereignty to the Reformation34.

However, in its essence the concept of people’s sovereignty remained Machiavellian through the Reformation period. By this, Bolin means that also the power of the people was based on force and power. But even this increased the role of the people in the development of the modern

29 Bolin 1870, 139.30 See Uusitalo 1977, 332; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 255.31 Bolin 1871, 381.32 Bolin 1871, 390.33 Bolin 1870, 174–178.34 Bolin 1870, 181, 184–185, 195; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 260.

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state35. Spinoza, as the last Machiavellian according to Bolin, represents a real breakthrough in the doctrine of people’s sovereignty. According to Bolin, Spinoza understood that the ruler does not have any other force and power than that given by people and people constantly watch how the ruler realizes the rights of the people36.

In connecting the historical roots of modern people’s sovereignty to the Reformation and Spinoza, Bolin leans strongly on his own ideas about the relationship between the social sciences and practical political life. In Bolin’s understanding, the historical basis for the concept of the people’s sovereignty was in the people’s revolts against their rulers37. Especially Spinoza was influenced by the liberation struggle of the people of the Netherlands. After the liberation struggle in the Netherlands people’s historical role was imminent in the English Revolution as well as in the French Revolution. And especially the latter case stressed people’s political role in the modern state38. People’s own political activity both expressed and strengthened their social and political consciousness. Simultaneously people raised themselves into being a subject of politics.

What has been said above is possible to understand in a way that, according to Bolin, in the 17th and 18th centuries it was not theoretically possible to develop any final concept of people’s sovereignty and the modern state since the objects of both of the concepts had just come into being. And in Bolin’s understanding, the great philosophers of the Enlightenment, who have been taken as fathers of bourgeois political thinking, represented only the breakthrough of the modern. For Bolin, Montesquieu’s doctrine on the separation of powers was just a compromise between the feudal regime and the modern political regime that was just emerging39.

Even Rousseau does not, according to Bolin, represent a modern approach to political regimes. Although Rousseau’s democracy model for the first time stressed the necessity of the participation of all people in governance, he represented for Bolin the idea of the ancient polis from Greece and not a modern political system with modern institutions that made it possible

35 Bolin 1870, 223, 225, 228, 240.36 Bolin 1870, 394, 399–400.37 Bolin 1870, 232–234.38 Bolin 1871, 315–316.39 See Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 263.

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for people to participate in politics and the use of power. However, Bolin himself stressed local people’s self-governance since that made it possible for everyone to participate in decision-making40.

People’s liberation struggles throughout history demonstrate for Bolin that people’s sovereignty and social liberties are never guaranteed just by institutions. On the contrary, people’s sovereignty will be a reality only in case democracy and liberties will be fought for and won in everyday praxis41. The rising up of people as political subjects was a necessary precondition for the development of the concept of the political element of people. According to Bolin, Hegel already defines people as a nation to be a subject of the state but the final will and power is still in the ruler’s hands42. In Bolin’s analysis it is Carl Wilhelm von Humboldt who was the first one who understood people as the natural substance and subject in modern states43. That means that the dividing line between the rulers and ruled will disappear and people will rule themselves by themselves. And especially the development of local self-management gives people the possibility to realize their rights by themselves44.

As a general and maybe even universal social tendency, Bolin stressed the disappearance of force as one characteristic of the state and the democratization of social life45. But it was not a deterministic process; it was a result of people’s struggle for self-management. Democratization is a central idea also in Bolin’s study of the history of the family and the development of the concept of the family. According to Bolin, even in the family, equality and democracy have been increasing46. Democratization and the development of people into a political subject and into the essence of the state imply the marginalization of the role of the state. The role of the state will be limited to a narrow field of truly public and common issues and to the maintaining of a legal order47.

On a more general level, it is possible to say that for Bolin human history is people’s struggle for the subject and substance of political power. The

40 Bolin 1871, 350, 384.41 Bolin 1871, 349–351.42 Bolin 1871, 354.43 Bolin 1871, 391–393.44 Bolin 1871, 348.45 Bolin 1871, 375, 381.46 Bolin 1860, 85.47 Bolin 1871, 353, 414; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 273.

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development of political philosophy is just a part of this struggle. This struggle will end only when the dividing line between the rulers and ruled disappears, since that would make power needless. According to Bolin, people will never, and in fact cannot, give up their sovereignty. Real political power is undivided and belongs to the people48.

To conclude this discussion of some of Bolin’s ideas, it is possible to say that people as political actors always construct their social reality. And this is possible only in case we understand that the human will is free. This means that nothing is deterministic – even peace is possible. It is also good to insist that Bolin does not respect institutions or legal systems as such. They both are socially constructed and can be changed by people in case there is a need to do so. In this sense, Bolin represents radical democracy, which has to be won again day by day. It is the same with peace. It is not in institutions; it has to be made a reality again and again in everyday praxis. It is also possible to argue that when democracy as people’s self-management increases, there is less need for force and violence.

Peace in Bolin’s politics

Like Kant, Bolin49 carried out a separate study of peace. He starts his essay with a direct attack against traditional studies of history: he declares that when historical studies make war heroes their central figures, written history is actually supporting human sacrifice.50 Above it has been shown that Bolin himself demonstrates in his main work that history is created by the masses/people. Bolin’s work is mainly concerned with different peace plans, plans that, as he says, are part of human history. Having introduced and analyzed some of these plans, Bolin formulates his own idea of peace by integrating various elements from different plans and from his own philosophical understanding of the problem. It is important to note that the three main subjects that Bolin was concerned with as discussed above were the general development of human freedom through human praxis; the problem of the freedom of will and democracy as a system for controlling the world of people.

Bolin starts his essay on peace by discussing a plan proposed by Abbé de Saint-Pierre in 1718, a plan that had provided a starting point for several scholars interested in the organizing of peace. Bolin does not accept Saint-

48 Bolin 1871, 371.49 Bolin 1889. This study was first published in 1870.50 Bolin 1870a, 249–250.

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Pierre’s plan as it stands, but there are at least two points that Bolin borrows from Saint-Pierre:

Bolin makes a clear distinction between the concepts of power and 1. greatness. For Bolin, the use of power in war for destructive purposes is not something that deserves to be called “great”; the use of power for purposes of peace is.51 Here, Bolin leans on Saint-Pierre and takes distance from the Hegelian tradition.

Real history has been the history of wars; peace has only been a cease-2. fire between wars. However, this is not an imperative. Wars have been part of real history because in the international system there are no such institutions that would safeguard the interests of states, a sovereign institution that civil society does have: the state.52

Bolin’s acceptance of these elements from Saint-Pierre means at least three things. First, Bolin has two different concepts of peace: the concept of negative peace, i.e. peace as a transient stage in between two wars, and the concept of positive peace, a lasting state in the international system53. Second, Bolin shares at least in part the realistic idea that the international system is anarchic by nature. And in anarchic systems wars are inevitable. However, the internal logic of the international system may also change; anarchy is not a permanent state, but belongs to a given stage of human and social development. Third, since anarchy can be overcome, perpetual peace is possible, but only through the institutions that safeguard the interests of individual states. The latter point connects Bolin to a wider tradition of federalism, and in a sense to functionalism. Connecting Bolin to federalism is justified in light of fact that Bolin accepts Saint-Pierre’s idea of state confederations that guarantee peace.54 Bolin also finds more arguments in support of federations from both Kant and Bentham further on in his study.

The other major plan that Bolin examines is Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, a work from which Bolin borrows above all Kant’s principle of justice.

51 Bolin 1889, 235. Bolin takes a position against the use of force already in his study of the history of European political ideas. According to him, democracy as the power of people brings an end to the use of force as an ultimate means of order.52 Bolin 1889, 255.53 In modern peace research, negative peace means the absence of war and positive peace harmonious relations within and between societies. Already in 1942 Quincy Wright used these concepts. See Wiberg 1983, 16–17.54 Bolin 1889, 256.

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According to Bolin, justice is a necessary condition for any kind of peace. If we add the principle of justice into the concept of peace, we would have the basic elements of Galtung’s concept of positive peace55. For Bolin, the principle of justice is not only a concept that would specify the essence of peace, but above all a contradiction to anarchy in the international system. This means that by establishing a just world order, the anarchic nature of the international system can be overcome. We must realize in this connection that justice in general does not equal a legal international system. By justice Bolin also means an equal world system.56

Bolin also extends the core of Kant’s concept of justice to the area of in-creasing interaction between states, and places special emphasis on the role of trade.57 Commercial interaction could be organized on a mutual basis. Otherwise, the situation would differ little from complete anarchy. This, then, is why justice also means equality in Bolin’s worldview. In addition to the principle of justice, Bolin borrows from Kant the idea of a common cultural heritage of mankind. All of these elements will guarantee peace. And it was with these elements that Bolin constructed a concept of positive peace. Besides this modern element, Bolin also worked with ideas that are at the heart of present theories of integration and interdependence.

The third major plan that Bolin introduces is Jeremy Bentham’s Principles of International Law from 1789. Bentham, Bolin argues, lends support to Saint-Pierre’s and Kant’s idea of state federations as safeguards of peace. From Bentham, Bolin borrows the idea of a federative Parliament that is assigned the task of managing all kinds of conflicting interests between states.58 This idea of a federative Parliament is an institutional form of conflict resolution, and the function of this institution is to replace wars in an organized international system. It is also an institution that should provide people and communities with other means than pure force and warfare for settling disputes. A suitable sanction for states that fail to abide by the norms of the system, Bolin says, would be to expel such states from the community and deprive them of their rights as members of the community. The advantages of being a member in the community would be so notable that every state would abide by the norms of the Parliament.59

55 Galtung 1964.56 Bolin 1889, 259.57 Bolin 1889, 261.58 Bolin 1889, 261-262.59 Bolin 1889, 262.

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Having presented these idealistic plans, Bolin moves on to discuss the historical events of the 19th century. Here again he points out that wars have been part of historical reality, but says that it would be impossible to conclude that eternal peace is a utopian state.60 The existing interaction between states is according to Bolin evidence that wars can be avoided, but unfortunately he fails to specify his argument at this point.61 Instead, he moves on to discuss human cultures. According to Bolin, peace depends largely on people’s way of thinking, an argument that from the point of view of modern peace research is again very interesting and important.62 One of the main concerns of current research has been precisely the roles of culture and the structure of human language, since it is believed that these might have been the key factors in getting people to accept armament and war.

Bolin believes that culture is a bridge to eternal peace, a point where he approximates Hegelian concepts. He assumes that the process of civilization will eventually bring about peace in the world. Bolin also stresses the role of education, which could and should be used for making wars impossible. Through education it should be made clear to people that the most important human and social value is the right to live. Any kind of war destroys this value.63

Finally, we return briefly to the concept of positive peace in Bolin’s study. I stated earlier that one of the elements Bolin incorporated in this concept was equality. To my mind there is no other way to interpret his arguments. Perpetual peace, he says, can only be possible if the living standards of all people can be promoted,64 which also means that Bolin puts his faith not only in a high level of morality; the material preconditions for peace are as equally valuable as the ideological preconditions.

Bolin’s understanding of peace or the possibility of perpetual peace reflects his understanding of politics or political life in general. First precondition is that even in the international system people will govern themselves by themselves. In this respect he overcomes at least partially the state-centric approach. In governing themselves, people have to make peace day by day. In this sense peace is a political act by people. Therefore it is possible to say

60 Bolin 1889, 264.61 Bolin 1889, 266.62 Bolin 1889, 267–268.63 Bolin 1889, 268.64 Bolin 1889, 272.

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that in Bolin’s thinking there are the roots for something that has recently been called cosmopolitan democracy65.

Concluding remarks

It seems to be possible to conclude by saying that Bolin was a Feuerbachian materialist and a neo-Kantian in his political thinking. For Bolin praxis comes before any theory. It is praxis that scholars can theorize and theory does not exist without praxis but praxis lives also without theory. This aspect in any case is in a central position in his plan for perpetual peace. It is also likely that Bolin had many ideas that seem to be fresh in a situation where the modern system is in crisis and is likely in the process of reconstruction66. This is maybe explained by the fact that Bolin in his studies reflected the coming of the modern but at the same time he was a critic of the modern. This is the aspect which makes Bolin an interesting scholar even today although he has been an almost a forgotten scholar more than 100 years.

Bolin is interesting also in the sense that his social philosophy reflects a constructivist approach. While doing politics (i.e., in everyday social praxis) people construct social institutions. That has to be understood in a way that human institutions are socially constructed. Even peace can be understood as a system established in institutions for realizing and maintaining peace in the international system. Those institutions are supposed to provide three essential aspects of peace for people: justice, human freedom and democracy. Simultaneously the system had to safeguard the interests of individual states. In this sense Bolin did not go beyond a state-centric approach although he brought the civil society to a position that was as central as that of states.

According to the English school’s three versions of international society, Bolin stands finally somewhere between the Grotian rationalist and Kantian revolutionist approach67. But maybe he is closer to the Kantian tradition. As an institution for peace, the European Union can be understood in the context of Bolin’s theoretical approach. The EU is an institution that has organized relations between member states, peacefully providing similar human rights

65 See for instance Archibugi & Held 1995, 1–16.66 Several IR scholars have understood the current historical situation as a global transition period. However, in this connection I refer as an example only to Ferguson & Mansbach 2004.67 Dunne 1998, 139.

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for all the citizens of the Union. For maintaining its institutions, the EU does not need coercive force. Gains in being a member are a big enough incentive for being inside rather than being excluded from the community or the new society in construction.

Finnish peace research has been largely influenced by American scientific traditions; Johan Galtung’s major influence does not change the matter at all. However, this is apparently a problem for the whole academic community in Finland. The national scientific traditions were completely neglected in mid-20th century Finland, and suppressed by everything that came from the USA. But as I have demonstrated here, the old Finnish traditions contain a number of “modern” points of view that have survived until today. To my mind, the case of Bolin demonstrates that a closer study of some early traditions would make possible a true emancipation of our scientific knowledge, and also provide the means for overcoming the obvious restrictions of the American scientific traditions.

References

Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (1995): “Editor’s Introduction”, in D. Archibugi & D. Held (eds.) Cosmopolitan Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1860): Familjebegreppets utveckling ända till reformationen. Helsingfors.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1864): Familjen. Helsingfors.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1864): Leibniz ett förebud till Kant. Helsingfors.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1868): Problemet om viljans frihet, kritiskt och logiskt undersökt. Helsingfors.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1870–1871): Europas statslif och filosofins politiska läror, 1 och 2. Helsingfors.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1889): “Den eviga freden”, in W. Bolin Studier och föredrag I. Helsingfors.

Bolin, Wilhelm (1891): Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen. Stuttgart.

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Bolin, Wilhelm (1904): Ausgewählte Briefe von und an Ludwig Feuerbach. Vol. I und II. Leipzig.

Bolin, Wilhelm & Friedlich Jodl (Hrsg.) (1903–1911): Ludwig Feuerbachs Sämtliche Werke I—X. Stuttgart.

Dunne, Tim (1998): Inventing International Society. A History of the English School. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ferguson, Yale H. & Richard W. Mansbach (2004): Remapping Global Politics. History’s Revenge and Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Galtung, Johan (1864): “An Editorial”, Journal of Peace Research, 1(1).

Juva, Mikko (1950): “Wilhelm Bolin ja Ludvig Feuerbach”, Historiallinen Aikakauskirja, 48.

Kant, Immanuel (1999): Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lehén, Tuure (1964): Materialisteja ja idealisteja. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri.

Manninen, J. (1976): ”Ihmisen vapauden ja solidaarisuuden aatteet Vilhelm I. Bolinilla”, Psykologia, 11.

Manninen, J. (1980): “Wilhelm Bolin, Feuerbachin ystävä. Appendix II”, in B. Byhovski Ludwig Feuerbach. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri.

Manninen, J. & Jyrki Uusitalo (1979): ”Vapausaate ja demokraattisen valtion teoria Wilhelm Bolinilla”, in S. Knuuttila, J. Manninen & I. Niiniluoto (eds.) Aate ja maailmankuva. Juva.

Noro, Mauri (1979): Etiikka ja politiikka Kantin ja Hegelin ajattelussa rauhankysymyksen näkökulmasta. Suomalaisen teologian kirjallisuusseuran julkaisuja, 115. Helsinki.

Parkinson, F. (1977): The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Uusitalo, Jyrki (1977): ”Wilhelm Bolin ja modernin valtion teoria”, Politiikka, 4.

Wiberg, Håkan (1983): Rauhantutkimus ja konfliktiteoria. Helsinki: Tammi.


How many wars, how many dead,

how many peace deals?

Unto Vesa

How many wars?

Peace researchers are frequently approached with questions of how many wars there are going on, how many people have lost their lives in them, and how many of these have been civilian. Related to these questions about quantities are inquiries into the changed character of wars. All these are legitimate and important questions addressed to peace research, the normative goal of which is to promote the building of a warless and non-violent world by means of scholarly research. Such inquiries have a long tradition. Already in 1817–1819 the Massachusetts Peace Society tried to estimate the total number of war victims “ever since Adam and Eve.” Similarly, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th several studies were carried out about the number of wars and about the human and material destruction caused by them throughout history.1 Quincy Wright’s monumental classic work A Study of War, which as a systematic and comprehensive study of the causes and character of war can be regarded as a predecessor and an inspirer of modern peace research, gathers under its analytic focus all statistical and qualitative data on wars available at that time.2

In spite of such a long tradition, it is not easy to provide clear-cut, unequivocal answers to the questions referred to above. With regard to the statistics of both past and ongoing wars, several problems are encountered and, depending on their methodological solutions, it is possible to arrive at different – and yet well-argued – answers. I try to discuss some of these problems here, also illustrating them with empirical examples.

The first, and a very basic, problem is related to the very definition of war. In the Clausewitzian tradition war has been characterized as the continuation of politics by other means, and in the international legal literature it has

1 Wiberg 1983 and Vesa 1995, 80. Wright (1942) provides data e.g. from Thomas B. Harbottle, Dictionary of Battles from the Earliest Date to the Present Time, London 1904.2 Wright 1942.

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been emphasized that, although wars are organized violence, they are legally regulated violence. In the history of inter-state wars, of course, there have been periods when wars have been officially declared and their goals formally announced. But nowadays this feature cannot be considered decisive, because wars are initiated without any declaration and finished without formal peace agreements. For that reason, the international relations literature today attempts to define war through certain criteria for organized violence and, especially within the international law discourse, the concept of “armed conflict” is increasingly being used instead of the term of war. Among the criteria for armed conflict is the use of organized violence by at least two conflict parties. An armed battle between the armies of two or more states is of course a clear case; so is a battle between the army of a state and a resistance movement that follows the rules of military order; likewise a fight between competing militarily organized resistance movements in a region. It is worth noting, however, that such a definition also excludes various forms of political and armed violence. Thereby genocide organized by a government against a civilian population is not covered by the definition of the concept of war, or armed conflict3; neither are single cases of politically motivated terrorist acts; nor “non-political” violence between organized crime groups. What is also significant is that the use of force, the demonstration of force, or the threat of the use of force, are not defined as war or armed conflict if certain additional criteria are not fulfilled.

This takes us to the second problem, the quantitative threshold of violence. In order to have organized political violence classified as a war, usually a certain number of fatalities is “required”. The occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 is, of course, an example of the use of force, but it is not counted among the wars in Europe. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that some historical war statistics include cases where wars have been declared and the state of war has thus prevailed, but with very few – or even no – casualties. That the “certain number” of deaths varies from one researcher and one set of war statistics to another implies that the threshold is a kind of “contractual” definition issue, and it is difficult to argue for any universal threshold agreed upon by all researchers. As is well known, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute’s SIPRI Yearbooks provide annual data on “major armed conflicts” and in that data the threshold has been 1,000 battle-related

3 Because such a definition excludes e.g. genocides like Rwanda, some researchers prefer to add together all fatalities due to wars and political conflicts regardless of whether they are battle-related deaths or not; see, for example, Leitenberg 2006, especially p. 6.

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deaths during the whole duration of the conflict.4 This choice does not, of course, imply in any way that researchers would consider minor amounts of violence less significant. For instance, the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research collects and publishes statistical data also on quantitatively minor armed conflicts, defining all those conflicts with “at least 25 battle-related deaths per calendar year” as active armed conflicts.5 It is self-evident that the figure given for ongoing armed conflicts indicates the chosen threshold. Thus, if the threshold is at one thousand battle deaths, then we usually arrive nowadays at 20–30 “major armed conflicts” each year. If, however, the threshold is lower, and the definition for inclusion thereby more sensitive, the number of active armed conflicts can be manifold.

As a consequence of the threshold issue, even a protracted armed conflict can remain outside war statistics, until one day its total battle deaths exceed the quantitative threshold set by the researcher. The Northern Ireland conflict is an illustrative case, with its annual fatalities for a long time remaining at relatively low levels, only accumulating over years.

The next problem, which is relevant both with regard to historical cases and present wars, is the question which armed conflicts are added together and which are disaggregated. If we think of some past wars, we may ask, for instance, if the Thirty Years’ War was one war, or in fact consisted of several separate wars during that period. The same question can be raised with regard to the Napoleonic wars, or the Second World War, or the long Algerian resistance and armed struggle.6 As regards the armed conflicts of today, the disintegration of Yugoslavia is an illustrative example: is it a series of four or five separate wars, or shall the future historians deal with the whole series as a single Yugoslavian dissolution war?

Part of the same problem is the task of defining when a given armed conflict is finished. Namely, if there is break of even a few years between battles, perhaps due to an armistice, is the re-eruption of violence counted as a continuation of the old war, or as a new war altogether? Both alternatives are used in the literature.

4 SIPRI Yearbooks: http://www.sipri.org; Harbom & Wallensteen 2007.5 See the data bank of the Uppsala department: http://www.pcr.uu.se/basicSearch/index.php; the respective PRIO databank: http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/; and the guide of the Uppsala department to various conflict data sources: http://www.prc.uu.se/research/UCDP/conflictdatasetcatalog.pdf.6 Melasuo 1999, especially 97–118.

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And finally, even nowadays there is the issue of getting information about some armed conflicts. When an armed conflict flares up in the Middle East or Northern Ireland, it is always, of course, immediately known and reported. But what about the continuation of armed struggles, perhaps sporadically, in some faraway corners of Burma, or Colombia, or north-eastern India, such as the Manipur region? The continuation of such armed conflicts, especially when of small scale, can remain outside the horizons of media and researchers even for longer periods.

For a long time, a dominant trend has been – for instance according to SIPRI Yearbooks – the decreasing proportion of international wars, while an ever-increasing share of ongoing wars have been ostensibly “internal” wars, that is, armed struggles within the borders of a state, either about government or territory. Examples of the former, traditional inter-state wars have included the wars between India and Pakistan as well as between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The long armed struggle in Nepal has been about government, whereas territorial claims and identities have been dominant issues in all those conflicts where the goal of a guerrilla movement has been the achievement of regional autonomy, or independence. It is worth stressing that the borderline between inter-state and internal wars is very fluid, because foreign powers have very often and in different ways interfered in armed conflicts that are internal in terms of their appearance or origins. Today’s Iraq, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo serve as dramatic examples of this phenomenon.7 A totally new and different problem is today posed by the “war on terror” launched by the Bush administration. Its representatives have used that term to lump together several ongoing armed conflicts in various parts of the world; wherever one party to the conflict is a movement, or organization classified as terrorist by the US government. Many of these conflicts have originally had internal domestic roots – and have often as such been historically protracted – where a guerrilla or resistance movement has by armed means attempted to achieve its goal, be it independence or bringing down a government.

How many deaths?

To estimate the amount of human losses in wars is at least as difficult as estimating the number of wars, and this issue is relevant both with regard to past and present wars. Again, there are many difficulties.

7 See e.g. Kende 1971; 1977; and 1978; and Gleditsch 2007.

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According to an old wisdom, the first casualty of war is the truth, and this immediately leads us to a basic problem: It is in the interest of parties to a conflict to provide purposive and misleading information about both their own losses as well as those of their adversary, at least as long as the armed conflict goes on. Their own losses are downplayed, while those inflicted on the enemy are exaggerated. If the scale of the enemy losses – and especially of its civilian population – seem to grow very high so that the numbers begin to appear bad in the public eye, it is possible nowadays also to either totally ignore the deaths on the enemy side, or present these figures as misleadingly low. Regarding ongoing wars, the case in point is again Iraq, where the United States counts the casualties of its own forces as accurately as possible – although even their number is not very openly reported, due to the criticism of the war – but has declined to comment on the battle deaths on the Iraqi side, especially the number of civilian deaths. For this reason, it has been left to research centres, mass media and non-governmental organizations to attempt to estimate the total number of war casualties.

The statistics of the Vietnam War are equally illustrative. The total number of Americans who lost their lives in the war is estimated at 58,1938, or 58,2269, and about 350,000 have been counted as wounded. Simultaneously, the losses of the Vietnamese are estimated to be between one and two million. In other words, the losses of one party are known with a high level of accuracy, whereas the much greater number of casualties of the other side – the weaker one – is not known even at a tolerable accuracy so that even the range between estimates is perhaps one million dead. However, even the official figure regarding the American casualties may be too low. The figure 58,000 includes the battle deaths, but what about those who were wounded and died later on? Moreover, the calculation does not include, or take note of, those who committed suicide after the war, although it is widely reported that the suicide rate among war veterans has been higher than among the rest of the population.10

War casualty statistics may also in other cases exclude those victims who did not die immediately on the battlefield, but after a time lag. The number of atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, continued to increase years after the war, due to burns and radio-active radiation. By

8 The National Archives.9 Vietnam War casualties.10 See e.g. Willson 1999.

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the end of 1945, when the acute phase of radiation was over, the number of deaths due to the Hiroshima atomic bomb is estimated to have been 140,000 – the figure usually given for those who died immediately is 70,000 – but the number grew in the following years and decades.11

An even greater problem in estimating war casualties derives from the habit of calculating only battle-related deaths, although it is known that, both in the past and today, a large share of total human losses in wars is caused by war-related misery, famine and diseases. Wright refers to estimates according to which in the Napoleonic wars about 80–90 per cent of the total losses of armies were from disease and in the nineteenth century this proportion averaged 65 per cent.12 Thus, the damage caused by these is often larger than the direct impact of the fighting. Moreover, the indirect consequences of misery and diseases hit mostly the civilian population, and particularly the weakest among it.

From the historical perspective, terror intentionally targeted at civilian populations is nothing new, although there have also been wars where the principles of international law have been somewhat better respected than today. As an example of a very cruel war in this respect, Quincy Wright refers to the Thirty Years’ War, in the context of which the whole population of some besieged towns was killed. Because modern air warfare is especially thought to risk civilian populations, Wright notes that, in the First World War air raids, 1,117 British civilians died, whereas during the Thirty Years’ War, 30,000 civilians of the town of Magdeburg were massacred. That war is estimated to have reduced the population of Bohemia from four million to 800,000, and that of Germany as a whole from 16.5 to four million.13 Since the Second World War, the number and share of civilian casualties has increased. Some modes of warfare, like area bombings, are considered to have contributed to this trend, as well as the general cruelty of civil wars and the lack of respect in them for the prescriptions of international law.

The total population losses are not limited to the aggregate amounts of direct and indirect casualties, however. Because major wars have their impact on population structures, and thereby for instance on the birth-rate, their overall impact on the size of populations can be noted only afterwards, by studying the number of the unborn. The studies by the famous Soviet

11 Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.12 Wright 1942, Vol. I, 242–243.13 Ibid., 244.

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scientist B. Urlanis on the impact on populations of the wars waged between 1600 and 1945 also take into account this population deficit, adding it to the total of human losses.14

In addition to all the issues discussed above there have been occasional random mistakes by researchers in their estimates. These include cases in which, for instance, the original estimate of the total number of “dead and wounded” – or casualties – has later mistakenly been interpreted as meaning that all were dead.15 Urlanis provides several examples of how a mistake in a source is subsequently repeated in the scientific literature, and rightly emphasizes that researchers should always, even when making use of existing literature, attempt to find themselves the original sources and use them also with caution and a critical eye.16

If and when the number of war casualties for some reason has been either exaggerated or downplayed, later inquiries can respectively either decrease or increase the estimates. In the case of the Finnish Civil War (1918), for example, a recent comprehensive and detailed inquiry – carried out more than eighty years after the war – found the number of deaths to be greater than in any of the earlier studies.17

At present it seems to be commonplace that the mass media, in often rather early phases of conflicts, reports on the numbers of casualties, speaking of as high numbers as hundreds of thousands, even though the reliability of the data may be quite questionable. In such cases, the downscaling of estimates during the conflict is not easy, because it may look like an effort to downplay the severity of the conflict. But is it not in fact perverted, if the prevailing view is that only large casualty figures can contribute to an anti-war opinion? The alternative is to consider any amount of destruction and suffering as condemnable; for those who lose their lives the loss is total.

The UN Secretary-General has conveyed an estimate that 100 million people lost their lives in the wars of the twentieth century, and an additional 170 million in other types of political violence. Obviously, higher estimates are arrived at when the calculations include cases of genocide, as well as famines caused by political conflicts.18 Even since 1990, in other words after

14 Urlanis 1976, 227–279.15 Urlanis (1976, 42–43) informs about several such examples in the literature.16 Urlanis 1976, 43.17 Suomen sotasurmat 1914–1922.18 See Leitenberg 2006.

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the Cold War, wars and violence are estimated to have claimed more than five million lives.19

In general, most studies caution about the uncertainty of quantitative data, and with good reason. The mere range of estimates – for instance between 50,000 – 100,000 or from 1 to 2 million – in either one source or between different sources, serves as an indication of this problem.20

And what about peace?

What does it matter from the perspective of peace research if, at a given time, there are either ten or forty ongoing wars; if one or two million people have lost their lives in them; and if the share of civilian casualties has been either ten or ninety per cent? At least it is possible to argue that, on the basis of such figures, the dominant trends of the international system can be evaluated. This includes questions such as whether the movement is towards a more peaceful or more bellicose world; whether the norms of international law are followed more or less duly than before; whether war can be considered to have a decreasing role as a means of resolving conflicts, or is it perhaps resorted to more easily than before? Briefly, such analysis concerns the prospects of peace.

The work of the famous French polemologist Gaston Bouthoul refers to 8,000 peace treaties during the past few millennia.21 Anthony Stevens states that each one of them was meant to remain in force forever – which may not necessarily be quite correct – and notes that, on average, they lasted for two years.22 This type of discussion of the history of war and peace easily leads to the often-repeated slogan that “there have always been wars and there will always be”. That, however, is questionable reasoning both with regard to the past as well as the future. Especially concerning the latter part of the claim, the analysis of trends is relevant.

In his book Maailmanpolitiikka tekniikan aikakaudella (1964) Göran von Bonsdorff classified wars, according to their magnitude in two main categories, as world wars and local wars; and the latter group again into two sub-categories, wars in which great powers had interfered, and those where they had not. He argued that this typology was relevant particularly from

19 Millennium Report of the Secretary-General.20 See e.g. Military Balance 2007; SIPRI Yearbook 2007; and White 2005.21 Bouthoul 1948.22 Stevens 2007, 3.

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the perspective of prevention. In his view, the prospects for the preventive action of the international community and organizations had improved also in armed conflicts where some great powers had intervened, like in the Suez crisis of 1956.23 Such surveys and arguments are nowadays often found in the IR literature.

It is self-evident that historical trend analyses do not warrant too hasty conclusions about long-term trends. This is because the same statistical data also inform us about notable wave-like movements as regards both the frequency and the intensity of wars. These indicate that, even in the past, more peaceful and more war-like periods have followed each other.24

Similar wave-like patterns can be observed for the period after the Second World War.25 An especially noteworthy optimism-raiser for the post-Cold War period was the finding that the number of ongoing major armed conflicts decreased year after year, as did their intensity. It was possible to reason that this trend was due to the collapse of the Cold War structures and the decrease of political conflicts related to that. It was also thought that, in the new political atmosphere, the opportunities available to the international community, and especially to the United Nations, for preventive and early action in conflict situations had improved. The drastic increase of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s was taken as a valid indicator of this trend.26

Today, this positive trend seems to have halted, at least for the time being. According to a recent report by Peter Wallensteen and Lotta Harbom, for a period of ten years beginning in 1991/1992, the incidence of ongoing major armed conflicts was in continuous decline. Now, however, the level seems to remain around 30 active armed conflicts each year, and these “appear to be protracted and difficult to solve.” Therefore, Peter Wallensteen and Lotta Harbom suggest that “the peace strategies of the 1990s have to be improved in order for them to yield success today.” Nevertheless, even at present they observe some parallel positive tendencies as well, such as negotiations and peace agreements in some protracted conflicts like Nepal and Aceh.27

All armed conflicts end one way or another. The durability of peace depends on the degree to which it is considered just or otherwise legitimate by the parties of the conflict. If a peace deal is perceived as unjust, the seed of

23 von Bonsdorff 1964.24 See Wright 1942, 218–248.25 Kende 1971; 1977; and 1978; Gantzel & Schwinghammer 2000.26 Ks. Human Security Report 2005; Harbom & Wallensteen 2007.27 Uppsala Universitet Press release 2007.

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a new conflict remains – which explains why new armed conflicts often flare up again in conflict-prone regions. Thus, a conflict cycle without a solution that would be recognized as legitimate by all conflict parties easily leads to an ever-continuing and deepening vicious circle.28 On the other hand, the European integration after the Second World War – the overcoming of old animosities and the build-up of new cooperation patterns on the foundation of common values and shared interests – is an encouraging example of the possibility for peaceful change in an international sub-system. If and when it is possible to find pathways of unification on a continent like Europe, the history of which is so full of war and violence, to a level where no one can regard war as probable in any imaginable future, it will be possible to get rid of the scourge of war elsewhere and universally as well.

References

von Bonsdorff, Göran (1964): Maailmanpolitiikka tekniikan aikakaudella. Hämeenlinna: Karisto.

Bouthoul, Gaston (1948): 8000 traités de paix. Paris: Julliard.

Gantzel, Klaus Jürgen & Torsten Schwinghammer (2000): Warfare Since the Second World War. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2007): “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War”, Journal of Peace Research, 44(3), 293–309.

Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen (2007): “Armed Conflict, 1989–2006,” Journal of Peace Research, 44(5), 623–634.

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/peacesite/.

The Human Security Report 2005. War and Peace in the 21st Century. Human Security Centre/Oxford University Press.

Kende, Istvan (1971): “Twenty-five Years of Local Wars”, Journal of Peace Research, VIII (1), 5–22.

Kende, István (1977): “Dynamics of Wars, of Arms Trade and of Military Expenditure in the “Third World”, 1945–1976”, Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 7(2), 59–67.

Kende, István (1978): “Wars of Ten Years (1967–76)”, Journal of Peace Research, XV(3), 227–241.

28 Ks. Pfetsch & Rohloff 2000.

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Leitenberg, Milton (2006): Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century. Cornell University Peace Studies Program. Occasional Paper 29, 3. ed. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cdsp_occ_leitenberg.pdf.

Melasuo, Tuomo (1999): Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954. Tampere: Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus. Tutkimuksia No. 85.

The Military Balance 2007. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Routledge.

Millennium Report of the Secretary-General [A/54/2000]. Also http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report, “We the peoples” The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.

The National Archives (s.a.): http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html.

Pfetsch, Frank R. & Christoph Rohloff (2000): “KOSIMO: A Databank on Political Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research, 37(3), 379–389

SIPRI Yearbook 2007. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2007). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Suomen sotasurmat 1914–1922-projekti. http://vesta.narc.fi/cgi-in/db2www/sotasurmaetusivu/ stat2.

Stevens, Anthony (2007): “What is war and why do we do it?” Lecture given at the Durrell School, Corfu, on July 4th. http://www.anthonystevens.co.uk/what_is_war.htm, 2.1.2008.

Uppsala Universitet Press Release (2007): “The general decline in armed conflicts has now clearly ceased”.

Urlanis, B. (1976): Sodat ja väestö. Helsinki: Tammi. (Original in Russian: Voiny i narodonaselenie; engl. Wars and Population).

Vesa, Unto (1995): Miten rauhantutkimus tuli Suomeen. TAPRI tutkimuksia No. 69. Tampere: Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus.

Vietnam War casualties. Http://www.vietnam-war.info/casualties.

White, Matthew (2005): “National Death Tolls for the Second World War”. http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/ww2stats.htm, 10.1.2008.

Wiberg, Håkan (1983): “The peace research movement”. A paper presented at the conference of the International Peace Research Association in Györ.

Willson, S. Brian (1999): “Memorandum: Accelerated Mortality Rates of Vietnam Veterans”. Http://www.brianwillson.com/awolvetmemo.html.

Wright, Quincy (1942): A Study of War, Vol. I-II. Chicago: The University of Illinois Press.


A troubled relationship:

peace research and emancipation

Tarja Väyrynen

Such a man will leave the gold in the mountainand the pearls to lie in the deep.

He does not view money and goods as true profit,nor is he attached to fame and fortune,

nor by enjoyment of long life,nor sadness at an early death;

he does not value wealth as a blessing,nor is he ashamed by poverty.

He will not lust for the wealth of a generation to have as hisown;

he has no wish to rule the whole world as his private domain.His honour is clarity of understanding that all life are part of one

treasuryand that death and birth are united.

Chuang Tzu

In the quote above, emancipation means spiritual development and freedom from attachment and from worldly concerns. In the Western tradition, however, emancipation refers to something else. It indicates personal or collective freedom, political and economic rights as well as improvement of the position of a disenfranchised group. Western theorising on emancipation is strongly embedded in the Marxist tradition of the social sciences, and the most prominent thinking on the issue can be found in the Frankfurt School.

Peace research has not been immune to the theorising on emancipation. On the contrary, there is a profound connection between the idea of emancipation and peace research. In this short essay, I will examine the relationship through four examples, namely, peace research as an emancipatory project in itself, peace researchers as emancipators, conflict resolution as a form of emancipation and gender and emancipation. I will argue that the relationship between emancipation and peace research has

128 Tarja Väyrynen


not been unproblematic and it has always created lively debates among peace researchers.

The Frankfurt School and peace research

The Frankfurt School sought to bring about emancipation from ideological blinders and increase our awareness of the conditions of our own knowledge of the world. According to Max Horkheimer, the social world lacks the given character of the natural world and should be seen as our construction. The political implication of this is that the social world could be otherwise. This is something that traditional social sciences have tended to obscure, according to Horkheimer, and thereby they perpetuate the status quo under capitalism. Therefore, a form of reflective social science is needed. Reflective social science implies theoretical reflection in the ordinary self-understanding of participants in the social world. In short, the guiding concern of the original, first generation Frankfurt School was with emancipation through reflective social science.1

For Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand, the normative foundations of critical social theory are to be found in the proper understanding of communicative action and, in particular, in the ideal speech situation that must be undertaken by anyone trying to come to an understanding with someone about something. According to Habermas, every communicative act carries with it claims to validity (truth, rightness, and sincerity). In ideal speech situations all participants must have equal opportunity to participate. The participants must also be motivated by the desire to reach a consensus, and in order to do this they must also have communicative competence which involves communicating in accordance with the fundamental system of linguistic rules. In the Habermasian view, what makes it possible to coordinate action is our ability to come to an understanding with each other about something. Emancipation can be measured by the progress toward the realization of the ideal speech situation.2

For Habermas too, our knowledge is constituted through our being in the social world and is tied to knowledge-constitutive interests. These are, first, the technical cognitive interest which is associated with instrumental reason and positivism and arises from the interest in shaping and controlling the natural environment. Second, the hermeneutic or interpretive disciplines are guided by the practical cognitive interest and aim at reaching an inter-

1 Anderson 2000; Habermas 1992, 401.2 Habermas 1985.

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subjective understanding rather than control. Third, the emancipatory cognitive interest seeks to secure freedom from distorted communication and ideology. It implies self-reflection, human autonomy, self-understanding and self-formation. Critical social sciences are guided, according to Habermas, by the emancipatory interest.

Emancipatory interest has guided a part of peace research and its development. Particularly the Scandinavian tradition of peace research allies itself with critical social theory suggested by the Frankfurt School3. Johan Galtung defined peace research as applied science that would lead to positive peace and structural change. Through structural change the actors can be freed from the burden of repression and false ideology. Peace research itself can be seen, thus, in this definition, as an emancipatory project that connects research with action, theory with praxis and knowledge with policy-making.4

A harsh criticism of the Galtungian view and the conservative nature of peace researchers was presented by Herman Schmid already in the late 1960s. In his article “Politics and Peace Research”, Schmid accused peace researchers of remaining within the confines of the status quo and being afraid of promoting profound structural changes. For him, working with structural change – that will bring forth positive peace – means polarizing a conflict to the extent that the conflict becomes manifest and clear for the groups under structural violence. Through polarization the “struggle escalates either to a point where the power relations between the conflict actors have changed so much that a structural change can be negotiated or to a point where the system breaks down and is rebuilt with a new structure.”5 Although Schmid himself does not raise the question of emancipation, his view on conflict polarization can be interpreted to imply it. A peace researcher is able to diagnose conflict situations better than the actors in a conflict themselves in order to promote polarization. The task of the researcher is to participate in the emancipatory reform that is oriented towards structural change and ultimately positive peace.

3 On the peace research tradition see e.g. Rytövuori-Apunen 1990; Jutila et al. 2008.4 Galtung 1969.5 Schmid 1968, 227.

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Conflict resolution as a form of emancipation

In the Anglo-American tradition of peace research, conflict resolution is often connected with empowerment, not emancipation as such. It is argued that through the commitment to ensure that people retain ownership of their destructive conflict during the conflict resolution process, there is a greater opportunity for the empowerment of those involved to create new ways of communicating and resolving their conflict. According to a broad definition, empowerment is the process of obtaining basic opportunities for marginalized people, either directly by those people, or through the help of non-marginalized others who share their own access to these opportunities. Empowerment includes encouraging and developing the skills for self-sufficiency.

Particularly the so-called problem-solving conflict resolution approach has theorized empowerment in conflict resolution situations6. Since many conflicts are embedded in asymmetrical power structures, the parties to a conflict do not have equal resources, capacities and skills to negotiate a resolution to the conflict. A.J.R. Groom and Keith Webb argue that in asymmetrical conflict resolution situations empowerment of the weaker party is needed7. In problem-solving conflict resolution the third party should remain neutral during the process, thus, anything that would question the neutrality of the facilitator is left out of the empowerment process. A way to empower the weaker party, according to Groom and Webb, is to teach the communication skills that are needed in problem-solving workshops. A workshop facilitator can engage in this type of teaching activity without sacrificing the principles of neutrality and non-partisanship. Communication skills are of vital importance in conflict resolution workshops, since conflict resolution requires improved communication patterns and dialogue in the Habermasian sense of an ideal speech situation.

The view on empowerment suggested by the problem-solving school of conflict resolution comes, thus, close to the definition of emancipation. The conflict resolution workshop participants are freed from the inadequate means of communicating that entitle them, among other things, remain in an underprivileged position, e.g. under the condition of structural violence. The role of the facilitator is important, because she can act as a catalyst for learning, self-improvement and self-sufficiency. The type of emancipation promoted does not bear similarities with the Schmidian approach described

6 On problem-solving conflict resolution, see Väyrynen 2001.7 Groom & Webb 1987.



above since it does not require profound structural changes. Emancipation relates to a group’s capacities and skills rather than the polarization of a struggle and the breakdown of old structures.

Emancipating women in peacebuilding

A very recent expression for the desire for emancipation in peace research and in conflict resolution practices can be found in the quest to include local women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. “Including local voices” has become a slogan of peacebuilding theorists and practitioners. The UN discourse as well as the mainstream writing on gender and peacebuilding insists on including local women in peacebuilding. The inclusion of local women is seen to offer a voice for marginalized groups that are seen to be a key to self-sustaining peace. As I have demonstrated elsewhere in a more detailed manner,8 the programme of including local women implies emancipation and is highly problematic. It needs to be considered, who are these “local women” who should be included, whose emancipation is needed and whose voice is more authentic than the voice of women representing the “international community”?

For me, Gayatri Spivak’s question “can the subaltern speak?” offers a starting point for examining this troubled relationship between peace, gender and emancipation. In her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak examines the possibility of speaking of and for subaltern women as well as the question of representation. For Spivak, subaltern refers to a colonial subject who is cast aside to the margins and whom the Western epistemic violence constitutes as Other. She argues that the “ideological construction of gender keeps the male dominant” and that “in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in the shadow.”9 It is exactly these subaltern subjects that Western peacebuilding interventions try to deal with when insisting on including local women.

Spivak warns us strongly against solutions that assume a monolithic collectivity of the oppressed who can speak for themselves in the way we in the West understand speech and who can be included in emancipatory political dialogue and peacebuilding. She considers it to be a dangerous path to take where the First World intellectual (or policy-maker, activist, etc.) masquerades as an absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak for themselves. For Spivak, the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably

8 Väyrynen 2008.9 Spivak 1988, 287.

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heterogeneous and cannot speak. I argue that “local women” and their emancipation serve the construction of Western agency in peacebuilding as protector, human and ethically active. The wish to hear the voices of “local women” is distinctly problematic and opens up a critical research agenda for peace research that should examine the role of colonial and subaltern subjects in the construction of First World agency.

Concluding remarks

In this short essay I have tried to show how the idea of emancipation and peace research are closely connected. Both in the Scandinavian and Anglo-American traditions, there is theorizing on conflict resolution practices that would lead to emancipation. Furthermore, peace research itself can be seen to be an emancipatory project. The connection is not, however, an unproblematic one. The views on emancipation are always challenged in peace research and the challenges point towards two directions: emancipation is not radical enough (Schmid) or emancipation as such is a problematic notion and relates mainly to Western self-understanding (Väyrynen).



References

Anderson, Joel (2000): “The ‘Third Generation’ of the Frankfurt School”, Intellectual History Newsletter, 22.

Chuang, Tzu (1996): The Book of Chuang Tzu. London & New York: Arkana.

Galtung, Johan (1969): Rauhantutkimus. Helsinki: Weilin+Göös.

Groom, A. J. R. & Keith Webb (1987): “Injustice, Empowerment and Facilitation in Conflict”, International Interactions, 13(3), 77–86.

Habermas, Jürgen (1971): Knowledge and Human Interest. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, Jürgen (1985): The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Habermas, Jürgen (1992): The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Jutila, Matti, Samu Pehkonen & Tarja Väyrynen (2008): “Resuscitating a Discipline: An Agenda for Critical Peace Research”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 36(3), 623–640.

Rytövuori-Apunen, Helena (1990): Barefoot Research and Tribune of Reason. An Analysis of the Textual Corpus of Peace Research in Scandinavia, 1959–1986. Tampere: Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Tampere.

Schmid, Herman (1968): “Politics and Peace Research”, Journal of Peace Research, 3, 218–232.

Spivak, Gayatri (1988): “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in G. Nelson & L. Grossberg (eds.) Marxism and the Interpretation. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Väyrynen, Tarja (2001): Culture and International Conflict Resolution. Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press.

Väyrynen, Tarja (2008): “Gender and Peacebuilding”, in O. Richmond (ed.) Advances in Peace Studies. Houndsmill, Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave.


Touch and vision

Frank Möller

What is that? It could be old memories of other times and other places, stamped in the skin memory. – – Something we run after but never catch – always

escaping from the chains or labels, always running away from being classified, always evading from the drawers of the definitive things.

Rosa Matos Bentofrom the liner notes to

Maria João and Mário Laginha, Danças (Verve World)

In the theory and practice of international relations the basic attitude to difference still seems to be one of understanding difference as a problem.1 The first encounters between Europeans and indigenous peoples in South America may paradigmatically illustrate Western approaches to encounters with other people. These encounters regularly resulted in the elimination of the latter by the former, albeit on the basis of two opposing logics that, however, joined hands in evaluating other cultures in terms other than their own thus inevitably misunderstanding them, misrepresenting them, and justifying their elimination: either unalterable difference and inferiority were stressed and depicted as a potential or actual threat that had to be countered, or sameness and commonality were emphasized and translated into demands for total assimilation. Either way, these encounters resulted in the elimination of difference. Curiously little seems to have changed since then although the need to accept and capitalize on difference has been acknowledged in a huge number of academic writings in the social sciences. The need to live with difference is as strong today as it was then but international politics in the light of regime change, the liberal peace proposition, increasingly illiberal practices home and abroad of allegedly liberal democracies and exaggerated self/other rhetoric point in a different direction. The designations of other people have changed – “wild men,” “infidels” and “primitives” then, “terrorists,” “insurgents” and “Taliban” today – but the politics towards them are depressingly similar including the self-authorization to kill with impunity.

1 For a profound critique, see Inayatullah & Blaney 2004.

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Pictures, it is argued in this essay, are important vehicles for peace-building because they show, without ignoring difference, the commonalities of being human2 – the not-so-otherness of other people and the not-so-sameness of the self – and help people to identify partially with one another. The surplus of meaning that pictures inevitably carry with them means that pictures, precisely by co-representing similarities and differences, the general and the particular, the central and the peripheral, can help their readers to live with difference rather than by reducing difference. Understanding the visual might thus pave the way to live with difference without neglecting sameness and to live with sameness without neglecting difference; others “are (complex, fractured, contradictory) selves”3 and we are others, too.

It does not really matter in this context that we still do not know what pictures are: a picture, says the photographer William Eggleston, “is what it is”; pictures are “right there, whatever they are” and this is a very adequate approach indeed because it emphasizes pictures’ non-reducibility to a specific meaning: not only “would [it] not make any sense to explain” pictures,4 it would also violate their very nature, their surplus of meaning, and deprive them of one of their most important potentialities, namely, to tell different and equally valuable stories at the same time. Thus, in the center of this essay is the nature of images rather than the question of “right” or “wrong” interpretations of images – a question that ultimately cannot be answered anyway.

From this it follows that the combination of words and images, while undoubtedly powerful and to some extent unavoidable and emphasized in numerous criticisms of photography – Walter Benjamin speculated that the caption might become the most important ingredient of a photograph; Susan Sontag wrote that “all photographs wait to be explained or falsified by their captions”; and John Szarkowski, commenting on the photographic works from the American Civil War and the Second World War, emphasized that “neither explained, without extensive captioning, what was happening”5

– is also problematic precisely because it fixes a picture’s multiple meanings and often supports photography’s tendency to “reproduce and reinforce the already-in-place ideological discourses vindicating entrenched systems

2 See MacDougall 1998.3 Couldry 2000, 120.4 All quotations are from O’Hagan 2004.5 Benjamin 1963, p. 64; Sontag 2003, 10; Szarkowski 2007, unpaginated.

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of power and authority.”6 Thus, Brazilian songwriter Caetano Veloso, remembering his encounter with Andy Warhol’s Marilyn, might be more to the point by saying that he saw “how raw images would become comments on the world if only we would abstain from commenting upon them.”7

Regarding the word-image relationship, what is the evidence that Jacquet Callot’s etchings titled Les Misères et les Malheurs de la Guerre depicting the invasion and occupation of Lorraine by French troops in the early 1630s need captions in order for them to communicate to the beholder the indiscriminate cruelty of war? Do we have reason to believe that the “devastating”8 effect of Goya’s print series Los Desastres de la Guerra depicting “with no distinction between winners and losers, right or wrong, or often even dead or alive”9 the invasion of Spain by Napoleon’s troops in 1808 results from the combination of words and images? Would Goya’s Desastres not be equally poignant without captions? What is the evidence that Flavio de Barros’s photographs of Brazilian troops’ crusade against and slaughter of crowds gathered by Antônio Vicente Mendes Maciel (Antônio Conselheiro) in Canudos, Sertão, in September 1897 – some of “the great images of the horrors of modern war”10 – require bylines in order for them to affect the viewers? The viewers do not have to understand the pictures in their historical context or political ramifications in order to be appalled by them and by that what they depict.

Consider in this context Edouard Manet’s paintings of the execution of Emperor Maximilian in Querétaro, Mexico, in June 1867,11 some of the greatest examples of both 19th century art and of political art although – or because – their political message is far from clear. Manet did not make a clear political statement either for or against the execution; he abstained from an evaluation of Maximilian’s installation as emperor; and he refrained from making a clear political assessment for or against the role of France in the whole débâcle. Manet used only some parts of the available information on the execution and ignored others. He inter-visually applied, and altered, the rules governing the painting of current and historical events established by such artists as Francisco de Goya.

6 Shapiro 1988, 126.7 Veloso 2002, 18.8 Sontag 2003, 44.9 Eisenman 2007, 86.10 Robb, 2005, 206; Some of the photographs can be seen on a website maintained by Fondacão Joaquim Nabuco at http://www.fundaj.gov.br/docs/canud/fotos.htm. 11 See Elderfield 2006.

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Manet’s works speak to the viewer, not because Manet imposed a specific interpretation of the paintings on the viewers or because he realistically depicted what actually had taken place in Querétaro. Rather, the paintings affect the viewer because they maintain their autonomy as works of art, because they complicate and do not simplify, and because they put the viewers in a very awkward subject position, thereby involving them in both the depicted scene and the execution. This is true especially with respect to the painting that is currently owned by Städtische Kunsthalle Mannheim. Here, the viewer sees his or her own shadow in front of the non-commissioned officer preparing the coup de grâce and this shadow involves the viewer directly in the execution scene.12

What are we doing there? Are we only observers of the execution or are we participant observers, that is to say, do we participate in the execution simply by being there, by observing the execution, by not intervening to prevent it? Is there anything we could possibly have done to prevent the execution? Do we actually look at the execution, our gaze directed by the gaze of the group of people peeping over the wall, or do we focus our attention on the non-commissioned officer and his nonchalant non-involvement, or do we turn our back to the execution scene, perhaps appalled at what happens, aware of our own failure to prevent it, averting our eyes, insisting on our right not to look? Our shadow does not answer this question. And do we actually have the right not to look, to close our eyes to the pain of others?

Writing about the notorious photographs taken in the Abu Ghraib prison, art historian Stephen Eisenman would seem to deny the right not to look. He claims that “there is simply no alternative” to carefully paying attention to the photographs if one wishes to undermine what he calls the Abu Ghraib effect: “a kind of moral blindness – – that allows [the US public and the amateur photographers at Abu Ghraib] to ignore, or even to justify, however partially or provisionally, the facts of degradation and brutality manifest in the pictures.”13 Thus, we have to look; we cannot not look if we wish to undermine the Abu Ghraib effect.

Art historian Horst Bredekamp would probably disagree. He argues that deliberately to watch an image of a crime is an act of complicity if the crime had been committed in the first place in order to produce images of it; by watching these images, the viewer becomes an accomplice of the

12 Möller 2008, 25–29.13 Eisenman 2007, 9.

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perpetrators.14 The Abu Ghraib photographs were intended to be shown to friends and loved ones at home, and they were disseminated world-wide, unaffected by censorship, uncontrolled and uncontrollable. Thus, if there is no alternative to regarding the Abu Ghraib images (Eisenman) then there also would not seem to be an alternative to becoming involved, as a viewer, in the crimes committed at Abu Ghraib (Bredekamp). Thus, looking is not an option but not looking is not an option, either. This is a real dilemma in the sense that it offers the viewer only equally unfavorable options.

In this connection it may also be suggested that simply by watching the photographs or the video footage of the attacks on the two towers of the World Trade Center and the people caught in them on 11 September 2001, the viewers inadvertently join hands with Al Qaeda. After all, the perpetrators could almost take for granted that someone would produce images of the attacks and that these images would then be disseminated worldwide; the attack “was clearly planned and executed to maximize imaging.”15

Another question to be asked in connection with the Abu Ghraib and the 9/11 photographs is the following: Did they move us? And if so, what does it mean to be moved by photographs? After all, “as soon as we are moved by [a photograph] we are ready to move on.”16 Being moved by a photograph would then seem to be the condition for the impossibility of critically engaging both with the photograph and with the conditions that produced it. Even if we move on, however, photographs may haunt us, engrave themselves on our pictorial memory; we might not be able to forget them. Thus, even if we move on, we do not let the photographs that moved us behind us. We are carrying them with us as memories but it is difficult to say what exactly they do to us and what we do with or about them or about the conditions that produced them.

Eisenman writes that “the one who watches is stronger than the one who is watched.”17 While this is certainly true on one level we should also think about the power of the one who is watched – or the power of the image of the one who is watched – over the one who watches (although power is perhaps not really the right word for the haunting effect of images that I am addressing here). “Old memories of other times and other places” are not only “stamped in the skin memory” (Rosa Matos Bento) but also indelibly engraved on our

14 Bredekamp 2004.15 Levi Strauss 2003, 182.16 Dyer 2006, 31.17 Eisenman 2007, 99.

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pictorial memory. Thus, when we speak about images we also speak about the images that we already carry with us as memories serving as the standard against which newly incoming information, including visual information, is being evaluated.

Thus two notoriously unreliable sources of making sense of the world, images and memories, join hands – and both are used as sources of making sense of the world although it is well known that they are unreliable and that there is no necessary and direct connection between a photograph and “any prior reality.”18 Indeed, the truth-value of photographic representations is routinely overestimated reflecting photography’s seeming documentary potentialities, its mechanical way of reproduction and the long history of the use of photographs as evidence in a variety of circumstances, but this overestimation tells us perhaps less about photography than about our longing for some degree of certainty, assurance and non-arbitrariness. Not least, photography is, as Diana Taylor has argued with respect to the photographs taken in connection with the 11 September 2001 attacks, “evidence – – of our own existence.”19

Many authors have written about the effects photographs of human suffering can have on their viewers. Most of them emphasized what Arthur Danto has called photography’s “dulling, if not desensitizing” effect or what Barbie Zelizer has referred to as habituation in the course of which that what moved the viewers when seen for the first time increasingly fails to move them when seen again and again and again. Susan Sontag, however, called into question her earlier assessment that photographs “shrivel sympathy” and asked: “What is the evidence that photographs have a diminishing impact, that our culture of spectatorship neutralizes the moral force of photographs of atrocities?”20

The history of photo-journalism is a history of pushing the boundaries of that what can be shown further and further often resulting in “picture[s] that shouldn’t be shown of an event that shouldn’t have happened.”21 Recent approaches to the depiction of human suffering in the visual arts, however, make the viewers acknowledge their implication in that what is being shown in the images precisely by not showing human suffering or by showing human suffering only by implication. For example, in “The Eyes of

18 Tagg 1988, 2.19 Taylor 2003, 255.20 Danto 2006; Zelizer 1998; Sontag 2003, 105.21 Hariman & Lucaites 2003, 41.

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Gutete Emerita,” part of The Rwanda Project, Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar does not show human suffering but only eyes that have seen such suffering. By so doing, Jaar “engages the limits of representation in situations of extremity – and not as an abstract philosophical question but as one in which viewers of the work are implicated.”22 Canadian visual artist Jeff Wall, in his staged, near-documentary photograph “Dead Troops Talk (A vision after the ambush of a Red Army patrol, near Moqor, Afghanistan), winter 1986,” re-enacted in the studio with the help of actors, uses black humor and irony to engage what Reinhardt calls the limits of representation. As Wall says, at the time when he started the project (1990) the Afghan war “had just simply dropped out of the public eye. That meant it had become sort of immovable. And that seemed sort of right for the hallucinatory image I wanted to make.”23 Again, the viewers do not have to understand the historical context within which these images are located in order to be affected by them and motivated to think.24

It would then seem that some photographs have a dulling effect while others have not. Some photographs have a dulling effect on some observers but not on others. Some photographs, seen for hundreds of times, still move us – or at least some of us. Thus photography is not as limited as it is often accused of being. And the limits of sight and vision are not the limits of photography. And “the limits of photography are not the limits of art.”25

Responding to the Abu Ghraib photographs, Colombian artist Fernando Botero decided to paint Abu Ghraib.26 One of the paintings’ most striking features is the almost total absence of the perpetrators from most of the paintings and the strong focus on the victims and their pain. In the few paintings where the perpetrators are being depicted, they are neither smiling nor grinning, and they are certainly not giving thumbs-up behind a pyramid of naked Iraqi bodies as can be seen in the photographs. In other paintings, their faces are off the canvas, their heads are painted from behind or hidden behind arms raised in order to beat a prisoner.

For the viewers, it is not possible to avoid the victims’ pain by focusing their attention on the jailors: we are compelled to face the victims and their pain.

