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Building Democracies in South AsiaAuthor(s): Anirudha GuptaSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 13 (Mar. 25-31, 2000), pp. 1071-1074Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4409077

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reprimand ythecourt othe chief investigatingofficer inspectorJai Singh.4 According o seniorgovernment fficials,"Thenew legislationwhich is essentially aimed atcombating international errorism,will takecare of all hijackingincidents that flow fromsuch criminal activities"quoted in HindustanTimes,January14, 'Toughanti-terrorismawin pipeline'. Not mentioned is the fact thatexistinglaw alreadyprovidesfor offences likehijacking.India has been signatory to threeinternational onventions against hijacking-Tokyo (1963), Hague (1970), and Montreal(1971) - which are alreadyin force throughtheSuppression f Unlawful Activitiesagainstthe Safetyof Civil Aviation Act, 1982. Underthis law hijackers are punishable with lifeimprisonment. utthisfact seems to havebeenmissed in the furious debates on the need fora 'strong' aw to tackleterrorism.All the three'terrorists' howerereleased fter hehijackhadbeenarrested nder particularlytrongaw, theTADA. Whathappenedo theircases? MaulanaMassodAzhar,aleaderof Harkat-ulAnsar,wasfirst arrested n February1994. Even six yearslaterno challanhasbeenproducedn thecourts.The case underTADA was finally dismissedby the designatedcourt for want of evidence.The case for which he is actuallyfacing trialis one of attemptedjailbreak (The Hindu,

January3). MushtaqAhmedZargar,knowntobe a leader of Al Omar-Mujahadeen,as beenfacing a trial in a TADA case since 1992. Inthis instance oo achallan s yet to beproduced.Thethird terrorist',AhmedUmarSyedSheikh,was arrestedundersections of TADA in 1994.Five years later charges have still not beenframed.So of the three terrorists ne has beenacquittedof TADA charges.The other two arestill waiting, after more thanfive yearsbehindbars,forchargesto be framed!This then is theworkingof a 'stringent'law like TADA. Asa matterof fact this is thestoryof TADA trialsinmostcases.Anextraordinaryegislation eemstoproduce xtraordinaryaxity ninvestigation.An ironicspin-offof thereleaseof threeTADAundertrials n exchange for the safe returnofthepassengers fIC814 was apetition ubmittedby 30 accused n the 1992-93serial bomb blastcase to the primeminister.The petitionciteddelaysindisposalof TADAcases, as the reasonwhy 'hijackerswere able to get awaywiththeirdemands'.Arguingthatdespitethe provisionsin Section 17 of TADA,whichgivesprecedenceto TADA cases over othercases, TADA casesare not being disposed of for many years. Sogiventhelong andprotractedrial stillpendingbefore these TADA detenues,who have beenin jail for more than five years, the petitionseeks their release on bail.

Building DemocraciesnS o u t h A s i aThis article examinespolitical and legal institutions,demographiccompulsionsandparty politics infour countries- India,Sri Lanka,BangladeshandNepal - to assess theprogress of democracy nthesecountries.ANIRUDHAGUPTAT he fact of politicalindependencehas not ensured democratic reedom to thepeoplesof south Asia.In some countries uch freedom s alto-getherunknown;but even in countrieswhere civil liberties are guaranteedbyconstitution,argepatchesof autocratic,arbitrary,ndfeudalisticpracticesvitiatethearea fgovernance. hus,despitebeingtheworld's argestdemocracy,heIndianadministrationtill runs on old Britishcolonial ines. Its centralised tatestruc-turestaysdistant and over andabove-civilsociety.Itspoliceandsecurityorcesfunction as an apparatusto decimateopposition nd errorise hepublic,and nsomeregions f thecountry, sinKashmirandnorth-easterntates,it is the rule ofgunthatprevailsover the rule of demo-cratic consensus-building. In short,

despite ts lengthof successandsurvival,democracy has failed to secure goodgovernance n India.The over-centralisedtateof Sri Lankatooseemsto befarremoved rom heday-to-day xistenceof itscitizens.Beingover-whelmedbytwocontraryorces Sinhalamajoritarianismnd Tamil separatismthe statehas usedmostof its resourcesnaugmentingts militarymachine.At the otherend, two new entrants odemocracyreNepalandBangladesh.othhadundergoneong periodsof despotic,dynasticormilitary uleuntilwidespreadpopular unrest secured the space andfreedomfor democratic overnance.Buttheirexperience howsthat nstallation frepresentative government does notnecessarily reateaclimate orresponsivegovernment.In this paperwe tryto assessboth theadvanceand the retreatof 'democracy-

building' n south Asia in the contextof(a) politicaland egal institutions;b)de-mographic ompulsion;and(c) politicalleadership and democratic choices asavailable o each of thesefour countries.Political and Legal Institutions

