Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response

8/6/2019 Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response

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BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE:CHINAS PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY

DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLANAND THE U.S. RESPONSE

Kevin Pollpeter

March 2008

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

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This monograph was originally written for a conferencesponsored by the RAND Corporation, the Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace, and the Chinese Council of AdvancedPolicy Studies in 2005. The author wishes to thank Evan Medeiros,Michael Swaine, and Andrew Yang for their initial support in thisendeavor. The author would also like to thank Garth Hekler, SusanPuska, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments onearlier drafts, as well as David Swanson for answering questionson space technology. The author is responsible for any errors oromissions

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FOREWORD

Chinas space program has achieved spectacularsuccess in recent years. Since 2003 China has launchedtwo human space ight missions, destroyed asatellite with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon,and launched a moon orbiter. In this monograph, Mr.Kevin Pollpeter assesses Chinas rise as a space powerand its implications for the United States. He arguesthat Chinas use of space power is part of an integratedapproach to increasing its comprehensive nationalpower and achieving great power status. As a result,Chinas increasing space power challenges the UnitedStates militarily, economically, commercially, andpolitically.

Chinas increasing space capabilities will erode theU.S. lead in space in both absolute and relative terms.

Nevertheless, the loss of preeminence in space need notresult in the United States losing its role as the leadingspace power. To maintain its lead, the United Stateswill not only need to improve technologically, but alsotrain and keep a competent workforce, develop newand innovative ways to compete commercially, andexpand the role of space in its exercise of soft power.To this end, this monograph offers valuable insightsinto Chinas rise as a space power as well as a numberof policies designed to respond to the challenges itpresents.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

KEVIN POLLPETER is China Program Manager atDefense Group Inc.s Center for Intelligence Researchand Analysis. Previously, he was a researcher at theRAND Corporation. Mr. Pollpeter is widely publishedon China national security issues and focuses on theChinese space program. He has travelled widely inAsia, including China, where he lived for 2 years. Mr.Pollpeter has advanced Chinese language skills andholds a masters degree in International Policy Studiesfrom the Monterey Institute of International Studies.


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SUMMARY

The advance of the Chinese space program haslaid a foundation for that country to enter into the toptier of space powers. In recent years, China has madeimportant progress across a broad range of spacetechnologies including launchers, launch schedules,satellites, and human space ight, and has taken aleading role in regional space cooperation.

This monograph examines how the United Statesshould respond to Chinas rise as a major space powerbased on Chinas space activities during the periodof the Tenth 5-Year Plan (2001-05). It nds that theChinese space program made impressive gains duringthe Tenth 5-year Plan, but when compared with theother major space powers, Chinas space technologystill lags behind.

Chinas burgeoning space program providesopportunities for China to use the benets derivedfrom space power to become a more inuential andrespected nation. While China does not have an ofcialgrand strategy, the Chinese leadership appears tohave reached a consensus on a plan which sustainsthe conditions necessary for economic growth andmilitary modernization in the context of operating ina unipolar world dominated by the United States. Thisstrategy is designed to ultimately usher in a multipolarworld in which China is one of several great powersby protecting Chinas core national interests againstexternal threats and by shaping the internationalsystem in which it operates.

To this end, Chinas space program is intended to

portray China as a modernizing nation committed tothe peaceful use of space while at the same time servingChinas political, economic, and military interests. It


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contributes to Chinas overall inuence and providescapabilities that give China more freedom of action and

opportunities for international leadership. Militarily,the Peoples Liberation Army is undergoing reformsto transform itself into a military that is reliant oninformation for winning wars. Economically, Chinassupport for its space program lies in its potential as adriver for economic and technological advancement.Commercially, China is positioning itself as a low costprovider of space technologies and launch services.Commercial services not only increase revenues forthe space industry but have also been used to advanceChinas diplomatic interests with oil-rich countries.Politically, Chinas expanding international cooper-ation on space activities portends a more inuential for-eign policy. Domestically, by developing a robust spaceprogram and participating in high-prole activities

such as human space ight, the Communist Partydemonstrates that it is the best provider of materialbenets to the Chinese people and the best organizationto propel China to its rightful place in world affairs.

Chinas rise as a space power will present military,economic, and political challenges to the United States.Uncertainty over Chinas pathway to potential majorpower status, the possibility of a conict over Taiwan,and the inherent dual-use nature of space technologiesmeans that Chinas improving space capabilities couldbe used against the U.S. military. Chinas efforts todevelop its space program to transform itself into aneconomically and technologically powerful countrymay also come at the expense of U.S. leadership inboth absolute and relative terms. China has also been

able to use its space program to further its diplomaticobjectives and to increase its inuence in the developingworld and among second-tier space powers.


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Chinas increasingly capable space programwill have a net negative-sum effect on the United

States and requires both domestic and internationalresponses by the United States. Domestically, theU.S. Government and industry must improve thehealth of its space industry through better programmanagement, attracting and retaining a competentworkforce, and increasing funding to develop cuttingedge technologies. Internationally, the United Statesmust take into account Chinas growing presence inworld affairs, including space activities.

The rise of China as a space power also raises thequestion of whether the United States should cooperatewith China in space. The difculty in deciding anappropriate response arises from the inability of bothsides to determine whether their relationship will befriendly or hostile. Nevertheless, the United States is

presented with four policy options to meet the changingdynamics presented by Chinas space program: contain,compete, cooperate, and do nothing.

Containment is the least viable of the four options,and as China becomes more integrated with the world,it will become even less practical.

Competition may also be problematic. U.S.-Chinarelations may be ambivalent, but extensive cooperationdoes take place in many araeas, and it is not apparenthow dening China as a competitor in a space race willfurther relations. It is also not apparent whether theAmerican public will support a race which will requireadditional funding with little short-term gain.

Cooperation, on the other hand, has the potentialto increase transparency and trust and to lessen

competitive aspects that may lead to armed conict. Apolicy that treats China as a friend, however, has its ownshortcomings. Because Chinas strategy is designed


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to further its own national interests and because itsinterests are often not aligned with U.S. interests, it

is unlikely that assisting China in increasing its spacepower may eliminate these differences and may, infact, exacerbate them.

Doing nothing is a safe option that does not riskthe transfer of technology or expertise. A policy ofinaction does risk ignoring the possible benets ofcooperation.

While the inherent military nature of Chinas spaceprogram and its lack of transparency preclude mostforms of cooperation, the United States can cooperatewith China in benecial ways that do not transfertechnology or expertise. These include coordinatingscientic research and increasing the safety of humanspaceight by establishing a code of conduct to rescueimperiled astronauts. Consequently, the challenge for

the United States is to manage the positive-sum andnegative-sum consequences of Chinas ascendantspace program by improving its space industry, betterenabling its military to counter space-based threats,and engaging in cooperative activities that improvescience and increase the safety of human space ight.


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BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE:CHINAS PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY

DURING THE TENTH FIVE-YEAR PLANAND THE U.S. RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

Chinas launch of its rst human space ight missionin 2003 has raised concerns about the U.S. ability tomaintain its lead in space technology. In recent years,China has made important progress across a broadrange of space technologies including launchers,launch schedules, satellites, and human space ight. Itestablished a robust remote sensing network consistingof meteorological, land resources, and oceanographysatellites, as well as a satellite navigation and positioningsystem. China also conducted more launches and more

complex launches than at any other time in its history.It has developed a solid-fuel launcher for small andmicro-satellites, signed agreements to export satellites,and taken a leading role in regional space cooperation.While China has started from a low base, it has laid afoundation to become a major space power.

The United States, on the other hand, maintainsthe worlds most advanced and largest spaceprogram. Most of the worlds commercial satellites aremanufactured by U.S. companies, it conducts the mostspace exploration activities, and spends as much onnational-security space activities as all other countriescombined.1 In recent years, the United States announcedplans to return humans to the moon. But much of thespace program has encountered difculties, including

the fatal break up of the space shuttle Columbia andsystemic problems affecting its national security spaceprogram. Every next generation U.S. satellite being


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developed ran over budget and behind schedule andexperienced technical difculties.2 In contrast to the

Chinese program, the United States appeared to belosing its edge in space technology.

