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BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AS PRESENTED BY JAYANTA BHATTA .
111.0. Defini t ion of Pramka according t o Buddhists philosophy
According t o t h e Budd.hists the de f in i t i on of pramana - e- is: a cogni t ion which i s not contradicted and which leads t o
1 t h e obtainment of t h e ob jec t , i s a v a l i d cognition. I t s
capac i ty t o lead t o o r ig ina l obtainment cons is t s i n this t h a t
i t po in t s ou t t o t he object as the aim of purposive action
i n t h e form ~f obtaining and giving up a? object which 2 causes ha23iness o r so-row, i . e . when w? proceed t o ac t
with reference t o ob jec t p o i n t ~ d out by the c ~ z n i t i o n , it,
i s obtained. 3
The known a t t a i n s t h e object but the p e o ~ l e think t h a t
the means o f proof causes him t o a t t a i n it because it shows
the ob jec t t o him. For ins tance, t h e peogle say t h a t he
robs, a man of h i s property through h i s so ld ie rs ac tua l ly do
the a c t of h i s ins tance. Here a means of knowledge v i r tua l ly
Points out t o the poas tb le attainment of the ob3ects and thus
becomes responsible f o r it. So it i s a means of knowledge. 4
The two p r a m h s i.e, perception and inference accepted by . .- the Buddhists ,have the capaci ty t o lead t o the attainment
4 A L - e
Of the obJect and hence they a r e v a l i d e 5 I n both cases
i a i-rect. Even the perception I s about unique
indiei~ml thiag which i s momentary and therefore, cannot be
a t t a ined , but the s e r i e s of the thing i s obtained, and there-
fore , i n f a c t t h e Percept ion Can give r i s e t o a determination
about t h e s e r i e s i n i t s capacity t o lead t o a t t a in l en t . 6
I n t h e case of inference , t5ough i t s object i s always
a c rea tu re of imagination being bzsed upon the solid rock of
the unbroken succession of r ea l objec ts , s m5n a t t a i n s a
r ea l o b j e c t under t h e guidance o< a:- in ferent ia l knowledge. 7
L e t us c i t e an e x z q l e t o c l a r i f y t h i s . A mnn sees t h e
l u s t e r of the jewel a t a dis tance and mistakes it for t h s
jewel. If he procee?s t o a c t wit", ~fe rence to the su7,~os?d
jewel, he ge t s t h e r e a l jewel. Likewise, 2 Isn yroceedin;:
t o g z t h o l d of imaginary object under the dir:jction o f
inference a t t a i n s a r e a l object . Thougl-I the object of
determinate knowledge i s unreal , ye t the source of imngi-
nat ion being r e a l , t h e r e a l object a t ta ined through it.
Jayanta concludes t h e de f in i t ion of Pramha . according
t o Buddhists as: a v a l i d means knowledge leads to the a t ta in-
ment.02 the obdect which it i s determined t o be,8 and so - . * 9
i l l u s o r y cogni t ions are dis t inguished f r o m val id c o g n i t i o n !
Themfore a judgement such as the conch-shell is yellow, etc.
i s not t m e though a man vho proceeds t o a t t a i n the object
Nferred t o by the above i l l uea ry jud~ement ce t s conch-shell
since he does n o t a t t : i in ti.& ,;_I,: .:t r i , ; . i . ; I ' ~~~ b : ~ tj? :?
ju.';;einent. The Zudge nen t; rr!vco "i s: yel low cv.nr,.! -shell
but a white conch-shell i s a t t s i n r b . 10
Therefore a va l id means of Bulowle:dg~ i s that whlch i s
not contradicted and wkiich leads to the atitait~~n#:nt of the
objec t revealed by t h e apprehens ion , 11
According t o the BuEdhist the number of means o f
va l id knowledge a r e two. l 2 They s t a t e that there a re only
%wo types of knowlable objects, nlrnely, percept ible o r
p a r t i c u l a r and imperceptiable o r universal. l 3 These types
of objec ts mutually exclude each o the r , so, they maintain
tha t a t h i d type of objec t i s not possible. '4 Each being
t he negation of t he o ther they exhaust the whole universal
and exclude the middle.
To the question how does one .know the non-exist,ence
of the t h i r d type, l 5 They answer: That i s because of the 4
meri t of the perception. I b Perce,,tion which is din->cted
towards a blue objec t grasps it r?s : i blue o ~ j e c t and ~vhicI\
is not oirr.cted by it i:: ;i nc)n-b?u.> nt);jr?c-I;. 17
Thes i s no such object, a s is nei thzr . n l ,~~n nor non-
'blue. Percept ion de ter rn in .3~ i t s own o b j e c t , excludes i t s
o;m o b j e c t , exc luaes i t s n zgztive alci FIJ -,.t:; +h? rib:a nct3
of t h i r c i k ind. l i j
If wz do no t accep t t h i s view, th? nr2ct ic: i i u t i l i t y
o f knorvledge w i l l be notctin,;, b:-cause :.re a r e not 23le t o
nave an o b j e c t as a b t a i n ~ b l e i n less tlrn know rhst it i s o t h e r
t h a n ?voidable .
Ir, i s f u r t h e r st?teC! by t h e 31~d,"-' .L-L+ 2 --- ..a t h ? t , ?A?
r ~ e r c e p t i o n e s t a b l i s h e s i t s ovm o b j e c t 2 - d i r e c t l y nc rc? ived ,
excludes t h e o b i s c t which does n o t b ? c o ~ e m,mife::t i n t h a t
i jercept ion, and proves it t o be indi : -ect ly c o ~ n i s n ~ l - e and
3.150 sug;;l:,ests t h e i m ? o s s i b i l i t y of a t h i r d cz t ?aory of ob3ect.
A s i n g l e means of knowledge thus func t ions i n th ree ways. 19
Therefore according t h e Buddhists a l l t h r e e f u n c t i o n s i
o f a Pramana a re e s s e n t i a l p r i o r i t i e s f o r t h e d e f i n i t e -c
knowledge of an o b j e c t , because, t h e y f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t
if t h e n a t u r e of an o b j e c t i s n o t a s c e r t a i n e d i n t h i s manner,
it i s imposs ib le t o u s e i t h e r t o a c c e p t o r t o r e f u s e a
p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t i n view o f i t s p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y . 20
Even i n f e r e n c e proves only two c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e
knowable. C f the two 373351:+7 hen 9115 j . ~ ;?sr~rtc.?.!2 t:-;,3
nega t ion of ",he ot!~?lsr i s ncz~cesszril .r? cognised bccaus? o f
t h e i r o p 3 o s i t i o n . I t i s aZso n q t necec.:ary t o zip ,rehc?nr!
s e ? ~ r : t e l y t h a t soxethin: i s 0?7~:;,.cll t o 9, _ri;ic:~l ;.r t h i nc.
That which i s n o t a??rehended on tb.? s i t u ~ e i o n of t h e ap?rc-
nension o f one i s o-)pose3 t o t:2e 0bj1;ct. 2 1 This 1s :~nou+
g r o ~ n l - : t o prove t h z t t h e r e i s n9 t'nir:! c a t e y o r y , b c ~ : ~ u s e . .. t h i n g s a s s e r t t h e i r a x i s t e n c c 5 y t h ~ d!.er?i?~i of oth:?rs an3
t h e r e z r e only twc kin(5s of obj:cts. 22
1 i h u ~ t n e t~::t;-i>lci ciivi:sFgn ~f r i l l sub:?cts is
~ e r c 2 ~ t i b l . l r~lb j . ;-ct , v i z . 39 exc iusivi '-1i 3 '3~t i~ : : ' 'IT :33int of
23 the range o f ? e r c e p t i o n .
Therefore Budd3ist.s conclud? t h a t , t h e r e a r e two
kind of knowable o b j e c t s which a r e w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by two
k inds of t h e means of p roof .
Thus argued t h a t Buddhists : l a t e r t h e s e are only
two t y p e of knowable o b j e c t s , and the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a third
t y p e i s doub t l e s s , why should one p o s t u l a t e a t h i r d t y p e of
mean, o t h e r t h a n t h e accepted two. 24
Xotes and References
2 . a r t h e n s s a l a y a t sZm7yam sadrsyaw .- ---
szma r t h a ?adar tha --.----- ? e n t i p e r i h E r a ohGtGya3
c f . marge c e t sahaj&&IC?na h&au va bhavah kutah - - - - -- -- - -- - -- -- . -- . sukh? - - - briaveyam - dukkhi - - -- - va - - m a bnuvamiti - ---- t r sy - i t ah -. . ---. PV. - 44. I. s l . 202.
pra 'P t i rbhavat? t i p r s p t i k p r a t i pramanasya - -.- /
pradarsakatvameva vyilpdrah NM, p t . I . p. 35. . - /
cf . vaktrvyZparavisayo yo ' rtho budhu p r a k a S t i - . . - I---.--- --- - ---- f
prGrn6nyam tatra sabdasya nathatatvhibandhai. a-
PV. p. 3 , I. Sl* 4 , - /
4. p r a d a r s a y a t s - - . h i tena s o ' r t h a h p r s p i t o
b h a v a t i yathC hartavyai p r a t i ra jz~rn~j;~ - - dgnameva - - h a r t r t v a i , taduktam p r5pana ------- . -- - .' s a k t i h pm-mgnyamiti. NM. p t .I. p . 35. -* - .---
5. tacca -. peakatvarn pratyaks5nmanayontbha
yoverpyasti t i pram&asaGnya laksana6. I b i d . p . 35, - 0 - .-. -
6. .- t a t r a pratyaksasya vastusvalaksana visa -. .- - . I. . - - .
yatva't tasya ca ksanikatvena p~~ptyasa&bhavep i - - - -
jannanameva przpakatvam. I b i d . p . 35.
vas tuksanaparamparyap rabhavatvz&anipra .-. 0-
bhZmanibuddhivettatpEpty5 -. pr*akatvarh. I b i d . 3. 35<
/
p rayogadarsangd vZt sya - yat ki&idudayataaka6.
PV. p . 61, I . s l . 286. -d
8. adhyavasitaprZpakatva6 prZrnZnyam, adhya .-- -- vasi tasya avastutve 'pi Lamula - vastuprzptyg
n i rvaha t i . NM. p t . I. p. 36. .- -- /
9. ~r tasa f ikh~d i~ra? l ina '& ..- sa6khZdimZt rap 6 p t a u 0-
sstygrnapi - na prKrnanyG. Ibid. p. 36. .- l o . yathii avagatasygpre teravagato h i p i t a h _----.