22 Reinhardt 2007, 33.23 Jeff Wall in Lederman 2008.24 For the relationship between affect and critique, see Bennett 2005, especially 46–69.25 Danto 2006.26 Botero 2006.

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In the large body of scholarly and journalistic comment revolving around what happened at Abu Ghraib, the focus was “on ourselves.”27 Regarding Botero’s paintings, however, we cannot hide behind a discussion of the role of the perpetrators and the society from which they emerged and which they represent. Thus, Botero’s works make us realize both the inadequateness of the photographs as evidence for what actually happened in Abu Ghraib and the immorality of the self-centered discussion following the publication of the photographs.

Thus the limits of photography are not the limits of art. But the limits of sight and visions are not the limits of photography, either.

In her work on photographic family snapshots and portraits, Marianne Hirsch describes the photographic family album as a vehicle for the construction, justification and maintenance of often idealized family relationships, rules of appropriate behaviour and family traditions. The family album is one of the everyday places where identities are constructed, notions of self and others are developed, feelings of belonging are articulated and collective memories are formed. It is a place of intimacy, meaningful only for those who are aware of the tacit assumptions and implicit relationships that can be felt rather than seen in the photographs. “Feeling photographs” was accordingly the title of Elizabeth Edwards’s key note speech at the 2006 conference of the Nordic Network of Visual Social Science. And concerning photographs of musicians, Geoff Dyer writes that “the better the photograph, the more there is to hear.”28

Here, I want to emphasize the notion of touching photographs: photographs not only touch us, but we can touch them with the sensitive tips of our fingers, we can cry over them and kiss them. By replacing a disembodied relationship with an embodied one we can relate to the photographs and to that what they depict better, more directly and more intimately than by simply looking because “by virtue of physical contact with the object, touch – – produces a much less dramatic transubstantiation of the object’s material substance and form into a spiritual expression of boundless significance than do seeing or hearing.”29

Can it then also be argued that touch, by virtue of physical contact with a photograph, produces a more dramatic sense of connection with,

27 Simpson 2006, 107.28 Hirsch 1997; Edwards 2006; Dyer 1998, xii.29 Gilgen 2003, 54.

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involvement in and responsibility for that what a photograph conveys than does looking? Does touch undermine the dulling and desensitizing effect that photography is often accused of generating? Does touch make it more difficult for the viewers to escape from their responsibility for the conditions under which photographs are being taken? Does it help undermine the notion of privileged spectatorship – privileged in the sense of not being responsible for that what a given photograph communicates – turning seemingly privileged spectators into implicated spectators?

Touch would then appear to have an important role to play in many conflict and peace-building situations in international relations and elsewhere including truth-telling as performed in truth and reconciliation commissions. This is not to say that truth-telling should be abandoned but it is to suggest that it should be accompanied by truth-showing and truth-touching.

The “Western valuation of seeing and hearing as primary senses for the production of rational knowledge is as fundamental to the Western sensory schema” as is the understanding of touch, smell and taste as lower and irrational.30 Preference given to sight and vision would then seem to be fundamental to the endurance of Western domination over non-Western ways of making sense of the world. Post-colonial and other variants of critique of this very domination should therefore include in their critique the Western focus on sight and vision.

This raises important questions about the recent attention directed to visual culture in peace research and international studies. Indeed, exclusive attention on sight and vision might actually support and strengthen that what visual analysis is often meant to criticize. However, preference given to sight and vision would also seem to prevent complete understanding of Western cultures. Let me return, for a last time in this essay, to the attacks of 11 September 2001. In addition to being visually assaulted by the repetitive display of the images of the attack and its aftermath while herself contributing to the production of such images, Diana Taylor writes that “we inhaled the Towers, smelled them, tasted them in our mouths, rubbed them from our teary eyes, crunched them with our feet as we walked through the streets.”31

It is adequate to conclude this essay by returning to Fernando Botero, not to his Abu Ghraib paintings but his earlier animal sculptures. Situated in urban landscapes, these sculptures are meant to be touched and to be

30 Edwards et al. 2006, 7.31 Taylor 2003, 243.

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changed by being touched. This is one of the reasons why people love them. They are sculptures made for the streets, not for the art galleries. Likewise, Eisenman reminds us that Jacques-Louis David’s paintings of French revolutionaries in 1793 and 1794 – “token[s] of emancipation” rather than “sign[s] of subservience to autocratic power” – were paintings “made for the streets, not for the court.”32 Perhaps we should also think about photographs for the streets, not for the museums where such signs as “Don’t touch the objects” deprive these very objects of many of their potentialities.

32 Eisenman 2007, 84.

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References

Benjamin, Walter (1963): Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Bennett, Jill (2005): Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Botero, Fernando (2006): Botero Abu Ghraib. Munich: Prestel.

Bredekamp, Horst (2004): “Wir sind befremdete Komplizen”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 May 2004.

Couldry, Nick (2000): Inside Culture: Re-imagining the Method of Cultural Studies. London: Sage.

Danto, Arthur C. (2006): “The Body in Pain”, The Nation, 27 November 2006.

Dyer, Geoff (1998): But Beautiful: A Book about Jazz. London: Abacus.

Dyer, Geoff (2006): The Ongoing Moment. London: Abacus.

Edwards, Elisabeth (2006): “Feeling Photographs”, keynote speech at the meeting of the Nordic Network for Visual Social Science A Closer Look: Knowing Through Images, Roskilde University, 23–24 November 2006.

Edwards, Elisabeth, Chris Gosden & Ruth B. Phillips (2006): “Introduction”, in E. Edwards, C. Gosden & R.B. Phillips (eds.) Sensible Objects: Colonialism, Museums and Material Culture. Oxford & New York: Berg.

Eisenman, Stephen F. (2007): The Abu Ghraib Effect. London: Reaktion Books.

Elderfield, John (2006): Manet and the Execution of Maximilian. New York: The Museum of Modern Art.

Gilgen, Peter (2003): “History after Film”, in H.U. Gumbrecht & M. Marrinan (eds.) Mapping Benjamin: The Work of Art in the Digital Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hariman, Robert & John Louis Lucaites (2003): “Public Identity and Collective Memory in U.S. Iconic Photography: The Image of ‘Accidental Napalm’”, Critical Studies in Media Communication, 20(1), March.

Hirsch, Marianne (1997): Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press.

Inayatullah, Naeem & David L. Blaney (2004): International Relations and the Problem of Difference. New York & London: Routledge.

Lederman, Marsha (2008): “The master of ‘blatant artifice’ speaks”, The Globe and Mail, 24 May 2008.

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Levi Strauss, Daniel (2003): Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics. New York.

MacDougall, David (1998): Transcultural Cinema. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Möller, Frank (2008): “The Implicated Spectator – From Manet to Botero”, in M. Hyvärinen & L. Muszynski (eds.) Terror and the Arts: Artistic, Literary, and Political Interpretations of Violence from Dostoyevsky to Abu Ghraib. New York: Palgrave.

O’Hagan, Sean (2004): “Out of the ordinary”, The Observer, 25 July 2004.

Robb, Peter (2005): A Death in Brazil: A Book of Omissions. London: Bloomsbury.

Reinhardt, Mark (2007): “Picturing Violence: Aesthetics and the Anxiety of Critique”, in M. Reinhardt, H. Edwards & E. Duganne (eds.) Beautiful Suffering: Photography and the Traffic in Pain. Williamstown/Chicago: Williams College Museum of Art/The University of Chicago Press.

Shapiro, Michael (1988): The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Simpson, David (2006): 9/11: The Culture of Commemoration. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.

Sontag, Susan (2003): Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Szarkowski, John (2007): The Photographer’s Eye. New York: The Museum of Modern Art.

Tagg, John (1988): The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Taylor, Diana (2003): The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas. Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Veloso, Caetano (2002): Tropical Truth: A Story of Music & Revolution in Brazil. New York: Da Capo Press.

Zelizer, Barbie (1998): Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera’s Eye. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.


Tuomo Melasuo, un finlandese per il

Dialogo euro-mediterraneo

Salvatore Bono

In queste pagine, volte a festeggiare l’amico Tuomo, ricorderò le occasioni di comune impegno nella prospettiva del dialogo e della comprensione nel mondo mediterraneo, al tempo stesso richiamando convinzioni e prospettive derivate anche dalla esperienza che ci ha accomunato. In particolare farò cenno della fondazione e della storia della SIHMED, la Sociéte internationale des historiens de la Méditerranée, vicende condivise appunto con Tuomo, e della presenza insieme nel Comitato consultivo della Fondazione euro-mediterranea per il dialogo delle culture Anna Lindh (FAL).

Ci siamo conosciuti nel marzo 1986, alla riunione a Parigi del Conseil Européen des Études Africaines (CEEA) sulla documentazione africanistica in Europa (vi esposi il rapporto concernente l’Italia1). Constatammo allora, Tuomo ed io, una comune preoccupazione per i problemi dell’organizzazione degli studi – sull’Africa, sul mondo arabo islamico, sui paesi emergenti – da condurre su una base scientifica rigorosa e allo stesso tempo nella consapevolezza di dover indirizzare il proprio impegno verso le esigenze della società, nei nostri due paesi rispettivamente, e nel quadro della politica della Comunità europea. Fin da quella prima conoscenza nacque fra noi un sentimento di simpatia, oltre che di stima, dovuto da parte mia anche al fatto che la Finlandia era un paese al quale mi sentivo legato, in modo indiretto e tuttavia significativo, e per il quale provavo molta ammirazione insieme a un forte desiderio di visitarlo2.

1 Il CEEA era stato creato nel 1963, per iniziativa della Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Techinique (ACCT). L’Agence aveva pubblicato due grossi volumi sulle Études africaines en Europe, Paris, Karthala, 1981. I rapporti sulla documentazione vennero riuniti nel volume La documentation africaniste en Europe, CEEA-ACCT, Paris 1987.2 Nel 1983–1984 mia figlia Laura (allora 16 anni) frequentò per un intero anno scolastico il liceo scientifico a Tampere, ospite della famiglia Liisa e Reino Kurki-Suonio, professori della Università di Tampere, ai quali mi piacere rinnovare qui l’espressione della mia gratitudine. Dal 1986 mio figlio Francesco (ora professore associato di Storia e critica del cinema) cominciò ad interessarsi della

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Un po’di anni dopo l’avvio del mio rapporto di amicizia con Tuomo, uniti dall’interesse per il mondo mediterraneo e da una particolare attenzione verso l’Algeria, la politica mediterranea della Unione Europea diede vita al Partenariato (Barcellona, novembre 1995). Mi sembrò allora – e l’impressione era confermata da altri osservatori – che il terzo volet, quello sociale, culturale e umano, fosse stato inserito nella Dichiarazione di Barcellona, che dava vita appunto al Partenariato, più che altro come un «fiore all’occhiello». La formulazione degli intenti di quel terzo settore – mirante a «sviluppare le risorse umane, favorire la comprensione fra le culture e gli scambi fra le società civili» – parve invero molto generica, mentre per i primi due, e in particolare per il cesto che definiva gli intenti economico-finanziari, le indicazioni programmatiche e i percorsi da seguire erano indicati in modo molto più preciso e in qualche misura cogente. Il primo volet, politico e di sicurezza, mirava a «definire uno spazio comune di pace e di stabilità», il secondo prevedeva di «costruire una zona di prosperità condivisa», anzitutto attraverso la creazione entro il 2010 di una zona di libero scambio3.

In particolare riguardo al «dialogo», la Dichiarazione di Barcellona nel suo punto terzo riconosceva che «le tradizioni di cultura e di civiltà da una parte e dall’altra del Mediterraneo» e il loro dialogo, nonché gli scambi, non solo «umani» (dizione peraltro troppo generica), ma anche quelli scientifici e tecnologici, «costituiscono una componente essenziale del riavvicinamento e della comprensione fra i popoli e di miglioramento della reciproca percezione», ma non faceva alcun cenno al fatto che quelle culture e civiltà avessero valori comuni o comunque avessero interagito in una vicenda storica condivisa4. Nessun particolare riferimento si faceva alla storia, che invece agli storici, e in generale a tutti gli studiosi del Mediterraneo, sembra costituisca il primo, più consistente e duraturo, patrimonio comune, e non solo dei popoli rivieraschi. L’affacciarsi infatti di un territorio sul mare interno è invero una caratteristica meramente geografica, che ha senza dubbio rilievo per determinati specifici problemi attuali, ma che costituisce per diversi paesi un dato contingente

cinematografia finlandese, sino a pubblicare il volume Cinema Finlandia (Roma, Aiace, 1989).3 I documenti costitutivi del Partenariato sono pubblicati da B. Khader, Le parténariat euro-méditerranéen après la conférence de Barcelone, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997. Una aggiornata bibliografia sul Partenariato e i suoi sviluppi nel volume citato nella nota successiva.4 Riprendo in questo passo, in qualche misura letteralmente, le osservazioni sviluppate nel mio recente volume Un altro Mediterraneo. Una storia comune fra scontri e integrazioni, Roma, Salerno Editrice, 2008, 169–180.

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se si considerava la loro identità in una prospettiva storica più profonda anche soltanto di decenni o di un secolo o poco più. Si pensi, per esempio, ai paesi eredi della ex Federazione iugoslava, all’Austria e all’Ungheria, per non dire della Giordania e del Portogallo, che infatti per convenzione vengono considerati mediterranei e sono stati tra i firmatari della dichiarazione di Barcellona.

Il patrimonio storico-culturale «mediterraneo» a parer nostro appartiene ed è un dato costitutivo essenziale per un insieme di paesi, potremmo dire per tutti quelli del «mondo mediterraneo», inteso in senso storico e di civiltà. Questa comunanza di esperienza storica e di eredità di patrimonio di civiltà, al di là delle certo significative e innegabili specificità di singoli paesi o di gruppi, riguarda dunque altrettanto, e unitariamente, tutti paesi d’Europa e del mondo arabo, oltre che la Turchia e Israele. Questa prospettiva, ideale prima che politica, la indichiamo senza certo ignorare le circostanze e le vicende storico-politiche che hanno visto entrare nell’Unione Europea prima i paesi dell’Europa carolingia e più tardi altri, mediterranei per eccellenza (Grecia, Spagna, Portogallo), mentre ne tenevano assenti alcuni, sia europei che arabi, coma la Slovenia e la Croazia, la Polonia e la Romania, la Libia e l’Iraq, i quali per la loro identità storico-culturale non differivano da altri già presenti. Ciò che a noi studiosi appariva ben chiaro era il fatto che le mete, auspicate nella Dichiarazione di Barcellona sul piano culturale e spirituale, di superamento di risentimenti, pregiudizi, persino radicate inimicizie, e di apertura invece verso comprensione e apprezzamento reciproci, non potevano, come non possono, essere conseguite se non rifacendosi alla storia, ripensandola e ‘riscrivendola’. Vi era perciò la necessità di richiamare gli studiosi, l’intera società civile, i responsabili politici verso la consapevolezza di un patrimonio storico comune nel mondo mediterraneo e dell’altrettanto comune conseguente responsabilità di tutti i paesi europei – dall’ Italia, così vicina anche geograficamente alla riva sud, alla Finlandia, soltanto geograficamente lontana – di promuovere e gestire il Dialogo. In questo quadro la convergenza di convincimenti e d’intenti fra Tuomo e me, rafforzava il nostro personale legame di amicizia e ci conduceva a una ulteriore più stretta collaborazione.

Per sottolineare questi convincimenti e questa prospettiva, proprio mentre il processo di Barcellona si avviava con molte speranze e buone volontà – ma non con la piena necessaria chiarezza di idee, sul piano umano e culturale – alcuni studiosi, più vicini nello spirito e nell’impegno mediterranei, e fra questi Tuomo, dopo aver sentito colleghi ed amici, lanciavano l’idea di costituire una rete di storici del Mediterraneo, quella che è poi divenuta la

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SIHMED. I promotori della Société degli storici del Mediterraneo nel novembre 1995 non vollero formalizzare subito la Société stessa ma invece attendere prima l’ampliarsi del consenso intorno alla iniziativa. Una occasione rilevante per questa verifica venne offerta molto gentilmente nell’ambito della X riunione ad Aix-en-Provence (4–7 luglio 1996) dell’Association française pour l’étude du monde arabe et musulman (AFEMAM); Tuomo Melasuo ed io potemmo presentare intenti e caratteristiche della nascente associazione5. A Tampere, un anno dopo, l’impegno organizzativo e scientifico di Melasuo convocò un workshop su New Trends of Mediterranean History, al quale la SIHMED – prima occasione di sua manifestazione pubblica – prestò la sua collaborazione6.

Questa volontà di considerare il Mediterraneo – sia come campo di ricerche e di studi, sia come spazio d’azione – una responsabilità comune dei paesi europei (tanto più se già inseriti nella nascente Unione Europea) trovò espressione concreta nella elezione di Tuomo Melasuo quale membro del primo Consiglio direttivo (maggio 2000); accanto a lui, sempre confermato nelle successive elezioni, vi sono stati e vi sono altri componenti provenienti anche essi da paesi non rivieraschi (Ungheria, Austria, Serbia)7.

Dopo il primo biennio di avvio del Partenariato euro-mediterraneo, la stessa Commissione europea ritenne necessario impegnarsi con più vigore nell’aspetto culturale e in particolare nel Dialogo da rendere direttamente funzionale allo sviluppo dell’intero Processo di Barcellona. Una concreta iniziativa partì nell’autunno 1997 dal governo svedese ed un apposito workshop si svolse infatti a Stoccolma il 23–24 aprile 1998. Fra i progetti presentati in quella sede ed approvati poi in maggio dal Comitato euro-mediterraneo fu presente anche HISTMED (Histoire de la Méditerranée), formulato dalla SIHMED.

5 Melasuo, io e Daniel Panzac eravamo presenti come membri del comitato direttivo provvisorio della SIHMED.6 Il convegno si svolse l’ 8 agosto 1997, nell’ambito della XXIII conferenza degli storici nordici (7–12 agosto); gli atti sono apparsi sotto il titolo Individuals, Ideologies and Society. Tracing the Mosaic of Mediterranean History, a cura di K. Virtanen, Tampere, Tapri, 2001. La SIHMED venne formalmente costituita con atto notarile del 31 ottobre 1997; fu allora costituito un consiglio direttivo provvisorio; la prima assemblea dei soci con le elezioni del consiglio direttivo si tenne a Grasse il 30 maggio 2000.7 La vita sociale e le attività della SIHMED sono documentate dalla serie di «Lettre de liaison», giunte al numero 13 (1997–2006); la serie sarà prossimamente proseguita a cura della Segreteria generale della Société diretta dal prof. Luigi Mascilli Migliorini.

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Si trattava della definizione di un progetto di Storia del Mediterraneo, al quale solo più tardi sarebbe seguita la effettiva realizzazione dell’opera. A un decennio di distanza posso far sapere che il collega Melasuo – che sin da allora godeva di molto credito presso i governi degli stati scandinavi – ebbe un ruolo essenziale nell’accreditare favorevolmente il progetto stesso8.

Successivamente il progetto HISTMED entrò in un programma più ampio detto EuroMed Sciences Humaines, promosso e coordinato dalla Maison Méditerranéene des Sciences de l’Homme di Aix-en-Provence, nelle persone di Robert Ilbert e Thierry Fabre. Dopo un anno di lavoro, EuroMed Sciences Humaines – al quale partecipavano anche istituzioni di Germania, Turchia, Marocco e Tunisia – presentò alla Commissione un Étude de préfiguration concernente sette progetti fra i quali HISTMED. Per ragioni non del tutto chiarite, la Commissione Europea non mandò avanti EuroMed Sciences Humaines, che pur venne più volte esplicitamente ricordato, come nel Plan d’Action approvato a Valencia nell’aprile 2003 e infine nel documento costitutivo della Fondazione euro-mediterranea per il dialogo delle culture Anna Lindh (FAL)9.

Dalla istituzione del Partenariato si sono di anno in anno moltiplicati incontri di lavoro, seminari, convegni, diversi per caratteri e impostazioni, volti a discutere e valutare realtà e prospettive del Processo di Barcellona, come è stata chiamata la progressiva attuazione del Partenariato, giudicata più o meno favorevolmente dopo un decennio10. In queste iniziative Tuomo Melasuo è stato fra gli studiosi presenti più assiduamente, riscuotendo

8 Il Workshop sul Dialogo, proposto con una fiche presentata il 23 ottobre 1997, d’intesa fra il governo svedese e quello egiziano, si svolse a Stoccolma il 23–24 aprile 1998.I partecipanti furono invitati a fornire informazioni su «progetti in corso o redatti» attinenti alla questione (memorandum svedese del 19 febbraio 1998). Il progetto HISTMED fu presentato congiuntamente dai governi italiano e algerino (fra l’altro il vicepresidente della SIHMED era lo storico algerino Moulay Belhamissi). Il Programma EuroMed Sciences Humaines fu approvato dal Comitato euromediterraneo nel maggio 1998 e confermato dai ministri degli Esteri a Palermo nel giugno seguente.9 L’ Etude de préfiguration, concernente sette programmi (HISTMED al primo posto) venne presentato alla Commissione (Gg IB) nell’aprile 1999; nell’agosto 2000 sembrava avesse superato la revisione critica operata nel settore dalla Commissione europea (vd. nota del 2 agosto della DG Relazioni esterne alla Rappresentanza italiana presso l’Unione) ma sopravvenne un ulteriore stallo.10 Sulle valutazioni dei risultati conseguiti dal Partenariato, in particolare nella politica del Dialogo, attraverso la FAL, si può vedere Bono, Un altro Mediterraneo, cit., pp. 166–183 (Fra Partenariato e Politica di vicinato).

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simpatia e apprezzamento crescenti; ci siamo incontrati così molte volte, ad Aix en-Provence, a Barcellona, a L’Aja, altrove, nonché nei Forum civili euro-mediterranei di Napoli (1997) e di Marsiglia (2000).

L’interesse per un altro paese mediterraneo, la Libia – a me caro poiché vi sono nato e in esso era radicato dal XIX secolo il ramo materno, maltese e siciliano, della mia famiglia – mi ha fatto incontrare Melasuo anche nel quadro del Primo WOCMES (World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies) tenuto presso l’Università di Mainz, dove uno dei numerosi workshop riguardò Modern and Contemporary Libya: Sources and Historiographies11; successivamente Tuomo partecipò attivamente al convegno internazionale – con studiosi di quindici diversi paesi – su “La Libia nella storia del Mediterraneo”; la sua relazione riguardò la Libia e il partenariato euromediterraneo12.

Nell’ambito della partecipazione italiana alla FAL – della quale torneremo a dire più avanti – una riflessione sul progetto HISTMED fu riattivata, tramite la diretta sponsorizzazione del progetto da parte del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, grazie soprattutto al personale convincimento della validità dell’iniziativa da parte dell’ ambasciatore Riccardo Sessa, Direttore generale per il Mediterraneo e il Medio Oriente (ora ambasciatore d’Italia a Pechino), coadiuvato dal consigliere Elio d’Auria (ora ambasciatore in Arabia saudita). Nel ristretto gruppo di studiosi, riunitisi a Roma nell’ottobre 2005 per delineare un primo tracciato del percorso da seguire, vi fu naturalmente Tuomo Melasuo, che portava la sua esperienza e la sua rete personale di contatti in campo politico-culturale nel quadro mediterraneo contemporaneo. Seguì in dicembre a Roma una presentazione alla stampa e al pubblico del progetto HistMed. Le successive difficoltà del bilancio statale italiano e i drastici tagli ai capitoli di spesa dei diversi ministeri, così quello degli Affari Esteri, fermarono il corso del progetto nelle sue forme organizzative e nelle espressioni pubbliche più impegnative. Gli studiosi però continuarono la loro riflessione in diverse occasioni di confronto e di dibattito13.

11 Il workshop, svoltosi il 12 settembre 2003, venne organizzato nel quadro di un programma italo-libico di ricerca storica, concordato fra i governi dei due paesi nell’ambito di una intesa siglata nel giugno 1998 e poi svoltosi fra il 2000 e il 2005. Gli atti del workshop sono stati editi a cura dell’IsIAO e del Libyan Studies Centre, responsabili del programma: Modern and Contemporary Libya: Sources and Historiographies, a cura di A. Baldinetti, Roma, ISIAO, 2003.12 Il convegno si svolse a Roma, nella sede dell’Isiao dal 10 al 12 maggio 2003, gli atti del convegno sono apparsi come numero speciale, a cura di S. Bono e H. Sury, della rivista «Africa», LXIII, 2008, no. 2.13 Chi scrive – responsabile scientifico del progetto HistMed – nel recente volume

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L’auspicato sviluppo di una rinnovata storiografia mediterranea dovrà tener conto con la maggior apertura e simpatia possibile di come ogni diverso attore del processo storico abbia vissuto ed abbia conservato memoria di determinate vicende storiche. Nell’affrontare fenomeni, periodi ed episodi storici occasione di confronto e di scontro fra due o più parti, si impiegheranno ancor più cautela e sforzo di comprensione. Nella varietà e complessità della storia del Mediterraneo tutto ciò ricorre con accentuata frequenza. Nell’impegno di una ricostruzione storica volta a promuovere rapporti pacifici di collaborazione, la narrazione equilibrerà opportunamente vicende e aspetti di contrasto e di ostilità con modi e tempi invece di convivenza, di contatti, di scambi. All’interno inoltre di uno stesso fronte, per così dire – l’europeo-cristiano e quello islamico sono i due solitamente richiamati – si potranno mostrare varietà di posizioni e di atteggiamenti, persino connivenze e complicità fra una parte e l’altra. Apparirà dunque sempre più discutibile la visione manichea di mondi compatti e irriducibili nell’ostilità e nel conflitto.

Torniamo alla FAL e ai suoi primi difficili anni di vita14. Nel Comitato consultivo, che affiancava il direttore generale nella struttura della nuova istituzione, così come delineata dallo Statuto, alcuni specialisti del mondo mediterraneo si ritrovarono insieme nel Comitato consultivo; fra di loro Melasuo e Bono15. Il Comitato in alcune rapide riunioni fu invitato a dare valutazioni relative a singole iniziative e il previsto obbligatorio parere sul bilancio annuale della FAL; non gli fu invece offerta la possibilità di suggerire al direttore prospettive e orientamenti di azione a lungo termine, sulla base di una visione mediterranea discussa e definita attraverso singoli apporti e un dibattito collegiale.

Alcuni membri del Comitato, fra i quali chi scrive, assunsero ben presto consapevolezza del rischio che la FAL, priva di una visione e di una strategia

Un altro Mediterraneo, cit. ha sintetizzato alcuni orientamenti in merito. Si veda in particolare il par. 3 (Per una nuova storia) del cap. VII, pp. 253–272.14 La Fondazione, nata da una delibera del Comitato euromediterraneo, in data 26 ottobre 2004, è stata affidata per la gestione alla Svezia in tandem con l’Egitto; la sede è stata fissata ad Alessandria presso la Biblioteca Alexandrina.15 Il Comitato consultivo era composto da 12 membri, sei provenienti da paesi membri dell’Unione Europea, sei da Paesi partners mediterranei (PPM). Fra gli altri componenti del Comitato vi era Malek Chebel, già membro del Groupe des Sages istituito dalla Commissione europea nel dicembre 2002; i Saggi presentarono un rapporto conclusivo nel quale suggerirono la creazione di una Fondazione ad hoc per il dialogo.

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d’insieme, operasse attraverso singole iniziative pur in sé apprezzabili ma senza raggiungere risultati efficaci e rilevanti; per tutto ciò persero fiducia ed entusiasmo. Altri membri del Comitato, come Melasuo, pur altrettanto consapevoli dei problemi e dei rischi in atto, proseguirono sino all’ultimo la loro partecipazione alle riunioni del Comitato, cercando con impegno di operare per il meglio; ne diamo atto con apprezzamento. Ad un certo punto, nei primi mesi del 2007, le difficoltà della FAL e le crescenti riserve sui risultati effettivi hanno condotto alle dimissioni del direttore Traugott Schoefthaler.

Nella delicata fase successiva, il nuovo direttore, ambasciatore Lucio Guerrato ha risolto molti problemi pendenti e ha studiato rilevanti modifiche alla struttura della FAL in vista di un suo rilancio. Secondo il nuovo statuto al vertice si colloca un presidente prescelto dal Comitato euromediterraneo della Unione Europea; nel marzo 2008 è stato designato André Azoulay, consigliere dei sovrani del Marocco Hasan II e Mohammed VI, e alto esponente della Fondazione delle Tre Culture di Siviglia nonché della Alleanza delle Civiltà; quale nuovo direttore con la stessa procedura è stato nominato il dott. Andreu Claret, spagnolo, già direttore con grande successo dell’Instituto Europeo del Mediterraneo (IEMED), con sede a Barcellona; queste due scelte lasciano bene sperare in un rilancio della Fondazione e del suo altissimo compito16. Nel Consiglio scientifico, composto da 18 membri, secondo le indicazioni del rinnovato statuto della Fondazione, è di nuovo presente Tuomo Melasuo.

Con queste annotazioni, a volte di semplice cronaca, e con le brevi riflessioni su Mediterraneo, storia, dialogo, sono stato lieto di attestare la mia amicizia e stima per Tuomo. Nel concludere vorrei ora aggiungere che la sua presenza fra i fondatori e gli animatori della SIHMED e poi del progetto HISTMED ha avuto ai miei occhi un forte significato: Tuomo dall’estremo nord d’Europa ed io, nato sulle rive libiche, ci siamo incontrati nello studio del Mediterraneo e nella promozione del dialogo fra popoli e civiltà di un vasto mondo che ha come centro ideale il mare Mediterraneo ma si estende molto ampiamente sino alla misura, come ci ha insegnato Braudel, del Mediterraneo della storia; un passo promettente verso la realizzazione di questo più grande Mediterraneo sarà forse intrapreso dalla annunciata Unione Mediterranea.

16 Il nuovo direttore, dott. Andreu Claret, per molti anni attivo come giornalista, ha diretta conoscenza della realtà mediterranea in tutti i suoi aspetti ed una solida esperienza di manager culturale e di comunicatore.


Réflexions sur le processus de Barcelone

1995–2008

Paul Balta

Né à Alexandrie, je précise d’emblée que le Méditerranéen que je suis par mes racines dédie ce texte à Tuomo Melasuo pour le remercier et le féliciter des

initiatives qu’il a prises à l’Université de Tampere parce qu’elles ont notamment favorisé un dialogue inédit et fructueux entre la Baltique et la Méditerranée.

L’acte fondateur de la Méditerranée du XXIè siècle

À mes yeux, la Déclaration de Barcelone est l’acte fondateur de la Méditerranée du XXIè siècle, comme je l’avais dit au Forum culture que j’avais contribué à préparer dans le cadre du premier Forum Civil Euromed organisé à Barcelone du 29 novembre au 1er décembre 1995 par l’Institut Catalan de la Méditerranée, devenu l’IEMED, Institut Européen de la Méditerranée.

La Déclaration a en effet proposé un « partenariat » afin de créer en Méditerranée « une zone de paix, de stabilité, de sécurité – – et de prospérité partagée ». C’est une importante innovation ! La Déclaration comporte trois volets : 1) Partenariat politique et de sécurité : définir un espace de paix et de stabilité ; 2) Partenariat économique et financier : construire une zone de prospérité partagée ; 3) Partenariat dans les domaines social, culturel et humain : développer les ressources humaines, favoriser la compréhension entre les cultures et les échanges entre les sociétés civiles. Elle a été adoptée par les 15 de l’Union européenne1 et les 12 PPM, Pays partenaires méditerranéens2 réunis à Barcelone les 27 et 28 novembre 1995.

1 Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Danemark, Espagne, Finlande, France, Grèce, Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Royaume-Uni, Suède. En 2004 : Chypre et Malte (ex-PPM), Estonie, Hongrie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Pologne, République tchèque, Slovaquie, Slovénie. En 2007 : Bulgarie, Roumanie. 2 Algérie, Chypre, Égypte, Israël, Jordanie, Liban, Malte, Maroc, Autorité palestinienne, Syrie, Tunisie, Turquie. Libye et Mauritanie ont le statut d’observateurs. Avant la signature de la Déclaration, les PPM étaient appelés PTM, Pays tiers méditerranéens.

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Avant d’analyser les principaux aspects du PEM, il me paraît indispensable d’expliquer les innovations du Volet 3 par rapport à sa première version. En effet, le Rapport de synthèse du 10 avril 1995, élaboré par Bruxelles pour servir de base à la future Déclaration de Barcelone, occultait pratiquement la culture. Intitulé simplement, « Partenariat dans le domaine social et humain », il se préoccupait en priorité des migrations, du trafic des stupéfiants, du terrorisme, de la criminalité internationale avant de consacrer un petit paragraphe d’une dizaine de lignes à « Culture et médias ». Quant aux religions, composantes importantes des civilisations et des sociétés méditerranéennes, elles n’étaient même pas mentionnées ! Roland Dubertrand, alors directeur du CAP, Centre d’analyse et de prospective du ministère français des Affaires étrangères, avait organisé une journée de travail, le 23 mai 1995, avec cinq spécialistes de la Méditerranée3 et des diplomates de la Commission de Bruxelles, responsables du projet.

Nombre de critiques et de suggestions avaient été formulées. Pour ma part, j’avais fait observer qu’il n’y avait pas un paragraphe ou même une ligne pour rappeler que, depuis 10 000 ans et malgré les guerres, le flambeau de la civilisation n’avait cessé de circuler d’une rive à l’autre. En outre, c’est la Méditerranée qui a inventé la notion de société civile, dès l’Antiquité, même si elle ne portait pas ce nom avant l’expression latine societa civilis. Elle concernait la façon dont la société s’organisait face à l’État et à son chef. Ainsi, les communautés avaient-elles leurs règles de solidarité s’ajoutant à celles liant les membres de la famille, du clan et de la tribu et aussi des réseaux de villes, de couvents, de confréries, de marchands.

Les diplomates présents ont tenu compte des critiques et des suggestions comme le prouve l’intitulé final du Volet 3 et son contenu, cités plus haut. Il souligne aussi la « contribution essentielle » qu’elle peut apporter « dans le processus de développement du PEM ». Les actes du premier Forum civil euro-méditerranéen en sont une excellente illustration4.

La Déclaration de Barcelone avait suscité d’immenses espoirs, surtout sur les rives Sud et Est, et amorcé de nombreuses initiatives souvent financées par l’Union Européenne. Les lourdeurs bureaucratiques de la Commission de Bruxelles, l’élaboration de l’Euro et sa mise en place définitive le 1er janvier 2002, puis la préparation de l’élargissement à 25 et sa réalisation en 2004,

3 Michel Chatelus, Thierry Fabre, Xavier Gizard, Mohamed Sid Ahmed et moi-même.4 Forum civil euromed 1995. Les actes ont été traduits en six langues : anglais, arabe, catalan, espagnol, français, italien.

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ont malheureusement contribué à reléguer la Méditerranée et le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen au second plan.

Certains PPM ont aussi leur part de responsabilité. Exemple: Barcelone 1 avait décidé que les Conférences des ministres des Affaires étrangères du PEM auraient lieu tous les deux ans, alternativement au Nord et au Sud. Rabat s’étant désisté en faveur de Tunis, Barcelone 2 devait s’y tenir en 1997, mais la Syrie avait alors opposé son veto en refusant que les Arabes s’assoient à côté des Israéliens sur une terre arabe. Elle s’est donc tenue à Malte.

Il en fut de même pour le Forum Civil Euro-med qui suit ou précède la conférence ministérielle. On peut d’autant plus le regretter que, tant chez les Israéliens que chez les Palestiniens, des ONG et des associations luttent courageusement pour le dialogue et la paix. Le résultat c’est que le PEM n’est guère connu des opinions publiques des PPM. Un des objectifs de Barcelone 10 aurait dû être d’appliquer ce principe de l’alternance ; ce ne fut pas le cas. Je souligne quand même que le Partenariat est la seule instance méditerranéenne qui réunit autour d’une même table Israéliens et Palestiniens, même s’il arrive aux uns ou aux autres de la bouder. Retards et déceptions ne doivent cependant pas masquer les acquis.

Pour le Volet 1, « Politique et sécurité », le PEM, n’a certes pas ramené la paix dans le bassin, mais, alors que la plupart des PPM ont des régimes autoritaires, voire dictatoriaux, on assiste à une timide démocratisation, à un rôle croissant des femmes et de la société civile dans plusieurs pays, à une coopération entre le Nord et le Sud dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et Al Qaida.

Innovation importante : l’Assemblée parlementaire euro-méditerranéenne, l’APEM, qui a tenu sa session inaugurale le 22 mars 2004 à Athènes. Elle est composée de 240 membres : d’une part, 120 Européens dont 75 parlementaires nationaux et 45 du Parlement européen, d’autre part, 120 des PPM. L’APEM, assure notamment le suivi des accords d’association dans le cadre du Partenariat, favorise le dialogue et une meilleure connaissance réciproque.

Pour le Volet 2, « Économique et financier », on est très loin de l’objectif fixé : la prospérité partagée. L’apport de l’UE devait être très important. Le programme MEDA, principal instrument de coopération financière, avait pour objectif de faciliter la mise à niveau des économies des PPM et accélérer la privatisation des entreprises nationalisées, souvent déficitaires. Il a consacré une enveloppe de 3,4 millions d’euros pour la période 1995–1999 et de 5,3 millions pour 2000–2006. Les PPM avaient cependant fait observer, en 1996, que la somme attribuée aux Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale était trois fois

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plus importante par habitant. À quoi Bruxelles avait rétorqué qu’il convenait d’ajouter les prêts de la BEI, la Banque européenne d’investissement, qui a engagé 4,8 M d’euro pour 1995–1999 et 6,4 millions pour 2000–2007. Pourtant un constat s’impose : les fonds MEDA n’ont été déboursés qu’à hauteur de 26% ! Une formule lapidaire de Jean-Yves Moisseron, alors directeur de l’IRD, l’Institut Recherche et Développement (ex-ORSTOM), au Caire, résume la situation « Les fonds MEDA I : 1/4 de réalité, 3/4 de virtualité ». C’est la conséquence d’une réglementation trop complexe et des lourdeurs de la bureaucratie de la Commission de Bruxelles. La zone de libre-échange demeure un objectif, mais ne semble ni réalisable, ni souhaitable pour certains, à l’horizon 2010.

Pour le Volet 3, « Social, culturel et humain », les résultats sont complexes. Alors qu’elle est essentielle, la culture a été longtemps le « parent pauvre »5. En outre, à chacun des Forums Civils Euromed, les participants demandaient que les représentants de la société civile (associations, ONG, universités, etc.) soient considérés comme des interlocuteurs de la Commission européenne. Finalement, il a fallu attendre la Conférence ministérielle de 2005, à Luxembourg, pour que la Plateforme Non-gouvernementale Euromed, formée de nombreux réseaux méditerranéens du Nord et du Sud, devienne l’interlocuteur qui sera consulté et informé régulièrement. Grâce à lui, le premier Forum civil du Sud s’est tenu au Maroc, à Marrakech, du 4 au 7 novembre 2006. Le prochain est prévu à Marseille du 31 octobre au 2 novembre 2008, alors que la France présidera l’Union européenne.

Plusieurs programmes importants ont été lancés dans la cadre du Volet 3 : Euromed Héritage, Euromed Audiovisuel, Euromed Jeunesse et Eumedis qui signifie « Développer la société de l’information dans la région méditerranéenne ». Toutefois, ils ont un caractère trop institutionnel. Le PEM a également favorisé la réalisation de nombre de projets de la société civile. Citons notamment le CICM, le Conservatoire international des cuisines méditerranéennes, créé à Marseille en 1998. Son riche site6, mérite d’être consulté car il permet de comprendre combien il est utile, comme je l’explique dans un de mes livres7. N’oublions pas, en effet, que très pauvre à l’origine, la Méditerranée est devenue, dès l’Antiquité le principal berceau de la gastronomie et de l’art de vivre. La mondialisation a porté atteinte à ce patrimoine. Le CICM contribue à le sauvegarder.

5 Balta 2000.6 http://cuisinesmed.lafriche.org.7 Balta 2004.

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Dernière initiative : la création de la Fondation Euro-Méditerranéenne Anna Lindh pour le Dialogue entre les Cultures, la FAL, qui comble un vide, en particulier en direction des jeunes. Son siège a été inauguré en 2005 à Alexandrie, ce dont on ne peut que se féliciter. Sans doublonner avec les programmes que j’ai cités, elle a notamment pour objectif de définir, développer et promouvoir des zones de convergence culturelle entre les jeunes de la Méditerranée tout en combattant les stéréotypes.

Barcelone 10 : bilan et perspectives

Le Sommet du dixième anniversaire du PEM s’est tenu à Barcelone, les 27 et 28 novembre 2005, dans un contexte régional et international difficile : processus de paix israélo-palestinien bloqué, montée de l’islamisme, attentats terroristes, forte immigration clandestine en Europe, retombées négatives de l’intervention américaine en Irak depuis 2003. Ses résultats sont mitigés. Pour les uns c’est un échec, pour d’autres, un demi succès. Qu’en est-il ?

Ce sommet était co-organisé par l’Espagne, pays hôte, et la Grande-Bretagne, présidente en exercice de l’UE, dont 22 chefs d’État ou de gouvernement sur 25 étaient présents. En revanche, les chefs d’État turc et arabes étaient absents, à l’exception du Palestinien Abou Mazen. Ils ont ainsi boudé la rencontre pour manifester leur déception quant aux résultats du PEM. Ils se sont fait représenter par leurs Premiers ministres ou leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères. Sur le fond, les États et la société civile espéraient une relance spectaculaire pour donner plus d’efficacité et une meilleure visibilité au PEM. Cela n’a pas été le cas. Les tensions entre Israéliens et Arabes ont bloqué l’adoption d’une déclaration commune. C’est le discours du président Tony Blair qui a fait la synthèse des travaux et des décisions prises.

Les participants ont réaffirmé fortement les principes et les objectifs de la Déclaration de Barcelone. Toutefois, l’élargissement de l’UE de 15 à 25 a rendu la situation plus complexe à gérer. À son initiative, le Sommet a entériné la Politique européenne de voisinage, PEV, conçue prioritairement pour les pays de l’Est et fondée sur la coopération bilatérale, alors que le PEM l’est sur la coopération multilatérale. En 2007, l’Instrument européen de Partenariat et de Voisinage a remplacé les fonds MEDA. Le sommet a adopté un plan d’action prioritaire et sécuritaire : « Code de conduite euro-méditerranéen de lutte contre le terrorisme » et un Volet 4, « Justice, sécurité et migrations », qui se veut novateur sur les flux migratoires. De même, il a défini un programme quinquennal ambitieux pour les trois Volets. Néanmoins, on craignait qu’en raison des ambiguïtés de ce Sommet, le PEM soit en péril. La

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réalisation de l’ensemble euro-méditerranéen exigera un renforcement de l’UE et sans doute beaucoup de temps. La Déclaration de Barcelone demeure certes l’acte fondateur de la Méditerranée du XXIè siècle, mais pour le réaliser concrètement il faut qu’existent les volontés politiques de la respecter et de se donner les moyens de la mettre en œuvre.

C’est dans ce contexte que le président Nicolas Sarkozy a lancé, dans un discours prononcé à Toulon le 17 février 2007, l’idée d’Union méditerranéenne puis l’a confirmée à Tanger le 20 octobre. Elle est devenue depuis l’UPM, l’Union pour la Méditerranée. En avril 2008, l’ambassadeur Alain Le Roy, principal responsable du projet a apporté les précisions suivantes concernant le PEM et l’UPM :

« Nous allons prendre « Barcelone » pour le transformer puis le développer en changeant les méthodes de gouvernance. Tout le monde disait que « Barcelone » était un partenariat déséquilibré. Les pays du Sud avaient le sentiment que l’Europe est trop forte avec 27 pays membres qui imposaient ses conditions. Cette transformation va se faire avec une coprésidence paritaire, de nouvelles méthodes de gouvernance, la création d’un secrétariat indépendant des instances européennes, avec deux codirecteurs, un pour le Nord et un autre pour le Sud. »

Il a précisé aussi que lors du sommet des chefs d’État le 13 juillet, à Paris, une déclaration pérennisant l’Union pour la Méditerranée doit être signée.

Dans mon exposé, j’ai exprimé des voeux et des critiques, mais le « méditerranéiste » que je suis par vocation reste malgré tout optimiste. « Méditerranéiste », est un néologisme que j’ai forgé, à partir du catalan et de l’espagnol, pour désigner les spécialistes de la Méditerranée, et aussi les militants, en espérant qu’il figurera enfin dans les dictionnaires français, à l’instar d’africaniste et d’américaniste.

En conclusion, je voudrais formuler, une fois de plus, un voeu qui m’est cher : qu’Ulysse et Sindbad, les deux grands marins qui parlent à nos imaginaires apprennent enfin à naviguer ensemble afin que mare nostrum devienne un jour mater nostra8. Ce voeu a commencé à être exaucé grâce au Processus de Barcelone qui les a réunis sur le même bateau. Mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour qu’ils naviguent vraiment ensemble afin que la Méditerranée devienne un lac de paix et de prospérité partagée. Face à la mondialisation et à la théorie du « choc des civilisations » de Samuel Huntington, qui est aussi

8 Balta 1992.

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celle de Ben Laden, il importe d’opposer et de faire prévaloir la philosophie du dialogue des civilisations et des cultures, qui a généralement prévalu en Méditerranée. Il faut donc qu’elle devienne le berceau de l’avenir9 d’une Méditerranée réconciliée avec elle-même et à nouveau novatrice.

Références

Balta, Paul (sous la direction de) (1992) : La Méditerranée réinventée. Réalités et espoirs de la coopération. Paris : La Découverte, Fondation René Seydoux pour le monde méditerranéen, Paris.

Balta, Paul (2000) : Méditerranée, défis et enjeux. Paris : L’Harmattan.

Balta, Paul (2004) : Boire et manger en Méditerranée. Arles : Actes Sud, Collection L’Orient gourmand.

Balta, Paul & Claudine Rulleau (2006) : La Méditerranée, berceau de l’avenir. Toulouse : Les Essentiels Milan.

Forum Civil Euromed 1996 (1996) : Vers un nouveau scénario de partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Barcelone : Institut Català de la Mediterrània.

9 Balta & Rulleau 2006.


Les deux rives de la Méditerranée :

toujours les mêmes asymétries

Ahmed Driss

Tout d’abord, qu’entendons nous par « asymétrie »? Aucun de nous n’ignore que le terme désigne la différence, contrairement à la symétrie qui signifie la parfaite concordance, « l’harmonie résultant de la disposition régulière, équilibrée des éléments d’un même ensemble ».

Appliquer ce terme à la situation des deux rives de la Méditerranée, signifie que celle-ci ne serait pas un ensemble harmonieux, qu’il n’y a aucune concordance entre ses riverains et que ses éléments constitutifs ne peuvent avoir de disposition équilibrée. Les deux rives sont donc asymétriques, différents, l’ensemble est souvent qualifié d’hétérogène.

Plusieurs aspects montrent cette asymétrie dans son sens le plus large et j’essayerai dans cette introduction, et avant d’entamer l’aspect institutionnel, d’en faire l’état et de rappeler quelques propositions tendant à atténuer leur gravité.

L’aspect le plus important reste sans doute l’aspect économique. Plusieurs auteurs ont déjà montré que durant les trois décennies qui viennent de s’écouler, l’écart entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée n’a cessé de s’aggraver, à la fois quant au poids de chacune des deux rives par rapport à l’économie internationale que du poids de l’une par rapport à l’autre. Cette asymétrie ne peut rester sans conséquences fâcheuses sur l’équilibre de la région et de sa sécurité. Le nombre des « candidats tentés par une immigration malheureuse » vers les pays du Nord de la Méditerranée ne cesse d’augmenter, immigration qui est considérer comme une source majeure d’insécurité en Europe, d’autant plus que le thème est en train de provoquer des remous sinon des bouleversements politiques importants avec la montée de l’extrême droite et l’accroissement de son électorat. La solution, selon un bon nombre d’experts, serait de créer de l’emploi sur la rive Sud; autrement dit, en y investissant et en y soutenant le développement. Il serait opportun à cet égard de travailler sur les moyens qui peuvent convaincre les décideurs à opter pour cette solution plutôt que de se renfermer derrière un mur qu’on croit étanche mais qui pourrait souffrir d’infiltrations.

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Un autre aspect, qui n’est pas moins important, et qui est étroitement lié au premier, c’est l’aspect social et culturel. L’analphabétisme, dont souffre la société Sud méditerranéenne, fait des populations de cette rive, des populations très vulnérables, à la fois très ambivalentes, facilement influençables, donc très instables et imprévisibles ainsi que très partagées entre un discours traditionaliste et un discours moderniste, avec parfois une nette sensibilité pour le premier. Il serait bénéfique dans ce cadre de se pencher sur ces discours traditionalistes et de voir jusqu’à quel point contribuent-ils à ancrer l’hétérogénéité entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée.

Un troisième aspect, c’est celui qui se rattache au cadre politico-juridique; à cet égard et depuis que le terme gouvernance a fait son apparition dans les rapports et les analyses, les pays de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée se sont distingués par leur manière d’appliquer ce processus et qui est loin d’être la bonne, absence de transparence dans la gestion des affaires publiques, absence de responsabilité, dépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, médias à la solde du pouvoir ou marginalisés, absence de démocratie et de la primauté du droit, les textes les plus progressistes ne font pourtant pas défaut, mais qui restent souvent sans application.

Cette situation ne peut avoir que des effets pervers et elle ne peut créer que du malaise chez les populations des pays concernés. Ceci n’est pas sans danger, bien que pour certains, ce malaise ne concerne que quelques esprits éclairés et que chez la masse c’est généralement le règne de l’indifférence. L’absence d’espaces libres d’expression, l’absence de soupapes de sécurité que peuvent former les ONG et toutes les organisations de la société civile, l’absence de structures qui soient à l’écoute de ces populations ne peut que générer des situations explosives susceptibles de favoriser l’instabilité de toute la région. D’où l’urgence de se pencher sur la question de savoir comment favoriser et renforcer l’action et le rôle de cette société civile dans les pays de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée, à la fois en tant qu’élément de stabilité interne en agissant comme catalyseur ou comme « canalisateur » et aussi en tant qu’élément d’homogénéisation et de concordance dans toute la région méditerranéenne. L’absence de pratique démocratique au niveau de la gestion de la chose publique pourrait être partiellement compensée par l’action d’une société civile qui disposerait des moyens nécessaires à son émancipation.

Un autre aspect qui mérite d’être évoqué, celui qui se rattache à l’environnement de paix et de stabilité dans lequel devrait vivre tous les riverains de la Méditerranée; un environnement qui est malheureusement

167Les deux rives de la Méditerranée


loin d’être assuré et il se trouve que c’est la rive Sud qui est inéluctablement un espace de conflit. Le conflit au Moyen-Orient, bien qu’il ne soit pas le seul conflit dans la région, reste la plus grande source de violence, mais aussi de discorde, à la fois au niveau des pays de la rive Sud qu’au niveau de tous les riverains partenaires. La définition de la nature des violences reste parmi les points les plus controversée, violence justifiée pour les uns, injustifiée et condamnable pour les autres. D’où la nécessité de travailler sur la recherche d’un terrain d’entente afin de redonner la chance à un véritable dialogue; car il est toujours bénéfique d’approfondir la recherche de part et d’autre, sur les perceptions relatives à certaines définitions susceptibles de soulever des controverses.

Dans un souci de changer cette situation qui prévaut en Méditerranée, les riverains ont décidé de s’inscrire dans un processus ambitieux afin de faire de cette mer un bassin « de dialogue, d’échanges et de coopération qui garantissent la paix, la stabilité et une prospérité partagée » tel que cela a été traduit dans les termes de la Déclaration de Barcelone, adoptée en novembre 1995.

Toutefois, après plus d’une décennie de l’adoption de la Déclaration qui donna naissance à ce processus global, le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen n’a pas pu atteindre tous ses objectifs, souffrant d’un certain nombre de problèmes, dont une forme d’asymétrie qui n’a pas été évoqué plus haut; une asymétrie institutionnelle qui touche surtout le Sud, incapable d’assurer son intégration.

Un Sud désintégré

Aucun doute que face aux pays du sud de la Méditerranée, s’est érigée une Europe fortement unie et institutionnalisée, issue d’un processus d’intégration commencé il y’a presque une cinquantaine d’année et qui n’est pas encore achevé. L’Europe, en effet, connaîtra encore plus d’institution qui la rendra encore plus forte et unie.

Les pays de la rive sud n’ont pas pu, quant à eux et malgré plusieurs tentatives, achever les processus d’intégration qu’ils ont essayé de mettre en place. Toutes les expériences d’intégration ou même de coopération régionale ou sous-régionale ont connues plus ou moins l’échec.

Au niveau sous-régional l’expérience qui à souffert le plus de l’échec reste assurément l’expérience maghrébine, bien que l’idée d’un Maghreb uni est une idée dont les origines remontent aux toutes premières années de l’indépendance des trois pays du Maghreb central, puisque c’est en 1957

168 Ahmed Driss


que les représentants des formations politiques dominantes à cette époque dans la région, ont proclamé leur intention de construire un Grand Maghreb uni, par la mise en œuvre dans le cadre d’une approche globale, d’un grand projet de coopération inter-maghrébine.

Le grand projet n’a en fait jamais abouti. Entre le début des années soixante et jusqu’à 1989, date de la création de l’Union Maghreb Arabe, l’UMA, les tentatives n’ont pas manqué, la plus sérieuse c’est celle de 1964 lorsque les dirigeants des pays du Maghreb ont décidé de commencer par une coopération économique et ont créé le Comité permanent Consultatif du Maghreb, expérience qui n’a pas pu résister après la défection de la Libye trop préoccupée à cette époque par ses projets d’unité arabe.

La politique des axes qui a commencé juste après cette expérience, une série de propositions et de traités d’union bipartite ou parfois tri-partite1, n’a fait que confirmer les désaccords, les malentendus et les conflits entre les voisins maghrébins et n’a jamais constitué une base sérieuse pour la construction d’une union plus globale.

Décidant de mettre entre parenthèses les problèmes qui les séparent, les chefs d’Etat maghrébins créent en 1989 l’UMA, une structure qui couvre la totalité du Maghreb, avec des mécanismes et des institutions communes très ambitieuses pour une démarche d’intégration.

Presque douze ans après, on en est toujours au point mort, la vitesse n’a jamais été enclenchée. Les projets et les recommandations, présentés les premières années, sont restés sans suite, et depuis décembre 1995, les instances de l’union ne fonctionnent plus, ses institutions sont gelées à la demande du Maroc mécontent de l’attitude algérienne sur le Sahara.

Le problème le plus crucial que les fondateurs de l’UMA ont voulu mettre à l’écart continu à envenimer les relations inter-maghrébines. Aucun Conseil de la Présidence ne s’est réuni depuis le Sommet de Tunis de 1994, les Sommets qui ont été prévu par la suite ont tous été « reportés ».

Sachant, d’après les termes du Traité de Marrakech, que le Conseil de la Présidence est le seul organe décisionnel dans le cadre de l’UMA, sachant aussi que les décisions de ce Conseil ne peuvent être adoptées qu’à l’unanimité, les

1 La proposition algérienne d’union avec la Tunisie, en 1973; la proposition libyenne d’union avec le même pays, en 1974; l’accord de Hassi-Messaoud entre l’Algérie et la Libye, en 1975; le traité de fraternité et de concorde de 1983 entre la Tunisie, l’Algérie et rejoint par la Mauritanie; l’Union Arabo-Africaine de 1984 entre le Maroc et la Libye.



défections répétées d’un ou plusieurs Chefs d’Etat ou le report des Sommets prévus, ne peuvent avoir que des répercussions graves et négatives sur le fonctionnement de toutes les instances de l’Union ainsi que sur l’Union elle-même.

L’UMA a souffert dés sa création d’un handicap de base, celui de vouloir faire de cette structure, une « Organisation internationale » sans objectifs propres, dotée d’un Secrétariat Général qui n’intervient que dans la gestion administrative et d’institutions excessivement politisées, dont on n’a pas pris en considération lors de leur mise en place, les différences des régimes politiques, trop peu compatible pour former un ensemble homogène, ni même les différences des politiques économiques, sociales et aussi sécuritaires, caractérisées par l’absence d’une vision communautaire commune.

Au niveau régional, l’expérience des pays arabes reste aussi très décevante. Ceux-ci ayant plus ou moins définitivement écarté les projets d’unification globale à caractère politique, ont opté pour des projets de coopération économique et ils ont visé trop grand puisque dés 1964 ils ont créé le Conseil de l’unité économique arabe et le marché commun arabe. L’objectif était la réalisation progressive de l’unification économique complète entre les pays arabes et assurant la libre circulation des personnes et des biens en considérant l’ensemble du territoire arabe comme un territoire douanier unifié; les contractants ont convenu d’harmoniser leur politiques économiques et de coordonner les législations fiscales, financières et monétaires. Les résultas se sont avérées cependant loin d’atteindre les espérances. Un indice peu à lui seul démontrer l’échec : depuis 1980, le commerce inter-arabe ne dépasse pas un milliard de dollars, ce qui constitue un rapport insignifiant de l’ensemble du commerce extérieur de ces pays.

Plusieurs éléments peuvent expliquer cet échec, les causes sont en effet multiples. Elles tiennent en premier lieu à des facteurs politiques et aux nombreux conflits qui opposent les régimes en place et dont la solution constitue une condition indispensable à la mise en place de tout processus d’intégration que l’on veut viable. Il est certainement illusoire d’envisager la création d’institutions économiques commune tant que persisteront les conflits qui divisent les pays arabes.

En deuxième lieu, les causes tiennent à des facteurs économiques et sociaux. Un projet d’intégration économique trop ambitieux, qui ne prend pas en considération les réalités nationales, produit des effets de distorsion très graves dans des économies déjà malades de nationalisme,

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de protectionnisme, de développement sectoriel inégal, de faiblesse de la capacité d’épargne et d’investissement et de déséquilibre démographique et qui les rendent incapable de s’adapter rapidement à la logique de l’intégration économique.

Tirant les conclusions de cet état des choses, certains pays arabes, profitant d’une certaine homogénéité tant politique qu’économique ont créé un ensemble sous-régional qui est le Conseil de Coopération des pays du Golfe. Mais bien évidement il n’y a pas lieu de s’arrêter ici sur ce model d’intégration qui a tendance à bien fonctionner et qui pourrait servir d’exemple à d’autres expériences.

Il faut noter en outre que le lancement du Processus de Barcelone a été l’occasion pour les pays arabes de s’engager de nouveau sur la voie de la coopération économique, prenant conscience de l’importance d’une démarche commune, nécessaire pour faire face aux exigences du marché gigantesque d’une Europe unie ayant pour seul devise le libre échangisme.

Dés 1995, lors de la session du Conseil Economique et Social de la Ligue des Etats arabes, ces derniers décident de réactiver un accord de 1981 sur le marché inter-arabe, pour relancer une coopération basée sur la compétitivité et la complémentarité. L’accord qui est entré en vigueur en janvier 1998 prévoit un régime de libre échange entre les contractants, qui soit à la fois ouvert sur le marché commun.

Or, il se trouve que les clauses concernant l’unification des tarifs douaniers restèrent lettre morte et tout le système de libre échange inter-arabe s’est trouvé largement inopérant par un jeu de dispositions unilatérales, chaque pays s’est vu réduire de son côté la gamme des produits échangés.

Certains pays arabo-méditerranéens ont cru bon s’engager dans un processus de partenariat Sud–Sud, pensant qu’en dépit de la faiblesse des échanges intra-régionaux au sein de la zone arabe, il existe bien un potentiel de régionalisation. Quatre pays bien engagés dans le processus euro-méditerranéen (Tunisie, Maroc, Egypte et Jordanie) ont décidé à Agadir le 8 mai 2001 de mettre les jalons de la Zone de Libre-échange entre les pays arabes méditerranéens (ZLEA).

Cette initiative qui « va dans le droit fil » du Processus de Barcelone, dont l’un des objectifs est de favorisé un partenariat Sud–Sud a soulever l’enthousiasme de plus d’un responsable européen mais moins d’optimisme chez quelques experts notamment arabes, qui voient que malgré la proximité géographique, linguistique et culturelle, les conditions politiques



et réglementaires ne sont pas, dans l’état ou ils sont, favorables à un tel processus, et que le potentiel d’intégration régional reste encore très limité, en raison du niveau insuffisant de développement des pays arabes méditerranées et du caractère similaire de certaines économies qui forme un obstacle devant la réalisation d’un niveau d’échange plus élevé.