This monograph examines how the United Statesshould respond to Chinas rise as a major space powerbased on Chinas space activities during the period ofthe Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-05). For the purposesof this monograph, space power is dened as thepursuit of national objectives through the mediumof space and the use of space capabilities.3 Themonograph will rst outline Chinas space goals andthen examine its activities during this period as wellas discuss Chinas goals for the Eleventh 5-year Plan(2006-10). It will then determine how the space programcontributes to Chinas goal of becoming a major powerthrough the application of comprehensive national

power (CNP) and draw implications for U.S. nationalsecurity. Finally, it will examine possible U.S. military,economic, and diplomatic responses to Chinas spaceprogram.

The monograph nds that over the long term,Chinas rise as a space power will present military,economic, and political challenges to the United States.Uncertainty over Chinas pathway to potential majorpower status, the possibility of a conict over Taiwan,and the inherent dual-use nature of space technologiesmeans that Chinas improving space capabilities couldbe used against the U.S. military. Chinas efforts todevelop its space program to transform itself into aneconomically and technologically powerful countrymay also come at the expense of U.S. leadership in both

absolute and relative terms. Finally, with the exceptionof its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, Chinahas been able to use its space program to further its


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diplomatic objectives and to increase its inuence inthe developing world and among second-tier space

powers, which could diminish U.S. power in the spacediplomacy arena.

Chinas increasingly capable space programwill have a net negative-sum effect on the UnitedStates and requires both domestic and internationalresponses by the United States. Domestically, theU.S. Government and industry must improve thehealth of its space industry through better programmanagement, attracting and retaining a competentworkforce, and increasing funding to develop cuttingedge technologies. Internationally, the United Statesmust take into account Chinas growing presence inworld affairs, including space activities. While theinherently military nature of Chinas space programand its lack of transparency preclude most forms

of cooperation, the United States can cooperatewith China in benecial ways that do not transfertechnology or expertise. These include coordinatingscientic research and increasing the safety of humanspaceight by establishing a code of conduct to rescueimperiled astronauts. Consequently, the challenge forthe United States is to manage the positive-sum andnegative-sum consequences of Chinas ascendantspace program by improving its space industry, betterenabling its military to counter space-based threats,and engaging in cooperative activities that improvescience and increase the safety of human space ight.

GOALS

Chinas space program, as well as its entireeconomy, is guided by a series of economic policy


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decisions generated every 5 years. Appropriately calledFive-year Plans, these documents outline specic

industrial goals spanning every sector of the Chineseeconomy from agriculture, to steel, to semiconductors.At the time of writing, China is in its Eleventh Five-year Plan, which governs the period from 2006-10. TheTenth Five-year Plan, the subject of this monograph,covers the period from 2001-05.

In November 2001 the China National SpaceAdministration (CNSA) published its Tenth Five-year Plan, of which only elements have been publiclyreleased. China committed to spend more than 5billion yuan (~$603.9 million) on the research anddevelopment of civil space technology. According toLuan Enjie, then head of the China National SpaceAgency (NSA), Chinas broad goals for the Tenth Five-year Plan included:

Establishing a varied remote sensing systemthat has long-term stability and an integratedspace-ground application system.

Setting up a preliminary satellite navigation andpositioning system application industry.

Establishing a satellite communications systemthat can basically meet domestic market needs.

Strengthening the capability to providecommercial launch services.

Carrying out space science research and deepspace research by beginning to research themoon.

Striving to be a major power in space research. Launching nearly 30 satellites. Developing small satellites.

Carrying out human space ight. Striving to be a major power in space research.4


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Specically, China planned to develop eight newcivil satellites. These included one Haiyang ocean

monitoring satellite, two Fengyun-3 meteorologicalsatellites, two earth-space science satellites, and threeenvironmental and disaster monitoring satellites.China would improve its communication satellites forboth military and civilian use by developing Ku and Cband communications technology comparable to worldtechnology levels. China also planned to upgrade itssatellite navigation system, though no specics weregiven.5 In addition, China was to develop a smallsatellite, a new generation of launch vehicles, as wellas lunar exploration technologies.6

TENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Space Launches.

China launched a total of 28 satellites and spacecrafton 26 launchers for a 100 percent success rate for nontestlaunches. Launches steadily increased from just one in2001 to a peak of eight in 2004. See Table 1.

Table 1. Total Chinese Nontest Space Launches,2001-05.

Year Satellites Spacecraft Total Launches Failures

2001 0 1 1 1 0

2002 3 2 5 5 0

2003 6 1 7 7 0

2004 10 - 10 8 0

2005 4 1 5 5 0

Totals 23 5 28 26 0


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2001. The year 2001 was a low point for the Chineselaunch industry, with a single launch of the unmanned

space capsule Shenzhou-2 in January. 2002. During 2002, China launched ve spacecrafton ve rockets. Most notably, China launched twounmanned Shenzhou capsules in March and December.In May China launched two satellitesa Fengyun-1D meteorological satellite and a Haiyang-1 oceanmonitoring satelliteinto orbit on a Long March-4B(LM-4B). In addition, the rst test launch of the Pioneer-1solid-fuel rocket was conducted in September, thoughunsuccessfully. Later that month, it was announcedthat China had a total of nine satellites in orbit, themost for China at any one time up to that point.7

2003. In 2003, China announced it would launcheight domestic satellites and one spacecraft.8 China,however, managed launching just six satellites and

one spacecraft. Most notably, China conducted its rsthuman space ight mission on October 15. China alsolaunched its second Beidou navigation and positioningsatellite in this year. In September, a second Pioneer-1rocket was launched, this time successfully. Five ofthe launches for 2003 occurred during a 3 1/2-monthwindow from October 15 to December 30. Theselaunches were conducted from three different launchsites with all unmanned missions being controlledfrom Xian and with each launch requiring differentsoftware and control teams.9

2004. Because of the many strides made in spacetechnology, 2004 has been called the year of the fourmosts. In 2004, China launched 10 satellites uponeight rockets, all of them government launches. This

was the most launches conducted in a year by China,demonstrating an increased ability to maintain aregular operational tempo in terms of launch and


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satellite control. At the beginning of 2005, China had19 satellites in orbit.

Contributing to the impressiveness of theseaccomplishments was the conduct of seven of theeight launches during a 4-month period between July25 and November 18. The Long March-2C (LM-2C)rocket also distinguished itself with the unprecedentedaccomplishment of launching ve times from threedifferent launch sites and carrying six satellites intoorbit in 1 year.

The fourth accomplishment of 2004 was thereduction of launch preparation times from 45 days to23 days. Preparation time for satellites at the launchsite was also reduced.

Other highlights for this year included the launchof a Ziyuan-2 environmental monitoring satellite toform a three-satellite network for more timely earth

observation. In addition, the launch of two recoverablesatellites in August and September demonstrated anability to quickly launch satellites from the same launchsite. The 19th recoverable satellite was launched fromthe Jiuquan Launch Center on August 29 and remainedin operation for 27 days, returning on September 25.Two days later, the 20th recoverable satellite waslaunched from the Jiuquan Launch Center.10

2005. In 2005, China conducted just ve launchesby orbiting one spacecraft and four satellites. Chinalaunched the Shenzhou-6its second human spaceight missionthis time with two astronauts. Othernotable launches include two recoverable satellites onAugust 2 (FSW-21) and August 29 (FSW-22) from theJiuquan Launch Center. The FSW-21 mission returned

on August 29, the same day the FSW-22 was launched.Not only did the missions prove China could launchtwo missions from the same launch center in a short


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period of time, but also that command and controlteams can work continuously in maintaining a mission

while preparing for a second mission. The launch of theApstar-6 satellite on a LM-3B on April 12 was the rsttime in 6 years China launched a commercial satellite.