/
sarikhah p s p y a t e ca sveta iti . Ib id . p . 36. . Y - .
cf . 1 . - na pratyaksaproks6bhyiim meyasya nyasyasa6bhavah . . --- - -- -- .--a
t asmzt p rameyadvi tvena p rarnanadvi tvami sya te . . PV. p. 77. 11. S Z , 6 3 . -
2. dvividho - h i visayah pramznasya ?JBT. p. 70 ----,A. - - - . -
/
13. visayasca pratyaksa paroksabhedena svalaksana -. L *.& -* - . -.- samanya -- bhede va - dvividha z. - NPI. p t . I. p. 43.
c f . NBT. pp. 70-71. -
/
trtiyara'-yanupravesa'bhGv~t. N?1. p t . I. p. 43 -. 15. trtiyavisayZsatvapariccheda eva kutastya iti
.- . . -- - - c e t ? I b i d . p . 43. +-
c f . abhave r t haba l a j j a t e r a r t h a l saktyanapeksane .- .- vyavadhGnZdibhaf p i jayatendriya j5 matih. PV. p .78 I1
-. .. .- -.-- . - . . .
16. pratyaksamahimna eve t i b n h a h . NM. p t . I. p. 43 - -. -.- - / /
abhgve v i n i v r t t i s c e t --. pratyaksasyaiva niscayah. . - - - . . .- . - PV. p. 78, 11. sl . 67. --
paricchinattiti tavadavivgda - - eva. NM. p t , I. p . 43
cf, - NBT. pp. 87-89. /
18. trtiyamapi S s i m ada eva tadapakarot i , bhiiti - -. . . - ---."-- - - cennilameva syiirina prakar&tarantu t a t -- no c e t t a t h g l -
pyanilam syana prakggntarasr h i t a t . - I . p t . I . p . 44.
cf. I.-Px. p . 68.11. sl. 16 /
2. tryekasa&khyZni raso VZ prameyadvayadarsangt . -
I b i d . p. 75. s l . 64.
19. t a t p a r i c c h i n a t t i , -- anyadvyavacchinat t i ,
pramEnavyZp5rah. Xi. p t . I. p . 44 . ----- . /
20. anya tha . . v i sayasyaiva svam-pEpariniscayKt
kvopEdZna9arityagau kuryurartha k r iyz r th inah . I b id . p . 4 4 , - . . .-- - - . "
21 . viruddhayorekatarapariccheda samaye - dvi - ---- t I y a n i r~sanamava;~am bha t i v i ruddhZtvZdeva
- - - - . . - .- - -- - - -- - - /
s i t o s n a v a t . I b i d . p . 44. - - . 22. t r u t i y a v i s a y o l p i tadviruddha eva tadbuddha -- - -- ---
vaprat ibhasa?lanatvat . - Ib id . p . 44.
t a t r a .- -- pra tyakse - . - v i s aye - .- -- pratyaksam p r a v a r t t a t e , - parokse .- . -- t u .- .- sgm&y&are 'numanamiti . Ib id . p . 4 5 ,
24. pramgnadvaya s iddhe ca visayadvaya vedane. -- * - -. - .
vadakasyanumdhena trtiYai ~Gnamisya t ih . Ibid . p . 44. -. -* -"-
111.1 Budenis t ' s d e f i n i t i o n of pe rcep t ion
There a r e two t r a d i t i o n s of' d e f i n i n g p e r e e - ~ t i o n , 9ne
which does n o t inc lude the word non i l l u s o r y
i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n , and another one which incorpor2tes i t .
The f i r s t t r a d i t i o n i s s t a t e d by D i h a g a , t .?e ? ioneer
Buddhist log ic ia r l o f 5 t . century A.D. According t o him t h e
d e f i n i t i o n o f percept ion i s t h a t cogn i t ion which i s f r e e
I from mental cons t ruc t ions . i . e. imqgination ( ~ a l p g n a s ) .
By Kalpana t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f t h e f i v e ca t egor i e s such as
niimarn (name), jzti ( c l a s s ) , guna ( q u a l i t y ) , kriyZ ( a c t i o n ) - - .- - 2
and dravya job j e c t ) with a t h i n s , i s understood. A knowledge
wi thout any r e fe rence t o name, u n i v e r s a l , qua l i ty , e t c . , i s
noth ing b u t t h e knowledge of . svalaksana and t h a t i s termed .-.- a s n i rv ika lpaka . - iiere Jayanta 3 h a t t a mentions ~ h a r m a k ~ r t i ' s . . d e f i n i t i o n of pe rcep t ion and g ives an exposi t ion o f the
reasons f o r regard ing determinate cogn i t ion a s a non-valid
cogn i t ion . According t o ~ h a r m a k z r t i t h e d e f i n i t i o n of
pe rcep t ion i s t h a t , " the cogn i t ion which i s f r e e from
conceptua l c o n s t r u c t i o n and i i . l ~ s i o n . ~ I t i s a d i r e c t o r
immediate cogn i t ion because i t s o b j e c t is present - - before
U s d i r e c t l y and t h a t must be taken as non-constructive and
non-erroneons. The meaning of t h e term kalpans must be
expla ined here .
r>ha+rmakirti d e f i n e s kalpqna a s t h e " t h a t c7gn i t ion
the c.-mtr,ct o f which i s corni~etent t : be assoc ia ted w i t i l a
verbal d e ~ i ~ n a t i o n . ~ And verbal des igna t ion i s t h e deno-
t a t i o n by words o f something. I t i s f u r t h e r s t + % e d t h + ~ t a
pe rce2 tua l c o g n i t i o n vinich i s f r e e f ron conce??tual con-
s t r u c t i o n ( k a l p a n a j and which i s not i l l u s o r y i s a lone
a u t h o r i t a t i v e and v s l i d . Sur,'? a kinowl?dge a r i s e s avlniz?n t h e
eye f i r s t time comes i r l contac t w i t h c e r t a i n o b j e c t and i s
f r e e from de te rmina t ion . The unique indivi t?ual f r e e f r o s
t n i s a s s o c i a t i o n i s t h e ob jec t o f such as v a l i d 7ercept ion . 6
J e r e i n t h i s c o n t e x t , I;BT of Dnamot ta ra c i t e s t h a t , - some t imes i t s:3 happens t h a t even i f the objec t s of percep-
t i o n a r e n o t accompanied by word element, t h e y ,?T? a l s o
capable of be ing accom2anied by t h a t . To c i t e an example
a baby a l though does n o t know t h e meaning of a word and
h i s i h e r pe rcep t ion i s n o t associatt?", w i t h any name, we
cannot s a y t h a t h e i s f r e e from mental cons t ruc t ion .
S i m i l a r l y a new born baby does n o t s t o p cry ing and does n o t
suck h i s o r h e r mother ' s b r e a s t until and un less h e o r
she recognizes t h e b r e a s t t h a t he ( o r ) s h e has experienced
before .
Thus " the a c t of r e c o s n i t i o n and nqming invo lve t h e
u n i f i c a t i o n of t'ne o b j e c t s of p r e s e n t experience w i t h t h e
03 j e c t of the o a s t experience. So, t h a t t ~ e - ; are n o t
d i r e c t l y produced by ob j s c t s coning i n t o cont3ct wi th the
p r o J e r sense organs, f o r p a s t o b j e c t s can never be presented
t o t h e sense.' Hence a perce , tuz l cogni t ion must be f r e e
from a l l a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h names and e l a b ~ r a t i o n s . This
i nde te rmina te pe rcep t ion i s va l id means of knowled3e; because,
i t makes known an o b j e c t a s it i s , and it i s distinguis".led
from a cogni t ion expressed i n verba l statements; because, t he
l a t t e r i s n o t a u t h o r i t a t i v e an2 v a l i d , and which i s c a l l e d a s
tile Determinate c o g n i t i o n i . e. S a v i k a l p ~ k a pratyaksam: .- I t may be observed that ~ : ? ? r m a k i r t i e labora tes the
d e f i n i t i o n of D i h Z g a ' s ?erce? t ion by addin,.: t h e wonj abhrznta
t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n , which is not a f f e c t e d by m y i l l u s i o n
o r erroneous cogn i t ion 2roducsd o u t of t h e colour bl indness ,
r ap id moment t r a v e l l i n g on board a s h i p , s ickness o r o the r
causes .' So, both t h e words kalpanZpodharn and abhrzntarn
t aken t o g e t h e r c o n s t i t u t e the d e f i n i t i o n of percept ion .
Now i n t h i s c o n t e x t it is jenuine t n know t h e o b j e c t of
p e r c e p t i o n i . e. t h e svalaksana, t h e mere p a r t i c u l a r . *-.-
It may be s t a t e d he re t h a t a word expression +as always
a r e f e r e n c e t o the common, and it func t ions i n dependence on
t h e knowledge of r e l a t i o n s . Word cannot have any reference
t o t h e unique p a r t i c u l a r which i s excluded from a l l t h e
~ a r t i c a l a r s be longing t o t h e same c l a s s a s ;.Is9 from
a v s r y t h i n g c i s s i m i l a r . ~ n a r r n o t t n r a l ~ too ?.fines i r , h i s
TiBT s v a l a k s a n a a s a n e n t i t y whiccl i s uncomnon t h e t n i n g i n p- .- .-
i t s e l f . I n o t h e r words, it i s ~e l : -de f ined and t h e r e i s no
common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f it, and i t i s unique i n d i v i d u a l .
F u r t h e r , ~ h a r m a k i r t i a l s o s t a t e s i n h i s iB, a b m t - s v a l a k s a n a t h a t i t i s t h e f i r s t p e r c s 3 t u a l cogn i t ion , t h e .- .- o b j e c t o f which i s somethin:: uncolninon. . a d f u r t h e r he
e x p l a i n s tha t t ~ e o b j e c t grodxces a d i f f e r e n ? rnentzl i r n q ~ e
a c e o r z i n g t o t le placement of t h e o b j x t . i . e . f a r -n;l n?a r .
I f an DS j e c t i s n e a r , i t :~roduces 2 c l e a r cqgni t ion and i f
i t i s f a r i t produces a f a i n t l y v i s i b l e co-;ni t ion, b u t above
311 t h e s e n s e groups t h e e a s i e s t p a r t i c u l a r . I ?
T h e r e f o r e unique i n d i v i d u a l i s n o t giver? t o a word
which has always a r e fe rence t o t h e conmon because of i t s
ve ry n a t u r e , t o e n t e r i n t o any r e l a t i o n with any o t h e r t n i n g
i .e . a n o t i o n o r an express ive word. There i s no o t h e r
r e a l i t y but t h e unique i n d i v i d u a l , ' ) which i s grasped by
i n d e l e r m i n a t e p e r c e p t i o n .
