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Buddhist Logic. Vol. II - F. Th. Stcherbatsky - 1930

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BUDDHISTLOGIC byF.Th.Stcherbatsky In Two Volumes - VolumeII DoverPublications,Inc. NewYorkNewYork PublishedintheUnitedKingdombyConstable andCompanyLimited,10OrangeStreet,London W.C.2. ThisnewDover edition, firstpublished in1962. isanunabridgedandcorrectedrepublicationofthe workfirstpublishedbytheAcademyofSciencesof theU.S.S.R.,Leningrad,circa1930. VolumesIandIIwereoriginallypublishedas VolumeXXVI,PartsIandII,ofthe"Bibliotheca Buddhica"Series. Libraryof CongressCatalogCardNumber: 62-52862 Manufactured intheUnited States ofAmerica DoverPublications,Inc. 180VarickStreet NewYork14,N.Y. TABLEOFCONTENTS P Preface.....................I AshorttreatiseofLogic(Nyaya-bindu)by DharmakIrtiwith itscommentary(Nyayarbindu-Vka)byDharmottara translated fromthe sanscrit text edited in the Bibliotheka Buddbica..........1-253 I.Perception1 II.Inference.47 III.Syllogism.109 Appendices I. VacaspatimiSraontheBuddhistTheoryofPer-ception............255 II.VacaspatimiSraontheBuddhist Theory of 1\radicil distincti onbetweensensationandconception(pra-mfll}.a-vyavastbii:versusprami 7;l&-samplava).299 III.Thetheoryof mentalsensation309 IV.Vasubandhu,VinItadeva,Vacaspatim.iSra,Udayana, Dign1igaandJinendrabnddhiontheactandthe content ofknowledge,on the coordination (sarupya) of perceptswith their objects and on our knowledge oftbeexternalworld...........341 V.VlicaspatimiSraonBuddhistNominalism(apoha.-viida)..............401 VI.CorrectionstothetextsoftheNyltyabindu, Nyayabindu-tJkaandNyaya-bindu-tIkl'1-Tipp3{l.l printedint heBibliot.hekaBuddhica433 Indices ..... I.Propernames II. Schools... m. Sanscritworks . '" IV.Sanscritwordsandexpressions '.439 441 443 443 444 PREFAOE Morethantwentyyearshaveelapsedsincewehavefirsttreated thesubjectofBuddhistlogicandepistemologyastheyweretaught intheschoolsofMahayanaBuddhism..Ournearlyuniquesourceat thattimewastheNyaya-binduand tika, this solitary sanscrit remnant -ofwhathasbeenavastfieldofliterary production. Since that time our knowledgeofthesubjectbasbeenconsiderablyenlarged.Important sanscrittextshavebeendiscoveredandpublishedinIndia.The inter-connectionandmutualinfluencesofIndiansystemsarebetterknown. TheTibetanliteraturerevealsitselfasanalmostillimitedsourceof information.Prof.H. Jacobihascontributedaseriesofarticlesonthe earlyhistoryofIndiansystems.Prof.J. Tuccihasrecentlyelucidated theproblemofBuddhistlogicbeforeDignaga.Prof.delaVallee Poussinhasbroughttoasuccessfulendhismonumentaltranslation -oftheAbhidharma-Kosa.Prof.SylvaniLevihasenrichedourknow-ledgebyimportantdiscoveriesin Nepal. Prof. M. Walleser bas founded inHeidelberganactivesocietyforthestudyofMahayana.A great dealofworkhasbeendonebyIndianandJapanesescholars.The Nyaya-binduisnomoreasolitaryrockinanunknownsea.Buddhist logicrevealsitself astheculminatingpointofa longcourseofIndian philosophichistory.Its birth,itsgrowthanditsdeclinerunparallel withthebirth,thegrowthandthedeclineofIndiancivilisation.The timehascometoreconsiderthesubjectof Buddhistlogicinits histo-ricalconnections.Thisisdoneinthesetwovolumesofwhichthe secondapearsbeforethefirst.It containstranslationswhichaimat beingintelligible,areservationnotunnecessaryinIndianmatters, sincewehavewitnessedtranslationsbyauthoritativepenswhichread likeanabsolutelyunintelligiblerigmarole.Inthecopiousnotesthe literaryrenderingsare given where needed.This will enablethe reader fully toappreciatethe sometimesenormousdistancewhich lies between thewordsofthesanscritphrasingandtheirphilosophicmeaning VI renderedaccordingtoOurhabitsofthought.Thenotescontainalso aphilosophiccommentofthetranslatedtexts.Thereaderwhowould liketohaveavued'ensembleofBuddhistphilosophyasit isrepre-sentedinitslogicalpartwillhavetogothroughthelabyrinthof thesenotesandtextsandmakeforhimselfastatementaswellasan estimateofthatdoctrine.Thistaskisfacilitatedinthefirstvolume whichwillcOiltainahistoricalsketchaswellasasyntheticalrecon-structionof the wholeedificeof the finalshape ofBuddhist philosophy, asfarasitcanbeachievedatpresent.Thesecondvolumethuscon-tainsthemat.erialaswellasthejustificationforthisreconstruction. Thefirstvolumeisinthepressandwehopethatitwillappear beforelong. A SHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC, NYAYA-BINDU BY DHARMAKIRTI WITH .ACOMMENTARY(TIKi) BYDH.ARMOTTARA CHAPTER1. PEROEPTION. 1.SUBJECTMATTERANDPURPOSEOFTHISW PRK. 1.Allsuccessfulhumanactionisprecededby' rig h tk now 1 e d g e.The re for et his(k now led g ewill beher e)in v est i gat e d. (1. 6).Inthissentencetheimportanceofthesubjectofthepre-sent work ispointed to.The bodyofaliterary work, indeed, has a double aspect,itconsistsofwordsandsubjectmatter.Thewords,inthe presentcase,havenootherpurposethantoconveytheirmeaning; theywillnotbeanalysed.Butifthesubjectmatterwereofnouse, noworkcouldbedevotedtoanenquiry 1intoit,justasnoreason-ablemanwouldeverundertakeanenquiry about the teethof the crow, becausethiswould servenopurpose.ll Wishingtoshowthatthistrea-tisedeservestobewritten,theauthorpointstotheimportanceof itssubjectmatter(1.10).Because(sayshe)allsuccessfulhumanac-tionisprecededbyrightknowledge,thereforethis(phenomenon) mustbeinvestigated,andwiththisaimthepresenttreatiseisunder-taken.Suchisthemeauingofthe(prefatory)sentence.3 (2. 2).(By makingthisstatement,viz.)bystatinp;thatrightknowledge - the 1pratipatti =bstan-pa. IIWewould expectsincethe melLll-ing is not that the teeth are useless, but that an investigationaboutunexisting teeth isuseless,cpoTlitp., p.1.17,!lJldinfra,p.2.22.(text).Thiswouldagreewith Vinitadeva's interpretationaccordingtowhomthevyutpattimust haveaprayojana.Sincevyutpattiisalready the prayojanaofthetreatise itself itsimportancewillthen be prayojanasya prayojanam. To this doubleprayojana Dharmottara takesexception,heisthusobligedtogive&so-mewhat awkward turn to his example.But cpoTatp.,p.28.12,(-iim?) 3VinItadeva, p. 81. 10, hasinterpretedthe firstsentenceasconta.iningan indication1)ofthesubject-matter(abhidheya =samyag-jflana),2)ofitsaim (prayqjana =vyutpattl), 3)their connection(sambanaha)and 4)theaimof theaim (prayojanasyaapi prayo,janam),thelatter referring tothe realimportanceofthe studyofthetheory of cognition,sincecognitionisinvolvedineverypurposiveac-tion.Dharmottaraobjectstotheunusualprayojanasyaprayqjanam.He takes the firstsentenceasa whole,indicating theimportanceofastudyof the theoryof 2A.SHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC subjectmatterofthistreatise - isthecause 1ofallsuccessfulhuman action,theimportance(ofatheoryofcognitionisalone)stated(di-rectly).(2.3)Butbymakingsuchastatementthesubject-matter(of thework),itsaimanditsfitness 2(forthataim)are(indirectly)in-dicated.Indeedwhenitisbeingstatedthatrightknowledge,the sourceofall(successful)humanaction,Swillbeanalysedinthepre-sentwork,itisalsoimpliedthat right knowledgeisthesubject-mat-terofthisliterarycomposition,itsaimisananalysisof(thepheno-menon)ofknowledge,andtheworkitselfrepresentsthemeans through whichtheanalysis(isaChieved).(2.5).Directlystatedisthus only (one) point, the importanceof the subject matter, (theother points), itsfitnessetc., are then implicitly understood:' The(prefatory)sentence aloneisnotadequatetogiveadirectstatementofthesubjectmat-ter,thepurposeandtheconnectionbetweenthem(separately).By namingdirectlyonlyonepoint,it indirectlyalludestoallthree.(2.7). Theword"this))(knowledge)pointsheretothesubjectmatter.The words((will beinvestigated - tothe purpose.Thepurpose here meant (isdouble).Fortheauthoritisthetaskofcomposingthework, whilstforthestudentitisthetaskofstudyingit.(2.9).Indeed,all reasonablemensetthemselvestoworkwhentheyhavesomeuseful aiminview.Tothequestions:;astowhyhas theMasterwrittenthis treatiseandwhyshoulditbestudiedbythepupils,it isanswered thatitspurposeisananalysis(of knowledge).It iswrittenbythe authorinorderthathemayhimselfbecometheteacherforthose cognition,andthenthethreeusualpreliminariesasimplicitly containedinit.He thinks that a.distinctionbetweenprakara'f}asya sarira-prayojanwmandabhiilheya-prayojanamisuseless,sincesariraisfirst ofall sabilawhichisnot investigated. 1uktviimURtbeinsertedbeforeprayojana,p.2.2, cpoTib.rgyu.fl,id-du b8tan-pas. 2sambandka. 3 = 4Lit.,p.2.5.Thereforebytheforceof direct sta.tement(abhiilhana)of the importance(prayojana)ofthepa.rt(whichis)thesubject,connectionetc.are expressed.Dh.thusinsists that thefirstsntra,asawhole(samutiayartha),refers directlytoabhidheya-prayojana,i. e.tothe importanceof atheoryof cognition, thethreeusualpreliminariesare thentobeunderstoodimplicitly.Vinihdeva thinks that abhiilheyaand prayojana areexpresseddirectly (readmnon-auinstead ofanon-au,p.32.2ofM.delaVallee-Poussin'seditioninB.I.)and sambandha indirectly.Theimportanceof atheoryofcognitionistheuconceived by himasa prayojanasyaapiprayojanam (p.3S. 8). 5iti satrtsaye. PEROEPTIOK3 whoarebeinginstructedin(thetheoryof)cognition,anditisstu-diedbythepupilsdesirousofacquiringforthemselvestheinstruc-tiondeliveredbytheMaster.Ananalysisofknowledgeisthusthe purposeofboththecompositionandthestudy ofthework.(2.13). Noword(intheprefatorysentence)indicatestheconnectionbetween thesubjectmatterandthepurpose.Itmustbesuppliedfromthe context.]Indeedwhenareasonablemanisworkingat thistreatise forthesakeofananalysisofrightknowledge,thistreatise isjust themeansofattaininghispurposeandthereisnoother.Thusitis dearthattherelationbetweenthistreatiseanditsaimisthatofan expedientandthethingtobeexpedited. (2.16).However,(theadvisabilityofstatingthesetopicsatthe beginningcanbequestioned),since,evenif theyarestated,norea-sonablemanwillacceptthemwithoutfurtherevidence,beforehaving lookedintothebook.Thisistrue!Withoutaforegoingstudyof the book thesetopics,althoughstated,cannot beappreciated.But when stated,evenwithoutbeingauthenticated,theyprovokethespiritof inquisitiveness 2 by which people are incited towork(2.18). Indeed, when reasonablemenpresumethatathingmaybeofsomensetothem,B they (immediately)set towork;whereaswhentheysuspectthat it is of nouse,4theygiveitup.(2.19).Thereforetheauthorofascien-tificworkisespeciallyexpectedtomakeatthebeginningastate-mentabouttheconnection(betweenhisaimandthesubjectmat-ter).Fotitisallverywellforwritersofromancetomakefalse statements inordertoamuse,5l)ut wecannot imagine what wouldbe the aim of a scientific author if he went (the length of) misstating his subject-matter.Neither(doweseethatthisactually)occurs.Thereforeit is naturaltoexpectinquisitivenessconcerningsuch(works).(2.22).If it werenotstated,thestudentmightpossiblythinkthatthesnbject matterservednopurposeatallas,e.g.,anenquiryabouttheteeth ofacrow;orthat(theaim)wasirrealizableas,e. g.,theinstmction toadornoneselfwiththedemonTakaka'screstjewelwhichre-leasesfromfever 6;orthatitsaimwasundesirable,liketheinstruc-1samarthyiit. IIsal"(l-8aya. 8artha-saf!l6ayn.. 4anartha-sal1;6aya. :;Lit.,2. 20.Indeedthewordsof story-tellel'smaybeimaginedilla differentwayforthesakeof sportetc.(Tib. =k'r"i4iidi) I). 6Cll.thesamesimileTatll D.3. 6. 