Launch Vehicles.

China formally began researching and developingits next generation launchers on May 10, 2001.11This new family of launch vehicles offers increasedreliability and adaptability and will be powered bynonpoisonous and nonpolluting engines that willprovide more thrust than the current generation oflaunch vehicles.

These new launchers will, in part, support Chinashuman space ight and lunar exploration programs by

launching a space station into Earth orbit and satellitesto the moon. The new generation of rockets will bedivided into light, medium, and heavy-lift versionsand will be able to send a 1.5 to 25 ton payload intolow-Earth orbit (LEO)12 and a 1.5 to 14 ton payload intogeosynchronous orbit (GEO).13

The rst launch of the new rocket is uncertain.CNSA Vice Administrator Luo Ge in April 2006 statedthe launch would occur by 2011.14 More recently, HuangChunping, the former head of the manned spaceightlaunch vehicle system, gave a launch date of 2014 or2015.15

In addition to developing a next generation launchvehicle, China completed the development of a smallersolid fuel rocket, called the Pioneer(kaituozhe), designed

to launch micro and small satellites and to provide acapability to rapidly enter space. Though advertised


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as built for the commercial small satellite launch vehiclemarket, an article inAerospace China lists the Pioneers

benets as stressing low cost design and a variety ofusers, it is able to meet the special needs of the militaryfor launching small payloads.16 Indeed, it is the KT-1that is believed to have been used to conduct ChinasASAT test on January 11, 2007.

The Pioneerhas two variants. The KT-1 is a four-stagebooster based on the military DF-21 and is designedto launch satellites weighing less than 100 kilogramsinto orbit. Its sister launcher, the KT-2, is based on theDF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and can lift upto three 100 kg payloads or one 400 kg payload. Bothvariants are road-mobile.17 The rst test of the KT-1was in September 2002 and was unsuccessful,18 but asecond KT-1 was successfully launched in September2003.19

Satellites.

China made steady progress in satellite develop-ment during the Tenth Five-year Plan. China now hasthree different types of remote sensing satellitesmeteorological, ocean, and earth resourcesin orbit ona continuous basis. These systems are able to providedifferent types of information to monitor weather anddisasters. China has also established its rst satellitenavigation and positioning system.

Fengyun. Chinas rst Fengyun (FY)-class meteor-ological satellite was launched in 1988. China has twoseries of Fengyun satellites, the FY-1 and FY-2, two ofwhich were launched during the Tenth Five-year Plan.

The Fengyun-2 (FY-2) is similar to the Fengyun-1 butwith improved sensors.20 The FY-2 has a service life of3 years21 and can normally take 28 images per day.22


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China is currently developing a FY-3. Chinesepress reports boast that it will reach higher technical

standards than the U.S. NOAA-15satellitea spacecraftlaunched in 1998.23 A Peoples Daily article from2002states that China planned to launch two FY-3s by theend of 2008.24 By November 2007, however, no launchhad occurred.

Ziyuan. The Ziyuan earth monitoring satellite isa joint project with Brazil, in which China has a 70percent stake.25 China launched three Ziyuan satellitesfrom 2002-04, which formed a network to providetimely coverage of the Earth. Ziyuansatellites have included a 20-meter resolutionoptical imager, and 80-meter and 160-meter resolutioninfrared sensors. It also has two wide band imagerswith a resolution of 256 meters.26 The ZY-2 is reportedto have an imager with a resolution of three meters.27

Haiyang. Development of the Haiyang-1 (HY-1)was a goal of Chinas Ninth Five-year Plan and isChinas rst ocean monitoring satellite. The satellitewill observe the characteristics of seawater, includingchlorophyll density, sea surface temperature,suspended sand content, yellow materials, andmaritime contamination.28

The rst Haiyang was launched on May 15, 2002 andcost 200 million yuan (~$24.2 million) to manufacture.29The satellite is a small satellite, weighing only 360kilograms.30 The HY-1 has a color scanner with a 1,100-meter resolution. It has two infrared sensors, eightvisible light sensors, and an imager with a 250-meterresolution.31

Beidou. TheBeidousatellite system is Chinas regional

satellite navigation and positioning system. After thelaunch of the rst two Beidou satellites on October31 and December 21, 2000, China was said to have


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established its own satellite navigation and positioningsystem to be used primarily for road, rail, and ocean

trafc. The third Beidou satellite was launched on May25, 2003. Despite these successes, Chinese ofcialsdescribe Beidou as a preliminary system that is unableto meet Chinas future needs.

Beidou is based on a system called radiodetermination satellite service (RDSS) involving atleast two satellites in geostationary orbit, at least oneground station, and customer receiver/transmitterswhich communicate with each other. This system canachieve accuracies up to 20 meters. While the Beidousystem cannot achieve the accuracies of the U.S. globalpositioning system (GPS), it does have the advantage ofallowing two-way communication between the signalprovider and the customer and can be used in vehiclelocation systems that can provide anti-theft and engine

monitoring services. Beidou will eventually be replacedby a system similar to the U.S. GPS that will be free ofcharge.32

Communication Satellites. China launched twocommunication satellites during the Tenth Five-year Plan, the Chinasat-22 in November 2003 and the

Apstar 6 manufactured by Alcatel in April 2005. TheApstar 6 is advertised as providing enhanced receptionquality over an area extending from India and China toAustralia.33

China boasted that the orbiting of theApstar 6 wasits rst commercial launch in 6 years. The signicanceof this event is somewhat less than advertised,however. The Apstar 6 is owned by APT SatelliteHoldings, a Bermuda-registered corporation with

its principal ofce in Hong Kong. While technicallya commercial launch, the principal ownership of thecompany by Chinese government entities most likely


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dictated the use of Chinese launch services. APTSatellite Holdings principal shareholders include the

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation(CASC) and the China Telecommunications BroadcastSatellite Corporation (Chinasat), both Chinese stateowned enterprises. Another principal shareholder,CASIL Satellite Holdings Limited, is a publicly ownedsubsidiary of CASC that is listed on the Hong Kongstock exchange.34

China also made progress in improving its groundsegment for communication satellites. By the end of2005, China had more than 80 international and domestictelecommunications and broadcasting stations and 34satellite broadcasting and TV link stations.35

Moreover, in 2005, China completed its VillageTelevision Broadcast Project, a program aimed atbringing television to more than 100,000 villages

located in remote areas of Western China. China alsosurpassed its goal of expanding phone service in ruralareas, with 98 percent of administrative villages nowhaving phone service.36

Human Space Flight.

Chinas human space ight program is the spaceindustrys most difcult and largest mission.37 Chinaconducted ve launches of the Shenzhou during theTenth Five-year Plan, two of which were manned. OnOctober 15, 2003, China launched its rst astronautinto space on the Shenzhou 5. This mission lasted lessthan 24 hours but proved that China was capable ofsafely sending a human into orbit and returning him to

Earth. Chinas second manned space ight occurred onOctober 12, 2005, and lasted 5 days, with a crew of two.Chinas human space ight program can be expected


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to increase in difculty and is planned to eventuallyresult in a permanently-manned space station.

Space Science.

Lunar Program. Chinas lunar program wasofcially announced in January 2003, but planningfor the endeavor had been going on for years.38 Therst stage occurred in 2007 and involved sending asatellite to take three-dimensional images of the moon.Eventually China wants to land a robotic vehicle onthe moon much in the same way as the United Stateslanded a robotic vehicle on Mars. Double Star. The Double Star satellite projectis the result of an agreement signed on July 9, 2001,between the China NSA and the European SpaceAgency (ESA) to research the effects of the Sun on

the Earths environment.39

Chinas two satellites havejoined the four ESA satellites of the Cluster project toform a monitoring network. The rst launch occurredon December 30, 2003, and the second satellite waslaunched on July 25, 2004.40

Satellite Export.