There fo re a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Buddhis t s , it may be
observed on the b a s i s of t h e above d i s c u s s i o n t h a t
s v a l a k s a n a has no o t h e r commoli c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s than." ' i t s -- .- . - un iqueness , i . e . when it is perceived i n the f i r s t moment
of pu re percept ion no part of it rnmrlins unc3~taised. 14
dence t h e knowledge of Svalaksana i s y r e percep-zion, The
n i rv ik . i lpaka , t he ul t i r n ~ t e r e a l i t y wni -,h the Sa~ddhis t s
c o n s i d e r s it a s t h ? s o u l o f t h e i r t h e o r r .
~ h a r m a k i r t i further maintains t h a t a ? . ? r t i c u l w , once
seen i n one ? lace , cannot be the same as perceivred i n
a n o t h e r p lace . The reason i s t h a t t h e r e i s no universa l
over and above t h e p a r t i c u l a r which i s fo>ma coxplz te ly
d i f f e r e n t from t h e pure p a r t i c u l a r . 15
S i m i l a r l y , when we say we pe rce iv a msn w i t h s t i c k
(dand i ) we look upon t h e m.in as q u a l i f i e d by tile s t i c k , -. .- t a k i n g t h e s t a f f t o be h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n , we take i n t o
account t h e i r r e l a t i o n and a l s o do n o t f a i l t o observe
t h e i r s t a t e i n t h e gene ra l scheme of th ings . Then only
we have t h e de terminate cogni t ion such a s "a man with s t i c k " 16
Indeterminate pe rcep t ion which a r i s e s when t h e eye f i r s t
f a l l s on t h e o b j e c t i s n o t a b l e t o c a r r y on such a lengthy
p rocess being as it i s an ins tan taneous r eve la t ion of the
o b j e c t . l 7 Hence a l l knowledge a r i s i n g o u t 6f t h e sense
exper ience , a r e on ly t h e pure percept ion . A continuous
endeavour f o r employing a word t o express a ind iv idua l
becomes f u t i l e sense .- a i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i r e l y f r e e from the
range o f any r e l a t i o n between a word and a ind iv idua l . X 7 4
word i s connected wi th t h a t obJec t which has i t s proper-
r e f e r e n t of a u n i v e r s a l construction. ' ' Thus, so f a r a s
t h i s argument i s concerned, no moaning r e l a t i o n can be
es tab l i shed between a word and an ind iv idua l .
Therefore i t may be observed t h a t according t o t h e
Buddhists t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a 2ure percept ion i s t h a t w h ~ n a
man b e r e f t of all s o r t of imaginative - cons t ruc t ions f rox
h i s mind, and again concent ra t ing h i s mind on p a r t i c u l a r
o b j e c t perce ives t h e co lour w i t l i h i s eyes, a? t h ? t time
the pe rcep t ion of h i s i s a pure percept ion i.e.
kalpanKpodha~nabhrZntani ? ratyaksam . 19 .- Percep t ion and Kalpzna: 6 -
The Buddhists n a r r a t e s five v a r i e t i e s of imaginative
judgements. They are:
1 . ~ S t i k a l p a n 6 ; A imaginative judgement which i s
having a u n i v e r s a l a s i t s context .
2. gunakalpana; A imaginative judgement which i s L.
having an a t t r i b u t e a s i t s content .
3 . - karma o r kriya7calpang; A imaginat ive judgement
which i s having a word as i t s con ten t . .. ..-,
4 . ngmakalpang; A imaginat ive judgement which i s
having a word a s i t s content .
5. dravyakalpana; -- A imaginat ive judgement which i s
having a substance as i ts content .
According t h e Buddhists these five kind ; of imaginative
judgement sometimes super-impose i d e n t i t y between two d i f f -
e ren t ob jec t s and a t o ther times super-impose di f ference
between two i d e n t i c a l things. 'O For example, t he re i s no
d i f fe rence between an individual and a univc:rsal, but a
judgement abs t r ac t s a uni vprsal from an indivivual anti
superimposes an imaginary difference between the two, f o r
example between (gau) cow an< (gotvam) covmess. Nobody -- . - --
experiences a d i f f e r ence , but s t i l l i t i s imagined, and
i t i s ca l led ja t ikalpana. L
There i s no difference? between a sllbstancc and i t s
a t t r i b u t e s , and they can nt5ver be experienced independent
of each o ther , s t i l l they have d i f Serence ancl i t i s ca l led
guna kalpana. - 22 An ac t ion cannot be d i f fe renc ia ted from
the substance, but when we say 'devadatta goes f , we a r e
seeing n e i t h e r more nor l e s s than Devadatta and it i s cal led
ngmakalpana-. 24 The judgement connected with a substance i s
imaginative s ince i n cases such a s t h i s i s a club man
(dandiayam) t h i s and club' a r e two d i f f e r e n t substances - * .
but s i nce they a r e mentioned a s i f they have the same
substance and it i s c a l l e d drvyakalpanz. 25 Here, it can
be s a i d t h a t these fmeginative judgements a r e ne i t he r t r u t h
nor un t ru th , and accordin3 t o the Buddhists kalpang i s not
d i f f e r e n t from the e r r o r .
Notes and References
I. pratyaksari kalpanzpodam, PS. p. 82. - .- cf . z. p . 90. sl . 123.
pratyaksalaksanam. NI\I. p t . I . p. 141. . . - . - -
pratyaksasya. Ib id . p. 141 - . .--
c f . 1 . t a t r a pratyaksari kalpanZpodha6abhrZntafi. NBT. p . 32 - .- -
5. .&bdasa~sargayog~~rthaprat~ti -- k i l a kalpana. - - NM. pt .I. p. 141
cf. I. - PV. p . 100 sl. 176.
2 . JgT*. p . 42
jn"~na&. E. p t . I . p. 142.
c f . E. p. 101, sl. 177. - -
7. E T p . 89.
8. Sinha, J.N. Indian psychology cogni t ion . p . 105 /
9. t a y g r a h i t d t i m i r a s u bhramananaupay~nasa6ksobh5dyana?ita
10. - - Svam asa"dh3iranam l a k s a n d t a t v a i svalaksanam. I b i d . p . 6 9 . ,- . - -1-11- .- 11. HB. quoted in DP. p . 75. - 12. e k z t r a d r s t o bhedo h i kvacinn&-iyat ra d r s y a t e na ...- - - -.---
tagms.3. bhignamastyany:t_ ~%jrq& b e h y a b h e d a t a h
1). Sabdgrtasya, v 5 s t a v a s y ~ b h Z v ~ t 9 svalaksanasya - 4 - -
/
savyapeksaprart t i n s sabdena v i s a y ~ k a r t u m a s a k y a t v ~ t , .-..- - .. t a d r y a t i r i k t a s y a vastunah anupalambhst. Nvl. p t . I , p . 141. -
I 4. yekasyarthasvabhZvasya pratyaksasya satah svayam . - -,
kon'yo -. na d r s t o bhggah syzd ya pramanaih ?ar iksya te iti. ---...-----a .-.- - -.-- * -
Ib id . p t . I. p. 143.
c f . - PV. p . go. s l . 126 /
15. tasmgd - visesavisayg sarvaivendriya ja rnztih -- - .-. --- - -- - - -.
/ /
na v i sesu sabdzna'i p r a v r t 6 v a s t i saibhavah . .-- - . -- --%
Ib id . p . 90, sl . 127.
16. kiEca - - dandityzdi vikalpavi jE&ai neridriyZp5tavelGyZmeva
j aya te k in tu bahuprakriyzpaksd yada'ha -- . - / /
visesanarn v i s e s y a i ca sambanda6 laukikim s th i t im - .- , -- " ,
NM. p t . I. p . 142. -
17. L a ceyat% p r a k r i y G prathamanayanopanipgta j5tamavikalpakam
j&namudbodh~ ksamami ty&a - -. sa&ketasmaranopiiyram drsta samkalpanatmakd , - ..- - ...- *-
cf. - Pv. p . 100. sl. 174. 0 /
18. ananvayiit vises&a& s d k e t a s y i p r a v r t t i t a h visayo yasca - -...-.. - -.*----.* .-*- .- /
sabdgnam sa iyo jya te sa eva taih. E. p .91. sl. 128 5 - - -. - --
na yatha vas tu j ayan te kadscidapi k a l p a n a . NM.pt. I. p .143. - - -- . - /
c f . samhrtya -- sarvatascintZm, s t i rni tenatarat iana. ..-
kvacicca bhadepyabhedakalpanzt kalpana ucyante.
IW. pt .1. p. 143. - /
21. j a t i r j z t i a a t o b h e d o - na .kasc i t para3arthatah . /
idanasya gorgotvamit i -- na h i kascidbhedai /
p a s y a t i tenabnede bhedakalpanaiva. Ib id . p . 143.
ta t rapyabhinayor - - bhedah kalpyzte guna tadvatoh, Ibid. p.143. - . A -. - --
23. bhedaropanarupaiva gunavatkarmakalpana -. -. t a t s v a f i p & . r i k t Z h i n a kriysnama kacana. Ib id . p . 144.
24. vibhinayostvabhedena p r a v r t t a nZimakalpana " - -- .- caitroyamityabhedena ni&ayo nZmanSminoh. Ib id . p. 144.
25. -- evam dandyamityZdimantavyZ drvyakalpana . ' sZrniin&dhikaranyena bhedinorgrhanattayoh. Ib id . p. 144- . '- .-.
111.2 The - t heo ry of AnumZna According t o t h e Buddhists .
The Buddhist hold t h a t the r e c o l l e c t i o n of Niyama i s one
of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of inference .' Niyarns means t h e r e a l re la -
t i o n o f i n v a r i a b l e cancomitance holding between the middle
term and t h e mesor term, an ind i so lub le cp,nnexion between
o b j e c t s o r ideas . And a l s o i t i s designed a s the cons tant
co-presence o f t h e two,
Buddhists f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n of i n v a r i a b l e
concomitance (ltiyama) i s based upon t h e laws of i d e n t i t y and
c a u s a l i t y . Z
/ /
For example, a ,simsapa i - a t r e e . i .e. an indiv idual / /
Delonging t o a s p e c i e s o f t r e e , s o a simsapa c o n s t i t u t e s t h e
probans f o r t h e probandum t h a t it i s a t r e e . This probans
i s based upon i d e n t i t y . This i s a t r e e , because t h i s i s a /
s i i s a ~ ~ . Thus t h e ind i s so lub le connexi on between t h e s e two
i d e a s i s based upon t h e law of i d e n t i t y , which i s vygpt i .