4 ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC tionabouttheritualtobefollowedat the(re-)marriageceremonyof one'sownmother 1;orthattheaimcouldpossiblybeattainedinan easierwaythanthroughthisbook;or againthatit wasaltogether useless.If anysuchpresentimentofuselessnessarises,reasonable menwillnotapplythemselvestothestudyofthebook.Bystating thesubjectmatteretc.someusefulpurposeis(always)suggested, andthischecksthesuspicionofuselessness.Reasonablemenarethus incitedtotakeaction.Thusitisclearthattheconnection(be-tweenthesubjectmatterandthepurpose)isstatedinorderthat thebookmaybecreditedwithefficiency,sincesuchconsideration inciteshmnanactivity. 2.RIGHTKNOWLEDGEDEFINED. (3.5).Rightknowledgeisknowledgenotcontradicted(byex-perience).2 In commonlife we likewise say that (aman)has spokentruth whenhemakesusreachtheobjecthehasfirstpointedout.Similarly (wecanalsosay)thatknowledgeisrightwhenitmakesusreach anobjectitdidpointto.Butby((making usreachanobject,)nothing elseismeantthanthefactofturning(ourattention)straighttothe object.Indeedknowledgedoesnot createanobjectanddoesnotoffer ittous,butinturning(ourattention)straighttotheobjectit(eo ipso)makesusreachit.Againtoturnamanstraighttothe object isnothingelsethantopointitoutasan aimof a (possible)purposive action.Indeed,(oneshouldnotimagine)thatknowledgehasthe powerforciblytoinciteaman(againsthisWill).3 1ThisisanindicationthatBuddhistshadinIndiathesameaversiontothe remarriageofwidowsasthebrahminic(llHindus. 2This isthe Buddhistdefinitionofempirical knowledge(Ba1llyag-jiiana=pra-malJa).It isopposedtothedefinitionsoftheMlmal!lsakas(artha-avabodha), oftheCarvIikas(artha-darsana),theNaiyayikas(prama-kararta).MIidh-yamikasandYogacaras heldthat thisknowledgeisatranscendentalillusion liila1llbanebhranta1ll).Withthisreservationthefirstacceptedtherealistic Logicof the Naiyayiks, the secondadheredtothereformofDign:tga,cpomyNirviilJ.a, p.156 n.For VinItadeva, p.34.1,40.13, and K amalaiHla, Tattvasg., p. 392.6, the definitionrefersto the field of experience only andthns agrees both withthe YogIicliraandSautrantika viewsBut theTipp., p.18-19, thinksthatthe Yoglicara idealismishere forsaken Ilnd the Sautrantika realism adhered to. As to Jinendrabuddhi'8 view cpo Appendix. 8ThusjriiinamisaF!iipaka-hetu,notakaraka-hetu.Theseremarksare probablydirectedagainstVinitadevawhoexplainspurufartha =prat/ojana, siddhi =siidhaka(gj'ub-par-byed-pa)andpiirvakaas''''etu.Hethusconverta joonaintoakaraka-ht.tu.KamalasHa,justasDh.,definesavisaf!lfJaditfJG88 PERCEPTION 5 (3.9).Forthisveryreason(aswillbestatedlateron) 1the Qnlyultimateresultofanactofcognizingis(simply)adistinctco-gnition.Whenanobjecthasbeencognized,manhasbeen(eoipso) turnedtowardsitandtheobjectreached.2 The(proper)functionof cognition is thusat an endjust after the object has been cognized. (3.10). Forthisveryreasoncognitionisconcernedwithanobjectnotyetco-gnized.Butwhenit hasbeenfirstcognized,thesameactofcognition hasalsodrawn(theattention)ofmanandhasmadehimreach theobject,(i. e.,reachit byhiscognition).Anyfurtheract conceming thatveryobjectcannotberegardedasitscognition.s Consequently(a purposiveactiondirectedtowards)anobject alreadycognizedwillnot beanactofcognizingit.4 (3.12).(Turningnowtothedifferentmodesof cognitionwesee that)whenanobjecthasbeenapprehendedbydirectexperience,sit hasbeenconvertedintoanobjectof(possible)purposiveaction throughsense-perception.Because(wesay)thatsense-perceptionhas pointedoutanobject,whenthefunctionofthatknowledgewhich consistsinmakingusfeelitspresenceinourkenis followed by a COD-struction(ofitsimage).6Therefore(wesay)thatanobjecthasbeen pointedoutbysense-perception,whenitiscognizedassomething directlyperceived.(3.15).Inference(orindirectcognition,differs)in thatitpointsoutthemarkoftheobject,andbythus(indirectly) makingsure(itsexistence)submitsitasanobjectofpossiblepurpo-referringtoapossible,not toan actualslIccessful action (=abhimata-artha-kriyii-somarthaarthaprapatJa-saktimattvam,na tu 1'1'apanameva.,op.citp.392.7). 1Abont cpoinfra,text,p.14. 16 and 18.8cpotrans!. and notes. IITheMimlll}lSaka.assumesthreestagesinthedevelopmentofeveryco-gnItiveact,thefirstapprehensionpurposiveaction(pravartana) andthesuccessfulreachingof theobject(prapaTfaorhana-upadiincr),everyfol-lowingstagebeing theresult(phola)of theprecedingone.AccordingtoDh.,the firststage alonebelongstothedomainofcognitionproper,thesubsequentideaof a purposiveactionisnotanactof cognizingthe samething,cpoTip p.,p. 8. 5,and Slokav.,60-70. 3Lit.,p.3.12. Regardingthatveryobjectwhatcananothercognition make additionally? l) 4Reaching"(prapa1,la)asunderstoodbytheMimal}lsakt\andNaiya-yika meansactualsuccessfulaction;asunderstoodbyDh.,it heremeanspossible purposivecpoTipp., p.8.6.CpoT3 tparya t., p.15.5. 5drf.areferstoallsense.facultir.s,notvisionalone. (lThisistherealdefinitionof sense perception,itisconceivedasamoment ofindefinite(l'ijfiana)whichisfollowedbyaconstruction (kalpanif = vikalpa)of adefiniteimage. Thedefinition asgivenon p.6. 15ismadf' 1'ipratiprrtti-cpothe samedefinitionillf)'(1.text,p.11.12. 6A.SHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC siveaction.Thusitisthatsense-perceptionpointsoutadefinite 1 object,(i. e.,anobject localizedintimeandspace)whichappearsbe-foreusdirectly,Sandinferencelikewise pointsoutadefiniteobjectby wayofthemarkitisconnectedwith.Thesetwo(methodsofco-gnizing)pointoutdefiniteobjects,thereforetheyareright know-ledge.(3. 17). Whatdiffersfromthemisnot(right) knowledge. Know-ledgeisrightwhenitmakesusreachtheobject,anditmakesus reachitwhenithaspointedtoanattainableobject.sButanobject pointedoutinsomedifferentway,notaccordingto theabovemen-tionedtwo(methodsofright knowlegde),iseitherabsolutelyunreal as,e.g.,waterseenasavisioninadesert - it doesnotexist,itcan-notbereached - oritisuncertainastowhetherit existsornot as,e.g.,everyproblematicobject.Sincethereisnosuchobject inthe world,whichatthesametimewouldbeexistentandnon-existent, thereforesuch(aproblematicobject)canneverbeattained.(3.21). Andallimagination 4whichisnotproducedbythe(real)markofthe 1niyataisherecontrastedwithsa'fl}sayaandviparyaya,it isthesameas niscita.Cponiyata-pratibhasaonp.8.10,andniyata-akaraon p.70.11, where themeaning of niyata varies. 1Ipratibhi:i8a =nirbhiisa =1ibhasa =prattbimbana,cpo'1;'ipp.,p.12.12. 8Lit.,p.3.17.Thereisnootherv-iji'lana.What points toanobject,which itis possibletoattain,fetches,andbyfetchingit isrightknowledge.We would haveabettermeaningifthis:firstsentencewereunitedwiththe followingtwo. Noother sensation (vijnana)indicating (adarsayat=upadarsayat)anobject.cap-ableofbeingreachedissuchasmakesreach))(prapaka)andthroughmaking usreach(theobject)isrightknowledge.But the Tibetantranslationdoesnot supportthis interpretation.Vijilana in logic losesitsmeaningof aninde:finitepure sensation(= nirvikalpakajilana) whichithad inAbhidharmawhereit wascon-trasted with sarrjilaasadefiniteidea.Withthe Yogacaras andMli.dhyamikas itisoftencontrastedwithji'lanawhichhasthenthesenseoftranscendental knowledge(= Tib. ye-ses).Here it has thegeneralsenseof knowledge,idea,orre-presentation,justasintheterm 'V-ijilana-vadin; jilanaandvijfianaarehereused indiscrilninately,asthenextfollowingjilanenaproves,anyajji'lanamisthen = mithyli ji'lanam asp. 3. 23, cp.my Nirvlil)a, Index. However there are some contexts where,as will beseen below, we must take into account the original meaning orviji!ana-skandhaaspuresensation.CpoVacaspati's remarkthat whenjilana standsinsteadofvijilana = vistfta-jiianait excludeseveryelementofsmrtior saf!llJkara,cpoN.vart.,p.48.5-6 andTatp.,p.114.1.Buttherelation may bereversed,cpoJinendrabuddhi, f.40.a.7. 4,kalpanameaningprimarilyarrangement(yojana)andvikalpameaning choice,dichotomy(dvaidhi-kam'1}Cl),arebothusedinthe senseof imagination,but pure imaginationisdistingnished fromconstructive imagina-tion(linga;a-vikalpa).A doubtappertainsalwaystotheimaginativepartofknow-ledge,not tosensation,yas tu(sa)vika7Iakasya jiianasya, Tipp., p.10.11. 'I object,whichoperates(freely)withouttakingnoticeoflimitation(by reality)canbutrefertoa problematicfact(aboutwhichweneither know)thatit existsnorthatitdoesnotexist.Suchanobjectcan neverbereached.Thereforeeverycognitionother(thanperceptionor inference)isnotasourceofrightknowleuge,sinceitpresentsan objectwhichcannotbereached,anobjectwhichis(either)abso-lutelyunreal(or)uncertainastowhetherit existsornoti (3.23).(Sentientbeings)strivefordesiredends.Theywantthat knowledgewhichleadsthemtotheattainmentofobjectsfittedfor successfulaction.Theknowledgethatisinvestigatedbythetheory (ofcognition)isjusttheknowledgetheywant.Thereforeright knowledgeisknowledgewhichpointstoreality,(arealitywhich)is capableofexperiencingpurposiveaction.ll (4.1).Andthatobjectalone whichhasbeenpointedoutbysuchright knowledgecanbereached)), (i. e.,clearlyanddistinctly cognized), because,aswe11avestated above (p.4),weunderstandby,l,or words are etprnal, becausetheyarevoluntarilyproduced. 2Lit.,p.19.13.Bythewordjustthegeneral-uncertain (isset aside))), i.e.,anuncertainreason(anaikantika,)whichisovercomprehensive(siidhara,1}a),it isfoundinsimilar and indissimilar cases,ase.g.,-Thesis.Ourwordsdependuponvolition, Reason.Becausetheyareimpermanent. Impermanentthingsarefoundinsimilarcases,inobjectswhoseproduction dependsIIponvolition,and illdissimilar cases,e.g,inlightningwhoseproduction doesnotdependuponhuman volition. 3Lit.,p.19.14-15.eeByputtingtheemphaticwordbeforementioningpre-sencethe validity (hetutvct)of dependence onan effortis indicated, whichpossesses existence notembrac.ing(all)similarcases)). 56ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC Thesis.Someoneisomniscient. Reason.Becausehespeaks. 1 Thesimilarcasesarecasesofomniscience.(Theexistenceofomni-scientbeingsisproblematic,henceitnever)canbemadeoutwith certaintywhethertheyspeak,(ornot). 7.Itsabsoluteabsenceindissimilarcasesis ne ce s sary. (19.20).What adissimilar case is, willbestated later on.The third aspectofalogicalmarkconsistsinitsabsoluteabsenceindissimilar cases, (such absence beingcharacterized by) necessity. Here the word (( ab-sence)) aimsat exeluding a contrary mark,sincethe contrary is present in dissimilar cases.(19.21).Bytheword absolute)) an overwideIImarkis excludedwhichembraces(allsimilar casesand)partofthedissimilar cases(aswell),e.g., Thesis.Wordsareproducedvoluntari!y. Reason.Becausetheyareimpermanent. Inthisexamplethemark(impennanence) ispresent inonepartof the dissimilarcases,suchaslightningetc.(whicharenotvoluntarilypro-ducedandareimpermanent),andabsent inanotherone,e.g.,in Space (whichisnotvoluntarilyproduced,butiseternal).Therefore,it must benecessarilyrejected(asavalidmark).(20.1).If insteadofsa.ying absoluteabsenceindissimilarcases))theauthorwouldhaveputem-phasisontheword(( dissimilal'))cases,the meaning would have been the followingone - this isa validmarkwhichisabsent in dissimilar cases onlY)I.Then(intheaboveexample)thequalityofbeingproducedvo-luntarily IIwouldnotmakeavalidmark, becauseit is really alsoabsent 1Theoriginofthisstrange-looking inferenceisprobablythefollowingone. TheBuddhistSaint,thearya, theBodhisattva, is credited withthefacultyof ap-prehendingtheUniversesub specie aeternitatis,cpop.32n.Whenhehasreached thedrti-'I1largaallhishabitsofthoughtarechangedaDdhedirectlyintuitsby mysticintuition(yogi-pratyka)thatconditionoftheworldwhichrevealsitself to themonisticphilosopher.Thisiscalledomniscience(8arva-iikara-jrlata,8Qrva-jnata).Butthisoutlookissomethingbeyondverbalexpression(anirvacaniya). Thereforewhosoeverputshisteachingintowordscannotbeomniscient inthis senseofthe term.CpoNyaya- kal,kika,p.110.15:1i.and181. 