China announced agreements in 2004 and 2005to export its rst satellites. A contract was signed inDecember 2004 between the Nigerian government andthe China Great Wall Corporation for China to buildand launch the satellite, provide operating services,and train Nigerian technicians in its operation.41 TheNigerian Communication Satellite is based on the

Dongfanghong-4 communication satellite and waslaunched on May 14, 2007. China also signed a similaragreement with Venezuela for a telecommunicationssatellite to be launched in 2008.42


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Cooperation.

China took steps to take a leading role in regionalspace cooperation during the Tenth Five-year Plan.In October 2005, China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran,Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand endorsedthe Asia-Pacic Space Cooperation Organizationconvention to promote multilateral cooperation inspace science, technology, and applications and agreedto headquarter the organization in Beijing. Since then,Turkey also signed the convention. China submittedthe convention to its legislature in June 2006, whichwill take effect when the legislatures of at least vesignatories approve membership.43

China has also increased its cooperation with theESA. In 2004, ESA and the National Remote Sensing

Centre of China (NRSCC), an entity under theMinistry of Science and Technology, began a 3-yearearth observation program called Dragon. TheDragon program focuses on science and applicationsdevelopment in China mainly using data from ESAsEarth Remote Sensing (ERS)-2 and Envisat missions.The objectives of this cooperation are to promote theuse of ESA data from the ERS and Envisat satellites,to stimulate Earth observation science, to publishcoauthored research results, and to provide trainingin processing, algorithm, and product developmentfrom ESA earth observation data of land, ocean, andatmospheric conditions.44

While developing its own indigenous satellitenavigation and positioning system, China agreed in

2003 to invest 200 million Euro in the Galileo satellitenavigation and positioning system. According tothis agreement, China will invest 70 million Euro in


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space technologies and 130 million Euro on groundinfrastructure and applications. Since then, Chinas

participation in Galileo has been reduced. The politicalrationale pushed by Brussels for cooperating with theChinese, a major factor driving the agreement, loststeam after the Dutch and French rejected the Europeanconstitution in 2005 and industry advocates used theopportunity to voice concerns over the agreement.European businesses wanted to cut China out of themarket by developing as much of the technology aspossible themselves. The aerospace industry also hadreservations that U.S. export controls may not permitthem to use critical U.S. technologies in Galileo due tothe possibility of their diversion to China.

Due to these concerns, China will continue to investin domestic ground infrastructure and applications butwill minimize the development of technologies for the

space segment. In accordance with this, China will setup a center at Beijing University in cooperation withthe ESA, the European Commission, and the ChineseMinistry of Science and Technology, called the China-Europe Global Navigation Satellite System TechnicalTraining and Cooperation Center. This organizationwill facilitate joint ventures between Chinese andEuropean companies involved in the research anddevelopment of satellite navigation and positioningproducts.45

While Chinas cooperation with Europe has beendiminished, its cooperation with Russia is increasing. InSeptember 2005, the head of the Russian Federal SpaceAgency stated that cooperation with China reacheda fundamentally new level with 29 new projects

added to the cooperation program for 2004-06. Exactdetails remain unknown, but in 2006 Russia and Chinaannounced a joint Mars exploration mission to land a


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robotic explorer on the red planet and then return it toearth.46 Cooperation on a lunar program and satellite

communications has also been discussed.47

ASSESSMENT

The period of the Tenth Five-year Plan occasioneda signicant improvement in all aspects of Chinasspace program. For example, during the previous

Five-year Plan, China allocated just 1.7 billion yuan(~$205.3 million) to civilian space activitiesless thanhalf the 5 billion yuan (~$603.9 million) budgeted forthe Tenth Five-year Plan. Chinas 26 launches duringthis 5-year period are nearly half the total number ofsuccessful launches (54) conducted before 2001. Chinaalso launched two new types of spacecraft: the Shenzhou

manned spacecraft and the Haiyang oceanographicsatellites, and existing satellite classes underwentimprovement.

While the Chinese space program made impressivegains during the Tenth Five-year Plan, when comparedwith the other major space powers, Chinas spacetechnology still lags behind. Taking imagery satellitesas an example, Chinas Ziyuan satellite has just a three-

meter resolution and remains behind even commercialremote sensing technology resolutions. Commercialremote sensing provider Geoeye, for example, offersone-meter imagery and plans to offer 0.41-meterimagery. Similarly, the Beidou satellite navigation andpositioning system is a regional system that offersaccuracies to 20 meters. The U.S. GPS constellation, on

the other hand, offers a global service with accuraciesof several meters.


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*Marketed to international customers**Dedicated for Shenzhou missions

Table 2.Long March Family Success Rates.

Chinas progress in launchers and launches isalso mixed when compared to the other major spacepowers. China successfully launched all of its Long

March boosters during the Tenth Five-year Plan. Thelast launch of 2005, which orbited Shenzhou 6, wasthe 46th straight successful launch of the Long Marchseries. The Long March booster reached a 92 percentsuccess rate based on 88 launches, a gure approachinginternational standards. The success rates of the Long

March family vary widely depending on launcher,however. The LM-2Ccontinues to be a solid work horsewith no failures and 28 launches by mainly launching

Chinas recoverable satellites. The LM-3, on the otherhand, has just a 77 percent success rate.48

As a result, while the success rate of the LongMarch family as a whole may approach international

RocketRate

Capabilities TotalLaunches

FailedLaunches

SuccessPercentage

LM-1 LEO 2 0 100LM-2 LEO 1 1 0

LM-2C* LEO 28 0 100

LM-2D* LEO 6 0 100

LM-2E* LEO/GEO 7 2 71

LM-2F** LEO 6 0 100

LM-3 GEO 13 3 77

LM-3A* GEO 8 0 100LM-3B* GEO 7 1 86

LM-4B* LEO/GEO 10 0 100

Total 88 7 92


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levels, certain launchers are still far from reachingthese standards. (See Table 2.) Because of this, the

Great Wall Industry Corporation, the commercialrepresentative for the China Aerospace Science andTechnology Corporation, only markets the LM-2C,LM-2D, LM-2E, LM-3A, LM-3B, and LM-4B boosters tointernational customers. While the LM-2E and LM-3Bhave below average success rates (71 percent and 86percent, respectively), the other four launchers have a100 percent success rate. It is probable that these twolaunchers will not achieve international success ratesbefore the next generation of launchers is introduced.

China also does not appear to have the capabilityto match the launch tempos of the major space powers.(See Table 3.) While China has shown a capability tosurge launches, this capability does not compare to thelaunch rates of Russia and the United States. In fact,

examination of the number of launches reveals a hugegap between China and the United States and Russia.Its proximity to the number of European launches,however, reects just how close China is to being onpar with that major space power.

Year Russia United States Europe China

2005 26 12 5 52004 22 16 3 8

2003 21 23 4 6

2002 25 17 12 6

2001 23 22 8 1

Totals 117 90 32 26

Table 3. Total Space Launches of Major SpacePowers, 2001-05.


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Chinas development of launch vehicles also lags

behind the United States and Europe. Developmentof Chinas next generation launch vehicle, originallyscheduled to take 10 years, may now take 15 years.In contrast, development of the U.S.Atlas Vand DeltaIV launchers took approximately 8 years, while theEuropeanAriane 5 took approximately 11 years.

The only area in which the Chinese have reachedinternational standards is its human spaceightprogram. While the United States may operate themore advanced space shuttle, it has recognized thepracticality of space capsules for human spaceight andits next generation of manned spacecraft will adopt thetechnologies used during the Apollo missions. In thisrespect, by adopting a Back to the Future conceptfor its Shenzhou program, the Chinese are ahead of the

United States in manned spaceight technology.

THE FUTURE49

China plans to build on its successes in the TenthFive-year Plan in the coming years. According to theCommission on Science, Technology, and Industry for

National Defense (COSTIND), there are six main spacescience projects for the Eleventh Five-year Plan:

Human space ight. This includes increasing thecomplexity of its human space ight missionswith a space walk scheduled for the Shenzhou-7mission in 2008 and docking missions.