They f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t , what i s an e f f e c t i s abso lu te ly -.".A
dependent upon i t s cause f o r i t s very ex is tence , and i s never
independent of i ts4 But when an e f f e c t cognized it l e a d s t o
t h e i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge of i t s cause. I n o t h e r words the
cause i s i n f e r r e d from i t s e f f e c t -for example, here i s f i r e
because he re is smoke. The indissoluble connexion subs i s t ing
between 'smoke' and ' f i r e ' i s based upon the law of causa l i ty . 6
Therefore t h e Buddhists hold t h a t merely a s ta tement of
the i n v a r i a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n of the probans and probandum
founded on the f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n e n t i t i e s a r e always found
t o co-?resent o r co-absent does not s u f f i c e as a su re bas i s
of in fe rence .
The Buddhist Theory o f TrirGpa
The Buddhists maintain three c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s ,
t h a t it i s p resen t i n t h e sapaksa, absent i n the vipaksa . - -. -
and a l s o p r e s e n t i n the subjec t . If the p r ~ b a n s i s thus
cha rac te r i zed , t hen i t s p o s s i b i l i t y of being associat-?d with
a probandum, which i s contradicted by a piece of va l id know-
ledge , i s ru led ou t ; s ince , i nva r i ab le concomitance and
c o n t r a d i c t i o n a r e For example, i n t h e propo-
p o s i t i o n , f i r e i s n o t h o t because it i s an e f f e c t , it i s wrong
t o suppose t h a t t h e reason f u l f i l l s t h e t h r e e condi t ions , and
y e t i t i s sublated.' I n f a c t , t h e t h r e e conditions a r e not
f u l f i l l e d he re . The reason Is. no t a t a l l a property of t h e
s u b j e c t , because t h a t thing alone can be t h e subjec t whose
P o ~ s i b i l i t i e s a r e n o t a p r i o r i den ia l by perception. 10
That being n o t t h e case namely, f i r e i s no t hot , i s not - q u a l i f i e d t o be a sub jec t . I t i s vipaksa, 11
. - . - -13
Secondly, t h e p o s i t i v e concomitance of the reason is no t
?roved beyond doubt. While we g r a s p the pos i t ive concomitance
every th ing i s included i n We vyapt i statement, l 2 a s whatever
i s an e f f e c t i s n o t h o t , bu t t h e loophole i n the vyzpt i is
a l r eady l a i d ba re a t t h e time of i t s very ascertainment,
because w e observe t h a t though f i r e i s a n e f f e c t , it i s hot.13
If t h e p o s i t i v e concomitance i s grasped witho>.~t including
t h e f i r e , i .e. t h e i n t e r n a l i n v a r i a b l e assoc ia t ion of t h e
problems and t h e probandum i s n o t cognized and ascer ta ined . 14
To expect t h e proof o f t h e probandum frorn a reason whicn has
b id f a r e w e l l t o u s ~robandum is f r u i t l e s s . 15
The Buddhists f u r t h e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t the nsga t ivs
concomitance i s cognized subsequent t o pos i t ive concomitance,
i f l a t e r i s d e n i a l the former i s obviously re jec ted . l 6 The
f i r e i s perca ived t o be possessing a property q u i t e opposi te
of t h e one d e s i r e d t o be proved, t h a t i s ca l l ed vipaksa, . - when t h e reason t lkr taka tva t t no t being absent, I negat ive
concomitance i s disproved. So t h a t t h e t r i p l e condi t ions no t
being f u l f i l l e d , it becomes a f a l l a c i o u s reason and it has no
n e c e s s i t y t o l a y down t h e fourth cond i t ion of non-sublation. 18
The f a c t of non-sublation cannot be ascer ta ined merely
On the s t r e n g t h of non-apprehension, because that does n o t
ensure a b s o l u t e absence o-f a bzdha, and s o a s t h e reason
i s no t f u l l y ascer ta ined t o be f r e e from contradict ion
it cannot be a va l id reason. 19
It may be observed t h a t according t o t e Buddhists
the re i s no d i r e c t de f in i t i on o f anumzna, because they
themselves have s t a t ~ d t h a t they can e a s i l y define t he
d e f i n i t i o n of anumana, through i t s c l a s s i f i ca t i on , t h a t i s
why they s t a t e f i r s t the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of anwngns. i .e.
svZrth&umZna and pasarthZnumZna . 20 I t i s interest in: t o
note t h e comment of Dharmamottara on the types of inference.
Dnarmottara s t a t e s t h a t the two types of inference a r e
absolute ly d i f f e r e n t from each o ther and that i s why Dharna-
k i r t i po in t s out these types before attempting t h e i r def in i -
t i o n . He f u r t h e r opines t h a t it i s not possible t o give a
s i ng l e d e f i n i t i o n f o r both the types. Because inference f o r
both the types. Because inference f o r oneself i s an i n t e rna l
process of cogni t ion and inference f o r others cons i s t s of
proposi t ions f o r t h e purpose of communications. 2 1
Let us see t h a de f in i t i on of sviirthanumiina, According
t o ~ h a x m a k i r t i . The cognition which i s produced i n d i r e c t l y
through a mark, cons i s t ing of a three-fold aspects and referr-
ing , t o an inferred ob jec t , is ca l led sv6rthGnumEna. 22
Dharmottara too def ines inference i n a s lmi l3r way, but
there i s a s l i g h t d i f ference i n language. According t o him
the d e f i n i t i o n of svarthZnumZna i s cognition produced by a
mark having t h r e e a s p e c t s and concerning an in fe r red object . 23
The d i f fe rence between t h e inference and i t s r e s u l t i s jus t
t h e inference and i t s r e s u l t i s j u s t the same a s i n t h e case
of perception. 24
The t h r e e aspec t s of t h e aark a re as follows:
1. I t must abide i n the in fe r red object cognised by
in fe rence . 25
2. It must abide i n homologous instances. 26
3. I t must n o t abide i n heterologus instances. 27
The homologous ins tance i s t h a t i n which both the
probans and t h e probandum abide. 28 The heterologous instance
i s t h a t i n which t h e probance and the probandum never reside. 29
Dhamottara s t a t e s t h a t inference i s cognit ion o f an
absent th ing , which cannot be grasped, but only imagined.
I n t h e case of perception, cogni t ion grasps the
P a r t i c u l a r and cons t ruc t s t h e symbol. I n inference it grasps
t h e symbol and cons t ruc t s t h e p a r t i c u l a r . 30
The d e f i n i t i o n of t h e pan-rthZnumZna i s t h a t , t h e
cogni t ion , which i s deduced f o r t h e b e n e f i t of another
person from premises presented t o him. 3 1
Thus we may draw t h e conclusion, t h a t according the
Buddhist, t h e t h r e e fo ld c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e l t u r e s of - he tu
l e a d s t o t h e in fe rence . They divlde anurnzna i n t ~ two
v a r i e t i e s f i r s t and d r f i n e it l a t e r on, and on the b a s i s
of t h e theory of i d e n t i t y and causa l i ty .
Notes and References
1. niyamasmrti iti. NY1. p t . I. g . 168. ,.- - - t e n a i v a jziita sambande dvayormya ta rok t i t ah
a r t h z p a t t y a d v i t i y e ' p i smrti samupajayate. PV. 111. p.136, - - .- - s l . 28.
2. vyzp t i ravinZbhZvo n i tyasa%acarysmi t y a r t h a h t acca -.* -
t Z d Z t m y a t a d u t p a t t i c ? a i . . - M\I. p t . I. p. 169.
PV. 172. 111. sl. 2 - /
2 . vastutastZdZtmyZt t a d u t 2 a t t e s c a . Idi3T. - p. 1 j S , G I G . 21 1 /
3. vrksatmikaiva h i s i rnsa,~Z t ena v r k s a t v a s anumzpayati, - .-. - --
s o ' y a i svabhEvaheturucyate -. vrkso'yam ;imsag5tviidit i . -.-. - N d . p t . I. p. 169. -
c f . 1 . v r k s o t y a m i t i sa6ketah k r i y s t e t a t p r a t i p a d y a t e - .-. vyavahzre 'pi - t e n a l y d adosa it c e t taruh.PV. p.229 - * - - * - I11 sl. 117.
2.-=T. p. 125. NYB. 2.15.
cf kZryakG6nabhEvah -. l oke pratyaksEnup~l&bhanibandhanah 0 -
4
-2
NM. pt.1. p. 169. - cf + khryh yathg-vahni a t ra dhtiinii iti . NBT . p . 126. NYB. 2.17. --.-.-.-. - -- - -
6 . karyahetau t adu tpa t t i h - . pratibandhah - - )G4. p t . I . p . 169. - /
cf . he tos t r i svap i -- rupesu niscayastena varni tah . - -- -.
PV. p . 179. 111. sl. 15. -
cf : tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabnicara niyarnSbhiiva't. - . .-
NBT. p. 131. NYB, 2.10 ----
8. nanu t r i l aksanake hetau avinahavah parisamzpyate , - 7- . -. --
b5dhZvini%havayorvirodhat. - - NM. p t . I. p. 165.
c f : E. p. 233. 111. sl . 216.
9 . yaccedai agniyanusnatvasadhane k r t a k a t v d trilaksanarnapi . . - --. -- .-. -
bhidhznai, a t r a trilaksunyZnupapatteh. NIL p t .I. p. 165. -- . -. - 10. paksadhma - eva tavzdayai . - na bhavati . . . pratya-
k s s d y n i r a r t a h h i paksa ucyate. Ib id . p. 165. - .-- - 11 . ngpi a y a i anvayI heturanvaya grhanasamaya eva t ad - -
-- viplav5vadhZranGt. Ibid. p. 165.
' 8 -
12. anvayo h i grhyamcmah sar6ksepena yad yat - -0--. - .--- -- - k r t a k a i t a t t a d a n u s n d ityeva6 grhyate. I b id . p. 165. -. - 8 - -. . -
/
13. t a t a s c a - tadgrhanasamaya evayamusnolpi krtaka . . - . - it1 hrdayapathamavatarati t a n ~ a p g d i t i . Ib id . p. 165 - .
14. -- yadi t u analamuts r jya khat6dau anvayaghah -EL---- -.
ngntarygpt igrhI t5 syiit ~Sdhyasadhana dhamayop. -. Ibid. p . 165.
