Building a Wall around the Welfare State, Instead of the Country

7/27/2019 Building a Wall around the Welfare State, Instead of the Country

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Executive Summary

Economists generally believe that immi-gration increases the size of the economy, im-proves productivity, and is an economic boonfor almost all parties. Moreover, historically,immigration has been a net positive for thefederal budget, improving the long-run fiscalcondition of the United States. Changes to fed-eral laws, many of which are proposed in theBorder Security, Economic Opportunity, and

Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, couldfurther improve the fiscal impact of future im-migration.

Critics of immigration reform worry aboutimmigrants disproportionately consuming pub-lic benefits. Instead, they should support legal

changes to immigrant welfare eligibility. Elimi-nating immigrant welfare eligibility for Tem-porary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), Supple-mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP orfood stamps), Supplemental Security Income(SSI), Medicaid, and other programs would,in the words of the Cato Institutes late Chair-man Emeritus William Niskanen, build a wallaround the welfare state, not around the coun-

try. Doing so would reduce immigrant welfaredependency and could increase the pace of inter-generational mobility among immigrants. Suchmeasures would also be constitutional. Thispolicy analysis shows how to implement thosereforms.

Building a Wall around the Welfare State,Instead of the Country

by Alex Nowrasteh and Sophie Cole

No. 732 July 25, 2013

Alex Nowrasteh is an immigration policy analyst with the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity at the CatoInstitute. Sophie Cole is a former legal associate at the Cato Institute.


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Furtherrestricting

immigrant accessto welfare will

not only advancesound publicpolicy, it will

likely improvethe publics

assessment ofimmigration

reform overall.

Introduction

The Border Security, Economic Oppor-tunity, and Immigration Modernization Actof 2013 (immigration reform bill) excludes

some immigrants from receiving federalwelfare. The bill prevents registered provi-sional immigrants (RPI), blue card holders,and the new guest workers from receivingfederal means-tested welfare benefits.1 Re-gardless of those barriers and existing ones,opponents of immigration reform are fo-cusing on the supposed fiscal costs of im-migration reform by assuming that welfarerolls would be swollen under the proposedreform, thus worsening the long-term fiscalshape of the United States.2

Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) recently ex-pressed such concerns, saying: Many ofthe 11 million undocumented people donthave high school diplomas. Making themeligible for welfare, social services and healthcare will be hugely expensive.3 Former sena-tor Jim DeMint (R-SC), now president ofthe Heritage Foundation, echoed Sessionsstatement when he said: Delaying eligibilityfor federal benefits to newly legalized immi-grants merely puts off the day of reckoning.The truly enormous costs come when unau-

thorized immigrants start collecting retire-ment benefits.4

The effects of immigration reform onwelfare and the fiscal shape of the U.S. gov-ernment are legitimate concerns. Every netnew dollar spent on welfare worsens thefiscal condition of the federal government,sustains debilitating dependency, and cre-ates labor market rigidities.5 Immigrationhas historically been a net positive for theTreasury over the long run,6 but decreas-ing immigrant welfare use through legal re-

forms will increase the fiscal benefits of im-migration reform in the short and mediumruns too. This analysis provides numerousideas on how to exclude or limit noncitizenaccess to federal means-tested welfare pro-grams.

Generally, low-income immigrants havelower rates of welfare use than low-income

native-born citizens and receive smallerbenefits when they are the beneficiaries.7

However, all immigrants are more likely toreceive means-tested welfare benefits thanall native-born Americans because immi-

grants are poorer on average.

8

Immigrantspay more into Medicare Part A than theycurrently receive in benefits because theyare less likely to be of benefit-receiving agethan native-born Americans.9 They willhave even less access to benefits under theproposed immigration reform bill thanthey currently dobut that alone does notdeter criticism that immigrants will abusethe welfare state.10

The biggest concern that Americans haveabout unauthorized immigration, shared

by 44 percent of those polled in a recent sur-vey, is that unauthorized immigrants wereoverburdening government services.11 Asimilar poll from three years ago found that84 percent of Americans were concernedthat immigrants are overburdening gov-ernment services.12 In 2010, 86 percent ofRepublicans, 64 percent of Democrats, and76 percent of independents agreed with thestatement that ILLEGAL immigrants domore to weaken the U.S. economy becausethey dont all pay taxes but use public ser-

vices.13 In the same year, 84 percent of re-spondents were either very concerned orsomewhat concerned that illegal immi-grants might be putting an unfair burdenon U.S. schools, hospitals and governmentservices.14

Since immigrant access to public ben-efits shapes so much of the publics per-ception of immigration, further restrictingimmigrant access to welfare will not onlyadvance sound public policy, it will likelyimprove the publics assessment of immi-

gration reform overall.Given the enormous patchwork of fed-

eral statutes providing for public benefits,the statutes identified below are not an ex-haustive list of laws that determine nonciti-zen access to public benefits. However, weaim to provide interested parties with a firmstarting point and analysis.


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Most economistagree thatimmigrationincreases the sizof the economy,improvesproductivity,and increasesthe income of

almost all partieaffected.

Economic Benefits ofImmigration

Most economists agree that immigrationincreases the size of the economy, improves

productivity, and increases the income of al-most all parties affected.15 The academic de-bate concerning immigration is over the sizeof the benefits and who the main beneficia-ries are,16 not whether the benefits outweighthe costs.17

Migrants are mainly drawn to economicopportunity in the United States. Wages foridentical workers in the United States are onaverage 2.53 times as high as in Mexico, pro-viding a powerful magnet for Mexican im-migrants.18 Wage disparities between iden-

tical Asian and American workers are evengreater,19 which is especially important forfuture migrant flows.20 Workers in India,Vietnam, and the Philippines, three largeimmigrant source countries, can expect tosee their wages increase by about 6, 6.5, and4 times, respectively, by moving to the Unit-ed States.21 Greater worker productivity inthe United States is the source of such mas-sive international disparities and gains frommovement.

The migration of workers to the United

States is a rational and mutually beneficialresponse to varying economic opportunitiesacross countries. Immigration of healthyand peaceful people, like the flow of goods,services, and capital across borders, typicallybenefits the majority of people in both thedestination and source countries.22

Immigration benefits the American econ-omy in several ways. Immigrant workers fillgaps in the labor market, even in some pe-riods of unemployment. The segmentationhypothesis explains that immigrants are

disproportionately represented in the low-est and highest skilled occupations becausethe gap between the supply of workers andthe demand for them is greatest in thosesegments of the labor market.23 That hour-glass shape of the immigration labor poolcomplements the native-born workforce,where a much larger share of workers falls

in the middle range in terms of skills andeducation. As a result, immigrants do nottypically compete for the kinds of jobs heldby the vast majority of American workerswhich is better for the immigrants earning

potential, too. Instead, immigrants migrateto those segments of the job market wheremost Americans are either over- or under-qualified.24

Immigrant workers with different skillsand education than natives actually increasewages for most Americans. Natives have acomparative advantage in jobs that requireEnglish communication skills and so arepaid higher wages. Low-skilled immigrantstypically have poorer English language skillsand therefore a comparative advantage in

lower-paid jobs that require brawn.25

Im-migrants who are not as highly skilled thuscluster in jobs that do not require Englishlanguage proficiency, such as construction,agriculture, and manufacturing. Natives re-spond to immigrant clustering by movinginto skilled positions, for example, foremenand management, where they can use theirlanguage skills more productively. As a re-sult, immigration-induced complementarytask specialization makes Americans moreproductive.26 Newer low-skilled immigrants

have a negative impact on the wages of pre-vious immigrants, because their skill sets areso similar.27 Native wage earners continue tosee improvements, with the possible excep-tion of American workers with less than ahigh school degree, who are about 8 percentof adult workers and who may have experi-enced a 4.7 percent wage decline from 1990to 2006 due to immigration.28

Occupational clustering by unauthorizedimmigrants supports the complementarytask specialization hypothesis. Nationwide,

unauthorized immigrants are estimatedto make up 25 percent of farm workers, 19percent of maintenance staff, 17 percent ofconstruction workers, 12 percent of workersin food preparation 10 percent of employeesin manufacturing production, and about 5percent of the total workforce.29 Comparedto just 8 percent of native born American


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The benefits ofimmigrating

reaped by theimmigrantsthemselves

should beincluded in these

calculations justas the gains by

both parties arecounted in other

areas of economicanalysis.

adults who did not graduate high school, 47percent of unauthorized immigrant adultsare not high school graduates.30 (In 1960, 50percent of working-age adult Americans hadnot completed high school.)31 Occupations

filled by lower-skilled workers have not goneaway but low-skilled native born Americanshave shrunk dramatically as a percentage ofthe population as immigrants have filledthose occupations. Crucially, American de-mand for the goods and services producedby those professions has not diminished.