Lunar exploration. The rst stage of the lunar

mission to send a lunar orbiter to take three-di-mensional images of the moon was successfullyconducted in 2007. The second stage, landing


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a lunar rover on the moon surface to conductrobotic exploration, is scheduled to launch

in 2012. The third stage involving a lunar soilreturn mission is scheduled to be launched by2020.

Space science. Indigenously develop a hard x-ray

modulating telescope to study black holesto be launched in 2010.

Launch the Shijian-10 recoverable satellitein 2009 to carry out microgravity spacebiomedicine experiments.

Develop a solar telescope to study solarphysics.

Develop technologies for a three-satelliteconstellation called Kua Fu to study solaractivity that will consist of one satellite to

monitor solar activity and two others tostudy the aurora.

International cooperation. Participate in theSino-Russian Mars environment explorationplan, the World Space Observatory UltravioletProject,50 and the Sino-French Small SatelliteSolar Flare Exploration Project.51

In addition, space cooperation will be advanced by theformal establishment of the Convention on Asia-PacicSpace Cooperation Organization and the publicationof a second space white paper.52

In regards to imaging satellites, China will launch18 remote sensing satellites; these include earthresources, environmental disaster, meteorological,

and oceanographic satellites. These remote sensingsatellites are to form an all-weather, 24-hour, multi-spectral, differential-resolution Earth observation for


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stable operation, and achieve stereoscopy and dynamicmonitoring of the land, atmosphere, and sea.53 This

will include establishing an environmental anddisaster monitoring satellite constellation consisting offour synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and four opticalsatellites. The rst three satellites will be launched in2007 and will include two optical and one SAR satellite.Another ve satellites will be launched in 2010.54

China also plans to spend $1.5 billion to developmeteorological satellites, including launching theFY-2 with a 1.25 kilometer visible and a ve kilometerinfrared resolution imager; and the FY-3 with infrared,spectrometer, and microwave imagers; a mediumresolution imager; radiometer; and a scanningradiometer. It will also develop the FY-4, which willinclude improved meteorological measurements andone to ve kilometer resolution imagers.

In addition to its meteorological satellites, Chinalaunched the HY-1B oceanography satellite in 2007.This satellite is equipped with a 250-meter resolutionimager and an ocean color spectrum scanner witha 1,100 meter resolution. In 2009, China will launchthe HY-2 to monitor ocean waves, ocean wind eld,ocean gravity eld, ocean currents, and ocean surfacetemperatures. It will be tted with a microwaveradiometer, microwave spectrometer, and radaraltimeter.

A main focus for the Chinese space industry duringthe Eleventh Five-year Plan will be the developmentand launch of communication satellites. Multiple largecommunication satellites having a service life of 15years and weighing 5,200 kilograms will be launched

beginning in 2006.The Eleventh Five-year Plan thus promises to

further Chinas progress in space technology with


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breakthroughs in synthetic aperture radar technology,allowing China to image objects regardless of

weather; human spaceight capabilities allowingfor extravehicular activity that will give China theexperience necessary to maintain space stations; andcontinued space weather missions that will provideadditional knowledge to protect astronauts from solaractivity.

THE BENEFITS OF A SPACE PROGRAM:FITTING SPACE POWER INTO CHINAS GRANDSTRATEGY

Chinas burgeoning space program providesopportunities for China to use the benets derived fromspace power to become a more inuential and respectednation. The trappings of a robust space program are

one hallmark of the great powers and China appearsto be positioning itself as a great power with its spaceprogram. Indeed, as a COSTIND press release on itsEleventh Five-year Plan for space science states, Ourcountry is one of the few major space powers. Chinasposition in the world and the countrys securitydepend on the continued fast development of spacetechnology.55 This sentiment would be in accordancewith some Chinese analysts who have advocated thatChina adopt a great power mentality in which Chinasinterests mirror those of the major powers.56 While thereis no ofcial Chinese grand strategy, the Chineseleadership appears to have reached a consensus on thegoals of Chinas foreign policy and how it should goabout achieving them.57 According to Avery Goldstein,

Chinas grand strategy:

aims to engineer Chinas rise to great power status withinthe constraints of a unipolar international system that


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the United States dominates. It is designed to sustain theconditions necessary for continuing Chinas programof economic and military modernization as well as tominimize the risk that others, most importantly thepeerless United States, will view the ongoing increase inChinas capabilities as an unacceptably dangerous threatthat must be parried or perhaps even forestalled. Chinasgrand strategy, in short, aims to increase the countrysinternational clout without triggering a counterbalancingreaction.58

Similarly, Dr. Evan Medeiros writes that Chinasforeign policy goals are to [maximize] its inuence,leverage, and freedom of action while pursuingeconomic development to facilitate its reemergence asa great power.59 China is implementing this strategyby establishing partnerships with other major powersin order to make China an attractive or indispensableactor whose interests must be taken into account.

The second component of this strategy is an activistinternational agenda designed to establish Chinasreputation as a responsible member of the internationalcommunity and mute widespread concerns about howBeijing is likely to employ its growing capabilities,thus reducing the incentives for others to unite inopposition to China.60 This strategy is also designed to

protect Chinas core national interests against externalthreats as well as to shape the international system inwhich it operates. In addition, Chinas activities areto help usher in a multipolar world in which Chinawould be one of several great powers.61 In the shortterm, however, Chinas foreign policy is concentratedon developing national capabilities and internationalpartners while avoiding the provocative consequencesof a more straightforward hegemonic or balancingstrategy.62 This section examines the benets of spacepower China uses to pursue these goals.


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Space Powers Contribution to Chinas

Comprehensive National Power.

Chinas space program furthers its grand strategyambitions by adding to Chinas comprehensivenational power (CNP). Comprehensive national poweris dened as the sum of a nations economic, political,military, scientic and technological, educational,and cultural strength. CNP can be divided into hardpower, such as military force, and soft power, such aseconomic and cultural inuence. While space power isnot a main contributor to Chinas CNP, it neverthelessis considered an important component. Space activitiesincrease Chinas hard power by improving Chinasmilitary capability and increase its soft power throughits economic and political benets.

Chinas grand strategy is reected in its pursuitof space power. Chinas space program is intendedto portray China as a modernizing nation that iscommitted to the peaceful uses of space while at thesame time serving Chinas political, economic, andmilitary interests. It contributes to Chinas overallinuence and provides capabilities that give China morefreedom of action and opportunities for internationalleadership. With the exception of its ASAT test inJanuary 2007, China has been able to conduct many ofthese activities without directly challenging the UnitedStates in space. Indeed, despite the dual-use natureof space technology, China is loathe to mention themilitary utility of it space program. Chinas progressin space technologies, however, has many negative-

sum aspects for the United States which may lead toconfrontation or competition in space.


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Military Benefts. The Peoples Liberation Army(PLA) is undergoing reforms to transform itself into a

military that is increasingly reliant on information forwinning wars. According to Chinas 2006 defense whitepaper, informationization will be the driving forcefor PLA modernization as well as its major criterion.Moreover, the white paper states that the PLA pursuesa strategy of strengthening itself by means of scienceand technology, and works to accelerate change inthe generating mode of war ghting capabilities bydrawing on scientic and technological advances.

Indeed, information superiority is now seenby the PLA as a primary component for winningfuture wars.63 The side which can better collect andprocess information will be better able to detect andexploit battleeld opportunities and counter enemymovements. In analyzing U.S. military operations, PLA

writers recognize the role space plays in the collectionand transmittal of information. Remote sensingsatellites can provide intelligence on the disposition ofenemy forces and provide strategic intelligence beforea conict begins. Communication satellites can provideglobal connectivity and can facilitate communicationsfor forces landing on the island of Taiwan. Navigationand positioning satellites can provide criticalinformation on location and can improve the accuracyof munitions.