Amongcolonialpowers,Britainalonedevelopeda set of objectives oreventualtransfer f power oitscolonies.Thisdoesnotmean hatBritain onsciously ried oimplantWestminstermodel in the coun-triesunderts subjugation. ar rom t, itscolonialpolicieswereasharsh ndrepres-sive as those practisedby othercolonialpowers.Yet,thesepolicieswerebasedona vague assumptionhatat somepointorotherpoliticalpower houlddevolve o thepeoplesof the colonies oncetheybecamefit to govern themselves. This was theprincipleof trusteeshipwhich assumed,albeittheoretically,hat Britain'srule inthecolonies cannotbut be transitional.twas over the lengthof this transition hatits local representativesnd nationalistsclashedandsometimes nded n violence.Besides,as a trustee, he Britishadmin-istrationcould not wholly abandon heinterestsof those who stayedoutside oropposedhenationalists.n heIndianase,these interests were representedby theprinces, heminorities nd otherpoliticalformations.The differencesbetween thenationalistCongressand these interestgroups also held up talks for ultimatetransfer f power.Nevertheless,he tran-sitionalphase nIndiaandSriLanka eganin real earnestaround he 1930s, whenlimited ranchise nd imited uthority eregranted o local andprovincialbodies.The 1935 ConstitutionalAct providedforsettingupof elected egislaturesn theIndianprovinces.Thoughshort n dura-tion (1937-39), the responsibility f ad-ministeringat the provincial evel gaveIndia'sCongresseaders hemuch-neededlessonthat heir oleas ministerswasverydifferent romthe roleof rabble ousing.The experiencealso brought o the foreseveral weaknesses in the Congressorganisationas infighting,scandal andcorruptionecame ampantnmanyareasof governance.This,however,did notrobtheCongress f itsfighting piritasshownduring he QuitIndia movement.Theexperience f Sri Lankawas some-what different. By 1930, under theDonoughmoreCommissionReport,adultfranchisewas grantedbut the affairs ofgovernancewereentrusted o a systemofcommittees ratherthan to a ministerial

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cabinet on the Westminster model. Thisintroduced what can be described asgovernance by an elite composed of lead-ers from majorityandminority communi-ties.From1930 till 1948, the device workedremarkablywell andproduceda galaxy ofoutstandingSinhala and Tamil leaders. Inaddition, the committee system provedresilient enough to check the growth ofcommunalism inpolitics. The prospects ofSri Lanka flowering into a full-fledgeddemocracy were indeed so good that, in1947, Soulburyassured the house of lordsthat, "with such natural resources andwith leaders of proven experience, I feelthat Ceylon can face the future under thehighest auspices".The contrast between the Indian and SriLankanexperience was that, whereas thefirst had advanced politically to both un-leashand control masspopularmovement;the second had advanced administrativeinstitutionswithaweak popularbase. Bothhad to adoptdifferentpathsfor democraticdevelopment. Indians were required toevolve institutionsofparliamentary overn-ment and resolve the divisive consequencesof mass franchise. Sri Lankans needed towiden the base of politics to confer a senseof effective participation o the masses. Inthis, the transitionfrom colonial to demo-cratic politics in India owes much toJawaharlal Nehru's untiring emphasis onthe building of parliamentarygovernmentbased on free and fair elections. In sodoing, Nehru often acted as an autocrat;but in the context of large-scale violence,breakdown of law and order, and linguis-tic-communal clashes, a 'charismaticautocrat' was perhaps needed to keepIndia on the democratic path.In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, thecommittee system came undergreat strainas class and mass dichotomy becameincreasingly apparent.Pressedbydifferentelements - Buddhist priesthood, Sinhalachaunim, n mn fr ttinism,nd demands for better living- major political formations faced theproblem of winning over majority votes.Among the leading political families,S W R D Bandaranaikeof the Sri LankaFreedomParty(SLFP) realised that unlesstheelite-massgapwasdrasticallynarrowed,winning majority support was unthink-able. Hence, he gave the populist call tomakeSinhala the 'official language' within48 hours. This call galvanised all sectionsof the Sinhala community. In no time, thepolitics of language gave birth to twindemands to make Buddhism the officialreligion ndSriLanka landofSinhalese nly'.