Immigration increases labor mobility,thus decreasing labor market inefficienciesand increasing economic growth.32 By al-lowing poor workers to work in the UnitedStates, even temporarily on guest worker

visas, they can accumulate massive savingscompared to what they could accumulatein their home countries. According calcula-tions by economist Michael Clemens, allow-ing just 3,000 more Bangladeshis to work inthe United States for one year would produceroughly the same in extra income for Bangla-deshis as does the vaunted Grameen Bank, apioneer in microcredit lending for the poorin Bangladesh.33 Merely allowing some low-skilled workers to temporarily work in de-veloped countries would be a huge boon to

economic development across the globe.Because of the legal dangers of working

without authorization, unauthorized im-migrant workers have artificially depressedwages compared to legal workers with thesame skills. Business sanctions, through bu-reaucratic requirements and the potential ofmassive fine and punishment, have encour-aged hiring through subcontractors andoff-the-books cash payments.34 Employersanctions operate like taxes with much ofthe cost being passed on to the unauthor-

ized workers through adjustments in quan-tity demanded, ultimately lowering wages.35

Employers and subcontractors are com-pensated for the legal risk of hiring unau-thorized workers by offering lower wages orworse working conditions. In recent yearsthat risk has been escalating. In 2009 Im-migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

began rapidly expanding the number of in-spections and audits of business owners I-9records.36 ICE routinely investigates over1,000 businesses at a time, often remotely.37

Fines for certain violations have increased

by almost 16 fold since 2008 to $10,463,988in 2011.38 These government actions dimin-ish the productivity and bargaining powerof immigrant workers, decreasing their con-tributions to American economic growth.

Furthermore, an illegal labor economywith the threat of deportation disincentiv-izes unauthorized immigrants from acquir-ing human capital that would increase theirproductivity and thus raise their wages. Sincedeportation would void much of those in-vestments, which are mostly U.S.-specific, un

authorized immigrants acquire human capi-tal at a lower rate than their legal co-workersUnauthorized workers legalized through the1986 Reagan reform saw their wages increasein the short term by 2.1 to 13 percent becauseof their new lawful work status.39

A 1995 Labor Department study foundthat those legalized immigrant workers re-sponded by investing in their skills and edu-cation. The study found that, [f]or manylegalization appears to have been a turningpoint. Suddenly, there was a surge of invest-

ment in language skills, education, and train-ing. Specifically, 43 percent of Mexican menundertook some kind of skill enhancementtraining following legalization, more than adoubling of the previous rate of human-cap-ital accumulation for most origin groups.40

The immigration reform bill would likelyhave a similar result on those legalized to-day.41

Most economic studies of immigrationfocus entirely on how it impacts native-bornAmericansa method rarely used in evalu

ating other international economic poli-cies like trade.42 The benefits of immigrat-ing reaped by the immigrants themselvesshould be included in these calculationsjust as the gains by both parties are countedin other areas of economic analysis. Only afew economists rightly include the massiveeconomic benefits to immigrants, many


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Restrictingnoncitizen accesto welfare willhave a relativelysmall yet positivfiscal effect.

of whom could also be called new Ameri-cans, as part of their analysis of the benefitsof immigration.43 However, even excludingthe biggest beneficiaries of immigration, theimmigrants themselves, still reveals that thebenefits outweigh the costs.44

Fiscal Benefits of LimitingWelfare to Citizens

In the long run, the benefits of increasedimmigration are fiscally positive for theUnited States,45 especially when taking intoconsideration increased tax revenues, the ef-fects of welfare reform,46 a larger and fastergrowing economy,47 and the low rate of im-

migrant welfare use.48 Reforming immigrantaccess to welfare programs by, in the words ofWilliam Niskanen, building a wall aroundthe welfare state, not around the countrywill reduce the fiscal costs of immigration.49

Survey data from the March 2011 Inte-grated Public Use Microdata Series of theCurrent Population Survey (iPUMS-CPS)reveals the percentage of nonnaturalized im-

migrants and American citizens on differentwelfare programs (see Table 1).

Restricting noncitizen access to welfarewill have a relatively small yet positive fiscaleffect. For the programs listed in Table 2,noncitizens use 6.7 percent of total welfareexpenditures while comprising 7.1 percentof the population.50 American citizens used

Table 1

Welfare Program (Percent Use)

Welfare Program Noncitizen Citizen

Medicaid 15.60 18.70

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 18.40 14.40

Supplemental Security Income 1.44 2.10

Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 1.57 0.98

Unemployment Benefits 3.56 3.88

Source:Integrated Public Use Microdata SeriesCurrent Population Survey, March 2011.

Table 2Welfare Benefit Level (Average Per Beneficiary Unit)a

Welfare Program Noncitizen ($) Citizen ($)

Medicaid 4,340 4,257

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 3,748 3,799

Supplemental Security Income 7,075 7,090

Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 3,667 3,338

Unemployment Benefits 7,141 7,784

Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata SeriesCurrent Population Survey, March 2011.aBenefit for Medicaid, SSI, TANF, and Unemployment benefits are per individual. Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance Program (SNAP or food stamps) benefits are calculated on a family basis.


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Cutting offwelfare benefits

to noncitizenswill undoubtedly

affect the lives ofsome immigrants

but not as manynor as greatly as

it may seem.

the remaining 93.3 percent while compris-ing 92.9 percent of the population.51 Pre-venting noncitizens from accessing means-tested welfare programs will immediatelysave taxpayers more than $29 billion for the

five programs under discussion.

52

Grandfa-thering in welfare reform of this kind by al-lowing noncitizens currently eligible for wel-fare to maintain their access or phasing inwelfare eligibility by class of noncitizen overa period of years would produce a positivefiscal effect, albeit a smaller one than deny-ing welfare to all noncitizens.

Limiting means-tested welfare programsfor noncitizens would immediately save tax-payers billions of dollars, while reformingaccess to entitlement programs for currently

unauthorized immigrants naturalized un-der the immigration reform bill could limitentitlement payouts in the future. Entitle-ment reform along these lines would havea positive but more speculative long-runfiscal impact than merely restricting means-tested welfare programs. Additionally, notcounting work done while an immigrantwas unauthorized toward qualification re-quirements for Social Security and Medicarepayments would marginally diminish thenumber of legalized immigrants who could

receive those benefits. Adjusting the age atwhich legalized immigrants can receive en-titlement benefits may be a politically dif-ficult reform but it would yield a positivefiscal impact.

If welfare access to noncitizens was morelimited, some immigrants would choose tonaturalize or do so earlier than they other-wise planned in order to gain access to pub-lic benefits. That phenomenon was smallbut observed after the 1996 Personal Re-sponsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-

ciliation Act (PRWORA) barred immigrantsfrom most means-tested welfare programs,although it was difficult to differentiate theeffect of anti-immigrant laws in California,such as Proposition 187, on immigrant nat-uralization rates.53

There is scant historical evidence thatwelfare induces immigrants to move from

states with relatively fewer benefits to stateswith greater benefits.54 From 2000 to 2009the fastest growth in the immigrant popula-tion occurred in states with the lowest percapita social spending, while the slowest

growth occurred in the states with the high-est social spending.55 Instead, states withthe lowest social spending have more favor-able economic policies that have increasedeconomic growth and job opportunities,and this is a stronger attraction for immi-grants than welfare.

The cost of moving between states is highwhich explains why some immigrants choosenot to move for small welfare benefits, butthe cost of naturalization is also relativelyhigh. The N-400 Application for Naturaliza-

tion form costs $685 per applicant, a signifi-cant deterrent for low-income immigrantswho wish to naturalize.56 The high cost ofnaturalization would likely dampen, al-though not eliminate, any rush to naturalizethat would occur if the strict welfare restric-tions were enacted.

How many immigrants will naturalize forwelfare is ex ante unknowable because thereforms included herein are so much morestringent than what currently exist. The dy-namic and rational response by some current

immigrants to naturalize would diminishthe benefits of walling off welfare, although100 percent of them would have to natural-ize to reach the welfare status quo, all elseremaining equal. Additionally, naturaliza-tion would open up a broader swath of thelifetime earnings of immigrants to taxationThe long path to citizenship for those im-migrants legalized under the proposed im-migration reform bill would not add welfarecosts until many years after implementation

Effects of Walling OffWelfare

Cutting off welfare benefits to nonciti-zens will undoubtedly affect the lives ofsome immigrants but not as many nor asgreatly as it may seem. Noncitizens are 16.6


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To the extentthat means-testewelfare programdecreaselabor forceparticipationrates and skillacquisition, theycan hold back th

pace of economiadvancement.

percent less likely to be enrolled in Medicaidthan all native-born Americans, 31 percentless likely to use Supplemental Security In-

come (SSI), and 8 percent less likely to beon unemployment (see Table 1). However,all noncitizens are 28 percent more likely toreceive Supplemental Nutrition AssistanceProgram (SNAP or food stamps) and 60 per-cent more likely to receive Temporary Aid toNeedy Families (TANF) than all native-bornAmericans (see Table 1).