A partir de ce constat, il est donc évident que durant les cinquante dernières années, au Sud et à l’Est de la Méditerranée on a toujours cherché à prendre des initiatives visant l’unification ou l’intégration, parfois politique et d’autres fois seulement économique. Mais à chaque fois la mise en œuvre de ces initiatives se trouve bloquée pour les raisons déjà citées.

Il est à l’évidence aussi que le processus de partenariat euro-méditerranéen cherche à favoriser un régime d’intégration entre les pays du Sud eux-mêmes; reste que cette volonté n’est pas soutenue par des instruments juridiques capable d’imposer ce choix. L’instrument fondamental sur lequel se base ce processus reste, faut-il le rappeler, l’Accord d’association que l’Union européenne contracte d’une manière bilatérale avec chaque partenaire du Sud, d’une manière qui ne permet aucune inter-connexion entre les contractants sud-méditerranéens, c’est un peu comme les rayons d’un cercle, qui convergent tous vers le centre, qui se croisent peut-être mais sans jamais se mêler. Il est vrai que ces accords d’association font référence à la coopération régionale, tel est le cas des accords conclus avec la Tunisie, le Maroc et récemment l’Algérie, dans lesquels le Maghreb est expressément mentionné. Mais ceci est-il pour autant suffisant pour assurer une mise en œuvre réelle de l’intégration Sud–Sud?

Un Sud incapable d’accéder à un statut d’égalité

Comme il est évident de l’indiquer, le partenariat suppose l’existence de partenaires, assimilés à des associés qui ont décidé de mettre en concert leurs efforts afin d’atteindre un but. Or, comme dans toute société ce sont toujours les sociétaires qui détiennent la majorité des parts qui déterminent aux autres les conduites à suivre.

Dans le cadre du partenariat, les partenaires sont d’une part des pays développés et riches et de l’autre des pays en développement et parfois pauvres. Les pays riches se sont trop longtemps considéres comme des pays donateurs en terme d’aide économique. Ce sont eux qui déterminent le flux des échanges entre eux et les autres et ce sont eux qui posent les conditions relatives à cet échange.

172 Ahmed Driss


En effet, pour s’engager dans un partenariat essentiellement économique, malgré la volonté de le rendre global, l’Europe conditionne cet engagement par des considérations autres qu’économiques. L’Europe se dresse en défenseur du model de la Démocratie occidentale et exige de ses partenaires ou les incite à asseoir un régime démocratique basé sur le respect des droits de l’homme et la garantie des libertés fondamentales, comme de sa coopération.

Cette exigence a été transposée dans le cadre des Accords de partenariat euro-méditerranéen, appelée par certains la clause démocratique, elle est jugée tellement importante pour qu’elle soit inscrite à l’article 2 de ces Accords dans lequel on peu lire que « les relations entre les parties, de même que toutes les dispositions du présent accord se fondent sur le respect des principes démocratiques et des droits de l’Homme qui inspirent leurs politiques internes et internationales et qui constituent un élément essentiel de l’accord. » Cet article traduit donc parfaitement la politique européenne en matière de partenariat qui fait de l’adoption d’un régime démocratique « la condition » pour engager sa coopération « afin de créer une cohérence entre la démocratie, l’Etat de droit et l’économie de marché ». Certains trouvent que ce principe s’insère convenablement dans la logique du Partenariat qui transforme une structure d’affrontement en une structure de co-responsabilité qui justifie un certain droit de regard entre les partenaires.

Cependant, en dépit de l’aspect technique de la conditionnalité et de ses finalités théoriques, il serait vain de nier que la politique européenne en la matière est assez ambiguë pour ne pas en douter de la sincérité de la démarche. Souvent un double langage est remarqué vis-à-vis des agissements des gouvernements du Sud en matière de démocratie et des droits de l’homme, favorisant parfois la stabilité qui est plus productive qu’un changement incertain.

D’autre part les partenaires arabes méditerranéens souffrent d’un déséquilibre en faveur d’Israël qui concerne toute la structure de coopération issue de l’Accord d’Association de 1995, suite auquel Israël acquière désormais le statut de partenaire privilégié, aussi bien en matière économique, qu’en matière scientifique et technologique; les dispositions relatives à ces matières sont sensiblement différentes de celles qui sont incluses dans les Accords avec les autres partenaires. Comme le note le Professeur Bichara Khader2, il n’y a aucun doute qu’Israël est un partenaire particulièrement utile pour l’Union européenne, pour qui il représente près du 1/5 du total des échanges

2 L’article de Bichara Khader dans Etudes Internationales, No. 61, 116.



avec l’ensemble des douze partenaires; mais que cela ne saurai justifier, sur le plan éthique, l’octroi à celui-ci d’un statut particulier alors qu’il continu à dénier au peuple palestinien ses droits politiques et territoriaux.

Beaucoup de chemin reste donc à faire avant que le partenariat euro-méditerranéen puisse résorber les asymétries qui existent en son sein; mais le Partenariat tel que défini dans la Déclaration de Barcelone est bien une œuvre de construction d’un espace commun de paix, de stabilité et de prospérité. Les moyens prévus à cet égard prouvent que la logique suivie est une logique d’intégration, peut-être pas au sens stricte du terme, une logique dont la base est une approche globale pour la région et qui nécessite, à cet effet, un grand effort d’harmonisation des législations applicable de part et d’autre de la Méditerranée.

Cette entreprise implique nécessairement un changement de nature dans les relations entre les Etats membres. Un changement qui semble aujourd’hui se dessiner dans le cadre de la nouvelle approche introduite dans le processus de Barcelone par le projet « Union pour la Méditerranée » Un changement dans lequel l’égalité et la souveraineté des Etats reste respectée mais qui permet aussi la mise en place d’une institution commune qui disposerait de suffisamment de pouvoir qui lui permettrait de jouer le rôle du moteur de l’intégration. Une institution à caractère politico-technique, capable de balancer efficacement les problèmes politiques sans les ignorés, qui aurai une vue d’ensemble des intérêts de la région et pourrait ainsi remplir une fonction dynamique dans la négociation en dégageant avec objectivité et impartialité le dénominateur commun entre les intérêts nationaux et l’intérêt régional.

Les sud-méditerranéens sauront-ils intégrer la logique de l’œuvre, accepter ses règles, dépasser leur immobilisme et sortir de l’inefficacité?

L’Europe saura-t-elle trouver la volonté ou le courage de faire des concessions sur son leadership, d’être moins dirigiste et d’accepter plus que de simples retouches institutionnelles insignifiantes?

C’est en trouvant les bonnes réponses à ces questions que les partenaires pourront aller de l’avant et résoudre les problèmes d’asymétries institutionnelles qui entravent le Processus.


Les enjeux méditerranéens

de la crise européenne

Jean-Robert Henry

A l’occasion de la présidence finlandaise de l’Europe au deuxième semestre 2006, Tuomo Melasuo a été étroitement associé par son gouvernement à la gestion du volet méditerranéen de cette présidence. Beaucoup d’observateurs ont constaté qu’il s’agit d’un domaine où les choses avaient progressé de façon relativement inattendue en compensant la mauvaise impression laissée par l’échec un an plutôt du sommet euro-méditerranéen de Barcelone. La conférence euro-méditerranéenne de Tampere en novembre 2006 s’est bien déroulée et ses conclusions ont été adoptées à l’unanimité après que le Forum civil, tenu pour la première fois au Sud, à Marrakech, ait abordé de front le problème des migrations et de la mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée.

S’il est vrai que dans un « petit » pays comme la Finlande, il est plus facile pour les chercheurs d’établir le dialogue avec les acteurs politiques, il faut reconnaître à Tuomo Melasuo un mérite propre qui est d’avoir mis au service des dossiers euro-méditerranéens sa compétence et ses convictions. Il a notamment contribué à remettre la dimension humaine du processus de Barcelone au premier plan en obtenant que la conférence Euromesco de Tampere en juillet 2006 s’interroge sur « l’espace humain méditerranéen ». De façon générale, Tuomo Melasuo, qui connaît bien les pays du sud de la Méditerranée, mais qui est également très attentif aux préoccupations des pays européens riverains de cette mer, s’est toujours montré sensible aux enjeux méditerranéens du projet européen. C’est sur cette question que je voudrais faire porter les quelques réflexions qui suivent, en sachant, pour avoir eu avec lui d’innombrables échanges, qu’elles sont pour une large part partagées par Tuomo.

« L’avenir de l’Europe est en Méditerranée », proclamait N. Sarkozy au soir de son élection le 6 mai 2007. On peut souscrire à cette affirmation de principe, même si on est en désaccord sur la plupart des idées qui l’accompagnent (« défi » de la confrontation entre Islam et Occident, caractère non-européen

176 Jean-Robert Henry


de la Turquie) et sur les modalités de mise en œuvre par le nouveau président français de son projet méditerranéen. L’initiative française, qui a perturbé la routine des relations euro-méditerranéennes depuis plus d’un an, a suscité comme on sait beaucoup de critiques et une grande perplexité chez les partenaires européens de la France, sans entraîner l’enthousiasme des pays du sud. Le succès de la conférence du 13 juillet 2008 à Paris n’a été que la consécration du médiocre compromis élaboré en mars 2008 par le Conseil européen, un compromis qui a davantage consisté à prolonger un statu quo qu’à renouveler les rapports entre l’Europe et son sud.

Sur un sujet qui colle autant à l’actualité, il importe cependant de faire la part entre l’écume des choses et les tendances de fond. La surface des choses, c’est le résultat global modeste de cette agitation méditerranéenne : on a tenté de réanimer un processus de Barcelone chancelant, sur lequel étaient portés des diagnostics sévères, en le renforçant par l’instauration (sous quelle forme et avec quelles attributions ?) de L’Union pour la Méditerranée. La surface des choses, ce sont aussi bien sûr les avatars de la politique méditerranéenne de la France qui a multiplié les maladresses dans la promotion de son initiative : au final, il y a très loin entre les ambitions politiques du projet initial et ce qu’il est devenu en regagnant le bercail du partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Cependant la tendance de fond révélée par cet épisode, plus significative sans doute que ses vicissitudes, c’est la redécouverte de la place que tient l’enjeu méditerranéen pour l’Europe. Au cours des derniers mois, le rapport de l’Europe à la Méditerranée s’est imposé sur l’agenda européen bien plus que comme une simple question de politique étrangère commune. Il apparaît comme constructeur du projet européen, révélateur de ses crises et de ses doutes, miroir de l’image que les Européens se font d’eux-mêmes. On peut dire qu’à bien des égards, l’enjeu méditerranéen habite le projet européen ; c’est un aiguillon qui invite l’Europe à mieux formuler sa vision d’elle-même et à mieux assumer son rapport au monde.

« Crise européenne » et défis méditerranéens

Ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui la crise européenne est multiple. Mais chacun de ses aspects est souligné par le rapport à la Méditerranée. Trois points me semblent majeurs.

Il y a d’abord une 1. crise identitaire de l’Europe par rapport à elle-même, une crise complexe à cerner car il y a plusieurs façons de répondre à la question « qu’est-ce que l’Europe ? ».

177Les enjeux méditerranéens de la crise européenne


Est-ce une perspective supranationale (le projet de Fédération européenne de la Déclaration Schuman), ou l’utopie d’une nouvelle patrie commune ; est-ce un espace déterminé par la géographie ou bien une communauté humaine (le « peuple européen ») ou civilisationnelle à base plus ou moins religieuse; ou encore, est-ce d’abord un espace de paix, de tolérance, de prospérité, de bonne gouvernance et de vouloir-vivre ensemble, devenu exemplaire et attractif à l’échelle mondiale?

Dans cette incertitude sur la nature de l’Europe, et dans un contexte de très grande prudence politique des gouvernants à l’égard de l’opinion, il peut être est tentant de laisser l’identité européenne se définir par rapport à un monde islamo-méditerranéen perçu comme une altérité privilégiée, externe et interne, de l’Europe. Face à ce monde différent, nous serions d’abord chrétiens ou judéo-chrétiens, ou bien « occidentaux » et « atlantiques » dans une version plus politique des choses. Le débat actuel sur l’identité chrétienne de l’Europe ne semble pas avoir d’autre origine que cette dialectique identitaire, qui tend à fabriquer une identité antimusulmane de l’Europe (et réciproquement). De même, la politique de voisinage laisse entendre que l’Europe est une « famille » qui se définit par rapport à des voisins. Or il est très risqué de laisser le discours identitaire envahir et gouverner la maison Europe. C’est une folle du logis qui peut exercer, demain comme hier, des dégâts considérables. L’évolution du débat sur l’Islam et sur l’immigration pose problème dans de nombreux pays, notamment en France avec la création d’un ministère de l’identité nationale et de l’immigration. De même, la chasse aux « roms » en Italie et dans plusieurs pays européens a pris une tournure inquiétante. Et même en Belgique, au cœur de l’espace européen, la résurgence – jusqu’ici pacifique – de l’antagonisme entre flamands et wallons ne témoigne pas d’un bon fonctionnement de l’idée européenne.

Cette crise identitaire est aussi une 2. crise du rapport de l’Europe au monde.

La question des frontières ou des « limites » de l’Europe est posée aujourd’hui de façon insistante et défensive par de nombreux hommes politiques, dans une perspective de clôture de l’espace européen. En août 2007, le président Sarkozy exigeait une réflexion européenne (et une prise de position) sur le sujet pour avancer sur la question de l’adhésion de la Turquie.

En se fixant de façon exemplaire sur la peur d’intégrer la Turquie, le débat sur l’élargissement a renforcé les termes du dilemme européen : repli sur soi ou ouverture universaliste dans le sens de « l’Europe sans rivages » que



proposait il y a cinquante ans François Perroux. L’évolution du conflit du Moyen-Orient n’a fait qu’accentuer la tentation du repli, tout en soulignant l’absence d’une politique étrangère européenne. Face à l’omniprésence américaine sur la scène méditerranéenne, l’impuissance européenne dans la région interroge le rôle de l’Union européenne comme acteur de la scène internationale : y a-t-il place pour une Europe-puissance face à la puissance américaine et quelle serait la nature de cette puissance : militaire ou d’influence ? Faut-il se résigner à une Europe atlantique (Communauté atlantique) dont la frontière serait la Méditerranée face au monde arabo-musulman, ou l’Europe peut-elle inventer un modèle alternatif de gestion pacifiée des relations internationales impliquant un recentrage sur la Méditerranée? Quelles leçons pratiques tirer de l’opération libanaise et des initiatives sur l’Iran ?

Le crise européenne est enfin une 3. crise des ressorts du projet européen.

Le projet européen parait aujourd’hui moins ambitieux, moins porteur que lorsque l’Europe était modeste ; l’utopie européenne fait moins sens que quand elle était un objectif lointain.

Ce sont en réalité les ressorts du projet qui ont changé depuis Maastricht : le but n’est plus d’instaurer durablement la paix dans une Europe ruinée par l’affrontement des nationalismes et le mépris des Droits de l’homme, mais tourne à la construction d’une identité commune. D’universaliste et humaniste, le ressort du projet européen tend à devenir identitaire face à d’autres identités, toutes essentialisées.

Ce changement de projet affecte le rapport de l’Union européenne à son voisinage méridional, le rend beaucoup plus contradictoire. Aujourd’hui, la Méditerranée constitue pour l’Europe à la fois une région périphérique, qu’elle considère comme son prolongement économique naturel, et une frontière identitaire, humaine et culturelle. En consacrant cette contradiction ainsi que le divorce entre espace économique et espace humain, le Processus de Barcelone n’a pas réussi ni cherché à faire de la Méditerranée un espace humain commun, sur le modèle européen. Au contraire, la philosophie implicite promue par Barcelone est celle d’un apartheid tempéré par le recours au « dialogue » des cultures. La politique de voisinage n’a fait qu’accentuer cette contradiction en opposant la « famille » européenne aux « voisins ». Un mérite des débats des derniers mois est d’avoir relativisé et disqualifié cette idée de voisinage, sans cependant réussir à construire une nouvelle vision du rapport euro-méditerranéen.



Dans un espace méditerranéen et eurafricain caractérisé depuis longtemps par des flux et des échanges intenses, et bousculé aujourd’hui par les stratégies des « migrants », la fermeture de l’espace humain européen vers le sud depuis 1996 a eu, pour le sud comme pour le nord, des conséquences nuisibles dont les effets n’ont jamais été mesurés. La frontière méditerranéenne de l’Europe tranche de façon absurde dans un tissu humain, culturel et social très dense, notamment en Méditerranée occidentale. Les obstacles grandissants mis à la libre circulation des personnes contrarient l’exercice d’un droit de l’homme élémentaire comme le rappelait le Forum civil de Marrakech. Ils ne répondent ni aux besoins démographiques de l’Europe, ni à « l’envie d’Europe » qui ne cesse de croître au Sud mais pourrait se retourner en haine d’une Europe inaccessible. Enfin cette politique engage les Européens dans une vision exclusivement sécuritaire de leur rapport au monde extérieur.

D’autres aspects moins centraux de la crise européenne sont également questionnés par le rapport à la Méditerranée.

La crise institutionnelle que représentent les « non » successifs à la Constitution a son pendant dans la difficulté de reformuler les rap-ports avec le Sud.

Pour réanimer les rapports euro-méditerranéens, on a mis en avant depuis quatre décennies des formules institutionnelles qui mobilisent un vocabulaire et des objectifs ambigus : partenariat, dialogue, voisinage…, peu susceptibles de répondre aux attentes des Etats et sociétés du sud. Aujourd’hui, l’Union pour la Méditerranée ne continue à leur offrir que l’appartenance à une euro-périphérie, à une banlieue de l’Europe.

La crise institutionnelle de l’Europe est aggravée par une crise de pilo-tage des instances communautaires et par une crise de gouvernance.

A la perte de visibilité des responsables communautaires, correspond un surcroît de visibilité de certains leaders et intérêts nationaux. Depuis un an, la question de l’Union de la Méditerranée n’a cessé d’opposer, de façon presque caricaturale, sur la scène européenne le couple Sarkozy-Merkel, alors qu’en 2003 le « couple fondateur » franco-allemand se trouvait réuni sur l’enjeu international majeur qu’était la guerre d’Irak.

A côté de cette dérive nationaliste permise par une certaine vacuité du pouvoir politique européen, l’Europe souffre plus largement d’une crise de gouvernance : la pesanteur caricaturale de la bureaucratie



européenne amène à s’interroger sur la place de la société civile dans le système européen, dès lors qu’on sort de la pratique institutionnalisée du lobbying.

La situation est encore moins enviable dans les instances euro-méditerranéennes. La représentativité de la société civile y laisse souvent à désirer, quand elle n’est pas tournée en dérision comme dans la formule « organisation intergouvernementale de la société civile » dont on avait cru devoir affubler la Fondation Anna Lindh. Mais une remobilisation de la société civile se fait jour au sud comme au nord : le Forum civil euro-méditerranéen interpelle les responsables politiques avec moins de conformisme qu’autrefois, et reflète en partie les débats non domestiqués des Forums sociaux mondiaux, régionaux ou nationaux. Des acteurs civils contestataires apparaissent qui imposent leurs revendications aux acteurs politiques, par exemple en ce qui concerne le soutien aux migrants clandestins.

La « crise culturelle » en Europe et en Méditerranée

La gestion de la diversité culturelle en Europe et en Méditerranée appelle une réflexion comparée approfondie sur deux points:

Sous prétexte de faciliter la communication, le principe de diversité 1. culturelle est battu en brèche dans l’espace européen au profit d’un langage commun réducteur qui coupe l’expression politique et sa-vante des sociétés de leur expression culturelle.

Alors que les différences culturelles tendent à être gommées dans 2. l’espace européen, elles sont surestimées et essentialisées dans l’es-pace euro-méditerranéen, comme l’a rappelé le Rapport des Sages (2004) sur le dialogue des peuples et des cultures en Méditerranée.

La nécessité d’une utopie refondatrice

L’inventaire des aspects de la « crise européenne » révélés par le rapport à la Méditerranée pourrait être poursuivi sur de longues pages. Si beaucoup d’analystes et d’acteurs politiques considèrent – à l’instar de N. Sarkozy – que ce rapport est crucial pour l’avenir de l’Europe, les solutions apportées, y compris par le dernier sommet de Paris, pour métamorphoser la relation euro-méditerranéenne restent décevantes, à l’image du paysage sans relief et sans perspective qu’est devenu le projet européen. Il serait au contraire nécessaire de sortir des ballets diplomatiques et des discours culturalistes et de faire preuve d’audace conceptuelle pour tenter de répondre aux défis



que la Méditerranée pose à l’Europe et que l’Europe pose à la Méditerranée. Or, le principal de ces défis est la gestion de l’espace humain méditerranéen comme un espace commun.

Leur proximité humaine et culturelle constitue pour les habitants du nord et du sud de la Méditerranée un défi et un atout qui les distinguent des autres acteurs présents sur la scène méditerranéenne. L’audace et le réalisme consisteraient donc à remettre la dimension humaine au centre de la problématique euro-méditerranéenne, soit en réinventant un scénario ambitieux de type euro-arabe soit en élargissant vers le sud le « cercle vertueux » européen. La perspective d’un élargissement euro-méditerranéen mérite d’être explorée dans le contexte actuel pour tenter de mieux penser et gérer notre appartenance à un espace humain commun et solidaire ouvert aux sociétés européennes et méditerranéennes. Bien plus que d’ « européaniser » le Sud, le problème serait de « reméditerraniser » l’Europe, c’est-à-dire de la réconcilier avec ses racines méditerranéennes, en cessant de voir chez les Arabes ou les Musulmans des usurpateurs de l’héritage antique des Européens, et de la recentrer sur la Méditerranée, en abandonnant l’illusion d’une Communauté atlantique tournée contre le monde arabo-musulman.

Cette perspective peut concerner tous les Européens, comme le suggérait la proposition de M. Moratinos, il y a quelques mois, de raisonner en termes d’Union euro-méditerranéenne, plutôt que de s’enfermer dans une Union méditerranéenne réservée aux riverains. Il reprenait ainsi une proposition de D. Strauss-Kahn en 2004, qui faisait écho elle-même à une réflexion formulée à l’intérieur du Club de Marseille dès 2001.

Le concept d’Union euro-méditerranéenne présente l’avantage de réunir autour d’un même mot d’ordre deux scénarios possibles : l’un maximaliste (élargissement de l’Union européenne vers le sud), l’autre minimaliste (création d’une structure confédérale autour de l’Union européenne); c’est souvent à travers des consensus ambigus que progressent les relations internationales. Ce concept a surtout le mérite de refonder l’ensemble euro-méditerranéen sur une utopie commune plus mobilisatrice que le partenariat au rabais de Barcelone ou l’apartheid implicite de la politique de voisinage. L’appartenance des sociétés européennes et méditerranéennes à un espace commun de paix et de solidarité offrirait également un cadre plus favorable à la résolution du conflit israélo-palestinien et au dépassement des malentendus bilatéraux hérités de l’histoire coloniale. Enfin, la perspective d’Union euro-méditerranéenne serait capable d’assumer les attentes du projet d’Union méditerranéenne sans entrer en contradiction avec l’Union européenne.


Barcelonan prosessista Välimeren Unioniin

– mihin sillä pyritään?

Risto Veltheim

Kylmän sodan päättyminen merkitsi Euroopassa monenlaisia muutoksia, joista EU:n nopeasti alkanut itälaajentuminen oli yksi keskeisiä ja näkyvimpiä. Tämä oli omiaan jopa siirtämään integroituvan Euroopan painopistettä Atlantilta kohti Keski- ja Itä-Eurooppaa, mikä ei voinut jäädä EU:n läntisimmiltä jäsenilta huomaamatta.

Osittain kompensoidakseen tätä muutosta päätettiin eteläisten jäsenten aloitteesta luoda vuonna 1995 erityinen foorumi Välimeren asioiden käsittelylle, joka sai perustamispaikkansa mukaan nimen Barcelonan prosessi. Virallinen nimi on kuitenkin Euro-Välimeri-kumppanuus, vaikka syntypaikasta muistuttava lempinimi on jäänyt jokapäiväiseen käyttöön. Prosessi, jota myös Oslon sopimuksen luoma suotuisa poliittinen ilmapiiri Lähi-idässä vauhditti, hahmoteltiin kehittämään kokonaisvaltaisesti EU:n suhteita Välimeren eteläpuolisiin rantavaltioihin. Yhteistyön piiriin tulivat poliittiset, taloudelliset ja niin sanottuun inhimilliseen ulottuvuuteen liittyvät kysymykset.

Monia muutoksia on tapahtunut perustamisen jälkeen, sekä yhteistyön sisältöön että muotoihin. Osallistujia on jo kaikkiaan 39. Nykyisin Välimeren kumppanimaista yhdeksän on arabimaita (Algeria, Egypti, Jordania, Libanon, Marokko, Mauritania, Syyria, Tunisia, palestiinalaishallinto) kun taas muut EU:n ulkopuoliset osallistujat ovat Israel, Albania ja Turkki. Libya on edelleen mukana tarkkailijana, eikä tähän ole näköpiirissä muutosta.

Prosessin vahvuutena on alusta lähtien ollut, että sen piiriin tulivat käytännössä kaikki Välimeren alueen maat, arabimaiden ohella myös Israel, johon toistaiseksi vain Egyptillä ja Jordanialla on toimivat diplomaattisuhteet. Mitään laajempaa normalisoitumista Israelin ja arabimaiden kesken ei siis ole prosessin avulla saatu aikaan.

Kyseessä on silti ainutlaatuinen yhteistyöjärjestely, jossa nämä valtiot keskustelevat muun muassa taloudellisen yhteistyön, kaupan, kulttuurin, ympäristönsuojelun ja vaikkapa liikenneolojen kehittämisestä. Myös poliittiseen tilanteeseen ja suoraan turvallisuuteen liittyvät asiat ovat esillä. On kuitenkin muistettava, että Barcelonan prosessin puitteissa ei haeta

184 Risto Veltheim


alueen varsinaisten konfliktien ratkaisua, ei Lähi-idässä sen enempää kuin esimerkiksi Länsi-Saharan tai Kyproksen ongelmassa.

Jugoslavian hajoamisen jälkeen Balkanille syntyneet uudet valtiot jäivät aluksi prosessin ulkopuolelle, sillä itse asiassa alue oli 1990-luvun puolivälissä vielä varsin levotonta ja valtiolliset olot vailla lopullista vakiintumistaan. Nyt ovat myös ex-Jugoslavian pohjalta syntyneet uudet valtiot kiinnostuneita Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyöstä. Muun muassa Kroatia ja Montenegro haluavat mukaan, vaikka niiden lopulliset tavoitteet EU:n suunnalla tähtäävätkin jäsenyyteen. Välimeren pohjoispuolelta on taas Monaco katsonut ajan olevan kypsä omalle mukaantulolle täysjäsenenä, mikä myös lähiaikoina hyväksyttäneen.

Ajankohtaisuuttaan prosessi ei siten ole menettänyt yhtään, pikemminkin siihen on kohdistunut yhä uusia odotuksia ja haasteita. Tämä on taustalla myös Ranskan tulevan presidentin Nicholas Sarkozyn jo vaalikamppailun aikana keväällä 2007 tekemään esitykseen uuden Välimeren Unionin luomisesta meren pohjois- ja etelärannan kesken. Sarkozyn kunnianhimoisessa aloitteessa nähtiin montakin tavoitetta. Näkyvin oli nostaa yhteistyön taso poliittisesti korkeammalle, luoda valtionpäämiesten kesken foorumi, jossa voitaisiin säännöllisesti keskustella sekä politiikan että yhteistyön keskeisistä kysymyksistä. Tätä korkean tason yhteydenpitoa avustaisi vain suppea läheisten neuvonantajien eli ”sherpojen” ryhmä. Niinpä Sarkozyn aloitetta verrattiin eräänlaisen Välimeren alueen oman ”G-8 huippukokouksen” luomiseen.

Toisena tavoitteena nähtiin Ranskan oman johtoaseman palauttaminen Välimeren politiikassa ja tämä taas heijastui muun muassa haluna pitää yhteistyön piiri vain Välimeren rantavaltioiden keskeisenä. Kolmantena tavoitteena nähtiin halu löytää jonkinlainen korvaava ratkaisu Turkin pyrkimyksille päästä EU:n täysjäseneksi: Välimeren pohjoisen ja eteläisen rannan yhteisöhän voisi tarjota islamilaiselle Turkille luontevimman pohjan myös EU-suhteille.

Ranskan kovan ja korkealla tasolla vedetyn diplomatiankaan avulla ei näissä tavoitteissa lopulta täysin onnistuttu, vaikka Välimeren Unioni lopulta saatiin luoduksi. Ensinnäkin sen osallistujapiirin suhteen, Välimeren EU-maat versus kaikki EU-maat, Ranskalla oli periaatteessa kaksi mahdollisuutta. Ensimmäinen oli tehdä tästä kokonaan Ranskan kansallinen ja EU-yhteistyöstä irrallinen hanke, vähän niin kuin brittiläinen kansainyhteisö tai vaikka Pohjolassa edelleen toimiva Pohjoismaiden neuvosto. Ranskalla olisi silloin ollut vapaat kädet antaa sille muoto ja sisältö, jotka vastaavat Ranskan

185Barcelonan prosessista Välimeren Unioniin


omia kansallisia tavoitteita eikä rahoituksesta tai muista institutionaalisista seikoista olisi tarvinnut kiistellä.

Toisin kuitenkin kävi. Epäily riittävien resurssien saamisesta näin laajan ja suuria odotuksia herättävän hankkeen tueksi ja muun muassa myös pohjoisafrikkalaisten maiden epäluulo sen kantovoimaan saivat Ranskan kallistumaan siihen, että se tehtäisiin osana EU:n ulkosuhdetoimintaa. EU:n instituutiot ja etupäässä komissio, mutta myös Euroopan kehityspankki EIB haluttiin mukaan paitsi niiden merkittävien taloudellisten resurssien myös niiden teknisen osaamisen ja kokemuksen vuoksi.

Kuitenkin kesti vielä kauan ennen kuin Ranska luopui perusvaatimuksestaan siinä, että kaikki EU:n jäsenvaltiot tulisivat olemaan Unionissa tasavertaisina osallistujina. Tähän se taipui Saksan ja Ranskan välisissä konsultaatioissa maaliskuussa 2008. Eurooppa-neuvoston päätöksellä 13.3.2008 ajatus uudesta Unionista periaatetasolla hyväksyttiin ja samalla siitä tehtiin koko EU:n politiikkaa. Näin haluttiin taata ennen kaikkea se, ettei EU:n ulkosuhteet lähialueille pirstoutudu erilaisiin naapurustopiireihin.

Vaikka Suomi on jo usean vuoden ajan ajanut voimakkaasti pohjoisten alueiden merkitystä EU:ssa etenkin Pohjoisen ulottuvuuden (PU) hankkeen kautta, oli tämä päätös täysin myös Suomen etujen mukainen. Aivan kuin Pohjoinen ulottuvuus, olisi myös Välimeren Unioni koko EU:n yhteistä ulkosuhdepolitiikkaa, johon periaatteessa kaikki osallistuvat – vaikka sinänsä kiinnostus ja intensiteetti saattavat vaihdella suurestikin. Muu olisikin saattanut johtaa jatkossa yhä suurempaan pirstoutumiseen paitsi ulkosuhdepolitiikan myös politiikka-alueiden osalta, varsinkin jos esimerkiksi energia-, ympäristö-, maahanmuutto- ja vaikkapa turvallisuuspolitiikkaa käsiteltäisiin eri kokoonpanoilla eri foorumeilla.

Myös Turkin tilanteen osalta voi todeta, että jos tavoitteena oli luoda paremmin houkutteleva odotushuone Turkin EU-jäsenyydelle, siinä ei onnistuttu. Turkki on kyllä tulossa mukaan Välimeren Unioniin, mutta on tehnyt täysin selväksi, ettei tämä vaikuta mitenkään sen jo pitkäaikaisiin EU-jäsenyystavoitteisiin.

Välimeren Unioni perustetaan Pariisissa

Välimeren Unionin perustava huippukokous pidettiin Ranskan kutsusta Pariisissa 13.7.2008. Suomea tässä historiallisessa ja poliittisesti onnistuneessa kokouksessa edustivat presidentti Tarja Halonen ja pääministeri Matti Vanhanen. Koska uusi, vahvennettu yhteistyö rakentuu jo toimivan Barcelonan prosessin pohjalle, on sen virallisena nimenä Barcelonan prosessi:

186 Risto Veltheim


Välimeren Unioni. Pariisin julistuksen mukaan se rakentuu kaikessa oleellisessa jo tutuksi tulleen ja toimintakykynsä osoittaneen Barcelonan prosessin, eli Euro-Välimeri-kumppanuuden pohjalle.

Näin ollen yhteistyön pilareina ovat edelleen poliittinen dialogi, taloudellinen yhteistyö ja kulttuurien välinen kohtaaminen eli niin sanottu inhimillinen ulottuvuus. Kuten Barcelonan julistuksessa jo todettiin, nämä kaikki muodostavat yhden, samaan päämäärään tähtäävän kokonaisuuden. Siitä ei voida valita osia tai hylätä toisia kansallisten preferenssien mukaan. Niinpä poliittinen kehitys ja dialogi vaikkapa ihmisoikeuksien ja demokratiakehityksen aloilla ovat edellytys myös lisääntyvälle taloudelliselle yhteistyölle. Kulttuurien kohtaaminen ja ihmisten välisen kanssakäymisen vahvistuminen taas antaa koko Välimeri-yhteisölle sen todellisen ja kadun tasolle ulottuvan legitimiteetin.

Välimeren Unionin institutionaalisista ratkaisuista merkittävin oli se, että sen johtoon tulee kaksi yhteispuheenjohtajaa: yksi EU:sta ja yksi Välimeren partnerimaasta. Ensivaiheessa puheenjohtajina toimivat Ranska ja Egypti. Koska ratkaisuun pääsy partnerimaita edustavasta puheenjohtajasta edellytti yksimielisyyttä koko ryhmältä, jossa ovat siis mukana Israel, Turkki ja arabimaat, oli se todellinen viesti Välimeren eteläpuoleisille valtioille ja niiden yhteistyökyvylle.

Muina instituutioina toimii yhteinen sihteeristö, joka koostuu kaikkien halukkaiden jäsenmaiden siihen lähettämistä virkamiehistä. Kustannukset jaetaan osin sihteeristön isäntä- ja sijoitusmaan ja prosessiin osallistuvien kesken. Tämä kustannusvarovaisuus on hyvin ymmärrettävää, sillä onhan tosiasia, että miltei jokainen uusi kansainvälinen kokous poikii nykyisin jonkun uuden seurantaelimen ja byrokratian vaara on todellinen. Monilla hallituksilla on lähes pysyväisohjeina, ettei uusia instituutioita tulisi ilman vahvoja perusteluja perustaa. Myös Välimeren Unionin sihteeristöstä toivotaan siten pientä ja vain projektien valmistelu- ja seuraantotehtäviin keskittyvää.

Välimeren Unionin rahoituksen osalta tullaan käyttämään luovasti kaikkia mahdollisia lähteitä. EU:n budjetti, josta Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyöhön kanavoituu rahaa naapuruusinstrumentin (ENPI) kautta, on yksi rahoituslähde mutta sitä ei ole tarkoitus ainakaan merkittävästi lisätä siitä, mitä jo tehdyt budjettiratkaisut edellyttävät. Välimeren Unionin lisäarvo tuleekin hyvin suurelta osin siitä, että kyetään identifioimaan kaupallisesti kiinnostavia ja luototuskelpoisia projekteja. Mahdollisuuksia tähän kyllä muun muassa energian tuotannon, infrastruktuurikehityksen ja ympäristönsuojelun aloilla varmasti onkin.



Barcelonan prosessin verkostot jäävät elämään

Barcelonan prosessiin kuuluu myös inhimillistä ulottuvuutta ja muun muassa kulttuuriyhteistyötä koskeva pilari, poliittisen dialogin ja taloudellisen yhteistyön ohella. Tämä on varsin laaja toiminta-alue, jolla kansalaisjärjestöt ovat aktiivisesti mukana ja joka on jo luonut runsaan ja kattavan yhteysverkoston. Tämä onkin nähtävä yhtenä Barcelonan prosessin ilmeisenä menestyksenä ja suurena rikkautena, sillä on muistettava että suuressa osassa jäsenistöä ei tällaiselle vapaalle kansalaistoiminnalle ole omaa perinnettä.

Samalla kun kansalaisyhteiskunta tukee ja kannustaa hallitusten välistä työtä, se vaatii usein myös enemmän tehokkuutta ja tuloksia. Kansalaisjärjestöjen kritiikiltä ei ole säästynyt yksikään tämän yhteistyön osapuoli, varsinkin jos yhteistyön jarruina tai rasitteina nähdään kapeat kansalliset edut tai vaikkapa epäaito, omia poliittisia tarkoitusperiä palveleva argumentointi.

Kansalaisjärjestöjen verkoista ehkä ensimmäisenä on mainittava Euro-Välimeri Civil Society Platform, joka toimii Pariisissa, ja kerää piiriinsä satoja kansalaisjärjestöä kaikista Euromed-maista. Tutkijapiirit taas ovat yhdistyneet EUROMESCO-nimiseksi (Euromed Study Commitee) verkostoksi, jonka keskuspaikka on Lissabonissa. Taloustutkijoiden verkostoa vedetään Marseillesta, missä se toimii FEMISE-nimisenä. Ihmisoikeusverkostoa (EMHRN) pidetään yllä Kööpenhaminasta, ja sen verkostot keräävät yhteen ihmisoikeusaktivisteja kaikista osallistuvista maista. Yhdessä nämä järjestöt ylläpitävät vilkasta ja hallituksista riippumatonta keskustelua muun muassa monista herkistä ja aroista kysymyksistä ja pyrkivät ohjaamaan lisää huomiota sellaisiin kysymyksiin kuten ihmisoikeudet, demokratia, kansainvälinen solidaarisuus ja hyvä hallinto.

Parlamenttien välisenä yhteistyöelimenä toimii EMPA – Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, jolla on useita alakomiteoita ja joka kokoontuu vuosittain. Viimeksi yleiskokous pidettiin Ateenassa maaliskuussa 2008, jolloin keskustelua sävytti paitsi Libanonin akuutti kriisi myös EU:n julistaman kulttuurien välisen teemavuoden asiat. Myös Euroopan Parlamentti seuraa tarkasti Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyötä. Vuonna 2006 yhteistyön raportoijana toimi ensimmäistä kertaa pohjoismainen edustaja, Anneli Jäätteenmäki (Keskusta).

Kulttuurien välistä dialogia edistämään on perustettu vuonna 2003 Anna Lindhin nimeä kantava säätiö (Anna Lindh-säätiö kulttuurien välisen dialogin edistämiseksi, ALF). Tämä instituutio toimii Aleksandriassa, Egyptissä. Sen käytössä on tilat Aleksandrian kuuluisassa kirjastossa (joka nyt on täysin modernisoitu) ja Ruotsin Aleksandria-instituutissa. Vuonna 2007 tehdyn

188 Risto Veltheim


organisaatiomuutoksen jälkeen sen johtoon ovat asettuneet marokkolainen André Azoulay säätiön presidenttinä ja espanjalainen Andreu Claret säätiön toiminnasta vastaavana johtajana.

Suomi Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyössä

Kun Suomen silloinen ulkoministeri Tarja Halonen osallistui vuonna 1995 Barcelonan ulkoministerikokoukseen, kyseessä oli ensimmäisiä kertoja kun Euroopan unioniin liittynyt Suomi oli täysivaltaisena mukana luomassa ja kehittämässä sen ulkosuhteita. Pohjois-Afrikka tai Lähi-itä eivät suinkaan olleet Suomelle uusia kohdealueita ulko- tai kauppapolitiikassa, mutta uutta oli se yhteistyön kehikko ja yhteisvastuullisuuden velvoite, jonka Euro-Välimeri-kumppanuuden synnyttäminen loi. Suomi halusi alusta alkaen olla tässä työssä täyspainoisesti mukana ja näin se on myös tehnyt.

Yhdeksi Suomelle läheiseksi alueeksi muodostui ympäristönsuojelu, jonka alalta sillä oli runsaasti omaakin kokemusta Itämeren piiristä. Niinpä Suomi jo vuonna 1997 isännöi Barcelonan prosessin ensimmäisen ympäristönsuojeluministereiden konferenssin. Näin alkoi yhteistyö, joka on jatkuvasti lisääntynyt ja tiivistynyt, siitäkin huolimatta että haasteet tuntuvat vain kasvavan.

Suomen toisella puheenjohtajuuskaudella vuonna 2006 (ensimmäinen pj-kausi oli vuonna 1999) järjestettiin jo toinen ministeritason ympäristönsuojelukokous, tällä kertaa Kairossa ministeri Jan-Erik Enestamin toimiessa kokouksen puheenjohtajana. Tässä kokouksessa hyväksyttiin Horizon 2020-nimellä kulkeva kokonaisvaltainen ympäristöohjelma. Silti olisi liioiteltua sanoa, että Välimeren suojelu olisi nyt turvattu. Aivan kuten muillakin merialueilla, kasvavan liikenteen, matkailun, rannikkoseutujen asutusten ja myös maanviljelyn aiheuttamat kuormitukset ja lisäongelmat tuntuvat juoksevan hallitusten ponnisteluja nopeammin.

Suomen toinen puheenjohtajakausi Barcelonan prosessissa oli aktiivinen ja tuloksekas myös monilla muilla aloilla. Kreikassa syyskuussa pidetyssä teollisuusministerikokouksessa, jossa puheenjohtajana toimi Suomen kauppa- ja teollisuusministeri Mauri Pekkarinen, keskusteltiin muun muassa pk-yritysten yhteistyökanavien vahvistamisesta Välimeren molemmin puolin. Taloudellis-teknologisen kehityksen hitaus Pohjois-Afrikassa verrattuna globalisaation menestyjiin on tosiasia ja Välimeren eteläpuolisten maiden osuus maailman kaupasta ja investoinneista on ollut taantumassa.

Tämä on alueelle keskeinen ongelma ja se heijastuu monilla tavoin yhteiskunnassa. Tuottavien investointien jarruna on usein nähty



muun muassa suljetut talousjärjestelmät, ylikorostunut valtion osuus talouselämässä ja toiminnan läpinäkyvyyden puute. Nämä aiheet ja taloudellisten reformien jouduttaminen ovat EU:n ja kumppanimaiden teollisuusministerien keskusteluissa jatkuvasti esillä.

Marraskuussa Istanbulissa tasa-arvoministeri Tuula Haataisen puheenjohdolla pidetty ministerikokous käsitteli naisen asemaa Euro-Välimeri-yhteisössä. YK:n kehitysohjelman UNDP:n raportti kuvaa osuvasti, että sukupuolten välisen tasa-arvon puute arabimaissa ei ole ainoastaan naisten ongelma vaan ilmeisestikin hidastaa koko alueen kehitystä. Raportin mukaan naisten koulutusmahdollisuuksien samoin kuin taloudellisten ja sosiaalisten oikeuksien rajoitukset ovat yksi merkittävä tekijä, joka vaikeuttaa maiden nousua maailman kärkijoukkoon muun muassa talouden, teknologian ja kulttuurin aloilla.

Istanbulin konferenssi oli ensimmäinen naisen asemaa ja tasa-arvoa käsitellyt kokous Barcelonan prosessin puitteissa ja kokouksessa sovittiin muun muassa laajasta työohjelmasta, joka tulee toteutettavaksi seuraavan kolmen vuoden aikana asianomaisten maiden kanssa sovittavissa kahdenkeskisissä toimintasuunnitelmissa. Teema on arkaluontoinen perinteisille muslimiyhteiskunnille, ja yhtälailla myös uusille, niin sanottua fundamentaalista islamismia edustaville liikkeille, mutta sen merkitys arabiyhteiskunnissa on silti kaikille selvä.

Suomen puheenjohtajuuskauden keskeinen tapahtuma oli kuitenkin Barcelonan prosessin ulkoministerikokous marraskuussa 2006 Tampereella. Kokous ajoittui kansainvälispoliittisesti mielenkiintoiseen vaiheeseen sillä se oli ensimmäinen kerta Etelä-Libanonin veristen yhteenottojen jälkeen (elokuussa 2006), kun Euro-Välimeri-alueen ulkoministereillä oli tilaisuus tavata toisensa. Barcelonan prosessi ei sinänsä ole rauhanprosessi tai luotu konfliktien ratkaisemiseksi, mutta kuten tässäkin tapauksessa, se antoi erinomaisen foorumin suoraan ja tiiviiseen ajatustenvaihtoon vallitsevasta tilanteesta. Käytännössä katsoen kaikki alueen ulkoministerit, muutamaa poikkeusta lukuun ottamatta, tulivatkin tähän tapaamiseen, jossa puhetta johti Suomen ulkoministeri Erkki Tuomioja.

Tampereen ulkoministerikokous oli sekä osallistujien että ulkopuolistenkin tarkkailijoiden mukaan menestys. Vaikeissakin olosuhteissa ja aivan loppuun saakka jatkuneiden neuvottelujen päätteeksi kokous onnistui saamaan aikaan yhteisen alueen poliittista tilannetta koskevan julkilausuman sekä myös laajan yhteisen toimintaohjelman vuodelle 2007. Kun sekä Israelin ulkoministeri Tzipi Livni että monet arabiulkoministerit poistuivat Tampere-

190 Risto Veltheim


talolta 8.11.2006 iltapäivällä jo aikaisin pimenevään yöhön ilmeisen tyytyväisinä tapaamisesta, saatettiin jonkin aikaa puhua jopa ”Tampereen hengestä” Lähi-idässä – kunnes uudet ongelmat ja väkivaltaisuudet peittivät sen alleen.

Tampereen kokouksessa, kuten yleensäkin Suomen puheenjohtajuuskauden yhteydessä, olivat kansalaisjärjestöt näkyvästi esillä. Näistä ensimmäisenä on mainittava jo edellä esitelty Anna Lindh-säätiö, joka toimii laajalti eri maissa toimivien kansallisten verkostojen kautta. Suomessa verkoston ensimmäiseksi vetäjäksi oli valittu Tuomo Melasuo Tampereen rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskuksesta TAPRIsta.

Tampereen ulkoministerikokouksen aikana Anna Lindh-säätiö oli kokemassa ensimmäisiä vaikeuksiaan, joihin kulttuurien väliset ongelmat ilmeisesti olivat pääsyinä. Henkilöstön vaihtuvuus pienessä Aleksandrian toimipisteessä oli suurta ja luottamuspula johtoon päin olivat kasvaneet. Etenkin päärahoittajamaissa lisääntyivät odotukset myös uuden, paremmin selkeytetyn johtajuuden luomisesta, jotta säätiö selviäisi vaativasta kulttuuritehtävästään.

Myös Tanskan Muhammed-pilakuvat ja niistä syntynyt kohu olivat omiaan nostamaan kulttuurien välisen dialogin painoa Euromed-yhteistyössä. Näin päätettiin Anna Lindh-säätiön kansallisten verkostojen kokous pitää myös Tampereella samassa yhteydessä ulkoministerikokouksen kanssa. Tuomo Melasuo tarttui tehtävään aktiivisesti ja taitavasti, minkä seurauksena vaikeaksi ennustettu kokous onnistui hienosti sekä sisältönsä että käytännön järjestelyjen osalta. Kokous sai runsaasti huomiota myös lehdistössä, mikä oli omiaan tuomaan kulttuurien välisen kohtaamisen problematiikkaa lähemmäksi myös suomalaista kadunmiestä.

Tuomo Melasuo oli jo alusta alkaen lähtenyt aktiivisesti edistämään Barcelonan prosessin tunnettavuutta Suomessa ja lyhyessä ajassa hänestä tuli tunnettu vaikuttaja Euro-Välimeri-piirissä. Hänet myös valittiin säätiön ensimmäiseen neuvoa-antavaan komiteaan (Advisory Board) ja hän tuli siihen uudelleen valituksi vuoden 2008 keväällä, ollen nyt sen ainoa pohjoismainen edustaja. Tuomo Melasuo on toiminut aktiivisesti myös Euro-Välimeri-alueen kansalaisjärjestöfoorumin piirissä, joka keräsi marraskuussa 2007 Marrakeshiin 450 osallistujaa. Kyseessä oli ensimmäinen kerta kun tämä kansalaisjärjestöfoorumi järjestettiin Välimeren eteläpuolella, ja sitä pidettiin merkittävänä tapahtumana liikkeen työn tunnustamiseksi näissä maissa. Suomen osallistumista koordinoi Kehys ry:n toiminnanjohtaja Rilli Lappalainen.



Miten eteenpäin?

Euroopan turvallisuus on yhä selvemmin kytketty oman naapuruston tilanteeseen ja mitä suurimmassa määrin myös sen eteläiseen suuntaan, Välimeren alueeseen. Tämän alueen vaikutus turvallisuuteemme on sitäkin suurempi, jos laajennamme turvallisuuskäsitettä valtioiden välisestä turvallisuudesta niin sanottuun inhimilliseen turvallisuuteen eli suoraan yksilöihin ja kansalaisryhmiin kohdistuviin turvallisuusuhkiin.

Ajankohtaiset kysymykset, kuten ääri-islamilaisten liikkeiden esiinnousu, kulttuurien välisen dialogin ja yhteisymmärryksen takkuilu, taloudellisen kehityksen riittämättömyys, siirtolaisuuspaineet sekä yhä kasvava terrorismin uhka ovat jatkuvasti olemassa. Niin sanottujen kadunmiesten ja etenkin nuorison kohtaamat ongelmat ja näköalattomuus ajavat usein hyökkäämään länsimaista elämänmallia vastaan ja hakemaan omaa identiteettiä islamista.

Monissa arabimaissa kytevän ja länteen vihamielisesti suhtautuvan islamilaisen fundamentalismin iskulause onkin ”Islam on vastaus”! Islamin pilkaksi koetut ilmiöt toimivat kipinänä ennestään jo varsin ongelmallisen ja tulenaran tilanteen kärjistymiseksi. Kun myös alueen avoimet poliittiset kriisit, palestiinalaiskysymys, Irakin sota ja jopa terrorismin vastaisen taistelun ylilyönnit pitävät jännitystä korkeana, tarttuvat islamilaiset ääriliikkeet oitis tällaisiin ilmiöihin ja käyttävät niitä hyväkseen pyrkiessään omiin päämääriinsä. Eräät tutkijat ovatkin korostaneet, että ongelmien ydin on turhaan nähty uskontojen välisenä konfliktina. Enemmän on kyse siitä, että poliittiset ongelmat ja kiistat, jotka muutenkin olisivat olemassa, saavat kärjistyessään päälleen uskonnollisen kaavun.

Euroopan ja Afrikan välinen etäisyys Gibraltarilla, 15 kilometriä, on samalla yksi maailman suurimmista elintasokuiluista, mikä on johtanut osin hallitsemattomiin siirtolaisvirtoihin. Vaikka Pohjois-Afrikka toimii usein läpikulkualueena syvemmältä Afrikasta tulevalle ihmissalakuljetukselle, on myös tämä asia tärkeä Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyössä.

Nämä kaikki ilmiöt ja tapahtumat tekevät Välimeren asioista myös meidän suomalaisten asioita, joihin joudumme ottamaan kantaa paitsi EU:n jäseninä, mutta myös sen vuoksi että ne todella koskettavat myös meitä joko välittömästi tai välillisesti. Kuten presidentti Tarja Halonen muistutti Barcelonan huippukokouksessa vuonna 2005, meillä on erityiset syyt osallistua tähän toimintaan sillä EU:n pitkänä ja ekologisesti herkkänä etelärajana Välimeri on nykyisin yhä enemmän myös ”meidän meremme” eli Mare Nostrum.


Cultural cooperation

across the Mediterranean:

where is the common ground?


The global and the European context

From a global perspective, Intercultural Dialogue (ICD) has increasingly been in focus of international cultural cooperation. The core elements of the emerging international consensus on ICD as a “fundamental aim of cultural policies”1 have been shaped throughout the last decade. Most of these elements are assembled in contemporary working definitions of “intercultural dialogue” as

“an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic background and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect. It operates at all levels – within societies, between the societies of Europe and between Europe and the wider world.”2

The key factor facilitating international agreements on ICD was a formal recognition of cultural diversity being “as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature”3. In particular two reports broke new ground: the Report by the World Commission on Culture and Development, chaired by former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Our Creative Diversity (1996), and the Report by the European Task Force on Culture and Development, In from the Margins. A contribution to the debate on Culture and Development in Europe (1997).

Both reports were welcomed and formally recognized by the World Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in Stockholm, 1998. The Stockholm Conference, in declaring cultural diversity “a treasure of humankind” and “an essential factor of development”, added a dynamic dimension to the

1 UNESCO 1998.2 Council of Europe 2008.3 UNESCO 2001.

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Mexico City Declaration, adopted by the First World Conference on Cultural Policies in 1982, and stressing “that in its widest sense, culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs”.

The new common ground was extremely fertile. It brought about new standards and guidelines for cultural policies at international, regional, and national levels:

A series of international Declarations on Cultural Diversity,the UNESCO Conventions for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) and on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005),new formats of cultural reporting, with diversity and ICD monitoring as essential tools,numerous agendas, detailed proposals and strategies for innovative forms of ICD.

From a Mediterranean perspective, cultural cooperation has started 1995 in Barcelona with high ambitions, followed by two Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Ministers of Culture: Bologna 1996 and Rhodes 1998. It has, however, not kept pace with political and economic developments in the Euromed Partnership (EMP). It has, in particular, lost direct contact with achievements at the global level. In the – ritually deplored – absence of significant cultural cooperation between Southern Mediterranean countries, Mediterranean cultural cooperation is now almost entirely managed by bilateral agreements between EU Member States – and to some extent Turkey and Russia – with Arab countries and Israel. Multilateral cooperation is almost entirely identical with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, with some additions provided by the Council of Europe and UNESCO and their cooperation with the educational, cultural, and scientific organizations of the Arab League (ALESCO, Tunis), and of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (ISESCO, Istanbul), as well as with the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF), established in April 2005 by the Euromed Partnership in Alexandria, Egypt.

The third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Culture in Athens, 29–30 May 2008, marked a new phase in the Mediterranean cultural cooperation. According to its conclusions, this conference was “the starting point of a fully-fledged Euro-Mediterranean Strategy on Culture,

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Cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean

encompassing cooperation in both the dialogue between cultures and cultural policy”. This strategy “should build on the principles stated in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the relevant international references”. Is the Mediterranean cultural cooperation back now on track with international developments?

The new initiative comes at an interesting moment. The French-German proposal for upgrading the Euromed Partnership into a “Union for the Mediterranean” to be established in July 2008 could be an impetus for more cultural cooperation. A closer look at the functioning of cultural cooperation in the Euromed Partnership, however, nurtures some scepticism concerning both the political framework and the activities on the ground. The political framework is EU-centred, qualifying Euromed cultural cooperation as a “specific context” within EU initiatives. The new strategy approved by the Athens Conference is hardly more than an aspect of the European Agenda for Culture presented by the European Commission in May 2007 and approved by the European Council on 16 November 2007. The new strategy, to be elaborated by a group of experts before the next culture ministers’ meeting scheduled for 2010, seems to confine itself to a European agenda “light”. The strategy, as outlined in Athens, covers only one and a half of the three key elements of the European agenda: the guidelines for intercultural dialogue are almost identical; cultural policies are in the European agenda closely linked to cultural industries whereas this dimension, in the Athens conclusions, seems to be limited to reconfirming appeals for integrated cultural policies, outlined in Stockholm 1998. In concrete terms, there is little more than expressions of intent to follow-up previous projects in the fields of heritage and audiovisual cooperation. The third pillar of the European agenda, declaring promotion of culture “as a vital element in the Union’s international relations”, is largely absent from the Athens conclusions.

The habit of exporting “light” versions of European cultural initiatives to the EMP was already established with the “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008”, decided upon with programmes, strategies, and a proper budget in December 2006. At the very last minute, in November 2007, the EMP Foreign Ministers decided to add also a Mediterranean aspect to it, with launching the “2008 Euro-Mediterranean Year of Dialogue between Cultures”, with no detailed programme and strategy, and without budget. Applicants from non-EU countries were not admitted to Calls for Proposals under the European Dialogue Year 2008 – at times when most of the programmes of the European Commission in Education and Research are now open to applicants

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from countries covered by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Programme (ENP) which includes the Mediterranean neighbours.

The Athens Conference, as much as all other Euromed Ministerial Conferences before, did not include any possibility for non-EU countries to participate in financial decisions. Almost all budgets for the EMP are decided upon within the EU’s structures, and follow its administrative and financial rules. Everything is ”project”, leaving little space for synergies and strategies, and not much room for joint decision-making. The language of development assistance divides partners into “donors” and “beneficiaries”. This applies, unfortunately, also to the first and only cultural institution jointly established and jointly financed by the Member States of the EMP, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF). In the perspective of the European Commission, this institution established by intergovernmental agreement is just one among thousands of projects. Its rules are set by a grant contract awarded by the European Commission, since this contract has a higher volume than any single government’s contribution. The ALF receives less than 2 million Euros per year from the European Commission; the envisaged 50 per cent increase does not alter the dimensions. In relation to the 16 billion Euros provided for the EMP from the EC general budget since 1995 – out of which roughly 90 per cent are spent on bilateral agreements between the EC and individual Mediterranean countries – such investments are marginal. Expectations at the ALF are in stark contrast to its human and financial resources. Due to a lack of financial allocations from both the EC and Member States, the Foundation had to cancel the only major event planned in the light of the Dialogue Year – holding the BJCEM Biennale for Young Artists from Europe and the Mediterranean for the first time in the Southern Mediterranean region, outside Europe. It had to be relocated to Europe, where governments are more easily inclined to finance cultural projects on their own territory. The activity mentioned in the Athens conclusions as “main activity” for the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue Year are the “1001 Actions for Dialogue”, with a total financial support from the ALF of 300,000 Euros, thinly spread among its 39 National Networks which bear the bulk of resources needed for actions in all countries. The European Commission provides 10 million Euros for flagship activities organized in its member countries for the “European” Dialogue Year 2008.

There is an urgent need for re-orienting cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean within the global context. Adding some more resources – which is expected after the transformation of the EMP into the “Union for the Mediterranean” – will not alter the nature of a cultural cooperation across

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the Mediterranean, caught in the cage of EU-led cultural policies. As long as cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean is conceived as an “aspect” of prefabricated EU policies, it will remain “culture light”. The Anna Lindh Foundation, with its own intergovernmental and civil society structures, provides important elements for designing Mediterranean cultural cooperation in its own right, co-owned by Northern and Southern partners. As soon as decision-making in the new Union for the Mediterranean would include financial decisions, another important factor for co-ownership would be established. The missing link would be a direct orientation within the new global context of cultural policies, thus overcoming the traditional habit of adapting EU cultural policies to the Mediterranean region as prerequisite for any new initiative.

Common ground for cultural cooperation

The following summary analysis of selected key documents focuses on main elements that seem to be widely shared and can thus be considered as common ground for contemporary cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean.

International declarations on cultural diversity

The World Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm 1998) endorsed key principles outlined in the “Report by the World Commission on Culture and Development (1996)”, in particular the appreciation of cultural diversity and cultural creativity. Cultural policies “should aim to create a sense of the nation as a multifaceted community – – rooted in values that can be shared by all men and women and give access, space and voice to all its members”. In qualifying social integration as a main objective of cultural policies which should be integrated into development and social policies, the Conference endorsed also the general thrust of the Report In from the margins, presented by the Council of Europe’s Task Force.

The Council of Europe’s Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2000) promotes “the co-existence and exchange of culturally different practices” and “the provision and consumption of culturally different services and products”. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) recognizes multiple, overlapping and dynamic cultural identities of individuals and groups in its definition of cultural pluralism. Cultural diversity is qualified as living treasure “that must not be perceived as being unchanging heritage but as a process guaranteeing survival of humanity”.