25ii.The problem reflected inthisexample is thatOmniscienceisbeyondour knowledge.Theterms have then beenarrangedinevery possible,positiveandnegative,combination,as willbeseen lateron,ch.III,ailtra 76, If. Cp.alsoKamalaiiIla, p. 882. 7 and890lf. 28 a d h a r a ~ a ,(over-embracing , INFERENCE57 in (some)ofthesimilar(i.e.impermanent) cases(suchaslightning).l Thereforethewords"indissimilarcases))havenotbeenemphasized. (20.3).Thewordnecessary(absence)setsaside aproblematicmark, amarkwhoseabsenceindissimilarcasesisuncertain. (20.5).Thefollowingquestionarises.Whenthepresenceofthe markonly))insimilarcaseshasbeenstated,its((absoluteabsence indissimilarcasesmustevidentlyfollowbyimplication.l!Whyisit then,thattwodifferentaspectsofthemarkhavebeenmentioned? (20.6).Theanswerisasfollows.Eitherthepositive concomitance 8(of themark withthepredicate)01'(itscontraposition,i.e.),theinverted concomitance(oftheirnegations),4shouldbeactuallyused.5 But both mustbewithoutexception.6 Nototherwise.Inordertoemphazise (thisnecessity)bothaspectshavebeenmentioned.(20.7).If however bothwereactuallyusedwithoutbeingapplied strictly,wewouldhave thefollowingresult - "amarkwhichispresentinsimilarandabsent indissimilarcasesisvalid ",andthen we would have a validinference in thefollowingexample, Thesis. The (child in the womb of this woman) has a dark complexion. Reason.Becauseitisherchild. Example.Justasherotherchildrenwhomwesee. Inthisexamplethefactof beingthesonofthiswomanwouldbe avalidmark,(althoughthisisnotthecase,sincethecomplexionof thefuturechilddependsuponthedietofthemother).7(20. 9).There-fore,eitherthepositiveconcomitanceOritscontrapositionmustbe actuallyusedininference.Butboth mustneedsbewithoutexception 1Lit.,p.20.1-2.(Supposing)theemphaticwordprecedestheword absence,themeaningwouldbethefollowingone,thatisareasonwhichisab-sent indissimilar cases only D.Butthebeingproduced by a voluntaryeffortis also absentinsomeofthesimilarcases,(i.e.,in someimpermanentobjects),there-foreitwouldnot beareason . 2Lit.,p.20.5.(cButwhenitissa.idthepresence(,Bosanquet, Logic,1.14 - identityindiffe-rencell,Sigwart, Gp.cit, I. Ill, objectingtoKant'sview,prefers to call it agree-ment(Uebereinstimmung). Thelast named author, ibid.1.264 ff.,gives also expres-siontotheviewthatthenecessityofeverythingexisting isdeducedeither out of its essenceoroutofitsorigin (ausdemWesennnd der Ursache);this would corre-spondtoDharmakirti'sdivisionof affirmationasfoundedeither onIdentityOr Causation (tadatmya-tatlutpathl,cpoalsoSchuppe, Logik,p.128.Alljudgments whicharenotfoundedonacausalrelationbetweentheterms,andwhichare notnegative,canbereducedtosuchaformulawheretheminortermisa point-instant,themajoristhepredicate,andthemiddle,whichisthesubjectinthe analytical judgment,representsthe justification forpredication. 1sambandlla. INFERENCE 17.Ase.g.-Thesis.Thisisatree. Rea son.B e c a useiti sanA S 0 k a. 67 (24. 2).Theword this IIpointstothesubject(oftheconclusion), thewords((atreellcontainthepredicate,thewords((becauseitisan Asoka))containthereason.Thismeans,-thisobjectisfittobecalled atree,becauseitisfittobecalledanAsoka.(24.3).Now,ifsome unintelligentmanwhodoesnot know theproper nseoftheword ASoka (wouldreside)inacountrywheresuchtreesareabundant,andif so-mebodywouldpointouttohima high Asokaandsay"thisisatree ", thentheman,beingunintelligent,willthinkthattheheightofthe Asokaisthereasonwhyit iscalledatree.LookingatasmallAsoka, 11ewouldthinl{thatisnotatree.(24.6).Thisunintelligentmanmust beinduced(tousethewordtree properly,asbeing)thegeneralmark ofeveryAsoka.It meansthatnottheheightorsomeotherspecial markarethereasonsfornsingthewordtree,but(itsessencealone), themerefactofitsbeinganAsoka,its(general)characteristics,its boughsandotherattributes,arethereason.l (24.9).Inordertoexemplify(adeductionbycausality,wherethe reasonis)aneffect,theauthorsays. 18.Thee ff e c tisasf 011 0 w s. The sis.Her ei sfir e. Rea son.Be c a usethe rei ssm 0k e. (24.11).Firen isthe predicate(major term)."Here IIis thesubject. (minorterm)."Becausethereissmoke))isthereason(middleterm). Causalityisaconceptionfamiliarincommonlife.2 It isknownto bederivedfromexperience(ofthepresenceofthecausewherever thereisaneffectpresent),andfromthenegativeexperience(ofthe absenceoftheeffectwhenitscauseisdeficient).Thereforethedefini-1Judgmentsreferring totheextensionandcomprehension of concepts are thus broughtunderthishead.Vinitadeva giveshere noexampleat all.The formula of Dharmakirtireferstoallanalyticaljudgmentsorinferences,andnottosuch casesof name-explainingalone. Thisofcoursedoesnot meanthat theevery-day conceptionofcausalityis admitted.Dharmakirtidevelopshisviewsonthat subjectin Pramapavinis.. caya.TheexpositioninSarvadars.S.(p.5 :if.)isborrowedfromthatsource. Cansa.lityexistsonlybetweenpoint-instants(katta)whicharenotproducing,bUi merelyfollowingoneanother.Dharmottaraalludestothistheoryabove,text p.10.12andinthesequel,p. 70Jr.But predication,inferring,purposiveaction, cognition,andconsequentlycausationareexamined inlogic mainlyfromtheem-piricalpointof view. 68A'l'REATISEOFLOGIO tionofcausalityisnotgiven,incontradistinctionfromtheanalytical reason(whosedefinitionhasbeengiven). 5.HowARESYNTHETIOANDANALYTICJUDGMENTSPOSSIBLE. (24. 13).(TheconsistencyofadivisionintoNegation,Identityand Causality) mightbequestioned.(If theyarequitedifferent)three prin-ciples,wecannotatallspeakofonelogicalreason(ingeneral).Ancl if theyarethedifferentvarieties(ofonegenus),then(thevarieties maybeendless),becausethevariouscasesofananalyticaldeduction aloneareinnumerable,anditbecomesimpossibletoreckononlythree varietiesoflogicaldeduction.Tothisweanswerthat(theprincipleof thedivision)isthefollowingone. 19.(Cognition)iseitheraffirmationornega-tion,(andaffirmation)isdouble,(asfoundedeither onIdentityoronCausation).l (24.16).Theword here))mean::; amongthesethreedifferent logicalreasons.Tworeasonsestablishrealities.TIlCYarethefoun-dation,orjustification,2foranaffirmativejudgment. 3 The(remaining) oneisthereason,orjustification,foranegativejudgment.It mustbe keptinmindthatbynegationwemean(all deductionsof)absenceand the practical value of negation in life.4 (24. 18).The meaning is the follow-ingone.(Thereasonsaredifferentnotbythemselves,butindirectly, 1Lit.,p.24.Hi.Heretwoareestablisllingrealthings(vastu),olleisthe reasonofnegation)). 2gamaka. Verynoteworthyisheretheidentificationofreality (vastu)withaffirmation (vidhi).Thefollowingtermsmustberegarded as synonymous vastu =paramiirtha-sat,cpop.13.18, =stalaka1}a,cpop.13.10, =kalJ.a,cpop.12.18, =artha-kriya-kiiri,cpop.18.15, = vidhi;cpoTu tp.,430.HIp.- bahyasya =f!.asya=fJidhi-riipasya = andp. 31(Bombay ed.) wheresamanyaiscbaracterized asprama1}Q-nirasta-vidhi-bhavII. 4abhava-'l:yavaMira.Thispoint isinsisteduponbecausenegationisalsoin-terpretedasthecognitionof apoint-instant of efficientreality (mst!t),cpotextp. 2S.22-artha-jiiiina eta .... ghafasya. abhat'a tlcyate. It isthe result of tbe first formula ofnegation,whileabhavaisdeducedinthe rcmaningtenformulae,cpoinfra,text p.29.22-24 and38.4-5.AcaryaSUkyabuddhiobjectstothissUtra.In the inferencethewordisnoteternal,becauseit has anoriginthereason ispositive, theconclusionnegative,andintheinferencethereisfireremovingcoldonthe mountain,becauseweseesmoke ",theconclusionispositive,if thepresenceof firebethemainthing,it isnegative,if theabsenceofcoldisintendedas themain thing,cpoRgy,t!-thsab,Rigs-thigs-J;tgrel,f.26(Lhasaed). INFERENCE69 through the differenceinthe things they help to establish). The reasonis subordinatetothededucedpredicate.Itsaimisto assert the existence ofthepredicate.The predicate constitutes the main(independent)part. Thereforethereasonwhichissubordinateto the predicate issplit into varietiesnotbyitself,butinaccordancewithadivisionofthemain part,thepredicate.(24. 19).Thepredicateissometimespositive, sometimesnegative.Sinceaffirmationandnegationrepresent attitudes mutuallyexclusive,lthereasonsforthembothmustbedifferent. (24. 20).Affirmation 2again,(i.e.,therealitywhichisasserted,can onlybe)eitherdifferentfromthefactfromwhichitisdeducedor identicalS withit.Differenceandnon-differencebeingmutually opposedbythelawofcontradiction,theirjustificationsmustalso differ.(25.1).Therefore,thereisaltogethernoinherentdifference inthereasonsquareasons,4butwhenthedeductions5 (thatfollow) areexclusiveofoneanother,theirreasonsbecome different (indirectly). (25.3).Whyagainisit thatthesethree(relations)representlo-gicalreasons?Whyaretherenoother(relations)representingvalid reasons? 6Inhisanswer(the author)showsbothwhythethreemen-tionedvarietiesarealonevalidreasons,andwhytheothersarenot. 20.B e c a use0net 11i n gcancon v e ythe(e xis ten c e ()f)a not her0new heni tise xis ten t i allyd e p e n-{lent(onthelatter). (25.6).Existentially dependent means dependent in its own existence. Existential (and necessary) dependence means dependent existence.7 When thecauseofsomethingistobededuced(synthetically),Oranessential quality 8istobededuced(analytically),the effectis in its existence de-pendentuponitscause,(andtheanalyticallydeduced)factisbyits ssencedependentuponthefactfromwhich it isdetluced.(25.8).Both 1paraspara-pariharaisthesecondmodeof thelawofcontradiction,cpobe-low,siUraIII. 77. 2Hereagainaffirmation meansobjectof whichtheexistenceisaf-firmed,vidhiyateitividhilJ.(karma-sadhana). 3abhinna,cpop.48.9 - saevavrksa'IJ.,saiva 4svataeva. 5sudhya. oTheNaiyayikasassumeanindefinitevarietyofrelations(sambandho ...yo soviibhavatu)establishedby experience,Tlitp.,p.107.10. 7Lit.,p.25.6--7.Beingtiednpbyone'sownexistencemeanshavingone's own existence tied up.The composite nonn is according to the rnle, Pi'i:Q.iniII.1.32. 8Thetermsvabhataishereusedin twodifferentsenses,svabhata-pmti-bcmdhaisexistentialtiewhiehinclude,therelationoftheeffecttoitscause.But 70A.SHORTTREA1'ISEOFLOGIC these(connections)arecontainedintheoneexpressionexistentially dependentn 1(25.9).(Thismeansthat)becausethefact(expressing) thereasoncanprovetheexistenceofthefact(correspondingto)the predicate,onlyif it isexistentiallydependent(onthe latter), therefore, theabovementionedthreerelationsalonecanprovesomething,and therearenootherrelationswhichwouldallowtodeduce(onefact fromanother). 2 (25.11).Now,whyisit,thatwecandeduceonefactfromanother, onlyifthereisexistentialdependence? 21.Becauseafactwhichisnotsodependent uponanotherone,cannotbeinvariablyandne-e e s s a r il ycon com ita n twit 11th e1 a t t e r. (25.14).(e80dependentmeansexistentiallydependent.Afact whoseexistenceisnotdependentuponanotherone,isnotsodepen-dent.(25.15).If onefactisnotexistentiallydependentonanother one,itisindependent,andtherecanbenoregularity Sinitsconco-mitancewiththelatter.Sucha fact,representingthat part fromwhich theotherpartdepends,cannotitselfbesubjecttoaruleofconcomi-tance.4 (25.17).Themeaningisthefollowing.If afactisnottiedup in 8vabhiiva-anumana thistermmeansidentity in thesenseindicatedabove,p. 66, itthenisexclusiveoftherelationofcansality.Wemustdistinguishbetween sva"bhiiva-linga,identityand8vabhlivapratibanlIha,dependence.Smokeis8vaMa-venapratibaddhawithfire,buttheyaretwodifferent 8vabhiivas,it issynthesis. OntheotherhandAsoka,althoughlikewise8vabhlivena prntibaddhawithtree, includes thelatterin itssvabhliva,the8'Cabhiivaisone,itisanalysis.In thelatter sensesvabhiivareferstotheintention,theessentialproperties,ofaterm.Thus, e.g., is=vrklJa-vyiipya,butnotviceversa,vrklJalfis not 1Lit.,p.25.7-8.When causeandessence must be established, the essential tie(svabhiivenapratibandha)oftheresultandof essence(svabhiivainthesense ofidentity)isnotdifferent,thusbotharecomprehended inonecompositeword. Thewordhihas thesenseof because )). 