Comparing means-tested welfare usebetween only poor native-born Americansand poor noncitizens shows less welfareuse among poor immigrants (see Table 3).

People in poverty, regardless of immigrationstatus, are most likely to use means-testedwelfare benefits and be affected by elimi-nating their benefits. Poor noncitizens areabout 23 percent less likely to be enrolled inMedicaid, 11 percent less likely to be receiv-ing SNAP benefits, and about 7 percent lesslikely to receive all forms of cash assistancethrough TANF, SSI, and unemployment in-surance than their poor native-born equiva-lents (see Table 3).57 Poor uninsured immi-grants currently rely much more on clinics

and health care centers that accept cashthan government-subsidized medical care.58That trend would intensify if Medicaid wereno longer available.

The success of second generation immi-grants in the United States in terms of edu-cation, income, home ownership rates, civicassimilation, and poverty rate convergence

with natives is evidence that welfare is notneeded to promote intergenerational mobil-ity or immigrant assimilation.59 By reducing

the small amount of immigrant welfare de-pendency that exists, the pace of intergen-erational mobility could actually increase.

Labor force participation rates and skillacquisition are two important componentsfor spurring upward mobility. To the ex-tent that means-tested welfare programsdecrease labor force participation rates andskill acquisition, they can hold back thepace of economic advancement. Labor mar-ket regulations and rigidities that producehigher unemployment, including those cre-

ated by generous unemployment benefits,have diminished the pace of economic as-similation for immigrants in Europeancountries.60 Fortunately, most immigrantsin the United States have not been held backby welfare. Foreign born adults have a laborforce participation rate of 67 percent whilefor the native born it is 63.6 percent.61 Im-migrants between the ages of 45 and 64 aremore likely to be in the labor force than na-tives in the same age ranges although nativesare more likely in other age groupings.62 Im-

migrant men are much more likely to be inthe workforce than native-born men, but im-migrant women are a little less likely to be inthe labor force than native-born women.63Reducing welfare payments to immigrantscould actually increase their labor force par-ticipation rates. Welfare dependency has notmuch distorted the economic advancement

Table 3Welfare Program (Percent Use, Adults Below 200 Percent of Poverty Line)

Welfare Program Noncitizen Native-Born Citizen

Medicaid 19.7 25.6

Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 29.0 32.5

Temporary Assistance to Needy Families,Supplemental Security Income, UnemploymentBenefits

2.7 2.9

Source:Integrated Public Use Microdata SeriesCurrent Population Survey, March 2011.


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The statutes

identified providea blueprint

for walling offwelfare or at

least limiting itsavailability.

of current immigrant groups but the poten-tial should be avoided in the future.

The historical example of Puerto Ricanwelfare dependency on the United Statesmainland and their relatively slow economic

advancement is a cautionary tale. Poor peo-ple on the American mainland from PuertoRico and other U.S. protectorates are Ameri-can citizens by birth, but they have sharedmany characteristics with immigrants, suchas low education and poor English languageskills. When Puerto Ricans began moving tothe mainland in large numbers during the1950s and 1960s,64 they became eligible forwelfare programs available to other citizens.That is one reason they have advanced eco-nomically at a slower rate than immigrant

groups from even poorer countries likeMexico or the Dominican Republic.65 Therate of welfare usage among people fromAmerican protectorates who reside on themainland is much higher than that of anyimmigrant group in the United States.66While recent data and analysis are hard tocome by because Puerto Ricans are not tech-nically immigrants, the relatively slow rateof assimilation among Puerto Ricans sug-gests that welfare can reduce the economicpotential of immigrants.

Other poor and low-skilled immigrantgroups, like Dominicans, did not receive thegenerous welfare benefits that Puerto Ricansdid, but their successive generations morerapidly and more successfully assimilatedinto the American economy.67 Excluding allnoncitizens from welfare will save the tax-payers money and potentially increase thepace of immigrant economic assimilation.

Identifying theWelfare State

Building a high wall around the welfarestate is an important, but not the only, com-ponent of a freer immigration policy. Liber-alizing immigration is so important to fu-ture economic growth in the United Statesand the rest of the world that barring means-

tested welfare and entitlement programs tononcitizens and allowing more lawful immi-gration would be a tremendously beneficialshift in policy.68

Consequently, barring welfare access to

all noncitizens is an admittedly ambitiousreform. The statutes we identify could bealtered to be less extensive, for example, bybanning welfare until individuals have heldgreen cards for 10 years or banning it fornoncitizens unless they are refugees or bar-ring certain welfare benefits but leaving oth-ers unaltered. As mentioned, welfare accesscould also be grandfathered in, allowingsome current immigrants to maintain theireligibility while barring future immigrantsfrom benefits. Regardless of the extent of

such changes, the statutes identified pro-vide a blueprint for walling off welfare or atleast limiting its availability.

Personal Responsibility and WorkOpportunity Reconciliation Act

The PRWORA introduced restrictionsfor federal means-tested benefits related toimmigration status and duration of U.Sresidence.69 The resulting federal and stateprovisions regarding immigrants access tohealth and human services have created a

patchwork of complicated, and often con-fusing, eligibility rules. Additionally, PRWO-RA has since been amended and partiallyundermined.

PRWORA defined three categories of im-migrant status: qualified, not qualified, andlawfully present. While different public pro-grams have different qualifications, nonciti-zens who are qualified are eligible for fed-eral benefit programs. This group includesrefugees, individuals who have been grantedasylum, lawful permanent residents, Cu-

bans who are subject to the wet foot/dryfoot policy, Haitians under TemporaryProtected Status, victims of domestic abusevictims of trafficking, people paroled by theDepartment of Homeland Security for oneyear and those already granted relief fromdeportation. Therefore, in order to deny fed-eral welfare benefits to noncitizens, PRWO-


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Numerousbarriers toimmigrantwelfare use have

been whittleddown since 1996in subsequentpieces oflegislation.

RAs immigrant eligibility definitions wouldneed to be amended and strengthened.

PRWORA restricted access to welfare pro-grams for lawfully present immigrants basedon when they arrived in the United States

and the duration of U.S. residence. Since1996, under PRWORA, most legal nonciti-zens are ineligible for federal benefits fortheir first five years of residence in the Unit-ed States. After five years, they may enroll ifthey meet the programs other eligibility re-quirements.70

Nonqualified immigrant status is notsynonymous with unauthorized immigrantstatus. Various lawful immigration and visacategories such as students, tourists, asylumseekers, and others also comprise nonquali-

fied immigrants.71

PRWORA was an important reform to

welfare that limited access to welfare for na-tive born Americans and immigrants alike.Numerous barriers to immigrant welfare usehave been whittled down since 1996 in sub-sequent pieces of legislation. Reforms shouldbar noncitizens from accessing welfare pro-grams mentioned under PRWORA or at leastrepair the five-year bar for federal benefitsimposed on green card holders that has beenwatered down over the last 11 years.72

Temporary Assistance for NeedyFamilies

PRWORA established the Temporary As-sistance for Needy Families program. TANFreplaced Aid to Families with DependentChildren, Job Opportunities, and the BasicSkills Training and the Emergency Assistanceprograms. TANF is a program of temporaryassistance that incentivizes recipients to re-turn to the workforce. TANF was reautho-rized as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of

2005.The immigrant eligibility restrictions

are not part of the TANF law but are free-standing provisions that cover the eligibilityof noncitizens for public benefits, and wereoriginally enacted via Title IV of PRWORAand subsequent amendments. The statuto-ry provisions for the TANF program simply

refer to these special rules relating to thetreatment of certain aliens. Therefore, torestrict the TANF program to U.S. citizens,amending and restrengthening PRWORAseligibility definitions (as mentioned in the

Medicaid and Personal Responsibility andWork Opportunity Reconciliation Act sec-tions above) would wall off TANF to non-citizens.

The U.S. citizen children of unauthor-ized immigrants can receive TANF benefits,so unauthorized immigrants can collectTANF on behalf of their children by filinga child-only case. The Office of Family As-sistance, a branch of the Administration forChildren and Families, issues the regulationsfor child-only cases. More stringent filing re-

quirements in this area could weed out somefraudulent cases.