The 1956 election was thus 'the water-shed' and, as Urmila Phadnis puts it,"Bandaranaike's volte-face reflected thestridency of forces for religio-culturalrevivalism...Meanwhile he UNP leadershiptoo could feel the intensity of the popularmood. As a result it also decided to reverseits previous policy of parity"(LarryDia-mond et al Democracy in Asia, p 148).Thus, parliamentary democracy in SriLanka faced two problems. First, oncemajoritarianrights became the principaltheme of political debate, its extremistadvocates went out of control and begandictating policy choices to the leadership.WhenBandaranaike esisted,he was elimi-nated by extremist elements. Second, itpushed the minority Tamils into ghettopolitics. They were discriminated againstin jobs, in higher education, and finally,in public life. Thus,paradoxically, politicsbased on appeasement of the majoritycommunity did not widen the base ofparliamentary politics. In fact, it threwit overboard.Incontrast to Sri Lanka andIndia,Nepaland Bangladesh still lack the administra-tive infrastructure o stand the challengesof democratic governance. Until 1950,Nepal languished under a century-oldfamily oligarchy. Its laws were framedaccording to the wishes of Rana primeministers. Civil liberties were unknown,and the kingdom was runby acomplicatednetwork of patronageand 'chakrigiri'. Allthis came to an abruptend when a smallgroup of Nepali intelligentsia and ex-soldiers launchedanarmeduprisingagainstRana rule from the Indian soil. The upris-ing itself was weak and haphazard- andit might not have succeeded had not thepolitical climate of south Asia undergoneradicalchange with the end of British rule(JNehru's Letters o ChiefMinisters,vol 2).The displacement of the Ranas restoredtheking's lost authority.But theweaknessof partyorganisations and factional infightamong leading politicians did not help thebuilding of civil institutions. In 1960, aftera briefstint inparliamentarypolitics, Nepalwent back to authoritarianrule under thecrown. Ittook 30 long yearsfor theNepalisto regain political freedom, start partyactivities and hold elections undera demo-cratic constitution. But, as we shall see,the restoration of multi-party democracyunder a defined constitutional monarchyhas not succeeded in reinventing politicalstability or popular faith in party politics.The political evolution of Bangladesh isnot very different. Until 1970-71, it con-

stituted the eastern wing of Pakistanwhena bloody war brought it to independentexistence. But with a huge population ofsome 110 million, the new state lackedeven the rudimentary apparatus to keeplaw and order. The first few years ofindependence witnessed social, politicaland communal disorder which MujiburRahman'sAwami Leaguegovernmentwasunable to check. The result was an armycoup in 1975, which climaxed in theassassination of Mujib and his familymembers (barringone daughter), and dis-solution of all party activities. Since thenthe country passed from one military ruleto another until a popular movementbrought about the restoration of civilianrule, a new constitution, party politics andgeneral elections. But the movement alsoignited a bitter family feud between twocharismatic ladies, Hasina, daughter ofMujib and leader of the Awami League,and Begum Zia, widow of General ZiaRahman and president of BangladeshNational Party (BNP).Since the restoration of civilian rule,politics has turned into a battle supremebetween the two ladies with each harpingon revenge - Hasina calling for the headsof her father's killers, and Begum Zia forthe heads of those behind the assassinationof her husband. Other actors too havegained in strength. One is Jatiya Party ofan ex-army dictator, General Ershad.Another is the fundamentalist Muslimoutfit, the Jamaat-e-Islam.Ershad's popu-larsupportis not clear; but the Jamaat hasa sizeable base in the countryside. Thesemutually hostile forces have given rise toa political culture which is least amenableto democratic behaviour.Demographic Compulsions