2Sinceinternalinference(sviirthanumana),as statedabovep.66n.,corres-pondsrathertoourjndgment,theclassificationof affirmativejndgments(vidhi cpotext,p.24.16)inSl:abhiiviinumanaaudkaryiinu1llanacorrespondstoourclas-sificationofjudgmentsinsyntheticalandanalytical.That the judgment((this Asokaisatreeisanalyticalwillnotbedenied.Allnon-analytical,i.e.,synthe-tical judgmentsareconceivedas judgmentsofcausality,because, asjust everyregularconnexionbetweentwopOint-instantsofrealityisregardedas causation. Sniyama. 4,Lit.,p.25.15-16.((What isnottieduptowhat, by itsessence,fortbisnot tieduptothat,thereisnorule(niyama)ofnon-divergencein that.Non-diver-INFERENCE71 byitsexistencetoanotherone,itcannotbenecessarilyconcomitant withthefacttowhichitisnottiedup.Therefore,thereisnorule oftheirinvariableconcomitance,i.c.,oftheimpossibilityofthe ollebeingexistentwithouttheother. (25.18).Thepossibilityofdeducingonefactfromtheother 1re-posesuponaninvariableruleprecludingtheexistenceoftheone withouttheexistenceoftheother.(25.19).ForlIedonot admit, that thelogicalmarkiscomparabletothelightof aJampwhichoccasio-nally 2bringstoourknowledgesomeunperceivedobjects.3 Onthe contrary(thelogicalmarkisalwaysafactwhoseinvariableconnec-tion)isascertainedbeyondthepossibility of exception.4o (25.20).There-fore if(two facts)are existentiallyconnected,wecanassertthatoneof themcannotexistindependentlyfromtheother,andthereforefrom thepresenceoftheonefollowsthepresenceoftheother.Henceitis establishedthattheexistenceofonefactcanconveytheexistenceof another only when it is existentially dependent on the latter,not otherwise. (25.22).Now,ifamongtwofactsonedeIlendsupontheother, theremustbeadependentpartandnnindependentpart.5 And here, betweenthelogicalreasonandthe logicall)redicate,whoisdependent uponwhom? 22.TIt isisade pen den ceo fthelog i calrea son uponthefactwhichisdeuucedfromit,(upon thepredicate). gencein that,isnon-divergencein thisobjectof beingtiedup,itsrule .... J)Ren.d = yulganyin-pade-Ia....AccordingtotheTib. p.,57.8, wewouldexpectya(! tasminnavyabhicaras tad-avy- pratibaddhaisthetermoflesserextension,e. g.,theAsokatree, pratibandlta-vi?ayaisthetermofgreaterextension,e.g.,thetreein general; apratibandha-riaya =ma-(!brel-paiyul,Tib.57.11,isanobject from which there isnodependence,withwhichanotherobjectisnotinvariablyconcomitant,cpo textp.26.3.Thelogicalmark,or middle term, is alwaysatermof lesserextension ascomparedwi ththededucedfact,ormajorterm.ThereforeitisQtiednpor dependent. 1lJamya-gamalca-bhliw.2yogyatctya. 3Aboutinvariableconcomitancecpoabove,p.52n.R jit isherecharll.cterized asnecessary;cpoalsobelow,p.72notes6and7. 4niscayaishereusedasasynonymof niyama,cpop.25.16,jnstasahovr, p.18.20,andbelow26.16.Otherwiseit isalsousedasasynonymof kall'a.na, vikalpa,adhya'l:asiiyaandthenmeansassertion,judgmentcpoabove,p.47aud Tatp., p.87.25. 5Lit.,p.,25.22... Andisitnotatieofthedependentontheothernpon theindependentontheother? 72ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC (26.2).Thisexistentialdependenceis(adependence)ofthelogical reasonupon the fact(corresponding to the predicate).1'helogicalreason, beingthesubordinatepart,isdependent.Onthecontrary,thefact correspondingtothepredicateisnotsubordinate,andthereforeit is (theprincipalpart), thepartonwhichthe markdepends,l and whichis itself independent.(26.3).Themeaningisthefollowing.Evenin those cases, where there is (an analytical deductionfoundedon)Identity2 (of the predicatewiththereason,therealwaysisadependentandaninde-pendentpart).It isthedependentpartthatpossessesthepowerto conveytheexistenceoftheother.The(independentpart,that)to whichtheotherissubordinated,listhededucedpart.(26.4).If the essenceofttnattribute 3issuchthatit isinvariably concomitant 4with somethingelse, itisdependentuponthelatter,e.g., thefactof being produced by a voluntary effortis invariably concomitant with,(and depen-dentupon,orsubordinateto),thefactof (mot being an eternal entity)).:; Ontheotherhand,aqualitywhoseessenceadmitsofbeingsome-timesconcomitant,andsometimesnot,do'1snotdepenrl;it represents thefactuponwhichtheotherdepends,e. g.,thequalitycalled ((non-eternity))versusthequalityof((beingavoluntaryproduct)),(forthere areothernon-eternalobjectsbesidesthoseproducedbyavoluntary llUmaneffort).(26.7).Thepossibility of deducingonefactfromanother reposesonanecessaryconnection. 6Theessenceofathingproduced byavoluntaryeffortisnevertorepresentaneternal(substance),this isa necessary characteristic (ofsuchthings). (26. 8).Thereforeit (repre-sents)justthefactwhichinvariablyisconcomitantwiththefactof impermanence.Thusitisthatconcomitancecannotbeanythingbut the(necessaryrelation)ofadeterminedobject. 7 Ipratibandha-viaya. 2lit. (einnon-differenceof identity));about identity between thetermsof ananalytical judgment cpoabove,p.66n. 8dharma..ni.yata(15Whatsoeverisvoluntarilyproducedisnon-eternal,ase. g.,a jar, but not deeVe1'sa,athingranbenon-eternalwithoutbeingvoluntarilyproduced,e.g., lightning,althoughnotcreatedbyhumaneffort, is evanescent. 6Lit.,p.21.7.((Therelationof deduceranddeduced(gamya-gamaka-bhCi1:((.) refersindeed tonecessity));niScaya = niyama . ..Lit.,p.26.8.((Therefore the relationofdeducedanddeducerpossessesjust adeterminedobject,nototherwise)).The an thorinsistsrepeatedly(text :pp.19,26, 47,49etc.)thatlogicalconcomitanceisanecessaryrelation.Invariableconco-mitanceisalwaysof themiddlewiththemajorterm,itis i.e.,it refersonlytothemiddlcterm.Thereasonisalwaysadependent fact,and becausc it isdependent,itprovestherealityof theotherfactupon whichit isdependent. INFERENCE73 (26.10).Further,whyisitthatthemark,(i.e.,therealityunder-lyingthereason)isexistentiallysorelatecltothepredicate? 23.Because,asregards(ultimate)reality,(the entityunderlyingthelogicalreason)iseither justthesameastheentity(underlying)thepre-d i cat e,0ritisc a usa 11 yde r i v e dfr 0mi t.1 (26. 12). In reality (there are only two necessary relations, Identity and Causation).Identity>'withthepredicatedfactmeansthat(the mark) represents(thepredicate)itself,itsessence.Since(inthosecases)the essenceofalogicalreasoniscontainedinthepredicate,thereforeit isdependentuponthelatter(andinvariablyconcomitantwithit).2 (26. 13).Thequestionarises,thatif theyareessentiallyidentical, therewillbenodifferencebetweenreason andpredicate,andthenthe argument will be(a repetitionor)apartofthethesis? 3Thereforeit is said,asregardSreality,i.e.,thetwoareidenticalwithreference towhatisthe ultimatelyrealessence,(i.e.,thesensedatumunder-lying both facts).(26.15). But the constructed objects, those (conceptions) whichhavebeensuperimposed(uponreality), are notthesame(inthe 1Lit.,p.26.ll. (cBecausein realitythereis identity with, and production from. the thing predicated. Theauthor insists thatthere can lIeonlytwokindsoflogical relations.Thepriucipleofhisdivisionisthis.Existenceissplitinpointinstants. Everyefficientpoint-instant canbethesubstmtnmofavarietyofItcanbeatree,anAsoka-tree,asolidbody,asnbstance,etc., etc.Allsuch characteristicsrefertothesameentity,theyaresimultaneous,theywillbe, accordingtotheterminologyoftheauthor,identicaLButifatree ischaracte-rizedasproducedfromaseed,thiswillbearelationbetweentworealities,two underlyingpoint-instants,smcethereisacausalrelationonlybetweenthebst momentof theseedandthe firstmomentofthe sprout. Thereforetherecanbeonly tworelationsbetweenthetermsincognition, either the one is containecl in the other, oritisproducedfromit,either analysisorsynthesis,either identityorcausatioll. 2Lit.,p.26.12-14.(! Fromrealityetc.;ofwhat thisprobandum isthe Self, theownexistence,thatis(thepossessor)of itsSelf.Its conditionisits-selfness, (theSelfof onethingbelongingtoanotherthing);forthisreason.Sincethe pro-banspossessestheownSelf ofthe probandum,thereforeitisexistentially tiedup. This is the meaning. If the probans possesses the own existence of the probandum, ... . 8 The thesis will be, e.g.,((this is a tree)),and the reasonbecause it is an Asoka tree .Thereason containsthepredicatetree ,orAsoka-tree is3 partof treesingeneral; pmtijna isherethesameassadhyaor pak?a,cpoIII. 40 Theanalyticaljudgmentbeingreducedtothe formulatheAsoka-treeisatree) seemsutterlyuseless.ThisproblemcontinuestopuzzleEuropean philosophers TheIndiausolutionisherehinted,it willbereconsideredinfm,insUtraIII. 20 74ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC factsconstituting)tIlereasonandthe consequence.!(26.16).(Wehave alreadymentionedthat) 2thepossibilityofdeducingonefactfromthe otheralwaysreposesuponanecessary(connectionbetweenthem). Thereforetheirdifference(inananalyticaldeduction)concernsexclu-sivelythose(constructed)conc('ptionswhichhavebeensuperimposed (uponthesamereality)andwhicharenecessarily(connected). 3 The (underlying)realityisthesame. (26. 17).ButIdentityisnottheonly(possiblerelationbetween, alogicalmarkandwhatcanbededucedfromit).ThereiRmoreover (therelationof Causality). Themark can represent aneffectofthefact (whoseexistenceisthen)inferredfromit.Thelogicalreason(middle term)canbeexistentiallydependent on, (and therefore invariably conco-mitantwith),anotherfact,theexistenceofwhichisdeducedfromit, because(thereason)owesitsexistencetoit.4 (26.19).Whyisitthatalogicalconnection canbetheoutcomeof nootherrelation Iithanthesetwo,(IndentityandCausality)? 24.B e c a usewIt e nafa c tisn e it 11ere xis ten t i ally identicalwithanotherone,norisitaproduct oft h e1 at t e r,i tcan notben e c e s s a r i 1Yd e pen den t uponit. (26.21).Ifonefactisacharacteristicofthesame(underlying) existenceasanotherone,theyare(heresaidtobe)existentiallyiden-1Lit., p.15-16. Buttheobjectof mental construction (vikalpa),that essence (1'Upa= nampa) whichhasbeensuperimposedbyimagination(samaropita),with respecttoit,thereisasplitbetweenthereasonand consequence)). 2Above,p.26.7. >.-It has been noted above, p. 7n., that the conception of niscaya or ama is assimilated to pramiitza and 8amyag-jiiana.All definite knowledge (pmtiti =-= bodha=adhigama etc.) is constructed= samiirOlJtta= 'l}lkalpa-aruq,ha=niscaya-arU4ha =buddhy-avasita.Every definite assertion is thus contrastedwiththe indefinite,transcendentalcharacterofultimatereality.And becauseallassertionsarefoundeduponsomeinvariableconcomitancebetween constrnctedconcepts,thetermniscayaimpliesbothnecessity(= niyama)nnd judgment (adhyavasaya =ka1l)(tna). 4,Lit.,p.26.17-18. (,Notalonefromidenty,but alsothereisoriginationof themu.rkfromthatdeducedObject,andbecauseoforiginationfromit, thereisan essentialtieof themark tothededucedobject. !\nimiita., INFERENCE75 tical,ifnot,theyareexistentiallynon-identical.l If onefact represents theeffectofanotherone,itisaproductofthelatter,ifnot,itisnot itsproduct.(26. 