Supplemental Security IncomeSSI is a federal income supplement pro-

gram for the aged, the blind, and disabledpersons who have little or no income. PRWO-RA regulates noncitizen eligibility for SSI byexcluding not qualified immigrants whowere not already receiving SSI benefits, mostqualified immigrants who entered the coun-try after the welfare law passed, and seniors

without disabilities who were in the UnitedStates before that date. Thus, in 2008 Con-gress enacted an extension of eligibility forrefugees who ran up against the seven-yeartime limit in the SSI Extension for Elderlyand Disabled Refugees Act.73 Some refugeescan get two additional years of SSI underspecific circumstances.74 Persons over 18years of age must submit a declaration thatthey are making a good faith effort to pur-sue citizenship and can receive an additionalthird year of SSI if they have an application

for citizenship pending. The 2008 extensionexpired on September 30, 2011, and so is nolonger an issue. Reforming PRWORA (asmentioned in the Medicaid and the PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-onciliation Act sections above) along theselines would make SSI available to only U.S.citizens.


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Comparinglow-income adult

immigrants tolow-income adult

Americans revealshow the latter aremore likely to usebenefits than the

former.

MedicaidMedicaid is a medical assistance program

jointly financed by state and federal govern-ments for low-income individuals. It is man-aged by the states and was first enacted in

1965 as an amendment to the Social Secu-rity Act of 1935.Federal law dictates that states may not

reduce other welfare benefits for peoplewhen they become eligible for Medicaid.States may not impose citizenship or resi-dency requirements aside from requiringthat an applicant be a resident of the state.Neither the age of the applicant nor employ-ment status may count as restrictions to re-ceiving Medicaid.

In 2010 the Patient Protection and Af-

fordable Care Act expanded Medicaid eligi-bility starting in 2014; individuals earningan income up to 133 percent of the povertyline qualify for coverage, including adultswithout dependent children.75 However, theU.S. Supreme Court ruled in NFIB v. Sebeliusthat states do not have to agree to this expan-sion in order to continue to receive Medicaidfunding.76 As of 2013, several states have de-clared that they will not expand eligibility.

While Congress and the Centers forMedicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) set

out the general rules under which Medicaidoperates, each state runs its own program.Under certain circumstances, an applicantmay be denied coverage. As a result, the eli-gibility rules differ significantly from stateto state, although all states must follow thesame basic framework.

Comparing low-income adult immi-grants to low-income adult Americans re-veals how the latter are more likely to usebenefits than the former. Only 19.7 percentof poor noncitizen adults below 200 per-

cent of the poverty line receive Medicaidcompared to 25.6 percent of similarly poornative-born Americans and 29 percent ofsimilarly poor naturalized Americans.77 Re-gardless of the generally lower poor nonciti-zen use rates, noncitizens should not haveaccess to Medicaid and Medicaid/CHIP.78Comparing all noncitizens to all citizens,

however, reveals that noncitizens are morelikely to use Medicaid and TANF.79

Emergency MedicaidEmergency Medicaid covers the treat-

ment of an emergency medical condition.

80

Federal law generally bars unauthorized im-migrants from Medicaid coverage, but partof the state-federal health insurance pro-gram pays approximately $2 billion a yearfor emergency treatment to cover a group ofpatients widely believed to be unauthorizedimmigrants, mainly reimbursing hospitalsfor delivering babies.81 This program is run-ning up extraordinary costs and strandingpatients in prolonged hospital stays becausethe program only covers inpatient hospital

care, not rehabilitation or nursing home careJust as each state administers its own Medic-aid program, individual states also adminis-ter their Emergency Medicaid programs.

States are constrained by federal law intheir ability to provide public benefits tocertain types of nonqualified aliens, but allstates provide all persons coverage for emer-gency medical services. Most states have bor-rowed essential definitions and restrictionson immigrant access to Emergency Medic-aid from federal law, creating some degree of

regulatory conformity across states. For ex-ample, because the federal PRWORA allowsthe provision of only emergency benefits tononqualified aliens, most states have bor-rowed the federal definition of emergencymedical condition in order to ensure theircompliance. Noncitizens should be countedas nonqualified aliens for the purposes ofthis program.82

Medicaid Proof of Citizenship Require-ments for Receipt of Benefits

The Deficit Reduction Act of 200583 re-quired citizens to provide documentaryproof of citizenship, such as an original birthcertificate or passport, to enroll in or renewMedicaid coverage. However, the legislationdid not change the documentation require-ments for noncitizens, thus creating a loop-hole that many could take advantage of to


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More stringentreportingrequirements

would preventthe currentlywidespread frauand abuse ofthe food stampprogram.

circumvent the rules. Requiring Medicaidapplicants to present satisfactory evidenceof citizenship to receive benefits would closethis loophole.84

Medicaid Verification RulesWhen a federal agency denies a federalprogram to nonqualified immigrants, thelaw requires the state or local agency to ver-ify the immigration and citizenship statusof applicants. However, many federal agen-cies fail to specify which of their programsprovide federal public benefits, creating aloophole whereby state agencies are not ob-ligated to verify immigration statuses. Ad-ditionally, Medicaid applicants must provetheir citizenship and immigration status to

authorities but loopholes built into the Pri-vacy Act of 1974 prevent the verification of awelfare applicants immigration status.

According to the Privacy Act, which reg-ulates the use of Social Security Numbers(SSNs) by government agencies,85 statescannot send information gathered in ap-plications for Medicaid to United StatesCitizenship and Immigrations Services (US-CIS).86 While it is important that that infor-mation should not be used for immigrationenforcement purposes, it should be used to

deny benefits to applicants who give suspi-cious or fraudulent SSNs to receive benefits.Altering the Privacy Act to allow states toestablish citizenship for applicants for Med-icaid, SCHIP, TANF, and Food Stamps willclose this loophole. 87

Under an important exception containedin the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform andImmigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),88nonprofit charitable organizations that dis-pense federal benefits are not required todetermine, verify, or otherwise require proof

of eligibility of any applicant for such ben-efits. Removing this exception that relatesspecifically to the immigrant benefits restric-tions in IIRIRA would close a loophole.89

Supplemental Nutrition AssistanceProgram

Prior to the welfare reform of 1996

(PRWORA), most noncitizens lawfully re-siding in the United States were eligiblefor SNAP benefits. With the enactment ofPRWORA, most lawfully present noncitizenslost eligibility.

In 1998 Congress began restoring eligi-bility to some noncitizens who entered theUnited States before August 22, 1996, includ-ing certain elderly, children, disabled, andnoncitizens who were members of Hmongor Highland Laotian tribes who rendered as-sistance to the United States during the Viet-nam War. Full restoration of SNAP eligibilityto noncitizens was included in the Farm Billof 2002.90 It broadly restored SNAP eligibil-ity to most lawfully present noncitizens whoresided in the United States for five years,

children under 18, and individuals receivingdisability-related assistance or benefits.

Due to the 2002 Farm Bill restorations,91noncitizensfrom poor working familiesand their children to elderly people lawfullyresiding in the United States age 65 or olderon August 22, 1996, and the disabledonceagain had access to SNAP. In April 2003qualified aliens who had lived in the UnitedStates for at least five years regained eligibil-ity, and in October 2003, eligibility was re-stored to all qualified alien children without

a waiting period. As a result, in 2004, approx-imately one million noncitizens became eli-gible for SNAP benefits. Noncitizens shouldnot be able to receive SNAP benefits.92

Additionally, households receiving foodstamps face lax reporting requirements toprove their eligibility. More stringent re-porting requirements would prevent thecurrently widespread fraud and abuse of thefood stamp program. Requiring frequent re-porting, such as weekly, would allow denialof the program to families shortly after they

become ineligible for food stamps.93

Earned Income Tax CreditThe Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is

available to single or married persons withchildren and who work at least part-time.EITC is a refundable tax credit, meaningthat if the worker did not pay taxes, or paid


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The EITC shouldbe restricted tocitizens, but allworkers should

be able to takethe deduction

so that taxesare not raisedon noncitizen

workers.

less than the amount of the credit, the IRSwill send him or her a check for the balance.The EITC is the nations largest means-test-ed cash assistance program for workers withlow incomes. Persons receiving the EITC

pay no federal income tax and instead re-ceive cash assistance from the governmentbased on their earnings and family size. Allpersons who file a return and are eligible forEITC receive it because the IRS will processit automatically. However, persons whoseemployment is not reported to the IRS orwho do not file an income tax return willnot receive the credit.

EITC is available only to lawful immi-grant workers but the law allows immi-grants to claim it for up to three years prior

to obtaining lawful work status by filing atax return for the years in which they werelegally ineligible to work. The immigrant eli-gibility definition provided in The PersonalResponsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-onciliation Act of 1996 does not apply tothe EITC. Rather, the PRWORA sought toprevent unauthorized aliens from receivingthe EITC by requiring that the SSN be validfor employment in the United States. Sincea valid SSN must be provided for everyonelisted on the tax return, this was thought

to be an adequate deterrence at the time.However, due to widespread use of fake, im-properly obtained, or shared SSNs, this hasproven to be less than an adequate means toprevent ineligible immigrants from claim-ing the EITC. The EITC should be restrictedto citizens, but all workers should be ableto take the deduction so that taxes are notraised on noncitizen workers.94

Pell GrantsA Pell Grant is a monetary grant from the

U.S. government to students to pay for theircollege education. The program is limited tostudents who demonstrate financial need,who have not earned their first bachelorsdegree, and who are not enrolled in certainpost-baccalaureate programs, through par-ticipating institutions. These grants are notloans and do not have to be repaid.