7 5. tata;caiva6vidh5ddhetoh . sv~sZdhyaniyamo j j h i t z t
sZdhy&hilgsa - i tyevarh sandha~unayadohrdah - Ib id . p . I 65 .- C. - . -.* cf: fl, p. 281. 111. s l . 212
16. anvaya piirvakatvscca vyatirekagrhanasya t ann i ra 4-
karane tadapakarand avagantavyai . NN. p t . I. p. 1 6 5 . - .- .- -
/
pmtyaksato n i scaya t vastuvrt tens s a eva v i ~ a k s a .- . - - L._
iti na t a t o vyatirakah krtakatvasyeti . Ib id . p. 165, -A- -. -
18. tasmat trilaksanyZpKyZdeva hetvabhaso ' yamiti ------ - - na f i p sn t a r a i abadhi tavisayatva5 apeksate . I\II'4. p t . 1. P. 166. - . ------ .--- .-
cf . t r iK?o . heturuktah. . . gadZrthatv5-t. NBT. p. 339, s. 322. - /
19. -- na h i adarsanamzt rena bsdhgvi rahani scayah sarvatnana . - h i n a s t i t v a i vidyuh kathak syoginah? NM. p t . I. p.166. --. -
20.1. anurncam dvidhg- - NBT. p. 96, NYB. 11.1.
2. prakarabhedo - h i vyaktibhedah, vyaktibhede
ca ka th i t e p r a t i ~ y a k t i n i ~ a t a i laksanam - C. -
sakyate vaktum, ngnyatha. Ib id . p . 97.
3. see NBVT i n NBP. p . 54. - -
n u h a 6 - t u jz&6tmakai, tayoratyanta
bhedhgt n a i k d laksanamasti. NBT. p. 97. -- . 22, 1. - t a t r a sv6rthe trirupzt llriggt yadanume y a j g ~ n a i --
t a t - anumgnam . NBT . , - 2. t r i s p a t .d lixiggt yad utpann& anumeyalam -
band - jnham . - t a t - sv~rtha"numana6 - iti . NBT . p . 99
23. Ib id . NBT. p . 99, Buddhist logic , vol . 11, p . 49. - 24. I . pramZnaphalavyavastha a t r zp i pratyaksavat . -. .-
,:BT, p , loo., NYB. 24. - 2. pramsasya y a t p h a l a i tasya yZ vyavasthg sZ --- .- ..-
a t r a a n u m z e ' p i pratyaksa iva veditavya. N3T. p.100. - - - -
25. anumeyo ' t r a ji j E ~ s i t a v i s e s o dharmah. !mT. 1 1 1 . , ?NB. 2.6 .- ---. -
Spaksa. NBT. p . 1 2 2 . , NYB. 2.7. - *- 27. na sapakso asapaksah. NBT. p. 114., NYB. 2.8. - ---- -- - --
28. sadhyadha samany ena samSna)l
spaksh on m T . p. 58.
30. anupaiabdhih svabhavah karyai c e t i . NBT. p . l l b . , MBY. 2.11 -. - - - - 31. I . yena param p ra t i padaya t i t a t parartham, PJBT. p . 98. - -
2 . ye czparasya p r a t i p a t t i h t a t p a r z r t h a i -- . -
avagan tavyh . - - NBVT. see on - NBP. D . 54.
111. 3 Budahists View of Upamzna
I n NySya magjari of Jayanta Bhatta, no discussion . o r object ion about t h e nature and forms of comparison i s
recorded from the po in t of view of the Buddhists. A s , they
accepted only two pramanas, i . e . perception and inference. -- But, the Buddhists hold-sense-perception t o belong t o
a s p e c i f i c abs t r ac t e n t i t y (svadharma) alone, devoid of a l l
c m c r e t e spec i f ica t ion so, they can very well deny resemblance
t o be an object of sense perce>tion. The percer~tion of
similarity forms an important par t i n upamzna and it i s held
t o be the case of perception. ~ h a r m a k i r t i r e fe rs t o I pratyaksa and anumzna only as t h e sources of knowledge.
- 0-
1. y a s t a s t i gavzyiikhranh p r a t i kIdrgasZvit i . ---.- -.
so ' p i pratyaksato d r s t e gavaye vinivartane . -. . .- pratyaksggamasiddhe r the tasrnZr\m&%tarena .- - kim. ?
c f . upama'na'di same ca na'numalaksaniinvi tam. . - - 0 - 1
t a t a h pramZntarastitve kathddve eva t e iti. PAB. p .2. - 0 - 0
- - -
We have a l r e a d y pointed out t h a t Buddhists a c c e p t two
means of va l id knowledge based on two d i s t i n c t type of
r e a l i t i e s . Thus, t h e o t h e r pramgnas can be included i n these -.- two , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n inference, a s thsy argue. Thus,
they do n o t accep t any distinction between verbal knowledge
and i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge. 1
They t h a t , bo th judgement and verba l
knowledge have no immediate object t o reveal ; because, both
of them depend upon some r e l a t i o n t o en l ighten and o b j e c t ,
s lnce they i n d i c a t e only t he conmon fea tu re of an ob jec t . 2
They f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t , both o f t q e ~ f a i l t o b r ing
about t n e i r in tended r e s u l t , i f t h e r e l a t i o n i s not discovered,
because, it i s very d i C ' f i c u l t t o d iscovar t h e i r r e l a t i o n ,
s ince t h e p a r t i c u l a r s a r e uncountable .3 On t h e b a s i s o f
t he fol lowing example they e s t a b l i s h t h e i r poin ts .
If a word i s employed t o convey t h e knowledge of an
object ,because i n t h e in fe rence of f i r e smoke p lays p a r t of
t h e s u b j e c t of in fe rence , s o it becomes the s u b j e c t of
in fe rence s i n c e t h e s u b j e c t denoted by it, belongs t o it.
In the first case smokeness i s t h e reason, in t h e second
case t h e un ive r sa l belonging t o t h e word, w i l l discharge
the func t ion of a reason. 4
The verbal knowledge i s i d e n t i c a l with the i n f e r e n t i a l
judgement, because t h e conditicx-is and o b j e c t s of both a r e
i d e n t i c a l , hence, we should not d i f f e r e n t i a t e one f rorn
another i n view of minor d i f ferences . A s we i n f e r f i r e ,
perceiving smoke, s o we make out t h e aeaning o f a wgrd,
hearing it. 6
The Buddhists f u r t h e r s t a t e t h a t the pos i t ive and t h e
negat ive concomitance between a probans and a probandum i s
t h e same a s between word and ob jec t , i . e . i n t h e cas? of
in fe rence srnokeness i s the rrason 2nd i n the cas2 of verbal
testimony, un ive r sa l belonging t o t h e word performs t h i s
ro le . 7
The-Buddhists hold t h a t , t hese impressions, l e f t by the
previous experience of alphabeix, a r e t h e assessory condit ion
of verba l knowledge. Moreover, t h e t r u t h of t h e verbal
knowledge i s a s c e r t a i n e d while we l e a r n t h a t the sentence, -7
t h e source of t h e ve rba l knowledge, has been u t t e r e d by a
r e l i a b l e person. Again we a r e a l s o t o read t h e in tens ion of
t h e 8ped~d.r of t h e sentence i n o rde r t o make out i t s o r i g i n a l
meaning, t h e s e a r e t h e d i s t i n c t i v e processes which invar iab ly
precede a piece of verba l knowledge unlike an i n f e r e n t i a l
judgement, and t h e Buddhists sa id t h a t by these pecu l i a r
condit ions they cannot hold t h a t the verb21 tes t inony i s a
d i s t i n c t type of proof of ~ n a w l e d ~ e . ~ Fur ther they rnalntain
t h a t , i n case of an in fe rence ?&en a very fami l ia r ob jec t i s
t o be e s t ab l i shed , no reference t o an example i s required
because no major premise i s presented t? consciousness, i n
case, o f verbal knowledge when a very f a a i l i a r o n j 2 c t i s
com~unicated by word, no reference t o an example i s
necessary. 9
Therefore t h e Buddhists coqclude and s t a t e t h a t , the
verbal knowledge i s i n f e r e n t i s l , s ince it is k n ~ m t o be
va l id i f it i s i n agreem2nt witn the undoubtable and
unquestionably t r u e of a r e l i a b l e person.'' (Zpta) .
Notes and Reference
/ / I . Sabdasya khalu pasy&o nanum%ct vibhinatam.
a tah tallaksana?rsepgt na ygcyam laksanzri t a r a i - . - - 7 s . - - -- .-. - - NM. p t . I. p. 220. -
/
c f . I . sabdah na pramgnam saugata7n ahuh. NK. p . 866. - . - - .- - - . - /
2. t a t r a anumEnamevedai bauddhavais e s i kaih sri t a i .
SV. p, S1. 15. -
2. paroksavisayatvam h i tulyam tairat dvoyorapi - --
s~manyavisayatvaf;ca sa6bandhrlpeksanZt dvayon. N..I.pt .I .T. 220 , - . .- - #
cf . I . sabdah anumzna6 ar thasya anupalabdheh -. -.. Z
anumeyat7:gt. - NS. 1.2.50 a lso see NB. p . 123.
2. ta t rar thayogah p r a g drs . . . tah . padartha'ntarasSig ?dah # -. / sabd5narnsabdasa6bandhZt asminnpi -- tathia --. sah
l a t o 'numgnamevaitat - a b a y e ' r t he p ravar ta te . Pa. p . 9.
cf . I . saibandhgcca. -.. Nj. 1,2.52. see a l s o N3. p . 122. .- - 2. anadiresa saibandhah iti sa tu aparamparg
* .- -..* - - - prat? t i h . prasidhya ti.
4. prakalpayisyate pakso d h h o dahanavgniva 6- -
t a t r a d h G a t v a szrniinyd tadvadat Kpi vaksyate -. - . NM. p t . I* p. 220. -
5. evam v i sayastimagris~my5t ekatvani ;cave na - -. - vilaksanat*iitram k i z ~ i d a n ~ a t v a k ~ r a n a r n . Ib id . p. 220. - C. .-
6. yatha pra tyaksa to dhtimam drs tva asn ih anumiyate. -- - 0 - -- -...- -. t a t h a i v s iabdad Qarnya f .adartho9pi avagariyate. I b i d . p . 220. . -
/ /
t a t h a - h i sabdah -sabda t v ~ t pdrvasabdavadeva 1?1,
samiparthena sanbanddho dh%o dhGma tayaya th5 . PAB . p . 1 0. - anvayavyatirekau - c a bhavatah a t r z p i l ir igavat . -
/ /
yo y a t r a d r sya t e sabdah s a tasyar thasya vacakah . -.- -. - -
/
paksadnarmatvampi a s t i sabda eva yato ' r thavzn. NFI. pt.I.p.220, -. ' - - . . -
/
i t y z d i n a visesana na prami.n$fitara,n bhavet . Ib id . p . 220. "- ---C-- -. - -
/
l ir ige t a t h i v a sabde ' p i ngnzrthabhxama ka r in i . I b id . p.221. - - . - / /
10. a t a eva h i manyante sabdasyspi v ipasc i tah --- 5ptavadEvisaivZda -. sZmKnyEdanurnanat%n. Ib id . p. 221.
cf . ZptavZdZvisa~v~das~mZnyZdanuGnat~,
Pv. p. 283. 111. sl. 217. .y_
111. 5 The Buddhist Theory of Apoha
Jayanta-Bhatta has d i scussed t h e Buddhist theory of . . apoha j u s t t o exp la in t h e un ive r sa l a s an object of a 3 r e h ~ n - - s ion. The Buddhists do n o t accept t h e r e a l i t y o f t3e Universal .