22).Now,afactwhichisneitherexistentially identical,norisitaneffect(ofanotherdefinitefact),cannotbeneces-sarilydependentontheotherfactwhichisneitheritscause,nor existentiallythesamereality.Forthisreason(there can exist no other basisforanecessarylogicalconnectirmthaneitherIdentityorCau-sality).ll(27.3).If theexistenceofsomethingcouldbe necessarilycon-ditionedbysomethingelse,somethingthatwouldneitherbeitscause, noressentiallythesamereality,then only coulda necessary connection reposeonanotherrelation, (besidesthelawof Identityandthelawof Causation).(27.4).Necessary(oressential)connection,indeed,means dependentexistence.3 Now, there is no other possible dependent existence (thanthesetwo,theconditionofbeingtheeffectofsomething,and theconditionofbeingexistentially identical with something).Therefore thedependentexistenceof something (and its necessary concomitance) is onlypossibleonthebasiseitherof itsbeingtheproduct(ofadefi-nitecause)orofitsbeingessentially(apart)ofthesameessence.4 (27.6).Nowletusconcedethepointandadmitthatthereisno othernecessityinourknowledgethanthat whichisfoundedeither 1Lit., p.26.2l. Ofwhatthisistheessence,it isIpossessor)of that essence, nothavingthat essenceispossessorofanessenceothertbanthat. IILit.,p.26.22-27. 3.Whatisnothavingtheessenceof what,andnot havingoriginationfromwhat,forthisnothavingtheessenceof that,andnotba-vingoriginationfromthat,thereisanessencenottieduptothat,tothe notha-vingthat essenceandtothe non-producer,thusthisis(the fact)wboseessence is nottiedup,(notdependent).Its conditionisthepossessionof independent own-existence.Therefore(i. e.)becauseoftheindependent condition (of every fact which isneitheranalyticallynorcausallydependent) ..... 3Thisisarepetitionof whathasbeensaidabove,textp.25.7.Theauthor insiststbat relation(pratibandha =Sa1?!8arga)meansdependence,thisinterdepen-dencedirectlyaffectstheconstrnctedconceptionsofourproductiveimagination, andindirectlytheunderlyingthingsin themselves),betweenwbichalsothese tworelationsof identityandcausalityareassumed. 4Thecommentaryof Vinita de va uponthissntra, p.65.10-15, runsthus. crWhatdoesnotpossessthesame(underlying)essencewiththepredi-cate, andwhatdoesnotoriginatefromtheentity(correspondingto)thepredicate, inwhatwaycoulditbesaidtobeconnected?What is notconnected Isnota mark,becauseanuniversalabsurdity(atiprasanga)wouldfollow,(evelything couldbededucedfromanything).Thereforewecanassert a (logical)connection onlyonthebasisof anidentical(factof existence)oronthebasisof causality,not otherwise . 76ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC onIdentityoronCausation.Buthowarewe,nevertheless,toexplain thecircumstancethatnothingbutacomprehendedfactoraproduced effecthavetheforcenecessarilytoestablishthe existence of something byinference. 1 25.Itis(s imp 1 y)b e c a useIde n tit YandC a u s a-tion(causalorigin)belongjusteithertoacom-prehendedpropertyortoaneffect.Infer ential referencetoRealityispossibleexclusivelyon th i sbas is. (27.10).Sincethepossibilityofdeducingonefactfromanotheris basedexclusivelyuponthesetworelationsof (underlying)Identityand Causation,andsincethey(intheirturn)arefoundedexclusivelyupon eitherthepresenceofa(comprehended)attribute(allowinganalytical deductionofthecomprehensivefact),oruponthefactthataresult (must have a cause),therefore theestablishing of reality,oraffirmatioll, ispossibleonlyuponthebasisofthesetworelations,Identityand Causation. 2 1Lit.,p.27.6-7.Letit be, forsure,thattheOwn existence-bondcomes onlyfromBeing-originated-bythis, but howisit that Own-existence, (i. e., the subor-dinated8vabhava,thecomprehendedproperty)alone(and)theeffect (alone)are conveyors? 2Lit.,p.27.8-11. AndtheseIdentity-with-thatandOrigination-from-that belongtothe ownexistence))andtothe effectalone, thusfromthemaloneisre-ality(vastu)established.-Andtheseetc.Theworditi illthesense of ((therefore)). SinceIdentyandCausationhavetheirstandon((ownexistence))andresultonly, andconditionedbythemistherelationof deduceranddeduced,therefore from themalone, from ((own existence)) and result, comesestablishing of realityor affirma-tion.-The fact of being atree isincludedinthefactof beingan Asoka U'I!!sapaft'a),thefirstfact((depends))(pratibaddha)uponthelatter,itisinvari-ablyconcomitantwiththe latter,becausethelatter is(titsownexistence(st;a-/lhiiva),i.e.,botharecharacteristicsofthesameunderlyingreality (vastu =para-martha-sat =svalak?at/-a = vVehaveheretwotermssorelatedthatby theanalysisoftheoneweget theother,byanalysingthetermof greatercom-prehension(vyaptu)wegetthetermof greaterextension (vVapaka).Thisrelation ishereexplained asidl'ntityn(tiidiitmya)of existence,sincel)Oth terms ultimately refertothesameunderlyingsense-datum.Aresult,onthecontrary,pointsto anotherrealitywhichisthecausefromwichit isderived.Thesetworelations alouepointtorealities.Uponsuchabasisalonecaaweestablishinferentialrefe-rencetorealityortruth. Thetermvastureality))isusedasasynonymof vidki affirmativejudgment),cpotext,p.24.16and27.11.All affirmative judgments, sofartheyrepresentcognitionofreality,canbereducedtothesetwo patterns, this isatree,becauseit isanAsoka)),and(thereisfirethere,becausethereis INFERENCE77 6.THEPRINCIPLEOFNEGATIVEJUDGMENTS. (27.12).Now,whyisitthatwedonotconsidernon-cognitionof athing 1unimaginedasthecauseof success,(whenpurposiveaction is evoked)byanegativejudgment? 2 26.Thesuccessofnegativebehaviourisonly o win gt 0aneg a t i v ecog nit ion0fthefor md e s-c rib e dab 0v e. (27.14).Thesuccessofnegativebehaviourreposesexclusively uponsucha(processof)repudiating inthoughttheimaginedpresence ofanobject.Nootherbasisforitisthereforegiven. (Twoquestionsarenowraised,1)whydoesitreposeuponsuch abasis,and2)whynootherbasis,e.g.,noreal non-cognition of a real non-existenceispossible)? (27.16).First,whydoesitreposeuponsuch(aprocess)? 27.Bee a usew 11e nare a lob j e c tispre sen t(i t isper c e i v e dan dit)be com e ssup e rfl u 0 n s(t 0i m a-gin eitspre sen c e). (27.18).Becauseiftheobjecttobedenied 3werepresent,(this wouldbeperceivedand)itwouldbeimpossibletodenyitsimagined presence.4 Thisprovesthatnegationisfoundeduponsuch(aprocess of repellingsomesuggestion). smoke)).It willbenoticedthatjudgments,oriderences,abontfutureresultsare notconsideredasvalid,e.g.,therewillcomearain,becausethereare clouds)) isavalidinferencefortheNaiyayibs,butnotfortheBuddhists,becausethey assumethatcausesarenotalwaysfollowedbytheirresults,cpotext,p.40.8. Resnltsnecess,crilymusthavealwayssomecanseorcauses,thereforethere is necessity(niScaya)insuchaffirmations,butnonecessityindeducingafuture result fromitspossiblecause. 1adrsya-anupa7abdhiisalwaysproblematic,cpoin/fa,p.78ff. 2 =pratiljedha-tyavahiira-siddhi = pratiljedha-vasiitpuru-ljii1tha-siddhi. SE.g.,thevisiblejar(Rgyal-thsab); forDh.thisseemstorefertovipra-lrriJta-1:astu.,cpop.28.9. 4TheIndianrealistsmaintainedthat negationisa cognitionofrealabsence. Just asaffirmationiscognitionof real presence, they thought that negation isa non-cognition of realabsence.TheMimaIJlsakas viewednon-existenceasa reAlity SUl generis (vastt'antaram) andadmittedyogya-pratiyogy-anupalabdhi, though not as anu miina, butasaspecialpramiilJ-a which they called abhiiva.The N yaya-VaiSesikB schoolvieweditasaspecialcategory (padartha),arealitycognized bythe senses. owingtoaspecialcontact TheSankhya! 78ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC (27.20).Whythisaloneisthebasis,(andwhyisnegationof unimaginablethingsimpossible)? 28aBe c a use0the r w is e,(s c.ifthea b sen tt h in g-hasnotbee ni mag i nedasp res en t,itsa b sen c e, andtheentailedsuccessfulactions,cannotfollowwith logicalnecessity).l (28.3).Becauseotherwiseetc.Thewordotherwiseimplies- becauseunimaginable(sc.metaphysicalorproblematic)negationis possibleevenifthe(corresponding)entitybepresent.Thatisthe re3.sonwhysuccessfulnegation(inlife)isfoundedonnoother(but imaginable)denial.Butwhyisthatso?Whyisit that even admitting thereality(ofmetaphysicalentities),their(non-perceptionbythe senses)canbe(onlyproblematic).2 28u.Becausewhenentitiesdonotconformto t 11econ d i t ion s0fcog n i z a b iIi t y,w henthe yare ina c c e s sib lei nspa c eandtim eand(i II vis i b 1e)b y nat u r e,sin c eallhum a nex per i en c eisthe nex c I li-d e d,a pod i c ticneg a t i v eju d g men t Sarenotp 0s s-i b 1e.3 (28.5).Wehavestatedabove 4thatanobjectissaidtobesatis-fyingtoallconditionsofperceptibility,1)whenalltheaccompanying appliedtheir ideaof and viewedasa pm'iniima-of bMUalaWhich,asall parit'tama-bheda,iscognized, they maintain, by sense perception. 1anyathiica,according toVinltadeva,p.66.18, andRgyal-thsab, f.27, =drsyiinupalabdhimanasl'itya,accordingtoDh.,=adrsya-anu21alabdhi-sambhatat. 2Vinltadeva,p.67andRgyal-thsab,f.27,interpretaUtraII,28as meaningbecauseotherwisetherecanbenodefiniteassertion(niscaya)of non-existenc,e(rrbhat:a)concerning .. , I). 3Theanupalabdhiof theSankhyas,e.g.,isan adrsya-an1!plllabdhi, it refers toentitiel:!whicharenotsensibilia,notindividuallydistinct.Thry maintainthat theirMatter (pradhana)and Souls aremetaphysical (suk?ma=atindriya). Theirnon-perceptionalone(anupalabdhi=doesnot entail apodictic negative judgment (abhava-niscaya).Theyare cognizedby samanya- whichis explained as darsanam,cpoS.-t.-kaumudiadK.5-6.The13l1ddhistsadmitvaliddenial only if tbereissome = vidhi-rupa = vastu = artha-kriyii.kari,i.e.,in regardofsuchobjectswhichcanalternatelybeperceivedandnotperceived, presentandcpoinfra,text,p.38.18.Cpoalso,sUtraIII.97wherethe jlldgment heisnotomniscientJ>,beingmetaphysical,isproved tobeproblematic. 48litraII.14;onDb.'sinterpretationofcponotesonp.64and65. INFERENCE79 necessaryconditionsarefulfilled,and2)whentheindividuallydistinct object itselfis present. When one or theother of theseclausesisdeficient, theobjectissaidtobeinaconditionofnon-perception.Thewords donotconformtotheconditionsofcognizabilitypointheretothe absenceofthefirstclause.Thewordsinaccessibleinspace,timeand invisiblebynaturepointtothe total absence of individual distinctness. (28.9)Therecanbenocertaintyabout the absenceof suchobjects. Wecontendthatwenevercouldknowitwithcertainty,eveuif such entitiesdidreallyexist.1 (28.10).Whyisitthattherecouldbenosuchcertainty?It is impossible,becausehumanexperienceofsuchobjectsisexcluded. (28.11).Sincehumanexperience 2inrespectof(metaphysical objects) which donotsatisfytotheconditionsofpossibleexperienceis excluded,andtherecanbenoapodicticknowledgeoftheirnon-existence,Stherefore,evensupposingthatsuchobjectsreallyexist, onlyametaphysica14 negationregardingthemispossible,anegation whoseessenceistobebeyondhumanexperience. (28.12).Thusthebasisofnegativejudgmentsisthat(processof thoughtwhichwehave)describedabove. (28.14).Thetimetowhichsuchcognition,ifit isvalid,5refers itsessence,anditsfunctionwillnextbestated. 29.Negativebehaviour4 issuccessfulwhena presentorapastnegativeexperienceofanob-s e r v e rhashap pen e d,pro vi d edt h eill e ill 0 l' Y0f t hisf acthasnotbee nob 1 i t era ted. (28.17).Theprp.ceptionbysomebodyofanobject,e. g.,ofajar, hasnothappened.Thisiscallednegativeexperience.Thismeansthat theessenceofnegationisthefactofsomeexperiencehavingnot happened.6 1Lit.,p.28.9-10. Evenif realityexists, its non existenceisadmitted u.tasya abhlivalJ, =niscayasya abhlivalJ"sati vastuni =sativastuni. II =(Rgyal-thsab). 3abhliva-niscaya-abhiiva;no)ssertiouasofareality(vastu),ibid. 4adrsya = cposiItra II. 15. 5 6abhliva-vyavahara,anegativejudgment,anegativepropositionandacor-respondingsuccessfulpurposiveactionare suggestedbythisterm,cpotext, p.20, 22-28, forabbreviationwemayexpressit asnegativebehaviour. 80..