The U.S. Department of Education uses astandard formula to evaluate the applicantsinformation by guaranteeing he or she isan undergraduate student who has not yetearned a bachelors degree, is a United States

citizen or an eligible noncitizen, and has ahigh school diploma or a GED or can dem-onstrate the ability to benefit from the pro-gram.

The Pell Grant is covered by legislationtitled the Higher Education Act of 1965(HEA).95 The HEA was legislation signedinto United States law on November 8, 1965,as part of President Lyndon Johnsons GreatSociety domestic agenda. Financial assis-tance for students is covered in Title IV ofthe HEA.

Reauthorization for the HEA of 1965 iscoming up at the end of 2013. Limiting PellGrant eligibility to only U.S. citizens wouldbe easy to accomplish since it requires anamendment to the HEA during the nextcongressional reauthorization.96

Housing VouchersThe Housing Choice Voucher program is

the federal governments major program forassisting very low-income families, the elder-ly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and

sanitary housing in the private market. Sec-tion 8 of the Housing Act of 193797 authoriz-es the payment of rental housing assistanceto private landlords on behalf of approxi-mately 3.1 million low-income householdsHousing Choice Vouchers are administeredlocally by public housing agencies (PHAs)The PHAs receive federal funds from the U.SDepartment of Housing and Urban Devel-opment to administer the voucher programThe PHA determines eligibility for a housingvoucher, based on the total annual gross in

come and family size. Eligibility is generallylimited to U.S. citizens but some small speci-fied categories of noncitizens have access.98

Social SecurityThe Social Security program provides

monthly cash benefits to retired and disabledworkers, their dependents, and survivors of


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Raising theSocial Securityeligibilityages for U.S.citizens whowere legalizedand eventuallynaturalizedwould improve

the systems cashflow.

deceased workers. To qualify for benefits,workers must work in Social Securitycov-ered jobs for a specified period of time. Gen-erally, workers need 40 quarters of coverage(QCs) to become eligible for benefits, while

fewer credits are needed for disability andsurvivor benefits, depending on the workersage.99

Workers do not automatically qualify forSocial Security retirement benefits. Nondis-abled and nonsurvivor beneficiaries mustwork and pay a minimum level of Social Se-curity taxes for at least 40 QCs during theirworking lives. These 40 QCs do not haveto be consecutive. Once an individual hasworked and paid Social Security taxes forthe required 40 QCs, they are fully qualified

to receive Social Security retirement bene-fits. In 2013 a worker will earn one credit foreach $1,160 in earnings, up to a maximumof four credits annually.100 To claim SocialSecurity retirement benefits, one has to befully insured and reach full retirement age,which varies from 65 to 67 depending onthe year of birth.101 Restricting the countingof QCs toward Social Security benefits un-til some level of legal immigration status isconferred would decrease outlays and incen-tivize more years of employment.102

Increasing the work requirements from 40QCs to 60 QCs for unauthorized immigrantswho are legalized and eventually gain natu-ralization under the provisions of the BorderSecurity, Economic Opportunity, and Im-migration Modernization Act of 2013 wouldbe politically difficult but would guarantee amore positive cash flow for Social Security.103Raising the Social Security eligibility ages forU.S. citizens who were legalized and eventu-ally naturalized under the provisions of theBorder Security, Economic Opportunity, and

Immigration Modernization Act of 2013would improve the systems cash flow.104These reforms could be viewed as a penaltyfor violating immigration laws or a steppingstone toward broader entitlement reform.

MedicareMedicare covers approximately 40 mil-

lion Americans and is administered by theCenters for Medicare and Medicaid Services.It covers qualified immigrants, naturalizedcitizens, citizens born in the United Stateswho are over the age of 65, and some indi-

viduals who are younger with serious dis-abilities, kidney failure, and Lou GehrigsDisease. There are three types of Medicare:Medicare Part A, which contributes to in-patient hospital, nursing, and home healthcare; Medicare Part B, which contributes tooutpatient treatment, medical equipmentand supplies; and Medicare Part D, whichcovers prescription drugs.105

Most U.S. citizens and permanent resi-dents can receive Medicare benefits if theiremployer paid into the Medicare system for

10 years. To qualify for Medicare, applicantsmust also fall into one of the following cat-egories: be at least 65 years old and be quali-fied for Social Security retirement benefits,have received Social Security Disability ben-efits for at least two years, receive railroadretirement or disability benefits, or have oneof a few qualifying medical conditions.

U.S. citizens and permanent residentswho are already receiving Social Securitychecks are automatically enrolled into Medi-care, and their benefits start at the beginning

of the month in which they turn 65. Indi-viduals who are not receiving Social Secu-rity payments or who are eligible before theyturn 65 need to apply via the Social SecurityAdministration website or local office. Thereare specific waiting periods, benchmarks,and programs that individuals must havequalified for in order to receive Medicare forone of the qualifying sicknesses or disabili-ties.

Raising the Medicare eligibility age forU.S. citizens who were unauthorized immi-

grants and eventually legalized and natu-ralized under the provisions of the BorderSecurity, Economic Opportunity, and Im-migration Modernization Act of 2013106would decrease outlays, but it is impossibleto know how much this far in advance. Bycomparison, gradually raising the eligibilityage for all recipients by two years over the


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The government

must inevitablydraw distinctionsupon citizenship

in the creation,execution, and

operation of laws.

next decade would lower Medicare outlaysby 5 percent in 2035.107 Unauthorized im-migrants were 5.4 percent of the workforcein 2008 so it is unlikely that delaying entitle-ment benefits for that cohort will have more

than a minor fiscal impact.

108

The Constitutionality ofRestricting Welfare

Eligibility to U.S. Citizens

Restricting noncitizen access to welfareraises some constitutional concerns. Alien-age classifications are distinctions made inlaw that treat citizens and noncitizens dif-

ferently and typically deny a benefit or anopportunity to noncitizens that are avail-able to citizens. The U.S. Constitution af-fords certain protections only to citizens.For example, under the Fifteenth and Nine-teenth Amendments, one must be a citizenin order to vote or stand for national electedoffices.109 Another example is the Privilegesor Immunities Clause in Section 1, Clause 2of the Fourteenth Amendment which holdsthat No State shall make or enforce any lawwhich shall abridge the privileges or immu-

nities of citizens of the United States.110However, the Equal Protection Clause of theFourteenth Amendment makes no such citi-zenship distinction and is thus the basis forconstitutional challenges to alienage classi-fications. It reads, No State shall make orenforce any law which shall . . . deny to anyperson within its jurisdiction the equal pro-tection of the laws.111 This clause originallyapplied only to the states; however, it waslater read to be judicially enforceable againstthe federal government through the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.112The government must inevitably draw

distinctions upon citizenship in the cre-ation, execution, and operation of laws. Inresponse, the U.S. Supreme Court has beenconfronted with the question of what levelof scrutiny to apply.113 Although the Su-preme Courts cases scrutinizing laws that

treat immigrants differently than citizensare complicated, it is clear that restrictingnoncitizen access to welfare would surviveconstitutional review.