According t o them u n i v e r s a l i s a f i c t i o n . A general name such
as ffcowll according t o t h e Bud4hists does not stand f o r any
2osi t i v e e n t i t y commonly i n t e r i n g i n d iverse p a r t i c ~ l a r s .
~ c c o r d i n g t o t h e Buddhists t h e r e a r e th ree vie7-:s of
s tages of developinent regard in : t he theory o f Apohz. (1 ) Pro-
$asated by iIiAn?ga ho lds apoha as t o t 3 1 negation o f a l l
o thers and acceots t h e ex i s t ence of sometning ?osi+iv? only /
by imp l i ca t ion ( 2 ) Pro:~ounded by Sgntaraks i ta , a d v x a t e s
t i la t words mean something p o s i t i v e and nsgation of o the r s
i s rendered only by i m p l i c a t i o n and (3 ) expounded by Flatna-
k l r t i maintains t h a t words aean something unique. 3e f u r t h e r
holds t h a t nega t ion and a f f i rma t ion a r e simultaneous. -
Anyhow, a g e n e r a l no t ion o f t h e Suddhist concept of
Apoha, without go ing i n t o t h e d e t a i l of these views of nega- - t i o n 02 a l l o t h e r s except a 'cowf o r id-gther words it
r e f e r s t o 'non-non-cowf.
'Dirintlgii as Rrof. R.C. Pandeya holds , t hus advocated -
aPoha as t o t a l nega t ion of t h e o t h e r and accepted the exis tence .L--__.
of sometnhng p o s i t i v 9 o n l y by i ap l i ca t ion . And a l so the
Bud&iists aa in te in t h a t s imi la r i ty bztween absolutely
d i f f e r e n t things can be establ ished only by t h e i r counter
co r re la t e s . They say t h a t the essence of words cons is t s i n
t h e negation of their counter c ~ r r e l a t e s i f t 4 i s p r inc ip le
i s not accepted, it w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o reconnize the
difference between the thing rzfer red and i t s counter
co r re la t e .
According t o 6 ~ n t a r a k s i t a agoha i s three types. They
a re presented by the following t ab le .
Negation o f aff i rmation Total negation (Par udasa) t (Prasajya prat isedha) --
Negati6n of the idal Negation of the Physical Universal Universal
(buddhygtmaka ) ( arthztmaka )
Therefore, it can be concluded according t o Buddhists
Apoha i s accepted through the t h r e e views of stages of
development.
Jayanta s t a t e s t h a t t h e 3uddhist theory of 'Apoha' i s
not some ex te rna l p o s i t i v e thing. ' J u t it i s i n t e r n a l and 2 of t h e f o m of cogn i t ion . I n t h a t case , i t may be doubted .
t h a t , t h e r e i s no n e c e s s i t y of l o g i c a l l y an4 s k i l l f u l l y
developing t h e theory of kpoha. So, i?; i s S e t t e r t o regard
t h a t a u n i t of consciousness i s cognised even from words. 3
J u t t n a t i s n o t c o r r e c t . Because t h e 2 0 o h a ' is n e i t h e r
i n t e r a a l , nor e x t e r n a l , bu t i t i s d i f f e r 9 n t from both consci-
ousness and t h e o b j e c t . 4
Yere, t h e o b j e c t i o n aga ins t t h e 3uddhi~t i s that, ~ r h i c h
i s no t ex te rna l or. in te r rx i l doss r ~ o t r e a l l y exi.-:t and t h e n r;
how can it form t h e meanin:; of 2 word?' The 3 u d d h i s t s answer
i s t h a t , t hey never b e l i e v t h e t words !nean sornetbing r e a l . b
Since t h e ' A ~ o h a ' i s n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l , nor i c t e r n a l , i t i s L
c a l l e d ' un rea l ' and imaginary f o r t h e same, and it i s some-
t h i n g t h a t i s superimposed and a f f e c t s t h e de terminate
notion.'l The conceptual cons t ruc t ions , being a s i f externzi l ly
p e r c e p t i b l e t i n g e t h e cognit ions. 8
The t h e s i s t h a t determinate c o g n i t i o n s a r e about 'apohav
i s based more on l o g i c . than on experience? The de terminate
cogn i t ions do no t g rasp t h e r e a l . What they grasp v i z . the
u n i v e r s a l i s n o t r e a l , l o t h e n f o r e , through e l imina t ion , we
g e t t h a t they cognise t h e apoh8 i . e. negat ion o f no t . &hat .
The imaginary form f o r t h e very f a c t t h a t it i s
superimposed, i s not ex te rna l and being d i f f e r e n t from
knowledge i s not i n t e r n a l . It i s nothing and from t h e fonn
of r e s u l t a n t judgement it i s c a l l e d 'apoha' . The opponent
mistaking t h e 'apoha' t o be - m e m a 1 and of t h e na tu re of
non-existence, su f fe red hardship without reason by his
cri t ic is in aga ins t t h e nature of apoha . 11
The objec t of determinate cogni t ion possesses t h r e e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s v i z , t h a t i t can be a s soc ia t ed w i t h ex i s t ence
o r non-existence through c e r t a i n o t h e r no t ions , it has d e f i n i t e
fo rn and it appears s i m i l a r to t h e e x t e r n a l . None of t h e
these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s belong t o t h e e x t e r n a l th ing . 12
The d e f i n i t e form of the o b j e c t o f d e t e r n i n a t i o n i s
known as ' t h i s i s a cow only and n o t a h o r s e t and i t cannot
be poss ib le unless o t h = r th ings a r e excluded s o t h a t de te r -
a i n a t e cogni t ions cognise exclusion. An o b j e c t whose na tu re
o r cha rac te r i s doubted i s not cognised by them.
This texc lus ion ' i s t h e only p o i n t o f s i q i l a r i t y between
t h e ex terna l and the imagined ob jec t and s i n c e de terminate
cogni t ion cannot cognise t h e already cngnized e x t e r n a l , they
a r e s a i d t o be about t h e exclusion. Though t h e n o t i o n s and
verba l expressions t a k e upon a g o s i t i v e form, I 3 i n a c t u a l
p rac t i ce , s t i l l l o g i c i a n s prove t h a t they a r e about Zyohas,
Jayanta observes14 i n conclusion t h a t t h i s view of t h i n k i n 5 is
pregnant with t h e theory t h a t the non-exis tent becomes
manifest i n cogni t ion .
Notes and References
1. - na - t u -9 asau bhavatma bahih abhyupagamyate. I\T,bi.pt .I1 .p. 34. - - 2. k in tu knalu ayam gntaro jn"hatma. 1bi.i . p . 14. ----
4. nGamZntaro - na bahyah apoha'n, k in tu jkartha'bhy-lri7m - . . . --
arlya =a. Ib id . p. 14. - 5. nanu - yad v iaya te nznta-mabhih paramarthatah .
/
na t u vidyate e v e t i kathai: sabdar tha ucyate. I b i d . 3 . 15 - - -, -
nehagatah smah enai~a$~ruyujyernahi tvayc. I b id . p. 15. . -. -.
7. KkZramFtrai v i kalpoparGjakaa. I b i d . p . 1 5
3. yuktya tesam aponavisayatvam ucyate na -. -.- -- -
p r a t i p a t t i t a h . - jGJ. r>t. 11. p. 16.
10. pamanya4 vzstava; n a s t i . Ib id . p. 16. - 1 1 . s o ' y q ~ Zropi tZkZro na s a h i r ZropitatvZdeva nZntah
-A- • -. abodhaf ipatvat , . . . - k l i s t o devSnZn pr iyah , I b id . , p. 16. .- - -.