\.SEaR':!.'TREA.'lISEOFLOGIC (28.18).Forthisreasonnegationisnotreallydeduced(byanin-ference),becausesimplenegation,(beingitsfundamentalaspect),is established(bydirectperception).(Buthowcannon-existencebeper-ceivedbythesenses?It isperceivedinimagination!) 1Anobject,e.g., ajar,althoughabsent,isneverthelesssaidtobeperceived,becauseit isimaginedasperceived,asbeingcognizedinallnormalconditions 2 ofperception,uponaplacewhichappearsaspartofthesameactof cognition. (28.20).Thereforewhatwecallnegativeexperiencesisthisobject (thesubstratum)itself appearingaspartofthesamecognition,and thecognitionof suchasubstratum.Becauseonthe basis of thispercei-vedsubstratumandofitscognitionwearriveatthejudgment 4on theabsenceofanobjectwhichisbeingimaginedasperceivedinall normalconditionsofa(possible)experience. (28.22).Consequentlywhenweasserttheabsenceofthe perceptiblejar,wenecessarilyassertsomethingpositive,(we assertthepresenceofthebareplaceandthefactofitscognition). S 1Lit.,p.28.17-18.Theobject jar etc.perceptibletotheobserver;itsab-senceisnon-cognition;itsessencemeanssomuchastheabsenceof this(object). Justthis non-existence is notdeducible,becausenon'perceptionof ownexistence (thefundamental:first formulaof negation)isestablished(itself)>>.abhiiva-vyat'a-haraisdeducedinthe:firstformula,abhiivaisdeduced intheremainingones,cpo textp.38.4. 2samagra-$amagr'ika. 3 4.avasiyate =nisciyafe = vikalpyate = pratiyate = p1'iipyale etc. lSLit.,p.28. 22.Therefore jnst (positive)cognitionofathingiscalJ ednon-existenceofaperceptiblejar.CpoBradley, Principles2,p.117,- every nega-tionmusthaveagroundandthisgroundispositive,it isaffirmationofaquality Iewhichpunar-arthe(Mallavadj). 2ihetilinga-pra8tiive (ibid). 3nanu yatha ghapa-abhiivefathaa'bhii-va-vyat,ahiire'pyastu,kimdrsya-anupalambhenalinga-bhutenaiti para-krtamprakat"yannahananv ityadi (p.29.1)(ibid). 4drliya-mvrtti7' ghapa-abhiival), (ibid). 5drsya.anupalambhiiditikemla-bhutala-griihi-pratyakfiidititato'abhiifa-vyavahiiro'pt syiid tti pariisayal), (ibid). 6nanu '!ladyasmad-uktasyasatymnity iidina (p. 29.2)anumatis, tada: drsyii-nupalabdhi-linga,tii na yuktii,ity iisankya iiha,keralamityiidi,ki7(1tusarniinadhi- iti(ibid).samiiniidhika7"a'l)pamhere eVIdentlymeansthatthesamefact canbeviewedeitherasasense-perceptionorasanillfm ence, cp.KamalasIla, p. 481. 12-yatriipi kevala-prad esopalambhiid(pratyakfiid J ghata.abhiivalJ,siddhal,l, 6iipi ghapiinupalambha-kiirya-anupalabdhir eva (an'lln!linam).The absence of noise is per-ceivedbykiiryiinupalabdhi,ibid. 7drsyiirillpalllbdhir.8siima7"thyiidem. 'JLit.,p.29.1-4.Andisnotabsenceoftheascertainedfromnon-perceptionof thevisible?ThisisquitetrnelHowe"er, if onavisible(place) united inthesa,mecognitiontherewereajar,it necessarily wouldbeviSible,thusthe 82A.SHORTTREA.TISEOFLOGIC (29.4). Therefore,lwhen we have realized the non-pt'rception of the object afterhavingimagineditspresence,(thisprocesscontains)byimpli-cation 2theideaofitsnon-existence.However,thisideahasnotyet beentranslatedintolife.a It canthereforereceivepractical application onthebasisof(aninferencewhosemiddletermis)non-perception;4 (29.6).Consequentlywemustkeepinmindthatwhatiscalledne-gation(hasapositivegroundin)theassociatedbareplaceandinthe factofitsbeingperceived,becausethiscanberegardedasthe middle terminaninferencewhichrepelsthesuggestedpresenceofavisible object.5 visibleisimagined,fromitnon-perceptionofthevisibleisascertained,andjust fromthecapacityoftheascertainmentofnon-percl'ptionofthevisible,thenon-existenceof thevisibleisascertained. 1ataevambhiUiiddrsya-anupalambha-niscayiid iti samiilliidhikara1!yam (ibid). 2siimart71yad. 8vyavaht:ta. - Onthepracticalimportanceofnegationinlife(abhltva-vyatahiira)B.Erdmanndelivershimself,Logik3,p.500,asfollows,>. 2liloka. 3Lit.,p.31.15-16. Becauseof thecertaintyoftheabsenceof smokein that(place),wemustlearntheabsenceof firewhoseefficiency isunchecked,hy whichlire,in whlch-placesituated,theproducedsmokewouldbeillthis place)). INFERENCE 89 un-perceivedpart,(notofthepel'c('i Yedpartalone).It isacomplexof somethingcognizeddirectlyan(lsomethinginvisible.ItlIasthepower ofbringingabouta judgment011theabsenceoffire.The word ((here ", whichpointstoperception,referstothevisiblepart. (31.21).Thesubjectofaninference(orthesubstratumofa judgment)isacombinationofallartperceiveddirectlyandapart not actuallyperceivednotonlyinthepresentcase,butinotbercases also.E.g.,whenit isbeingdeducedthatthesoundrepresents(acom-pactseries)ofdiscretemomentaryexistences,lonly:-;omeparticular sound can directly be pointed to, others are not actually pCl'cei veel.Just the same occurs inthe presentexample.Thesubjectofaninference(or of a judgment.)representsasubstratnm, (annndl'rlyingreality), uponwhich aconception(correspondin gto)thellredicate(isgrafted).2Onthe presentexampleithasbeenshowntoconsistofftpartdirectlyper-ceivedandapartunperceived.Thatthesameisthe('ase in the follow-ingformulaeofnegation(thereader)willbeabletomakeoutby himself. (32.3).Thethirdformularepre:;ent;;11!'gatiollofafactofgreater extensionfromwhichtheabsenceofasubordinatefactisdeduced. Anexampleisgiven. 04.Neg a t i a 11a fitt Cr 1lI0fg rca t e r('x ten s ion i sa sf 01I a w s. (T he sis).T 11ereish eren aAsa Ie ittr c e, (R e a son).B e c a usethe I' ear enot r e e s. (32. !J)."Here))isthesubject.((NoAsokatree",i.e.,theabsence ofsuchtrees,ispredicated."lkcausethereare(altogether)no trees ",i.P.,thetermofgreaterextensionisabsent.ThiRisthe logiml reason.Thisformulaofnegationisusedwhenasuboruillateterm 1ki}a7.tika. 2Lit.,p.31.21-32. 1.((And just asthesuhJect (dhal'mtn),beingthesubstra-tumforthecognitionoftheprobandum(siidhya-prntipatt-i-adhlkarar,ta).ishere showntoconsist ... .Therealsuhjectofajudgment(adhyavasiiya = niscaya = vi7calpa),whpther it beaninferentialoraperceptual judgment,isalwaysapoint of referencetorealitywhichinspeech exprcssedpronominallyasthis )),((there)) etc.,itthencorrespondstotheBuddhist(thing in itself))oritmay alsoincludesomecharacteristics,itthenconsistsofavisihleandaninvi-slblepart,andisexpressedbyanoun. Cpothe remarks of Sigw art,op.cit.1.142, uponthe judgment(thisroseisyellowwhichreducestothe form this is yellow)) therealsubjectbeingexpressibleonlybythedemonstrative(( tbis,theactually perceivedpart. 90ASHORTl'REATlbELOGIC liketheAsokatTeeisnotbeingperceived.If itwereinacondition affordingpossibilityofperception,simplenegationofthehypotheti-callyvisiblp,(i. e.,thefirstformula),wouldbesufficient. (32.7).Now(letusimaginebeforeus)twocontiguous 1elevated places,theonecoveredwithaforest, the other consisting of mere rock, withouttreeorbush.(Letusimagine)anobservercapableofseeing thetrees,butnotcapableofdiscerningtheirspecies,Asokaorother. Forhimthepresenceof treesisperceptible,but the presence of Asoka treesisnot.(32, 10).Then(turning)tothetreelessplacewhichcon-sistsofbarerock,hepl'oducesajudgment.!!(uIcannotdiscernAsoka treesinthiswood,butonthatplacebeyondtherearesurelynone, hecausetherearealtogethernotrees).Theabsenceoftreeshe ascertainsthroughi'implenon-perception,8becausetheywouldbe visible,theabsenceofAsokatrees- (indirectly)throughtheabsence of thepervadingterm,thetrees. (32.11).Thismethodofnegationiiiresorted towhennon-existence ispredic::atel1incasesanalogoulito(theexampleheregiven). (32.12).(Thefourthformula)consists intheaffirmation 4,of some-thingwhichbyitsnature isincompatiblewiththepresenceofthene-gativedfact.It isexemplified. 35.A ff i r mat ion0f (w i t hthefa c tw h i c h follow ti. somethingincompatible isbe i n gden i e d)isas (Thesis).Thereisherenotiensatiol1of c ()I d. (Reason).Becausethereisfire. (32.14). Here I)isthesubject.((Thereii'notiensatiollofcold ", i.e.,anegationofsuchasensation,istheprediclte.II Becausethere isfireisthelogicalreason.Thisvarietyofnegationmustbl:'applied wherecoldcannotbedirectlyexperienced.Otherwise::;implenegation wouldbesufficient.s Henceitisappliedinsuchcaseswherefireis directlyperceivedbyseeingacharacteristic(patchof)colour,but cold,becauseof itsremoteness,althoughpresent,cannotbefelt. 12am81Jati = niScinoti = kalpayati. :ldrSya-anupalambhiit. ,\upalabtIhilJ =fJidhih,cpoinfra, p.37.5. 5 LIt.,p.32.15.(IBecause,whenit isperceptible,Don'perceptionof theper-ceptible isapplied. INFERENCE91 (32.18).(Thefifthformula)consistsofthepositiveperceptionof theeffectofsomethingwhosepresenceisincompatiblewiththepre-senceofthefactdenied.Thisgivesvalid 1(negativejudgments). 36.Theaffirmationofanincompatihleeffect isasfollows. (Thesis).Thereisheren()sensationof cold. (R e as 0n).Be c a usethe rei ssm 0k e. (32.20).((Herellisthesubject. Thereisnosensationofcold", i. e.,theabsenceofsuchsensation,isthepredicate.(cBecausethereis. smoke"isthelogicalreason. (32.21).Inthosecaseswherecoldcouldbefelt directly, its simple negationwillgiveavalidjudgment.Wherefirewhichisincompa-tiblewithsuchsensationisdirectlyperceptible,(thefourthformula), theaffirmlltionof the incompatible, must beresorted to.But whenboth arebeyondtherangeofsense-perception,' wecanavailourselvesof (thisfifthmethod,consisting)inan affirmation of an incompatible effect, (i.e.,indeducingtheabsenceofsomethingfromtheabsenceof somethingelse,thissecondthingrepresentingtheresultofacause whosepresenceisincompatiblewiththepresenceofthedeniedfact). (33.1).(Thishappens, e.g.), infollowingcases.Supposing somebodY perceivesathickcolumnofsmokecomingoutof aroom.Thisallows himtoinferthepresenceofafirecapableofremovingcoldfromthe wholeinterioroftheroom.Afterhavinginferredthepresenceof such anefficientfire,heconcludesthattherei:;nocold.Inthiscasethe subject(onsistsofthevisibleplaceinthedoortogetherwiththe wholeinterioroftheroom,ashal';beennoticedbefore?because,when realizingthepredicate 3(absenceofcold),wemustconform(toits peculiarcharacteroffillingupthewholeinterior). (33.5).The(sixthformulaof anegative reason) consists in the affir-mationofafactwhichissubordinateto(orlessinextensionthan) anotherfact,whenthelatterisincompatiblewiththepresenceof the factdenied.Anexamplewillbegiven. 37.(Anegativereasonconsistingin)theaffir-mationofsomethingsubordinatetoanincompa-tiblefactisasfollows. 1gamaka. 2Cpoabove,p.89. 3tdidhya-pratiti. 92ASHORTTREA'l'ISEOFLOGrG (T 11e sis).Thee van esc en tc h a r act e r,eve 11 o fs u c ht h i n g sw h i c hh a v ea nor i gin,i snot somethingconstant. (Reason).Because(theirdestruction)de-pen d sup 0nasp e da Ic a use. I (33.8).Constalltiswhatnecessarily,constantly,occurs. Notcon-stant,i.e.,thedenialofconstancy,isthepredicate. Evanesccnee isthesubject. Evenofsuchthingsthathaveanorigin))isaquali-ficationofthesubject.(TheopponentsoftheBuddhisttheoryofUni-versalMomentarinessmailltamthat)theimpermanentcharacterof products,i.e.,ofthingsthathaveabeginning,isnotsomething constant.Stillstrongeraretlte reasons for denying COIlS taut evanescence inunproduccd(eternal)substances.2 Thatiswhythequalification (eyen"(evenofthingsthathaveanorigin)hasbeenadded.(33.10). IThenextexampleisapparentlychosenwiththe aim of meeting the objection that,ifeVf'rynegationisnothingbutarepudiationof imaginedvisibility,then objectsandprocesseswhicharpinvisibletoordinarymenbytheirnature,will neverbeliabletothiskindofnegation.Theobjcetorsmailltaillnon-perceptionof thelllvisible (adrsya-n.nu]urlabdTli),cpoabovep.81amIinfraslitraII. 