In fact, Chinese writers often assert that controlof space is a prerequisite for control of the terrestrialdomains.64 According to one source:

Space power improves battleeld awareness capabili-

ties, strengthens joint operations systems, improves pre-cision strike capabilities, and increasingly strengthensoverall battleeld superiority. Integrated joint opera-tions increasingly rely on space power and space is thehigh point of informationized warfare.65


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Chinese military authors are also placing increasing

emphasis on the use of space. In the past, PLA authorsacknowledged that its information systems wereincapable of enabling it to act more quickly than theU.S. military and their writings focused more ondenying space to potential adversaries. However, as thePLA begins to contemplate using space, it recognizesthat it must not only deny the use of information toits opponents but also use space to facilitate its ownoperations. One source, for example, asserts thattraditional information collection means cannotmeet the requirements of modern war and states thatthe collection of targeting information over a wideexpanse of territory, the monitoring of the battleelddisposition, and battle damage assessments cannot beseparated from space forces for the collection of timely

battleeld information.66

The establishment of a network of Ziyuan satellitesis the rst step in maintaining a system for thispurpose. Moreover, improved imagery resolutionswill make it more difcult for the U.S. military to hideits intentions. The improved resolution of the satellitefrom 20 meters to three meters will permit the Chineseto more accurately collect intelligence, monitor targets,and conduct battle damage assessments. This increasein resolution will enable China to image aircraft,distinguish between warships and commercial ships,and locate clusters of vehiclesall crucial to gainingtactical battleeld intelligence and capabilities theylacked until recently. The addition of SAR satellites inthe coming years will increase Chinas reconnaissance

abilities by allowing it to image at night and duringinclement weather.

The establishment of meteorological satellites andocean observation satellites will provide China with a


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network of satellites to monitor the weather, providemore timely weather forecasts, and allow more time

to prepare for severe weather. These satellites maybe especially important during typhoon seasonwhen operations would need to be planned aroundinclement weather. The importance of accurate weatherforecasting cannot be underestimated. The invasionof Normandy in World War II was delayed due toinclement weather, and more recently sand stormsduring the 2003 invasion of Iraq hampered close airsupport operations.

Chinas Beidou navigation satellite system also hasthe potential to assist military operations. Becauseits relative inaccuracy (20 meters) minimizes its usefor precision guided munitions, this system appearsto be primarily for assisting logistics units with thetransportation of supplies. One study, however, argues

that the system could improve the accuracy of Chinasballistic missiles to 500 meters.67 Currently, Chineseballistic missiles primarily use inertial navigationsystems, though some also use GPS guidance.68

Launchers. Chinese launch activity during theTenth Five-year Plan can also help facilitate militaryoperations. Chinese launch tempo was more activeduring this time period than at any other time in itshistory. Chinese launches were clustered during launchwindows of several months, demonstrating an abilityto surge launches before a conict or replace satelliteslost to enemy action. Particularly interesting havebeen the consecutive launches of recoverable satellitesfrom the same launch base to provide continuousreconnaissance capability. In addition, a more robust

launch tempo can be used offensively to launchrepeated ASAT attacks against adversary satellites.

The introduction of the Pioneer-1 solid fuel rocket,ostensibly to serve the micro and small satellite market,


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also enables China to surge a large number of satellitesinto orbit during a short period of time. Not only

could this rocket supplement Chinas communicationand remote sensing needs, it could also be used tolaunch ASAT satellites into orbit or provide a directascent ASAT capability. Indeed, many observershave speculated that the January 2007 ASAT test wasconducted using the Pioneer-1.

Because Pioneer rockets are presumably based onroad-mobile military variants, China could potentiallylaunch satellites or ASAT weapons into orbit even ifits three launch bases were destroyed.69 Locating theselaunchers would be difcult, and they thus potentiallyprovide China with a persistent ASAT and satellitelaunch capability.

Economic Benefts. China has embraced its spaceprogram as a driver for economic and technological

advancement. Chinas 2006 white paper states: Sincethe space industry is an important part of the nationaloverall development strategy, China will maintainlong term, steady development in this eld.

Chinas support for its space program lies in itspotential to spark innovation. Innovation has beenidentied as a key factor for economic growth, yet muchof Chinas growth has come through increasing inputsrather than through productivity gains. Moreover,much of Chinas technological advancement has comethrough the importation of foreign technology. AsJames Kynge writes in China Shakes the World, Chinastechnological advancement is driven not so muchby research as by commerce. Chinese companies, byand large, derive their technologies by buying them,

copying them, or encouraging a foreign partner totransfer them as part of the price of access to a largepotential market.70 A report by the RAND Corporation


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notes that the most protable defense industries,information technology, and shipbuilding are also the

ones that have the most access to foreign technology.71

Chinas space industry hopes to not only follow in thefootsteps of these industries, but also achieve successby indigenously developing technologies that not onlyspur development within the industry but also havespillover effects for the entire economy.

Despite these hopes, the Chinese governmentacknowledges that it still has far to go. The vice chairof the Chinese Association for Science and Technologyhas acknowledged that Chinas space technology isstill in an experimental stage.72 The space industryis still too immature to make large contributions toChinas economic development and makes up lessthan 1 percent of Chinas gross domestic product(GDP). Chinas space technology is also recognized as

still developing while other industries in China rely onmature technology. Because of this, the space industryhas not been able to realize the spin-off benets otherindustries have experienced since Chinese companiesfavor foreign technologies over domestically producedtechnologies. Given these challenges, the space industryis expected to have difculty making a meaningfulimpact on Chinas economy in the near term.73

Nevertheless, a foundation has been laid forthe space program to benet other sectors of theeconomy. In regards to human capital, Chinasspace industry keeps large numbers of engineersemployed and motivates others to become involvedin high technology elds. The Beijing University ofAeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA), for example,

has 23,000 students, about one-third of them directlyinvolved in aerospace. In 2001, space-related researchand educational programs at BUAA were reported tohave increased by 20 percent.74


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The training of so many highly skilled workers canalso benet the entire economy. It is possible that some

of these engineers either directly after graduation orlater in their careers may be employed in non-aerospace jobs. In fact, maintaining a large pool of aerospaceengineers and scientists presents a strategic advantagefor China and a long-term challenge for the UnitedStates. Chinas increasing number of engineers andscientists coincides with the drop in the number of U.S.citizens graduating with advanced technical degrees.If these trends continue, it will become increasinglydifcult for the United States to maintain its technicaladvantage.

In addition, Chinas human space ight programhas instilled an emphasis on quality control needed tosafely transfer humans into orbit. These proceduresare now conducted for the entire space program and,

if effectively implemented, will increase the reliabilityof Chinas space technology. These new measuresinclude:

Increased quality control testing andmanagement oversight of components;

Adoption of mature technologies; Production of surplus subassemblies to provide

a better statistical base for quality checking; Greater redundancy; Modernizing assembly procedures and tooling; Improved standards for selecting management

personnel and increasing their training; A more standardized process to assess

incidents.75

The emphasis on quality control can also have spillovereffects to other industries. The lessons and experiencegained in program management and systemsengineering can be applied to other areas of Chinas


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economy and enable China to increase the quality ofits products with decreasing assistance from foreign

sources.Commercial Services. While China has established

foundations in technology, human resourcedevelopment, and systems engineering, it has alsomade its rst forays into the international satellitemarket. Chinas success in signing agreements toexport satellites represents a small, but important stepto commercialize its space industry. Chinas satelliteexports are not pure commercial transactions, however,and cannot be divorced from its diplomatic agenda.It is no coincidence that Chinas two satellite exportagreements were signed with countries with large oilreservesNigeria and Venezuela. While the dollaramount of the Venezuelan satellite is unknown, theprice of the Nigerian satellite was reportedly around

$300 million. Moreover, China was the only providerwilling to sell a satellite to Nigeria and sweetened thedeal with $200 million in preferential buyers creditsfrom the Export-Import Bank of China.76

In the short term, the commercial implications ofsuch deals may be limited. Both satellites are scheduledto be launched on LM-3B boosters. As we have seen,these launchers have a success rate of just 86 percent,well below industry standards. In fact, it is doubtfulthat China could have negotiated these deals on purelycommercial grounds without substantial discountingto cover the risk of a failed launch. These deals mayhave also required China to assume the risk of launchfailure by ensuring the satellites.