12. a p i c a vikalpabhfhirar tho vikalpEntarasannidhZpita -4
/ f
b~~v&ha'v&sep? niyararGpo b a y a s a d r s a sasca .- -.--.- - , p r a t i y a t e , na cedam nipatrayam - a p i . - bh&ye
vas tun i yujyate . Ib id . p. 16. /
13. yadyapi vidhi Gpena gaurasva iti tesam p r a v r t t i h t a t h g ~ i -- . - -C- .- nx t iv ido anyZppohavisay&eva - . t g n vyavasthgpa y a n t i . I b i d . p .17,
/
14. so ' yam nEintam - na bayo 'nya eva ka1sc id6 rop i t a &a'm vyfivrtti- - .- - -.- cchgyoggd apohasabdsrtha ucyata asatkhyCtivcdagarbhZ-
a n Ib id . p . 17
111. 6. Non-apprehension Eudghists view
The Buddhists were much awzre about t h e i r p o s i t i o n
maintained by t h e Naiya'yikas t k a t 3 b h Z v a i s d i s t i n c t
padzrtha. A t t h e same time they are a l s c 7.cqu~inted w i t h
:he theory o f t h e b h a t t a s t h a t abhgva i s d i s t i n c t Tesn o f . . knowledge f o r t h e c o g n i t i o n of nega t ive e n t i t i e s . A s a g a i n s t
both t h e s e suppos i t ions , Suddhists ho ld t h a t non e x i s t e n c e
i s never cognised independent ly a s a d i s t i n c t e n t i t y of t h e
? form of non-existence of jar. Sut t hey say t h a t , we a l w z y s
have a not ion o f non-existence i n t h e con tex t of p a r t i c u l a r
t ime, p l a c e and a p o s i z i v e coun te r e n t i t y , a s f o r i n s t z n c e ,
something, i . e . a c l o t h , a p o t , e t c . i s n ~ t r,ow he re . 2
However, non-existence cannot e n t e r i n t o any r e l a t i o n
e i t h e r with t ime, p l a c e o r t h e c o u n t e r - e n t i t y .' The r e l a t i o n
of conjunct ion o r i n t i m a t e union cannot hold good i n t h e e e
c a s e s s i n c e non-existence i s n e i t h e r a substance i n t h e
f i r s t case, nor a q u a l i t y e t c . as r e q u i r e d by samavgya. 4
To t h e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n o f ' q u a l i f y i n g t o
q u a l i f i e d t may connect them wi th one a n o t h e r , t h e r e f o r e there
is no need of assuming o t h e r r e l a t i o n s , t h e Buddhists
s t a t e t h a t t h i s relation presupposes a n o t h e r r e l a t i o n o f
e i t h e r conjunct ion o r i n t i m a t e un ion (samavzya) because, a
q u a l i f i c a t i o n is e i t h e r conJunctd o r i n t i m a t e l y u n i t e d wi th
6 t h e qxa l i f i ed . For examnle, t he s t a f f with Devad-.,ti,9, or
the c o l o u ~ blue with l o t u s . I t i s no t r ea l r e l a t i o n involv-
i n g t h e ty ings bu t only t h e one, rnentqlly construed. I t s
f i c t i o n a l cha rac t e r i s proved ~y t h e f a c t t h 5 t t he same t h i n g
i s looked upon e i t h e r a s t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n or a s t h e q u a l i f i e d . 7
The 3uddhists f u r t h e r say t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n of non-
existent*> w i t h i t s countkr-ect i ty i s s t i l l mars inconceiv-
ab l e , because t h e t w o belon: to tv ; d i f f a r e n t times .8 For
exaxple, when t h e r e i s a j a r , i t s non-e.fi:ist@nce i s 3bs:nt
and w2en t .;~ non-existence o f j a r ? r e v a i l s , the re i s no j a r . 9
The r e l a t i o n of o p p o s i t i ~ n cannot serve an escape
from the confronta t ion. I t would ob t a in between them i f t h e
a l ready present non-existence of j a r were t o come and des t roy
t h e jar, i n t h e manner of s t a f f . 3 u t i n a s much a s the
des t royer and the destroyed a r e n o t simultaneously p r e sen t
t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of such a re la t ion .1° Des t ruc t ion
i s t h e same as non-existence. Therefore , t h e Buddhists
b r i ng i n t h e d o c t r i n e of cause less d e s t r u c t i o n and t h e
consequent s u p e r f l W y . o f t h e suppos i t i on of causes of
des t ruct ion." They po in t ou t t h a t nnon-existencelt o f a
t h ing cannot be a nproduct" of t h e agency of t h e causes of
de s t ruc t i on . Non-existence i s n o t a p o s i t i v e e n t i t y and
t he r e fo re , as such could be produced by causes . The supposed
causes of des t ruc t ion a r e , i n f a c t , responsible f?r the
o r i g i n of a new d i s s i m i l a r series. '12 The s t a f f does not
dectrgy a j a r , bu t pr2duces a d i f f e r e n t s e r i e s of pot-
s h e r d ~ . ' ~ If des t ruc t ion is d i s t i n c t e n t i t y a ? a r t fraa
t h e thing a jar i n v i r t u e o f which i t can en te r i n t o a
r e l a t i o n wi th the l a t t e r , i t besones d i f f e r e n t f ro3 t h e jzr
and then it cannot and does not qod i ty the bein5 o f jar
so t h a t t he jar would be cognisee as b e f o r t . I f it i s
i d e n t i c a l with the j z r , t he j a r w i l l bb7 th product o f t h e
ageKcy of the causes o ? d ? s t r u c t i o n . If the non-existence
of j a r i s sa id t~ be t h e same as the potshnl-ds, wnen t h n
potsherds are+ broken, the non-existence o f ,-j?r being. des t royed<
The j a r should be recons t i tu ted . 14
The 3uddhists f u r t h e r maintain t h a t the non-existence
of jar has e i t h e r t h e nature of coming i n t ? ex is tence , o r t h e
na tu re of not coming i n t o exis tence. l 5 I n t h e f i r s t case ,
i t would be a p o s i t i v e e n t i t y l i k e a jar,'6 i n the second
case it becomes e t e r n a l . j7 Further i t i s s a i d t h a t , t h e
e t e r n a l non-existence i s connected w i t h one th ing only o r
with a l l of them. '* So far as t h e first a l t e r n a t i v e is
concerned, we do n o t come across a d e c i s i v e cause a s t o
why it should be connected with one p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g only?19
As for t h e second a l t e r n a t i v e it i s connected with a l l
t h ings and the non-existence being e t e r n a l a l l t h i n g s as i t s
c o u n t e r - e n t i t i e s would be no m9rf ths-:re and the re would be
l e f t no p o s i t i v e o b j e c t e t e r n a l o r non-eternal as e x i s t e n t . 20
:he 3uddhis t s f u r t h e r 3o in t s out t h q t , i f t'ne hyoothes is
of nega t ion is d i s c a r d e d then t he l i n e of d i s t i n c t i o n which
a 3 s o l u t e l y s e p a r a t e s one pos i t ive o b j e c t f r ? n anoY.her w i l l
oreak down anclt one :nonot nous i d e - i t i t y w i l l snc;ulf a l l thrl-7
d i s t i n c t t ypes of o b j e c t s . Thus, t h s hunar cqnvention of
5 i s t i r : c t i ~ n based upon the c l a s s i f i c a t i ? n O F s b j e c t s o f t h e
un iv? r se , w i l l d i s a p 7 e a r from t h e s u r f a c e of ea r tn . 2 1
If w? assume the hypothesis t h ~ t n e g s t i ~ n i s o b j e c t i v e l y
r e a l , t hen t h e ? o s i t i v e objects main ta in t h e i r r n u t ~ 2 l
d i s t i n c t i o n by means of t h e i r o b j e c t i v e a i f ference. 22 2 u t
it do n o t subsc r ibe t o t h i s view and do n o t try t o a m i d t h e
danger o f t h e merging o f o b j e c t s i n t o one ano the r than a
g r e a t e r p e r i l w i l l s u r e l y awai t u s . 23 If t h e d i f f e r e n t f ~ m s
-of non e x i s t e n c e become d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by themselves from
one a n o t h e r as from p o s i t i v e o b j e c t s t h a t t . e y a r e he ld
i n c a p a b l e of d i f f e r e n c i a t i n g themselves from o t h e r o b j e c t s
n a t u r a l l y and hence depending on t h e nega t ion o f mutual a 24 i d e n t i t y f o r t h a t sake .
The buddh i s t s also held t h a t non-exis tence as such i s
uniform and i t s supposed d i s t i n c t i o n s are caused by the s o
nany 2:jsitiv~: o b j e c t s and a r e denied. 2 5 The t i i n c s a r e
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from one a n o t n e r i n v i r t u e of the1 r own
being and t h e r e i s no f e a r of a c ~ n f u s i o , ' ~ . of t n e v a r i q u s
o b j e c t s n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e p o s t u l a t i ~ n of n ~ n - e x i s t e n c e . 26
F i n a l l y t h e Buddhists s t a t e t n a t , it w i l l be u n w i ~ e t r
assume t h e hypothes is o f a ne - a t i v e s e a l , s ince the qapre-
hension on ' c o l o s s a l chaos ' a r i s i n s from i t h2uri-L~ us. 27 And
t ? e y exp la in t h e i r view a b m t t h e meaning of the nega t ive
? a r t i c l e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t n word.;, (naz ) - th(zLL according t 9
them i t i s no t t h a t t h e s t a t e of t h i n g s confoms t o v-?rbal
s t a t emen t s , words s i z n i f y o n l y c3nce? tua l c o n s t r u c t i o n s . 28
Tney further mention t h a t , we a c c e p t th? eleven kind
o f non-apprehension ( ~ n u p a ~ a h d b i ) on t h e b a s i s of 3 v e r b a l
express ion conveying non-existence and no t t h e cause o f the
c o g n i t i o n of non-existence i n t h e manner a jar i s t h e cause
i t s cogn i t ion . *' Therefore according t o -the Suddh i s t s
non-exis tence i s neve r cognised independent ly as a d i s t i n c t
e n t i t y of the form of non-existence of jar.
Notes and References
1 . abhgvo nzmz pra t Iyam~no ne svantratayh ghatZbhZvasvar@avat, - ---- anubhcyate. - !@I. p t . I . p. 86.
c f . anupalabdhih svabhavah, karyah c e t i . B?. 11. d l . '
--- --
/ /
c f . 1. - desadibhedZt drsyahte bhinzdravyesu saktayah t a t r ika - --. .------ - . -. /
crs-kya nsnyatra yuktah taeabhava niscayah PC. J. 183. -. .- -. L. -
/
atmapratyaksanivrteh abh~va&cay&hZvZt. iilBVT. p . 67. -. - ,. -. -- /
3 , -- na h i desena kZlena pratiyogina saha asya -- -- /
k a s c i t saiband_iah. Ib id . p. 86. -. /
c f . 1 . t a t r a - , anupalabcihi ya thz na pradesa . - - /
v i s e - kvacit -- ghatah upalabdhilaksana -. -. . -. - praptasya anupalabdhe riti. NBP. 11. 12 -. -
/
2 . desa i tyukte sarvasya paksatve - . - gha t anzva siddhereva na sygt saca - - .- - yogyofpi na bhavati . ,NBVT. p. 60 -
4 . Sainyogasarnav~yGderanupapatteh. NM. p t .I. p . 86. -0 -
/
5. nanu visesanavisesyabh~va .- eva sambandhah t
kim sdbandhz ta ra peksays? Ibid. p, 86. - --.- /
sdyuktari, samavetak vG visesand bhavati. Ibid. p. 86. - -..-. L .
7. &nrS pevadatto, nxlarh u tpa l a i i ti, . - / / /
visesanamapj. visesyi bhavati visesyamapi --.-4 -.,. .-- -.--
na ~ a s t u a n a ~ a n . I b i d . p . 86. - -. 8. psatiyogina saha natara"111 abhavasya
.- - sambandhah asam&nakalatvZt. IbFd, p. 86. .
9. yada h i ghato na tadZ tadahiivah - .A - - yada tadabh<?vah na t ada ghata i ti. Ib id , p. 86. - .-, ..- - -. ---.--.
1 C . v i rodhzkhy? s&lbandho bhavisya t l t i c e t , ko -, ----- - virodharthah? yadi h i praksidkko ghatabhava S a t y a ghatai -. --. -
v i rundhyat bhavedapi tadvi robtlo ghatamudgarayoriva , -. na - t u
evam a s t i , tayoh :asam5nakSlatvat, abhyupagane vii ghat3 -- -. ---
tadabhavayo? *a vadhyaghatahiyoh siihacaryahi inub3Gy-i t e . Ib id . p . 86.
11 . akiEcitkarasya v i rodhitve a t ip rasak t ih --- -. abhgv5ntarakarane anavasta. Ibid . p. 86.