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The Council of Europe elaborated further its Diversity Declaration in the context of conflict prevention (Opatija Declaration, 2003), inter-faith cooperation (Volga Forum Declaration, 2006) and ICD Strategy (Faro Declaration, 2005) which marks the framework for formal cooperation with Southern Mediterranean partners, including Memoranda of Cooperation with ALECSO and the ALF.

Cultures and civilizations are also understood in plural in ISESCO’s Islamic Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2004) that acknowledges “the cultural and civilizational specificities of a nation and a people” and “the right of individuals and groups alike to preserve their cultures and civilizations”. The Declaration promotes inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue “receptive to the plural cultural convictions and beliefs”, and “cultural exchange and interaction between innovators in Islamic countries and their counterparts from other countries, giving impetus to creativity – –.”

The Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement adopted in September 2007 in Teheran a Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights and Diversity that is very explicit concerning the human right to cultural self-determination in calling “upon all members of the international community to guarantee the right of all to have access to a culture of their own and to develop it creatively, as well as their right and duty to know and respect other cultures”. Governments are encouraged to promote “understanding, tolerance and friendship among human beings in all their diversity of religion, belief, culture and language”.

ALECSO’s Abu Dhabi Declaration on the Arab Position on Dialogue and Diversity (2006) adds important standards for an intercultural dialogue about diversity. This Declaration establishes benchmarks for overcoming traditional forms of sterile “representative” dialogues with participants mainly propagating their own achievements and cultural backgrounds. The “principles for dialogue among equals” and the proposed methodology advocate “development of the spirit of self-criticism in order to eliminate the inherited and unfortunate tendency to overrate oneself and look down on the Other”.

International conventions on diversity and human rights

The Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development (1996) had prepared the ground for the new understanding of cultural diversity as humanity’s common heritage. Thus enlarging the previous notion of a world cultural heritage, the Report proposed standard-setting also for the so-

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called “intangible heritage”. With reference to safeguarding cultural diversity, the Universal Declaration (2001) advocates specific standards for intangible heritage which were outlined two years later in the UNESCO Convention on this subject (2003). The convention covers five domains: oral traditions including languages; performing arts; social practices; traditional knowledge, and traditional craftsmanship. It is the first cultural convention establishing a “human rights clause” in stating that “consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing human rights instruments”.4

This clause was considered necessary in order to prevent possible conflicts between standards on preservation and promotion of diversity and universal human rights. It is further developed in UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). Article 2.1 of this convention states: “Cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only if human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, information and communication, as well as the ability of individuals to choose cultural expressions, are guaranteed. No one may invoke the provisions of this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or guaranteed by international law, or to limit the scope thereof.” In this context, it was possible to agree on the principle of “the recognition of equal dignity of and respect for all cultures”.

New formats of cultural reporting

The new focus on modernization of cultural policies following the Stockholm Conference was translated by the Council of Europe in 1998 into an ambitious programme of reviews in the form of annually updated country profiles. The Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe is an online information and monitoring system. In 2007, its eighth edition was published, covering already 41 countries and aiming at servicing all 49 member countries of the European Cultural Convention. Cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue are two of several thematic areas in which statistical and other relevant information are collected and processed. Possibly the most important aspect for these two areas is the regular selection of good practices. The information system is open to exchange and cooperation with other regions. It is being offered as a tool for monitoring the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity at the European level. The signature of the cooperation memorandum between

4 UNESCO 2003, Art. 2.

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the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation and the Council of Europe in October 2005 was followed by the inclusion of exchange and cooperation with the Compendium project into the medium-term programme of the dialogue instrument for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2007–2009. The Compendium project was also presented to cultural conferences in Latin America and South-East Asia.

The first World Culture Report of UNESCO (2000) was an experiment in covering world-wide trends and developments. The sections on cultural diversity are of particular interest: They include the first attempt at correlating statistical data on bio-diversity with those on cultural diversity (exemplified by linguistic diversity).The new Medium-Term Strategy of UNESCO for 2008–2013 includes the project of further developing reporting and analysis on this issue.

In recent years, “diversity monitoring” became a new standard for reviewing the effects of policies aimed at social integration of immigrant populations. Thousands of public institutions and private companies have added information on ethnic, linguistic or even religious diversity of their employees and their customers into their annual reports. Particularly interesting was the inclusion of diversity monitoring into annual reviews of national media and international media associations. One of the first studies to apply this tool to content analysis of broadcasting was the study on Racism and cultural diversity in the media undertaken in 2000 and 2001 by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in Vienna, Austria. It inspired the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and many of its members as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Association of TV Broadcasters (COPEAM) to adopt such reporting for their constituencies and to publish guidelines on benchmarks and good practices in the management of cultural diversity.

The most comprehensive world report on diversity was published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as its Human Development Report 2004 – Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world. This report is a unique combination of statistical and policy analysis. It has found “little empirical evidence that cultural differences and clashes over values are in themselves a cause of violent conflict”. On the contrary, ”it is often the suppression of culturally identified groups that leads to tensions”. The Report provides ample evidence for the growing number of international declarations and strategies opposing any association of cultural or religious groups with violence. It supports all ambitions for conducting ICD as a dialogue among equals, as expressed in recent declarations on diversity and ICD.

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Another innovative format of reporting was presented by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in January 2008 with the first issue on “Islam and the West” of an Annual Report on the State of Dialogue. The Report relates polls on public perception of Islam–West encounters in various countries to policy analysis and to featuring of programmes and projects. It covers international politics, integration, religion, education and the media. Culture and arts are not directly the focus of this report which advocates mainly action in the fields of migration, education and the media as well as in inter-faith dialogue. Concerning ICD in general, the report provides evidence for the “centrality of respect” in Islam-West relations, and also for cultural diversity within the countries covered.

The recent report for the European Commission on national approaches to ICD in Europe, published in March 2008, has the programmatic title Sharing Diversity. It proposes a more central role of ICD in a number of EC programmes and strategies. The report itself relates, somehow similar to the WEF Report, data on public opinion to an analysis of diversity, mainly concerning migration, and activities in four selected sectors: education, culture (arts and heritage), youth and sports. Taking inspiration from the Council of Europe’s annually updated Compendium exercise, case studies and good practices are featured throughout the report. The report provides evidence for both that visible differences play a major role in discrimination, but also that the majority of EU citizens hold views in support of diversity and ICD. It covers 34 countries – 27 EU member countries and seven candidate countries –respective partners in the EEA/EFTA economic associations. It provides evidence for the argument that ICD has become increasingly important for national legislation and educational, cultural or social policies and their relationship with EU policies5.

Novel agendas and strategies for ICD

Ten years ago, the terms “dialogue between cultures” (Stockholm Conference) or “dialogue among civilizations” (United Nations General Assembly proclamation of the Dialogue Year 2001, following an initiative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1998) or ”dialogue among cultures and civilizations” (UNESCO) were predominantly used. Since these terms gave rise to some misunderstandings, as if such dialogue would be conducted by “representatives” and not by individuals and associations fully enjoying their human rights and their “freedom to make choices” (UNDP), the term

5 Eric Arts project group 2008.

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”intercultural dialogue” is now increasingly used. UNESCO uses, in its Medium Term Strategy 2008–2013, both terms simultaneously; the European Commission (with the European Year for ICD 2008) and the Council of Europe use mainly the term ICD. A closer analysis of selected agendas and strategies indicates that such terminological differences are not related to substantive differences, and that the understanding of cultural diversity is shared by the international community as a feature of relations between as well as within countries.

Almost all core elements of contemporary ICD strategies are already provided in the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 2001 at the end of the Dialogue Year. This agenda defines dialogue as “a process between and within civilizations, founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple perspectives through dialogue”. All of the ten elements listed below (in the conclusion) as shared ingredients of ICD are directly or indirectly covered in the principles and programme of action of this first Global ICD Agenda.

The following selected agenda and strategies do not differ in substance from the UN Global Agenda; they focus either on specific regional commitments and/or on specific fields or actors of ICD.

Dialogue between peoples and cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area is the title of the report by a high level advisory group, Prodi Groupe des Sages, established at the initiative of the President of the EC and published in October 2003. This report was the framework for the establishment of the Anna Lindh Foundation two years later. It provides substantive arguments for the need of ICD addressing the structural problems of the whole region, which is rich in diversity but widely lacking mutual respect between peoples and cultures. The strategy focuses on three priorities: learning about diversity; promoting mobility and exchanges; and the media as an instrument of equality and mutual knowledge.

The role of civil society in this region was the focus of a Euro-Mediterranean conference in February 2006 in Algiers, ending with an Algiers Declaration for Shared Vision of the Future and an action plan. The conference was organised by the European Movement together with its southern partners, including the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. The Declaration addresses problems caused by too much governmental action in the region and leading to a lack of ownership of the Euro-Mediterranean process among citizens. The action

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plan addresses, therefore, the need to reach out to and involve civil society as one of three priorities, side by side with ICD through education and integration of immigrants.

For Europe, more than 200 European and national civil society organizations have recently established the Rainbow Platform, a civil society platform for ICD. The Rainbow Paper (2008) focuses on migration, education and learning in the widest sense, including informal learning through arts and culture. In a similar vein, the Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform, in its “conclusions and recommendations to the Euro-Med Ministerial Conference on Culture” in Athens, proposes to “create a regional specific programme of support to contemporary artistic creation”. The Platform and the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Cultures (FEMEC) insist in applying the term “contemporary” – hitherto mainly used for Western arts and creation – to all cultures.

Widespread frustration about shallow results of so many dialogue events motivated a number of organizations to convene a conference in June 2005 in Rabat, Morocco, on ”Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations through Concrete and Sustainable Initiatives”. The convenors of this meeting and signatories of the Rabat Commitment were ALECSO, ISESCO, UNESCO, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Danish Centre for Culture and Development and the Council of Europe. The uniqueness of the Rabat Commitment is manifested in a joint document presenting pledges of the participating organizations for close collaboration in concrete action, ranging from education (with a joint teacher-training programme on cultural diversity and religious pluralism by ALECSO, the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Council of Europe) to culture and communication. Cultural projects include “the power of music and musical creativity”, and the transformation of museums into multicultural spaces, as well as synergies between bi- and multilateral cultural agreements.

The UN project of an Alliance of Civilizations results from a joint initiative by Spain and Turkey. The Report presented by a High Level Group in November 2006 departs from acknowledging that “the anxiety and confusion caused by the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory regrettably has distorted the terms of the discourse on the real nature of the predicament the world is facing”. Re-asserting that cultural diversity is “a driving force of human progress”, the Report proposes building bridges through action in four priority fields: education, youth, migration, and the media. Three of

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these fields are already translated into projects which are under way, with a clearing house on learning and teaching about religious pluralism, a Middle East Fund for youth employment, and a rapid response mechanism for the media concerning disputes over defamation of religion or other sensitive issues. The regional focus of the Alliance project is the Middle East, but the concept is on a world wide scale.

The White Paper on ICD of the Council of Europe entitled Living Together as Equals in Dignity was adopted by the Ministers’ Committee of the 27 Member States on 8 May 2008. The paper is based on the conviction that an ICD aiming at reconciling respect for different identities with the need to strengthen social cohesion must be based on universal human rights and fundamental freedoms. The strategy sets out what is needed to promote ICD through five policy approaches: democratic governance of cultural diversity, democratic citizenship and participation, learning and teaching intercultural competences, spaces for intercultural dialogue, intercultural dialogue in international relations. It underlines the importance of engendering spaces for dialogue that are open to all, and in this, the specific role of town planning and urban spaces, physical spaces like streets, markets and shops, schools and universities, cultural and social centres, youth clubs, churches, synagogues and mosques, company meeting rooms and workplaces, museums, libraries and other leisure facilities, but also virtual spaces like the media.

The role and potential of artists and arts, cultural creativity

and heritage

A large number of contemporary strategies for ICD tend to put specific weight on education, youth, and the media. Although these fields of action are fully justified, given present needs and the virtues of promoting the enlarged notion of “culture”, it seems timely to call for renewed attention to the core elements of cultural expression: creative arts and cultural heritage (tangible and intangible). Arts and heritage should not be reduced to vehicles of pedagogical action. In an international context characterized by an increasing number of verbal dialogue events, the potential of promoting dialogue, cooperation and understanding through creative arts and co-ownership of heritage deserves to be more fully developed. Music and creative arts provide a common language across linguistic, ethnic, or religious frontiers. Nothing is closer to the appreciation of diversity and mutual enrichment than music, arts and cultural heritage.

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The European Foundation for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH) and the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) expressed their “particular interest in demonstrating that art and culture have a special role in ICD because they question prejudices and stereotypes, break taboos, trigger curiosity, play with images and words, inspire and connect. They have the potential to give an inspirational and educational dimension to political endeavours, and can provide the spark for citizens to become interested in the challenge of ICD.”6 In a similar vein, the Rabat Commitment (2005) calls upon “all actors engaged in intercultural and inter-civilizational dialogue to tap the power of music and musical creativity”.

Cross-Mediterranean cooperation in the arts

The European Cultural Foundation (ECF) published, in February 2008, the most comprehensive report on critical issues in arts cooperation between Europe and its Southern neighbours on the other shore of the Mediterranean, An Alternative Gaze. The Report qualifies most of arts exhibitions and festivals as “unilateral, not reciprocal”: Art from Europe is brought to other countries, and art from the Arab States region is brought to Europe, “Otherness” is more in focus than exchange or cooperation. The report features also an increasing number of innovative projects, from music to arts festivals which are jointly organised by partners from North and South and focus on exchange and joint production. Generally, the report supports some optimism, in reflecting the growing number of cultural initiatives and operators in the South and increasing interest of European partners in cooperation among equals. The report proposes support to more direct cooperation between arts projects in South-East Europe and in the Arab States region.

Resulting from cooperative research between European and Arab philosophers and arts specialists, the recent publication The Arts in the Dialogue between Cultures reflects the multiple perspectives in Europe and the Arab World on pictures in everyday life, on literature and music7.

Museums

The “Museum With No Frontiers” (MWNF) is one of the few cultural projects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was able to develop its own structures and financing. It started with promoting the concept of digital (and thus widely accessible) museum collections and developed a cooperative

6 Rainbow Platform 2008, 3.7 Wulf et al. 2007/2008.

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approach between museum experts and artists from North and South. Two of the most interesting recent projects are the ”Young MWNF”, bridging between museum pedagogy and arts education at schools, and “Discover Islamic Art”, the first project on Islamic Arts jointly undertaken by specialists from Europe and the Arab States.

Culture and music festivals

The Biennale of Young Artists from Europe and the Mediterranean (BJCEM), founded in 1985, was the first arts festival organised in cooperation between local and national arts associations from North and South (today: 75 institutions in 20 countries). The Biennale invites young artists (under 30 years) to present their skills and talent in seven areas, which increasingly involve everyday culture: visual arts (including performance and other action in public places), applied arts (including fashion), show, literature, music (including DJs), gastronomy, and moving images. The project has tried for many years to hold the Biennale in one of the Southern countries – the last project in Egypt could not be realised due to lack of both local and European funding for such unconventional cooperative events outside Europe; the 13th BJCEM Biennale was organised from 22 to 31 May 2008 in Puglia, Italy.

Among the Arts Festivals searching new ground and operating within an international art discourse are the Istanbul and Sharjah Biennials and the new Art Dubai. Bringing arts to public spaces is a common feature. The Istanbul Biennial recently reached out to other cities, with its programme “culture in action”. It includes art production in public space, and bringing artists together with visitors of shopping centres.

The European Arts Festivals Association has recently expressed a keen interest in introducing more cooperation and exchange in European Arts Festivals. In its Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue (2008) the arts promoters express their interest in contributing to transforming multicultural into intercultural societies, to strengthen the coexistence of different cultural identities and beliefs – – and to look respectfully at the differences of individual and local experiences”. The Declaration expresses commitment “to give artists from all over the world the opportunity of increasing and developing their artistic experience, thus initiating a process of mutual exchange of artistic excellence among different countries.” In this context, the Association highlights the importance of artists-in-residence-programmes, allowing “artists to live and work in new contexts and to combine their own experience with the local one”.

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In the field of music, the Marseille-based project Aide aux Musiques Innovatrices (AMI), founded in 1999, has inspired a new wave of mutual interest and joint production between creators of contemporary popular music in Europe and the Arab region. A series of Euro-Mediterranean Music Festivals, recording of cross-over and joint performances, and a system of awards for musical exchange has been organised. The most recent example is the “Monte Carlo–Doualiya Music Award for the Dialogue between Cultures”, established in 2007 by RFI, with financial support from the ALF, in partnership with the Festival of Jerash, Jordan; the Palestinian Edward Said National Conservatory of Music and the Austrian International Music and Media Centre. The award criteria focus on young performers’ creativity in using the power of music to build bridges between countries and cultures.

Mobility

Exchange of ideas in word and image, exchange of cultural goods and services, and exchange of persons are the three classical aspects of mobility which are reflected in virtually every international cultural agreement concluded over the last 60 years. Almost every local cultural identity now includes cultural elements that have found their way into the most remote and closed communities, thus forming new “transcultural identities” as a key dimension of cultural diversity in the 21st century8. It seems, however, that mobility of persons is much more unevenly distributed than mobility of information, goods and services.

“Free international movement of artists” and their freedom “to practice their art in the country of their choice” is among the international standards agreed upon with the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist (1980). Artists and other cultural actors from the Arab region, and, to a lesser extent, artists from non-EU Member States of South-East and Eastern Europe, are in a particularly difficult situation.

Recent data from the World Observatory on the Status of the Artist and the recent study on Artistic Mobility in the Mediterranean, undertaken by the Roberto Cimetta Fund in conjunction with the Council of Europe, ECF and UNESCO (2007), reveal a number of root causes and obstacles: surprisingly, it is, in many cases, not the post 9/11 visa regime that is considered the most important factor. It is the lack of funding opportunities and of relevant mobility programmes, followed by a lack of information about the few existing mobility schemes available for artists and other cultural actors. In

8 Robbins 2006.

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addition, existing funding schemes give support mainly on a case-by-case and individual basis.

A Comprehensive strategy for mobility in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, presented by the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Robert Cimetta Fund in autumn 2006 to several civil society and intergovernmental meetings, goes, therefore, beyond advocating facilitation of visa procedures. It recommends “a coherent cultural strategy with measures for improving conditions of equal partnership between North and South”, including “training and provision of advisory services enabling cultural actors – – in the South to organize a larger number of exchange and cooperation projects in the South”. The strategy recommends also to “transform support schemes to individual mobility into fostering exchanges”. Even grant schemes which are deliberately based on the principle of equality (such as the Anna Lindh Foundation’s 2+2 formula for North-South cooperation) noted a significant dominance of project leaders and coordinators from the North, and have, therefore, included elements for capacity-building among cultural actors in the South.

The same applies to the European Cultural Foundation (ECF). Concerning mobility and ICT, the 1997 World Congress on the implementation of the Recommendation on the Status of the Artist concludes: “the new technologies cannot be a substitute for direct contact between artists and their public or for traditional branches of the arts”.

The Report on Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area by Prodi Groupe des Sages in 2003 warns against restricting exchange and networking to virtual communication, since only meetings in physical locations, with face-to-face contact, can offer ”experience of all aspects of dialogue”.

Conclusion

The following core elements, as elaborated in the Declarations, Conventions, agendas and strategies analyzed above, can be considered common ground for cultural cooperation in the global context. They could, therefore, directly be used as shared values of cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean, and become a toolbox for overcoming the “culture light” syndrome that has affected cultural relations across the Mediterranean:

Cultural diversity between and within countries is a common heritage of humankind,cultural diversity and promotion of creativity are essential for sustainable development, economic development as well as all-

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round personal development,a human rights-based understanding of culture as both heritage and space for access and creativity: cultural policies must be based on universally shared human rights and fundamental freedoms,the “human rights clause” of international standards concerning cultural diversity,recognition of multiple and overlapping cultural identities of persons and groups,individuals and associations as actors in ICD; the role of civil society,equality, dignity and mutual respect as key factors of ICD,the understanding of ICD as an opportunity for learning,preservation, development and management of cultural diversity, respecting identities, fostering pluralism and participation, and promotion of creativity as objectives of cultural policies in close interaction with other fields of policy,priority fields of action are education, culture, media; priority groups are youth, migrants and women.

These standards invite governments to link international with national and local cultural policies, and to enhance the contribution of cultural policies to improving the quality of life of citizens at large. In promoting “dialogue” as an encounter that “starts with the assumption that the other might (also) be right” (as outlined in one of the masterpieces of 20th century philosophy, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, and reflected in a number of classical works of Arab philosophy), cultural cooperation and ICD among equals can transform into action the body of international commitments on cultural diversity as a common heritage of humankind, which are reflecting widespread acknowledgment of the constant process of mutual enrichment of cultures.

It will be interesting to monitor the post-Athens development of cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean. There will be, among other things related to the global context, possible synergies with the Council of Europe which will organize, for the first time, a joint Ministers of Culture Conference on ICD with ALECSO, ISESCO, and the ALF 2–3 December 2008 in Baku, Azerbaijan.

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References

Documents, Declarations and Conventions

ALECSO (2005): Dialogue among Cultures: Frame of Reference, Achievements and Strategic Prospects. Tunis.

ALESCO (2007): “The Abu Dhabi Declaration on the Arab Position on Dialogue and Diversity: Dialogue with the Other – Rationale and Principles. Abu Dhabi, 7 January 2006”, in UNESCO: Dialogue among Civilizations. Paris.

ALF (2007): “Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation and Arab League High Level Expert Group: ‘Overcoming Major Misconceptions in Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue’, Cairo, 15–16 October 2006”, in: UNESCO: Dialogue among Civilizations. Paris.

[ALF & Cimetta Fund (2006)]: Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation and Roberto Cimetta Fund (2006): “Towards a comprehensive strategy for mobility in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, September 2006, Paris, in T. Schoefthaler (2007): Adventures in Diversity. New Avenues for the Dialogue between Cultures. Bonn: German Commission for UNESCO, 51–54.

Cimetta Fund (2007): Study on Mobility of Artists in the Southern Mediterranean. Final Report. December 2007 (French). Study undertaken by the Roberto Cimetta Fund in conjunction with the Council of Europe, the European Cultural Foundation and UNESCO.

Council of Europe (1954): European Cultural Convention.

Council of Europe (2000): Declaration on Cultural Diversity.

Council of Europe (2003): Opatja Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention.

Council of Europe (2005): Faro Declaration on the Council of Europe’s Strategy for Developing Intercultural Dialogue.

Council of Europe (2006): Volga Forum Declaration.

Council of Europe (2007): Compendium: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. 8th edition. http://www.culturalpolicies.net.

Council of Europe (2008): White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: “Living Together as Equals in Dignity.”

EC/Commission of the European Communities (2007): “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World.” Document SEC (2007) 570 COM (2007), 242 final, Brussels, 10.05.2007.

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EricArts project group (2008): Sharing Diversity. Report to the European Commission on Intercultural Dialogue in EU and candidate countries. March 2008. Brussels.

EUMC (2000–2001): Racism and cultural diversity in the media. Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.

Euro-Arab Task Force of National Commissions for UNESCO, ALECSO, and ISESCO (2004): “The Euro-Arab Dialogue ‘Learning to Live Together’ – an inter-regional strategy”. Report by Fatma Tarhouni and Traugott Schoefthaler, in UNESCO-IBE, Prospects, 23, no. 4, 2004.

Euro-Med Non-Governmental Platform and Euro-Med Forum of Cultures (FEMEC): “Conclusions and Recommendations to the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Culture, Athens, 29–30 May 2008”. [Euro-Med Forum of Arts for Peace, Bari, Italy, 23–25 May 2008].

Euro-Med Partnership (2008): “Agreed Conclusions of the third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Culture, Athens, 29–30 May 2008” (Partenariat EuroMed, doc. de séance No. 139/08 en date du 30.05.2008).

EuroMeSCo (2005): Barcelona Plus. Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States. Lisbon.

European Cultural Foundation (ECF) (2008): An Alternative Gaze. A shared reflection on cross-Mediterranean cooperation in the arts. Amsterdam.

European Festivals Association (EFA): Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue. Signed in Ljubljana 7–8 January 2008, http://www.efa-aef.eu.

European Movement (2006): Algiers Declaration for a Shared Vision of the Future. Adopted by the Civil Society Congress convened by the European Movement and its Mediterranean Committee, Comité Algérie, the Bibliotheca Alexandrina and the Anna Lindh Foundation, Algiers 24–26 February 2006.

European Task Force on Culture and Development (1997): In from the Margins. A contribution to the debate on Culture and Development in Europe. Strasbourg, Council of Europe.

ISESCO (2002): White Book on Dialogue among Civilizations. Rabat.

ISESCO (2004): Islamic Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Rabat.

ISESCO 2007: Tripoli Commitments on “Renewing cultural policies in the Islamic World and adapting them to international changes”. Adopted by the 5th Islamic Conference of Culture Ministers, Tripoli 21–23 November 2007.

Non-Aligned Movement (2007): Tehran Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights and Cultural Diversity, adopted at the NAM Ministerial

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Meeting in Tehran, 3 and 4 September 2007. New York: UN General Assembly document A/62/464

Prodi Grope des Sages (2003): Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. Report by the High-Level Advisory Group established at the initiative of the President of the European Commission. Brussels, October 2003.

Rabat Commitment on Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations through concrete and sustainable initiatives (ALECSO, ISESCO, OIC, ALF, UNESCO, Council of Europe, DCCD), 16 June 2005, in UNESCO, Dialogue among Civilizations, Paris 2007.

Rainbow Platform (2008): Practice makes perfect, a learning framework for Intercultural Dialogue. The Rainbow Paper from the Civil Society Platform for Intercultural Dialogue. Brussels 7 January 2008.

UN (2001): Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations. Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 November 2001. Document A/Res/56/6.

UN (2006): Alliance of Civilizations: Report of the High Level Group. 13 November 2006. New York: United Nations.

UNDP (2004): Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. New York.

UNESCO (1980): Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist.

UNESCO (1996): Our Creative Diversity. Report by the World Commission on Culture and Development.

UNESCO (1997): “World Congress on the Implementation of the Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist, Final Declaration, Paris 16–20 June 1997.”

UNESCO (1998): “Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development: Action Plan adopted on 2 April 1998 in Stockholm.”

UNESCO (2000): World Culture Report.

UNESCO (2001): Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity.

UNESCO (2003): Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage.

UNESCO (2005): Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

UNESCO (2005/2007): “Dialogue among Civilizations. International Conference: Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations through Concrete and Sustainable Initiatives.” Rabat, Morocco, 14–16 June 2005. Paris 2007.

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UNESCO (2006/2008): New Stakes for Intercultural Dialogue. Acts of the International Seminar Paris, 6–7 June 2006. Paris: UNESCO.

UNESCO (2008): Medium-Term Strategy 2008–2013. Paris. (“Objective 4: Fostering cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and a culture of peace”).

World Commission on Culture and Development (1996): Our Creative Diversity.

World Economic Forum (2008): Islam and the West. Annual Report on the State of Dialogue. January.

Bibliography

Derrida, Jacques (2006): “Hospitality”, in Lasse Thomassen (ed.) The Derrida-Habermas Reader. Edinburgh. (Original in French, 1999).

Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975): Truth and Method. London. (Original in German,1960).

Robbins, Kevin (2006): Final Report on cultural policy and cultural identities for the Council of Europe. March. Strasbourg.

Schoefthaler, Traugott (2007): Adventures in Diversity. New Avenues for the Dialogue between Cultures. Bonn: German Commission for UNESCO (also published online: www.unesco.de under section “publications”).

Wulf, Christoph, Jacques Poulain & Fathi Triki (eds.) (2007/2008): The Arts in the Dialogue between Cultures. Europe and its Muslim Neighbours. Berlin 2007 (German); Paris 2008 (French); Rabat 2008 (Arabic).


Islamic Cairo imagined: from a historical

city slum to a time machine for tourism?

Susanna Myllylä

Introduction

Whether in Beijing, Tampere, or Cairo, old historical city centres are becoming silently obsolete, thus losing their traditional identity. It is happening due to modernization and urban gentrification processes comprising authorities’ neglect, land speculation and demolition, increase in property prices, and out-migration of low-income population. In many instances, these areas serve today as so-called historical city slums, and it is rather difficult to trace the original buildings which have been covered by newer urban fabric. Thus some cities have awakened to the preservation of their vanishing historical core areas.

In my essay, I will discuss the situation of Islamic or historic Cairo, and the contesting images and claims that different interest groups or actors have about the city. The actors discussed include the Egyptian government, various international donors and institutions (e.g. United Nations), the Egyptian and international planners and conservationists and, last but not least, the local residents. Making an overall plan to develop tourism and to preserve this national and global cultural heritage domain while, at the same time, meeting the needs of the residents seems to be a very tricky task. A question arises: is Islamic Cairo’s upgrading primarily done for global audience, or tourism, at the expense of the local needs? On the other hand, this case epitomizes the difficulties that developing countries often face, when receiving international pressure to both improve and sustain the urban heritage, and simultaneously to upgrade local peoples’ livelihoods.

Islamic expressions in space

Using the concept Islamic City bears some complex entailments to be considered. Janet L. Abu-Lughod reminds us that, since Islam has expanded into wide regions with disparate traditions of urban form, there exists a great diversity in Islamic architecture, and it is not relevant to discuss a single Islamic system of city building, or Islamic City. However, she remarks that

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there “appear to be certain basic ‘deep structures’ to the language of Islamic expression in space”, and she also discerns recurring idioms (or colloquial metaphors) commonly found within Islamic urban patterns. These are: i) sūq or bazaar; ii) the residential court; iii) the hidden entranceway to individual quarters; iv) the tri-fold division of space (private, controlled semi-private, and public); and v) a clear segregation into male and female spheres (presumably an underlying cause of the previous features).1 The deeper structure, in turn, was constituted in the legal system, through regulations of property relations and by legal notions of proper behaviour in space. In addition, the dynamic between building and context has always been part of the Islamic system known as waqf.2 This is the case in Cairo’s Fatimid Mosque of Salih Tala’i (1160), for example, where the rents of the twelve shops built into its façade used to assist in the costs of the mosque’s upkeep and personnel. Besides mosques, houses and palaces, the Islamic city also included madrasas (schools), hammams (public baths), wikalas or caravanserais (khans), and sabil-kuttabs (covered water fountains combined with school classes upstairs)3. The basic urban unit was hara, a resident quarter, according to which also various ethnic groups were segregated in the old city4.

Islamic Cairo comprises a land area of nearly four square kilometres, and it is located to the east of central Cairo megapolis. The city was built during numerous dynasties, namely the Fatimids (969–1168), the Ayyubids (1169–1250), the Mamluks (1250–1348) and the Ottomans (1517–1798), each leaving their marks in the urban fabric.5 From the steps of the minaret of Ibn Tulun Mosque, which draws a borderline for the historic area in the south, one can clearly see Cairo’s division into modern and traditional subcities. The mosque’s 40 meters tall minaret, resembling a tower of Babel, serves as a surprisingly tranquil site to watch the busy city; in peace from above as loud traffic voices become fainted. Its open courtyard represents both a modern urban anomaly and a peaceful oasis in the midst of horizontally and vertically growing megacity, where empty space is a scarce and highly competed commodity. In the west, Port Said Street is the border or bridge between different worlds. In the horizon of the northern boundary loom Bab al-Nasr and Bab al-Futuh gates, along with the city wall. In the northeast, one

1 Abu-Lughod 1978.2 Pl. awqaf, transfer of money or property donated to an institution. Williams 2002; Abu-Lughod 1978.3 See e.g. Raymond 1993.4 Ibid., 277–278.5 Raymond 1993; Rodenbeck 1998, 66–71.

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can see Al-Azhar Mosque and University as well as Khan el-Khalili bazaar. In the south-east, numerous domes and minarets of the largest mosques – Mohammad ‘Ali, Al-Rifai and Sultan Hassan Mosque – dominate the view, as well as the entire Citadel of Mohammad ‘Ali.

The major spine of the historic Cairo is the Al-Muizz Street, stretching from the northern Bab al-Futuh to the southern Bab Zuwayla gate with a distance of 1.5 km. Continuing southwards from the gate and towards the adjacent Mosque of Salih Tala’i is the Tentmakers’ market, Radwan Bey Qasaba, which is an extension of the major spine. The long market avenue, qasaba, is also situated on the north-south axis between the northern gates and Ibn Tulun Mosque. Each its section has a different name, like the Tentmakers or the Brassmakers, and the medieval historian Al-Maqrisi counted a total of 12,000 shops within its area6. This Tentmakers area is also Cairo’s only remaining covered market, built in the 17th century7. Its roof is dilapidated by time, and sunlight shines through the wooden ceiling. From the Tentmakers’ area, by following Darb al-Ahmar Street and towards the Mosque Sultan Hassan, the route finally leads to the mosque of Ibn Tulun. Furthermore, the whole Islamic city is divided into two parts by the east-west route, Al-Azhar Road, and extensive medieval cemeteries, “Cities of the Dead”, surround the entire area with their important historical monuments.

Unlike in modern city centres, which immediately become empty as the shops and lights are closed, Cairo seems to raise its stamina and offer warmth and security when the dark falls. This is a special case of historic Cairo, which seems to still endorse some of the traditional lifestyles that have attracted visitors for centuries. For the Cairenes it has remained a place for social, religious and commercial activities. An Egyptian writer and journalist describes the core of historic Cairo as follows:

“– – Al Azhar University and the Al Hussein mosque, surrounded by dozens of other mosques that are lit up and come alive at night, calling to one another with the ebbing and flowing of the vast Cairo crowd – – I never tire of weaving my way with friends at night through the latticework of streets and alleyways in this neighbourhood where the soul of Cairo never sleeps. Anything can happen on Al Batiniya Street.”8

6 Rodenbeck 1998, 104.7 See Raymond 1993, 236–237. 8 Gharib 2000.

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When looking at the view from the roof of the Mosque of al-Mu’ayyad, attached to the Bab Zuwayla gate, one can not only see a large number of minarets and domes, however. The “second city” phenomenon is related to the problems of poor housing conditions, as rooftops are used for keeping livestock and poultry, as well for workshops, and as rubbish dumps9. At the street level, old buildings disappear behind various everyday activities of the local people, such as drying of laundries on the old palace walls, or cooking on the alleys. The character of the old city is imbued in the busy life of the narrow streets, where the local people express their traditional right for the use of public space – for family events and the like. Here, the concept of al-Fina is particularly meaningful, describing the relationship between the inner space of a building, its frontage, and part of the street pavement10.

Despite its grand architectural and traditional cultural heritage, Islamic Cairo today thus also represents one of the most densely populated and poorest parts of the city. However, before going to the historic Cairo’s contemporary development questions, I would like to bring up its Northern connections with a short historical view to the images of the early visitors from the North.

Old Cairo seen by Finnish and other Nordic Orientalists

Cairo’s cosmopolitan city landscapes and lifestyles, especially concerning its historical quarters, offered an ideal place for escapism and romanticism from the 18th to early 20th century visitors, and Nordic travellers were not an exception. Our famous Orientalist, professor G.A. Wallin stayed nearly half a year in the old quarters of Cairo, where he ended up living in a caravanserai, or a roadside inn combined with a warehouse. These places, meant for the reception of merchants and their goods, were built in multi-storey houses so that camels and other animals could stay in the bottom floor, while the men and their goods were accommodated in the upper floors. Edward W. Lane reported that, in the beginning of the 19th century, there were about 200 wikalas in the city area, three-fourths of which were within the part that constituted the original city11. In 1844, Wallin described his housing preparations:

“– – I took a room from a big wekâle, where mainly the Greek lived, but that wing where I settled down, was nearly empty, as there was

9 Myllylä 2001, 78–79; Myllylä 1994.10 Antoniou 1998.11 Lane 1836/1989, 316.

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only a hearty tailor living there. It is located in the busiest part of the city, Gemelije, close to the large Khan el-khalîli bazaar and quite close to the largest mosque, Azhar. I must now take care of purchasing the most necessary furniture there, because the rooms, which are two and a kitchen, had no more than bare walls and about three inches high martaba bricked in one wall. This martaba, equipped with mattresses and cushions, and covered by a cotton quilt, serves a typical divan here. Fortunately there are windows and glasses here, which are rare in this city; but many window panes are broken and frames so sparse that currently starting khamasîn (hot wind) brings flying dust inside.”12

In which one of the many Cairo’s wikalas did Wallin stay then? Although he did not explicitly name this caravanserai here, by comparing his descriptions to André Raymond’s work on the Ottoman city structure of Cairo,13 we can assume that, in Gamaliyya, Wallin most probably stayed in either Musafirkhana, the “palace of travelers” (built 1779–1788), or – as Wallin’s references to the large size of the place could suggest – in Wikala Dhulfiqar Katkhuda (1673), one of Cairo’s greatest caravanserais serving the main centres of coffee trade in the city and abroad. The latter was a huge building with 35 apartments and 32 warehouses, comprising 2,625 square meters altogether14. Had Wallin arrived to this caravanserai in our modern times, he unfortunately could not have entered the building, since its door or entrance is all that is left. Musafirkhana, in turn, was particularly famous for its wooden ceilings and windows, being even more splendid than another palace, Bayt al-Suhaymi (1648), one of the finest examples of the Ottoman domestic architecture. Musafirkhana was entirely destroyed by fire in 1998. Currently, only 20 wikalas still remain in the city, and among the best conserved is a wikala called al-Ghouri (1504).

In the late 18th century, a member of the Danish expedition group, the mathematician Carsten Niebuhr, made detailed notes on Cairo’s urban structure and trade15. The Swedish explorer Peter Forsskål, born in Helsinki, was also a member of this group. Besides his botanical and zoological research, he liked to watch various caravans arriving at Cairo. One caravan could consist of thousands of camels, and the items they carried ended up to the markets. Forsskål made note of the contents of the caravans as the tradesmen arrived

12 Aro & Salonen 1989, 48. Translation by the author.13 Raymond 1995, 54–57.14 Raymond 1995, 258–259.15 Hansen 1963/1996, 94.

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to market places and caravanserais: from Africa came ivory, speaking parrots, various ages of slaves and gold sand for alchemists; diamonds were brought from Mecca, as well as emeralds, pearls, Indian cotton, and musk animals.16

Concerning the local culture, Niebuhr emphasized the importance of becoming like the Egyptians: for him the “Arab’s rope means same as the myth’s robe, which makes its carrier invisible”.17 Also Wallin tried to get an “accurate” habitus when wandering in the streets of Old Cairo:

“– – I had tried to get Oriental apathy and impassivity to my walk and succeeded in it so well that they considered me a Muslim. – – But I missed a lot that satisfaction, which can be seen in people’s faces when they are sitting idle and talking. But now [during the Ramadan], from where could the contented mind come, when they are not allowed to enjoy a pipe and coffee?”18

In the late 19th century, due to increasing tourism and also photography, exotics gave way to new images of poverty and exploitation, which decreased the Orientalists’ interest to the East19. Exotic views have persisted among the visitors, and this concerns the observing women as well as men. In the late 1920s, a Finnish traveller, soprano Hjördis Tilgmann alias Pia Ravenna, created an international career with an Italian opera group around Egypt. She visited one rich harem in Cairo, and unfolded the local women’s “qualifications” as follows:

“– – the Egyptian men prefer a plump, if not fat wife. That’s why the bride is put on fattening diet before the wedding, so that she would better please the man and also that a better price could be demanded for her.”20

At about the same time, the Finnish explorer, Professor Arthur Hjelt was puzzled with another type of local phenomenon while he was looking at the basic structures of Cairo’s historic buildings:

“Gold treasures did not the pyramids hide in their bosom but rather limitless amounts of precious building stones. The Arabs benefited

16 Ibid., 91–94.17 Ibid., 269.18 Aro & Salonen 1989, 66, 84. Translation by the author.19 Öhrnberg 1984.20 Ravenna 1949, 51. Translation by the author.

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from them diligently when they built mosques to Cairo. Even one of Egypt’s rulers is said to have ordered the pyramids to be torn down.”21

Today, we can still make similar observations and, indeed, the Egyptians seem to have well known how to recycle building materials even between the millenia, including threshold stones for historic Cairo’s mosques and private houses. In this lengthy process, the Europeans have all too often played the last part:

“Black granite obelisk of Ramses II [1290–1224 BC], re-used by Merneptah and Sethos II [1214–1204 BC], perhaps usurped from Middle Kingdom [2050–1780 BC] – – used as threshold in a house in Cairo, now in Berlin Museum.”22

Just like the pyramids have had to endure the construction of the historic Cairo, this previously magnificent urban district faces its own threats in the modern times. In the following section, I will discuss this and the related problems.

Threats for the historic district

Unlike other cities, such as Baghdad, the historic Cairo with its monuments in the walled city of al-Qahira, have never faced a full-on attack from an enemy force. It is thereby one of the world’s few historic cities left intact. Today, a visitor can find many of the same monuments and landmarks as those mentioned in writings by medieval historians, such as Al-Maqrizi and Ibn Battuta.23 In architectural terms, the historic Cairo is the largest, most complex, and richest area on the World Heritage list24. Whilst conservative estimates may state that around 450 monuments should be considered historic and deserve restoration, according to more liberal views the number is up to 630. In addition, more than 500 private houses have received a historic status.25 According to the Documentation Centre for Islamic Monuments, in 2000, there were 175 Islamic monuments in historic Cairo, 138 of which were to come under the control of the Ministry of Endowment. The Supreme Council of Antiquities was responsible for another 30, and the remaining seven were

21 Hjelt 1929, 47. Translation by the author.22 Rodenbeck 1998, 36–37.23 Aslan 2006; Raymond 1993.24 Williams 2002.25 Aslan 2006.

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private properties.26 Keith Sutton and Wael Fahmi point out that, while it may be debatable whether Old Cairo is comparable to other North African medina cores, there are similarities in their approaches to urban conservation and the related heritage problems.27

New city quarters were built in the 19th and early 20th centuries, through indigenous efforts or colonizers, attracting local aristocracy who moved out from the old city. The places they vacated became filled with a growing number of working-class and lower-income residents. The implications of such a demographic change were significant for both social and the physical conditions in the old area.28

It is estimated that currently more than 300,000 people live in this historical area, half of whom live below the poverty line29. The previously mentioned Gamaliyya district is estimated to have 600–800 persons per hectare30. Cairo, like many other historical city cores, such as Delhi, Dhaka, Karachi and Istanbul, has its own specific historic city slum. Usually slums are defined as having high commercial densities and overcrowding, decaying housing stock, as well as levels of services and infrastructure originally suited for much smaller populations. The streets are usually too narrow and irregular to accommodate cars, lorries, and refuse-collection vehicles, and the lack of public space is very apparent. Dilapidated infrastructure includes leaking drains and water supply pipes, and electricity and telephone cables – many of which are unofficial – tend to hang over the streets. Buildings in slums are often subject to ownership disputes, feuds, claims and counterclaims, all of which make it difficult for the properties to be redeveloped as, in the mean time, the buildings go neglected and unmaintained by the authorities. The economic return is often negated by rent control which, in turn, encourages owners to withdraw maintenance, hence further accelerating the decline.31

In old areas, there are numerous problems due to neglect and slummification throughout the system. The overriding problem of Islamic Cairo is the rising underground water table, most of which is due to the leaking 19th century pipes and sewers – itself a system overpowered by the influx of new residents. Old cities often have an underground layer of very

26 El-Aref 2000.27 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.28 Abu-Lughod 1978.29 Aslan 2006; Antoniou 1998.30 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.31 UN-HABITAT 2003, 86–89.

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fine dust (habitation sediment), which creates an artificial water table above the natural one. Due to the dry conditions of Cairo’s atmosphere, water is sucked up into the foundations and walls of the monuments. Furthermore this water, containing sewage and waste, is full of acids that also attack the stonework of the buildings – a fundamental problem to be dealt with before any lasting restoration can be done.32

The lack of public services constantly causes irreversible damages to old buildings. This was the case when the precious Musafirkhana Palace burned down in 1998: The incident erupted when the residents set fire to piles of refuse in front of the palace, and its wooden gate caught fire by accident. Flames quickly spread to the palace itself, and it took five hours for the firefighters to put out the blaze that devoured the rich woodwork of the palace, leaving only the walls standing. A fire brigade source blamed the Cairo Governorate’s poor rubbish collection service for the tragedy.33 Before Musafirkhana’s total destruc tion, it was used as an artists’ workshop.

The road tunnel under the busy Al-Azhar district, and other large scale changes in the use of land have commercialised former residential areas. This, in turn, has brought in polluting activities, like marble and tinsmith workshops, that produce waste and noise, thus leading to further degradation of the area34. However, already medieval Cairo suffered from environmental conditions we tend to think of as modern phenomena: Air pollution was a problem even in the 11th century and, the accumulation of waste has been a side effect of human development throughout the history. Indeed, passing through Bab Zuwayla gate one walks at the same height as the 11th century Cairenese rode their camels.35

Dilapidated old buildings and their poor residents are particularly vulnerable to various natural catastrophes. In 1992, Cairo had a strong earthquake, which hit the area and further deteriorated the historic buildings. Within just 20 seconds, over a hundred monuments were affected, and the 14th and 15th century structures along Shari‘ Saliba (the street from the Mosque of Ibn Tulun to the Citadel) experienced the worst damage. Minarets and domes collapsed, and buildings suffered cracks. However, much of the damage was an exacerbation of conditions resulting from years of neglect and population

32 Williams 2002.33 Darwish 1998.34 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.35 Rodenbeck 1998, 119, 121.

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congestion.36 When I visited the historic area a year after the incident, the impacts were still apparent. The beautiful Turkish blue tiles of the Mosque of Aqsunqur (or Blue Mosque) had bad looking cracks, and climbing to the minaret of Al-Hakim Mosque was not recommended as it was partly tilted.

Upgrading efforts – but for whom?

“The conservation of historic Cairo has made the whole area as a massive construction project. – – These days it seems as if nearly every historic monument, including mosques, madrasas and old palaces, are closed to conservation projects. Workers, in their work-worn clothes and bare feet, can be seen climbing over precarious scaffolding and sitting on piles of stones sipping tea in front of many monuments in the area.”37

There are several policy alternatives in the context of historical monument “preservation/ restoration”: First, in the “Dead Museum” approach, buildings are reconstructed to some original state, and then guarded against deterioration. In practice, this implies restrictions in the use of buildings, and hence the name of the policy. Second, partial restoration of deteriorated monuments is an approach which “tries to evoke a sense of history rather than to create a movie set”. Although more authentic than the previous one, this policy too has a sense of “under glass” preservation of a functionally vacuous monument. A third alternative is to reconstruct or reconstitute the original form of a structure, or set of structures, but for a new use via transformation. Fourth, a monument can be regenerated or revitalized so that earlier forms and functions are adapted to contemporary needs. It may include reconstruction or rehabilitation of existing buildings, but “must also involve continual replenishment of the stock of useful and beautiful elements in the quarter in a harmonious way”. Abu-Lughod prefers the last approach since, unlike the others, it emphasizes that the target is to preserve a dynamic community. As for Cairo, its old, so-called Islamic city has been a living city that has constantly renewed itself.38

In Cairo, numerous periods and actors can be found in conservation projects that vary from restoration to rehabilitation:

36 Williams 2002.37 Aslan 2006.38 Abu-Lughod 1978.

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Already more than a hundred years ago, the 1. ‘Comité’ by a group of Egyptians and foreigners (1881) aimed to record and preserve more than 600 structures. According to Aslan, in spite of some mistakes in its conservation methodology, the role of the group was essential in diverting attention to this urban heritage.39

The 2. Foreign missions (since the 1970s), consisting of French, Italian, Danish, German, American and Polish missions have, with their “purist methodology of conservation”, received much appreciation in restoration of single buildings. An exception was the so-called Bohra Mission group, which received strong criticism of their restoration work from the academic world of conservators and art historians, which eventually led to the refusal of the Bohras to carry out more projects in Cairo.40

In 3. UNESCO Plan (1980), followed by the declaration of the historic Cairo as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, 450 monuments were listed under UNESCO protection. The plan has remained as a “paper project”, however.41

The 4. Greater Cairo Region Master Plan (1988) included historic Cairo as part of the Homogeneous Sector No. 1. It addressed building control regulations, infrastructure upgrades and requested more open space. In addition, it formally acknowledged the area’s value for tourism, seeking to relocate business activities elsewhere “whilst keeping retailing and handcraft workshops within the main historical spine”. Conservation of buildings was prioritized according to their reuse for various social and cultural activities. The historical city already being an attraction for tourists, the raising of awareness amongst the local people, and developing their commercial activities so as to promote the area’s socio-economic and cultural role were also recognized as targets in the plan.42

From 1988 to 1991, 5. French-Egyptian planning and research body IAURIF/GOPP aimed to encompass whole districts. It had three schemes of

39 Aslan 2006.40 Bohra Mission’s leader is the Imam of a branch of Ismaili Shiism. As the Bohras claimed descent from the Fatimid dynasty, their representatives traveled to Cairo to search for their roots and thus also restored several mosques, such as Al-Hakim. (Aslan 2006)41 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.42 Ibid.

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rehabilitation: (i) in Sayeda Zeinab Quarter in the South, where noisome tanning and other activities were relocated to less problematic sites in the periphery of Greater Cairo; (ii) in the Gamaliyya Quarter in the north, where Bab al-Nasr cemetery squatters were to be relocated so as to transform the area into a park and tourist site; and (iii) in the Darb al-Asfar Quarter in the east (Bayt al-Sihaymi). To sum up, the IAURIF/GOPP rehabilitation plan aimed at enhancing both the historical buildings and their urban environment via introduction of new public spaces that would give more impressive outlook to the monuments. The Gamaliyya project never realized, however, due to disputes over the residents’ compensations to cover their evacuation and the demolition of the tombs.43

The 6. UNDP Rehabilitation of Historic Cairo Project (1997) was undertaken by the United Nations Development Program with the Supreme Council of Antiquities. Its aim was to preserve the urban heritage and improve the quality of life of its inhabitants; the two components were seen as being equal and inseparable. In total, nine specific development clusters were identified along the main street, from al-Muizz to the Mosque of Ibn Tulun, and these formed “the heritage corridor”. One such cluster was centered on the important Qalawun complex, for instance. In the east side of the corridor, emphasis was on the provision of appropriate housing within the context of community development. The west side, in turn, was marked by “complex requirements of mixed uses” (commercial, tourism, residential, and manufacturing). Most of the spine, al-Muizz Street, was planned to be pedestrianized. According to the plan, the buildings needed to be restored and enhanced for purposes of reuse, and incorporated into community development strategies.44 However, as Sutton and Fahmi note, despite an ambitious rehabilitation plan, several obstacles have emerged due to organizational deficits, lack of will power and funding. Thus, the UNDP Rehabilitation scheme has not been implemented either, but it too remains as a mere paper project with substantial documentation on guidelines, suggestions and information.45

The 7. Al-Azhar–Aga Khan Park (2003–2007) by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture (as a part of the Historic Cities Support Program) was

43 Ibid.44 Antoniou 1998.45 Sutton & Fahmi 2002; 2008.

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established on the 30-hectare site of what had been a rubbish dump since the medieval times. The dump had buried the 12th century 1.5 kilometer Ayyubid wall, which was restored. Not only was the park meant to provide much needed green space for the public, but it was also assumed to become an economic catalyst for the area. Now, the park has gardens, a lake, playgrounds, promenades and restaurants and the project has evolved to include the restoration of the Ayyubid wall and mosques from the 14th and 15th centuries, as well as some Ottoman-era houses. Moreover, the project eventually further spread to the neighboring poor and congested Darb al-Ahmar district, as it was concluded that its old houses are part of the wall structure, and are thus not to be detached. Socio-economic initiatives were developed in Darb al-Ahmar, such as housing rehabilitation, microfinance and healthcare. One Ottoman house was transformed into a community center. The aim was to pinpoint spaces where the community could “rebuild itself, and begin to foster a deeper sense of shared identity”. In workshops, scattered throughout the neighborhood, the trust has trained dozens of local masons, stonecutters and carpenters, many of whom also worked on the restoration of the wall.46

The 8. Historic Cairo Restoration Project (1998–2006) by the Supreme Council of Antiquities and Ministry of Culture involved a total of seven ministries and the Governor of Cairo. The H.C.R.P project sought to restore 149 listed historic monuments in eight years.47 The Historic Cairo Restoration Project has been an official Government project, involving Mme. Suzanne Mubarak, a staff of 250 people and offices in the Citadel.48

The above development endeavours to sustain and improve historic Cairo have been rather controversial, and perhaps the loudest criticism has been directed at the H.C.R.P. In general, three main fields have been debated: technical, institutional and residential. The technical considerations concern the questions as to how the style of the renovations has been carried out. Concerning the politics of conservation, Caroline Williams, who has been critical of the previously mentioned project (especially due to the Bohra Mission project funded by the H.C.R.P), argues that the responsible companies or contractors tended to renovate rather than preserve, and

46 Aga Khan 2007; Youssef 2007; Ouroussoff 2004.47 Williams 2002.48 Sutton & Fahmi 2008.

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modern technology was used together with very modest knowledge of the engineers on medieval architectural principles. As a result, the contractors showed little sensitivity to the original fabric of the buildings and their authenticity, replacing original materials with replicas without reintegrating them in the structure.49 There are several problematic restoration cases – for instance, the way in which the wooden lattice, or mashrabiyya windows in the restoration of the Wikala al-Bazar in the Gamaliyya quarter was carried out. Another case, referred to earlier in the context of the Bohras, is the failed restoration of the dilapidated Al-Hakim Mosque which was entirely reconstructed to “a new building” rather than restored50. It has also been suggested that the Musafirkhana Palace could be restored, but some conservationists remain skeptical, comparing it to the fate of the old opera house destroyed in 1972. The modern opera, built in the 1980s, although practical, has no resemblance to the old one, and is considered by conservationists to be an eye-soar. They are worried that the restoration of the Musafirkhana might become but another opera.51 Also Sutton and Fahmi are aptly stunned that some developers have even suggested the demolition of a large number of monuments in the area.52

Williams claims that the Minister of Culture’s vision of Old Cairo resembles an open-air museum, and that the Supreme Council of Antiquities’ budget was only for the monuments, not for socio-economic and environmental improvements in the poor neighbourhood.53 In recent years, criticism to both the Bohra Mission and the Supreme Council of Antiquities has nearly entirely vanished, however, and most scholars working in the field seem to be reluctant to criticize the conservation work at all. Here, it is emphasized that, despite mistakes, it is more important to have these buildings under attention and serious conservation attempts. Some Egyptian architects also notice that any restoration work is utmost challenging, and it is difficult to avoid mistakes. They argue that “while foreign critics sat around and told Egyptians officials how they were doing everything wrong, the critics weren’t doing anything themselves to help”.54

49 Williams 2002.50 Sutton & Fahmi 2002, referring to Rodenbeck 1983, 25.51 Darwish 1998.52 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.53 Williams 2002.54 Aslan 2006.

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Secondly, institutional problems are often seen as the main cause for dysfunctions in various conservation schemes. It is argued by Jim Antoniou that there has been overlapping responsibilities and confusion between the various authorities in relation to the monuments, their ownership and responsibility, and in the entire administration of the historic city. Moreover, a large part of the demolitions and damage have been permitted under the rules and regulations in force. For instance, official permits for manufacturing industries in, or adjacent to old buildings allow for various types of pollution that affects the monuments. Rent controls discourage maintenance and, in a similar vein, laws prohibit the renovation of buildings nearby monuments, which encourages collapse and deterioration. A lack of urban management easily leads to “institutional paralysis” and an inability to organize resources.55

The third, residential field of the debate refers to the ambiguity in the re-use of the restored sites on one hand, the legitimacy of the authorities’ single-handed decisions on the other and, finally, the rights of the local residents in the midst of it all. Williams claims that the government officials must find out a common vision for historic Cairo, as to how these buildings once restored could be adapted for re-use, and who will eventually benefit from the result. Mosques will continue to be used by their local members, but there are many secular historic buildings that would need maintenance and custodians. Furthermore, according to Williams, the purpose of the re-use should be addressed before changes are made, and it should also be kept in mind that “empty buildings are doomed: to survive they must be rooted in the socio-economic matrix”. Williams argues that the Ministry of Culture’s approach continues to be that the restored buildings should not be used for anything other than cultural activities (art centers, bookstores, libraries, small museums, and concert venues), implying that they benefit only a tiny elite and have just little utility to the local population. Moreover, Williams (like Abu-Lughod) suggests that many of the secular buildings – such as wikalas, sabil-kuttabs, and residences – could be adaptively reused to serve some of the area’s housing needs.56 Another complicated problem is that of authority: as the city is upgraded, the questions of zoning and real-estate values become critical. The low rent laws in Egypt have enabled the owners to sell old houses, and the new owners have then let the buildings deteriorate

55 Antoniou 1998.56 Williams 2002.

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while looking into the possibilities of their demolition so as to redevelop the site.57 The case of the restored 18th century Wikala al-Kharbutli serves as a good example. This building, formerly located across the street from Sabil of Mohammad ‘Ali Tusun, though dilapidated, was a registered monument for many years. However, in late 2000, the protection was removed and the wikala was bought by a private individual. As a result, the building was torn down overnight, carted off, and replaced by a concrete building.58

As for the relocation of Bab al-Nasr cemetery squatters for the purpose of transforming it into a park and tourist site, much resistance was raised among the residents of the City of the Dead and the tomb owners, as well as by historians of art and Islam – all whom had their own arguments as to why the area should be saved from demolition59. Local communities have been held responsible for the deterioration of the area and, consequently, the authorities consider it necessary to relocate the poor inhabitants60. On the contrary to the authorities’ beliefs, however, some residents have in fact devoted themselves to upkeep and repair some of the buildings – such as mosques – on a voluntary basis well before the arrival of any conservation projects in the locality.

According to the study of Sutton and Fahmi, the local residents in the Old Cairo have felt dissatisfaction because of the lack of proper services and infrastructure. There has also been absence of security in tenure in cases where people do not have official documents to prove their ownership of the buildings. One basic problem has been that decisions in restoration projects are made hierarchically, or in a top-down manner, and thus changes have been instituted without a public negotiation. It has lead to situations where local residents are powerless to act once a decision is made, and the contracting companies have moved in. A bottom-up NGO is suggested to be a better option for the management of restoration projects but, in the Egyptian political context, it is also a less realistic one.61 Through more credibility and trust in comparison to the government authorities, NGOs – if not concentrating only on money – could be more efficient in disseminating awareness, and in helping communities to improve their livelihoods.62

57 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.58 Williams 2002.59 See Nedoroscik 1997, 98–100.60 Antoniou 1998.61 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.62 Aslan 2006; Myllylä 2001.

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As the Al Azhar park and the Darb al-Ahmar case have showed, it is often not sufficient to concentrate on a single historical monument, but its wider environment, including other buildings and especially their residents, must also be addressed and respected. In addition, there are different images and viewpoints, as to which elements make the “authentic atmosphere” of Old Cairo – what to preserve, and what to leave out? Is this certain historic urban atmosphere an intrinsic value that has to be maintained persistently, for centuries, even in the constantly evolving megapolis? Perhaps this is an irrelevant question but, there being diverse images, there are also varying policies and approaches as to what, ultimately, makes the urban heritage of Cairo.

