Buddhism and the regulation of religion in the new ... · PDF fileBuddhism and the regulation of religion in the new constitution: ... , and future options CPA Working Papers on Constitutional

Buddhismandtheregulationofreligioninthenew

constitution:Pastdebates,presentchallenges,andfutureoptions

CPAWorkingPapersonConstitutionalReform,No3,July2016

BenjaminSchonthalandAsangaWelikala1

CentreforPolicyAlternatives|www.cpalanka.org

1AdraftversionofthisWorkingPaperwasdiscussedataninformalseminaratCPAon18thJuly2016.TheauthorswishtothankNiranAnketell,ViranCorea,AmeerFaaiz,BhavaniFonseka,LuwieGaneshathasan,AsokaHerath,IromiPerera,andPaikiasothySaravanamuttufortheircomments.TheviewsexpressedintheWorkingPaper,however,remainourresponsibility.

AbouttheAuthors:DrBenjaminSchonthalisaSeniorLecturerinBuddhismandAsianReligions,UniversityofOtago.Ben'sresearchexaminestheintersectionsofreligion,lawandpoliticsinlate-colonialandcontemporarySouthernAsia,withaparticularfocusonBuddhismandlawinSriLanka.DrAsangaWelikalaisLecturerinPublicLawattheSchoolofLaw,UniversityofEdinburgh,andtheAssociateDirectoroftheEdinburghCentreforConstitutionalLaw.HeisResearchAssociateoftheInstituteofCommonwealthStudies,UniversityofLondon,andResearchFellowoftheCentreforPolicyAlternatives.TheCentreforPolicyAlternatives(CPA)wasformedinthefirmbeliefthatthereisanurgentneedtostrengtheninstitution-andcapacity-buildingforgoodgovernanceandconflicttransformationinSriLankaandthatnon-partisancivilsocietygroupshaveanimportantandconstructivecontributiontomaketothisprocess.TheprimaryroleenvisagedfortheCentreinthefieldofpublicpolicyisapro-activeandinterventionaryone,aimedatthedisseminationandadvocacyofpolicyalternativesfornon-violentconflictresolutionanddemocraticgovernance.Accordingly,theworkoftheCentreinvolvesamajorresearchcomponentthroughwhichthepolicyalternativesadvocatedareidentifiedanddeveloped.ThisWorkingPaperisavailableforfreedownloadfromwww.constitutionalreforms.org.Ifcitedorquoted,referenceshouldbemadetotheCentreforPolicyAlternatives,thename(s)oftheauthor(s),thetitleandthenumberoftheWorkingPaper.©CentreforPolicyAlternativesandtheauthor(s)

IntroductionAstheConstitutionalAssemblyanditssubcommitteesaredeliberatingonthecontentofwhatmightbecomeSri Lanka’s third republican constitution, oneof themajor issuestheywillhavetoaddressistheroleofreligioninthenewconstitution.AforemostplaceforBuddhism–whileassuring freedomofreligion–hasbeenacentral featureof thetworepublicanconstitutionssince1972,butalsoaheavilydisputedone.By all indications, the status of Buddhismwill be both a significant and contentiousissue in the2016processaswell. A largenumberofsubmissionsmadeto thePublicRepresentations Committee on Constitutional Reform (PRC) addressed the status ofBuddhismandtheroleofreligionintheconstitutionandinpubliclifemorebroadly.Itis our understanding that submission-makers and PRC members disagreedsubstantially on the matter.2Rather than a clear recommendation, the PRC Reportoffered six ratherdifferent suggestions, eachendorsedbydifferentmembers, rangingfrom the retention of Article 9 (the Buddhism Chapter of the constitution3) to adeclarationofasecularstate.ThisWorkingPaperoffersalegalandhistoricaloverviewoftheissueofBuddhisminSriLanka’s constitution, which, we hope, will help the Constitutional Assembly in itsdeliberations. We also hope that this Working Paper will help advance discussionsbeyondthenormaltermsofpublicdebatethattendtoframetheissue.Atthecentreofmost public discussions of the Buddhism Chapter – from both defenders and criticsalike – is a concern with the Buddhism Chapter’s expressive functions, its role incommunicatingandendorsingahierarchyofreligions.Whilethisfunctionisimportant,itisnottheonlyimportantmattertoconsider.AlsovitalforconstitutionaldiscussionsisanawarenessoftheBuddhismChapter’shistoryanditsregulatoryfunctions,itslegaleffectsonsocietywhenusedasaninstrumentoflitigation.Inshort,theConstitutionalAssemblywillbebetterpositionedtoundertakemeaningfulrevisionof theBuddhismChapter–ortoleaveitasitis–ifmembershaveaclearunderstandingofwhypreviousconstitutiondrafterschosethewordstheydid,whilealsobeingawareofhowlitigantsandjudgeshaveinterpretedanddeployedthosewordsoverthelast40years.ThisWorking Paper unfolds in four sections. Sections I and II give overviews of theBuddhismChapter’shistoryand itsuses in litigation,andoffersseveral “lessons” thatConstitutionalAssemblymembersmighttakeaway.InSectionIII,weusetheselessonstoassessthePRCrecommendationsandtodiscussfouroptionsavailabletodraftersfor

2Schonthalhasattemptedtoobtaintheoriginalsubmissions,soastoconsiderthemdirectly,butwasunabletoobtainthem.3WeusethephraseBuddhismChapterinthisworkingpaperbecauseitallowsustoreferbothtothechaptersentitled“Buddhism”inboththe1972Constitution(asSection6)andinthe1978Constitution(asArticle9).