12, mudgarZdayd1 ghatasya nhhgva he tavah bhavi td arhant i , . .
/ /
bhzvasya -- svata eve bhariguratvena vinSsahetvanapeksatvZt C r-.
I b i d . p. 86.
eva qmugaradika'rakavya"pa'mh. Ibid . p . 86. - 14. s a h i g h a t g t v a s t v a n t a d cet . . . yadasau na phrvavadupaf abhyate, - - --L- -
tadvirodhi tvgt - . ---..-.be iti c e t p ra tyuk td e t a t . Ibid . p. 86
16. bhavanadharmatve bh5votsau - bhavet. ghatiidivat. I b id , p. 87
17. abhavanadharmg t u yadi abhgvo'sti sa nityah. I b i d . p. 87. - .- - - .
samapad6rtha saibandhi va"? Ibid. p . 87. -43 -
7 9. - eka bhavasaibandhi t ve na tasya niymakSr2nam -- .I-
/
utpasyzrnah. Ib id . p . 87, -. 20. sarvabhzva saibandhitve t u - sarvapad&rthapratikG1asya
/
abhavasya n i t ya tva t n i tyah sannityo va kasc i t abhZv7 . - .- --.- - -- nznzs t i . -- I b id . p . 87.
21. nanu abhava, anabhyupagame bhgvksm i t a re ta rasahkara t -
ak!?il~vyavahZraviplavah p s p n o t i . Ib id . a. 87.
22. .abha'v? abhyupagarne . t u - bhavsnai ,i t a re tasZ~hZv5t --
asarhirnasvabhavatvgt . Ib id . p. 87. ..
-sutar%n . viplavah. I b id . p. 87.
24. - bhgvo bhzvgdivsny - asrnct L4 a b ~ ~ v ~ n k t api - dhrvam .---a -
asarik?rnah abhyupetavyahsa ka tha i va bhavisyat i . - .'* ..-I
anyonyamapi bhavanE& .. - yadi asarikirnata svatah bhzvaih . -. /
k i 6 aparZddh& va pa ra tasce t kuto nu sa. Ibid. p. 87. -. -. --- /
25. a b h a ~ a s v a b h ~ v a t ~ i y i g c a _. sarvgn - pr tyavi sesat ..-.. rat isedhya nibandhana eva tadbhedah. Ibid. p. 88. 9- .- . -- L--.. -*-,
26. bhii~adhingi abhgviiniiri a shkarya* vak t u i
u c i t d , . -- na t u viparyayoyuktah. I b id . p. 88.
na abh?ita abhyupa gamo yuktah. I b i d . p. 88. - -,. 1 - . /
28. - na - va i sabdGusZrena vas t u s t h i rupeyate .- bauddha khalu vaya6 loke sarvatra khyatakzrtayah -* - -
0
v i kalpamgtra sabdhgrtha parikalpana p a n d i t h . I b i d . p . 88 . 29. - _ SZ tu asadvyavahiirasya he tuh na--abhzvasaividah. I b i d . p -89 -* -
111. 7 Buddhist view on Jati:
Accod ing t o t h e Buddhists there i s no onto logica l
ex is tence of u n i v e r s a l s and t?iey ? r e mere c~ns t - ruc t ions of
mina o r imaginary. They maintain t h a t univzrsa ls are subjec-
t i v e cons t ruc t ions capable of being connected with names. They
a r e n o t r e a l e n t i t i e s , subs is t ing a s t h e r e a l i s t s th ink . The
universe i s a flux of momentary particulars. Nothing i s
icient ical and no two a r e sirnilar. i'he so calle::! i c4ent i ty and
s i n i l a r i t y a r e based on our imagination.
~ h a m a k i r t i repudia tes the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e universa l a s
an e x t e r n a l t h ing . The Suddhist den ies e x t e r n a l i t y of t he
un ive r sa l and no t i t s r e a l i t y , a s a p a r t i c u l a r i2ea . 1
The importants po in t s aga ins t the acceptance of ob jec t ive
r e a l i t y of u n i v ? r s a l s by t h e r e a l i s t , a r e summed up by R.R.
Dravia a s follows:
1. The u l t i m a t e l y r e a l i s t h e f l e e t i n g momentary p a r t i -
c u l a r (Svalaksana which i s a b s o l u t e l y d i s c r e t e and disparate.) -- L,
2. The u n i v e r s a l is n o t an e n t i t y belonging t o t h e same
o r d e r o f ex i s t ence as t h e p a r t i c u l a r . It i s a category of
thought and not a thin!;, . The r e a l i s t commits t h e mistake of --
confusing two di $fe ren t o rde r s o f existent:.: thc ~smp&~i@!il
and the u l t ima te .
7 , . Iden t i c21 co ~ n i tions dr, not i - y ~ l y resZ ~ ~ n i v e r s a l s . 1 Lney a r n x p l a i n a b l e on t.ie b a s i s of p a r t i c u l a r exf s t e n t s
anlj t h e n a t u r a l l y c o n s t r ~ c t i v e mind.
4. The assuapt ion of r e a l u n i - ~ o r s s l s pervazin~ d i f f e r e n t
p a r t i c u l a r s i s f r augh t with insolubel d i f f i c u i t i e s . These
d i f i c u l t i e s can be avoided onl-y i f u n i v e r s a l = a r e regarded
2 - tllought-cx-~s t r a c t s .
5. i : ~ i d e n t i t y o r s i s n i l a r i t y i s g ivsn . The un iv -? r sa l i s
n o t a perceived f a c t .
6. A l l no t ions or^ i d e n t i t y a r e n.clgative, t l ~ . ? ~ ; a r i s e 3y
n 2 s e l e c t i n g t h e mutual differenL:e o f o a r t i c u l a r s and by
d i f f e r 2 n t i a t i n ~ tiiern f ron t h e i r o p p o s i t e s 2
~Gotes and Rt?f e renses
sam5natZna tu subhyaXSratven3. See ?VTJ 3c T';. ?. 65. -- - - -- - 11. sl. 9,10.
cf. - X4. p t . 11. p. 2
2. v ide 2.3. Drav id ; The ?rob le? o f univ :rsals in I n d i m
2hilosophy. p. 86.
cf. :;.I. p t . 11. p. 2 .
111. 6 3 u d i h i s t v iew on ;arnava'ya
-4mongst t h e opponents o f the r e l a t i o n of the Fnh?r?r~ce -
3udC'his"L come f i rs t . : ~ h n m a k i r t i as comao~ 21 t7,:e?ty f i v e
., ,exovic v2rses wi th h i s own co::imentary i n o r e e r t . 3 r c fuc? s l L
I kin55 o f r e l a t i o n s .
- -ic:or:inj t o D h a m a k i r t i , a r e l a - z i ~ ~ i s a c ~ n c ? l ~ t u a l
f i c s i o n f s*~r i c : : : t ed by our mint5 havin:4 no 95joctiv6: raality a t
a l l . 2
Thi dno-.dedge of r e l a t i o n i s u n r e a l , becaul? it csznot
be a s c s r t a i n 3 d ei-Lher by n e r c s p t i o n o r 5\: inft?re:lc-3. An,-! t h e r e
i s no t::i+ means of ? roo f . 3
The !JaiyZyikas dsfenc.: of a r e l a t i o n i s e n t i r e l y 4 b a s e l e s s , because, t h e r ? can be only t w o ways of inter-
p r e t i n g a r s l a t i o n . 5
1 . Dependence ( ~ a r a t a n t r y a )
2. I n t e r p e n i t r a t i o n (n iPas / l e sa ) . .- But bo th t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f a i l t o e s t a b l i s h it. If we
a c c e p t dependence, we w i l l have s e v e r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s .6 I f 1
we a c c e p t r f ipaslesa, it w i l l go a g a i n s t t h e fundamental .- p r i n c i p l s o f ou r r e l a t i o n s , t h a t n r e l a t i o n needs two d i s c r e
e n t i t i e s . 7
F i n a l l y ~ n n r m a ~ i r t i c o n c l u r ~ e s , t h a t t he r - can be no /
r zpas l e sa saSosn<-.ha between t w ? d i s t i n c t e n t i t i es. 6
~ h a r m a k i r t i f u r t h e r argues t h a t whether the r s l a t i o n
i s i d e n t i c a l with :he rc la t ;? o r d i f f e r e n t f rox thsn. If i t
i s i d e n t i c a l with t h e r e l a t i , then t h e r e w i l l bs s i t h e r t ' ~ e
r e l a t i m o r t h e r e l a t ~ i . ~ If t h e r 2 l a t i o n i s a ( - : i s t i n c t
e n t i t y d i f f z r 2 n t from tb .~ . r e l a t a , now t h e r . - l a t i?n i s t o be
r e l a t e d a t a l l . 10
.:ran-in; t n i s sug7ositFon tha:, a re!.?ti?n i s a d i s t i n c t
e A t i t y along with t h e r e l a t . ? , i~ow t h e two rel::t,2 b r z l a t s d
by on? r s l a t i o n . ' If another r e l a t i o n i : nostul-3ted to
relate i t s r e l a t i o n , i t would involv.? t h e f a l l l t of anavastha. 12
F i n a l l y i ) h a m a k i r t i c a t e g o r i c a l l y ru l ed ou t th::t, t he
no t ion of r z l a t i o n a s an independent e n t i t y i s a f a l s e one. 13
1 . F o r a. de ta i led : ' , iscussion on this, vide!, \I.,;. Jh3,
?hi?;so,:ny o f P k l a t i o n , vide, a l s o h i s a r t i c l e "T~harms-
-,. , i rde, d.K. Dala i , O?.cit., np,. 94-102.
u k t a lrakarebi-iyah pramSn5ntara;ya ??renSnabh.vu.2a . m i i t , - - .
4 . te~mzt sarvasya - bhavasya sa ib lndho n g s t i t ? tv s t3h -
laksano va PUI, p . 104. - .-._ - - 6. prsthamspakse kim asau nispannayoh sambandhinoh s y a t ,
.- ._ -- -. . - anispannayor va? na t a v a t anispannayoh, svanipasyaivZstta- .- . -- - . . . -
'-'-' v a t -- sasas visiinavat nispannayos/ca PKM, SMP, P O 504,Sw, pa812 --- --. --
7. dvistatvzt tr[lsya sambandhasya T?KM, p. 505+ .-, -..- -.- - - -, ,
8, rupasleso h i saibandho dvi tve s a ca k a t h a i bhavet - .- - I --- -- tasmgt prakrtibhinnangm saibandho n a s t i t a t v a t a h -. - ---a