Broadly speaking, both Sri Lanka andIndiahave an advanced middle class, wellequipped nmoderneducation,professions,skills and technology. But, as we havenoted, the middle class in Sri Lankais splitdownthe middlebyasingle lineof ethnicity,language and religion. This has come inthe way of any communication betweenmajority and minority communities. Thisis not so in the case of India, where themiddle class has come to berecruitedfromdifferent ethnic, religious and linguisticcomponents and represents an all-Indiaclass. It is this class that provides thecountry'sbureaucratic-political lite as alsoa countrywide entrepreneur class. Thereare numerousfissures within each layer ofthe Indian middle class just as there are

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numberlessointsof intercommunicationbetween differentclasses, culturesandinterestroups.nsuchacontext fmultiplecontradiction nd antimonies,no singlelineoffissioncanovercasthepolitical kyon a similarscale as the Sinhala-Tamilconflicthasdone n Sri Lanka. n a word,as the Economist nceput t,India'sgrandmuddle asprovedessof adangerounitythana single splithas in Sri Lanka.It is admittedlya fact that caste andcommunaliotsbreakoutandcreate aw-lessnessanddisordern differentpartsofIndia.Butnoneassumes nall-Indiahapeto disturbIndia's democraticpoliticalsystem.Besides,heIndian tatehasgainedanover-archinguthority ver and abovecaste,classandotherdentities.Curiously,the notion of an over-developed,evenimperial tate,hasgivenIndiaa measureof stabilityhat s notcommonlyavailabletoother hirdworld ountries.At the sametime,astwohighly nformed uthors ointout,"theIndian tate'ssourceof strengthhas been a centristpatternof partisanpolitics that minimisesthe political sa-lience of majorcleavages. Under stateguidance,hecountry eemsagreed deo-logically on secularism,socialism, anddemocracy,on the merits of a mixedeconomy...andon a nonaligned oreignpolicy" Rudolph ndRudolph,n Pursuitof Lakshmi, p 1).It is also under tateguidanceandpa-tronage hattraditionsuch as caste andcommunalolidarityurviveas alsobreak,thatcapitalist nd tradeunionsclashandcompromise,and arch political rivalscondemn achother n the mediaandyetshare the same vegetariandishes at thedinnerable. n someways,India'spoliti-cal stabilityandliberaldemocracyhaveproduced rarebrew.Ifdemographicomogeneity e a factorto contribute o democraticgovernance,thenNepalandBangladeshhouldbemilesahead fother outhAsianstates.Yet,thisis not so. Over 90 per cent of Nepalipopulation s Hindu,generally Nepali-speaking ndcomprises ubsistence eas-ants.There s aminority fNewars,mostlyurban-basednd adherents f Buddhism.The size of Muslims s negligible.Sucha demographicompositionexplainstheabsenceof separatist r ethnicchallengeto the traditionalHinduway of life. Butit is preciselybecause Hindusface nochallenge hatthere s no militantmove-mentof the type of RSS, JanSangh,asexistamong he Hindus n northernndia.Communalism as no roots in Nepal's

peasantsociety, but caste and ethnicityhave a very definite impact, which isreflected n the 'Bahun-Khatriya'omi-nanceas therulingstrataof society.It isto this castegroupinghatmostof Nepalimiddleclass, intelligentsiaand politicalleadersbelong.Does this createpopulardistrustn thepolitical class? It does not appearso,becausethe distancebetweencaste-classelite and the depressed astes is so greatthat here s hardlyany nteraction mongthem barringf course n timesof excep-tionalstressas during hepro-democracymovement n 1990).Yet, notwithstanding oliticaland so-cialdominance,heBahun-Khatriyaiddleclass acksanautonomous conomicbase.Ithasproducedo ndigenous ntrepreneurclass. As in the case of parasite, t livesoff rather than for the well-being ofsociety.Besides,asaleadingNepali ocio-logistpointsout, thisclass (as an intelli-gentsia) acksinitiativeorcreativity. t isfatalistic in its outlook. "In Nepal, thecultureof fatalismdevalues the conceptof productivity...Mostevelopmentandthe risingstandard f livinghas beenat-tainedthrough he heavyinfusionof ex-ternal id.Thebeneficiariesavenotalwaysbeen hosewhoactuallyontributeogrowthand production" (Fatalism and Develop-ment,Adds Dor BahadurBista, p 2).No wonder hat such a class is neitherrepresentativeor stable.Inview of theirutterdependency,membersof this classcontinue he practiceof 'chakari',hat s"apassive ormof instrumentalehaviourwhose object is to demonstratedepen-dency,with he aimof...elicitingavourofthe persondependedupon" ibid,p 3).The case of Bangladeshis not verydifferent romNepal'sexcept hat ts mainunifyingforce is religionand language.The rulingstrata,or 'bhadralok'lasses,is concentratedn Dhaka, hecapital,andperhapsa few urbanpocketselsewhere.Unlike its Nepali counterpart, theBangladeshibhadralok s considerablyaccomplished n western educationandskills,buthe/she hunsmanualwork,acksenterprise ndsubsistson salariedobs. Itis politics that holds the prime place indiscussionamong riendsand familiesofthe middle class.There is also a sense of lost identityamongmostBangladeshis.Havingcomeoutof thebondageof erstwhilePakistan,theycannot eturn o it even as the Islamicpullremains.Atthesame ime, tis India'sbig size, militaryand economicstrength