Bayt al-Suhaymi (five floor domestic building of 2,000 square meters added with 115 halls and chambers surrounding the main court of 200 square meters), and the related Darb al-Asfar district case offer an ideal example to scrutinize this authenticity dilemma. Darb al-Asfar alley connects Mu‘izz Street and the Gamaliyya in the northern section of the Fatimid city. Here also emerged endangered foundations due to subsoil water so the project had to go beyond the palace restoration, and include also the neighboring monuments in the Darb al-Asfar. This site, in turn, had suffered badly from overcrowding, pollution, and the 1992 earthquake. Some old houses were inhabited by people who had moved there after the earthquake, and the houses were further deteriorated as the families altered the interiors to better suit for apartments. These families were removed to private apartments elsewhere, however, and a new drainage system was installed. The first floor of Bayt al-Suhaymi was planned to be converted into a cultural arts centre, while the rest of the building was to be left as a museum. This integrated urban redevelopment project of 1996 is seen as the first of its kind within historic Cairo, and it was funded by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. Another part of the project was to develop social awareness among the district’s inhabitants, “to explain the importance of living beside a monument like Bayt al-Suhaymi”. Meetings were held regularly during the restoration process. Although restoration teams sought to retain the character of the old area, everybody was not satisfied with the look of the new Darb al-Asfar. Some people, both insiders and outsiders, claimed that the changes erased the area’s “original flavour” due to certain modern elements. As one inhabitant described: “When walking around, I feel myself to be in an imitation studio, like the City of Media Production in 6 October City”.63

63 El-Aref 2000.

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Also, an agreement is needed on what kind of tourism is desirable: the spending of the “Coca-Cola tourists”, or the cultural tourists, who are fewer but more discerning.64 Sutton and Fahmi note that the Egyptian Government has favoured the development of tourism (e.g. in the IAURIF/GOPPP Gamaliyya project) at the cost of neglecting the local residents’ perceptions and attitudes towards conservation policies – an approach which ultimately could lead to the “disneyfication” of the Old City.65

Conclusions

Like other old city cores, also Islamic Cairo has gradually deteriorated into a historical city centre slum district. As a historical slum area, the development of Old Cairo requires a novel approach, which integrates certain measures of slum upgrading with urban rehabilitation plans. Such measures could include, for instance, building of connections between various interest groups, finding alternatives for informal economy and informal housing, creating employment and education for the youth, offering affordable environmental and energy solutions, as well as strategies to encourage the work of civil society organizations.

Those urban restoration projects that aim to move out large sections of the local – the poor and their jobs – represents the kind of exclusive, or “fortress” conservation policies that can be universally observed and, yet, have a tendency to fail. Thereby, one can only wish that, while attracting global attention, the developers of Islamic Cairo would not end up riding the kind of time machine that takes us to a monumentally impressive but deserted, sterile and thus boring theme park city without an authentic social life. Elsewhere in Arabia, in Dubai for example, this trip to a spiritless urban development has unfortunately already been taken.

64 Williams 2002.65 Sutton & Fahmi 2002.

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References

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Aga Khan Development Network. http://www.akdn.org/egypt_social.asp, 8.8.2008.

Antoniou, Jim (1998): “Historic Cairo. Rehabilitation of Cairo’s historic monuments”, The Architectural Review, 1st March 1998.

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Nedoroscik, Jeffrey A. (1997): The City of the Dead. A History of Cairo’s Cemetery Communities. London: Bergin & Garvey.

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Economic challenges facing Jordan within

the Euromed context

Seyfeddin Muaz

Jordan overview

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, ruled since 1952 by His Majesty King Hussein. With the passing of the monarch in February of 1999, the King’s eldest son, His Majesty King Abdullah, ascended the throne.

Since 1989, all elements of the Jordanian political spectrum have demonstrated commitment to increased democracy, liberalization and consensus-building. These reforms, which had been guided by the late King Hussein, have placed Jordan on an irreversible path toward democratization. The result has been greater empowerment and the involvement of everyday citizens in Jordan’s civil life, contributing to increased stability and institutionalization, which will benefit the country far into the future.

The remarkably stable political and social climate that Jordan has enjoyed for decades under the Hashemite Dynasty continues to thrive under His Majesty King Abdullah’s leadership. The new King has undertaken his father’s legacy of reform, committing Jordan to the goals of privatization, economic liberalization, and modernization of the law.

Scarce natural resources and reliance on foreign energy sources and foreign aid are some of the most important challenges that face Jordan. Scarce water resources are also considered a continuous dilemma for households as well as the industrial and agriculture sectors.

The geopolitics of the country, at the centre of the Middle East, make it vulnerable to the perceptions of events in the region.

The governmental budget and the external sector deficits have reached alarming levels; unemployment remains an economic burden that has been exacerbated by the fall in tourism receipts due to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and the events in neighbouring Iraq.

The human element remains Jordan’s source of national pride. The country enjoys an educated, highly competitive, young and skilled labour force of

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1.56 million. In a turbulent region political, legal and social stability remain priceless assets to the Kingdom.

The international trade agreements with the EU, USA, AFTA, and several Arab countries are witness to Jordan’s business-friendly and secure environment and have been a major factor in attracting billions of dollars in foreign direct investments.

The Jordanian foreign policy has maintained balanced relations on the regional and international arenas, which has given Jordan a moderate role in resolving regional conflicts.

Socio-economic development in Jordan

Jordan was heavily impacted by the war in Iraq, the disruption of trade with Iraq (its main export market) having not only important economic consequences for the economy but also having an adverse impact on prospects for development. Furthermore, pressure on the current account mounted as a result of the rocketing oil prices. Tensions in the region contributed to a significant drop in foreign investors’ interest in Jordan, in addition to the marked deterioration of income from tourism.

After a spectacular GDP growth of 7.7 percent in 2004 (up from 4 percent in 2003) largely due to a surge in domestic demand, Jordan’s economic situation worsened in 2005 because of higher world oil prices and an unexpected drop in external grants (down from US$ 1.3 billion in 2004 to US$ 700 million in 2005). The GDP growth remained at the same levels throughout 2006 and 2007. Oil price shocks have contributed to a higher budget deficit and the inflation rate surged from 3.4 to 6 percent. The external current account deficit has also deteriorated, largely due to a deeper trade deficit; partially offset by private capital inflows (banking, mining, real estate and telecommunications) and remittances from Jordanians living abroad. However, the economy has continued to grow, with real GDP growth reaching 6.3 percent in 2006 according to the International Monetary Bank, reflecting the economy’s dynamic activity.

The leading sector is services, which account for 64.5 percent of Jordan’s GDP; the role this sector is playing in supporting production is underlined in the King’s new economic guidelines. While the agricultural and construction sectors account for only a small portion of GDP (9.7% of GDP), they employ a significant percentage of the workforce. The main manufacturing industries are textiles, mining (potash and phosphates), fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, oil refining, and cement.

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Economic challenges facing Jordan

Main economic indicators1

2004 2005 2006 2007 (proj.)

2008 (proj.)

Real sector

Real GDP growth (% change) 8.4 7.2 6.3 6.0 6.0

Inflation CPI (average) 3.4 3.5 6.3 5.7

GDP, nominal (USD, billion) 11.4 12.7 14.3 16.0 17.5

GDP, per-capita (USD) 2131 2317 2544 2778

Social indicators

Unemployment (%) 12.5 14.8 13.9 13.1

Life expectancy (years) 72 72 72

Literacy total (% ages 15 and above) 90

Literacy female (% ages 15 and above) 85

Fiscal sector1

Total revenues (excl. grants, % GDP) 25.7 28.0 30.9 29.9 30.2

Total expenditures ( % GDP) 38.4 38.0 37.9 38.5 34.3

Budget balance (incl. grants, % GDP) – 1.7 – 5.0 – 3.8 – 2.7 – 2.1

Budget balance (excl. Grants, % GDP) – 12.7 – 10.0 – 7.1 – 7.8 – 4.1

Net public debt (% GDP) 88.5 82.8 72.4 66.7 62.2

Monetary sector

Private sector credit (% change) 17.3 30.3 24.4 16.5 14.6

Private sector credit (% total credit) 79.2

Broad money (M3, %) 11.7 17.0 14.1 10.3 9.4

Degree of monetisation (M3/GDP, %) 130.8 137.2 138.9 136.9

External sector

Current account (incl. grants, % GDP) – 0.1 – 17.8 – 13.6 – 13.4 – 13.6

Trade balance (% GDP) – 38.6 – 47.0 – 35.0 – 35.0 32.9

FDI flows (% GDP) 5.4 10.0 6.8 9.1 8

Import cover (months)² 5.1 4.7 5.6 5.2 4.71 Covers the central government and budgetary agencies. Includes non-budget account net spending.2 International reserves in terms of months of imports of goods and non-factor services.

1 IMF; WB.

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Main economic indicators2 (cont.)2004 2005 2006 2007

(proj.)2008 (proj.)

External vulnerability

External public debt (% GDP)³ 66.2 56.1 49.8 44.2 39.1

Debt service ratio4 15.1 12.3 11.2 10.4 8.7

Foreign exchange reserves (USD, billion) 4.7 4.7 6.1 6.5

Reserves/M3 (%) 42.8 35.4 40.1 36.4

Financial sector

Short-term interest rate (average, %) 2.5

Exchange rate (per USD, end of period) 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71

Exchange rate (per EUR, end of period) 0.96 1.11

Real effective exchange rate (eop, 2000 =100) 92.1 1.9 97.2

3 Total government external debt including government-guaranteed external debt.4 Public external debt service in percentage of exports of goods and non-factor services.

Jordan–EU relationship

Jordan and the European Economic Community first established diplomatic relations in 1977. In 1978 their first cooperation agreement came into force.

Jordan was one of the first countries to sign an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, and is among the five countries which have expressed an interest in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and which adopted an ENP Action Plan in 2005 covering the next three years. This Action Plan encompasses a new and ambitious agenda in the political, social and economic fields, designed to move Jordan closer to a set of shared values with the EU.

During the first year of implementing the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, a regular dialogue between the EU and Jordan took place through several subcommittees, involving discussions on the implementation of the different chapters of the Action Plan, and enabling specific priorities to be identified. In addition, Jordan has worked on a reform agenda for the next ten years: the “National Agenda”, completed by the Kulluna al Urdun initiative (“We Are

2 IMF; WB.

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All Jordan”), which set out detailed priorities and objectives for addressing national challenges. This reform agenda is fully in line with the Action Plan and can guide its implementation.

The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan and aims to build on the successes of past co-operation to support the implementation of Jordan’s plans for reforms with a range of relevant instruments, including financial assistance. These help cover the cost of the reforms, with a strong emphasis on institution-building.

Four main priority objectives have been defined by the EU and the Jordanian authorities for this first Country Strategy Paper under the Neighbourhood Policy:

Political reform and good governance.1.

Trade and investment development.2.

Sustainability of the development process.3.

Institution-building, financial stability and support for regulatory 4. approximation.

A total amount of €265 million was allocated for the first National Indicative Programme, covering the period 2007–2010, to support these four priorities with EU financial assistance under the ENPI.

Jordan–EU Association Agreement

Framework

The EU Association Agreement with Jordan was signed in November 1997, was ratified by the Government of Jordan in September 1999, and came into force in May 2002. The objectives of the Association Agreement are in line with the objectives of the Barcelona Process, and the agreement revolves around three major themes: politics, economics and finance, and society and culture.

Political and security partnership

This part of the Agreement addresses principles that govern cooperation in the political field. This initiative involves a dialogue that leads to the adoption of common principles by the partners, emphasizing the achievement or movement toward peace, security, democracy, human rights, and regional development as the engine for change.

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Economic and financial partnership

This component aims at establishing a Euro-Jordanian Free Trade Area in progressive steps by the year 2014. The free trade agreement is based on the provisions of this Agreement as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Services. The provisions of the agreement cover: trade in agricultural and industrial products, the right of establishment and services, payments and capital movements, competition, intellectual property rights, financial cooperation, economic cooperation in the fields of industry, agriculture, investment, standards and measurements, transportation, telecommunications, energy, science and technology, environment, tourism, statistics, and the fight against illegal drugs.

Social, cultural and human partnership

This section addresses principles that govern cooperation in the cultural and social fields. Emphasis is placed on education, training, youth, culture, migrant population groups, and health. Greater co-operation in the field of home affairs and justice is also envisaged, with action in particular against drug trafficking, terrorism, and international crime.

Implementation

Following the entry into force of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, the EU launched in 2002 a programme of support for the Association Agreement (SAA – Support for the Association Agreement), with the overall objective of assisting Jordan in following the entry into force of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, which will require legislative and regulatory alignment of policies and regulations in the different fields, as well as the upgrading of Jordanian institutions to carry out necessary reforms. Several programmes and initiatives were designed and implemented to help Jordan.

Cultural cooperation

By reviewing the developments in the relationship between Jordan and the EU countries, especially after the Association Agreement, one can easily observe good progress in trade, financial, and economic cooperation, but on the other hand social and cultural cooperation is still under the desired levels.

The cultural cooperation between Jordan and the EU countries can be seen in different ways; tourism and the exchange of students is a good indicator of the interaction of people. In this regard, official figures from 2006 indicate

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that the number of European tourists in Jordan reached 156,950, the number of Jordanian students studying in the EU countries reached 3949, or 23% of the total Jordanian students abroad, while only 32 European students were at Jordanian universities.

Exchange programs and civil society3

The involvement of civil society organisations and individuals is vital for the overall success of the ENP. The civil society dimension complements and depends on the other aspects of the ENP. Jordan is currently engaged in various exchange programs and initiatives with the EU aimed at strengthening the involvement of civil society and its institutions in the realization of the ENP goals:

Jordan has access to several EU educations and training programmes (TEMPUS and Erasmus Mundus). In this context, we welcome the launching of the External Cooperation Window of Erasmus Mundus, which will cover more than 1500 students from the ENP countries during the academic year 2007–2008. We also welcome the EU’s initiative to launch a new scholarship scheme for the ENP region under the Erasmus Mundus. Moreover, we are keen to deepen our cooperation in science and technology, not only in the EU research framework programme, but also in other dimensions of the European research area.

In December 2006, Jordan and the EU signed the Euro-Med Youth Program with the overall objective of enhancing the fundamentals of youth knowledge, experience and participation within a framework of strategic partnership between State and Society. The programme targets young people aged 15–25 years, youth leaders, youth workers, youth organizations and NGOs dealing with youth.

We attach great importance to the Cross-Border Cooperation Programme within the ENPI. This programme, which involves local actors such as civil society actors, local and regional authorities, represents an important tool in promoting and enhancing the civil society dimension within the ENP. Jordan is an active player in the CBC programme and we have recently been given the honour of hosting the programme’s Antenna. We aspire that the active participation of Civil Society Organizations from the various

3 Connecting neighbours, Marwan Al –Refa’I, PAO manager, support for the Implementation of the EU–Jordan Association Agreement Programme & support for the Human Rights and Good Governance Programme.

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partner countries will contribute to the establishment of good neighbourly relations.

Jordan has welcomed and supported the establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures. We hope that this Foundation will play a more instrumental role in promoting the dialogue between our peoples and cultures, and in contributing to our joint efforts to fight xenophobia, intolerance, racial discrimination and false stereotypes among our nations.

Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy4

The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a vital interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighborhood. The responsibility for this lies primarily with the countries themselves, but the EU can substantially encourage and support their reform efforts. It is therefore in the best mutual interest of both the EU and its neighbours to build a much stronger and deeper relationship.

Most of the EU’s neighbouring countries have made progress during recent years in economic and political reforms. Nevertheless, poverty and unemployment, mixed economic performance, corruption and weak governance remain major challenges. Citizens of the neighbouring countries, particularly the young, are often faced with bleak personal prospects. “Frozen conflicts” and recent events in the Middle East remind us that the conditions for peaceful coexistence remain to be established, both between some of the EU’s neighbours and with other key countries. These are not only the EU neighbours’ problems. They risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism.

Promoting people-to-people exchanges

Distinct from the mobility issue, the ENP must have a “human face”, and citizens of the EU and of the neighbouring countries should have more opportunities to interact, and to learn more about each others’ societies and understand better each others’ cultures. The ENP cannot only be a matter for officials and politicians. On both sides of the borders, people should be

4 “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy”.

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able to see directly the impact of a stronger bond between the Union and its neighbours.

Educational and youth exchanges must be a core element of the ENP.

The mobility of researchers must be an essential part of increasing research cooperation between the EU and the ENP countries.

Civil society exchanges should also be strengthened, reaching beyond governmental contacts to build bridges and contacts among trade unions, regional and local authorities (including city-twinning programmes), health practitioners, NGOs, and cultural groups.

Business-to-business contacts must be enhanced. In particular, small and medium-sized companies should be actively encouraged to establish closer links and transfer experience.

Partner governments must be encouraged to allow appropriate participation by civil society representatives as stakeholders in the reform process.

The human dimension of the ENP is as much a matter for the Partner States as for the Community. Integrating these elements into bilateral programmes, and sharing information and best practices on people-to-people activities, will enhance the image of the Union as a whole in the partner countries.

References

IMF (2008): International Monetary Fund: Jordan: 2006 Article IV Consultation and Fourth Post-Program Monitoring Discussions—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion.

Central Bank of Jordan: http://www.cbj.gov.jo, last consulted in June 2008.

Delegation of the European Commission to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deljor/en/index.htm, last consulted in June 2008.

Department of Statistics: www.dos.gov.jo, last consulted in June 2008.

International Monetary Fund: http://www.IMF.org, last consulted in June 2008.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.jo, last consulted in June 2008.

World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org, last consulted in June 2008.


What kind of security policies between the

Maghreb, the US and the EU?

Ulla Holm

The basic argument advanced in this article, is that the combination of the “nature” of the Maghreb regimes, the US “war against terrorism,” the European fight against illegal immigration and “home-grown” Maghreb terrorism, has resulted in Maghreb, American and European status quo policies that function as security policies.

Introduction

The Maghreb regimes’ authoritarian policy towards their populations and the populations’ increasing socio-economic despair has resulted still more often in desperate riots that are seen as about the only way to channel socio-economic and political despair. At the same time, there has been a rise in the attachment to religious identity. Whether this fact is a security problem depends on how the regimes deal with religion. The Maghreb regimes have included those Islamists that serve the status quo and repressed those who are critical to the regimes. The Islamist parties which the regimes allow to be represented in the parliaments do not challenge the regimes’ nor the Moroccan monarchy’s hegemony. The parties are dependent on the regimes’ and the monarchy’s patronage, which in turn are dependent on the Islamist parties in order to be able to continue the status quo.

This mutual dependency has alienated those parts of the Maghreb populations that take no part in the power-sharing. The consequence has been that the majority becomes depoliticised – as the Moroccan and Algerian elections in 2007 demonstrated. Others might take refuge in either the conservative or the Jihadi version of Salafism1.

1 The conservative version of Salafism is foremost occupied with the social behaviour of people, and the aim of the movement is to correct behaviour in order to make it conform to the example of the Prophet and his companions, the venerable founding fathers (al-salaf al salih) of the faith. The aim of the “revolutionary” violent Salafism is to install the Caliphate which has to be purified of all elements that do not fit into what these Salafists consider to be “authentic” Islam. International Crisis Group 2004; Roy 2002; Kepel, 2000.

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In large sectors of European public opinion there is a general distrust of religious identity and a threat perception of the “Islamisation” of the Maghreb. However, the EU member states are supporting the Maghreb regimes that instrumentalize conservative Islamism in order to remain in power. There thus exists an “unholy” alliance between the regimes’ and the European threat perceptions. Both sides prefer the status quo to open discussion as to why the regimes are becoming still more delegitimized and as to how change can be brought about.

Export of European and American democracy has therefore become downgraded in the last few years. Up to the Iraq war in 2003 and some years after, the concept of “democracy is security” was dominating in the international discourse on how to bring about change in authoritarian Arab countries. Changes did not happen. Instead, the lack of “success” in Iraq and Afghanistan has produced American and European fear of losing power and influence in the Arab countries. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in Europe and in Arab countries have resulted in deep suspicion of Islam and Arab ethnicity. The consequence has been that security has become identical to the political status quo and not to the export of democracy.

Liberalised autocracy in the Maghreb

By 1999, an air of optimism percolated across the Maghreb. The level of violence in Algeria – while not resolved – fell substantially and Algeria’s new President Bouteflika seemed to be talking seriously about national reconciliation and an amnesty for those rebels in prison, on the run or still fighting. In the case of Libya, wider international sanctions had been placed in the wake of the Lockerbie disaster in 1988. Libya decided in 1999 to hand over the two Lockerbie suspects for trial in the Netherlands, which resulted in the suspension of United Nations sanctions the same year. There were signs of movement in the Western Sahara “frozen conflict”. In Morocco, the new King, Mohammed VI, who came to the throne after his father’s death in July 1999, brought hope of a more modern (less brutal) and transparent form of government. However, all the dire circumstances: the lack of popular legitimacy; strong Islamist opposition movements and smaller groups that engage in bin Laden-style terrorism; economic systems that have lagged far behind other regions in the increasingly globalised economy; large youthful populations clamouring for jobs or visas to the “West”, resulting in migration – continued in varying degrees in the Maghreb.

However, the Maghreb societal hopes of political and economic changes have been watered down especially because of the terrorist attack on 9/11

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What kind of security policies?

on the WTC and of internal terrorism, which have made the regimes intensify their control over society.

Ever since the independence of the Maghreb states, the Maghreb populations have been subject to the regimes’ arbitrary policy of either controlled political openness or of harsh repression of perceived opposition to the regimes.

Repressive authoritarianism constitutes thus the “deep structure” of the Maghreb state system. However, repression is selective and inserted into what Daniel Brumberg calls “liberalised autocracy”. He characterises the Arab state system

“as a mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections and selective repression. It is a type of political system whose institutions, rules and logic defy any linear model of democratisation. The rulers widen or narrow the boundaries of participation and expression in response to what they see as the social, economic, political, and geo-strategic challenges facing their regimes. To endure, they must implicitly, or explicitly, allow some opposition forces certain kinds of social, political, or ideological power – but things must never reach a point where the regime feels deterred from using force when it deems fit...They therefore strive to pit one group against another in ways that maximize the rulers’ room for manoeuvre and restrict the opposition’s capacity to work together. Consensus politics and state-enforced power sharing can form an alternative to either full democracy or full autocracy, particularly when rival social, ethnic, or religious groups fear that either type of rule will lead to their political failure.”2

Daniel Brumberg’s characterisation of the Arab system as a type of political system whose institutions, rules and logic defy any linear model of democratisation is epitomised in the Maghreb. It is the “simultaneous stop and go” politics that produce popular powerlessness. The regimes can decide arbitrarily which party is allowed to run for elections. They can forbid all of a sudden a political party. At the same time, the repression is accompanied by a certain political openness. The objective of regime-managed politics in the Maghreb has so far been to give especially Islamist opposition groups space to let off steam and allow for their political participation. However, this has remained controlled and limited in order to preclude factors that might undermine the ultimate power of the ruling elite.

2 Brumberg 2002, 56–57, 67.

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Brutal repression and/or the guided integration of Islamist participation in the political system mark the regimes’ response to religious opposition. In Algeria, support for the conservative version of Salafism is increasing. The ruling elite is sympathetic towards this version of Salafism because it depoliticises and thereby guarantees the status quo. The Algerian regime has even appointed conservative Salafist professors and imams, in order to control mosques and universities3.

Salafist conservatism is no threat to the Algerian (and Moroccan monarchy) regime because it abstains from violence – being more interested in the Islamisation of moral behaviour. However, the regime’s backing of conservative Salafism might turn out to be a double-edged sword because of the conservative Salafists’ anti-Western discourse. The Algerian regime is closely linked to the American and European fight against terrorism and immigration. American and European capital is flowing into Algeria because of Algerian oil and gas resources. Hence, the regime is balancing on a tightrope with regard to support for anti-Western Salafist attitudes and its approach to the “West”.

Islamist terrorism in the Maghreb

Until 1988–1989, Europe and the US did not view the Maghreb as a security problem. The Maghreb countries were a problem for the region, rather than for Europe or the US4. However, the outbreak of violence in Algeria in 1992 and the subsequent refugee flow to Europe became a matter of security concern for Europe, especially for France, which was also hit by Algerian terrorism. The European threat perception of the Maghreb increased in the wake of President Bush’s declaration of the war against terrorism.

The Maghreb has seen a rise of terrorism following September 11th and in the wake of the American–led war against Iraq. Such terrorist attacks have occurred, for example, in a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Jerba in 2002, in Casablanca, Morocco in 2003, and included the suicide bombings in Algeria in 2007. The Casablanca May 2003 bombings served as a wakeup call in Morocco regarding the dangers of home-grown radical Islamist terrorism, generating harsh measures against Islamist activists.

In Algeria, on April 11th 2007, two explosions set off by suicide bombers rocked the capital city for the first time in several years. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

3 Amghar 2007.4 Holm 2002.

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Maghreb (AQIM), formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) took the responsibility for the 30 killed and 200 wounded. It has continued killings targeting especially police, security forces and politicians just as the AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut), the armed branch of FIS, did in the 1990s. AQIM has declared that it carried out the bombings in defence of Islam and the Islamic nation, and that it will continue its operations.

The Islamist terrorist attacks put an end to the relative calm that had prevailed in Algeria over the previous two years. The new attacks raise concerns whether Algeria might be facing a situation resembling the early 1990s. However, even if these concerns seem overblown there is no doubt that terrorism is increasing in Algeria. Moreover, it is worrying that the killings are executed by suicide bombers. This was not the case during the violence in the 1990s. It might point to cross-fertilisation of an Al-Qaeda tactic to AQIM, which had never used these methods before they declared their affiliation to Al-Qaeda. According to some sources, many AQIM have joined the insurgency in Iraq, thus gaining a high level of expertise in terrorist tactics, lessons which they have apparently brought back to the Maghreb5.

It is a fact that AQIM spreads fear amongst the Algerian population and constitutes a security problem to individuals. However, it is difficult to know the extent to which the Algerian regime is boosting the fear in order to strengthen its own authoritarian regime. Or perhaps the increased fear is due to a power struggle inside the regime between different factions6. What one can say is that memory of the violence in the 1990s makes people and the regime very sensitive to a resurgence of terrorism. This fact might produce support for the regime’s attempt at tracing down the terrorists, but on the other hand, the regime might also become deligitimised because the regimes operate without any restrictions.

The four regimes’ tough anti-terrorist laws might also produce societal anger. Since the passage of a new anti-terrorist law was rushed through the Moroccan parliament in 2003 following the Casablanca incidents, thousands of terrorist suspects have been arrested and sentenced to prison without any trial. It is reported by eminent jurists that security forces or intelligence services have been involved in arbitrary and sometimes undisclosed detentions in Algeria and Morocco since the Casablanca terrorist attack.7 The result of the terrorist attacks has thus been a return to some of the authoritarian excesses,

5 World Security Institute, 30 April 2007.6 Burgat & Gèze 2007.7 International Commission of Jurists 2006.

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including flagrant abuses of human rights, arbitrary arrest, torture, and unfair trials that have been applied not only against terrorists but also for the purpose of curtailing political and civil rights in general8.

The fight against terrorism strengthens the authoritarian regimes’ control of society. It might evolve into pure repressive authoritarianism. If this happens, the radicalisation of youngsters in the suburbs of the big cities might expand, particularly in the poor suburbs of big cities where especially poor youngsters and unemployed, but well educated young men are recruited to Islamist Jihadism.

The regimes are aware that the more violent the actions of Jihadist groups are, the more legitimate regime repression against them appears in the eyes of national and international actors. Actors such as the US and the EU have so far largely accepted the interpretation of the Maghreb’s authoritarian rulers – namely that the regimes and societies are equally threatened by Jihadism. The European and American acceptance of the ruling elite’s interpretation might lead to a further undermining of the regimes’ legitimacy. If this happens the elite might further insist on the necessity of “containing” societal protests resulting in a still further increasing lack of legitimacy. If the regimes silence opposition to discussion on why Jihadism exists, the human rights situation in the Maghreb might very well worsen even more, and we will not witness liberalised authoritarianism, but purely repressive authoritarianism.

The Maghreb, European and American fight against illegal

immigration and terrorism in Sub-Sahara and the Maghreb

Security dynamics have certainly changed since 9/11. The perceived threat of terrorism and illegal immigration in the Sub-Saharan Area has pushed Maghreb security concerns to the Sub-Saharan area that comprises – as seen from the Maghreb – Mali, Senegal, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Bukino Faso and Mauritania9.

The Sub-Saharan immigration to the Maghreb has provoked racism in the larger Maghreb towns. For example in Morocco, racism against the Sub-Saharans is increasing10 and the same applies to Algeria. Police raids in the

8 Entelis 2005.9 Mauritania is a member of the UMA (Union du Maghreb Arabe) and as such is perceived as belonging to the Maghreb area.10 Aliou 2005, 56. In the wake of the terrorist bombings in Casablanca, Morocco intensified the fight against illegal immigration. Many Africans were arrested and escorted to the Moroccan-Algerian frontier. A law on the extradition of illegal

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poor urban suburbs of the big cities where the illegal immigrants are living are becoming more frequent. Most often, these illegal immigrants are sent to huge immigration camps in the confines of the Sahara desert, where there is a lack of water and food. The southern part of the four Maghreb countries thus produces a new kind of space: a space of relegation which stretches from the Nigerian to the Libyan border, the Algerian to the Malian border and the Moroccan to the Mauritanian border11.

The Maghreb fight against sub-Saharan illegal immigrants is complementary to the EU’s illegal immigration policies. The fight against illegal immigration from the South is a top priority on the EU security agenda and the EU is putting pressure upon the Maghreb states to readmit illegal Sub-Saharan immigrants who have made it to Europe, back to their countries of origin via the Maghreb. Thus the EU’s claim of re-admittance of illegal immigrants puts the societal and economic burden on the Maghreb states.

The EU tries thus to externalise the European border by “ordering” the Maghreb states to closely control their own maritime borders. The EU considers the Maghreb as an advanced post in its remote control of illegal immigration. This has in fact resulted in “migration conditionality”12: if the Maghreb regimes do not comply with the EU’s conditions with regard to illegal immigration, they will have difficulties in obtaining loans and credits. Therefore, the Maghreb regimes have entered into bilateral agreements on illegal immigration with European member states.

The illegal Sub-Saharan immigration has had three important effects: the borders have been pushed farther down into black Africa; it has strengthened the regimes’ fear of social unrest and exacerbated the violation of human rights; and the cooperation on illegal immigration (and also terrorism) has drawn the Maghreb and the EU closer together than before.

The combination of the European fear of the radicalisation of Muslim communities in Europe and the increasing Islamisation of Maghreb societies has made the EU an important outside power in the fight against illegal immigration and terrorism. However, the EU is not the only outside power that is penetrating13 the Maghreb and the Sahara and is seen as being an

immigration was passed and the same happened in Algeria and Tunisia. Hence, a link between Islamist Jihadism and African illegal immigration was constructed (Perrin 2005).11 Bensaad 2005, 26–27.12 Ibid., 23.13 The verb ”penetrate” refers to Buzan’s and Wæver’s vocabulary with regard to the

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agent in the further blurring of the southern borders of the Maghreb. The US has penetrated the Maghreb and the Sahara with the goal of tracing terrorists in the Sahara and the Sahel14.

Until 2001, the Maghreb had only a peripheral status in American eyes. After September 11th, security and political cooperation with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were strengthened. Morocco, the longstanding ally of the US, was granted the status of preferential non-NATO ally in 2004, and Algeria is now regarded as a key regional player15. Algeria is central to the American “war against terrorism” because the Algerian regime has extensive experience in combating Islamist Jihadists since the early 1990s.

The US considers the Maghreb as a foothold for penetrating further south, where – according to the US – yet another area of expanding terrorism is developing16. The US perceives the Sahel as a vulnerable area because of its low demographic density and its permeable borders. American decision-makers state that terrorist groups, local as well as international, devote themselves to all kinds of smuggling, including weapons, and recruit new members among the local population17. The Sahel is regarded by the US as “the new front in the global war against terrorism,” and thus the objective of the US is “to facilitate cooperation among governments in the region and strengthen their capacity to combat terrorist organisations” such as the GSPC.18

The US argues that the Maghreb and the US have common interests in combating terrorists in the Sahel – maybe even with military means. One might of course state that this American way of dealing with terrorism is far from unusual. It is rather the American global standard. What is unusual is that the US has penetrated an area that until some years ago was considered to be an area of fragile states that were threats to their own societies but not to the US. Now, however the threat of terrorism is considered a danger to

regional security complex (RSC) theory. They write that penetration occurs when outside powers make security alignments within an RSC (Buzan & Wæver 2003, 46). The U.S. is an outside power that makes security alignments with regional states (Ibid., 46). 14 The word Sahel comes from the Arabic Sahil, meaning shore or coast, and refers to the lands on the edge of the Sahara desert.15 Ammour 2006, 5.16 Zoubir 2006.17 Rémy 2004.18 Pope 2005.

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stability and peace in the whole of Africa and in the Maghreb, and therefore to the US as a global power.

As long as the US, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan common operations against terrorists remain “invisible” to the Maghreb populations, the Maghreb regimes will probably continue to support the US penetration into the Sub-Sahara and the Maghreb. However, if the regimes allow American military bases in the big Maghreb cities, they will be met by public anti-Americanism. The Maghreb regimes are very well aware of the populations’ anti-Americanism. They thus balance on a tightrope between support for the US “war against terrorism” and the populations’ resentment at US “neo-imperialism” in the Maghreb and Sub-Sahara. The fear of terrorism and the subsequent threat to regime survival make the regimes work together with the US. This is, in part, balanced out by the societal fear of the loss of Arab and Muslim identity due to the US penetration into the Maghreb, which in turn, makes the regimes distance themselves from overt American intervention and involvement.

Conclusion

The “war against terrorism” and Sub-Saharan illegal immigration have profoundly affected the relationship between the US, the EU and the Maghreb. It has expanded the borders of the Maghreb into the Sub-Sahara. This change has had one serious side-effect both in the Maghreb and in the Sub-Sahara: increasing anti-Americanism. Add to this the conservative Islamists’ general anti-Western feelings that challenge the regimes’ collaboration with the US and the EU.

Societal anger against the regimes, Europe (the EU) and the US has increased. The regimes’ answer to this anger is a mixture of “liberalized autocracy”, status quo policies and the liberalisation of economics. The EU reply to this mixture is to give lower priority to the export of its “own model”: political liberalism. This model has been represented as security policy – as the export of common security19. However, the European fears over the destabilization of the Maghreb regimes that might open up for further terrorism and immigration result in a political conception that dictates that the status quo is security. The Union for the Mediterranean that was launched in Paris on the 13th of July 2008 – as the opening of the French EU Presidency – does not change this conceptualization of security. It underlines the need for concrete projects in order to stabilize the EU’s near neighbourhood. The agenda of democratization seems in turn to be downgraded, whereas

19 Holm 2004; Malmvig 2006.

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enhanced cooperation between the EU member states and the regimes with regard to the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and border control is high on the agenda. Stabilization of the fragile regimes is actually what counts for the EU. The future of the Maghreb societies and their demands for transparency, justice, and rule of law is gloomy.

References

Alioua, Mehdi (2005): “La migration transnationale des Africains subsahariens au Maghreb. L’exemple de l’étape marocaine”, Maghreb–Machrek, No. 185, Automne, 37–59.

Amghar, Samir (2007): “Le salafisme au Maghreb: menace pour la sécurité ou facteur de stabilité politique?” La revue internationale et stratégique (IRIS), Automne, 40–51.

Ammour, Laurence (2006): “The Frozen Conflict in Western Sahara: Who Benefits?” Research Paper. Academic Research Branch – NATO Defense College, No. 30, November, Rome.

Bensaad, Ali (2005): “Les migrations transsahariennes. Une mondialisation par la marge”, Maghreb–Machrek, No. 185, 13–36.

Brumberg, Daniel (2002): ”The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy”, Journal of Democracy, 13(4), 56–68.

Burgat, Francois & François Gèze (2007): “Algeria”, in T. Archer & H. Huuhtanen (ed.) Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver (2003): Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Entelis, John (2005): “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The Maghreb State between Transition and Terrorism”, Strategic Insights, V(6), June.

Holm, Ulla (2002): The Maghreb: Half-way between Europe and the Middle East. Roskilde: Fédérico Caffè Centre.

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Holm, Ulla (2004): “The EU’s Security Policy Towards the Mediterranean: An (im)-possible Combination of Export of European Political values and anti-Terror Measures?” DIIS Working Paper 2004.

International Crisis Group (2004): Islamism in North Africa 1: The legacies of History. Cairo/Brussels, 20 April.

International Crisis Group (2004): Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page. ICG Middle East and North Africa. Briefing, 20 April.

International Commission of Jurists (2006): Eminent Jurists conclude sub-regional Hearing on Terrorism and Human Rights in the Maghreb. 7th July. http://www.ejp.icj.org/hearing2.php3?id_article=56&lang=en.

Kepel, Gilles (2000): Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme. Paris: Gallimard.

Malmvig, Helle (2006): “Caught between cooperation and democratization: The Barcelona process and the EU’s double discursive approach”, Journal of International Relations and Development, 9(4), 243–270.

Perrin, Delphine (2005): “Le Maghreb sous influence: le nouveau cadre juridique des migrations transsahariennes”, Maghreb–Machrek, No.185, Automne.

Pope, P. William (2005): “Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance”. William P. Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Washington DC, 10 March. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm.

Rémy, Jean-Philippe (2004): “Les Etats-Unis renforcent leur dispositif antiterroriste dans plusieurs pays africains”, Le Monde, March 5.

Roy, Olivier (2002, 2005): L’Islam mondialisé. Paris: Seuil. (Den globaliserede islam. København: Vandkunsten)

Zoubir, H. Yahia (2006): “American Policy in the Maghreb: The Conquest of a New Region?” Working Paper, No. 13, 24 July. Real Instituto Elcano.



Hassan Hanafi

Orientalism as a field of research emerged in the West in modern times, since the Renaissance. It appeared during the second cycle of the history of the West, after the classical period and the Patristics, the Medieval time and the Scholastics. It reached its peak in the 19th century, and paralleled the development of other Western schools of thought such as rationalism, historicism, and structuralism.

Orientalism has been the Victim of historicism from its formation, via meticulous and microscopic analysis, indifferent to meaning and significance. Orientalism expresses the searching subject more than it describes the object of research. It reveals Western mentality more than intuiting Oriental Soul. It is motivated by the anguish of gathering the maximum of useful information about countries, peoples and cultures of the Orient. The West, in its expansion outside its geographic borders, tried to understand better in order to dominate better. Knowledge is power. Classical Orientalism belongs for the most part to similar aspects of colonial culture in the West such as Imperialism, Racism, Nazism, Fascism – a package of hegemonic ideologies and European supremacy. It is a Western activity, an expression of Western élan vital, determining the power relationship between the Self and the Other; between the West and the non-West; between Europe from one side and Asia, Africa and Latin America, from the other side; between the New World and the classical world; between modern times and ancient times.

This brutal judgement, without nuances, is undoubtedly a severe and painful one, but a real one on the level of historical unconsciousness of peoples, on the level of images even if it is inaccurate enough on the level of concepts. On the contrary, Occidentalism is a discipline constituted in Third World countries in order to complete the process of decolonization. Military, economic and political decolonization would be incomplete without scientific and cultural decolonization. Insofar as colonized countries before or after liberation are objects of study, decolonization will be incomplete. Decolonization will not be completed until the liberation of the object to become subject and the transformation of the observed to an observer. The object of study in Orientalism becomes the studying subject in Occidentalism,

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and the studying subject in Orientalism becomes an object of study in Occidentalism. There is no eternal studying subject and no eternal object of study. It depends on the power relationship between peoples and cultures. Roles change throughout history. Peoples in the Ancient World, China, India, Persia, Babylonia, Egypt, were studying subjects. Peoples and Islamic classical cultures were previously studying subjects and Europeans at the time were objects of study. The role changed in modern times when Europeans became the studying subjects and the Muslim world became an object of study. The end of Orientalism and the beginning of Occidentalism means exchanging roles for a third time in the subject object relationship between the Self and the Other. The West ceases to be subject and becomes object, and the Orient ceases to be object and becomes subject. Subjective idealism switches from Western colonial modem times to Third World post-colonial new times. Cogito ergo sum, which declared the West as a knowing subject, becomes in the Third World studio ergo sum.

Occidentalism is a counter-field of research, which can be developed in the Orient in order to study the West from a non-Western World point of view. The Other in the self is always an image. An image is always a caricature, which helps in shooting at the target. Orientalism drew many images for the Orient. These included Blacks, Yellows, Oriental despotism, primitive mentality, savage thought, Semite mind, Arab mind, Violence, fanaticism, underdevelopment, dependence, sectarianism, traditionalism and conservatism. Once the Other is caricatured, it is easy to deal with him, justifying any action of the Self. The image made the Other a target the Self shoots at. Besides, the Self promotes self-made image to sharpen itself, such as: whites, Western, democracy, logical mentality, civilization, Aryanism, peace, tolerance, development and even over development, independence, secularism, modernism, progress. By the power of mass media and its control by the West, the perpetuation and the repetition of this double image was made by the self to disarm the Other and to arm the Self, to create a permanent relation of superiority-inferiority complex between the Occident and the Orient, and a relationship of inferiority-superiority complex between the Orient and the Occident.

If Orientalism was the creation of the centre, Occidentalism is the creation of the periphery. The centre was also privileged in history of sciences, arts and cultures, while the periphery was marginalized. The centre creates and the periphery consumes, the centre sees and conceptualises. The centre is the master and in the periphery lays the disciple. The centre is the trainer and the periphery is the trainee. Occidentalism, as a new science, can exchange

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this type of relationship, with the fixed roles played by the two, for reverse relationships and roles.

Orientalism is born in an ethno-racist culture. It expresses Euro-centrism, based on historical pride and organic superiority. This pits White against Black, knowledge against ignorance, logic against contradiction, reason against magic, rationalization against ethico-religious practice, dignity and human rights against dignity and rights of God or of the king, democracy versus despotism or in short, life against death, being against nothingness. Occidentalism corrects this type of relationship between the West as Self and the Orient as Other to the Orient as self and the West as Other. The relation between the self and the Other, either way, can be an equal relation, not a high-low relation, an even and sane inter-subjective relation instead of a superiority-inferiority complex. Constructive Occidentalism is the substitute for destructive Orientalism.

The history of the world was written as if the West was the very centre of the Universe and the end of history. History of ancient civilizations was reduced to the minimum. History of modern times in the West is blown up to the maximum. Three thousand years of the Orient are summarized in one chapter, while five hundred years of history of the modern West is expounded in several chapters. Orientalism was the victim of Western philosophies of history, which conceived Europe as the peak of all civilizations, the fruits in modern times after planting the seeds in ancient times, the accomplishment of a theological development, the perfection of things after the abrogation of all previous imperfections, the unique Christ after the prophets of Israel, repeated in history. Occidentalism aims at evening the balance of world historiography against this historical injustice in history of world civilization.

Neutrality and objectivity were claimed to be the conditions of Western science. However, Orientalism is neither neutral nor objective. It is an oriented and committed discipline, expressing the inclinations and the profound motivation in European consciousness. It reveals the passions of the subject, more than it describes the neutral object. It substitutes for the independent object the mental image of the subject. Neutrality and objectivity appear to be a cover-up for partiality and subjectivism. Occidentalism is just the opposite. It is not motivated by rancour or the desire to dominate. It does not consciously or unconsciously deform the object by stereotyped images, or make value-judgements on it. It tries to be a vigorous science by its object, method and purpose. The desire to liberate one’s self from the yoke of the image imposed on him by the Other is a creative power, unveiling the truth

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of power relationships between the subject and the object in Orientalism, controlling the Other by the image, or in Occidentalism, liberating one’s self from the image imposed on him by the other. Occidentalism may produce counter-images for the Other, with its desire to dominate, and for the Self, with a self-producing image of endogenous creativity, as a desire for self-liberation.

The object of Occidentalism is to counterbalance Westerni zation tendencies in the Third World. The West became a model of modernization outside itself, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Western life style became very common in non-Western countries, especially in the ruling classes. The imitation of the West became almost a national behaviour. These westernization tendencies have generated anti-Western attitudes as they appear in religious conservatism and fundamentalism. Occidentalism is partly a defence of national character, national culture and national life-style against alienation and disloyalty; a popular option against Orientalism as a minority option; a mass culture against Orientalism as an elite culture; an ideology for the ruled against Orientalism as an ideology of the ruler; a liberating device like liberation theology against Orientalism as a dominating device, like church dogmatics.

National culture everywhere in the Third World is split between two antagonistic tendencies. Each is presenting itself as the true representative of the people, the first in the name of Modernity, the second in the name of Tradition. In the case of the Arab World, the West is a model of modernization in the three major trends in modern Arabic Thought: Religious Reform founded by Al-Afghani, Secular Scientism initiated by Shebly Shmayyel, and Political Liberalism conceived by Al-Tahtawi. In these three trends, the West is a model of knowledge that is of power, industry, urbanism, democracy, multi-party system, constitution, freedom of press, human rights. This is the image of Europe during the enlightenment. The diff erence between the three trends is of degree, not of nature. Once national passion calms down, westernization appears as loyalty to the West and a life style for the ruling class. Cultural dependence on the West generates a gradual loss of national independence. Occidentalism as a science gives the priority to the endogenous over the exogenous, to the interior over the exterior, to the Self over the Other, to antinomy over heteronomy.

Occidentalism as a cultural movement aims at transforming developing societies from transfer of knowledge to cultural creativity. Since the national liberation era, the construction of the Nation State is based on modern sciences coming from the West. The role of intellectuals and even of scientists was to

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transfer science, art, and literature from the Western to the non-Western World. The West produces and the non-Western World con sumes. The West creates and the non-Western World transmits. National cultures became conveyers of foreign systems and ideologies. The Culture of the centre radiates on the peripheries. The centre profuses and the peripheries diffuse. Occidentalism can help the Third World in sharing the creation, not just the diffusion, of a common cultural homeland for all humanity. Science emerges from reality, not from pre-formulated texts in the ancient tradition or in the modern West. Conceptualisation is not the monopoly of European consciousness. It is a human effort, accessible to every human consciousness. The long and painful work of creativity is preferable to the laziness of con sumption and imitation, to the transfer to one’s self of concepts formulated elsewhere. Peoples in the Third World can then reach the age of maturity and get rid of western cultural tutorship.

The scientific data of this new science, Occidentalism, can be drawn from two sources: First, the criticism of European culture by Third World intellectuals, based on simple intuitions and existential reactions or on scientific analysis and demonstrative arguments. Before and after national liberation, national intellectuals in Africa, Asia and Latin America tried to liberate their national cultures from the hegemony and supremacy of Western culture. The critic of the Other and the perception of his limits is the pre-requisite of self-liberation from the control of the Other. The mentality, the history and the culture of the Other are distinct from the soul, the history and the culture of the Self. Indiginismo, liberation theology in Latin America, Conscientism and Negritude in Africa, base and democratic movements in Asia. All are examples of national creativity.

The second source of critique of European consciousness is made inside the West by the Europeans themselves, their thinkers and philosophers. Rousseau criticizes arts, sciences, literature and their negative influence on individual and social ethics. Spengler declares the “Decline of the West.” Max Scheler speaks of the reversal of values. Nietzsche evokes general nihilism and announces the death of God. Husserl and Bergson deplore the loss of life, “Erlebnis,” “vecu” in European consciousness, which became bankrupt for Husserl, and machines creating gods for Bergson. Nietzsche declares “God is dead”, Derrida and the post-modernists declare “Man is dead,” and Barthes even declares “The Author is dead!”

This double testimony, external and internal, constitutes the already-existing data of Occidentalism as science.

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Besides, there is also primary data, the works produced by European consciousness itself as symptoms of European Lebenswelt, the barometer of Being and Nothingness, of life and death of cultures and civilizations. This raw material consists of major philosophical works during the historical course of European consciousness. Philosophy is a whole worldview including art and science. It is the mirror, which reflects the development and the structure of European consciousness. The object of Occidentalism is European consciousness itself, as the soul of Europe, the condition of its renaissance or decline, life and death. The concept is not an abstraction, a hypothesis or a moral one but it refers to “une prise de conscience,” Besinnung, a self consciousness, a subjectivity, the basis of objectivity studied by most philosophers of history: Scheler, Spengler, Bergson, Husserl, Ortega, Toynbee, Hazard. European consciousness has its sources, its beginning and end. It has a structure coming out of its development. Its future is debated at this turning point from the 20th to the 21st century.

European consciousness has three sources: Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian and the European milieu itself: mentality, temperament, popular culture, customs, and traditions. The Roman source took over the Greek one, given the Romanist intensive of Imperial Rome, which was reiterated in modern European colonialism. The Jewish source took over the Christian one, with Paul and the Judaisation of Christianity. The European milieu, which was closer to Romanism and Judaism than to Hellenism and Christianity, took over two other sources. Realism triumphed over Idealism. Materialism dominated over Spiritualism and Satan overwhelmed God. The first two sources, Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman, changed models from Plato during the Patristic period to Aristotle during Scholasticism; from Idealism to Realism; from mind to matter. The European milieu is the material substratum for Judaism, Romanism and Aristotelianism. Thus the carrier and the carried are of the same kind.

European consciousness began in modern times, with the Cartesian Cogito, “Cogito ergo sum.” The subject has an absolute priority over the object. The Word is a perceived world. Subjective idealism was the point of departure. Regarding ethics, temporary ethics were proposed, unsubjected to reason. The will is much wider than reason. Theoretical Truth is guaranteed by Divine veracity. From this subjectivism, two apparent opposite trends emerged: Rationalism and Empiricism. Both are subjectivist, the first as an idea, a priori or deduction; the second as impression, sensation, a posteriori and induction. The first trend begins from the subject upwards, while the second begins from the subject downwards. European consciousness became like an open mouth.

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This is the famous Western Dualism which European modern philosophy began with and suffered from. The Transcendental Idealism of Kant tried to unify the two trends as form and matter, category and intuition, a priori and a posteriori, induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, metaphysics and physics, philosophy and science. In this famous problematique: how an a priori synthetic judgment is possible? Organic unity and dialectic movement were absent. The same dualism continued in ethics. Pure reason is incapable of knowing right and wrong. Only practical reason can. Pure reason deals with phenomena, while practical reason deals with noumena. Kant declares that through this dualism, determining the final purpose of Transcendental idealism and critical philosophy, he had to destroy knowledge in order to make room for belief. Later, when efforts were again made through the absolute Idealism of postkantians, to unify this juxtaposed dualism, it only became tri adism, sensation, understanding, and reason; aesthetics, analytics and dialectics, in a dialectical process. Fichte conceived practical Idealism and the subjective dialectic between the Ego and the non-Ego to form the Absolute Ego. Hegel reiterated Fichte, transforming subjective dialectics to objective, and going from logic to Being. Schelling preferred a certain kind of philosophy of Identity between Geist and Natur, to begin with unity as an axiom, not Cartesian duality. Schopenhauer reiterated the same dualism in the World as representation and Will, trying to unify the two in the negative aspect of life. This was already a symptom of the end, in accord with Rousseau’s critique of modern civilization. The criticism of the Hegelian left, regarding Hegelian absolute Idealism, is also the beginning of the end. In all efforts to close down the open mouth of European consciousness, the end appeared in three ways: first, with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Ortega and most existentialists, the critique of Western rationalism became abstraction and formalism, ending in a complete destruction of reason and the affirmation of the irrational, the absurd and the contradictory, in order to bring the upward ascendant line downwards. Second, with Scheler, Weber and all existentialist philosophers, the critique of Empiricism as materialism and naive objectivism, brought the downward descendant line upwards. The two lines meet in the middle in the new Cogito of Husserl and Bergson, in human existence according to all existentialist philosophers, and in life with all philosophers of life, thus putting the third way between the two opposing trends and thereby closing up the European mouth. The course of European consciousness has its beginnings and endings. It has a point of departure and a point of arrival, from the Cogito of Descartes to the Cogitatum of Husserl. The epopee ends.

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Besides, European consciousness has a structure formed during its development. It has a Trinitarian structure, expressing itself in a triadic vision which splits the phenomenon into three parts and reduces the whole to one of its parts. The question is whether the phenomenon is formal and can be understood by reason, or material and can be perceived through senses, or lived and can be felt through human experience. The three visions disputed among each other in order to have the monopoly of knowledge. Each vision became unilateral, one-sided and unilinear. European consciousness fell down into the dichotomy of either/or. European consciousness was not satisfied with the two alternatives and ended by neither/nor. The oscillation between all became the only truth. Change took over permanence. European consciousness lost its focus. It shoots outside the point, in all directions except in the centre. It goes all the time off to the side in diversion. All alternatives became equally true and untrue, which led to total scepticism, at the very basis of contemporary Nihilism.

The question now is what is the future of European consciousness? Has it accomplished its historical course in the cycle of world history? Which world-consciousness will take the lead? If Europe in modem times has inherited historical cultures of Africa, Asia and Latin America, can Third-World consciousness, the new energized by the upsurge of these historical societies, take the lead and inherit European consciousness in a new cycle of world history? Evidence can prove such a historical possibility, given the symptoms of new existence and optimism in Third World consciousness. Most philosophers of history in the West declared the birth of world history in the East and its rebirth and decline in the West. History was accomplished and the final stage was reached in modem times in the German enlightenment (Herder, Lessing, Kant, Hegel), in the French enlightenment (Voltaire, Montesquieu, Turgot), in the Italian enlightenment (Vico), in the Russian enlightenment (The Slavophiles), or in the American Enlightenment (Thomas Paine). Only Condorcet left one stage, the tenth, for the future. Rousseau had already declared the beginning of the end, while Hegel declared the accomplishment of history and the close of a European historical cycle. Contemporary European philosophers showed the different manifestations of Nihilism at the final stage of the development of European consciousness, integral Nihilism, the death of God (Nietzsche), renversement des valeurs (M. Scheler), Lebeweltverloss (Husserl), Des machines pour créer des Dieux (Bergson), the decline of the West (Spengler), civilization on trial (Toynbee), l’Occident n’est pas un accident (Garaudy), la crise de la conscience européenne (Hazard). The same phenomenon appears in human and social sciences, launching the question of crisis in Western sociology.

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It appears also in the general malaise of daily life, the counter-culture, two World Wars in thirty years, the collapse of the Western project, maxi mum of production, for maximum of consumption for maximum of happiness, the high rate of suicide, organized crime, violence. The last hopeful signs of returning back to European classical Liberalism in Germany, Eastern Europe and Russia, the renewal of the capitalist system, the rejuvenation of socialism. All are temporary and ephemeral signs. On the contrary, other real hopeful signs began to appear in Third World consciousness: liberation movements, decolonization, development, mass mobilization, modernization, building-up modern State, endogenous creativity, a new world value-system expressing a new world ethical social and political order in international agencies, a new world consensus against apartheid in South-Africa and Zionism, a new decolonization regime in Palestine. Set-backs are temporary counter-revolutions, dictatorships, militarism, new classes. Westernization, dependence, underdevelopment, violation of human rights. There are moral and material Potentialities in the Third World. Experiences of trial and error are fruitful. Historical traditional experiences of the self from the past and modern European experiences of the other in the present time can be two signposts for a New World consciousness.

Does Occidentalism as a new science sacrifice the unity of world universal culture in favour of national particular culture? In fact, World Culture is a myth created by the Culture of the Centre to dominate the periphery in the name of acculturation. It has been created thanks to the mass-media monopolized by the centre. There is no One Culture in capital C. There are only multiple cultures, in small cs. Each culture has its own autonomous life, an expression of a people and its history. Cultural interaction throughout history does not mean acculturation, the absorption of small cultures in the periphery by the big Culture of the Centre, assimilation, imitation, or modelling. It means an equal exchange, a give and take, a two-way movement on the levels of language, concepts, horizons, methods, and values. Is Occidentalism a politicization of historical sciences? In fact, politicization of science is a common experience, shared among all peoples and cultures in all times. It appeared not only in classical Orientalism, but also in European Sciences, human, social and even natural. It is only when the balance of power changed from Europe to the Third world, from the centre to the periphery, that politicization of science became an accusation. The master in the centre was the champion of such endeavour. Science is Power. The passage from Orientalism to Occidentalism is in fact a shift in the balance of power.


Islam, Europe, Occident :

combats pour un humanisme commun1

Mohammed Arkoun

A Tuomo, en hommage à ses combats et ses contributions pour la construction d’une Union méditerranéenne.

Pour un humanisme universalisable

On notera dès le départ le choix du concept universalisable qui permet de sortir du postulat de l’universel toujours invoqué, surtout par les religions, mais honoré. Chaque religion disposant d’une longue tradition d’accumulation d’œuvres et d’enseignements, se veut universelle, alors que dans l’histoire concrète et les constructions doctrinales, elle unit ses fidèles tout en les séparant des infidèles impurs. Cela est particulièrement vrai entre les trois grandes versions du monothéisme et leurs schismes respectifs. Paradoxalement, c’est quand les travaux critiques sur les religions ont clairement montré la fermeture des religions sur leurs solidarités exclusives de l’autre que la revendication de l’universel est devenue obsédante et arrogante. Mais la raison des Lumières a suivi les mêmes voies et oppose son universel imparfait à celui insoutenable des religions. Il en va de même pour la tolérance qui peine à s’imposer même après les efforts modernes pour différencier les intolérances des religions closes et la tolérance dans la cité démocratique où la citoyenneté ne retient plus les critères de confession, de couleur, d’ethnie ou de lieu de naissance.

Tout cela nous renvoie à l’attitude humaniste. Les philosophes et les théologiens disputent encore de la possibilité d’un humanisme chrétien, juif, musulman. Dans les années 1930, quand Emmanuel Mounier développait la vision d’un personnalisme chrétien et Jacques Maritain défendait l’idée que le catholicisme thomiste est un Humanisme intégral, Emile Bréhier réfutait ces propositions en soutenant que l’humanisme ne peut prendre son essor qu’à partir de l’héritage philosophique grecque. La raison philosophique se distingue de la raison théologique par son indépendance totale de tous les

1 Version inédite d’une conférence donnée à la Mairie de Rennes pour l’inauguration du Centre culturel Avicenne le 19/9/2006.

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postulats invérifiables de la croyance religieuse. Les disputes actuelles en France sur la relation entre raison autonome philosophique et scientifique et raison serve du donné révélé ou d’une sagesse ancienne sacralisé par le temps (Hindouisme, Bouddhisme, Confucianisme, religions africaines…) prolongent celles commencées au Moyen Âge entre les philosophes et les théologiens d’expression arabe (8e–13e siècles).

Aujourd’hui, on réexamine la précipitation idéologique de ceux qui ont proclamé la mort de Dieu, puis celle de l’homme et du sujet (années 1960–1970). On a déconstruit la métaphysique classique également présente dans la raison philosophique et la raison théologique ; on réhabilite le sujet comme foyer de liberté et aptitude à la créativité ; mais on n’arrive pas à redonner à l’humanisme des assises doctrinales et des pratiques inscriptibles dans la marche des hommes vers l’universalisable. Celui-ci est un mouvement continu et pluriel vers des valeurs partagées, mises à l’épreuve dans la diversité des parcours historiques concrets. Dans cette perspective, les vastes flux d’immigration qui inspirent partout tant de peurs, d’angoisse, de mal vivre, de méfiances et contrôles, deviennent des promesses d’intercréativités et de communion toujours plus universalisables.

Par delà l’exemple de la France où se vivent ces tensions éducatives même dans les moments de violence sociale, ces observations s’appliquent à l’ensemble de l’espace historique européen souvent désigné par le concept ambigu d’Occident. Nous devons réfléchir ensemble sur les trois concepts Islam, Europe, Occident trop embrouillés par des conflits récurrents avant et après 1945. Nous vivons sur des représentations fausses et dangereuses qui structurent depuis 1945 notamment, les imaginaires sociaux et politiques tant du côté du monde dit musulman que de celui de l’Europe/Occident. Rappelons brièvement ces conflits majeurs. La guerre d’Algérie commence le 8 mai 1945, jour de la victoire des alliés, mais aussi du bombardement de Sétif pour réprimer un soulèvement local. La guerre de libération dure de Novembre 1954 aux accords d’Evian en mars 1962. A l’intérieur de ce conflit qui avait des aspects de guerre civile, s’insère la guerre de Suez pour punir l’Egypte de Nasser qui venait de nationaliser le canal du même nom. L’Europe/Occident a un rôle décisif dans la guerre de 1967 dite des six jours, entre Israël et ce qu’on appelait alors la « Nation » arabe. Guerre dite de Kippour en Octobre 1973 ; puis première guerre du Golfe en 1990. Le tout culmine dans la guerre d’éradication du terrorisme international en réponse aux attentats du 11/9/ 2001. Les développements de la guerre d’Irak depuis mars 2003 suffiraient à justifier une analyse subversive des « valeurs » au nom desquelles les protagonistes des guerres antérieures et de la guerre en cours

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Combats pour un humanisme commun

« légitimes » tant de destructions, de vies humaines supprimées, d’espérances collectives abolies. C’est en ce sens que j’ai publié en anglais un livre sous le titre explicite à cet égard : Islam: to Reform or to Subvert?2

Antérieurement, j’ai publié avec Joseph Maïla3, un autre livre où j’ai esquissé la genèse socio-culturelle et idéologique des mémoires collectives et des imaginaires d’exclusion réciproque entre les deux polarisations mythohistoriques et mythoidéologiques développées dans une littérature pléthorique sur Islam et Occident. Le terme islam renvoie indistinctement à la religion, à une tradition de pensée, aux cultures propres aux sociétés nombreuses converties à cette religion depuis le Moyen Âge, à une civilisation reconnaissable partout à des œuvres et des styles spécifiques de réalisation de l’existence humaine. Mais depuis la Révolution dite islamique de 1979 en Iran et plus encore après les attentats du 11/9, toute cette diversité désignée par le même mot est quasi abolie par le terrorisme international lié au fondamentalisme dit islamiste à distinguer du qualificatif islamique. Les musulmans n’ont pas su répondre avec pertinence à des amalgames qu’ils renforcent eux-mêmes lorsqu’ils descendent dans la rue à propos du voile, des versets sataniques, des caricatures, de tel roman subversif ou d’une conférence du pape. En outre, ils construisent un imaginaire de l’Occident aussi arbitraire et polémique que celui de ce même Occident sur l’islam. Au lieu de faire un retour critique sur les manipulations incessantes que les Etats et leurs oppositions politiques font subir partout à l’islam comme religion et tradition de pensée, la majorité des musulmans préfèrent dénoncer le scandale de l’islamophobie.