When states have excluded noncitizens

or treated them differently the Court hasgiven those laws strict scrutiny under theEqual Protection Clause.114 For example, inGraham v. Richardson, the Court struck downstate restrictions on welfare benefits paid tolegal aliens as a violation of the Equal Pro-tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-ment.115 Arizona required residency for a setperiod of time before receiving entitlementprograms, while Pennsylvania granted wel-fare to only citizens and not aliens.116 TheCourt held that classifications based on

alienage are inherently suspect and subjectto close judicial scrutiny117 since aliens area prime example of a discrete and insularminority.118 The Court also consideredhow state immigration policies could in-terfere with federal authority over aliens.119

State laws that restrict the eligibility ofaliens for welfare benefits merely becauseof their alienage can conflict with . . . over-riding national policies in an area consti-tutionally entrusted to the federal Govern-ment.120 The Court had similar concerns in

the recent decision ofArizona v. United Stateswhere it held that the state law usurped thefederal governments authority to regulateimmigration laws and enforcement and wasthus preempted.121

The Court would later allow small excep-tions to state alienage classifications. Underthe political function exception, state lawsreceive the less-strict rational basis review.122

The political function exception applieswhen states classify on the basis of citizen-ship in a manner so bound up with the op-

eration of the State as a governmental entityas to permit exclusion from those functionsof all persons who have not become part ofthe process of self-government.123 For ex-ample, the political function exemptionallows states to require U.S. citizenship inorder to work as police,124 probation offi-cers,125 public school teachers,126 or in the


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The courts haveaffirmed thatCongress has haplenary power

over immigratiosince the 19thcentury eventhough thereis no cleargrant of powerto the federalgovernmentto regulateimmigration.

competitive classified civil service.127 This isnot, however, limitless, as aliens cannot beprohibited from some roles essential to civilsociety such as becoming notary publics.128

When it comes to the federal government

making alienage classifications, the resulthas been rather different. The Court is moredeferential when scrutinizing alienage clas-sifications made at the federal level. Whilethe standard has never been clearly articu-lated, federal alienage classifications and re-strictions upon aliens eligibility for welfareprograms receive rational basis review. Thislower standard not only reflects the Courtsrespect for Congress as a co-equal branchof government, but also the Courts under-standing that the national government has

interests in immigration that are related tocore functions of the federal government, es-pecially national defense and foreign policy.

In Matthews v. Diaz, the Court upheld afederal law requiring aliens to be admittedfor permanent residence and in continuousresidence in the United States for at leastfive years in order to qualify for enrollmentin the Medicare Part B supplemental medi-cal insurance plan.129 The Court suggestedthat Congress be given considerable defer-ence in this sort of line-drawing since its

plenary power over immigration extends toand justifies a broad range of classificationsand distinctions in benefits and entitlementprograms.130 Congress regularly makesrules that would be unacceptable if appliedto citizens,131 but the fact that an Act ofCongress treats aliens differently from citi-zens does not in itself imply that such dispa-rate treatment is invidious.132

The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-teenth Amendment concerns relationshipsbetween aliens and states, not aliens and the

federal government.133 As the unanimousdecision in Matthews v. Diaz, written by Jus-tice Stevens, found, neither the overnightvisitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile for-eign power, the resident diplomat, nor theunauthorized entrant, can advance even acolorable constitutional claim to share inthe bounty that a conscientious sovereign

makes available to its own citizens.134 TheCourt held that it is unquestionably rea-sonable for Congress to make an aliens eli-gibility depend on both the character andthe duration of his residence.135

When the Equal Protection Clause of theFourteenth Amendment is applied to thefederal government through the Due ProcessClause of the Fifth Amendment, its impactand resulting protection is substantially less.The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-ment protects both aliens and citizens.136However, it does not lead to the conclusionthat all aliens are legally entitled to enjoy allthe advantages of citizenship. . . [or] that theyare in a single homogenous legal classifica-tion.137 A vast number of statutes, includ-

ing the whole of Title 8 of the United Statescode, are based on the legitimacy of distin-guishing between citizens and aliens.138

For reasons long recognized as valid, theresponsibility for regulating the relation-ship between the United States and our alienvisitors has been committed to the politicalbranches of the federal Government.139 TheConstitution allows the federal governmentmore freedom in its exercise of power overaliens than that of the states. In this, thereis a need for flexibility in policy choices

rather than the rigidity often characteristicof constitutional adjudication.140 More-over, some line is essential and any linemust produce some harsh and apparentlyarbitrary consequences.141 The Court dis-tinguished Graham v. Richardson as state-levelwelfare policy, thus substantially differentthan a law arising from and committed tothe political branch of the federal govern-ment.142

Later, in Atkins v. Parker, the Court up-held the restriction of food stamps to U.S.

citizens and aliens in specified categories.143The court held that [a] welfare recipient isnot deprived of due process when the legis-lature adjusts benefits levels . . . The legisla-tive determination provides all the processthat is due.144 The court held that undocu-mented children have the right, under theFourteenth Amendment, to a state-provided


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Instead of tryingin vain to halt

immigration, weshould turn our

energy towardreforming

welfare, makingit less accessible

to all, eliminating

it altogether,or lowering the

benefit levels.

public education.145 Yet, this too concerneda state law intervening in a domain constitu-tionally reserved to the federal government,and the court is much more protective ofundocumented children than alien adults.

In the areas of immigration and natural-ization, the Court gives Congress great defer-ence. The Court consistently reaffirms this,holding that over no conceivable subject isthe legislative power of Congress more com-plete than it is over the admission and ex-clusion of aliens. Our cases have long recog-nized the power to expel or exclude aliens asa fundamental sovereign attribute exercisedby the Governments political departmentslargely immune from judicial control.146

In light of this long history of deferring

to the federal governments alienage clas-sifications, the Court will likely find thatthe potential restrictions and distinctionsare constitutionally permitted. The courtshave affirmed that Congress has had plenarypower over immigration since the 19th cen-tury even though there is no clear grant ofpower to the federal government to regulateimmigration.147 The Supreme Court devel-oped this plenary power doctrine as a largelyextraconstitutional theory of federal legisla-tive authority over immigrationalterna-

tively arguing that power over immigrationis a necessary and inherent attribute of sov-ereignty, related to the war power as a mat-ter of foreign affairs, or as inherent in thecommerce clause.148 Under current jurispru-dence, if other constitutional requirementsare met, the legislative or executive branchesare largely free to decide the issue under cur-rent precedents, and the judiciary has mini-mal power to interfere.149 Reducing welfarebenefits for immigrants and federal spend-ing overall are legitimate national interests

that will easily pass the Courts deferentialstandard of review.

Conclusion

Building an even higher legal wall aroundthe welfare state will make immigration re-

form more fiscally beneficial for Americantaxpayers. It will increase the fiscal andeconomic benefits from lower-skilled im-migrants and, importantly, reduce native-born American opposition to a more open

American immigration policy. Contrary towhat immigration restrictionists wrongfullybelieve,150 halting international labor move-ments in a world as economically integratedas ours is impossible without hamperingeconomic growth. Instead of trying in vainto halt immigration, we should turn ourenergy toward reforming welfare, making itless accessible to all, eliminating it altogeth-er, or lowering the benefit levels.

Notes1. Border Security, Economic Opportunity andImmigration Modernization Act of 2013, S. 744,113th Cong., Sec. 245B and Sec. 2211 (2013).

2. See Robert Rector and Jason Richwine, TheFiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Am-nesty to the U.S. Taxpayer, Heritage FoundationSpecial Report, May 6, 2013.

3. Michelle Gerlach, Senator: ImmigrationReform Could Create Huge New U.S. Tax Bur-den, Andalusia Star News, April 4, 2013, http://www.andalusiastarnews.com/2013/04/04

senator%E2%80%88immigration-reform-could-create-huge-new-u-s-tax-burden/.

4. Jim DeMint and Derrick Morgan, Immi-gration Reform about Opportunity, Not Debt,USA Today, April 17, 2013, http://www.usatodaycom/story/opinion/2013/04/17/jim-demint-and-derrick-morgan-on-immigration-reformcolumn/2091655/.

5. Michael Tanner and Tad DeHaven, TANFand Federal Welfare, Downsizing GovernmentSeptember 2010, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/hhs/welfare-spending#5.

6. James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, eds.The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration (Washington: NationalResearch Council, 1997), p. 34954.

7. See Leighton Ku and Brian Bruen, PoorImmigrants Use Public Benefits at a Lower Ratethan Poor Native-Born Citizens, Cato InstituteEconomic Development Bulletin no. 17, March4, 2013.


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8. Or find information from the Current Pop-ulation Survey, http://www.cis.org/immigrant-welfare-use-2011.

9. Leah Zallman et al., Immigrants Contrib-uted an Estimated $115.2 Billion More to theMedicare Trust Fund Than They Took Out in

200209,Health Affairs 32, no. 6 (2013): 1.

10. Border Security.

11. PollingReport.com, http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Independent Institute, Open Letter on Im-migration, news release, June 19, 2006, http://

www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1727.

16. George J. Borjas, Heavens Door: ImmigrationPolicy and the American Economy (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. xiiixvi.

17. See George J. Borjas, The Labor DemandCurve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining theImpact of Immigration on the Labor Market,The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 4 (2003):133574; Michael A. Clemens, Economics andEmigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Side-walk? Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 3(2011): 83106; and Tim Kane and Kirk A. John-son, The Real Problem with Immigration . . . andthe Real Solution, Heritage Foundation Back-grounder no. 1913, March 1, 2006.

18. Michael Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro,and Lant Pritchett, The Place Premium: WageDifferences for Identical Workers across the U.S.Border, Center for Global Development Work-ing Paper no. 148, July 2008, p. 11.