Nevertheless, Chinas packaging of satellite sales,

operations, and launch services may present a newbusiness model. The main impediment to making thesatellite industry more cost effective is the inabilityto lower launch costs. Launch costs during the 1990s


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averaged around $12,000 per pound and have onlyinfrequently been able to be lower than $10,000 per

pound.77

By packaging sales, operations, and launches,the Chinese may be able to lower the overall priceby reducing costs in satellite manufacturing andoperations. In addition, by focusing on customerswho may not be able to purchase more advanced,but more expensive western satellites, China can gainvaluable experience in the satellite market and drawrevenue that can then help them expand into othermarkets. This model has been used successfully inthe telecommunications industry by companies suchas Huawei, a manufacturer of networking equipment.Consequently, as its satellite technology and launchrates improve, China could become competitive in thesatellite market. Political Benefts. The Chinese government also

uses its space program for domestic and internationalpolitical gain. Chinas human spaceight and lunarexploration missions present a peaceful imageof Chinas space program and are intended tocounteract concerns over Chinas use of space formilitary purposes. Diplomatically, Chinas expandinginternational cooperation on space activities portendsa more inuential foreign policy. Headquartering theAsia-Pacic Space Cooperation Organization in Beijingdemonstrates Chinas determination to take a regionalleadership role in space.

The success of Chinas program also has internalpolitical benets. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)is now communist in name only, and its continuedlegitimacy is predicated on delivering economic and

nationalistic benets in an informal social contract withits citizens: The CCP agrees to increase the standardof living and develop China into an internationallyrespected country, and the people agree not to rebel.


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By developing a robust space program andparticipating in high-prole activities such as human

space ight and lunar exploration, the CommunistParty can demonstrate that it is the best provider ofmaterial benets to the Chinese people and the bestorganization to propel China to its rightful place inworld affairs. The October 2007 launch of its lunarorbiter, for example, received nearly continuous all-day coverage on Chinese state-run television.

Anecdotal evidence appears to conrm publicsupport for the program. According to one NationalPublic Radio report, the Shenzhou program receiveswidespread support among the Chinese populace.Quoting one man, If China wants to be powerful, weneed to be able to compete in space. Its like having theatom bomb. If we want to have a voice that is heardin the world, we must have this space program.78

Anecdotal evidence from author interviews withChinese shortly after the launch of the rst mannedmission also indicates that the program receiveswidespread support, with a number of the interlocutorsspecically stating that they were proud that the humanspace ight program used indigenous technology.

Such support does not appear to be universal,however. Statements by Chinese ofcials comparingthe cost of the lunar program to the cost of constructingtwo kilometers of subway line in Beijing suggest effortsto justify parts of the space program to its detractors.79Moreover, the depth of public support for the spaceprogram is unclear, and it is unknown to what extentthe public is willing to support space activities,particularly if China is subjected to a national crisis or

severe economic downturn.


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THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RISE OF CHINASSPACE PROGRAM FOR U.S. INTERESTS

Chinas pursuit of space power is a reection ofits grand strategy. It has established partnershipswith the major space powers of Europe and Russiaas well as numerous smaller space powers, and it hassought leadership positions in the international spacecommunity, which promotes an image of China as aresponsible member of the international community. Bystriving to be a major space power, China increases themultipolarity of world politics. Chinas progress in spacecapabilities has also increased Chinas comprehensivenational power. None of these capabilities, however,have yet tipped the scale in Chinas favor militarily,economically, or politically. While China must beconsidered a major space power in terms of number of

launches, satellites, and missions, the ability to use itsspace program for military applications, and economicand political benet remains limited in relation tothe other major space powers. China has, however,laid the foundation to begin using space power as aninstrument of its national power. Chinas increase inspace power, whether in relative or absolute terms, hasimplications for U.S. national security.

Military Interests.

A 1997 report by the U.S. National Defense Panelcalled space power an integral part of the revolutionin military affairs and a key asset in achieving militaryadvantage in information operations. It asserted that

space is the information battles high ground, andthat the United States cannot afford to lose the edgeit now holds in military-related space operations.80


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It also warned that greater accessibility to space byour competitors will strongly inuence the struggle for

advantage in military operations.81

Chinas improving space capabilities appear to

have negative-sum consequences for U.S. militarysecurity and the potential for armed conict betweenthe United States and China requires the United Statesto prepare to confront an adversary possessing spacetechnologies. Chinese remote sensing satellites canprovide critical intelligence on the disposition of U.S.forces. For example, the U.S. Defense Departmentrevealed in its 2006Military Power of the Peoples Republicof China that China is researching the use of ballisticand cruise missiles to attack aircraft carriers.82 Such acapability would require the Chinese military to rstlocate and track the aircraft carrier, most likely throughthe use of space-based means. Aircraft carriers would

play a critical role in a conict over Taiwan due to thelack of nearby airelds, and the loss of even one carriercould seriously degrade U.S. operations.

Commercial Interests.

A surgent Chinese space program would also appearto have negative-sum consequences for U.S. commercialinterests, mainly due to the slow growth of key sectorsof the international space market. According to datacollected by Futron Corporation, global revenue formembers of the Satellite Industry Association grew by63 percent between 2001 and 2005. (See Table 4.) Mostof this increase occurred in the area of satellite services,such as satellite television and radio, which constituted

60 percent of total satellite industry revenue.


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Year Amount

2001 64.42002 71.3

2003 74.3

2004 82.7

2005 88.8

Table 4. World Satellite Industry Revenuesin Billions U.S.$.83

Other sectors did not fare so well. Global satellitemanufacturing revenues decreased from $9.5 billionin 2001 to $7.8 billion on 2005. U.S. revenue decreasedfrom $3.8 billion to $3.2 billion for the same time

period. (See Table 5.) Global launch industry revenuesremained stagnant at $3 billion from 2001 to 2005,while U.S. launch revenues increased from $1.1 billionto $1.5 billion.84 (See Table 6.) These numbers illustratethat while the entire satellite industry market mayhave increased dramatically during the Tenth Five-year Plan, revenue from critical sectors such as satellite

manufacturing and launch services either decreasedor remained unchanged. Under these conditions, aChinese space industry that becomes more active ininternational commercial activities will negativelyaffect existing market players. When this may occuris uncertain. The poor success rate of certain Chineselaunchers and Chinas catering to low-end satellitecustomers indicates that it could be some time beforeChinas commercial space activities dramatically affectthe global market.


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Year World Amount U.S. Amount

2001 9.5 3.8

2002 11.0 4.4

2003 9.8 4.6

2004 10.2 3.9

2005 7.8 3.2

Table 5. World and U.S. Satellite ManufacturingRevenues in Billions U.S.$.

Year World Amount U.S. Amount

2001 3.0 1.1

2002 3.7 1.0

2003 3.2 2.1

2004 2.8 1.5

2005 3.0 1.5

Table 6. World and U.S. Launch Industry Revenuesin Billions U.S.$.