that scare them. There is an abiding fearthat India might encroach on their inde-pendence. Such fears get magnified intimes of elections, yet, this does not leadto effortsatself-sufficiency orself-reliance.Such fearsdo not make forpolitical stability.Party Politics

The stability of a democratic politydepends on party formation and institu-tions such as free press, free elections andright to assembly and dissent as guaran-teed by laws and constitution. If partyformations areweak or brittle, no party ingovernment - or in opposition - can besure of its own survival. The relation bet-ween government and opposition, on theother hand, if based on grounds of mutualrespect and trust, can make a democraticsystem less disruptive and more resilient.Accordingly, single-party dominance ofthe Congress provided the base for build-ing democratic institutions (includingprecedence, norm andconvention) of par-liamentary government. But the patternchanged when, in 1969-70, the Congressbroke into two, with one section support-ing Indira Gandhi's leadership and otherjoining veteranCongress leaders.The crisiswas overcome after Gandhi was carried toa resounding victory in the 1971 election.This victory, however, was largely won bypromoting Gandhi's charisma and by re-sorting to populism in competitive poli-tics. Both proved inimical to the cause ofparliamentarydemocracy. In a bid to saveher own leadership, Gandhi imposedemergency which lasted from 1975 till1977. When the constitutional rights wererestored, enough harm had been done tothepartyandgovernment. Instead of beinga widely based, representative and all-Indiaparty,theCongress had been reducedto ahelpless appendage of a single family,ordynasty. Populism on the other hand hadcorruptedandpoliticised most institutionsof government,bothatthe centre and states.For a while dynasty held together theCongress until the 1989 election, when itdid not win enough seats to form govern-ment. Out of the ruin of Congress sprangup several regional parties and splintergroups aspiring for power at the centre.One by one such groups were given thechance to form government but failed tomustermajorityor last in power. This alsobrought coalition formation which cameinto full force in the period between 1996and 1999. At the end of this period, theBharatiyaJanata artyrealised hat tssingleplank of a Hindu majority state could not