19. Ibid.

20. The Rise of Asian Americans, Pew Socialand Demographic Trends, July 12, 2012, p. 1.

21. Clemens, Montenegro, and Pritchett, p. 11.

22. Daniel Griswold, Willing Workers: Fixingthe Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to theUnited States, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analy-sis no. 19, October 15, 2002, p. 8.

23. For a more detailed discussion of the seg-mentation hypotheses, see Augustine J. Kposowa,The Impact of Immigration on the United States Econo-

my (New York: University Press of America, 1998).

24. Griswold, Willing Workers, p. 8.

25. See Brian Duncan, V. Joseph Hotz, and Ste-phen J. Trejo, Hispanics in the U.S. Labor Mar-ket, in Hispanics and the Future of America, ed.

Marta Tienda and Faith Mitchell (Washington:National Research Council, 2006).

26. See Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber, TaskSpecialization, Immigration, and Wages, Ameri-can Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 3(2009); and Ethan G. Lewis, Immigrant-NativeSubstitutability: The Role of Language Ability,National Bureau of Economic Research Work-ing Paper no. 17609, Cambridge, MA, 2011, pp.1517, 33, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17609.

27. See Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and GiovanniPeri, Rethinking the Effect of Immigration onWages,Journal of the European Economic Association

(forthcoming).

28. See George J. Borjas and Lawrence Katz,The Evolution of the Mexican-Born Workforcein the United States, inMexican Immigration to theUnited States, ed. George J. Borjas (Cambridge: Na-tional Bureau of Economic Research ConferenceReport, 2007); and Ottaviano and Peri, Rethink-ing the Effect of Immigration on Wages.

29. Passel and Cohn, p. 15. Those numbers areestimated through a residual estimation meth-odology that subtracts the total number of non-native respondents in the Current Population

Survey from the number of known lawful immi-grants and then isolates survey responses mostlikely to come from unauthorized immigrants.

30. Ibid., p. iv.

31. Gordon Hanson, The Economics and Pol-icy of Illegal Immigration in the United States,Migration Policy Institute, December 2009, p. 5.

32. See George J. Borjas, Does ImmigrationGrease the Wheels of the Labor Market? Brook-ings Papers on Economic Activity Economic Studies Pro-

gram 32, no. 1 (2001), pp. 69134.

33. Michael Clemens, One Small Way to Fixthe World: Welcome Guest Workers, Centerfor Global Development, June 22, 2009, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/one-small-way-fix-world-welcome-guest-workers.

34. Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and No-lan J. Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican

Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (NewYork: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), pp. 11826.


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35. Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, Clinton R. Shiells,and B. Lindsay Lowell, Immigration Reform:The Effects of Employer Sanctions and Legal-ization on Wages (Immigration and Policy Re-search Working Paper 9, U.S. Department of La-bor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, 1991),p. 1.

36. Andorra Bruno, Immigration-Related Work-site Enforcement: Performance Measures, Con-gressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, pp.24.

37. Alex Nowrasteh, Is Obama Pro-Immigra-tion?Daily Caller, March 28, 2011.

38. Bruno, p. 6.

39. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Cynthis Bansak,and Steven Raphael, Gender Differences in theLabor Market: Impact of IRCA,American Econom-ic Review (2007): p. 412; Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz,

Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market:An Analysis of Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexi-can Immigrants in the United States, Journal of

Population Economics (1999): 99104; Sherrie A.Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, IRCAsImpact on the Occupational Concentration andMobility of Newly-Legalized Mexican Men,

Journal of Population Economics (2000): 9395; andSherrie A. Kossoudji and Deborah A. Cobb-Clark,Coming Out of the Shadows: Learning about Le-gal Status and Wages from the Legalized Popula-tion,Journal of Labor Economics (2002): 602609.

40. Shirley Smith, Roger G. Kramer, and Audrey

Singer,Effects of the Immigration Reform and ControlAct: Characteristics and Labor Market Behavior of theLegalized Population Five Years Following Legalization(Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, 1996),p. 45.

41. Griswold, Willing Workers, p. 10.

42. See Borjas,Heavens Door, pp. 26, for a justi-fication of that approach.

43. See Clemens, Economics and Emigration,pp. 83106; and Bryan Caplan, Why ShouldWe Restrict Immigration? Cato Journal32, no. 1(Winter 2012).

44. Borjas, The Labor Demand Curve Is Down-ward Sloping, pp. 133574; Clemens, Econom-ics and Emigration pp. 83106; Tim Kane andKirk A. Johnson, The Real Problem with Immi-gration . . . and the Real Solution, Backgrounderno. 1913 (March 1, 2006).

45. Smith and Edmonston, p. 353.

46. Ibid., p. 10.

47. Michael Clemens, The Magically Vanish-ing Slice of Pie: Shockingly Bad Methods behindthe Heritage Foundations Estimates of the Fis-cal Costs of Unauthorized Immigration, Center for Global Development, May 7, 2013, http://www.cgdev.org/blog/magically-vanishing-slice-pie-shockingly-bad-methods-behind-heritage-

foundation%E2%80%99s-estimates.

48. Smith and Edmonston; Ku and Bruen.

49. William Niskanen, Build a Wall around theWelfare State, Not around the Country, Cato at

Liberty, June 15, 2006, http://www.cato.org/blog/build-wall-around-welfare-state-not-around-country.

50. Authors calculations from the AmericanCommunity Survey, 2011 1-Year Estimates, S0501and the March 2011 Current Population Survey.

51. Authors calculations from the American

Community Survey, 2011 1-Year Estimates, S0501and the March 2011 Current Population Survey.

52. Authors calculations. This is not a fiscal ac-counting because the taxes paid by either groupare not included; its merely a cost of welfareexpenditures. This is for just the programs dis-played in Table 2. Including other means-testedwelfare programs will increase the cost savings.

53. Borjas, Heavens Door, pp. 11920; Alan Bar-rett and Yvonne McCarthy, Immigrants andWelfare Programmes: Exploring the Interactionsbetween Immigrant Characteristics, Immigrant

Welfare Dependence, and Welfare Policy, OxfordReview of Economic Policy 24, no. 3 (2008): 54259.

54. See Madeline Zavodny, Determinants ofRecent Immigrants Locational Choices, International Migration Review 33, no. 4 (Winter 1999)Rebecca Blank, The Effect of Welfare and WageLevels on Location Decisions of Female House-holds, Journal of Urban Economics 24 (September1988); and Neeraj Kaushal, New ImmigrantsLocation Choices: Magnets without Welfare,

Journal of Labor Economics 23, no. 1 (January 2005)

55. Dan Griswold, Immigration and the WelfareState, Cato Journal32, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 161.

56. N-400, Application for Naturalization,U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, lastmodified March 29, 2013, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=480ccac09aa5d00VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD.

57. Ku and Bruen.

58. Karyn Schwartz and Samantha Artiga


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Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Carefor Low-Income Non-Citizen Adults, KaiserCommission on Medicaid and the Uninsured,Policy Brief (June 2007), http://www.nipcweb.com/KFF_Immigrants.pdf.

59. See Second-Generation Americans: A Por-

trait of the Adult Children of Immigrants, PewResearch Center (February 7, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/02/FINAL_immigrant_generations_report_2-7-13.pdf.

60. Francesco DAmuri and Giovanni Peri, Im-migration, Jobs and Employment Protection:Evidence from Europe, National Bureau of Eco-nomic Research Working Paper no. 17139, Cam-bridge, MA, 2011, pp. 2428, http://www.nber.org/papers/w17139.

61. Table 1. Employment Status of the Foreign-Born and Native-Born Populations by SelectedCharacteristics, 20112012 Annual Averages,

United States Department of Labor, last modi-fied May 22, 2013, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t01.htm.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, Be-yond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews,Italians, and Irish of New York City (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 1970), pp. 9394.

65. See Marta Tienda, The Puerto Rican Work-er: Current Labor Market Status and FutureProspects, in Puerto Ricans in the Mid-Eighties: An

American Challenge (Washington: National PuertoRican Coalition, 1984). Reprinted in Journal of

Hispanic Politics 1(1984): 2751.

66. Ruth Uwaifo Oyelere and Maharouf Oyo-lola, Welfare Usage in the U.S.: Does ImmigrantBirthplace and Immigration Status Matter? IZADiscussion Paper no. 4659, December 2009, pp.1920.

67. See Seth Motel and Eileen Patten, Hispan-ics of Dominican Origin in the United States,2010, Pew Hispanic Center Statistical Profile,

June 27, 2012.

68. See Clemens, Economics and Emigration,pp. 83106.

69. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-nity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), Pub. L. No.104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (2002).