4R-49. Since theBuddhistsareadvocatesofUlliversall\Iomclltal'illeSS(ordestruction)the author seelllSwillingtotellhisopponents" ifyouwishtorepudiatemyideaof impercep-tibleconstantdestruction,yoncandoit onlybyoenyingavisihle,sensibleformof constancy,notaninvisible,metaphysicalone)).Mallavadisays-ath((i1,a,n vya-paJca-anl/palllbdhirdTsya-sil!ISapatveprayujyate,adTsyecetyop.cit., fol.64.R gya 1- th s a bmtroducesthecxamplewiththe foIl wing, words, oJ!.Cit,fol. SO,-log-togstlw,l-bai-sbyor-ua-smras-par::r.td-kyi,flea ni,dnos-poehoscat!;rgyu-labltos-pa-med de, l}jig-ne8yin-pai-phYl:?'ces-P(W;thal-ba-ltm'raii-rgyud-dpe-Iasuynr-na,1'118dkar-pockos-can ... =1ipm.tipatti-nifakara'l}-artham pmsanga-prayoga-vaeana-matram, niscayastit,bhal'Odluwm'i,vinii.sa-hetvantara-anapek?al},1!inasa-niyatat'l:lid ftij yatha-prasangam prayufl,jiina(t,8ulda(iti)dharmi .. ThevipratipattinlludedtohyRgyal-thsabisevidentlytheviewof theSunkhyas, theandthe l\limarpsakas thatmetaphysicalentitiesandprocessesaro Mntpalabdlm = adrsya=IIAllIudiansystems,except theBuddhists,assumedtheexistenceofseveral eternalandubiquitous Theearly Buddhistspostulatedthereality of threeeternal,i.e.,unchanging,unprodllCed,permanentelemeuts(asa'!l,skrta-dhar. ma),viz"emptyspaceand twokindsofeternalblanksuperveningafter thetotal l'xtinctionofallforcesintheUniverse.InMnhll,yanatheyaredeclaredtobe relativeandthereforeunreal.The Sautrlintikasfl.ndYogacal'asidentifiedexistence withconstant cbange (kattikatm). INFERENCE93 Aspeeialcause 1isacausedifferentfromorigination,2c.g.,a hammer(bywhosestrokeajarisdestroyed).Evanescence(ac-cordingtoRealists)isdependentuponsucha(specialcause). Becauseitsodependsisthelogicalreason.(33.11).Now, (thefactofbeing)dependentonaspecialcauseisnotsomething constant,3e.g.,thecolourofaclothdependsuponafortuitouspro-cessofdyeingwhichisnotconstant.Non-constancyistheoppositeof constancy.(33.13).Evanescense(interpreted)asthe factofhavingan end,isassumed (by Realists) to dependuponspecialcauses.4 They there-foredenyitsconstancy,ontheground of experience,(whichteaches) thatitdependsuponspecialcausation,(andthisfactofaccidental causationdisprovesconstancy),provestheopposite(ofconstancy). 5 1hetv-antara. 2TheBuddhisttheoryofUniversalMomentariness(klfaYfikatta),converting theuniverseintoakllldof cinema,maintainsthat thereisnoothercauseof de-structionthanorigination,entitiesdisappearassoonastheyappear,themoment whenthe jarisbrokenbyastrokeof abammerdoesnotdifferinthis respect from allprecedingmoments,sinceeverymomentaneworotberjar appears,con-stantdestructionorrenovationisinherentineveryexistencewhIchisreally a compactseriesofevernewmoments.Therealistic opponents of the Buddhists admit theduration(sthiiyitm)ofentitiesfromthemomentof theiroriginationuptotbe moment of their destruction bya special cause (hetv-antara). The Siinkbyas establish-edthetheoryof constant The Buddhist theory ofUniversalMomentarinessisonce morealluded to below, sutra III. 11ff.,cponotes. 3Lit.,p.33.11. Dependenceuponaspseemsartificial.Vinitadevahasnothingofthesort. Malla vadi doesnotcommentuponthispassage. 1Lit.,p.38.15-17. Becausemanyobjectionshavebeengonethrough,the wordcawhichhasherethemeaningof collectingtheanswerstogetherhasthe meaningofII because,(therefore)becausewehavesllchaudsuchanswers, thereforesuchandsuchobjectionsare notrightn,this isthemeaningofcall. 2InthetextofsUtra47thewordabhiivamustbeinserten before cpoTib.ThisaMavaisinterpretedasabhavascavyapyasyavyapakasya abhiive. TheTib.,p.88. 1,hasnoequivalentforvyapyasya.Tbiswordabhava wouldthus refer tothefourthformnla,thevyapaka-anupalabdhi,cposiitrn.II. 34;but Vini-tadeva, p.82. 10ff.,dividesand explainsit as virodha8yabhavaBcaabhavaJca,kt'iryakara1)atvaayabhaVaBcaabhaVaBca.This explanationseemspreferable,sincethe vyaplika-anupaZabdhicanberegarded as includedin virodha.Thelit.translationof thesUtra,asnnderstoodbyDh.,is-(,be-causeContradiction,CausalityandSubalternation ofothersarenotestablisbed; as uuderstoo(lbyV.,it is- becausethe existenceandnon-existenceofContradic-tionandCausalityofothersisnotestablished.Dh.'sinterpretation seemfln,rtifi-cialandisprobablyduetohispolemical zeal. lNFERENCE105 perceived.Theircontradiction withsomething else,their causal relation (tosomethingelse),theirsubalternation 1it isimpossible(toimagine). Thereforeit isimpossibletoascertainwhatisittheycontradict,and what aretheycausallyrelatedto.2 Forthisreasoncontradictingfacts (causesandeffects)arefittobedeniedonlyaftertheirobservation hasbeenrecurrent.s Therefore,sincetheimpossibilityofcontradiction orofcausalrelationisestablished, the incompatiblefactscanbedenied onlywhenthey refer toobjectswhichalternatelyare perceived and non-perceived.Thosewhichareopentoboth(perceptionandnon-per-ceptionarecalledsensibilia),theyarenecessarilycapableofbeing experienced.Therefore,negationrefersonlytoobjectsofpossible experience.4 (39.1).Thefollowingisthe meaning. Contradiction,Causa-lity,Subalternationarenecessarilybaseduponnegativejud-gments,(uponnonperceptionofsensibilia).(39.2).Contradictionis realizedwhenonthepresence 5ofonetermwedistinctlycognizethe absenceoftheother.Causalrelation isestablished whenthe factwhich weacceptastheresultisabsent,ifanotherfactwhichweacceptas causeisalsoabsent.Subalternationisestablishedwhenitisprecisely knownthatontheabsenceofthetermwhichisadmittedtopossess greaterextensionthelessextensivetermisdefinitelyabsent. Wemustindeedbealivetothefadthattheextension(and comprehensionofourconcepts)arefoundedonNegation.The (compa-rative)extension(of thetermstree and Asoka)isfixedwhenweknow that,ifonacertainplacetherearenotrees,therearealsono ASokas.(:39.G).Theknowledge ofthe absence of something is always pro-ducedonlybythe repudiation of an imagined presence. (39.7).Therefore, if we remember (some cases)of Contradiction,of Causality orofdifferent extension,weneedsmusthaveinourmemorysomenegativeexperi-ence.(Negationis)thefoundntionofourconceptofnon-existence whichiRunderlying I)ourknowledgeof(thela.ws)ofContradiction,of 1Lit.,p.38.21. Alldabsellceofthecont(tined(thetermoflesserextension) whenthereisabsenceof thecontainer(thetermof greaterextension)". 2Lit.,p.38.22.((Therefore,forthecauseofnOll-establishmentof thecontra-dicting,of therelationof causeandeffectandof non-existence(ofthesubaltern) I) (accordingtoDh.).Thereal meaningisprobablybecausetheabsenceofthecon-tradicting andof causalrelationisnotestablished. 3Lit.,p.38.22.Canbenegativedcontradicting (facts)etc.oJllywhenthey possessperceptiollandnon-perception . 4dryanameva. ~samnilthiinthesenseofpresence(notnearnessasinsutraI.13). I)vinya. 106ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC CausalityandofSubalternation.(39.9).If wedonothaveinourme-morysomenegativeexperience,2wewillnotremembercontradiction andother(relations),andthen,inthatcase,thenon-existenceofit fact 3wouldnotfollowfromtheaffirmationofanincompatiblefact orfromthenegation(ofitscause)etc.Sincethenegativeexperience whichwehavehadatthetimewhenwefirstbecameawareofthe factofincompatibilityor(ofacausalrelation)mustnecessarilybe remembered,(itisclear)thatanegativecognitionisfoundedexlusi-velyonsuch(arepudiationofimaginedvisibility).(39.11).Thus, althoughthenegativeexperienceisnotoccurringatpresent,itdid occuratthetimewhentheincompatibilityof thefactsandtlleir other relationshavebeenfirstappreht'nded.Itspresenceinourmemoryis therealfoundationofournegativejudgments. 4(3D.13). Thenegation oftheresult,(i.e.,thesecond)andfollowingformulae,differfromthe (first)formula,the(lirectrepudiationofallimaginedpresence,inthat theydeducetheabsenceofsomethingfroma past negative experience,s butsince,bytheaffirmationof thepresenceofanincompatiblefact orbythe negationof thepresenceofthecause,theyimplicitelyrefer 6 toanegativeexperience,therefore(inthesecasesalso)negation iis basedjustonsucharepudiationofan(imagine(!)preseIlcewhich occurredatanothertime,buth;llevertheiesspresentinmemory,and thereforetheseformulaeare(virtually)include(linthe(first)formula ofsensiblenegation.Thusit isclearthatthewhole(ofthepreceding discussion)provesthatthetenformulaeof negationart'attl1('hottom 8 nothingbutnegativeexperiencesof10.THE OFNI'JGA'J'IONINME'!'APHYRIC::l. (an.18).Negationwhichhasbeenhercanalysed(asreducingtoi.l. negativeexperienceofsensibilia)isa validcognitionoftheabsence 2 dr/,ya.allupalabdhi. :J-itarrr.abhara. 4ab1!ata-prat-iprrtt'i. 1>Lit.,p.39.13-14.Therefore - thereisnoperceptiollofthevisible now-thusbyprodngnon-existencetheformulaeofnOll-perceptionof aresultet(.differ fromtheformulaof non-perceptionofthevisible II. s7abldira.pratipatli. S pi.i1"a1llpa1yer;,a. INFERENCE107 (ofthedeniedobjects)and(asourceofthecorresponding)purposive actions.1 Now,whatmaybetheessenceandwhatthefunctionofa negationof non-sensibilia? 2 48.Negationofobjeetsinaccessible(toexpe-ri e n c e)isthesou r ceo fpro b I e ill at i crea son i n g, sinceitseSReneeisexclusiveofbothdirectand indirectknowledge. (39.21).Anobjectcanbeinaccessibleinthreerespects,intime, inspaceandinessence.Negationregardingsuchobjectsisasource ofproblematicreasoning. 3 What.istheessenceofsuchreasoning? It isrepudiationofbothdirectandindirectknowledge. 4 Thismeans thattheyarenot(knowledgeatall,because)theessence(of know-ledgeistobeanassertory)relationbetweencognitionandits object.s (40. 1).However,cognition 6provestheexistenceofthecognized, thereforeitwouldbeonlynaturaltoexpectthatabsenceofcognition wouldbeaproofoftheabsenceofthecognized? 7(Thisquestion)is nowanswered. 49.Whentherearealtogethernomeansof cog nit ion,thenon - ex i s ten ceo fthe0 b j e c tc a n-notbee s tab lis h e d. (40.4).Whenacauseisabsenttheresultdoesnotoccurand whenafactofwiderextension absent,itssubordinatefartis likewiseabsent.But knowledgeisneitherthecausenortheextensive fact,inregardoftheobjectof cognition.Therefore,whenboththe waysofcognition(thedirectandtheindirectone)areexcluded,Sthis 1abhCiva-vyavahara. 2adrsya,i.e.,objectsunimaginableaspresent tothesenses. 3sa'Y{laya-hetu,i.e.,doubtfulreasonsornon-judgments. 45jnana-jneya-svabhava. 6 7Thiswastheopinionof theNaiyayikasandofEuropeanscienceuptothe timeof Sigwart. SIt is clear fromthis passage thatviprakarairreferstometaphysicalentitieswhichare to ipso de-claredtobeuncognizablebytheirnature =na jrtana-jneya-s'I;abhava,they are un cognizable neither by sense-perception=atindriya, nor by inference cpoK amalasil a,p.476. 3.Thcexampleof suchameta-108ASHOR'f,!'REATISEOFLOGlC doesnotprovethenon-existenceoftheobject,andsince (this absence ofknowledge)provesnothing,thenegationofthenon-imaginable 2is thesourceofproblematicreasoning,notof(ai!sertory)judgments. 3 (40.7).Butontheotherhanditisonlyrighttomaintainthat theexistenceofa(suitable)sourceofknowledgeprovestheexistence Qfthecorrespondentobject.Arightcognition"istheproductof its Qbjet:t.Aproductcannotpossiblyexistwithout[l,cause.Butcausesdo notnecessarilycarrytheirresults.Thereforetheexistenceof right knowledgeprovestheexistenceofrealobjects,but absenceofknow-ledgecannotprovethenon-existenceof(thecorresponding) object. Endofthesecondr.hapteroftheS h 0rt TreatiseofLogic. physical,declaredtobeuncognizableentity,asisclearfromsiltraIll, 97,isan OmniscipntabsoluteBeing, a Buddha. Thisagreeswiththeviewsof Dharmakirti' asexpressedinothercontexts,cp.,e.g.,theconcludingpassageof Santilnantn-rasid dhi.Suchentitiesarealsocharacterizedasant'palabdhi-Ia7c?a7fa-prapto (II. 28).svabhava-viSea-rahita,p.23.9, 28.8,andadrsya,p.39.18.In regardof suchflntitiesnojudgments,nodeductionswhichwouldpossesslogical necessity (niscaya)arepossible.Anegative judgmentinregardof themispossibleonlyby tadatmya-nisedha,i.e.,byassumingforthemakindofvisibilityfor amoment,us t'xplainedundersutra II. 37. 