The potential over the long term of a strongChinese presence in the international space market,however, may require the U.S. Government to assistthe U.S. space industry to remain competitive due toits reliance on government contracts for the majority ofits business. The government, while a customer, mustalso assume some responsibility for the health of theindustry if the United States is to maintain its lead in

space technology. According to one report, the federalgovernment provided over 95 percent of funding forbasic research, 85 percent for technology development,


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and 70 percent for concept demonstration in the spacesector.85 It also found that the United States led in 39

space technologies, was equal in 13, and lagged in three;and that U.S. space technology was most advanced inareas which received more government support.86

Demographic changes occurring in the aerospaceengineering profession also remain a critical challengefor the U.S. space industry. According to theAerospace Industry Association, The United Stateshas lost 750,000 scientic, technical, production, andadministrative workers in the past 14 years.87 Manyaerospace professionals will also be eligible to retire. In2005, 55 percent of the aerospace industry workforcewas over age 45, and in 2008, 25 percent of the U.S.aerospace workforce will be eligible to retire.88 Inaddition, the number of U.S. citizens graduating withdegrees in math and sciences continues to decline

and of those, many choose careers in more lucrativeelds such as computer science. One potential sourceof human capital may come from other countries, butthat option is limited for military contractors whoseworkers require security clearances. The result is thatthe U.S. space industry may only be able to replace halfof the 57,000 to 68,000 military engineers expected toretire by 2010.89

This is in contrast to the Chinese space programwhere a large percentage of the workforce is under age45, and where China continues to graduate increasingnumbers of students educated in math and sciences.China is widely reported to graduate 600,000 engineersper year while the United States graduates just 70,000.These numbers, however, are subject to debate.

According to research done by Duke University, theUnited States graduates 137,000 students with 4-yeardegrees in engineering. This same research concluded


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that China actually graduates 351,000 engineers.90 Evenif China is not graduating the number of engineers once

believed, the Duke University numbers demonstratethat China is producing more than 12 times the numberof engineers as the United States when the size of thetwo countries economies are compared.91

U.S. demographic and educational challenges maybe exacerbated by Chinese mercantilist policies thatsupport the space industry, in contrast to the U.S. spaceindustry which is more subject to market considerations.Indeed, the U.S. space industry is contracting at a timewhen the Chinese industry is expanding. In responseto market concerns two major restructurings of the U.S.space industry occurred in 2006. On October 11, 2006,Lockheed Martin announced that it had:

completed the sale of its interests in Lockheed Khru-nichev Energia International, Inc. (LKEI) and ILS Inter-national Launch Services, Inc. (ILS) to Space TransportInc. The two companies had provided sales, marketingand mission management support for launches of boththe Lockheed Martin-built Atlas and Khrunichev-builtProton and Angara rockets to commercial customers.92

Also in October 2006, the U.S. Federal TradeCommission approved the merger of Lockheed

Martins and Boeings rocket manufacturing andlaunch services into a joint venture called UnitedLaunch Alliance. The merger was approved due to thefears of the U.S. Defense Department that one of therocket manufacturers would drop out of the businessdue to a weak launch market.93

Diplomatic Interests.

The importance of Chinas space diplomacy shouldnot be overstated, but is nevertheless noteworthy.


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Good relations in space do not drive good relationson Earth. International cooperation on space activities

usually follows progress in the overall relationshipand is more of an indicator of the state of a relationshipthan a critical component. It is more likely that Chinaspenchant to offer aid and investment to developingcountries without conditions will increase its inuencemore than cooperation on space activities.

Nevertheless, Chinas space program does playa role in advancing Chinas diplomatic agenda andChinas leadership in this area may contribute toits overall increase in diplomatic inuence. Chinascooperative space activities present another avenuefor countries to participate in space without the UnitedStates and increases multipolarity. The failed attemptby China to become a major player in the Galileoproject is just one example of how attempts by China

to promote a more multipolar world can impinge onU.S. security interests.

Chinas cooperation with the European Union (EU)and Russia also provide additional opportunities fortechnology transfer. While Chinas participation inGalileo has been diminished, future activities mayresult in closer cooperation between the EU and China.The Sino-Russian cooperation on a Mars explorationmission will certainly result in some form of technicalcooperation. Moreover, the likelihood of cooperationwith China has prompted some countries to developspace technologies independent of the United Statesin order to avoid U.S. International Trafc in ArmsRegulations (ITAR). For example, theApstar 6 satellitelaunched by China in April 2005 was Acatels rst ITAR-

free satellite. Consequently, cooperation with China ismaking Europe more technologically independent ofU.S. industry, which could increase competition and


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result in the loss of market share for U.S. aerospacecompanies.

THE U.S. RESPONSE: CONTAIN, COMPETE,COOPERATE, OR DO NOTHING?

The difculty in deciding an appropriate responseto Chinas rise as a major space power arises fromthe inability of both sides to determine whether theirrelationship will be friendly or hostile. The UnitedStates views a more capable China as potentiallycoming into conict with its interests. China, for itspart, views the U.S. hedging strategy as possiblythwarting its ambitions to become a major power. Theuncertainty of the U.S.-China relationship is reectedin the rise of Chinas space program, which appears tohold more negative-sum outcomes than positive-sum

outcomes for the United States. Indeed, the focus on thenegative-sum outcomes of Chinas space program andpossible U.S. responses has increased with the renewedemphasis in both countries on human space ight andlunar exploration. The United States is thus presentedwith four policy options to meet the changing dynamicspresented by Chinas space program: contain, compete,cooperate, and do nothing.

Contain.

Containment is the least viable of the four options,and as China becomes more integrated with the world,it will become even less practical. As Avery Goldsteinwrites, Chinas grand strategy of integrating itself

into international politics and the world economyundermines the feasibility and desirability of a U.S.policy of containment.94 Nations without the security


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concerns of the United States will increasingly lookupon space as another venue for interacting with China.

China has stable and positive working relationshipswith its neighbors and other major powers, andthese relationships, for the most part, are improving.China cooperates with many nations in space andlooks to Europe in particular for access to technologyand expertise that is denied by the United States.95 Itmaintains important cooperative activities with Russiain which Russia sells technology or expertise, especiallyin regards to Chinas human spaceight program. Italso maintains important cooperative relationshipswith organizations based in the EU, including withSurrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. with which Chinadeveloped two microsatellites.

Chinas heading of the Asia Pacic SpaceCooperation Organization also demonstrates just

how difcult it would be to isolate China as it takesa leadership role in international space forums. Chinawill benet from international space cooperation withor without the United States and trying to containChinas space cooperation with other countries, exceptwhen U.S. interests are directly threatened as with theGalileo project, may only undermine its position withother space powers.

Compete.

The similarities of the two countries humanspaceight programs in terms of technology and lunarprograms in terms of timelines has raised the prospectof a new space race in which the two countries compete

to send humans to the moon. Accelerating the U.S.return to the moon, however, would require devotingincreased resources to the U.S. space program at time


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when the federal budget has come under greaterscrutiny. Since theApollo program, the American public

has been unwilling to fund the National Aeronauticsand Space Administration (NASA) much beyond a 1percent share of the federal budget and at a time ofdeepening budget decits and ongoing wars in Iraqand Afghanistan, it appears unlikely that NASA cangarner the support needed for greater budgets. Indeed,in February 2007 the U.S. Congress passed a continuingresolution which froze NASAs budget at the level for2005-06, which was a $545 million reduction in theamount requested by the Bush administration. Theaction resulted in $677 million less for the humanspace ight program due to funding required for theconstruction of the International Space Station andwill delay development of the new Crew ExplorationVehicle until 2015.

Support for another space race faces an additionalhurdle. The American public is not as emotionallyinvested in its space program as during the 1950s and1960s. The historical conditions that created the spacerace were unique and pitted rival superpowers in acontest of economic systems and global support. Whilemany Americans recognize China as a potential threat,most do not regard it as inimical to U.S. interests as theSoviet Union. U.S.-China relations may be ambivalent,but they are also ones in which extensive cooperationtakes place, and it is not apparent how dening Chinaas a competitor in a space race will further relations. Itis also not apparent whether the American public willsupport a race which it has already won. The UnitedStates rst landed men on the moon in 1969 and may

be in no rush to return.


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Cooperate.

Alternatively, the similarities of the two spaceprograms have prompted calls for cooperation.Supporters of cooperation argue that cooperation inspace has the potential to increase transparency andtrust and to lessen competitive aspects that may leadto armed conict.96 Supporters of cooperation alsoargue that cooperation can produce dependencies onthe Unit

Documents

Building for the Future: China's Progress in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response