70. PRWORA, 8 U.S.C. 1612(a) (1)-(2) (1996).

71. These provisions of the Act are contained inTitle IV, Subtitle A.

72. 8 U.S.C. 1611(a), 1612(a)(1), and1612(a)(2) could be changed to bar noncitizensfrom accessing welfare programs mentioned un-der the PRWORA. 8 U.S.C. 1613(a) explains the

five-year eligibility of qualified aliens for federalmeans-tested public benefits that has been wa-tered down over the last 11 years. That sectioncould be amended to ban all noncitizens or toreinforce the original intent of that provision.On top of those changes, definitions set for in 8U.S.C. 1621(a) and 8 U.S.C. 1641(b) could alsobe changed to cement any changes made in thepreceding sections.

73. SSI Extension for Elderly and Disabled Ref-ugees Act, Pub. L. No. 110-328, 122 Stat. 2567(2008).

74. These circumstances are: (1) under age 18 or

over 70; or (2) have been lawful permanent resi-dents (LPRs) for less than 6 years; or (3) have apending application for LPR status, filed within4 years of getting SSI; or (4) are a Cuban or Hai-tian entrant; or (5) were granted withholding ofdeportation or removal; or (6) have a pending ap-plication for citizenship.

75. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Actof 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 119-124 Stat. 1025(2010).

76. National Federation of Independent Business v. Se-belius, 567 U.S.132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

77. Ku and Bruen.

78. 8 U.S.C. 1611 explains which immigrantsare ineligible for welfare benefits. Section 1611(b)(1)(A) lays out an important exception that forc-es states to pay for emergency medical condi-tions for immigrants that are unrelated to organtransplants. Furthermore, a part of the originalMedicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a), could bechanged so that only citizens are eligible.

79. Authors calculations from the AmericanCommunity Survey, 2011 1-Year Estimates, S0501and the March 2011 Current Population Survey.

80. 42 U.S.C. 1396b(v), a medical condition(including emergency labor and delivery) mani-festing itself by acute symptoms of sufficientseverity (including severe pain) such that the ab-sence of immediate medical attention could rea-sonably be expected to result in (A) placing thepatients health in serious jeopardy, (B) seriousimpairment to bodily functions, or (C) seriousdysfunction of any bodily organ or part.


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81. See C. Annette DuBard and Mark W. Has-sing, Trends in Emergency Medicaid Expen-ditures for Recent and Undocumented Immi-grants, Journal of the American Medical Association297, no. 10 (2007).

82. 42 U.S.C. 1396b(v) explains under what

circumstances noncitizens can receive coverageunder Emergency Medicaid.

83. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2005).

84. Section 6036 of the Deficit Reduction Actchanged 32 U.S.C. 1396b(x)(1). Amending thatsection to require documentary evidence of citi-zenship could reduce welfare fraud.

85. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(1974).

86. 5 U.S.C. 552a Mississippi Division of Med-

icaid, Important Information for Immigrants,http://www.medicaid.ms.gov/Documents/IMPORTANT%20INFORMATION%20YOU%20NEED%20TO%20KNOW%20ENGLISH.pdf.

87. Privacy Act 7(a)(2)(A); 5 U.S.C. 552a.

88. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-migrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1642(d), 508.

89. Ibid.

90. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).

91. Title IV of the Farm Security and Rural In-vestment Act of 2002 is officially cited as theFood Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2002.Subtitle D4401 provides for the restoration ofbenefits to legal immigrants.

92. Repealing 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(F) and 8 U.S.C.1612(a)(2)(J) would deny Supplemental Nutrition

Assistance Program (SNAP, or food stamps) ben-efits to disabled noncitizens and noncitizens chil-dren, respectively. Repealing 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)would restrict SNAP benefits to so-called quali-fied aliens.

93. Changing the reporting requirements under7 U.S.C. 2015(c)(1) would cut down on fraudu-lent claims.

94. 26 U.S.C. Section 32(c)(1)(A)(ii)(l) defineseligible individuals for the Earned Income TaxCredit (EITC). Amending it so that eligible in-dividual is redefined as a U.S. citizen wouldrestrict the EITC to citizens. In order to denyunauthorized immigrants the tax refund but

still allow them to take the deduction, a sectioncould be added that reads: In the case of all non-citizens, the amount of the Earned Income TaxCredit (EITC) shall not exceed the tax liability ofthe taxpayer.

95. 20 U.S.C. 1070a, Title IV, Part A, Subpart 1.

96. 20 U.S.C. 1091(a)(5) determines Pell Granteligibility based on citizenship status.

97. 42 U.S.C. 1437f.

98. 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1)(E) contains exceptionsto the general rule that aliens are ineligible forhousing benefits. Repealing it would limit thebenefit to U.S. citizens. Amending 42 U.S.C. 1436(a) so that only U.S. citizens are eligible toreceive federal housing benefits will eliminatehousing vouchers for noncitizens.

99. Stanley Tomkiel III, The Social Security Benefits

Handbook (Naperville, Illinois: Sphinx Publish-ing), 201-215 and 601-605.4.

100. Ibid., Appendix 2.

101. Ibid., Appendix 7.

102. Adding to 42 U.S.C. 414(a) a category ofeligible U.S. citizen recipients who were legalizedand naturalized under the Border Security, Eco-nomic Opportunity and Immigration Modern-ization Act of 2013 will only count their QCs af-ter they earned registered provisional immigrantstatus green card, or citizenship status.

103. Reforming 42 U.S.C. 414(a) and 404.110(b)of the Code of Federal Regulations are two plac-es to start although many other statutes wouldneed to be reformed to enact this change.

104. 404.409 of the Code of Federal Regula-tions would need to be amended to increasethe beneficiarys eligibility age for those legal-ized under the Border Security, Economic Op-portunity and Immigration Modernization Actof 2013. A small alteration to 416.202(a)(1)of the Code of Federal Regulations would con-firm that U.S. citizens born in the United Statescould retire and begin claiming Social Security

at age 67 while unauthorized immigrants whoare legalized and naturalized U.S. citizens underthe Border Security, Economic Opportunity andImmigration Modernization Act of 2013 wouldbe able to retire and begin to claim Social Secu-rity at an older age. The early retirement optionwhich allows beneficiaries to retire at age 62 andclaim benefits under Social Security in 42 U.S.C402(a), would need to be changed to push backthe eligibility age for unauthorized immigrantslegalized and naturalized under the immigration


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reform law before the Senate. 404.310 of theCode of Federal Regulations would need to bechanged to conform with those alterations to 42U.S.C. 402(a).

105. Michael F. Cannon and Chris Edwards,Medicare Reforms, Downsizing Government,

September 2010, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/sites/downsizinggovernment.org/files/pdf/hhs-medicare-reforms.pdf.

106. Raising the eligibility age to 70 and increas-ing the work requirements for unauthorized im-migrants legalized under this reform bill requiresaltering 42 U.S.C. 1395c, 42 U.S.C. 1395o, and 42U.S.C. 1395i2(a).

107. Raising the Ages of Eligibility for Medicareand Social Security, Congressional Budget Of-fice (Washington: Government Printing Office,2012), p. 6.

108. Passel and Cohn, p. 12.

109. U.S. Const. amend. XV; U.S. Const. amend.XIX.

110. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1, cl. 2.

111. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

112.Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

113. When analyzing whether governmental de-cisions or laws are constitutional, the SupremeCourt will use a hierarchy of standards (com-monly referred to as levels of scrutiny) to weighthe governments interest against a constitutionalright or principle.

114. To pass strict scrutiny, a law or policy mustbe justified by a compelling governmental interest,narrowly tailored to that goal, and the least restrictivemeans available to achieve that goal or interest.

115. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).

116. Ibid., p. 367.

117. Ibid., p. 372.

118. Ibid. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod-ucts Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n.4 (1938)).

119. Ibid., p. 377.

120. Ibid., p. 378.

121.Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. (2012).

122. Rational basis review requires a plaintiff toprove that a governmental action is not ratio-

nally related to a merely hypothesized legitimategovernment interest in order to succeed in a legalchallenge.

123.Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).

124.Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).

125. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).

126.Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).

127. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).

128.Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).

129.Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976).

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., p. 80.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., pp. 7072.

134. Ibid., p.80.

135. Ibid., p. 83.

136. Ibid., p. 78.

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid., p. 79.

139. Ibid., p. 81.

140. Ibid., p. 81.

141. Ibid., p. 83.

142. Ibid., pp. 8485.

143.Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115 (1985).

144.Atkins v. Parker, at 129.

145.Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

146.Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).

147. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581(1889);Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651(1892);Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698(1893);Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538(1895); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228(1896); The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamatayav. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); United States ex rel.

Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Carlsonv. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952);Harisiades v. Shaugh-nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Shaughnessy v. United


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States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Galvan v.Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Leng May Ma v. Barber,357 U.S. 185 (1958);Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.753 (1972);Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977);Jeanv. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); and Reno v. Flores,507 U.S. 292 (1993).

148. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581(1889).

149.Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).

150. Borjas, Heavens Door, pp. 12021.


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