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take t farunless t won the confidenceofregionalparties.This about-turnetchedhandsomeeturnnthe1999election.BJP'sNational Alliance with regional partiesgaineda big majorityn Lok Sabha andformed,aftera gap of six years,a stablegovernment.Congressnsisted nsingleparty overn-anceand ailed oretaintsformer trengthinparliament.deology asedparties,whichfocusedon secularism aredbadly.Someoftheregional arties,particularly eleguDesamofAndhra radesh,mprovedheirtally in Lok Sabha.The basicissue beforethegovernmentand the oppositionnow appearsto beeconomicreform,globalisation ndgoodgovernance.This does notmean that theproblemsof eradicating overty,supply-ing cleanwater,housingandwork to theunderprivilegedavebeenpushed o thebackburner.On the contrary, hey havecometo be viewedverydifferently romthe bureaucratic-cum-populistehaviourof a patron tate.To thisextent,perhaps,Indian democracy will become morevibrantand responsive.What we mustconclude from the Indianexperienceisthat there s institutional utonomy n aparliamentaryystem fgovernment, hichifnot nterfered ith,begins o assert tselfin relation o otherpoliticalactors. Thestrengthof this assertion ies in a readyacceptance f popular hoiceinelections,limits to arbitrary government andopposition's bligationoco-operatewiththegovernmentndabandonmentf rigidpositionsnpolitics.The50yearsof India'sdemocratic xperienceshows thatit hasgatheredhestrengtho overcome orcesof disruption, religious and sectarianonslaught,ndassert ivilianauthorityvermilitary rganisations.nthe 1970s,Indiaovercamehe hreat fpersonalisedynas-ticruleand, n the1980sadirect lashwithHindumajoritarianism.urprisingly, llthis couldbe achievedwithout resorttoforce and bloodshed.The sameunfortunatelyannotbe saidaboutSri Lanka.Fromthe 1960sdespitehaving majorpoliticalformationsunderable leaders, he island'spoliticalevolu-tion on parliamentaryines flounderedbecauseof the invocationof majoritarianprinciples, hich n urnmarginalisednter-ethnicco-operationnpublic ife.Populistmeasures averise to widespread isillu-sionment mongSinhala outh.Theyrosein an armeduprisingunder he banner fJVP,whileanangrygroupof Tamil ead-ersgave the call for Tamilautonomy.A

littlelater, hese eaderswerereplacedbymilitantyouthwhoopenlycalled for theconstruction f a separate tate- TamilEelam. Startingwith fratricidalwarfareamongrivalarmed roups,hemajority fTamil youths was organisedwholly onmilitaryinesbythe Liberation igers orTamil Eelam (LTTE).As the conflictescalated, he LTTEsucceeded n estab-lishingextensiveconnectionsorthesup-plyof money,armsandammunition. heLTTE'sguerrillawar,and its tactics ofassassinatingmportanteaders y sendingsuicidebomberspreaderror mongbothSinhalaandTamilpopulation.Yet, it isnotclearwhatthe LTTEaimsto achieve.Itinsistson thegrantof EelambeforeanytalkswithColombo.But even thispictureappears omewhathazy, for the stateofpermanent errorhas given the LTTEleadership kindof freedomand ncome(from business in drugs, narcotics andexportof smallarms).As a killeroutfit,it does notappear hateven the grantofEelamwouldsatisfy heLTTE'sappetite.Bangladesh ndNepaldo notfacesuchthreatso their xistence.Civildisturbancesin Dhakaor occasionally,peasantunrestin thecountrysidedo not appear o havedamagingpotentials uchas LTTE'swarin Sri Lanka.Politics, or the arena ofeffectivegovernance,sverymuchimitedto the doings of an urban-basedmiddleclass.Theinfights nthis class havecometo be channelisedby two majorpartyformations - Awami League and BNP -in astruggleorthecapture f statepower.Insofaras thesepartiesdivertordissipatepopular ngeragainsthe state tself,partypoliticswould avertanyrevolution.This

may not create space for Bangladeshidemocracy.Nepal is notBangladesh in the sense thatit was not violently tom away from itstraditional roots. As a Hindu state it con-tains many caste and ethnic divisions, butfor the same reason it is moreconservativein outlook. The Nepali Congress andvarious avatarsof Nepali communists maybe political rivals but not in the sense ofa class war between reactionaries andrevolutionaries. After the 1990 movementforthe restorationof democracy succeededin toppling the panchayati system, everypolitical group in Nepal has turned into ademocrat. This includes also shadowyfiguresof thepanchayatperiodonce knownas 'bhumigato giroho'. Barring a lunaticfringe of so-called Maoist group, fewbelieve either in armed revolution orabolition of monarchy. The future ofdemocracy in Nepal depends much moreon the manner in which the monarchyexercises its constitutional powers. Themonarch has certainly lost his arbitrarypowers, but reverence for him and hisposition as a linchpin of Nepali democracyremain undiminished. In fact, behaviourof all political parties,including Congress,communists andex-panchayatis illustratesthatthey expect the king to act as a refereein the political battlefield. The Maoistgroups areof no consequence because theNepali state has a formidable coerciveapparatus.Besides, unlike theSriLankans,Nepal can always depend on India forhelpif the need arises. Perhapssuch a need willnever arise, for so long as the Nepaliexperiment enjoys India's goodwill, itsmulti-party democracy will survive.[Il

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