On notera que ce jeu de miroirs des deux imaginaires d’exclusion réciproque, est aussi inégal et scandaleux que les guerres sans merci qui les opposent depuis longtemps. L’Occident dispose de ressources scientifiques et technologiques, de puissance militaire, économique et monétaire sans commune mesure avec les retards historiques, les régressions intellectuelles et culturelles, les sous-développements économiques et sociaux dont souffrent toutes les sociétés contemporaines globalement qualifiées de musulmanes. Et cependant, avec l’attentat du 11/9, l’Occident est devenu la victime de ce monde éprouvé par tant d’échecs historiques et assigné soudain à la fonction de bourreau. Les protagonistes de la lutte se livrent à une surenchère mimétique sur l’accès au statut de victime, seul argument opératoire pour légitimer les attaques et les ripostes. On sait comment les

2 Arkoun 2006a.3 Arkoun & Maïla 2003.

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instances internationales ont été elles-mêmes réduites à l’incapacité de mettre un terme à un conflit dont on retrace les origines et les enjeux cachés en remontant jusqu’aux conquêtes musulmanes aux 7e–8e siècles, réactivées par les Ottomans du 16e au 17e siècle.

On lira dans le livre sur L’histoire de l’islam et des musulmans en France du Moyen Age à nos jours des chapitres éclairants sur la genèse et les récurrences des conflits entre l’Europe chrétienne, puis moderne et les empires musulmans dont les effritements et les désintégrations ont commencé avec la chute du Califat de Bagdad en 1258, la fin de l’Andalousie en 1592, le dépouillement de l’Empire ottoman à partir de 1683. Je recommande particulièrement la lecture attentive des chapitres consacrés aux Croisades, aux relations avec l’Empire ottoman et à la politique coloniale. On mesurera à quel point l’histoire analytique et réflexive apaise les passions et rend plus intelligibles les événements qui nous déchirent. Il est urgent et nécessaire en effet, de dépasser les discours de victimisation et les bulletins quotidiens de comptabilité macabre pour préparer une pensée et une culture de paix dans l’ensemble de l’espace méditerranéen. En France, en Europe comme dans tout le monde de l’islam, on vit depuis l’émergence de la dernière version du monothéisme en Arabie (610–632) sur d’amples mythohistoires et mythoidéologies4. Il est temps de penser ou repenser les impensés accumulés pendant des siècles pour dissimuler les ignorances, les omissions, les diabolisations de l’autre qui continuent de dominer nos discours quotidiens et de faire irruption chez des écrivains et des professeurs médiatisés.5

Permettez-moi d’apporter un témoignage personnel pour donner des contenus concrets à toutes les observations précédentes. J’étais étudiant à Alger, puis à Paris pendant la guerre d’Algérie. Ce qui s’écrivait alors dans les journaux et se propageait sur les ondes ressemble beaucoup à tout ce qui continue de circuler de nos jours sur l’Occident en contextes arabo-musulmans et inversement sur ces derniers en Europe/Occident. Les maquisards algériens étaient des fellagas hors-la-loi ; l’Algérie n’a jamais été ni un Etat, ni une nation dans son histoire indistincte de celle de l’Afrique du Nord ; la France doit poursuivre sa mission civilisatrice qui légitime la conquête de 1830… Je percevais déjà que les réfutations opposées à ces proclamations par le discours nationaliste véhiculaient des ignorances égales à celles des défenseurs d’un régime colonial sûr de lui, de son bon droit et

4 Sur l’importance explicative de ces deux concepts guère utilisés par les historiens les plus critiques, je renvoie à mes analyses dans Arkoun & Maïla 2003.5 Arkoun 2006b.

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dominateur. Mes maîtres à Alger comme à la Sorbonne, étaient eux-mêmes incapables de tempérer les fureurs idéologiques par un savoir critique fiable et scientifiquement contraignant. C’est devant ce vide intellectuel et l’absence de part et d’autre d’une conscience historique critique consistante qu’est née en moi la détermination d’orienter mes recherches et mes réflexions vers un projet de grand envergure dont j’ai donné les premières expressions dans le recueil d’essais publié en 1982 sous le titre Lectures du Coran, suivi en 1984 d’une Critique de la Raison islamique. En 2002, j’ai publié en anglais The Unthought in Contemporain Islamic Thought, repris dans une deuxième édition en 2005 sous le titre plus explicite déjà cité Islam: to Reform or to Subvert?

Il m’a été donné de mesurer à plusieurs reprises la surdité des militants les plus cultivés à l’idée même d’accompagner la lutte armée et la politique de libération, d’un travail intellectuel et scientifique pour inscrire l’Algérie libérée du côté des acquits les plus incontournables de la modernité intellectuelle et institutionnelle. Le mot d’ordre de l’idéologie de combat dans les cas algériens, palestinien, irakiens, iraniens…, était et demeure de taire ces « abstractions » intellectuelles pour mettre fin d’abord au régime colonial. Je pressentais clairement vers quelle tragédie historique quelques leaders de la lutte entraînaient et continuent d’entraîner des peuples abusés avant et après la guerre. L’élimination de certaines voix qui osaient s’exprimer dans le sens d’un consensus national sur le destin moderne ou régressif de l’Algérie indépendante, m’a conforté dans le choix d’un combat intellectuel, scientifique et culturel de portée subversive pour l’ensemble de la pensée d’expression arabe et islamique. Une subversion thérapeutique, positive, constructive pour réparer des ans et des violences aveugles les irréparables outrages. Plus de 50 ans de recherche, de publications et d’enseignement ont clairement établi des constantes communes à l’évolution historique de toutes les sociétés dont le destin a été lié à ce que j’appelle le fait coranique et le fait islamique. Depuis la création de l’Etat d’Israël, les Palestiniens vivent dans les mêmes erreurs stratégiques illustrées dans le parcours algérien. L’islamisme militant dans les contextes européens contemporains demeure englué dans la même mythohistoire transformée en mythoidélogie malgré les ressources de la pensée moderne mises à la portée de tous ceux qui acceptent de s’en servir.

En plaçant la création de ce centre Avicenne dans cette perspective d’histoire réflexive, je veux aussi lancer un appel à tous les maires de France pour suivre l’exemple de leur collègue de Rennes. Pour renforcer le sens de cet appel, je dois également rendre hommage à l’action de mon ami Jean-Pierre

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Brard, député maire de Montreuil, qui a vite compris la haute portée politique à l’échelle nationale, d’un enseignement public du fait religieux. Nous avons créé en 2003 ce que nous avons appelé le Centre civique d’enseignement du fait religieux. Ce centre fonctionne d’une manière exemplaire, donnant la preuve que l’approche laïque du fait religieux élargit les horizons de sens de toutes les religions et renforce la pensée laïque qui sait enfin intégrer les richesses culturelles et intellectuelles des parcours historiques des religions abandonnées jusqu’ici aux seules initiatives privées des communautés croyantes.

Le centre Avicenne de Rennes doit d’autant plus d’ouvrir un même espace civique pour cet enseignement qu’il doit marquer sa fonction propre par rapport à celle cultuelle de la mosquée. Si la fonction cultuelle l’emporte sur les tâches civiques laïques de l’expression intellectuelle, scientifique et culturelle des religions, le pari pour faire bénéficier la vie religieuse des fidèles, des lumières de la connaissance critique, sera perdu. L’idée de combiner les deux fonctions dans un même espace bâti, a des antécédents historiques dans l’islam traditionnel ; on réservait toujours à l’intérieur des mosquées un espace à l’enseignement, à l’échange scientifique et à la méditation spirituelle. Cela n’a pas empêché la création de grandes universités ou médersas qui, avec le temps, se sont laissées gagner par l’emprise de la religion ritualiste et dogmatique. Est-il besoin de souligner que l’islam en France et dans l’ensemble de l’Europe est encore loin de disposer d’espaces scientifiques et culturels comparables à ceux dont disposent les religions enracinées depuis longtemps dans l’histoire des peuples européens. L’idée est d’habituer les populations d’origines ethnoculturelles diverses à poser et résoudre ensemble tous les problèmes liés à la construction d’un espace de citoyenneté humaniste où chaque mémoire collective se laisse enrichir par les acquis positifs des autres. Cela implique évidemment que toutes les cultures vivantes sur le sol français soient également accueillies dans leurs styles et leurs thématiques propres afin de dynamiser une créativité interculturelle et intellectuelle enrichissantes pour tous. Je pense au succès des maisons de la culture lancées par André Malraux pour faire bénéficier les provinces de manifestations culturelles trop concentrées à Paris. La nécessité politique d’intégrer tous les nouveaux venus dans une même marche citoyenne implique la consolidation d’une langue commune et de visions interactives ouvertes sur le futur immédiat et lointain.

Pour souligner la pertinence de cette politique, il convient de rappeler que la France a esquissé de timides efforts d’assimilation des « indigènes » en Algérie. Mais, compte tenu de ce qui a été sur l’épistémè de la pensée française

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et l’épistémologie de la connaissance, elle ne pouvait se donner ni les outils de pensée, ni la volonté politique indispensables pour dépasser l’idée simpliste d’assimilation de sociétés et de modes de pensée décrits comme primitifs et inscrits dans la magie et les croyances religieuses obsolètes. La critique nationaliste du colonialisme inspirée de fragments de la pensée protestataire révolutionnariste était encore plus limitée que celle du colonisateur pour accéder à l’analyse plus radicale que je suggère ici. C’est ainsi que la guerre de libération doit être décryptée comme un choc inévitable entre deux imaginaires à la fois différents dans leurs substrats et identiques en tant que structures anthropologiques déterminantes dans tous les mécanismes de production imaginaire des sociétés humaines depuis le stade « sauvage » de la pensée jusqu’au stade actuel le plus sophistiqué. La guerre d’Irak en cours, les attentats du 11/9/2001 relèvent de la même analyse.

Précisons que la science positiviste du 19e siècle rejetait dans l’impensable et l’obsolète ce que les ethnographes d’alors décrivaient sous les appellations magies, superstitions, croyances archaïques, traditions immobiles, conduites régressives, etc. Certaines postures laïcistes et militantes d’aujourd’hui en sont toujours au stade de ce positivisme arrogant et réducteur. C’est dire que la pensée laïque doit enfin se laisser instruire par les apports nouveaux de l’investigation pluridisciplinaire. De même que la République a fait attendre les femmes françaises jusqu’en 1945 pour l’octroi du droit de vote, elle s’est autorisée, a fortiori, à appliquer parcimonieusement aux départements d’Algérie, la loi instituant l’école obligatoire, gratuite et laïque. Elle a pensé encore moins à appliquer la loi de 1905 ou seulement à une politique de création de centres culturels à vocation éducative et laïque. Cette incurie se prolonge en métropole à l’égard des immigrés voués aux tâches manuelles et une existence précaire dans des banlieues ou quartiers réservés. Curieusement dans les débats actuels sur la violence des banlieues, la dimension culturelle et éducative telle que je l’évoque ici est rarement prise en compte. Bien des professeurs d’histoire au niveau secondaire sont encore prisonniers de l’ancien cadre de pensée se contendant d’opposer deux concepts abstraits comme tradition et modernité, régime fondamentaliste et régime rationnel de la pensée, des représentations et des discours, connaissance mythologique et superstitieuse et connaissance scientifique…

La persistance de ce cadre binaire de la pensée et du poids du logocentrisme aristotélicien dans la tradition spéculative de la métaphysique classique permet d’expliquer aujourd’hui la reconduction du choc des imaginaires et des ignorances mutuelles dans le face à face France/Europe et Islam/

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musulmans. La France reproduit les rhétoriques abstraites et idéalistes du Moment fondateur de la Révolution, les musulmans régressent de manière encore plus agressive et antihistorique vers le Moment inaugurateur de la dernière Révélation de Parole de Dieu à toutes ses créatures. Tous les français et tous les musulmans ne sont évidemment également enfermés dans ces représentations mythiques de leurs identités respectives et de leur vision de l’histoire des sociétés, évolutionnaires de carence révèlent le caractère prématuré de tous les principes généreux proclamés universels par la raison des Lumières. Dans cette perspective, on ne peut dire que l’Algérie a tourné le dos à la modernité ; ni son passé historique, ni sa structure socio-culturelle, ni sa sociologie linguistique, ni son anthropologie politique, juridique et sociale ne pouvaient faciliter l’accueil d’une modernité dont l’administration coloniale elle-même ignorait les enjeux et les principes fondateurs. Quant à la République gérée de Paris, elle s’est contentée d’une rhétorique ronflante, mais vide de tout programme émancipateur à l’instar des initiatives appliquées aux provinces métropolitaines. La preuve est qu’au lendemain de l’indépendance, la faible minorité convertie aux voies modernes de la connaissance et de l’action politique, a été vite éliminée par ceux qui pensaient dans le cadre nationaliste de la Grande Nation arabe que prônaient le Nassérisme et le ba‘thisme en Proche Orient. C’est un fait historique que l’Europe colonisatrice en général a introduit des désirs de modernisation matérielle plus que les conditions scientifiques, culturelles et institutionnelles d’un passage durable à la modernité intellectuelle. C’est ce qui explique la récession rapide et massive vers une politique de traditionalisation ouvrant un boulevard sans obstacle aux postures fondamentalistes de la religiosité populaire vite dégénérée en mythoidéologie populiste.

Cette évolution n’est pas particulière à l’Algérie. On la retrouve dans l’ensemble des pays colonisés avec des facteurs aggravants ou atténuants selon les passés et les conditions d’émergence des premières équipes dirigeantes. La politique de la recherche scientifique et de l’éducation imposée par les Partis-Etats et la rapide croissance démographique dès les années 1960, ont élargi la base sociologique de l’expansion d’une idéologie de combat dirigée contre les régimes en place et leurs alliés en Occident. On retiendra la différence entre les options socialistes de l’idéologie de combat anticolonial et les orientations religieuses des oppositions aux régimes des Partis-Etats. L’islam étatisé, c’est-à-dire placé sous le contrôle d’Etats plutôt séculiers, devient la seule source de légitimité et l’objectif premier d’une restauration systématique pour éclairer et orienter l’avenir des sociétés authentiquement musulmanes. On voit à quel point la réponse américaine

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et de certains Etats européens à cette impasse historique aggrave les conflits au lieu de les apaiser et de leur offrir des solutions viables.

Revenons à ce centre de Rennes. Je tiens à souligner la pertinence du choix d’Avicenne pour le nommer. Il reste bien d’autres noms comme al-Kindî, al-Farâbî, al-Birûnî, Jâhiz, Tawhîdî, Miskawayh, Maqdisî, Ibn Batûta, Ibn Khaldûn… Tahtâwî, Jurjî Zaydân à mêler à ceux des français et européens pour remembrer les champs de la pensée et des cultures dans l’espace méditerranéen. Ces noms sont autant de maillons forts dans les chaînes d’autorités intellectuelles, scientifiques, philosophiques, médicales, et pour tout dire humanistes qui renforcent le sentiment d’appartenance aux mêmes origines spirituelles, éthiques, artistiques et intellectuelles. Aucun des noms cités n’introduit une dissonance quelconque par rapport à ceux que nous lisons sur les plaques de rues en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Suède… Voilà encore une voie trop longtemps ignorée, rejetée dans l’impensable dans les cultures protégées des Etats-Nations, même à l’intérieur de cet espace nouveau d’appartenance qu’est l’Union européenne. Les esprits attardés dans les enfermements de la pensée essentialiste, substantialiste, intégriste de la religion vraie ou des identités spécifiques, dénonceront le cosmopolitisme, la dissolution des valeurs et des vérités, les métissages dissolvants… Il faut méditer sur les facteurs déterminants dans la grandeur et la décadence des civilisations pour mesurer les richesses potentielles de l’interculturalité et de l’intercréativité dans tout déploiement optimal des ressources de l’esprit humain et des sociétés qui rendent possible ce déploiement.

Comme toutes les grandes figures de l’humanisme pensé et vécu, Avicenne dépasse les limites géopolitiques et culturelles pourtant très étendues de l’islam de son temps. Il était nourri de tous les grands héritages culturels et intellectuels de l’Iran ancien, de la Grèce classique et hellénistique et de ce que son contemporain philosophe et historien Miskawayh a recueilli dans une anthologie célèbre sous le titre persan ancien Jâvidân Khirad6. En faisant appel à de grands noms de la pensée et de la culture d’expression arabe, persane, turque, on contribue au grand travail de réhabilitation de ce Moyen Âge longtemps méconnu et qualifié d’obscurantiste.

La pensée islamique est entrée dans sa phase historique de régression quant elle s’est détournée de ces héritages fécondants qualifiés d’intrus (‘ulûm dakhîla) dès le 9e siècle par le courant traditionaliste qui a fini par dominer jusqu’à nos jours. Je dois dire un mot de cette longue période dominée par trois empires musulmans : l’Empire ottoman dans l’espace méditerranéen,

6 Voir Arkoun 2005.

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l’empire safavide en Iran et l’empire Moghol en Asie. On ne peut bien sûr couvrir des espaces si vastes et si complexes ; on s’en tiendra à quelques remarques qui éclairent la situation présente.

De l’islam classique a l’islam ritualiste et populiste

L’une des pages les plus éclairantes pour les débats de notre temps sur la place de l’islam dans nos sociétés modernes est celle qui explique le passage historique de ce qu’on appelle l’islam classique (750–1358) à l’islam régressif et scolastique (1406–1830) ; puis de l’intermède libéral (1830–1940) aux idéologies de combat (1945–2006). Pour les conditions de ces passages, je renvoie à Dominique Urvoy : Histoire de la pensée arabe et islamique; et à ma Pensée arabe.7

Benoît XVI vient de nous donner un exemple pour réfléchir sur les temporalités inversées des parcours historiques de l’Europe chrétienne, puis sécularisées d’une part et de l’islam d’autre part :

« Tout cela m’est revenu à l’esprit lorsque récemment j’ai lu une partie du dialogue publié par le professeur Khoury (de Münster) entre l’empereur byzantin lettré Manuel II Paléologue et un savant persan dans le camp d’hiver d’Ankara en 1391, sur le christianisme et l’islam, et sur leur vérité respective. L’empereur a sans doute mis par écrit le dialogue pendant le siège de Constantinople entre 1394 et 1402… Dans le 7e dialogue édité par le professeur Khoury (« dialexis », « controverse »), l’empereur en arrive à parler du thème du djihâd’ (guerre sainte). L’empereur savait certainement que dans la sourate 2, 256, il est écrit : « Pas de contrainte en matière de foi » – c’est l’une des sourates primitives datant de l’époque où Mohammed lui-même était privé de pouvoir et se trouvait menacé. Mais l’empereur connaissait naturellement aussi les dispositions inscrites dans le Coran – d’une époque plus tardive – au sujet de la guerre sainte. Sans s’arrêter aux particularités, comme la différence de traitement entre « gens du Livre » et « incroyants », il s’adresse à son interlocuteur d’une manière étonnamment abrupte au sujet de la question centrale du rapport entre religion et contrainte. Il déclare : Montre-moi donc ce que Mohammed a apporté de neuf, et alors tu ne trouveras sans doute rien que de mauvais et d’inhumain, par exemple le fait qu’il a prescrit que la foi qu’il prêchait, il fallait la répandre par le glaive. »

7 Urvoy 2006; Arkoun 2003.

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Ce fragment de la conférence du pape nous renvoie par son style et son cadre de pensée théologique à l’abondante littérature polémique entre docteurs chrétiens et musulmans au Moyen Âge. Nous sommes dans la période d’ascension militaire des turcs ottomans qui allaient prendre Constantinople en 1453 : une grande date dans l’histoire de la lutte entre musulmans et chrétiens pour le contrôle de la circulation maritime, l’échange des marchandises dans ce qui a été avant l’islam la Mare Nostrum romaine. L’ascension militaire et politique des Ottomans n’a pas empêché la régression déjà signalée de la pensée islamique et de la langue arabe savante. Si Manuel II avait lu les grands penseurs mentionnés plus haut dans la période classique du Califat, il n’aurait pas tenu le même propos sur le glaive pour répandre la foi. Il est vrai que ce thème de la littérature théologique polémique est apparu tôt dans les confrontations du Haut Moyen Âge. Faut-il s’étonner que le pape s’appuie sur ce vieux motif d’une dispute si ancienne et toujours décontextualisée, pour construire une théorie en elle-même inacceptable historiquement sur l’intimité intellectuelle et spirituelle du logos grec et de la foi catholique au cours des siècles ? On lira à ce sujet le riche débat historique ouvert par Alain de Libéra à l’occasion de la publication de l’encyclique de Jean-Paul II sur Raison et Foi8.

Du côté musulman, on constate qu’ils s’indignent, exigent des excuses, manifestent dans les rues, mais n’opposent aucune réfutation historique et doctrinale scientifiquement contraignante. Le grand penseur Ibn Hazm de Cordoue (m. 1064) aurait sûrement stigmatisé avec verve et pertinence l’ignorance évidente de l’empereur. La suite de l’affaire est que le pape reçoit des ambassadeurs d’Etats musulmans pour leur exprimer son profond respect pour l’islam. Cela souligne le soutien du pape à l’étatisation totale de l’islam, alors qu’il s’indignerait qu’un semblable traitement fût infligé au catholicisme actuel. Ce geste traduit une double ignorance : d’abord que l’islam est théologiquement protestant et politiquement catholique ; c’est ce qu’exprime très clairement la citation de Muhammad ‘Abdou placée en exergue ci-dessus ; ensuite que sa conférence doit donner lieu à l’ouverture d’un débat entre historiens de la pensée théologique et philosophique et

8 Lire absolument la réfutation de l’encyclique par Alain de Libera 2003. On comprendra la différence très instructive entre l’histoire archéologie des épistémès des théologies et comment la théologie retenue comme orthodoxe par la hiérarchie officielle voue les autres constructions à la marginalité jusqu’à l’oubli. Cet exemple fouillé par un grand connaisseur s’applique mutatis mutandi au cas des théologies concurrentes en islam au temps où l’islam avait et lisait et réfutait ses théologiens ; ce n’est plus le cas depuis le 13e–14e siècle.

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non à des excuses adressées à des représentants qui n’ont ni la compétence scientifique, ni l’autorité spirituelle, ni aucune autre légitimité pour être mêlés à une telle affaire. Je n’ai eu connaissance d’aucune protestation d’une « autorité religieuse indépendante » contre ces deux fautes d’appréciation; preuve que les ulémas contemporains sont des fonctionnaires stipendiés par des Etats qui, en saine théologie, n’ont aucun titre pour s’immiscer dans les débats sur la foi.

Pour la réponse sur le fond du problème des rapports entre raison et foi, je dirai que nous sommes encore ramenés aux constructions médiévales de la foi avec les outils du corpus logocentriste aristotélicien largement exploité tant en contextes islamiques que catholiques. La langue arabe s’est enrichie des apports du logos entre 700 et 1200 environ ; c’est seulement après la marginalisation puis la disparition de la philosophie logocentriste en contextes islamiques qu’un fossé durable se creuse entre le logos et l’expression de la foi en islam. En chrétienté, il y a continuité, progrès et changements profonds notamment avec Vatican II en 1962–1965. Si le pape avait formulé les choses de la sorte, il aurait donné une belle et salutaire leçon d’histoire de la pensée religieuse depuis le Moyen Âge jusqu’à nos jours. Mais il a préféré s’appuyer sur un texte polémique pour faire valoir un privilège apologétique de la foi catholique.

Aujourd’hui, les ulémas musulmans ne maîtrisent ni le corpus théologico-philosophique au niveau où l’avait fait Averroès (m. 1198), ni encore moins au niveau de la déconstruction de la métaphysique classique et du corpus aristotélicien initiée depuis les années 1960. Avec tout le respect que je garde pour la haute fonction du pape, j’oserai dire que le théologien Ratzinger n’est même pas parvenu à respecter les règles strictes de la disputatio médiévale à Bologne, à la Sorbonne ou à Rome. Il aurait sûrement rehaussé son argumentaire s’il avait su souligner que depuis le 13e–14e siècle, le recours au jihâd – guerre juste plus que sainte dans la construction juridique musulmane – l’a effectivement emporté de beaucoup sur l’usage critique du logos.

Voilà un exemple de débat fécond qui devrait se reproduire tout au long de chaque année académique dans ce Centre Avicenne. Les musulmans de France et d’ailleurs cesseraient alors d’aller crier dans les rues leurs ignorances anciennes et nouvelles, tandis que la pensée islamique renouerait avec la pensée exploratrice, interrogative, inventive et émancipatrice. De tels débats ne doivent pas cibler des élites rivalisant d’érudition ; il s’agit d’offrir au grand public une série de conférences sur des problèmes d’histoire et d’anthropologie comparées des religions afin de diffuser les connaissances

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sans cesse renouvelées par la recherche en sciences de l’homme et de la société toujours accompagnée par l’interrogation philosophique. Toute religion qui refuse ce soutien constant de la pensée exploratrice et critique est vouée à la sclérose des répétitions ritualistes et aux dangers multiples liés aux croyances fidéistes. Chaque année, on offrirait au grand public les possibilités d’aborder les religions comme support d’une connaissance humaniste des cultures et des systèmes de pensée enfin pris en charge dans des espaces de recherche solidaire.

La thématique de la raison et de la foi permettrait d’explorer des domaines nouveaux, jamais visités encore dans l’espace historique méditerranéen depuis les temps lointains de la Figure prophétique d’Abraham d’un côté, et de l’autre, depuis la mise en place en Grèce ancienne du couple inépuisable du logos/muthos. En insistant sur cette dimension de la connaissance, je ne ressasse pas un rêve de spécialiste ; pendant plus de 35 ans d’enseignement à la Sorbonne, j’ai testé la fécondité intellectuelle et humaniste de ces deux grands axes de la pensée qui alimentent toutes les cultures et les modes de pensée dans l’espace méditerranéen avant de traverser toutes les frontières ethnoculturelles avec l’expansion du christianisme et de l’islam d’une part, de la raison des Lumières (malgré ses omissions, ses catégorisations arbitraires et ses échecs) à partir des révolutions européennes d’autre part. A l’omnipotence du logos opposé au muthos depuis Platon et Aristote, il convient d’ajouter celle concurrente et révélante de la Parole telle qu’elle est articulée dans le discours prophétique depuis la Genèse, première livre de la Bible hébraïque devenu l’Ancien Testament, dans les Evangiles et le Coran.

Pour mesurer la nouveauté du programme de recherche, de transmission, d’instruction et d’éducation généralisée que je propose ici, je dois m’arrêter davantage sur la définition de quelques concepts clefs appelés devenir des outils de pensée accessibles à tous. Il existe un lexique technique propre à mon écriture de l’histoire de la pensée dans l’espace méditerranéen ; ne pouvant le reprendre entièrement ici, je privilégierai les suivants : Parole ; discours prophétique ; textes recueillis dans les Corpus Officiel Clos (COC); logos et muthos ; mythohistoire et mythoidéologie.

Le travail de ces concepts exige une stratégie méthodologique et cognitive que je résume dans trois verbes à l’infinitif : transgresser, déplacer, dépasser.

Il s’agit de transgresser des frontières rigides tracées au cours des siècles par ce que chaque groupe social plus ou moins autonome appelle la tradition. Le terme français renvoie au latin tradere, transmettre, propager.

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Avec les trois traditions monothéistes, la transmission des enseignements des prophètes qui ont eux-mêmes transmis la Parole de Dieu remplace au fur et à mesure de son expansion, la reproduction des us et coutumes propres à chaque groupe ethnoculturel. C’est pour exprimer cette suprématie de l’acte de transmission et du contenu de ce qui est transmis qu’on écrit Tradition avec une majuscule quand il s’agit du donné révélé et de sa réception dans les trois Traditions monothéistes et on réserve la minuscule aux traditions au sens ethnographique qui survivent plus ou moins efficacement selon les parcours historiques des groupes, des communautés et des nations modernes. Dans le cas de l’islam, le terme sunna réfère aussi à la pratique commune conforme aux normes coutumières qui sont confirmées ou remplacées par les enseignements du Coran et des conduites du prophète. L’interpénétration entre la tradition ethnographique et la Tradition scripturaire est demeurée constante et active jusqu’à nos jours.

Ces précisions sur les mécanismes de formation et d’expansion de toute tradition nous aident à mieux définir le statut linguistique et les fonctions complexes des concepts clefs qui commandent la production du sens, la circulation des significations et des valeurs dans ce que j’appelle les sociétés

du Livre-livre9. C’est dans ces sociétés que le Livre révélé, appelé aussi Ecritures saintes, va générer une intarissable production de livres ordinaires (avec minuscules) jusqu’à nos jours. La littérature ainsi générée dans l’histoire concrète historicise la Parole de Dieu et sécularise les enseignements des prophètes. La croyance orthodoxe continuera cependant de parler directement de la Parole de Dieu et traditions prophétiques qui sacralisent le vécu profane. Cette dialectique entre transcendance postulée et historicisation de fait de la Parole de Dieu, revendication du pouvoir de sacralisation des traditions prophétiques et négation ou effacement de la désacralisation de fait quand ces traditions s’inscrivent dans la vie quotidienne profane; cette dialectique définit le nœud de l’incommunication entre la croyance sans questionnement critique et la croyance autocritique.

Cette incommunication ne peut être surmontée que par une pédagogie appropriée dans l’interprétation et l’enseignement du fait religieux. La laïcité militante n’a pas reconnu la nécessité de passer par cette recherche et cette didactique du fait religieux ; elle a choisi avec une certitude tranquille la voie de la facilité : on renonce à parler de religion dans l’enseignement public ; on abandonne ce travail aux gestionnaires traditionnels du sacré. Il en résulte une double carence et irresponsabilité : la religion est abandonné aux gardiens des

9 Sur la portée socio-culturelle de ce concept, voir Arkoun 2002, chapitre 3.

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orthodoxies dogmatiques, ce qui entraîne des conséquences sur la gestion citoyenne de l’espace public ; on appauvrit la connaissance adéquate des forces imaginaires de construction de la société et les conditions optimales de déploiement du sujet humain. C’est l’occasion de souligner à nouveau que l’appel constant à plus de police pour contrôler la violence et les dérives de « la racaille » et des sauvages nous réfèrent à l’arbitraire intellectuel du choix irresponsable de l’Etat positiviste et laïciste qui a institué l’ignorance dans l’école publique de la portée anthropologique irréductible du fait religieux.

La didactique préconisée passe par les opérations de transgression, de déplacement et de dépassement pour tester dans toute démarche cognitive la validité épistémologique de trois hypothèses heuristiques qui ont orienté les recherches des sciences de l’homme et de la société depuis les grands débats théoriques et pratiques qui ont marqué les mises en crise de la raison des Lumières durant les années 1950–1990. La bibliographie sur ces années cruciales est immense ; j’ai eu le privilège de prendre part à l’effervescence des années exceptionnelles et de contribuer à ces mises en crise à partir de la Sorbonne. Ce que j’écris dans ces pages repose sur cette expérience qui se poursuit encore aujourd’hui dans un contexte politique et épistémique changeant depuis la chute du mur de Berlin, puis le 11/9/2001. Je rappelle les trois hypothèses heuristiques qui subvertissent les postulats de la raison religieuse telle qu’elle continue de s’imposer dans les discours contemporains sur le retour ou la réactivation du religieux.

1. L’histoire est le produit des acteurs sociaux en compétition pour l’exercice du monopole de la fonction symbolique qui fonde à son tour la légitimité du pouvoir politique ; la légitimité est l’instance de l’autorité qui fait accepter la légalité comme exercice du monopole de la violence légale. « 2. Le monde civil est entièrement l’œuvre des hommes et par conséquent on doit savoir en trouver les principes dans les modifications de notre esprit lui-même », J. B. Vico, La science Nouvelle, 1725. A la proposition de Vico qui remonte à 1725, mais déjà présente 3. implicitement dans les analyses de la solidarité agnatique et des structures des sociétés urbaines et bédouines chez Ibn Khaldûn (m. 1406), s’ajoutent les travaux sur la production imaginaire de la société (C. Castoriadis), la construction sociale de la réalité (Peter Berger) et l’institution sociale de l’esprit (Jean de Munk).

Munis de tous ces préliminaires, revenons à l’examen de nos concepts. La linguistique moderne nous permet de bien distinguer le statut de la parole de celui du texte. « Au commencement était le Verbe », enseigne déjà la Bible.

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Le philosophe linguiste et sémioticien à la fois radicalise comme suit les traits distinctifs de la parole comme logos et muthos unis dans une interaction créatrice. Méditons ce riche énoncé :

« Au commencement fut le Topos. Et le Topos indiquait le monde, étant lieu; il n’était pas en Dieu, il n’était pas Dieu, car Dieu n’a pas de lieu et n’a jamais lieu. Et le Topos était le Logos; mais le Logos n’était pas Dieu, étant ce qui a lieu. Le Topos, en vérité, c’était peu de choses : la marque, la remarque. Pour marquer, il y eut des traces, celles des animaux et leurs parcours, puis les signes : un caillou, un arbre, une branche cassée, un cairn, les premières inscriptions, les premiers écrits. Si peu qu’il fût, le Topos c’était déjà « l’homme ». Or, le premier mot : le Topos, c’était le verbe et quelque chose de plus: l’action, « Am Anfang war die Tat ». Et quelque chose de moins – le lieu, dit et marqué, fixé. Ainsi, le Verbe ne se fit pas chair, mais lieu et non-lieu.»10

Topos, logos, action : la parole vivante prononcée dans le for intérieur ou adressée à une audience mobilise indivisément ces trois constituants de toute communication orale. Le discours prophétique tel qu’il se manifeste dans les différents livres ou suite d’énoncés recueillis dans la Bible, les Evangiles et le Coran, est entièrement parole dans les perspectives ouvertes par l’analyse du discours incluant le concept théologique de parole de Dieu. La parole se distingue du texte par plusieurs fonctions ; elle est reçue par l’oreille et les yeux; elle est prononcée dans un environnement sémiologique très riche (la nuit, le jour, dans un lieu sacré ou profane ; dans des circonstances de joie, de deuil, d’urgence, de communication solennelle, didactique, confidentielle…) ; elle peut être explicitée par une demande de l’interlocuteur ou de l’audience ; le charisme, l’autorité, le statut moral, social, intellectuel et la gestuelle du locuteur ajoutent de la valeur, de la signification, de l’efficacité à la parole prononcée dans le face à face avec le Tout Autre appelé Dieu (parole mystique), ou l’autre ordinaire qui résiste à ma subjectivité (rhétorique de la conviction et de la persuasion). Le texte au contraire, est silencieux et orphelin de son auteur qui, dans le cas des prophètes, est irréversiblement absent; chaque lecteur le fait parler selon ses compétences linguistiques, ses références cognitives et culturelles, ses choix subjectifs ; ses émotions heureuses ou chagrines ; même le critique le plus averti est obligé de souligner ses incapacités à percer le sens originel des mots, la vérité des contextes et des systèmes de connotation…

10 Lefebvre 1969, XLVII.

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Ces rappels servent à souligner la fragilité et souvent les errances des exégètes des Ecritures saintes avant l’intervention de la connaissance linguistique moderne et de la prudence des historiens critiques qui renouvellent de plus en plus les conditions de l’interprétation des textes fondateurs des grandes Traditions religieuses. Les trois religions monothéistes ne sont pas encore à égale distance par rapport aux enseignements de la critique moderne. L’islam est le plus dépourvu parce qu’il en est encore à une lecture littéraliste du texte coranique et des traditions prophétiques. Il est vrai que l’ensemble des fidèles du judaïsme et du christianisme ne connaît pas les grands acquits de la littérature savante qui a modifié considérablement le rapport au sens et à la réalité historique des textes sacrés. Même quand un grand media comme Arte fait connaître de manière très accessible les travaux archéologiques sur la Bible ou le Nouveau Testament11, les représentations communes sur la religion restent dominées soit par les notions orthodoxes chez les croyants, soit par les postulats de la culture positiviste de l’incroyance. Il n’y a pas seulement insuffisance de la transmission des savoirs nouveaux ; on doit réfléchir à des contradictions insurmontées de la civilisation dominante qui dénigrent la violence et le fanatisme des religions, concentre ses guerres contre les menaces du fondamentaliste terroriste, mais néglige d’apporter des solutions adéquates aux ravages de l’ignorance institutionnalisée, même là où la recherche scientifique atteint des résultats révolutionnaires et de grande portée émancipatrice pour l’esprit humain.

Montrer la continuité linguistique du discours prophétique en suivant l’itinéraire de la Figure symbolique d’Abraham des bords de l’Euphrate au pays de Canaan, puis la bifurcation jusqu’à La Mekke avec la double généalogie des lignes d’Isaac et Jacob pour la mémoire juive et d’Ismaël pour la mémoire arabo-islamique ; poursuivre l’exploration du même discours sur le Mont Sinaï avec Moïse, en Palestine avec Jésus que la tradition fait naître à Nazareth avant la construction de la Figure théologique de Jésus-Christ, à La Mekke et à Médine enfin avec le Hashémite Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah avant la lente construction de la Figure Symbolique du Prophète-Messager. Ce parcours linguistique, historico-critique et anthropologique n’ignore pas le parcours théologique qui a exercé le monopole de l’autorité spirituelle pendant des siècles au point qu’aujourd’hui encore il fait obstacle aux corrections et aux révisions inexorables des déchiffrements scientifiques de l’aventure humaine. Le terme aventure s’impose de plus en plus à mesure qu’on découvre la

11 Je pense notamment aux travaux de Israël Finkelstein et Neil Asher Silberman 2002 ; Voir aussi les trois volumes novateurs de John Paul Meier 2004–2005.

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suprématie de l’imaginaire sur la rationalité analytique et critique dans les représentations mythohistoriques et mythoidéologiques que les hommes continuent à reproduire sur leur passé, leur présent et leur futur.

La ligne linguistique de la recherche oblige à s’interroger sur la continuité du socle sémantique des langues sémitiques dans lesquelles se sont exprimés les prophètes fondateurs : il y a l’hébreu, le syriaque forme savante de l’araméen qui est la forme parlée utilisée par Jésus, l’arabe enfin. La recherche philologique s’intéresse à ce socle sémantique, sans pouvoir cependant ébranler les fausses certitudes enracinées dans les langues et les mentalités pendant des siècles de pieuses répétitions rituelles et de pieuses adorations. Sous le pseudonyme de Christof Luxenberg12, un chercheur a récemment tenté de faire une lecture syro-araméenne du discours coranique. La connaissance scientifique heurte de front une théologie séculaire qui a sacralisé ce qu’on appelle les Textes fondateurs et qu’il est plus éclairant de nommer Corpus Officiels Clos. Ces trois concepts obligent à réfléchir sur des problèmes linguistiques et historiques abolis et ignorés par les clercs gestionnaires des orthodoxies doctrinales. Ainsi, dans un livre récent, Jean-Claude Milner13 distingue le juif de savoir au sens du savoir absolu revendiqué par la wissenschaft allemande depuis le 19e siècle et le juif d’étude qui commence dès l’âge de 10 ans à entrer dans l’univers de connaissance propre à la tradition talmudique. Il en est de même pour le musulman et le chrétien. Cette distinction renvoie au clivage mental qu’instaurent deux types de connaissances, deux modes d’exercice des facultés de l’esprit raison, imagination/imaginaire/imaginal et mémoire individuelle dépendante de la mémoire collective du groupe, de la mémoire mythohistorique de la communauté et de la nation dans l’étape historique de l’Etat-nation.

Chacun des concepts que je viens d’énumérer nécessite de longues investigations et mises au point pour ouvrir de nouveaux espaces d’intelligibilité et identifier des enjeux escamotés, embrouillés, éliminés par des systèmes officiels politiques et religieux de contrôle du vrai et du faux, du mal et du bien, du juste et de l’injuste, du beau et du laid… Ces systèmes ont toujours existé dans toutes les sociétés et toutes les cultures. Dans les régimes démocratiques avancés, la censure directe est bannie dans les constitutions ; mais le libéralisme autorise la concurrence et on sait dans quel sens agissent les lois du marché utilisées par les partis politiques et les grands décideurs de la production et des échanges économiques. C’est pourquoi il y a conflit entre

12 Luxenberg 2000, ix + 306, bibliography, 307–311. 13 Milner 2006.

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libéralisme débridé et libéralisme surveillé par les Etats. Ces mécanismes ne parviennent pas à endiguer par exemple, la prépondérance de fait de ce que les philosophes appellent la raison télétechnoscientifique sur les formes critiques et humanistes d’exercice de la raison. La culture philosophique est devenue l’apanage de cercles réduits et les outils d’analyse et de pensée utilisées par les sciences de l’homme et de la société ne sont pas mis à la portée de toute la population scolaire ; quant aux larges opinions publiques, elles sont réduites aux représentations et aux logiques propres aux discours des médias qui ont remplacé l’ancien sens commun. La suprématie de cette raison est comparable à celle de la théologie des Magistères doctrinaux des religions avant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat; la théologie détrônée à partir du 18e siècle européen par la raison des Lumières a permis le déploiement compétitif des différents types de rationalité. On parle de raisonnement historien, sociologique, anthropologique, linguistique, psychanalytique que peu de chercheurs ouverts à la pluri ou transdisciplinarité parviennent à articuler en s’appuyant sur un faisceau de méthode. On aura compris que grâce à mes allers et retours incessants des champs islamiques aux champs modernes de la rationalité, je m’efforce d’habiliter une transrationalité pour ouvrir ces nouveaux champs d’intelligibilité déjà évoqués.

Le fait nouveau qui vient complexifier les usages inégaux, rivaux jusqu’à la tension où politique et épistémologie sont indistinctement mêlées14 c’est l’expansion récente du terrorisme national et international. Les régimes démocratiques les plus solides se trouvent atteint par l’embrouillage des légitimités, la régression vers les conservatismes des droits nationaux et internationaux, la paralysie des forces imaginantes du droit. L’agression du 11/9/2001 autorise la plus grande puissance du monde actuel à utiliser le statut de victime pour légitimer une « guerre juste » de protection et de diffusion des libertés démocratiques dans le monde ! Après l’échec avéré de cette généreuse ambition, on se contente jusqu’ici de commentaires redondants, de supputations rarement validées par le temps, d’évocations de solutions incertaines. On ménage l’irremplaçable allié ; on biaise avec le droit, on continue à soutenir des « valeurs » mises à mal au point que le grand magistère des sciences morales et politiques se fait à peine entendre dans les

14 Lors de l’éclatement de la Sorbonne après mai 1968, on a pu mesurer à quel point des enseignants chercheurs, producteurs et transmetteurs des savoirs peuvent aller jusqu’à faire prévaloir le critère de solidarité politique sur celui d’engagement épistémologique pour rejoindre des universités de droite ou de gauche. J’ai été témoin de bataille peu glorieuse.

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instituts hérités de l’âge classique ou dans des livres à grand succès pour la philosophie des cybercafés. Quant aux autorités religieuses, elles continuent de miser sur les vertus de la vieille rhétorique des sermons, des exhortations et des rappels à la conscience du bien et du juste.

Repenser les trois sphères géohistoriques : Islam, Europe,

Occident

Est-il possible de réduire ce brouillage généralisé ou de tenter des sorties d’une culture de banalisation de la raison par le bas, le scepticisme, le relativisme, les recours arbitraires au droit à l’exercice du monopole de la violence légale, à la différence, à l’identité, à la foi personnelle ? Il y a des chercheurs penseurs, des politiciens qui travaillent dans ce sens. Mais les plus visibles d’entre eux comme Michel Rocard, Hubert Védrine, J. Delors, E. Morin, le regretté P. Ricœur en France ne se sont pas donnés les connaissances nécessaires pour penser un futur politique, intellectuel et culturel intégrant dans la construction en cours de l’Union européenne, non pas l’islam comme système de croyances et de représentations mythoidéologiques, mais l’islam comme protagoniste positif et négatif de la formation au cours des siècles de ce que j’appelle l’espace géohistorique méditerranéen. Aucun historien ne peut nier à l’islam ce rôle de protagoniste constant à l’instar de ceux du christianisme, du judaïsme et de l’Europe moderne. F. Braudel est le premier à avoir donné au concept de géohistoire la grande fécondité cognitive et méthodologique que l’on connaît. J’ai souvent dénoncé l’oubli de cette contribution chez beaucoup de dissertateurs sur l’Union méditerranéenne. Je ne cesse de regretter aussi la rareté ou l’incompétence des voix venant de cet islam pour élargir, enrichir, éclairer les débats sur ce thème à l’occasion notamment de la candidature de la Turquie. Les argumentaires présentés de part et d’autre s’enferment trop étroitement dans les peurs, les menaces, les incompatibilités indéniables que suscite cette candidature comme si elle devait se réaliser dans l’immédiat. Il manque partout une ouverture sur les données de la longue durée pour reconstruire les différentes mémoires collectives dans le sens d’une conscience historique critique généralisée. Cette perspective fait partie intégrante de mon programme de Critique de la Raison islamique.

J’ai déjà évoqué la nécessité de repenser les trois concepts Islam, Europe, Occident où seul l’islam conserve l’ambiguïté d’une référence d’essence religieuse qui voile et dénature sa face de grande force de soulèvement historique des peuples et des cultures. Tant que le monde de l’islam était soumis sans voix audible aux souverainetés des puissances coloniales,

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l’Europe a dessiné la carte géopolitique du monde en tenant compte de la seule rivalité intra-européenne. L’islam était assimilé aux religions ethnographiques appelées à disparaître ou entrer dans le silence des consciences croyantes à l’instar du christianisme après sa longue résistance à la modernité intellectuelle, politique et culturelle. Cette représentation des religions et des sociétés dites archaïques ou traditionnelles est travestie aujourd’hui sous des déclarations formelles de respect de tous les cultes, toutes les expressions de foi, de vérités ou de valeurs propres aux cultures non occidentales. On s’oblige à répéter avec insistance qu’on ne confond pas les terroristes islamistes et l’islam comme religion, tradition de pensée et grande civilisation. On s’empresse d’organiser des rencontres de dialogues et de découverte mutuelle dans l’espoir d’atténuer les effets ravageurs de guerres de conquête, d’occupation et de punition. Toute cette agitation et les mises en scène internationales d’une diplomatie réparatrice continuent à s’imposer au détriment des populations civiles et des évidences ressassées par les chercheurs, les penseurs critiques, les esprits les plus respectés de notre temps.

Poursuivons la quête de sens déjà esquissée ci-dessus sur les rapports entre les trois grands protagonistes des conflits récurrents dans l’espace méditerranéen depuis l’émergence de l’islam comme posture théologique face aux religions antérieures et comme force d’expansion conquérante de 632 à 1200 avec les prolongements ottomans de 1453 à 1683. Partout on continue à utiliser le même terme islam pour englober des sociétés, des Etats, des cultures, des langues, des parcours historiques, des données sociologiques et anthropologiques d’une très grande diversité et complexité. Les observateurs des sociétés qui se réclament de l’islam comme instance de l’autorité, sources des valeurs et fondement d’identités pourtant très disparates, n’ont pas réussi à contrebalancer les usages idéologiques, confusionnistes, voire fantasmatiques du mot islam par les musulmans eux-mêmes notamment depuis l’irruption de la Révolution dite islamique en Iran. Cela tient à plusieurs facteurs dont je retiendrai ici la solidarité fonctionnelle entre le nombre croissant des politologues, les besoins des médias pour fonder leurs bulletins d’information sur des connaissances scientifiques minimales, les succès de librairie des titres attractifs sur la relation entre islam, terrorisme, fondamentalisme, régression culturelle et institutionnelle, rejet des droits de l’homme, Etats voyous, absence de société civile, contraste entre rente pétrolière, classes parasitaires et misère sociale, etc. Ce tableau noir favorise en Occident l’expansion de la droite extrémiste, la peur collective, le désir d’assouvir une haine grandissante contre une religion

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violente et dogmatique qui s’installe de plus en plus au cœur des sociétés et des institutions démocratiques.

Le fossé se creuse entre deux imaginaires de construction négative de l’autre dans un mélange inextricable d’émotions incontrôlables, d’indignation permanente, d’ignorances anciennes et nouvelles accumulées des deux côtés, de révolte contre des politiques nationales inadéquates, d’exaspération devant les violences quotidiennes, l’insécurité permanente d’un côté, l’islamophobie et le racisme de l’autre… Et il est vrai que beaucoup d’Etats ne trouvent pas de réponses pertinentes pour sortir du cercle vicieux de la violence systémique tant au niveau des Etats qu’à celui des opinions publiques. L’islam est l’autre intolérable de l’Occident et inversement celui-ci est l’autre à la fois mythologique, attractif et ennemi irréductible de l’islam. Des deux côtés, la référence à l’Europe est rare, car elle exigerait des précisions historiques et culturelles totalement absentes des mécanismes de construction imaginaire de l’autre, comme dans toute dialectique manichéenne de l’Axe du Bien et de l’Axe du Mal. Et l’on sait que ce vieux cadre de représentation, de perception et d’interprétation des « valeurs » et des contre valeurs, est explicitement invoqué par le président américain et implicitement présent dans le discours commun des sociétés travaillées par ce que j’appellerai le fait islamique reconstruit, réapproprié aux idéologies de combat qui mobilisent les générations actives entre les années 1950–1990.

Cette référence aux idéologies de combat est d’autant plus éclairante qu’elle est rarement invoquée dans la littérature pléthorique qui nourrit de part et d’autre les imaginaires d’exclusion réciproque dans la perspective de longue et moyenne durée à la fois. C’est à la lumière de ce concept qu’il faut en effet repenser comme je l’ai dit la portée historique et la profondeur anthropologique des contentieux entre Islam, Europe et Occident. Les perspectives de longue et moyenne durée obligent en effet à redonner à l’islam naissant, puis classique et à l’Europe chrétienne15, puis moderne leurs rôles respectifs d’acteurs premiers dans l’histoire intellectuelle, scientifique et religieuse de l’espace historique méditerranéen. Pendant des siècles de conflits récurrents entre terre d’islam et chrétienté, les termes Orient et Occident n’émergent que pour référer au Levant et au Couchant du soleil

15 Un ouvrage très instructif renvoyant aux grands enseignements de la longue durée vient d’être consacré par Marie-Françoise Baslez (2007) à la naissance du christianisme. Une monographie équivalente pour le même thème lors de la naissance de l’islam, délivrerait des constructions dogmatiques et arbitraires sur lesquelles vivent encore aujourd’hui bien des expressions de la foi.

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auquel s’ajoute à partir d’Avicenne notamment, le riche concept d’Orient de la pensée illuminative. Il convient d’insister sur l’écriture réflexive de l’histoire de ces siècles en intégrant plus clairement qu’on l’a fait jusqu’ici les enjeux intellectuels, spirituels et culturels des affrontements entre islam et christianisme comme protagonistes porteurs de témoignages différents par delà les cadres théologiques d’exclusion réciproque qui fonctionnaient déjà avec les mêmes émotions, les mêmes thématiques de diabolisation de l’autre rappelées ci-dessus. L’identification de ces phénomènes et leur déchiffrement relèvent de la psychologie historique et de l’anthropologie comme critique des cultures et des systèmes de pensée, deux disciplines que l’écriture de l’histoire politique, économique et sociale ou même idéologique a trop minimisées jusqu’ici. Nous payons très cher cette ignorance perpétuée au niveau de la recherche en sciences sociales qui continuent d’investir le champ religieux sous l’angle de l’érudition ethnographique et de l’exhaustivité descriptive et même statistique quand il s’agit d’enquêtes d’opinion. Un tel conservatisme au niveau de la recherche retentit sur tous les niveaux d’enseignement, notamment aux niveaux primaire et secondaire.

Les années 1945–2006 relèvent de ce qu’on appelle l’histoire du temps présent. Bien qu’elle soit une perspective de moyenne durée, elle contient des événements nombreux et très représentatifs des processus de mise en place dans le monde de la violence devenue systémique après le 11/9/2001. L’histoire de ce temps présent ne peut remplir sa fonction de catharsis pour les générations vivantes que si elle n’est pas réduite aux informations sèches des médias actuels. Elle doit expliciter les ressorts cachés, les stratégies constantes d’acteurs déterminants, les intentions inavouées et les tragédies programmées dans les négociations secrètes, les politiques de domination et d’expansion, les marchandages secrets et les connivences calculées des « grandes puissances ». Il est vrai que ce but serait partiellement atteint déjà dans la seule énumération des décisions internationales et nationales, des trahisons ou perversions répétées des principes généreux inscrits dans les chartes des Nations Unies et de l’UNESCO, des guerres dites de libération et de leurs répressions coloniales, des ravages de la guerre froide jusqu’en 1990, des stratégies d’alliance entre les puissances qui consacrent la suprématie du concept géopolitique d’Occident au détriment d’une Union européenne qui peine encore à définir et défendre sa vocation révolutionnaire à construire un nouvel espace de citoyenneté par delà ceux des Etats-nations. Je ne reviendrai pas sur l’importance des facteurs internes et externes dans chaque pays, qui génèrent la catastrophe mondiale du 11/9/2001 et les réponses désastreuses données par des puissances dont les parcours historiques et démocratiques

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laissaient espérer qu’elles ouvriraient enfin les horizons d’une culture de paix définitive dans un monde irano-turco-arabo-musulman particulièrement éprouvé par deux siècles de domination politique succédant à 3 siècles d’administration ottomane (safavide pour l’Iran).

A ce point de l’analyse historique surgit le drame central commun aux juifs que je n’ai pas mentionnés jusqu’ici, aux chrétiens et aux musulmans d’une part ; à l’Europe comme espace historique d’émergence de la modernité, des Lumières laïques et scientifiques que des révolutions politiques sanglantes substituent aux trois versions des Lumières monothéistes. Le drame se cristallise pendant des siècles d’humiliation, de marginalisation, de rejet des minorités juives en contextes islamiques et plus durement encore en contextes chrétiens européens jusqu’à leur émancipation à la fin du 18e siècle. Le statut juridique de protégés (dhimmi) continue de s’imposer en contextes islamiques jusqu’au partage de la Palestine en Novembre 1947 suivi par la création de l’Etat d’Israël le 14 mai 1948. Ce que j’ai nommé drame moral et politique se mue alors en tragédie au sens grec de destin inexorable de deux peuples devenant eux-mêmes la même victime émissaire des volontés de puissance qui ont toujours fait obstacle et perverti la quête de sens dans l’histoire des hommes telle que la racontent les grands récits fondateurs des parcours historiques les plus significatifs. Car le drame vécu par les juifs au cours de longs siècles n’a pas empêché le peuple juif de devenir « le témoin privilégié du cheminement de la liberté dans le monde ». Cette belle expression prononcée par André Neher, spécialiste reconnue de la pensée juive, au cours d’un entretien privé à Strasbourg en 1956, a toujours dirigé mon attention sur les dangers de l’histoire du temps présent quand elle réduit systématiquement les guerres israélo-arabes aux assassinats et attentats quotidiens, à la comptabilité macabre des victimes innocentes, au travestissement des responsabilités encourues au jour le jour par tant d’acteurs, au point d’effacer toute prise en charge historique et philosophique de la tragédie programmée dès les accords Sykes-Picot pour les destins individuels ou collectifs.

Les tragédies historiques programmées et la tragédie comme

destin

Toutes les guerres civiles qui éprouvent tant de sociétés depuis que les grandes puissances ont dessiné la carte géopolitique du monde16, sont programmées

16 C’est-à-dire les accords de Yalta entérinant ou modifiant les tracés des traités antérieurs depuis le 19e siècle.

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dans les choix politiques effectués à deux niveaux : celui des gouvernements nationaux qui génèrent des oppositions privées de moyens démocratiques d’expression ; celui des grandes puissances qui, selon les conjonctures politiques dans les sphères géopolitiques, pactisent soit avec les oppositions, soit avec les régimes en place. Une constante demeure dans le jeu changeant des alliances et des ruptures : l’islam est instrumentalisé par tous les acteurs en présence : les régimes en place affichent leur volonté de promouvoir et protéger l’islam en renforçant la politique de traditionalisation (tasnîn): renforcement de l’islam ritualiste, application du dispositif légal de la sharî‘a, enseignement des expressions orthodoxes d’un islam populiste, affirmation insistante de l’identité dite islamique… Les oppositions surenchérissent sur l’observance stricte de toutes ces mesures ou prescriptions; des militants très engagés tissent des liens forts avec les couches les plus démunies de la population en leur apportant une assistance morale et matérielle qui concrétise les valeurs projetées spontanément sur l’islam. On ne peut nier que ces initiatives sociales soulignent les carences des Etats et rehaussent l’attachement à un islam garant de la justice sociale et de l’efficacité politique. En même temps, on s’éloigne de l’idée moderne de la séparation du religieux et du politique et on proroge l’étatisation de la religion. On marche à rebours du parcours des sociétés démocratiques modernes qui se libèrent de l’emprise du religieux sur le politique et le juridique.

On voit bien que le concept du retour du religieux n’a de sens historiquement que pour les sociétés qui non seulement ont travaillé à leur sortie du religieux, mais ont favorisé l’expansion de la culture de l’incroyance. Les forces en travail de la mondialisation font apparaître des décalages considérables entre les sociétés closes repliées sur leurs croyances et leurs coutumes et les sociétés plus dynamiques et créatrices, notamment avec l’apparition du capitalisme, de l’industrialisation, de la technologie et des régimes démocratiques laïcs. Ici se ressent la rareté des chercheurs-penseurs qui éclaireraient les carences, les ignorances, les cynismes qui ont toujours contrarié la gestion adéquate de ces décalages générateurs de déséquilibres, de désintégration sociale, de régressions intellectuels et de violence structurelle. Les régimes coloniaux ont évoqué l’idée d’émanciper les sociétés traditionnelles en leur ouvrant les chemins de la modernité ; aujourd’hui encore, on parle d’aider les sociétés attardées pour réduire les flux migratoires en procurant des emplois aux générations montantes. On connaît le sort de ces velléités. L’idéologie communiste a longtemps nourri l’illusion d’un dépassement historique de tous les décalages en mettant fin simultanément aux superstitions religieuses et aux dominations du capitalisme bourgeois. L’effondrement brutal de cette

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religion athée a partout exacerbé les tensions entre un capitalisme triomphant et un reste du monde qui s’accroche désespérément à des identités bricolées et à des religions qui ne sont plus ce qu’elles ont été jusqu’aux années 1940.