2adrsya,thenon-sensible. 3 nicaya-hetu,thereasonof aninferential judgment.Aproblematic judgment fromtheIndianpointof view,isIIcontradictio in adjecto,a judgmentisaverdict, thesolutionofaproblem,aslongasthereisnosolution,there isnojudgment {niscaya = adhyavasaya). 4pramatta,in thesenseof prama. CHAPTERIII. SYLLOGISM. 1.DEFINITIONANDVARIETIES. (41.1).Betweenthetwoclassesof inference, (internal) (. ' c a ~(p.52.4)punar-arthe,evarthevii,tenadti-prakiiraevetiyojaniyafll (MallavadI, f.85). 5CpoB.Russel,Mysticism,p.152- theonlyway ...inwhichtheexis-tenceof A canbelogicallydependentupontheexistenceof B is whenB is part of A.This isthe same astheIndian view.TheDationof atree (B)isaninherent. 146 ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC onthatoccassionalsostated 1thatthedependent(partisthefact representedby)thereason,(itis dependent uponthe fact correspond-ingto)thededucedconsequence.!! 34.Itfollowsthereforethatifthe(concer-ted)absence(oftwoterms)isexpressed,their interdependencemustrevealitself.Thereforethe contraposedgeneralpropositionalwayscontains anindicationoftheirinterdependence.This indicationisnothingbutthegenera}proposi-t ion(i nit 8po sit i v efor m).T h u sitist hat0n e singlegeneralproposition,eitherdirectlyor i nit scon t rap 0sedfor m,dec} are st hatthelog i -calmarkispresentinsimilarandabsentin dis s i mil arc a s e s.The ref 0rei tisnoti n dis pen -Sa b 1 etoe x pre s sbot 11the s epro p 0sit ion s. 8 part ofthenotionofasif!tsapli (A)anditisthelatter that islogicallydependent on,i.e.,subordinatedto,theformer.Thefoundationof thisdependen('eisIdentity oftheunderlyingrealityBut,accordingtotheIndianview,itisnotthe onlyway.ThereisItdependenceofCoexistenceandadependenceofSuc-cession.Everythingistheresultofsomecauses,itisthereforelogically,or neces8anly,dependentonitscauses.ButacausedoesnotnecessarilyproQuce itseffect.Thereforethereisneverlogicalnecessity(niscaya)inthepredication of a futureresult, cpotransl.p.108. 1siltra II. 22. l!.Itishereagainpressedwithemphasisthatthereisnootherlogical thanthedependencefoundedeitheruponwhatisheretermedIdentity (tadlitmya)andexplainedascoexistenceofcoinherentattributes,oron Causationwhichisexplainedasalogicalnecessityforeveryentitytohaveacause (tadutpatti).Every factisthuseithercoexistentand coinherent withanother fant,or itisitsproduct.ThusthegeneralpropositioneitherexpressesaUniformityof CoexistenceoraUniformityof l:lucression.It followsthatwhateverbethemethod applied,whetheritbethemethodof Agreement,or themethodof Difierence,a logicaldeductionorlogicalthoughtingeneralcannotpossiblyexpresssomething Elsethanwhat eitherdirectlyreprE'sentsorfinallyreducestothesetwokindsof logicalrelations.Contrapositionis therefore equipollent with the original 8Lit.,p,52.9-13. ItSince(itisso),thereforewhospeaksabolitionmustshow connection.Thert'forethepropositionof abolition(thenegativeproposition) i:l just an indirectsh()wingofsuggestedconnection.Andwbatissuggestionof conne("tion, that isjustexpressionof concomitance.Thushyonepropositionformnlatedwitha. concomitance-faceorwith acontraposition-facethe prest'ncl'-absenceof the mark inthesimilar-dissimilarcasesisdeclaredThustheformulationofpropositions isnot necessary.hi inthesenceof" because" . SYLLOGISM 147 (52.13).When(twofacts)areessentiallyinterdependent/theab-senceoftheoneconveystheabsenceoftheother.Therefore,if itis shownthatthereasonisabsentwherevertheconsequenceisalso absent,theinterdependenceofboththeseabsences IIwillbeshown. (52.14).Ifthereasonisdependentuponitsconsequence,thenitwill necessarilybeabsentwheresoevertheconsequenceisabsent.3 (52.15). Andsinceitis(impossiblenotto)indicatethedependent(character ofthereason),thereforethepropositionindicatingtheabsenceofthe reason,ifitsconsequenceisabsent,contains 4animpliedindica-tion 5ofitsdependence.(52.16).Thisindicationisnothingbutthe generalproposition(or majorpremise)itself.6Theinterdependence(of reasonandconsequence)mustnecessarilybestated, but(thisdoesnot meanthat it shouldalways)bemadeinthepositive form,because the examplewillalwaysestablishtheinterdependencebyinduction,7and thiswillrepresentnothingelsebutthegeneral proposition in itsposi-tiveform.(52.18). Thereforewhenthenegationofsomethingdepends uponthe negationofsomethingelse,the interdependence of both these termsmustrevealitself,andthisbecomessimplyacognitionoftheir positive concomitance.8 (52.20). Since the positive concomitance implies its contrapositionand(viceversa)thecontrapositionimpliestheoriginal proposition,thereforeone \Iofthemis(sufficient)todeclarethepre-1 i.e.,whenonefactrepresentseitherthe identity oftheunderlying reality or itsproductionfromanotherreality. l!nivartya-nivartakayo1} pratibandhalJ,lit.,thedependenceofthestopped andthestopper. 3ase.g.,smokebeingdependentuponfire,isnot tobefoundinplaceswhere thereisuofire. 4=sa'!'ur7!ita. :;upa-darana. 6Lit,p.52.15-17.Andbecauseitsdependencemustbeshown,therefore thepropositionaboutthenon-existence(nivrtti)ofthereasonwhenthepredicate isabsent,bythis(proposition)anindirectindication(upa-darana)of the depen-denceissuggestedAndwhat(represents) theindirectindicationof the dependencesuggestedbythat, just thisistheconcomitance-proposition. 7pramattena.Concomitancemustbeshownbyan inductionfrom particular instances,nocounter instancebeingproducible,theseparticula.rinstancesare termeddrstantaorpramfitz,a,cpotheuseof thistermintheif. passages,44. 5, 45. 1,58.1,61.10,64. 1,80.21,81.1,81. 2,81. 20,81. 21(apramatz,a). 8Lit.,62.19- 20.Therefore the connection(interdependence)of anabolished andtheabolisher mostbeknown,andthus just(eva)concomita.nceisknown.The worditi inthesenseof"becatlse"lI. 9Thewordviikyeflamustbeinsertedafter ekenapi,cpoTib.p.119.9, thsig gcig-giskyaii. 148ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC senceofthemarkinsimilarcasesanditsabsenceindissimilarcases.1 (53.1).Thepositiveconcomitancemaybeprima facieexpressed.It is onemethodof expressing it.Similarly the contrapositionmaybeprima facieexpressed.!!Butsinceasinglepropositionconveysboth(these meanings),thereisnostrictnecessityfortheformulationof bothin everysinglesyllogism.s (53.4).Wordsareusedtoconveyameaning, whenthemeaningisconveyed,whatisthe useof (superfluous) words? (53.4).Thusitisthateithertheoriginal formofthegeneral pro-position must alone be used or its contraposition, (butnotbothtogether). 35.(T hisr u I ea p p 1i e s)a 1sot 0(N ega t ion,i.e.,to adeductionofabsencewhosereasonis)non-per-c e p t ion.W henwes tat e(t 11econ t rap 0sedfor m u 1a 4 o fneg a t ion,viz.)-(' W hat s 0eve rex i s t s,allcon d it ion S0fp e r-ceptibilitybeingfulfilled,isnecessarilyper-c ei v e dll, theoriginalconcomitance-Ifsuchanobjectisnotperceived,itis a b sen tll, i sest a b lis h e db yi 1ll P 1 i cat ion. (53.8).Even 5ina(propositionexpressingNegationfoundetl on)non-perception,theoriginalpositiveconcomitancefollowswhen thecontrapositionisexpressed. Whatsoeverexistsallconditionsof perceptibilitybeingfulfilled II- thesewordsexpressthatthe predicate (intheformulaofsimplenegation)iscancelled,i.e.,thepossibility ofsuchbehaviour(whichfollowsuponaperception)ofabsence(is 1i.e.theinductionfromparticularinstances,nocounter-instancebeingpro-ducible. 2Lit.,p.53.1-2.Positiveconcomitanceisthefttce,themeans,becauseit is directlyexpressed,thisisapropositionwhosefaceispositiveconcomitance.Thus (alsotheproposition)whosefaceiscontraposition.Theworditi inthesenseof "because" . 3sadhana-viilcya. 4anvaya,thepositiveororiginalconcomitance.Negationincontraposition willbedoublenegation,i.e.,affirmation.Theformulaof negationexpressedasdi-rectconcomitanceinageneralpropositionwillbeDon-perceptionisconcomitant withabsence >,itscontrapositionwillbeflnon-a.bsenceisconcomitantwith non-non-perceptionor"presellceisfollowedbyperception. 5na keralamkiirya-svabTllivaity artka'f;,(l'.Iallavadi,f.86). SYLLOGISM149 denied). It meansessentiallythe sameasthe existenceof something per-ceivable.Isnecessarilyperceived))-thesewordsexpresstheabsence ofnon-perception.It meansessentially the sameasperception.1 (53.10). Thusitisshownthattheabsenceoftheconsequence(orpredicate) isinvariablyconcomitantwiththeabsenceofthereason.!!Supposing theconsequencecouldbeabsentevenif thereasonwerepresent,then theabsenceoftheconsequencewouldnotbeinvariablyconcomitant withtheabsenceofthereason.s (53.11).Indeed,whenwerealizethe (contraposed)concomitance,wemust (also)realizethatthepresenceof thereasonisinvariablyconcomitantwiththepresenceofitsconse-quence.(53.12).Therefore(thenegativeconclusion)isdrawnin the wordsif such anobject, i. e.,a representable object, is not perceived, itisabsent)).Sincethis(conclusion)iscognized,sinceit issimulta-neouslypresenttothemind,4theoriginal concomitance(of the formula ofnegation)isthusascertained.s 7.IsTHECONCLUSIONANECESSARYMEMBEROFTHE SYLLOGISM? 36.Wheneitherofthesetwo(methods)isap-plied,itisnotalwaysnecessaryexplicitlyto mentionthethesis(ortheconclusion).6 1upalambha-rUpa. l!i.e.,wecannotdenytheexistenceofsomething whenit ispresent in the kenofoursense-faculties. 3Theabsenceof theconsequencemeansherethe presenceof the object in the range of our senses, the absence ofthereason-its perception. If theobjectcouldbe presentwithoutbeingperceived,thenwecouldnotmaintainthatitspresence (accompaniedby allother factorsof perception)isinvariablyfollowedbyitsper-ception. 4sam-pratyayat. Iianvaya-siddhi. 6ThetermpaJcameansherethestandpoint of thedisputant,it includes both -thethesisandtheconclusion.In siitra III. 41it isidentifiedwithsadhya which is alsoassadhya-dharma thenameofthe majorterm.In thefive membered syllogism of theN aiyayikasboth thethesis (pratiiila)andthe conclusion(nigamana)aread-mitteda.sseparate members,besidethereason,themajorandthe minorpremises. TheMimalj\sakasandthelater Naiyayikaswereinclined toreducethemembersof theirsyllogismtothree,roughlycorrespondingtothe three members of Aristotle. But Dig n ag a makes a distinctionbetween inference as a process of thought (sIJiirtha) andsyllogismasamethodofproof inacontroversy, and pointstothe fact that very oftenwhen the pointunderdiscussion isevidentoutofsomeformer argnmentation, 150ASHORTTREATISEOFLOGIC (53.15).(Thecoreofasyllogismis)thelogicalreason(ormiddle term),itsinvariableconcomitancewiththededucedpropertymustbe expressed,andthisagain,(aswehaveshown),isbased either uponne-cessaryco-existenceornecessarysuccessionbetweenthefactscorres-pondingtothereasonandthededucedproperty.Whetherweapply themethod(ofAgreementorthemethodofDifference),inbothcases thefacttobededucedisthesame.Thereforethereisnoabsolute necessityofexpressingseparately(thethesisor)theconclusion.(Sup-posing)thereasonhasbeencognizedasinvariablyconcomitantwith thededucedproperty,(wethenknowthemajorpremise).If wethen perceivethepresenceofthatveryreasononsomedefiniteplace,(i. e., if weknowtheminorpremise),wealreadyknow the conclusion.(What isthentheuseofmentioningthisfactoncemore?)Therepetitionof thededucedconclusionisofnouse! 1 (53.18).That justthis 2 (principle)applies totheformulaof a nega-tivededuction(asfoundedonarepelledsuggestion),willbenext shown. 37.Ino