La tragédie comme destin résulte des effets multiplicateurs des violences

structurelles internes à chaque société pauvre ou riche, développée ou démunie et de la violence systémique générée par les décalages économiques, politiques, juridiques, institutionnels, culturelles, scientifiques, religieux entre ce qu’on appelait dans les années 1960 les pays sous-développés et les pays riches, puissants, capables de produire leur propre histoire par un lent travail de soi sur soi. Les Partis-Etats postcoloniaux ont promis à leurs peuples de brûler les étapes pour rattraper et même entrer en compétition avec les puissances capitalistes. Jusqu’en 1970, on faisait confiance à la Révolution socialiste, à la collectivisation des terres pour faire passer les paysans de leur conservatisme au dynamisme de la culture prolétarienne. On affichait la volonté de sortir à la fois de la religion comme opium des peuples et du capitalisme exploiteur du prolétariat. Nasser, Tito et Nehru conduisaient le camp des non-alignés ; les peuples se laissaient gagner par l’espérance révolutionnaire… En 1967, la guerre des six jours brise des élans éphémères, dévoile les ravages de la mythoidéologie et révèle le rôle irremplaçable de la religion comme capital symbolique, recours sûr, refuge pour les opprimés, repaire pour les assoiffés de revanche, tremplin pour toutes sortes d’ambitieux sans projet, sans culture ni politique, ni religieuse. Israël élargit impunément la reconquête de la terre promise ; la Nation arabe exaltée par Nasser et les leaders irakiens et syriens du Ba‘th, mesure l’inanité d’une rhétorique belliqueuse et avale l’amertume d’une défaite humiliante. Nasser meurt en 1970 ; son successeur ranime un faible espoir avec une quasi victoire à la guerre de Kippour en 1973; il réussit à récupérer la terre égyptienne occupée, mais il paye de sa vie un succès diplomatique renié par les peuples arabes.

La tragédie poursuit son déploiement comme destin. En 1979, l’imam Khomeiny prend le pouvoir dans son pays ; la révolution est qualifiée d’islamique. Des intellectuels s’enflamment même en Europe. On n’a guère remarqué dans cet événement une nouvelle illustration de la marche à rebours de l’histoire en contextes islamiques par rapport à ce que les Européens ont appelé révolution au 18e siècle. Les moments forts de la vie politique ont toujours besoin de recourir à la fonction symbolique ; mais c’est pour rabaisser ses charges de significations positives à des éruptions mal contrôlées d’émotions ou colères collectives. Le nouveau leader iranien veut arrêter le Shah, le faire juger et condamner par les révolutionnaires

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pour mettre fin au régime injuste de Pharaon (figure coranique de l’injuste oppresseur) comme les français l’avaient fait en exécutant Louis XVI, symbole de l’Ancien régime monarchique. L’exécution du Shah devait consacrer le retour au régime islamique de l’imâmat shî‘ite, alors que celui de Louis XVI ouvrait la voie de la République dont la légitimité repose sur la souveraineté du peuple de citoyens libres et égaux17.

On remarquera les insuffisances de la psychologie, la sociologie et l’anthropologie historiques pour identifier les mécanismes de désintégration et de banalisation de la fonction symbolique dans les sociétés de spectacles, de consommation, de précarité, de la pensée jetable comme les ustensiles de la vie quotidienne, des disparités scandaleuses entre classes dirigeantes, classes parasitaires, classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses, masses délaissées, des centres et des périphéries, des puissances et des résidus, des faillites frauduleuses, des abus de biens sociaux, de la corruption généralisée, de l’ignorance statufiée, applaudie, vénérée (je pense à des chefs d’Etats qui s’érigent en interprètes des textes sacrés ou mettent en scène des ‘ulamâ’ stipendiés pour réfuter les exégèses sauvages de leaders populistes). Nous savons que le symbole meurt comme la métaphore, après avoir connu des expansions plus ou moins durables dans des sociétés où l’interaction entre langue, pensée, créativité, inventivité n’est pas entravée par les interdits, les conservatismes, les dogmatismes, les ignorances avérées et transmises comme des connaissances, ou, à l’inverse, quand cette interaction est livrée sans régulation, sans finalités déclarées aux seuls mécanismes aveugles du marché.

On dira à juste titre que ces aspects menaçants de la mondialisation en cours n’affectent pas de façon égale toutes les sociétés contemporaines ; on ajoutera même qu’il y a partout aussi des initiatives positives pour l’émancipation de la condition humaine. Assurément ; mais il demeure nécessaire d’attirer l’attention sur tout ce qui diminue, compromet, aliène et fausse durablement l’exercice optimal des facultés de l’esprit. Ainsi, quand on observe la régression intellectuelle et culturelle de beaucoup de sociétés contraintes pendant des décennies à une marche à rebours de l’histoire moderne, on se trouve devant le dilemme bien connu de l’obligation juridique de non ingérence ou de danger moral de non assistance. L’Occident croit dépasser ce dilemme en favorisant des aides dites humanitaires, sans avouer qu’il renonce, ce faisant, aux impératifs catégoriques de l’attitude humaniste qui ne se contente pas de soulager des misères générées totalement ou partiellement par les excès de

17 Voir Duprat 1993.

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la Realpolitik et de la Machtpolitik choisies depuis le 19e siècle par toutes les « grandes » puissances.

Dans la pensée des Lumières le concept d’impératif catégorique renvoie immédiatement à la morale kantienne du sujet transcendantal. Nous sommes dans l’intellectualisme abstrait d’une pensée qui a effacé de la culture dominante toute référence à une autre voie possible d’intériorisation de l’impératif catégorique : c’est la conscience de culpabilité qui a surgi dans le discours prophétique et que résume clairement le récit évangélique sur la femme adultère : le juif Jésus veut sortir du rituel collectif de la lapidation en appelant chaque sujet humain à la conscience de sa propre culpabilité qui va déplacer le jugement moral et judiciaire vers une définition plus universalisable de la faute (péché en religion) et de la sanction. En évoquant cet épisode très connu, je ne veux pas réactiver les tensions séculaires entre la raison religieuse et la raison moderne laïque ; l’objectif demeure le dépassement des faux problèmes ou des controverses désuètes qui continuent d’obstruer nos débats politico-religieux. Pour progresser dans cette voie de dépassement, je retiendrai deux exemples concrets d’une actualité brûlante : 1) la pendaison de Saddam Hussein au matin de la commémoration dans tout le monde musulman d’un récit de fondation commun aux trois religions monothéistes ; 2) la question juive que viennent de reposer deux livres qui donnent beaucoup à penser18.

La pendaison du dictateur irakien le matin d’une commémoration sacrificielle qui renvoie à la Figure fondatrice d’Abraham comme référence commune aux trois religions monothéistes, permet d’enrichir la réflexion esquissée à propos du Shah d’Iran et de Louis XVI. Une fois de plus, une puissante symbolique religieuse se trouve inextricablement mêlée à un climat politique aussi complexe que tragique. Les polémiques vont bon train sur l’identité et les responsabilités de ceux qui ont voulu un tel mélange détonnant de croyances réputées sacrées et sanctifiantes, de « valeurs » morales et juridiques formellement défendues par le magistère occidental de la démocratie la plus avancée, de stratégies cyniques d’amplification des haines sectaires qui font couler le sang d’innocents depuis mars 2003, sans parler d’une longue histoire d’exclusion réciproque entre sunnites et shî‘ites depuis le martyr de Hussein en 680. Tout cela renvoie normalement à la quête de sens si présente dans les traditions religieuses et la longue lignée de philosophes depuis la Grèce hellénique jusqu’à nos jours en passant par les grands médiateurs en contextes islamiques. Le 11/9/2001 a accentué

18 Morin 2006 ; Milner 2006.

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le brouillage des enjeux de sens et de connaissance avec les objectifs prioritaires de la Machtpolitik mise au service de la Realpolitik. Ce brouillage systématique affecte profondément les prétentions des deux protagonistes Islam versus Occident à défendre deux modèles d’action historique différents dans leur expression formelle, mais également obsolètes au niveau de leurs fondements mythohistoriques et idéologiques. C’est pour éclairer davantage les différences formelles et les convergences idéologiques que j’ai choisi deux exemples récapitulatifs des errements anciens et des confusions en contextes de modernité.

Nous avons vu comment le protagoniste Islam s’est enfermé dans la proclamation d’une religion valide pour tous les temps et tous les lieux du monde (sâlih l-kulli zamân wa kulli makân). Cette formule doctrinale est devenue un slogan politique avec le lancement du mouvement des Frères musulmans en Egypte en 1928 ; elle est reprise par les divers courants militants apparus dans les années 1970–2000. En clair, le modèle occidental moderne de production de l’histoire est trompeur, illusoire et incompatible avec celui instauré par le prophète à Médine entre 622–632. Une mythohistoire à usage populaire, puis populiste depuis les années 1970, a construit un puissant imaginaire commun à tout le domaine islamique contemporain. C’est cet islam qui finit par prendre le pouvoir en Iran, en Afghanistan et avec moins de radicalisme militant dans un nombre croissant de régimes. Le protagoniste Occident construit dialectiquement cet islam volontariste en ennemi absolu en utilisant les mêmes procédés de rejet et de diabolisation que son vis-à-vis. Dans ce jeu d’exclusion réciproque, il y a cependant une telle inégalité de ressources intellectuelles, scientifiques, culturelles, institutionnelles, politiques et économiques que l’Occident devient, comme on l’a noté, la victime inattendue de la victime réelle depuis l’émergence de la modernité en tant que discriminant irréfutable. C’est un fait historique indéniable que le protagoniste Occident a contribué depuis le 19e siècle à la dissolution du « modèle » islamique d’intégration sociale et de réalisation de soi de l’individu, du groupe, de la communauté et de la nation. Cette dissolution a affecté de façon plus brutale encore les sociétés où le christianisme a joué le même rôle que celui de l’islam en tant qu’instance de référence à la fois spirituelle, éthique, juridique, culturelle et politique. Mais, pour des raisons nombreuses et connues que je ne peux détailler ici, les tensions éducatives entre modernité et christianisme ont eu une intensité, une continuité historique, une fécondité pour la religion et pour l’Etat dont l’islam s’est paradoxalement éloigné davantage dans la deuxième moitié du 20e siècle. Ce qui explique les guerres meurtrières en cours.

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Dans les deux cas, toutefois, on constate une persistance des volontés de puissance à pervertir les nouvelles quêtes de sens. A ce point de l’analyse, il est nécessaire de s’interroger sur le phénomène terroriste tel qu’il s’est développé et étendu à la planète depuis les années 1950. Nous vivons sur l’idée indiscutable que le terrorisme est une forme barbare d’opposition politique principalement liée à l’islam fondamentaliste. Je ne peux m’attarder à approfondir une approche historique et phénoménologique de cette question. Je renvoie à l’essai récent de Jean-François Daguzan sur Terrorisme(s). Abrégé d’une violence qui dure19. Là encore, l’Occident ne se gêne pas pour étendre au domaine scientifique des procédés de travestissement de la réalité pour construire des légitimités qui ne résistent pas à la critique. La raison télétechnoscientique marginalise la quête de sens en confiant aux seuls experts et spécialistes le soin d’établir des faits empiriquement vrais et donc fiables, alors que la critique linguistique et philosophique distingue le sens des effets de sens. Ainsi, la construction imaginaire de l’autre pour le réduire à un vis-à-vis négatif qui sert de faire valoir à mes propres valeurs et à mes légitimités, fait reposer toutes les validations sur des effets de

sens mobilisateurs, mais intrinsèquement faux. Malheureusement, cette distinction essentielle n’est pas rendue accessible à ce qu’on appelle le sens commun dans toutes les sociétés contemporaines ; à ce niveau de discours et de culture qui autorise l’expansion de la crédibilité religieuse ou laïque, les effets de sens tiennent lieu couramment de sens sûr et immédiat.

A la lumière de toutes ces précisions, la mise en scène théâtrale du procès, de la sentence et de la pendaison de l’ex-leader irakien est perçue comme telle par l’opinion mondiale ; les auteurs et les acteurs de la scène ne continuent pas moins à jouer leurs rôles respectifs pour maintenir la fiction d’une souveraineté irakienne qui fonctionne avec une légitimité irréprochable. L’avenir nous éclairera davantage sur les calculs des uns et des autres pour inscrire cet événement dans la suite d’une longue tragédie dont personne ne peut prédire la fin heureuse pour les uns et sombre pour d’autres. On posera en attendant les questions suivantes pour déplacer les débats vers l’ouverture d’horizons d’espérance pour les peuples les plus injustement éprouvés.

L’idée d’introduire une culture et une pratique démocratiques en Irak aurait reçu un accueil positif dans la conjoncture créée par le 11/9/2001 si elle avait été inscrite dans une vision géopolitique globale des déséquilibres grandissants entre l’accélération de l’histoire pour la sphère de l’Occident que représente le G8 et les régressions dramatiques observées dans le reste

19 Daguzan 2006.

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du monde. Les pays regroupés dans l’OPEP entretiennent des rapports d’échanges importants avec l’Occident tout en demeurant rattachés au groupe des sociétés en quête ou attente de développement. En effet, les pétrodollars sont recyclés dans les économies dynamiques de l’Occident bien plus que dans la promotion d’une culture et d’un régime politique démocratiques. On écrit beaucoup sur le thème du pétrole chance et malheur à la fois des grands pays producteurs ; mais on passe plus ou moins sous silence la Realpolitik des grandes démocraties qui ont toujours soutenu les régimes les plus conservateurs, antidémocratiques et souvent corrompus et corrupteurs. Les attentats ciblés sur certains régimes après le 11/9 ont renforcé le besoin de protection auprès d’un Occident par ailleurs stigmatisé. Cela explique les réactions prudentes aux violences que subit le peuple irakien depuis cinq ans ; la pendaison de Saddam Hussein est traitée comme une simple péripétie dans la série quotidienne d’attentats, d’assassinats, de destructions chez un membre de la Ligue arabe. Il y a aussi une saturation des opinions publiques devant des enchaînements de violence sans aucun horizon de paix ou de solution apaisante ni en Irak, ni en Palestine, ni dans d’autres foyers de passions dévastatrices.

Au mélange de lassitude, d’indifférence, de résignation, d’indignation, s’ajoute dans le cas de la pendaison, la mise à nu de l’incapacité de l’opinion arabe et islamique d’ouvrir un riche débat sur la participation aux efforts déployés à travers le monde pour l’abolition de la peine de mort. On s’insurge contre le procédé et l’instrument choisis pour donner la mort, mais on ne va pas jusqu’à envisager l’abolition. Cela obligerait enfin à mieux définir le statut de la personne ou sujet humain et tout ce qui le distingue de celui de l’individu, du citoyen, de l’acteur social par delà les discriminations entre l’homme et la femme, l’enfant et l’adulte, le croyant et l’incroyant, le blanc, le noir et le jaune, le concitoyen et l’étranger… L’abolition de la peine de mort est un test très éclairant sur la richesse ou la pauvreté et parfois les régressions humanistes de chaque tradition de pensée et de culture qui proclame avec véhémence sa spécificité positive, voire sa supériorité tout en refusant l’indispensable autocritique ou confrontation avec autrui. Du côté euro-américain, on pouvait espérer l’ouverture d’un débat escamoté jusqu’ici sur la légitimité de tout ce qui se passe en Irak depuis le premier jour de la confiscation d’une souveraineté politique assurément pervertie par le dictateur, mais pas un cas isolé dans le monde actuel. On peut certes faire valoir que les envahisseurs agissent avec responsabilité quand ils refusent de quitter l’Irak avant d’avoir rétabli les conditions d’une paix civile durable. Cet objectif de portée éthique serait plus crédible si tant de faits sombres

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n’étaient pas accumulés : escamotage d’un procès, d’une sentence et de son exécution confiés à un tribunal ad hoc soi-disant national, alors que tout s’est déroulé hors de toute légitimité et même légalité dans un pays conquis, occupé, mis à feu et à sang, privé de toute souveraineté réelle. On aurait pu renforcer l’existence et améliorer le fonctionnement du Tribunal pénal international de La Haye qui préfigure mieux l’avènement d’une gouvernance et d’une légitimité judiciaire mondiale. Au lieu de ces horizons d’espérance et d’émancipation de la condition humaine, on préfère continuer à mettre en scène théâtrale des caricatures de démocratie et de justice. Les puissances démocratiques qui autorisent ce jeu et ce mépris des opinions nationales et de l’opinion mondiale, détruisent leur prétention à conduire d’autres peuples vers des valeurs démocratiques.

Le Tribunal pénal international aurait sûrement ouvert une ample discussion sur sa compétence à mettre en examen un dictateur d’une société conquise, un Etat-nation aboli, un peuple composite avec des mémoires collectives conflictuelles, déchirées par des héritages archaïques cyniquement manipulée par le monstre déchu et plus dangereusement encore par les conquérants du 21e siècle au nom des valeurs démocratiques. Le constat d’un procès impossible ouvre en même temps l’urgente nécessité de deux concertations internationales au niveau de l’ONU : 1) l’une sur le droit d’ingérence partout où apparaît manifestement le danger de non assistance ; car il est vrai que les Etats voyous se sont multipliés dans la deuxième moitié du 20e siècle avec la bénédiction des démocraties les plus avancées. 2) L’autre sur la refondation du droit international pour régler des problèmes de sécurité et d’environnement à l’échelle mondiale, au lieu de les abandonner à la discrétion de la seule nation qui s’est donnée les moyens militaires et technologiques de protéger les faibles et de détruire les méchants. On dira que ces évocations relèvent de la naïveté intellectuelle et de la rêverie utopique. Je serai le dernier à ignorer l’état présent des ignorances meurtrières, des obscurantismes dogmatiques, des idéologies dévastatrices usurpant les « valeurs » religieuses ou les promesses de la démocratie pour perpétuer les rapports de domination, d’exploitation et de dépossession des estropiés, des oubliés, des vaincus, des attardés, des marginalisés de l’histoire.

La question juive aujourd’hui

J’ai annoncé un second exemple fécond pour approfondir l’analyse critique des rapports d’hier et des solidarités de demain entre islam, Europe et Occident. Qui nierait que la question juive à la lumière de tout ce qui vient d’être dit et enrichie pour la première fois sur les données et les ambitions d’une histoire

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critique de la pensée islamique, est une des clefs majeures qui permettrait de pénétrer dans plusieurs champs verrouillés de l’histoire religieuse, politique, intellectuelle et culturelle de l’espace historique méditerranéen déjà évoqué ? La question juive reprend le titre d’un essai de J. P. Sartre au lendemain du désastre conçu et conduit par les serviteurs du nazisme. J’ai mentionné deux titres proches qui apportent de nouveaux éclairages sur le parcours des juifs et de l’Etat d’Israël jusqu’en 2006. Pour l’historien de la pensée islamique, la difficulté du parcours réside dans le refus ascétique de céder au moindre glissement vers les argumentaires ressassés jusqu’à la nausée entre les protagonistes israéliens/juifs et palestiniens/musulmans ou chrétiens. L’immense littérature qui a accompagné les guerres, les attentats, les massacres, les assassinés ciblés, les manipulations des opinions, les ruses et les cynismes des acteurs politiques, les rendez-vous manqués, la perversion des opinions et des perceptions mutuelles, sera une source inépuisable pour les diverses sciences de l’homme et de la société. Le philosophe et l’anthropologue auront aussi beaucoup à penser et à expliciter sur les errements et les automutilations des hommes comme individus et comme peuples ou communautés. Nous toucherons brièvement à tout cela ; mais parce que le parcours est délicat, long, complexe et inédit dans la perspective de la présente réflexion, je préfère lui consacrer un chapitre à la mesure des promesses d’ouverture qu’autorise un tel sujet. Pour focaliser la curiosité du lecteur, j’annoncerai les thématiques suivantes : Palestine et Israël ; judaïsme, christianisme et islam ; hébreu–syriaque–araméen–arabe ; Parole de Dieu–Discours prophétique–Textes fondateurs/Ecritures saintes/Corpus Officiels Clos–Communautés interprétantes et Corpus interprétants ; muthoslogos–monothéisme ; traditions vivantes–modernité–laïcité, raison religieuse/raison théologique et raison philosophique, raison télétechnoscientifique, etc. On devine l’ampleur du travail que méritent ces thématiques. Beaucoup de travaux érudits ont été accumulés depuis le 19e siècle ; mais j’ai dit que l’érudition froide, factuelle ne déclenche pas nécessairement la pensée critique propre aux opérations de transgression, déplacement et dépassement. C’est avec de nouvelles volontés de savoir pour agir qu’il faut revenir, comme l’a fait René Girard, aux «choses cachées depuis les origines du monde ».

Je laisse donc en suspens la conclusion finale de cet essai. Je n’ai cessé de penser en écrivant ces pages à plusieurs travaux d’Avicenne qui illustrent la mobilité et la fécondité d’une pensée ouverte et libre de ses mouvements en un siècle où la pensée d’expression arabe accueillait des richesses venant de toutes origines iraniennes, indiennes, grecques, arabes, islamiques, juives, chrétiennes… Le Nouveau Moyen Âge restitué par la Nouvelle histoire pour

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l’Europe, est encore loin de l’être pour la période correspondante appelée l’islam classique. Alain de Libéra a resitué dans un sens d’ouverture, les contributions d’Avicenne et plus spécialement d’Averroès. Son livre Penser au Moyen Âge n’a pas cependant mis fin aux débats sur ce que l’Europe médiévale doit à la pensée philosophique et scientifique d’expression arabe du 8e au 12e siècle. Un livre polémique vient d’être publié par Sylvain Gouguenheim sous le titre parlant, Aristote au Mont St Michel. Les racines grecques de l’Europe chrétienne20. Cela montre qu’il y a encore beaucoup à faire pour remembrer les apports des pensées et des cultures dans l’espace géohistorique méditerranéen.

Réferences

Arkoun, Mohammed (1982) : Lectures du Coran. Maisonneuve et Larose.

Arkoun, Mohammed (1984) : Critique de la Raison islamique. Maisonneuve et Larose

Arkoun, Mohammed (2002) : The Unthought in Contemporain Islamic Thought. London: Saqi Books in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies.

Arkoun, Mohammed (2003) : Pensée arabe. 6e édition. PUF.

Arkoun, Mohammed (2005) : L’humanisme arabe au IVe/Xe siècle: Miskawayh, philosophe et historien. 3e édition. Vrin.

Arkoun, Mohammed (2006a) : Islam : to Reform or to Subvert ? 2. ed. London : Saqi Essentials.

Arkoun, Mohammed (sous la direction de) (2006b) : L’histoire de l’islam et des musulmans en France du Moyen Age à nos jours. Albin Michel.

Arkoun, Mohammed & Joseph Maïla (2003) : De Manhattan à Bagdad. Au-delà du bien et du mal. Desclée de Brouwer.

Baslez, Marie-Françoise (2007) : Les persécutions dans l’antiquité : victimes, héros, martyrs. Fayard.

Duprat, Anne (1993) : Le roi décapité. Essai sur les imaginaires politiques. Le Cerf.

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Finkelstein, Israël & Neil Asher Silberman (2002) : La Bible dévoilée. Les nouvelles révélations de l’archéologie. Bayard.

Gouguenheim, Sylvain (2008) : Aristote au Mont St Michel. Les racines grecques de l’Europe chrétienne. Paris : Seuil.

Daguzan, Jean-François (2006) : Terrorisme(s). Abrégé d’une violence qui dure. Paris : CNRS éditions.

Lefebvre, Henri (1969) : Logique formelle et logique dialectique. 2e édition. Anthropos.

de Libera, Alain (2003) : Raison et foi. Archéologie d’une crise d’Albert le Grand à Jean-Paul II. Seuil.

Luxenberg, Christoph (ps.) (2000) : Die syro-aramaeische Lesart des Koran; Ein Beitrag zur Entschlüsselung der Qur’ānsprache. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.

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The implications of Arab Islamic influence

on the Italian Renaissance for the

Europeanization of Europe’s Muslims today

Peter Gran

Introduction

The crisis of Muslims in Europe today is a serious one. Muslims are an integral part of European life in fact but European media and culture tend to deny this attempting to exclude them on the grounds that Islam is not modern so they, meaning Muslims, are therefore inherently foreign to Europe which is modern. This paper takes up the problem of the supposed non-modernity of Islam as a problem in European history. Not uncommonly in European history and in other histories as well, the dominant power constructs its narrative so as to exclude some minority on one basis or another and this appears to have been the case here. Historical knowledge however is not always so predictable or so easy to control. This paper discusses one such example, the unexpectedly discovered influence of Arab-Islamic culture on Renaissance Italy. The paper reflects on what this might mean for the existing narrative.

As the student of cultural history would know, Arab-Islamic influence on Medieval Europe has long been acknowledged in Western scholarship. In recent years, however, there has been an unexpected addition to this traditional body of scholarly work. In this more recent work, evidence emerges not only of an Arab-Islamic influence on medieval Europe but on that of the Italian Renaissance as well especially on Venice. However, this rather important discovery has tended to be obscured given another development that took place at about the same time. I refer here to the even more dramatic –and much written about – implosion of the field of Renaissance studies in the past few years, many scholars now shunning it and indeed shunning even the idea of modernity with which it is associated.1 The upshot appears to be that as a result of scholarly choices being made today, fields such as the Renaissance perhaps even the Enlightenment will have to be reconstructed

1 A sign of the times is an influential work emphasizing the connection between the Renaissance, colonialism and racism in the New World, is Mignolo 2003.

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by a new generation of scholars although on what basis is not yet known.2 Perhaps this new generation would be inclined to take up this task with an eye to the problem of the Europeanization of Islam. One might hope so.

There are a large number of Muslims in Europe living there on a permanent basis seeking to be accepted as Muslim Europeans but doing so with very limited success. It apparently does not suffice for them that the medieval contribution of the Islamic world to European culture is acknowledged, the need they have, here to repeat, is to be recognized as participants in modernity in whatever sense of the word modern is in use. But is it the case that Arab-Islamic culture is so alien to the formation of modern Europe? Is the premise of the media polemic all that accurate? Given the new research on the Renaissance, one would think not.

This paper reviews some of this newer scholarship accepting its findings but wondering how there could have been such influence. How would it be that the elites of these two different regions came to have a similar taste in the decorative arts allowing for there to be this borrowing? Was this an accident or was this a predictable development given what had come before?

To proceed, the paper first looks (a) at the way the Renaissance has been dealt with in European scholarship over the past century up through recent years, i.e., as the awareness grew among scholars of an Arab-Islamic influence on Venice. (b) With this as background, the paper proceeds to try to explain how there could have been a general acceptance of Arab-Islamic design among the aristocracy and art patrons of the Renaissance. It hypothesizes that if this was not some exotic import of the moment and this does not seem to have been the case, the likely alternative would be that this art must have been some small part of a larger shared formation already in place which made this borrowing non-controversial.3 What a wider reading suggests is that this probably was the case, that both regions did in fact share an aristocratic and rich merchant type of culture, one which was rooted in Humanism and Scholasticism. One suspects that on the popular

2 Why is it the case in the Arab world as well today the use of the word Nahdah is also in decline? Looking back at a more confident age in Arabic culture, one finds Taymur (2003), a reprint from the 1930’s edition. Here was a book from the Arab renaissance period on the history of Arab art in the classical period. There is no recent book to my knowledge to replace it.3 Several recent works attest to the connection between trade and art; some reference is made to Islamic patronage of Western and of local art as well. (Maclean 2005)

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level in both regions, opposition to that culture including opposition to representational art existed as well.4 There is certainly some evidence to that effect. (c) To explore the hypothesis of a shared high culture, the most logical approach seemed to be to turn to the work of George Makdisi, a specialist on the subject of Humanism and Scholasticism and of the Madrasa’s influence on the European university. Makdisi makes the case for a shared high culture in his study of elite education. If one assumes, following Makdisi, that there was a common structure of elite education across the Mediterranean then borrowing among these elites be it in art or in other fields was something to be assumed right through the Renaissance and beyond. What art historians are finding for Venice at this point would thus appear to fit into a larger pattern and would make sense. For our purposes, here would be modern European culture in the process of formation and here too would be Islam. This is where the hegemonic narrative of Europe appears to be in trouble.

The rise and fall of the Renaissance in Western scholarly

thought, 1860–2000

In the nineteenth century, Jacob Burckhardt, (1818–1897) the Swiss scholar who was sometimes called the father of cultural history, wrote The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy (1867). This book remained the classic work on the subject of the Renaissance for a long time. Optimistic and forward-looking in tone, it fit the age of nation-state building as one found it in countries such as Germany in particular. And, here it should be noted that it was Germany, the nation-state builder par excellence which produced most of the great scholarship on the Renaissance. The nineteenth century, however, came and went. The attraction to state-building came and went as well. In the twentieth century which followed, very different ideas about modernity and its origins came to prevail, and here I refer in particular to the academic thought of the years after the World War II on that subject.

In this later period, the idea of a Renaissance with its belief in man, in progress and in the future was in crisis. Why this was so remains a matter of speculation and there are different perceptions of the matter. Some point to the fact that the middle classes themselves were in crisis; some point to the fact of the sudden arrival of many immigrants at the end of the colonial era and argue that this in itself was a new form of crisis, not one reducible to the fact of migration per se but to the combination of the fact that this migration came at a time when because of neo-liberalism European states could not

4 Grafton 2004, 57.

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easily create new citizens formed in Western culture. In some instances, the crisis was doubtless exacerbated as well by the fact that the migration came from the former colonies. In any case, racism began to rise in Europe. Much of it was anti-Arab or anti-Muslim. This racism gave power to a new class of politicians, those willing to support and to use it. Meanwhile anti-racism grew weaker. In the past generation, the only ongoing attempt to combat racism has been the one on the level of youth and of the marginal.5 Here one continues to find attempts to form cross-racial solidarities and fusion cultures.

Against this rather somber background, a hopeful sign is that a few scholars, who appear aware of the gravity of the situation, have begun to point to evidence showing how the Italian Renaissance reflected Italy’s links through Venice to the Middle East, how it was that much of the culture of the Italian Renaissance was thus in fact influenced by the Arab and Islamic world. All this scholarship is of course new to the last twenty years. It is difficult to decide to what extent, it has had time to sink into the wider cultural history and thereby to really influence the study of the Renaissance much less the study of modernity.6

John Martin, the Cambridge scholar, writes “that for Italian historians – like many of their counterparts in the United States and Britain – the Renaissance as a conceptual framework for the analysis of Italy in the period running from roughly 1300–1600 has lost much of its explanatory power and attractiveness. ”The Italians”, he finds, “take the Burckhardt tradition to be a part of the rise of the Anglo-Saxon world, one which simply was making use of Italy. Apart from that, even on scientific grounds, Italian writers appear to doubt the modernity of the Renaissance. At most, he concludes, we are left with art, literature and music but not social and political life.”7

In the US, Walter Mignolo, the influential Argentinean-American literary critic at Duke University has been emphasizing the connections between Renaissance culture, European racism and imperialism in the New World.8 At this point, what seems clear is that whatever Western modernity may be or will become in academic thought, it will not be the familiar history from

5 Most of the progress so far has been on the informal level among groups and individualized who have been marginalized. (Dawson & Palumbo 2005)6 Brotton 2002.7 Martin 1996, 613.8 Mignolo 2003.

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the Renaissance to the Enlightenment that we all learned back in school a generation ago.

For Muslims in Europe, the history of the Renaissance and of European modernity has thus suddenly become a matter of some importance. If one finds Arab and Islamic influence, this would have a bearing on much else right down to the present day. Whatever the case may be, scholars clearly can not rest on the formulations of times past. They need to rethink the Renaissance and what followed from it given the new evidence at hand.9

The operative word here is rethinking. The bulk of the known Muslim population of Europe has already been identified in European scholarship and categorized as Balkan. In this scholarship, the Balkans are often almost invisible and often unknowable. They are not a part of Europe yet not a part of the Middle East or even of the Islamic world. Albania, a predominantly Muslim European country in the Balkans, is the extreme case. Most scholars skip the subject of Albania in discussions of modern Europe as they do in discussions of the modern Middle East or of modern Islam. Yet as specialists on Albania have shown, Albanians participated in one way or another way in all the main periods of European history from George Castrioti Skanderbeg in the Renaissance onward.

The hypothesis of a shared high culture versus popular culture

An important assumption found in the traditional scholarship on Islam and on the Renaissance is the one differentiating the two civilizations in terms of individualism supposedly reflected in the representational art of Renaissance and its absence symbolized in the Islamic preference for design. For many, the representational art found in the Renaissance even symbolized a different and higher form of human consciousness, one pointing toward a specifically European modernity, one separate from all that came before. Today this is disputed. Few today would assume a dichotomy between Europe and its pictorial representation and the Islamic world and its opposition to pictorial representation. If one took this approach, what would one make of the contribution to representational art of the artists of the Ottoman, Iranian and Mughal courts? And what would one make of Savonarola, who opposed representational art in Italy? The attempt to sustain a civilizational dichotomy approach today confronts other problems as well. How does an era, such as our own which identifies with deconstruction and with abstract art as its symbolization of modernity go about trying to valorize pictorial art in the

9 Matar 1999.

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manner of the nineteenth century art critic? How would such a valorization proceed at this point? Such criticisms today are common; the issue is what formulation could historians come up with that could rise to these challenges? Here what is hypothesized is that it would be more fruitful to re-think the Euro-Islamic region in terms of a shared high culture, one which was resisted on the popular level and still is.

Thus one finds in the sixteenth century, rather than Europeans in favor of representational art and Muslims opposed to it, it turns out on closer scrutiny that certain groups opposed it both in the Islamic world and in the West. Girolamo Savonarola, (1452–1498) a Dominican Friar, an ascetic with populist leanings ordered the burning of Renaissance art and of other sinful art objects in Florence in the so-called Bonfire of the Vanities on Shrove Tuesday in 1497. During that event, Sandro Botticelli, the very famous painter, placed his own art on the bonfire as part of the sinful objects to be destroyed. These were the working classes and artisans destroying the art of the aristocracy. If this is on one side, on the other, the old argument that Islam opposes representational art seems belied not just by the indigenous production of representational art but by Sultan Mehmed’s cosmopolitan taste in portrait art. What has long been known is that the Italian artist Gentile Bellini (1426–1507) was invited by the Sultan to stay in Istanbul and to draw his portrait. A second major portrait painter of the Renaissance period was Reza Abbasi (1565–1635). Abbasi was a painter from the Isfahan School in Iran. He drew portraits for the court but for a period in his life, he withdrew from serving in the court to be free in the society. This is what is repeated about him. What we know is that the inclusion of this condensed and unexplained information was in those days a common device to allow an author to convey some controversial piece of information but to do so in a neutral way. Abbassi one deduces was not simply a courtier.

If one pursues, as part of one’s hypothesis, the idea of a conflict between high culture and popular culture, there is already a somewhat familiar example upon which to draw, that of the coming of the printing press to the Middle East. Rulers quietly promoted it; other voices more representative of the mass culture declared the printing press to be un-Islamic. What has also been noted is that the coming of the printing press un-employed a large guild of copyists who lost their craft and their livelihood as a result. One could infer the artisanal world understood what was happening and in the course of their struggle invoked religion. Thus in a sense the introduction of the printing press was against Islam. If one extends this approach to interpretation to the issue of art patronage one might suppose that a shift in royal patronage

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away from the guild and its decorative arts to a few portrait painters would be resisted in the same manner and for the same reasons. While this remains to be established a point worth noting is that such an explanation would certainly fit with the general impression scholars have of the economic history of the period. The rise of the merchants in Lucca in Italy over against their Egyptian and Syrian counterparts was a matter of differential labor power. Middle Eastern guilds were able to demand better remuneration than were their European counterparts. Thus European businessmen were able to move ahead. In places such as Italy, one could more easily have a break with the past or a Renaissance than one could in the Middle East. And, while the strength of the guilds may have contributed to the economic decline of the Middle East in world power terms over the long run, and this is another claim, it allowed for a number of centuries of relative social stability internally in these societies.

Bringing this up to date, one finds that there still is a certain class basis of interest in representational art right down to modern times. One of the very few books on the history of representational art in Arab culture was written by an Egyptian aristocrat, Ahmad Taymur Pasha. Taymur Pasha writing in the heyday of the Nahdah (Arabic Renaissance) in the 1930’s simply assumed the existence of such a tradition in Islamic Civilization and wrote accordingly. Clearly many other writers have not started from the same premise nor did they reach the same conclusions. In turning to the Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd edition) article on “Taswir” in order to try to get a general overview of recent scholarship on the subject, one finds Priscilla Soucek, the art historian, claiming that there was no Qur’anic interdiction against painting but that one arose in the theology of the late Umayyad Period. Even then, there was some ambiguity as the subject was never directly addressed as such. There was for example a Hadith about a Muslim not entering the house of painter and that how on the death of the painter he the painter would be responsible for failing to bring to life those whom he depicted. There was another one which described the Prophet ordering the destruction of all images save that of the Virgin Mary and Child. What was the relation of the one subject to the other? Was the Prophet referring to art or idols? Whatever the case, there was a way around this possible prohibition for wealthy Muslims. Thus we find that many of the painters of the classical Islamic world were Greeks, Christians or Chinese and not Muslims but they were patronized by Muslims.

What is apparent as well is that among the wealthy classes in Ottoman Turkey, collecting art was an ongoing activity in Early Modern history. Painting in the Ottoman tradition led to court painters producing albums

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containing pictures called Muraqqa’s. There is an article on that subject in the Encyclopedia of Islam by B. W. Robinson, an authority on Islamic art. Where Western painters painted wall art, the Ottomans produced art albums. Western art however was also available at least in Istanbul. By the 18th century, hybrid styles developed in the Ottoman Court as European art began to have an impact on Ottoman style. One wonders how much this was simply a function of different labor histories?

Putting this aside for the moment, it is important to note that current researchers are acknowledging certain difficulties in trying to establish the fact of Arab-Islamic influence on Italian art. One such difficulty is that important writers and artists of Renaissance Italy do not exhibit much curiosity about foreign influence past or present, Islamic or otherwise. This leaves the question were the Italians aware of the Middle East, were they curious about it? Did they have informed views about their trading partners there or is this too simplistic a way to deal with the subject of influence in any case?

From the work of the historians Nancy Bisaha and Julian Raby, one comes to believe that Venetian awareness of Middle Eastern countries was in fact quite superficial.10 Julian Raby, writing on the Oriental Mode a Venetian decorative art trend, noted how superficial the depiction of the Middle East was in Renaissance art. Only briefly did the artists even try to distinguish Arabs and Turks. After 1517, they homogenized the whole region as Turkish. The borrowing of culture which they engaged in through trade apparently did not awaken a very deep interest in whom they were trading with. Thus, it is,11 one could find a considerable borrowing of and emulation of foreign art and artifacts but a fairly limited awareness of who or what was producing such work. This is of course simply an impression. Before it can be taken as one which is fairly certain, some resolution of other issues in order. Presumably the knowledge of Greek, Jewish, Armenian and Ottoman merchants who served as intermediaries between Italy and the East was of a deeper order than that of the painters.12 In looking at Renaissance culture as a whole would one not have to include such knowledge? This is unresolved. Perhaps awareness as such was greater but demands placed by patrons explain the art which was produced. This too is a possibility.

In view of this ambiguous situation, one in which there is uncertainty about both art influence and even about the significance of the period of the

10 Bisaha 2004, epilogue; Raby 1982, 21–22.11 Howard 1991.12 An initial plunge into this is Kafadar 1985.

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Renaissance, one needs corroborative evidence to support the hypothesis of a shared high culture. Art alone will not suffice. Why not consider art education, better yet education as a whole? If Italian art was influenced by Islamic culture, there must have been more than simply commercial contact. This appears to be the case and here more conclusive research is available. One particularly outstanding researcher in this area was the late George Makdisi, a scholar who devoted a lifetime to working on the problem of Arab Islamic influence on European education and high culture. The paper concludes taking up some of the major insights in his work.

George Makdisi and the study of the structure of higher

education of the elites

Professor George Makdisi (1920–2002), an Arab-American born in Detroit, received his PhD at the Sorbonne and taught at Harvard and Penn. He was one of the main critics of the Eurocentric history of the Renaissance period of our times and a major contributor to the field of the history of education. Judging from book reviews, his works hit a sensitive nerve. Journals outside Middle East studies tended to ignore his writing altogether. One might conclude from this that his work is best known among specialists in medieval and Renaissance Europe and of course classical Arabic studies. For whatever reasons, his two main books were never translated into Arabic leaving him to be known in the Arab world simply as an editor of the Al-Wadih fi usul al-fiqh of Ibn ‘Aqil. For those who read him in English, however, it must have been clear how much Makdisi contributed to the study of the Arab Islamic contribution to Humanism and Scholasticism in Medieval and Renaissance Europe.13

It could also be noted that Makdisi was a very cautious writer. Perhaps given the uncertainties about how Venetians and other Italians saw the Islamic world and its influence on them, one finds a scholarly reticence on his part to argue for direct influence. He claimed that the cultural history of Medieval and Renaissance Europe has to be understood in terms of its complex relation with the Arab Islamic world. What Makdisi meant was that the Arabs gave the Europeans the Scholasticism of the medieval schools and the Humanism of the Renaissance but that the process was a more or less indirect byproduct of the translation movement. For this reason, a Renaissance Italian might have been unaware of it as he was focused on some detail in medicine or astronomy found in some particular translation and only incidentally on the

13 Makdisi 1981; 1990.

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larger scaffolding which came with it. In any case, the result was clear enough. The Scholastic movement, which one finds in Europe, much resembled and thus doubtless actually arose from the earlier one of the Arab world. It was centered on the school, on the skills needed by the student to study his lesson, on the skills needed by the student to defend a doctorate, and by extension the requirements needed to grant the student a degree by a school.14

What should we understand then about the Arabs giving the West “Greek” learning? As Makdisi shows, what we should understand is that the Greek knowledge which did get transferred to the West from the various fields of learning came with the philosophical and methodological developments from within Arabic culture. When the Europeans got Aristotle, they got him as developed by Arab Falsafa. This was how the transfer of Arabic culture occurred; it occurred in a way that seems indirect, here to repeat the above point.

One would think Makdisi’s works would have been best-sellers but such was not the case. Where his contemporary Edward Said was widely read, George Makdisi was a name mainly known to specialists, as for example, to his fellow Orientalists. And, while he had his detractors among them, he clearly was appreciated in those circles being elected president of the American Oriental Society in 1978. Outside of those circles, however, the extent of his influence is less clear judging as was noted from where his books were reviewed.

As a result, until now few realize that it was the methodology and philosophy of learning in the Renaissance which specifically came from the Arabs; the common emphasis in Western scholarship on the subject remains one on the level of particular texts, some of which did have roots going back to the Greeks.

Here it is also important to underscore the point that Makdisi was concerned with institutions and approaches and not simply with the details of subject matter. Herein lay much of his originality. For example, he showed that given a certain organization of knowledge and a certain manner of argument one would expect institutional developments of a certain kind. In this way, he was able to identify the major Islamic contribution to the workings of the first universities in the medieval West. Thus we have “fellows” holding a “chair,” or students “reading” a subject and obtaining “degrees,” or professors giving inaugural lectures or wearing academic robes, institutions taken for granted as traditional European ones, institutions which, however, can be traced back

14 Makdisi 1989.

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to Arab Madrasa practices. Indeed the idea of a university in the modern sense – a place of learning where students congregate to study a wide variety of subjects under a number of teachers – is generally regarded as an Arab innovation developed at the al-Azhar university in Cairo. As Makdisi has demonstrated, it was in cities bordering the Islamic world – Salerno, Naples, Bologna, Montpellier, and Paris – that first developed universities in Christendom, the idea spreading northward from there.

As Makdisi also showed,15 the Latin-based curriculum of Studia Humanitatis from the Medieval period on through the Renaissance was set up on the model of that of the Madrasa. It taught the fields that were needed, e.g. grammar (Al-Nahw) and rhetoric (al-Khataba). In medieval times and then later in the Renaissance as well, knowledge of these fields was needed by court officials for the purposes of letter writing (‘Ilm al-Tarassul) and for public communication, hence oratory (Al-Khatabah). Humanism emphasized eloquence while Scholasticism the dialectical method and disputation (Al-Munazarah). Both had a role to play. For example, the latter was used to test students and job applicants. If Scholasticism was uniquely a school and religion-based orientation, Humanism was found more widely in clubs, salons, and the like, both civilizations having many such institutions. Humanism included art appreciation, here to make some reference to the question of art.

What gives all this its importance here is that if we find art we do not find it in isolation but rather as a part of the totality of fields of learning and institutional forms. Here Makdisi’s work is quite useful. Makdisi found similarities not just in subject matter but in methods of pedagogy as well, especially in humanistic education. He found that memorization played a major role in humanistic education.16 Memorization, it was commonly thought, created the basis from which the creative faculties would then be developed. Education thus would go from dictation (al-Imla’) to memorization (Al-Hifz), and finally instructive discussion (Al-Mudhakara) and debate (Al-Munazarah). It would begin with Al-Riwaya, the simple acquisition of knowledge, then Al-Diraya, the analysis of this knowledge and finally it would reach Al-Ijtihad, the use of one’s ideas arising from the possession of this knowledge. Al-Mudhakara or instructive conversation was used as a part of the test of the job applicant. There was also self-education and guide books on how this was to be done, e.g., Thabit b. Qurra’s Kitab fi maratib al-ùlum. And similarly a work by Al-Farabi, Kitab

15 Makdisi 1990, 332, 335.16 Ibid., 202, 239.

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ihsa’ al-‘ulum wa tartibiha for which there were two Latin versions in the Renaissance. In addition, there was advice to the learner again often stressing the virtues of memorization as a part of learning. In both civilizations, the student used the same implements notably the inkwell (mahbara) and the notebook (daftar or kitab).

In both civilizations as well, Makdisi found, the Humanists felt themselves to be a guild and felt solidarity (Ikhwan, Sinaàt al-adab, Hirfat al-adab). Again as in Europe so in the Arab world, one could distinguish between those more of a professional sort in the guild such as court poets and court orators and those more amateur such as calligraphers and copyists. Then there was politics. There were different kinds of ruler patrons, some more cultured, some less. The common strategy of the Humanists was to tutor each new ruler as a child so he in turn would employ tutors for his children. There was also a great deal of jealousy and rivalry among Humanists in both places. Some tried to have more than one position. Salaries of humanists varied according to politics from a little to a lot.

As was noted, teaching and tutoring began with reading (Al-Iqra’) and dictation (Al-Imla’). The names for the teacher make clear what precisely these functions were. The Mukattib or Al-Muktib taught these skills on a basic level. The Mu’addib (tutor) taught Al-Adab, manners and humanities. For scientific subjects there was the Muàllim. Then there were students who took the approach of apprenticing or learning on the job such as the Al-Mutafaqqih. The word student (Al-Talib) applied to those studying while for the graduates the term Al-Mushtagilun as in medicine conveyed the idea of working while still learning. European practices were quite similar.

In the case of the Arab world, the defeat of the Mu`tazili and the return of traditionalists affected the direction of humanistic study. Institutions such as Bayt al-Hikma changed into Dar al-Qur’an and Dar al-Hadith. The rise of the traditionalists also brought an end to the institution of the Nadim or boon companion. In the Italian context, Lorenzini de Medici (1515–1547), a member of the cadet branch of the Medici family, was the boon companion of Alessandro de Medici. Be that as it may, he secretly plotted his murder, possibly out of republican convictions. Here too the boon companion was a dying institution, no pun intended.

As was noted before, the education system in both cases had its professionals and amateurs. Professionals were naturally those who dominated various fields and earned a living through them such as the tutors. The most advanced professional instructor was called Al-Mutasaddir.

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To teach a course on an advanced level was tasaddara li-l-iqra’ as for example Arabic as a subject (al-‘Arabiya). In the Arabic context, the assistant to the professor was the Mufid, an individual who helps the professor by imparting useful knowledge to the students. Hierarchies of this sort were also found in the academic libraries, in the secretarial bureaus and elsewhere as they were a bit later in Europe as well.

Makdisi looked at the matter as one of complex contact between two different civilizations.17 It was not a question simply of Europe borrowing something to fit an entirely comparable structure now to return to this point. The Europeans had to change quite a bit which they did. Sometimes they borrowed, sometimes they emulated, and sometimes they used their own tradition as a way to emulate. This may be a fruitful way to look at the Renaissance. Some of the main differences that Makdisi noted between the two civilizations was that the European university or Universitas was distinguished by its own particular organization, structure of privileges and system of protection. In effect, in the European case, the university was a corporation protecting its interests functioning as an alien entity in the city of which it was a part. Roman law recognized the corporation as a legal person apart from its leading members and this allowed the university in this context to survive. By way of contrast, a Muslim was not an alien anywhere in the Muslim world, thus there was no need for the protection of students nor of the Madrasa. If in need, a student could get Zakat as a wayfarer anywhere, i.e., as Ibn al-Sabil. The difference shows up as well when it came to giving a degree. In Europe, the Licentia Docendi or license to teach in a certain field was a corporate decision granted in combination with the permission of the Church. In the Islamic world, the Ijazah was a personal matter between teacher and student. In Europe learning thus became highly political as different powers were involved while in the Islamic world the student simply went from teacher to teacher getting Ijazas. Where the fight of the European university to grant degrees against the power of the city led to fixed semesters and other requirements, this is not found in the Ijaza system. The rulers had no such power to neither interfere nor impose conditions. Madrasas were supported by Waqf donations and the terms of the Waqf defined who would attend the madrasa and even what its purpose would be.

To survive in the West, the university often tried to play the interest of the Pope off against those of some king. When this failed, the university could face hardship. In the Arab Islamic context, the politics were different.

17 Makdisi 1970.

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A Madrasa could not simply leave. It was tied by its Waqf money, money which in any case made it somewhat independent. The difference in funding meant that education was not easily controlled in the Islamic world as it was in Europe. The professor as a result had more freedom. Thus Makdisi argues if the European system still under these conditions translated large number of books and adopted new methodologies this involved some complex series of choices. This still needs to be studied. For our purposes, the fact that European education moved along these lines in Humanistic fields seems to lend some credence to the idea of Arab-Islamic influence in the Renaissance art world, this being the larger point of this section. Education would serve as a base which would make borrowing and adaptation such as we find it something obvious even if the Italians of the Renaissance were not always conscious of why this was the case.

Conclusion

This paper set out to inquire into the subject of the Arab-Islamic impact on the Italian Renaissance and the new research surrounding it. The point of the exercise was that this new research might serve to alleviate some of the problems of Muslims in Europe, who are today in process of trying to become Europeans. In other words, if the Renaissance was shown to have been subject to a good deal of Arab Islamic influence in the area of art and if the Renaissance was the starting point of European modernity, Muslims in Europe could no longer be regarded as foreigners as they are today. They were from the beginning a part of Europe’s modernity. The evidence found when taken on its own was not decisive. However, when combined with a somewhat wider view of elite education and of popular culture, the idea of an Islamic cultural contribution to the birth of modern Europe seems eminently reasonable. In one way or another there was doubtless some contribution to art as well.

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References

Bisaha, Nancy (2004): Creating East and West-Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Brotton, Jerry (2002): The Renaissance Bazaar. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawson, Ashley & Patrizia Palumbo (2005): “Hannibal’s Children; Immigration and Antiracist Youth Subcultures in Contemporary Italy”, Cultural Critique, Vol. 59, 165–186.

Grafton, Anthony (2004): Bring Out Your Dead-The Past as Revelation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Howard, Deborah (1991): “Venice and Islam in the Middle Ages: Some Observations on the Question of Architectural Influence”, Architectural History, 34, 59–74.

Kafadar, Cemal (1985): “A Death in Venice 1575: “Anatolian Muslim Merchants trading in the Serenissima”, Journal of Turkish Studies, 10, 191–218.

Maclean, Gerard (ed.) (2005): Re-Orienting the Renaissance-Cultural Exchanges with the East. Houndsmill: Palgrave.

Makdisi, George (1970): “Madrasa and University in the Middle Ages”, Studia Islamica, 32, 255–264.

Makdisi, George (1981): The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Makdisi, George (1989): “Scholasticism and Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 109(2), 175–182.

Makdisi, George (1990): The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West with Special Reference to Scholasticism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Martin, John (1996): “Knowledge, Politics and Memory in Italy: Recent Italian Scholarship”, Renaissance Quarterly, 49(3), 598–616.

Matar, Nabil (1999): Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mignolo, Walter (2003): The Darker Side of the Renaissance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Raby, Julien (1982): Venice, Durer and the Oriental Mode. London: Islamic Arts Publ.

Taymur, Ahmad (2003): Al-Taswir ‘ind al-‘Arab. Cairo: al-Afaq Al-‘Arabiya.



Mehdi Mozaffari

Amity and enmity in the Koran

In the universe of the Koran, amity and enmity are determined by a single criterion, which is obeisance to or disobedience of Allah’s Will. In this Manichean view, the Koran does not recognize any opposition, but only friends and enemies. According to this simple rule, those who themselves fully and completely submit to Allah’s Will are acknowledged as true friends and those who rebel against Allah’s Will are recognised as enemies and there are some people in between, some Ahl al-Kitâb. In a few verses of the Koran, Allah denounces His (own) enemies (‘adow/a’iddâ’) and promises them the eternal fire.1 “You may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy”.2 There is no further precision about the identity of Allah’s (personal) enemies in explicit terms. This peculiar Koranic remark put aside, in the real world, amity and enmity in the Koranic discourse is defined in relation to (Muslim) believers. Seen from this perspective, Satan, by the fact that he is a creature of the God, is not seen as His equal – rival nor His enemy; Satan remains as a formidable enemy for human beings in general3 and for true Muslim believers in particular. In the Koran, Satan has two names: Shaytan and Iblis. The latter is often used when referring to his rebellion against God’s command to prostrate before Adam and the former is mostly referring to his role as a corruptor of humans beginning with misguiding Adam and Eve, causing their fall from Paradise. In this sense, Satan represents the archetype of an enemy and, more than this, Satan constitutes an “enemy model”; all other enemies have to measure themselves against him, because he is the perfect and “impeccable” enemy. He rarely confronts you directly. His role is acting in such a way that you by yourself commit wrong actions. Therefore, Shaytan lives inside everybody and is always ready to give you wrong and dangerous ideas. In the political vocabulary, Shaytan is often the symbol for the subversive and/or corrupted

1 Sura 8, Verse 60; Sura 41, Verses 19 and 28.2 Sura 8, Verse 60.3 The Koran uses different terms to define a human being, such as Bashar (generic), Banu Adam (genealogic), Insân (social) being. For “people” in general, the term An Nâs is employed.

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character of an idea or the character of some political forces. It was in this sense that Ayatollah Khomeini launched one of his successful slogans against the United States of America, dubbing the USA a Shaytan-e Bozorg/Great Satan!

The Tâghut is another Koranic symbol for an enemy which is presented in the statue of an idol.4 This symbol also has a political purpose and often governments or leaders in Islamic countries who are accused (by Islamists) of being hostile to true Muslims are called Tâghut (e.g. the Shah of Iran). A personified Tâghut is represented in the Koran in the person of the Pharaoh (e.g. President Anwar el Sadat according to Islamists), referring to human arrogance and rebellion. Each year in the hajj ceremony, millions of Muslim pilgrims in Mecca proceed to the ritual stoning of Satan (rajm min al-Shaytan).

Apart from these symbolic and metaphorical enemies, the Koran proceeds to a careful classification of friends and enemies who have been real actors in the formation and the evolution of the religion of Muhammad. The Koranic classification is predominantly directed towards internal friends and enemies. Considering the historical context of the 7th century (A.D.) and especially the geographical exiguity of Mecca and Medina, where all activities related to the rise and evolution of Islam were concentrated, the idea of one or many external enemies was apparently excluded. Therefore, the whole Koranic classification is essentially inspired by internal friends and enemies.

Let us have a closer look at the Koranic classification of amity and enmity. The list is composed of seven groups: three friends in different degrees and three enemies in different degrees too. The criterion of distinction remains always the degree of obeisance to Allah or disobedience of His commands. Consequently, Allah stands in the centre of the whole system of amity and enmity. The friends and enemies are separated from each other by a group of people who are playing in the Koranic logic a neutral role. This group, Ahl al-Kitâb, is composed of Jews, Christians, Sabeans and Zoroastrians. On the friendship side of the list, the following three groups are in hierarchical order:

1. Mu’minîn:5 True Believers

4 Sura 2, Verses 257 and 259; Sura 5, Verse 65; Sura 16, Verse 38; Sura 39, Verse 19.5 The Koran does not explicitly distinguish between Mu’minîn and Muslimîn. In the Koran, the mu’mîn (singular) means “someone who protects, gives safety” and God himself is called mu’mîn. Similarly, imân (semantic origin of mu’mîn) in the Koran ought to be understood as “giving mutual protection and security”. In

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2. Muslimîn: Formal Believers

3. Mustaz’afîn:6 Deprived peoples

0. Ahl al-Kitâb. Jews, Christians, Sabeans and Zoroastrians

1. Munafiqîn:7 Hypocrites/Dissenters

2. Kafirîn: Unbelievers

3. Mushrikîn: Polytheists

4. Murtadîn: Apostates

other Koranic contexts, it is not clear whether mu’mîn refers exclusively to those contemporaries of Muhammad who recognised Muhammad as the Messenger of God or whether other monotheists of Medina are being included (E.I. mu’mîn). The uncertainty around this denomination opens the door to different interpretations. One interpretation could be that mu’minîn and muslimîn are reflecting the same thing and are identical. Another interpretation could be that muslimîn is a generic term and an umbrella covering all kinds of Islamic “believers”, beginning with True Believers and ending with the Hypocrites.6 It is not clear whether this term goes beyond deprived Muslims embracing all other deprived peoples. As we will se later on, this term has especially been used by Ayatollah Khomeini in its broader sense, probably under the influence of Iranian communists (Toudeh Party) who supported him at the beginning of the revolution. In their analysis, Khomeini’s “deprived peoples” was equivalent to the Marxist vocabulary of the “proletariat”.7 Munafiqîn (Hypocrites) are recognized as being Muslim thus in dissension to Muhammad. The appellation of Hypocrites has been used by the Koran to refer to a group of Muslims in Medina who did not follow Muhammad’s instructions on all and every issue. The Koran cited at least on one occasion the reason for Muhammad’s anger against Hypocrites. It is because of the construction of a mosque without Muhammad’s permission. It was the reason for this particular mosque being called the Mosque of Dissension (Masjid al-Zirâr) in the Koran. In fact, the banishment of the unsatisfied Muslims by the Koran reaffirms the difficulty that the government of Muhammad in Medina had to admit the right of some Muslims to not fully agree with him on every issue. Many centuries later, when Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in Iran and established an Islamic regime à la Medina, he applied the same policy as Muhammad in excluding a group of pro-revolutionary Muslims (Mujahidin-e Khalq) from the community of genuine Muslims, calling them Munafiqîn instead of Mujahidîn. Since then, a bloody struggle has ensued between the Islamic regime in Teheran and the Organization of Mujahidin which did cause the death of thousands of people from both sides.

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Amity and Enmity through Islamic history

After the death of Muhammad in 632, Muslims continued to look at internal enemies who were still within the Community (Umma). The situation became severely critical under the reign of Othman, the third caliph (644–656). A group of Muslims rebelled against him, leading to the assassination of the caliph by a mob. This crisis entered into the Islamic vocabulary as Fitnat al-Kubra (Great Discord) and was followed under the caliphate of his successor Ali (656–661) by civil war between Muslims. Thus, Muslims became enemies to each other without any external interference. Perhaps, when a group of Muslim combatants leave the army of Ali because of his acceptance of an arbitrage, we can talk of the beginning of the externalization of enmity. Those who leave Ali in protest call themselves (or others call them): Khawârij which means “those who went out”. The question is “went out from where”; from the entire Umma or only from the camp of Ali? Since Ali was assassinated by one of them, Ali’s disciples consider the Khawârij as excommunicated. But, to the Non Shi’a in general, the other interpretation prevailed and Khawârij are considered as having belonged to the Muslim community and their rebellion must therefore be seen as yet another internal political event.

It seems that there exists a direct relation between, on the one hand, the territorialization of the Islamic empire and the construction of the image of external enemies on the other. When the Islamic caliphate became a formidable empire (under the Umayyads), multiple administrative functions (taxation, police, civil and military administration, etc.) required adequate knowledge about the geographic limits of the Empire. Muslim authorities therefore were confronted with a new and important problem, although the resolution of the issue of territorial delimitations. The real question was, how should a non-territorialized Umma be governed territorially? To resolve this problem, the Muslim authorities had to define and conceptualize territories already under their authority in the first place. Which name to give to these territories? A country? A state? Or what? It was because of this imperative and bureaucratic need that a new administrative and jurisdictional notion was invented: Dâr al-Islam or the “World of Islam” which has also been dubbed Dâr al-Salam (the Peaceful World). Territories which are situated outside of the World of Islam fall under Dâr al-Harb or the “World of War”. Between these two antagonistic worlds, there can be in some circumstances the “World of Contract or Armistice”/Dâr al-Aqd or Dâr al-Sulh) which is independent from the World of Islam; thus it is not at war with Muslims. From this point onwards, Muslims become conscious of the existence of external enemies; enemies who

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ironically were created and were imagined by Muslims themselves, especially as their answer to their own administrative and bureaucratic exigencies.

This new administrative invention contains some important political implications. The question of the legitimacy of war was one of them. Against whom is it legitimate to launch a war? In theory, one answer is that war is justified against those who are living in the World of War. In this case, the World of War and “enemies of God” are considered identical; and belonging to the World of War in itself is a sufficient motive for war; even when it is not provoked by an/the enemy. This (legitimate and justified) war can continue until the full pacification of the World of War and its merging into the World of Islam. This theoretical principle could be employed as far as realities permitted. This situation did continue during centuries under both Umayyads and a good portion of Abbasids. The situation, however, changed dramatically when the Islamic empire became divided into two rival centres; one in Baghdad and the other in Cairo, where the Shi’a Fatimids established themselves as a rival to the Abbasid Empire in Baghdad. This division, besides its political tensions, created a new problem questioning the identity of the enemy. Are Abbasids and Fatimids (both Muslim) enemies to each other? Is the war between them justified as a legitimate Jihad? Our purpose here is not to answer these questions but to put forward a variety of problems for which Muslim lawyers, mufti and average Muslims had to find acceptable solutions. As a result of the Islamic dichotomy, the frontiers between internal and external enemies became seriously blurred over the centuries. A huge and ferocious struggle was engaged in by the Bâtini (from Fatimi’s side) against the caliphs of Baghdad and this gave birth to the first organised terrorist actions which later became famous under the name of The Assassins8. History is witnessing that the first terrorist organisation, similar to the contemporary ones, was created by Muslims and the first victims were also Muslims themselves.9

Importantly, Muslim authorities, especially the caliphate of Baghdad, which was still in the hands of the Abbasids (thus formally) did not react to the attack of the Crusaders against Muslim territories10. Fatimids in Cairo made some

8 Lewis 1987; Mozaffari 1998.9 The word assassins derives directly from Shi’a history. It was the name given to the disciples of Hassan al-Sabbah (d. 1124), the Segnor de Montana, a region in the heart of the Alburz montains in the Iranian Caspian provinces of Guilan and Mazandaran. They killed a number of Muslim personalities; the most famous of them was Khâja Nizam ul Mulk, the powerful vizir of Seljuk kings.10 Cahen 1983: Laoust 1970.

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movements but it was not enough to push back the Christian invaders. At that time, Muslims were more occupied by their internal conflicts and dissensions than taking care of non-Muslims (friends or enemies) outside of the perimeter of their territories. The lack of sufficient attention from the Muslim side to an event of the magnitude of the (first) Crusade, demonstrates how a “non-event”’ becomes through history a “major event” as well as how a perceived “non-significant enemy” turns into a dangerous and “terrifying enemy”. This has been the case with the image of the Crusaders then and the Crusaders later on and especially with the image that both Muslims and Christians have of each other in contemporary times. When the Abbasid caliphate was abolished by the Mongols in 1258, for some Muslim theologians (but not all), the image of a “Mongol” became the symbol of the “Enemy of Islam”. In this connection, the man who has animated in the most consistent way Muslim feeling against the Mongols is indisputably Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), who stands today as one of the most influential figures for contemporary Islamists. The image of a Mongol as a “brutal, barbarian intruder” survived through history and still today it is used by Muslims against Americans, in particular concerning US military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, accusing Americans of being the new Mongols due to their “destructive” role in the world and the second fall of Baghdad in 2003.

While continuing our journey through history, we see that during the whole period of the Ottoman Empire, which is probably one of the longest empires in history (ca. 1299–1924), Muslims had not created a new common image for the enemy. The image of “enemy” gave progressively way to the word of “stranger”, “ferenji”.11 Different from the image of the Mongol, it was the image of a European invader, General Napoleon Bonaparte, in Egypt in 1798. He and his soldiers were of course considered occupying forces and some of them were assassinated by Egyptians. This was the case for general Kléber, the successor of Bonaparte. However, this expedition did not cause a durable hostility or even animosity between French people and Egyptians. On the contrary, Al-Jabarti, the chronicler who was a direct witness to Bonaparte’s journey in Egypt, admired some aspects of the French political culture: the principles of equality, fair justice and fair practices in general12.

After this brief review of Koranic and Islamic positions on the notions of amity and enmity, we begin the analysis of the position of Islamism towards the same issue.

11 “Ferenji” and “farangi” are terms indicating “Europeans” and “Frenchmen” in particular.12 Al-Jabarti 1995.

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The rise of Islamism and the construction of contemporary

“friends” and “enemies”

The study of the origins of Islamism is beyond the current study.13 Nevertheless, with the purpose of finding out Islamism’s views on amity and enmity, we need to have a precise idea about the circumstances of the rise of Islamism. In many ways, Islamism resembles Bolshevism, Nazism and Fascism. They are all totalitarian.14 They are all and in different ways consequences of the outbreak of World War I, where four empires, located almost on the same continent (Europe), collapsed simultaneously: the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman. Islamism in reality was a reaction to the fall and then abolition of the Ottoman Empire.

Only a few years after the end of the Great War and in a time of high “Panism” (Gross-Deutschland, Risorgimento, International Communism and Pan-Islamism), Islamism as a political movement and organization (Ikhwan al-Muslimîn/the Muslim Brotherhood) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) in Egypt in 1928, four years after the official dissolution of the Ottoman caliphate by Mustafa Pasha (later Atatürk), four years after the publishing of Mein Kampf by Hitler, six years after Mussolini’s March on Rome and less than eleven years after Lenin’s arrival to power. Here we have to mention an important point which can elucidate a crucial difference between Islamism on one side and Nazism, Fascism and Bolshevism on the other. This point is why the rise and then the evolution of Islamism did not attract much attention. It is quite possible that the reason for this negligence is found in the fact that Islamism since the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, did not succeed in gaining power as fast as other extremist movements. After remaining almost fifty years as a radical protest movement, Islamism gained power only in 1979 with the Islamist revolution in Iran. Putting it in retrospect, we may admit that even this spectacular revolution was not sufficient to attract attention to the novelty of the phenomenon of “Islamism”; apparently it took a tragic event like 9/11 to make the world more aware of the importance and the highly dangerous character of Islamism.

Now, the question is how Islamists define their friends and identify their enemies? Here, we are confronting a methodological problem. In contrast to Nazism, Fascism and Bolshevism, which are pretty well defined and numerous

13 See Mozaffari 2007.14 Among scholars, there is no consensus about the totalitarian character of Fascism. Hannah Arendt does not consider Fascism as a totalitarian ideology or regime. See Arendt 1976, 256–257.

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studies have brought to light various aspects of each of them, Islamism on the contrary is still a diffuse and disputed concept embracing a large variety of sub-divisions which cross Sunni, Shi’a, Wahhabi sects and are dispersed over different countries and continents.

The method that I have chosen is based on a selection of the most representative Islamist thinkers and leaders. The validity of the selection is depending firstly on the fact that the selected persons have described themselves as being Islamists. Secondly, they must represent a range of contemporary Muslims. Thirdly, they must possess both ideological and political influence during the period under investigation, although from 1928 to 2005. In this way, we get not only a qualified and representative view on the question of amity and enmity; we are also able to make a comparative analysis among different, always qualified and representative views. In accordance with the above-defined criteria, four persons have been selected as follows: Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), the most influential Islamist intellectual, Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989), the man who realized the first Islamist revolution and seized power, and finally Bin Laden as the leader of Al-Qaeda, responsible for the 9/11 and many other terrorist acts around the world. The four persons selected fulfill all the requirements necessary to having a sustainable picture of amity and enmity. The list could be longer, including persons like Ali Shari’ati (1933–1977) of Iran and Mawdudi (1903–1979) of India–Pakistan. We find that the composition of the four Islamist leading figures, mentioned above, is covering the main thesis of the two others (Shari’ati and Mawdudi), therefore, we did not consider it necessary to extend the field of investigation to them. Furthermore, the four selected personages have also the merit that they represent the three main versions of Islamism; the Sunni, the Shi’a and the Wahhabi versions. Al-Banna and Qutb stand for the Sunni version, Khomeini represents the Shi’a Islamist and finally Bin Laden and a significant part of Al-Qaeda’s known members stand for the Wahhabi form of Islamism. The selection is not only applied to the choice of persons, it has also occurred with regard to their respective writings or oral declarations, which is often the case with Bin Laden and his companions. The selection of authors’ works has been made in accordance with the criteria that the authors’ works must be the most important political ones. Based on this criteria, the selected works are: 1) Majmû’a Rasâ’il (Collection of Tracts) of Hasan al-Banna, 2) Ma’âlîm fil Tariq (Milestones) of Sayyid Qutb, 3) Hukumat-e Islâmi (Islamic government) and the Political testament of Ayatollah Khomeini, and finally 4) the Fatwa and other declarations released by Osama Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri and Al-Zarqavi.

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The detailed study of these works is unfortunately beyond the current space that has been allocated to the author.

References

Al-Banna, Hasan (1992): Majmû’a Rasâ’îl al Imâm al Shaîd. Cairo: Dâr al-Tawzi’ wan Nashr al-Islamiyya.

Arendt, Hannah (1976): The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: A Harvest Book.

Al-Jabarti (1995): Napoleon in Egypt, translated by Shmue Moreh. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishing.

Cahen, Claude (1983) : Orient et Occident au temps des Croisades. Paris : Aubier.

E.I. (1993): The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New edition. Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill.

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah (1971): Hukûmat-e Islami (in Persian), clandestine publication, no place of print, no publisher.

Koran, The Glorious (1992).Translated by Marmaducke Pickthall and introduction by William Montgomery Watt. London: Random House.

Lambton, Ann K. S. (1981): State and Government in Medieval Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laoust, Henri (1970): La politique de Gazâlî. Paris: Paul Geuthner.

Lewis, Bernard (1985): The Assassins. London: Al Saqi.

Mozaffari, Mehdi (1998): Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy. Oxford: Aarhus University Press.

Mozaffari, Mehdi (2007): “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8(1), March.

Qutb, Sayyid (s.d.): Milestones. The Mother Mosque Foundation.


The Prophet’s tradition or modernity of the

state: the case of Turkish hadith project

Sylvia Akar

“Turkey is preparing to publish a document that represents a revolutionary reinterpretation of Islam – and a controversial and radical modernisation of the religion.” This is how in February 2008 BBC News eulogized the project of the Turkey’s Department of Religious Affairs to carry out a “revision” of hadith, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

But how revolutionary is this? What are we dealing with when we speak about hadith? Hadith literature is composed of a vast collection of texts which are supposed to reflect the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad as well as descriptions of his behaviour, his life, and his appearance but also gives accounts of his sahaba (companions) and ansar (followers). The totality of hadith literature constitutes the Prophet’s sunna (the correct way of living) that Muslims are supposed to follow.

According to the view of Islamic scholars the foundation of Sunni hadith was laid in the years 622–757, i.e. during the generation of the authoritative sahaba and the first three Muslim generations. This early stage was followed by several stages of the compilation, criticism, evaluation and systematisation of the vast material, and the diffusion of the material throughout the Islamic empire. The original books of hadith were completed by the turn of the second millennium and the energy of the scholars has since then been devoted to the compilation of biographical dictionaries as well as the preservation and organisation of their predecessors’ work.

The most trustworthy collections, known as the Six Books, were compiled in the ninth century, more precisely 850–900. Two of these, the collections of al-Bukhari and Muslim, also known as al-Sahihan (the two sound ones) have been considered to be the most important, comprehensive, and trustworthy of the hadith collections. If a hadith is found either in al-Bukhari or in Muslim, or even better, in both collections, it can certainly be considered authentic. However, if a hadith is not found in either collection, that does not necessarily mean that it could not be authentic.

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Although al-Sahihan occupied a very special place among the basic Islamic texts, Muslim traditionists of the late first and early second millennium did not hesitate to criticise individual hadiths in the collections. Al-Daraqutni (919–995, Baghdad), who was the best-known traditionist of his generation, attempted to show the weakness of about one hundred of al-Bukhari’s hadiths. Ibn al-Jawzi (1126–1200, Baghdad) in his al-Mawdu’at al-Kubra recognised the fact that al-Sahihan contain weak and forged hadiths.

But one of the most modern endeavours was the work by al-‘Ayni (1361–1451, Cairo). In his eleven-volume work ‘Umdat al-qari’ fi sharh al-Bukhari he examined each hadith in al-Bukhari’s collection from five points of view. He investigated the relation between the hadith and the tarjama (the short introduction in the beginning of each hadith). He studied the isnad (chain of transmitters), and enumerated other chapters in the collection where the same hadith occurs. But most importantly, he studied the literal and juridical sense of the hadiths, and the ethical and juridical rules that can be deduced from the hadiths.

Although the number of forged or unreliable hadiths in al-Sahihan was limited to a few, it is significant that these scholars acknowledged the existence of weak and forged hadiths in the standard collections and evaluated the use of the texts as normative guidelines in Islamic societies.

‘Ulum al-hadith (hadith sciences) have historically been the Crown Jewel of Islamic science. Scholars have taken painstaking efforts to try and verify the authenticity of hadith literature. In outward appearance and according to Islamic history, the ‘ulama (Muslim scholars) have combined meticulous scholarship with the sacred purpose of reproducing the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad as accurately as possible. However, many critics claim that the need to promote a convenient interpretation of both political and theological questions was the determining factor in the choice of authentic hadiths, and that the ‘ulama’s consensus the was more essential than the actual tools of the science of hadith.

In recent years one of the most important Islamic media scholars, the Egyptian-born sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–) has drawn attention to hadith literature. Al-Qaradawi is head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, and he is known world wide for his popular programme al-Sharia wa-l-hayat on the al-Jazeera TV channel and the website IslamOnline, which he has contributed to since 1997. In his book Kayfa nata’amal ma’a l-sunna l-nabawiyya (1990) al-Qaradawi has stressed the need to compile three encyclopaedias of hadith.

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The project planned by al-Qaradawi is in line with the works of Muslim scholarship. He proposes a comprehensive encyclopaedia on the narrators of hadith, with biographies of all the narrators mentioned in the texts, be they considered trustworthy or not, and even if they were known to be fabricators or liars. A second encyclopaedia would concentrate on the textual subject matter of hadith literature, including all the chains of transmissions of the hadith reports. This part would then contain all the known Prophet hadiths from the first to the last ones ever recorded, with all known isnads. But only the third part of his project would present the real outcome of the work. It would be devoted to pinpointing the trustworthy hadiths and, consequently, it would be a tool to discard weak, defective and untrustworthy hadiths from the corpus. The work would be done according to the criteria of traditional hadith scholarship but with the aid of modern technology and data processing tools.

Even more importantly, al-Qaradawi proposes the addition of new commentaries to clarify the meanings of concepts and whole texts. All this should, according to al-Qaradawi, be written in the modern languages of Muslim peoples. The work should not imitate traditional methods but should address the needs and interests of contemporary Muslims.1

A lot has already been done in recent years in the field of hadith studies, but without gaining the attention of the general public. The IHSAN – The International Hadith Study Association Network2 – has published a huge work in print and a searchable database which includes “the Seven Canonical Hadith Collections: Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abi Dawud, Sunan al-Tirmidhi, Sunan al-Nasa’i, Sunan Ibn Maja and Muwatta’ Malik. “The aim of the Association is “to encourage, facilitate and advance world-wide work in all the disciplines of Hadith study.”

The Sunna Project seeks to assemble the entirety of hadith literature, and to edit, publish and print it in a manner which serves all those who make use of hadith texts in their research. The Project has taken full advantage of the rise of computer technology to process enormous quantities of data in a matter of seconds, and uses software which supports an almost infinite variety of search methods.

Why has this project passed totally unnoticed by the public? The reasons are many, the first of which is that the Sunna Project has been funded by The

1 About al-Qaradawi’s project in English, see Kamali 2005.2 Http://www.ihsanetwork.org/ihsan-home1.asp?lang=e.

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Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, which is a non-profit foundation established to “advance and promote the preservation, study and dissemination of the Islamic intellectual, cultural and artistic heritage.” The aim of the project is to promote research, not to raise public discussion about the relevance of hadith. Another important factor might be that the project works with original Arabic texts and does not even plan to translate its publications into Western languages.

Finally, the present Turkish project is not the first of its kind even in Turkey. After the country was founded in 1923 the republic’s first parliament commissioned a review of hadith literature. I have not been able to trace back the actual reformations which were done at that time, but I have no reason to suppose that anything that would not fit into the tradition of hadith science was accomplished at that time either.

Numerous Islamic institutions continued to exist after the disintegration of the caliphate. Atatürk spoke of the need to “cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for centuries.”3 Ironically, with Atatürk’s introduction of laiklik4 the traditional control of the imams became even stronger, since imams became civil servants and the state paid their salaries and controlled the content of the sermons.

Already in the early 1920s Atatürk declared a concern that his group’s politics “lacked certain things in terms of religion.”5 Soon after Diyanet işleri başkanlığı (The Directorate of Religious Affairs) was founded in 1924. It is one of the largest state institutions, owning over 120 mosques, appointing and supervising all Sunnite imams, and having several hundred employees in various European countries.

In 1928 a report was issued stating that “religious life must be reformed by means of scientific procedure and by the aid of reason.”6 From 1932 Atatürk carried out some of the reforms proposed: the Qur’an was read in Turkish in all mosques, and the Diyanet issued an edict requiring that calls to prayer can be issued in Turkish. But the most important change took place in 1928 when the Arabic alphabet was replaced by Latin. This “script revolution” loosened

3 Ahmad 1993, 54.4 Laicism, secularism or as practiced in Turkey, subordination of religion to the state.5 Davidson 1998, 152.6 Ibid, 153.

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the ties of Turkey with the Islamic world and united it with Europe,”7 but it also contributed to the rapid raise in literacy, which was even more important.

The current project of the Diyanet was first discussed in the Western media two years ago, when The Washington Post (16, July 2006) published an article about the initiative. At that time, Turkey’s “move toward reform” was widely overlooked in the West, and there was little acknowledgment of it in other Muslim countries.

The Diyanet launched the Hadith Project in June 2006 to carry out a comprehensive review of hadith literature. This government-sponsored project is being supervised by Dr. Mehmet Görmez, a British trained scholar who is heading a team of Turkish specialists in Islamic studies at Ankara University. The work will end by the end of 2008 resulting in six volumes, and there are plans to have them translated into English, Arabic and Russian. Once the project is completed, the Diyanet plans to offer the new version of hadith to more than 76,000 mosques in Turkey and elsewhere.8

The reaction in Turkey to the project has been divided. According to Fadi Hakura, an expert on Turkey from Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in London, Turkey is doing nothing less than recreating Islam: “The state is fashioning a new Islam…it’s changing the theological foundations of [the] religion.”9 But in the words of the project’s supervisor Dr. Görmez, the aim of the project is not to “expunge certain hadiths but to make a new compilation of the hadith and re-interpret them if necessary.”10 The project is surveying, reviewing, and clarifying the legal interpretations of authentic hadith. Everything else is just “Western fuss.”11

How far-reaching a reform the Turkish project will turn out to be remains to be seen. A great deal depends on the courage of the researchers involved in making real decisions about the relevance of the texts, but even so the substantive impact of the reform will still be hard to estimate. Put plainly, it must be acknowledged that the Turkish government does not carry a lot of

7 Ahmad 1993, 82.8 Turkish project aims to give Muslims guidance, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSL0637852720080307.9 Turkey in radical revision of Islamic texts, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7264903.stm.10 Turkish project aims to give Muslims guidance, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSL0637852720080307.11 Turkey Classifying Not Revising Hadith, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout&cid=1203757550116.

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religious credibility with Muslims in Turkey, to say nothing of Muslims around the world.

References

Ahmad, Feroz (1993): The making of modern Turkey. Routledge.

Davidson, Andrew (1998): Secularism and revivalism in Turkey. A hermaneutical reconsideration. Yale University Press.

Kamali, Mohammad Hashim (2005): A textbook of Hadith studies: authenticity, compilation, classification and criticism of Hadith. Leicestershire: The Islamic Foundation.


The secularising force of engaged religion:

reflections on Iranian and Egyptian

Islamism

Bjørn Olav Utvik

In a satirical Norwegian poem it is said that when Jesus returned to pass judgment on the living and the dead, his application was turned down by the Ministry of Church and Education as representing an undue mixing of religion and politics.1 It is certainly clear that when God turns human she or he must expect controversy. So must any human moving from passing general moral judgment on society from a distance to actually engaging with the concrete political and social issues of the day.

This article takes as its point of departure the following observation: Both in Iran and in the Arab world from the 1980s and till today there is a marked movement within mainstream Islamism in the direction of a more principled acceptance of democracy, of pluralism and of tolerance for others, and, crucially for the purposes of this article, in the direction of some sense of separation of political institutions from those of religion and of reduced direct reference to religious precepts when arguing for solutions to concrete problems. This is as true for the Muslim Brothers and the Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt as it is for the former Students Following the Line of the Imam (daneshjuyan-e peyrow-e emam) now leading the reformist trend in Iran.

These parallel developments take place despite the widely diverging, almost opposite, circumstances in which the movements in question find themselves. In Iran we are talking of a reformist trend opposed to the clerical-dominated theocracy that evolved out of the revolution, and working to limit the political role of religion and religious institutions. In the Arab world the main Islamist groups are working on the contrary to reinstate religion as provider of guidance for social and political life – in particular the reintroduction of the Sharia as effective law – and to reinvigorate the role of religious institutions.

1 Botnen 1970.

336 Bjørn Olav Utvik


Precisely the difference in situation makes for the fact that among the actors in question themselves an emerging hesitant recognition of the commonalities is paired with a nervous suspicion of the others as being somehow in league with the enemy, or at least of doubtful loyalty to democracy in the one case, to the Islamic cause in the other. Typical of Arab Sunni Islamists Yemeni Islah Party activists in Sanaa in 2002, when the similarities were pointed out to them, asked: “Are you sure the reformists in Teheran are not about to abolish the compulsory hijab?”; the implication being that if they did indeed harbour such plans or wishes, they would somehow be betraying the cause and acting as agents of Westernisation. From the other side it is revealing how the stunned journalist from the Iranian reformist newspaper Sharq in February 2006 discovers that the visiting Khalid Mish’al, leader of the Palestinian Hamas, contrary to the preconceived image of him as some Arab counterpart of Ahmadinezhad, comes across as both “modern, pragmatic and freedom-loving”.2

Why, then, do Arab Islamists and Iranian reformists seem to gravitate in a similar direction in their ideological development? To clarify this it is useful to ask about the possible effect on society, on religion, and on religious movements themselves of the direct political involvement of religion, or to perhaps be more precise of what happens when religiously motivated groups decide to invest religion directly into the political struggle of a given country or region. To be sure, in order to make more general pronouncements on these issues a vastly more comprehensive comparative study would be needed. What is attempted here is more modest; a reflection on some interesting points that emerge from the two-way comparison in question, with the Egyptian case representing Arab Sunni Islamism. First a tentative clarification of some key terms is in place.

Secularisation, engagement, empowerment

A typical broad definition of secularisation, taken from an online dictionary, is “the activity of changing something – – so it is no longer under the control or influence of religion”.3 In terms of political system it is often thought of as a strict separation of religion and state. In one sense this is a contradiction in terms, since as long as religion remains a factor influencing the morals and values of the population by the same token it will never be totally separate from their political behaviour. Trying to eradicate this kind of influence, for

2 Sharq, 3 Esfand 1384 (22 February 2006).3 http://www.wordreference.com/definition/secularization, August 2008.

337The secularising force of engaged religion


instance by prohibiting parties with a religious reference in their programme, only serves to make religious influence less explicit, and is more often than not in reality a move to exclude an unwelcome political contestant for power. An institutional separation of religion and state on the other hand is certainly a relevant issue, and has been implemented by a number of countries, historically most notably by France, where a strict policy of the total religious neutrality of all state institutions has been in force since 1905.4

Turkey, often claimed as the beacon of secularism in the Middle East has emphatically not followed this path. Turkey did admittedly remove religious leaders from the privileged position they had in the Ottoman state, but rather than separating religion from the state, it has placed the legal religious life of the country under strict supervision by a government agency, the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs), commonly known as the Diyanet. Whether secularisation in the sense of neutralising the state vis-à-vis religion is a good thing or not, is open for debate. Yet it seems fairly clear that one must separate between cases where such a process follows the free decision of the population through an open debate and free elections, or, as was the case in Turkey, it is forced on the population from on top by an authoritarian leadership. It is also important to note that secularization can proceed quite far in some aspects while the state in other aspects remains committed to a certain religion. Norway would be a case in point, where the king is still head of the church, the government decides on the appointment of bishops, and the Constitution stipulates in its Article 2 that the religion of the state remains the Lutheran version of Christianity. Yet this has not hindered a very gradual reduction of the political influence of the church and of the role played by religion in public matters. This has to do with the other aspect of secularisation, often thought of as the reduced religiosity of the population, or alternately the reduced role of religion in influencing the thinking and the daily practice of people.

For the purposes of this article, then, secularisation will be understood to imply the movement towards a greater degree of separation of institutions of religion and those of the state and towards a reduced use of religious references in deciding particular issues, and concurrently a movement towards the pluralisation of interpretations of religion and towards greater tolerance. The idea of “movement” here of course implies that these different layers of secularisation can all be described as a graduated scale.

4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663, August 2008.



What then of engagement and empowerment? In this article these concepts are used in relation to religious movements, or to be more precise, movements which hold that religion does not only concern the individual’s faith, but contains God-given regulations that should also guide social, judicial and political relations within human society. Engagement, then, refers precisely to the process whereby such movements try to put this idea into practice, i.e. where they actively campaign to change social and political conditions in the desired direction, in the process “operationalising” religion, as it were. Empowerment refers to the accession of such moments to positions of power, be it on a national political level or more “partial” access to power in municipalities or in nationwide organisations of various kinds.

Iran

To a large extent the Islamic tendency that emerged victorious after the internal fight over the leadership of the 1979 revolution in Iran was a de facto coalition of two broad trends. While there were clerics and non-clerics represented in both, broadly speaking one trend was constituted by mostly younger clerics who considered Khomeini their marja’-e taqlid5 and were otherwise guided by the moderately conservative teachings of clerical reformers such as Morteza Motahhari, the other was made up of student followers of the radical ideologue Ali Shariati who had come to see in Khomeini the leader of the community envisaged in Shariati’s work Ommat va emamat.6 It is important to notice that these young Shariatists, while ardent followers of Khomeini’s symbolic leadership, were not unconditional followers of the clergy in general. Inspired by Shariati they maintained a radical programme of social redistribution and of state-led development efforts. Under the protection of Khomeini they were able to establish themselves as a major faction within the system after the revolution. This “Islamic left”, as it came to be known, throughout the eighties dominated the parliament, majles, and the government. At times in sharp conflict with the conservatives dominating the Guardian Council they pursued policies of land reform and economic redistribution in favour of the poor, linked to a rather totalist conception of the Islamic state as a social utopia in line with Shariati’s thinking.

5 ”Source of emulation”: according to the dominant usuli school within Twelver Shia every Muslim believer must choose one of the leading experts of Islamic Law and follow his guidance.6 Shariati 1978.



The end of the war with Iraq in 1988 and the death of Khomeini the year after brought with it a new constellation of power in Iran. The pragmatist forces who wanted above all to get the economy moving after revolution and war struck a deal with the conservative elements in Qom and in the bazaar which resulted in the dual set-up of Khamenei as supreme leader (rahbar) and Rafsanjani as president. In the process the leftists were squeezed out of their positions in government, and from 1992 also out of the majles.

Their response was a gradual but eventually radical rethinking of their ideological stance. After a period of public soul-searching, not least through the journal Kian, the former radical Shariatists emerged as spokespersons for a thoroughgoing reform in the direction of cultural freedom, political pluralism and democracy. The landslide election of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency in 1997 suddenly brought power to the reformist faction. Despite important limitations, mostly linked to the overriding powers of the vali-ye faqih, Khatami and the reformist government he managed to have accepted by the conservative Parliament of the time, from the autumn of 1997 controlled most levers in the executive branch of government. In 2000 the reformists also managed to win a large majority in Parliament. Yet conservative control over the judiciary, and over non-elected organs like the Guardian Council, gave their conservative opponents the power to prevent much progress in implementing the reformist agenda of liberalising reform. In 2004 the power of the Guardian Council to vet prospective candidates for election was used to broadly exclude the reformist from the new parliament elected that year. In 2005 the conservatives also took over the presidency with the surprise election of Mahmud Ahmadinezhad.

Yet despite these setbacks the reformist movement continues as an active political force in the country, and the support for its agenda is broad. For the current discussion, anyway, the Iranian reformists serve as an important example of a radical movement coming to power with the aim of creating a religiously inspired utopia. Based on their experience since the revolution the young radicals conducted an ideological rethinking of the relation between religion and politics – in many ways a disconnecting of the two – where a key element has been the recognition that while the religion of Islam may through its holy scriptures represent absolute divine truth, what humans have access to are merely fallible human interpretations of these scriptures. Since the interpretations in themselves cannot claim divine status neither can they represent undisputed guidelines for human behaviour. Armed with this decoupling the reformists have felt free to advocate a greater degree of cultural and political freedom and pluralism, and the introduction of a more



genuine democracy in Iran. This call for greater freedom and a more liberal interpretation of religion has been accompanied by and intertwined with an outspoken pragmatism, sometimes bordering on cynicism. In an obvious reaction against the utopian and over-ideologised climate of the eighties, and against those, like current president Ahmadinezhad, who continued with the stark revolutionary rhetoric, the reformists moved to a position were they explicitly stated that complete solutions to various problems were not in sight and that the best one could do was to look pragmatically for steps which in a limited way might lead in a positive direction.7

In fact one might surmise that since the revolution a de facto secularisation of the religious institution has taken place. At the same time the practical experience both of clerical rule and of themselves being put in positions of power, has prompted among a dominant portion of the revolutionary educated youth of 1979 a radical ideological transformation in the direction of what amounts to a distinct “secularism with a religious reference”.

The accession to power of (a section of ) the Shia clergy has taken a heavy toll on the traditional symbolic capital of the clerics. Previously they could exercise moral judgment over politics from the outside. Now they are steeped in the mundane affairs of state. And having taken power over the Pahlavi state, they become dependent upon it; its functionaries. For while the ayatollahs and hojjatoleslams were traditionally able to influence events through an autonomy based on control of local fiefs involving the income from huge tracts of land and networks of clients, in the new Islamic Iran they wield power only in so far as they have gained positions within the state. They have continued the expansion of the centralised state begun under the last two shahs, to the effect of undermining any prospect of regaining their traditional autonomous position. In a sense the Islamic revolution institutionalised religion; thus it forced the secularisation of opposition and society, and profaned the Sharia through its instrumentalisation by the state.

Among some of the clerics affected, but primarily among the young lay followers of Shariati who came into power positions in the eighties, the fascinating and traumatising head-on confrontation with the exercise of power in a modern state prompted a thorough revision of ideology. Among the core principles emerging from this rethinking has been a) that no human being has any privileged claim to represent divine truth, b) that accordingly

7 Hajjarian 1380/2001, 190.



pluralism has to be the order of the day, c) that there can be no privilege for the clergy in the running of political affairs (and in radical versions neither in the interpretation of the Sharia), and d) that God has made his delegation of powers to the people in general, and not to specific experts, and that therefore democracy is to reign within the Islamic Republic. Importantly the rethinking leading to these views being established did not take place in a vacuum, but is a reflection of the same questions being radically and centrally posed for the religious population of Iran.

These developments can readily be interpreted as a reaction against the traumatising experience of the attempt to install a monolithic religious government. Yet the striking fact is that similar developments have taken place within many of the Sunni Islamist movements that are in opposition against more or less secularist governments in the Arab countries. And though the Arab Islamist movements mostly have not yet tasted government power they have lots of experience as leaders of professional unions and student unions as well as of businesses and charities that work in the same direction. Egypt will serve as an example.

Egypt

In Egypt, despite the long history of the Islamist movement, it is still in opposition. Yet while its experience thus differs radically from that of Iranian Islamists, similar ideological developments seem to be taking place.

In the Egyptian parliamentary elections of November–December 2005 the Society of Muslim Brothers (MB) had 88 of their number elected MPs. Because of the formally non-legal status of the MB, which is recognised neither as a political party nor as a welfare or religious society, they had run as independents yet campaigned vigorously under the banner of the Ikhwan.8 Despite the fact that they are still left without any grip on power in an Assembly where the ruling National Democratic Party of President Mubarak controls over two thirds of the seats, the success of the MB shook both the regime and the secular opposition groups. It established the MB as the overwhelmingly dominant opposition force in the country; the legal secular parties sharing 9 seats between them.

What concerns us here is that the reinvigorated Ikhwan organisation had gradually since the early nineties, at least, become dominated by the

8 Ikhwan is Arabic for Brothers and the commonly used short form for Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Society of Muslim Brothers).



outlook of a new generation different from the old guard who had grown to political maturity prior to the 1952 revolution and the 1954 crackdown on the Ikhwan.

This new generation is often connected to the term al-wasat which has become a buzzword among reformist-minded Islamists both in Egypt and in the broader Muslim world. The term wasat carries multiple layers of connotations. It has a Koranic reference, where the Muslims are spoken of as ummat al-wasat, literally the “community of the middle,” but generally understood to signify “the just and equitable community”. For those promoting the idea of al-wasatiyya, an Islam-based reformist ideology,9 the aim is to seek the middle ground in terms of moderation, always an ideal in Islamic circles. This aspiration for moderation is partly one of means: they denounce the use of violence to promote political goals, but equally the passive, apathetic acceptance of current conditions. With it goes a moderation of outlook: they seek a balance between the need to uphold sacred values and the need for dynamic social change, as well as a balance between the need to learn from abroad and the need to uphold independence. And they consider themselves the standard bearers of the jil al-wasat, the “generation of the middle,” a generation they see as having absorbed the experience of the pioneers but still free to chart its own course, a generation aware of the contemporary challenges but also able to guide the young onto the right path.10

In 1996 a number of the former student leaders from the 1970s, impatient with the lack of a formal political party through which to express their political ambitions, declared the formation of a new political party to be named Hizb al-Wasat, the Centre Party. When the MB leadership distanced themselves from this initiative a number of the founders broke with the Brothers, most prominently Abu al-Ila Madi and Salah Abd al-Karim. Despite several attempts the Wasat has never been accepted by the authorities as a legal political party. Yet the group remains active. However, the vast majority of Islamist activists from the seventies and later generations still belong to the Muslim Brother organisation proper. Though several wings exist within the MB, in general the political outlook of those Brothers who have staid within the mother organisation is not far removed from that of the Wasat.

To a large extent this outlook is most clearly expressed in the programmes presented by the Wasat group with each new application for recognition

9 For a comprehensive, albeit somewhat panegyric, presentation, cf. Baker 2003.10 Habib 2006, 7–19.



as a legal party. In a bid to establish a foundation for national unity across religious groups, the programme, while demanding the implementation of Article 2 of the constitution, where the Sharia is stated to be the main source of legislation, defines the role of religion vis-à-vis state and society as that of a marja‘iyya or point of reference. It is then made clear that, while for the Muslims Islam is a matter of faith, for both Christians and Muslims Islam is their inherited civilisation, to which they both have contributed. Rather typical of the programme, it is not spelled out exactly how this idea would translate in terms of the constitution and general legislation. However, the concept of marja‘iyya is used to underscore the right of full participation for non-Muslims in rights and duties. At the ideological level it is a definite step in the direction of understanding religion as a provider of identity through a common cultural heritage and a set of deeply embedded shared values, rather than as a set of detailed regulations. The Wasat also puts great stress on the point that in defining the religious values that must guide society, vital distinctions must be drawn between what is permanent and unchanging and what must change as society changes, between what is incumbent on Muslims and what is incumbent on all citizens, and between those issues directly regulated by the Sharia and the vast field of human activity that falls within the neutral category of the “permitted,” or al-masmuh.

With regard to the preferred political system to be adopted in Egypt, the Wasat adopted a clear-cut stance for a fully-fledged parliamentary democracy. The programme did call, as we have seen, for the implementation of the Sharia. However, it came very close to equating the Sharia with a set of moral values. Its application would be effected by the legislature “through democratic means,”11 and it was stated explicitly that the effort is not merely one to clothe the ancient regulations (ahkam) in a contemporary language. Rather the task was to choose interpretations that do not paralyze society and economic development. The Wasat programme also emphasised explicitly that the sovereign community, the umma, includes all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation. There is a parallel development with regard to the question of women’s role in society and politics, where the programme supports the complete equality of women in civil and political rights and duties and underscores the duty of society actively to secure the conditions that will allow women to be mothers and simultaneously active members of society.

11 It is noteworthy here that the loan word dimuqratiyya is being used instead of the “indigenous” concept of shura.



The ideological development of the Muslim Brothers points in a broadly similar direction. In the autumn of 2007 a draft for an MB political programme was circulated to a number of Egyptian public figures for comment, and rapidly was made available to the public. In the Egyptian debate that followed, prominence was given to the question of whether the Brothers were true democrats or not. Already in 1994, the Muslim Brothers had published a declaration, “Shura in Islam”, which goes a long way toward identifying this Koranic (and indeed pre-Islamic) term with popular sovereignty and representative democracy. The declaration states that “the people are the source of political power” and that they must elect through free and fair elections “a representative assembly possessing effective legislative and supervisory authority”. For the purpose of creating a just system of government the people must decide upon a written constitution securing a balance between the different institutions of the state.12

The declaration saw limits to this democracy in that the constitution must be based on the Sharia. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brothers acknowledged that there is an act of human interpretation involved. The constitution must be based first on the unequivocal texts of the Koran and the Sunna, thereafter on the “intentions and general principles of the Sharia”. It is significant in this regard that the declaration emphasises that most affairs dealt with by the popular assembly will consist of questions of law and political decisions that are subject to human interpretation, ijtihad, or which fall within the scope of the permitted (al-mubah), that is where the choice of a particular decision is neutral vis-à-vis the Sharia. From this they draw the conclusion that disagreement and debate not only are natural but also indispensable in order to reach the most socially beneficial decision, especially if the debate is characterised by “tolerance, breadth of vision, and the absence of fanaticism”. This leads the Muslim Brothers to the view that Islamic society needs to practice a multi-party system, and they oppose any conditions imposed by the future Islamic state on the free formation of parties and associations.13

This declaration came about mainly due to the initiative of the younger guard, and it goes a long way toward expressing its outlook, although its numerous references to Islamic precedence and strong emphasis on the Sharia as a framework within which a popularly elected assembly must act certainly reveals the effort to overcome the reservations of many in the old

12 The Muslim Brothers 1994.13 Ibid. For similar views expressed by Islamists cf. al-Ghannouchi 1993; and al-Iryan 1993.



guard. The draft programme of 2007 is clearly more explicit and unequivocal in its commitment to democracy. But it is also more detailed and in those details critics have seen a devil or two.

First it should be noted that while in the 1994 declaration the Arabic word for democracy, dimuqratiyya, is not found, in the 2007 programme it is freely and frequently used as a positive term for the desired political system. The programme contains a detailed discussion of important principles that are considered prerequisites of a well-functioning democracy, such as the division of powers, free and fair elections, genuine popular participation, party pluralism (including the right freely to form parties), and so on. To be sure even in this programme Islam and its Sharia is invoked as a framework within which democracy and freedom must move, but this is clearly less pronounced and less frequent than in 1994.

The harsh criticism that was filed against the draft programme by opponents of the MB concerned mainly two issues. One was the reference to a “Council of Higher Ulama” (hay’at kibar al-ulama), to be consulted by Parliament in the process of legislation. This was criticised for bringing in an Iranian-style system where a body of religious clerics could veto the decisions of the elected representatives of the people; a criticism coming both from without and from within the MB’s own ranks. (Apparently not even all members of the supreme body, the Office of Guidance, had been properly consulted.) The line of defence came along two lines: first if was emphasised that this clerical council should also be popularly elected. Secondly, while the text of the draft is distinctly ambiguous on this point, it was afterwards clearly stated by Muhammad Habib, the Deputy Guide, among others, that the council would only have consultative powers, and the Parliament remained sovereign in its right to decide against the counsel received.

The second point, or rather two points, which came under fire for being against democracy, was the fact that the programme made it a principle that the effective head of state, whether this be a president or a prime minister, must be a Muslim and a male. On the first point it was argued that while non-Muslims would be exempted from Islamic rules on matters related to personal status and to religious practice, it would still be the task of the state to see to it that Islamic principles were in effect in society at large and among its Muslim majority, and such a task could not be forced upon a non-Muslim. As for a woman becoming president this was not desirable because the head of state would also be a leader in war, and this does not harmonise with the female nature. Two things should be emphasised here; first, that even on



these points there was a lot of criticism internally in the MB, and secondly that in the shadow of these hotly debated provisions, the programme otherwise emphasises full equality in terms of political rights, and does this more clearly and explicitly than the 1994 declaration.

The programme, in an apparent effort to show its commitment to the unity of Egypt across religious boundaries devotes a separate section to the Coptic Church, emphasising its pivotal role as a factor for social morality and cohesion. Some effort is also made to present Islam as a civilisational framework which does not obliterate the value of pre-Islamic culture and religions.

As for the relation between the genders and the role of women in general, while emphasing the centrality of motherhood, the programme states the necessity of activating women’s political and social role, emphasising that it has become obvious that women can handle a lot of tasks which society is in need of. To do so, the programme advocates a campaign to spread “the culture of equality between the genders”.

Both the Wasat and a fortiori the MB programmes are out to square the circle of making the parties appear at once modern enlightened organisations and at the same time staunch defenders of authenticity and the Islamic heritage against a perceived Western onslaught. Nevertheless there is an unmistakable development in the same direction of accept for pluralism and democracy and a diminished belief in the existence of ready-made divine prescriptions for the details of how to build a good state and society.

Compared to the Iranian scene the rethinking of the Islamists seems to be less philosophically profound. But there is very important common ground in that in both cases the idea is developed that while the holy scriptures of Islam represent an eternal divine truth, no human being can claim to possess the correct interpretation of these scriptures. In both Iran and Egypt this insight leads to a determined defence of the need for democracy and pluralism. And, interestingly, in both cases appeal is made to the old fiqh principle of maslaha which is now understood to mean that the public good must have a decisive role in determining which interpretation of heavenly injunctions should be acted upon.

Conclusion

Religion falls into the trap set by reason: trying to stand up against the West, it is Westernised; trying to spiritualize the world, it becomes



secularized; and trying to deny history, it gets completely bogged down in it.14

A key to the parallel developments in Iran and Egypt may be found in the fact that a religious movement once it chooses to engage politics (and to seek a road to power through popular backing rather than through terror or “guevarist” tactics), is suddenly faced with having to deal concretely and practically with all sorts of political and social issues confronting the modernising societies of the Middle East.

I will argue that through the same process where religion becomes activated and mobilised for the solution of burning social and political issues, the religious society is actually on its way to secularisation for a number of reasons. Not least important is that religion and its clerical representatives do not longer hold the high moral ground where they can criticise the doings of government and people for deviating from scripture, it has itself entered the low grounds of practical politics. Thus it loses its sacred status. When the borders between religion and the social and political sphere are dissolved religion somehow lowers itself down into society. Through this act it becomes an object of controversy and has to be adapted.

How then should we understand the tendency to move from the declaration of an intent to implement the sacred eternal principles of religion in political and social life, to a more pragmatic and sober discourse and practice? At one level it could be seen as the renouncing of lofty ideals when confronted with the harsh and complex reality of trying to affect developments or even exercise power; a sort of resignation. Yet to stop at that would be a bit reductionist, at least if this is understood as a turn towards a cynical attitude to politics. For it is easily observable that people may remain deeply pious and committed to religion while shifting away from the assumption of possessing unambiguous divinely sanctioned answers to all possible questions and situations. A more open and pragmatic approach where concern for beneficial results takes the place of preconceived rigid frameworks for moral action, in many cases go together with a deepened spirituality. In the case of Islamism there was from the start both among Sunnis and Shi’is a clear affinity to Sufism in that great emphasis was placed upon the purification of souls combined with a strong urge to work for improvement of people’s living conditions.

Yet does all this mean that Islamism was a parenthesis and that religion is leaving the scene? This may be the long-term result, but it is probably more

14 Shayegan 1992, 78.



useful, at least for our current purposes, to think of this as the democratization and consequent pluralisation of the interpretation of religion, leading among other things to greater tolerance, and not least to the need to seek a consensus on concrete issues based on other grounds than religion. In the sobered understanding of the Iranian reformists and Egyptian mainstream Islamists, religion can only remain a factor for consensus if it is understood as broad moral injunctions, rather than as specific regulations.

An optimistic take on this would be to envisage over time a passage from a community around certain dogmas which existed (to a large extent) in the abstract as moral norms, via the stage of politicisation, to a community around wider norms and a consensus that most concrete choices are left to humanity.

References

Baker, Raymond William (2003): Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists. Harvard University Press.

Botnen, Trond (1970): Nattordbok. Oslo: Gyldendal.

al-Ghannouchi, Rached (1993): “The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government”, in A. Tamimi (ed.) Power-sharing Islam? London: Library for Muslim World Publications.

Habib, Rafiq (2006): Awraq Hizb al-Wasat. Cairo.

Hajjarian, Sa’id (1380/2001): Az shahed-e ghodsi ta shahed-e bazari: orfi-shodan-e din dar sepehr-e siyasat. Teheran: Tarh-e now.

al-Iryan, Isam (1993): “The Future of Power-sharing in Egypt”, in A. Tamimi (ed.) Power-sharing Islam? London: Library for Muslim World Publications.

The Muslim Brothers (1994): “Mujaz ‘an al-shura fi al-islam”, al-Sha‘b, May 19.

Shariati, Ali (1978): Ommat va Emamat. Teheran: Qalam.

Shayegan, Daryush (1992): Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting the West. London: Saqi Books.


Globalised Islam and the Alliance of

Civilizations

Kirsti Westphalen

Due to globalisation, national borders have lost some of their earlier relevance in matters of culture and religion. Increased transnationalism implies that national decision-makers have more restricted means at their disposal to control religious developments in their territory than earlier. Globalisation also highlights the centrality of the role of global and national media in representing and explaining complex phenomena that transgress traditional boundaries of all kinds. However, the role of the media is in many ways fuzzy, as they are simultaneously an effect, a cause and an accelerator of globalisation. Hence, increasing transnational bonds have created – at least for the time being – pervasive cultural and religious flows between states. This has increased both the religious diversity as well as the complexity of the issues involved.

Whereas religion as a social force seemed to be weakening in Europe after World War II, the situation has changed since the 1980s, and again since the fall of the communist bloc. Religion has increasingly become both a political force and a source of identity. This development has also been noted globally, and common examples of it are the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the rise of the Christian Right in the US in the 1980s and Islamist terrorism in the West, especially 9/11.

Scholarly interpretations of the rise of religion onto the political agenda vary, but certainty remains that the fall of the Communist bloc removed a counter-ideology to the so-called global Western hegemony and gave place to a politicised religion as an alternative. Developments in this respect have taken place in all geographic regions.

The increase of religious pluralism in Europe has come as a surprise for the majority of the continent’s inhabitants, political decision-makers and academic researchers alike. Even though much of the recent religious pluralism has been introduced by native and Western developments, international migration has amplified it to a large degree. The plurality of religious and other value systems is only likely to increase in the near future.

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Contrary to common beliefs and despite the importance of transnationalism, European populations of immigrant origin have rapidly and effectively been incorporated into their new host societies, which has made their new environment the single most important sphere of social relations.

However, incorporation does not necessarily mean successful integration, as more often than not the migrants have found their places on the margins of the labour market and faced persisting xenophobia. In addition, their offspring (the second and subsequent generations) have partially failed to climb the social ladders of education, professional development and welfare. There is thus a widespread failure to become part of the mainstream society and gain the benefits it brings along with it. All this implies that national policies are still highly central, but in order to succeed, they must increasingly take into account the transnational sphere.

The importance of religion as a defining factor of one’s identity has been on the increase in the Muslim, particularly the Arab world. There has been a failure by all too many governments to deliver the reforms and improvements which their citizens have the right to expect in terms of democracy, respect for human rights and concrete economic and social development. When a political avenue has been closed to the expression of divergent social views, many have channelled their frustrations through religious expression.

We are dealing with the results of years of accumulated frustrations in the Muslim world. These frustrations have their roots in the both domestic and international unresolved conflicts affecting Muslims.

Increasing religious and value diversity in European societies has brought along many challenges. The situation demands self-reflection and adaptation to changed circumstances by citizens, states and other actors, including religious organisations and the media. Public discussions and conflicts are two of the many ways in which these topics are identified, challenged and negotiated, but we should not forget that they are also embedded in a broader social reality. Many of the recent controversies relating to religious issues of immigrant origin cannot be understood unless the social position of these populations is taken into account.

Because religious identities in general and Muslim identities in particular have become politicised, it is clear that religion becomes one of the most important arenas for social negotiations regarding integration and social inclusion. This means that religious activities become forums of wider importance, where all kinds of issues are discussed, with or without the use of religious language. European secular states have had large difficulties in

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accepting religious demands as legitimate, even though they might eventually not be so different from other types of demands, were those religious claims to be “translated” into secular language. Claims by ethnic and “racial” groups are more easily accepted.

There are no simple responses to complex social phenomena, but there are several ways to improve mutual understanding and coexistence. Strong legal means of protecting religious groups and individuals from insults, unless it is a question of hate speech, do not seem realistic alternatives.

Calls and cries for dialogue over perceived civilizational, cultural, ethnic and religious boundaries have been many in recent years. There is certainly a need to find a new status quo regarding tolerance and understanding of a changed world through all possible means, including education for combating ignorance, stereotypes and the misunderstanding of religions.

Religious communities need also to discuss freedom of expression and respect for religious beliefs within their own community and to pursue a dialogue with other religious communities in order to develop a common understanding of religious tolerance. In addition, media professionals and their professional organisations should discuss media ethics with regard to religious beliefs and sensitivities, and develop their own codes of conduct in this respect.

Many kinds of efforts are needed, but it must not be forgotten that public conflicts and discourses over religion also reflect a reality outside the realm of religion and freedom of expression. Many of the recent controversies relating to religious issues of immigrant origin cannot be understood unless the social position of immigrant populations is taken into account. Dialogue may be useful, but it does not cure social ills, such as unemployment, feelings of unworthiness and marginalisation. Social problems facing many of Europe’s migrant populations cannot be changed by discussion, but by deeds.

Against this background, it is easier to see that some of the challenges we face in building multi-cultural and multi-religious societies are not due to differences among religions as such. Instead, they are reflections of social problems that give rise to small groups who seek to build an ideological foundation and gain support for their political cause. We must not allow these extreme views to overshadow those of the majority and the mainstream.

In Europe, it has become commonplace to speak of integration as a “two-way process”. Integration needs a welcoming society in order to support immigrants, realize all their potential, and develop their skills for the benefit

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of all. Furthermore, individuals and institutions in the host society must also adapt to a world in which migration is a permanent phenomenon. All individuals must assume responsibility in this integration process – as well as state institutions, political parties, the media, businesses, and civil society. Migrants who aim to stay permanently or for the long term will have to make a deliberate effort to integrate, in particular learning the language of their host society, and to respect the living conditions and the basic values of the receiving society.

During the “Cartoon Crisis” it became evident that various political forces within the Muslim world tried to gain legitimacy through religious rhetoric by making a connection between the Middle East conflicts, terrorism and immigration issues. It was easy to influence spiritually lost Muslims living in Europe.

Rather than being forever politically nourished from their previous motherlands, it has become vital for immigrants to create national conditions for the emergence of European Islam. Here it is important to underline that it is not the business of governments to master religious affairs, nor is it the task of the European Union to manage Islam in Europe. Governments should create conditions propitious for the growth of Muslim thinking which would reflect the realities of Western democratic and egalitarian societies. To achieve this, governments should focus on creating conditions for Muslims to build their human and organisational capacities to represent their own interests democratically and effectively in civil society. European governments should encourage mainstream Muslim voices by engaging especially with democratically elected bodies that represent faith and minority groups. In other words, European Muslims should be empowered and anchored in the European reality.

Opportunities for Islamic theological education are urgently needed in our European countries, for the purposes of strengthening Muslim communities and providing high-standard religious education for their children and youth, as well as preparing them for spiritual and academic encounters with the Christian, Jewish and other religious traditions present in Europe. These educational opportunities and dialogical encounters should be supported by governments according to the legal tradition of the respective states.

Alliance of Civilizations (AoC)

Finland has been encouraged by the multitude of local, regional and international initiatives and processes promoting inter-cultural and inter-

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religious dialogue and understanding. As a result of this positive development, the importance of co-ordination between various initiatives has thus become extremely important.

The Alliance of Civilizations was established in 2005, at the initiative of the Governments of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the United Nations. In April 2007, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed Jorge Sampaio, former President of Portugal, as High Representative for the Alliance. The AoC is supported by a Group of Friends – a community of over 85 member countries and international organizations and bodies.

The Alliance of Civilizations Initiative has put the inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue firmly in a multilateral context and on the UN agenda. The Alliance has the great advantage of bringing together many threads emanating from other initiatives and processes in this field. It is important to stress the need for concrete measures and the implementation of the AoC Action Plan. Nations need to step up their efforts in the areas of education, youth, women, migration and media.

For Finland, the Alliance of Civilizations is a key forum for the development and implementation of measures to prevent divisions arising among different populations, religions, cultures and civilizations – a task that seems to be becoming more and more important in the entire world, Europe included.

The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) aims to improve understanding and cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and religions and, in the process, to help counter the forces that fuel polarization and extremism. Working in partnership with governments, international and regional organizations, civil society groups, foundations, and the private sector, the Alliance is supporting a range of projects and initiatives aimed at building bridges among a diversity of cultures and communities.

The Alliance functions, both globally and within the UN system, in the following capacities − as a:

bridge builder and convener, connecting people and organizations devoted to promoting trust and understanding between diverse communities, particularly − but not exclusively − between Muslim and Western societies;catalyst and facilitator helping to give impetus to innovative projects aimed at reducing polarization between nations and cultures through joint pursuits and mutually beneficial partnerships;advocate for building respect and understanding among cultures

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and amplifying voices of moderation and reconciliation which help calm cultural and religious tensions between nations and peoples;platform to increase visibility, enhance the work and highlight the profile of initiatives devoted to building bridges between cultures; and as aresource providing access to information and materials drawn from successful cooperative initiatives which could, in turn, be used by member states, institutions, organizations, or individuals seeking to initiate similar processes or projects.

Finland seeks to contribute actively to two project areas of the AoC in particular, which are outlined in the following sections.

Rapid Response Media Mechanism (RRMM)

The significant influence of the media in shaping how we see the world and our perception of other cultures is widely recognized. While media organizations are often criticized for producing generalizations and clear-cut assessments of complex issues, the media can also be a potent force in challenging stereotyped perceptions and become a channel for new ideas and perspectives. Through balanced news coverage, analysis and debate, journalists and editors can play a positive role in reducing cross-cultural tensions and ensuring that a broad diversity of voices are heard on potentially divisive issues.

In order to capitalize on the positive, constructive role the media can play in bridging cultural gaps and helping to build understanding among nations and cultures, the AoC is developing a Rapid Response Media Mechanism. The aim of this initiative is to provide a platform for voices that can help reduce tensions in times of cross-cultural crises. To this end, the AoC is creating an online Global Experts Resource to support the work of journalists covering stories on religious, cultural, and political tensions among diverse groups and communities. With a specific focus on issues that threaten to widen cross-cultural divides, this resource will provide journalists with access to a network of individuals who can speak to these issues with a level of knowledge and discernment that may ultimately help improve cross-cultural understanding.

The AoC Rapid Response Media Mechanism (RRMM) has three components:

An online resource of experts and analysts who can make a positive 1. contribution to debates on sensitive cross-cultural issues. The AoC

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features these experts on a dedicated website, www.globalexpert-finder.org, and through direct outreach to the media.The AoC works with this network of experts to develop messages (i.e. 2. op-ed articles, audio and video statements and interviews) that help frame contentious issues in less polarizing terms and offer insightful and nuanced perspectives on complex debates. Content will be pro-vided in key languages and disseminated via a range of international and regional media outlets.To prepare the ground for these activities, the AoC works to build a 3. “community of interest” among journalists, editors, commentators and opinion formers worldwide. To this end, the AoC is working with think tanks and civil society groups to organize regional seminars and workshops to explore ways in which a greater diversity of views can be introduced in the media coverage of intercultural issues.

Finland is currently setting up a national Rapid Response Media Mechanism to ensure that the multitude of voices in civil society, for example, migrants, people of different beliefs and academics, are heard at times of crisis.

Clearinghouse, including media literacy programs

The Aoc is developing an online clearinghouse of best practices, materials and resources on cross-cultural dialogue and cooperation projects related to each of the four thematic areas: youth, education, media and migration.

The clearinghouse is intended to be a practical tool for governments, organizations and institutions interested in launching projects in the above-mentioned areas in their respective communities, countries and regions.

The AoC Secretariat is collecting information on initiatives underway and best practices related to seven subjects within the clearinghouse. One of them is media literacy programs. This is the opening item in the online clearinghouse, the first among the seven in total.

The Media Literacy Education Project refers to a rapidly growing field that is increasingly critical of improving cross-cultural relations: the field of educating media consumers to be more critical and discerning of the information they receive through new media technologies and to understand how the same events may be portrayed in widely different ways depending on how they are presented in the media.

Finland has chosen to be a contributor to the Media Literary Education Project and has already established a partnership with the AoC in this area.


Authors – Auteurs

Sylvia AkarLecturer in Islamic studies and Arabic languageUniversity of Helsinki, Finland

Jan Otto AnderssonAssociate Professor at the Department of EconomicsÅbo Akademi University, Finland

Mohammed ArkounProfesseur émériteUniversité de Sorbonne (III), France

Paul BaltaEcrivain, ancien du journal Le Monde, Directeur honoraire du Centre d’études de l’Orient contemporain, Université Paris III Sorbonne nouvelle, France

Salvatore BonoProfesseur émériteUniversité de Perugia, ItaliePrésident de la Société Internationale des Historiens de la Méditerranée

Lofti BoumgharConsultant, chercheurAlgérie

Ahmed DrissProfesseur à l’Université de Tunis, Directeur du Centre des Etudes Méditerranéennes et Internationles (CEMI), Tunisie

Peter GranProfessor of HistoryTemple University, United States of America


Authors – Auteurs

Hassan HanafiProfessor of PhilosophyCairo University, Egypt

Kirsi HenrikssonHead of Research and DevelopmentCrisis Management Centre CMC Finland

Jean-Robert HenryDirecteur de recherchesInstitut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe etMusulman, IREMAM-CNRS, France

Ulla HolmSenior ResearcherDanish Institute for International Studies, Denmark

Anitta KynsilehtoResearcherTampere Peace Research Institute, Finland

Jyrki KäkönenProfessor of International RelationsTallinn University, Estonia

Karim MaicheUniversity of Lapland, Finland

Valentine M. MoghadamProfessor of Sociology and Director of Women’s StudiesPurdue University, United States of America

Mehdi MozaffariProfessor, Head of the Center for studies of Islamism and RadicalizationUniversity of Aarhus, Denmark

Seyfeddin MuazExecutive Vice PresidentRoyal Scientific Society, Jordan

Authors – Auteurs


Pertti MultanenDocentInstitute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland

Susanna MyllyläSenior Research FellowUniversity of Jyväskylä, Finland

Frank MöllerSenior ResearcherTampere Peace Research Institute, Finland

Traugott SchoefthalerCo-ordinatorEducational Services, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Germany

Bjørn Olav UtvikResearcherUniversity of Oslo, Norway Risto VeltheimRoving Ambassador for AlgeriaCoordinator of Euro-Mediterranean affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Unto VesaResearcherTampere Peace Research Institute, Finland

Kirsti WestphalenAmbassadorMinistry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Tarja VäyrynenAcademy Research FellowInstitute for Social Research, University of Tampere, Finland