CPAWorkingPapersonConstitutionalReform|No.3,July2016

CentreforPolicyAlternatives(CPA)|2016 4

addressing religion in the new constitution, as well as some of the advantages anddisadvantagesassociatedwitheachoption.AshortExecutiveSummaryappearsattheendofthepaper,distillinganumberofkeypointsfromtheWorkingPaper.I.ContextualisingandLearningfromtheHistoryoftheBuddhismChapterCurrent debates about the Buddhism Chapter are, in many ways, continuations ofdebatesthathavebeentakingplaceontheislandsincethe1940s.Thissectionoffersacondensed history of the development of the Buddhism Chapter and the gradualdistillationofitsmainprovisions–givingBuddhismthe“foremostplace”andensuringfundamentalrights–fromthe1940stothe1970s.TheSeedsoftheBuddhismChapterinthe1940sTheBuddhismChapteris,inmanyways,areactionagainsttheprovisionsforreligioninthe 1948 Constitution. These provisions appeared in Section 29(2),which laid out aseriesof limits on the law-makingpowersofParliament, prohibiting it fromenactingbillsthatwould:

a) Prohibitorrestrictthefreeexerciseofanyreligion;orb) Make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or

restrictions towhichpersons of other communities or religions are notmadeliable;or

c) Confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege oradvantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities orreligions;or

d) Altertheconstitutionofanyreligiousbodyexceptwiththeconsentofthegoverning authority of that body; Provided that in any case where areligious body is incorporated by law, no such alteration shall bemadeexceptattherequestofthegoverningauthorityofthatbody.

As one can see, the provisions for religion in Section 29(2) were relatively spare.Religious freedomwaselaboratedasa seriesofnegative liberties, injunctionsagainstlawsthatwouldencroachonit.Initsapproach,thesectiontreatedreligiousfreedomasthoughitwasaconditionthatwasalreadyexistingamongSriLanka’scitizens,adefactostateofaffairstobepreservedthroughlimitingdejureencroachmentsonit.The problem with this formula was that many political actors on the island did notconsider religious freedom to be an already-existing state of affairs. From its earliest



drafts in 1943 and 1944, Section 29(2) was, therefore, targeted by numerous criticsfrom the island’s smaller and larger political parties. In 1945, the leader of the AllCeylonTamilCongress(ACTC),G.G.Ponnambalam,warnedtheSoulburyCommissionofthe growing “influence of religion on politics” and the rise of political parties whichwere organised along religious and ethnic lines andweremaking “direct appeals…toarouse communal passions.”4Section 29(2), cautioned Ponnambalam,was not strongenough to protect the freedoms and rights of non-Sinhala communities. 5Ponnambalam’sfearsweresharedbymembersoftheCommunistPartywhoobjectedtoSection29(2)forsimilarreasonsandwhoarguedthattheSoulburyConstitutionshouldintegratemoreexplicitprotections forcommunityand individual rights. Inparticular,theyadvocatedincludingprovisionsthatwouldbandiscriminationbasedoncaste,race,community, or religion, and sections that listed positive statutory guarantees forprotectingsocial,economic,educational,political,andreligiousrights.6Section 29(2) also had its critics among the island’s then-largest political body, theCeylon National Congress (CNC). Many in the CNC echoed the concerns ofPonnambalam’s Tamil Congress and the Communist Party, and proposed to resolvethemthroughdraftinganewsectiononindividualandcommunityfreedoms,onethatspelledout(amongotherthings)thegovernment’sresponsibilitytoreligiousfreedom.Insteadofprotectingindividualrightsthroughinjunctionsagainstprejudiciallegislation(ashadbeendoneinSection29(2)),certainmembers intheCNCproposedcreatingacomprehensive Bill of Rights that would enumerate the state’s positiveobligations touphold individual and group freedoms. A constitutional draft oriented around theconcept of a Bill of Rightswas produced and presented to the Board ofMinisters bymembers of the CNC in 1944.7 The draft outlined a series of fundamental rights,includinglibertyofperson,education,association,freedomofthepress,andfreedomofreligion.Thedraftarticulatedtheprinciplesof“freedomofreligion”inSection7,saying:

Freedomofconscienceandthefreeprofessionandpracticeofreligion,subjecttopublicorderandmorality,areherebyguaranteedtoeverycitizen.TheRepublicshallnotprohibitthefreeexerciseofanyreligionorgivepreferenceorimposeanydisabilityonaccountofreligiousbelieforstatus.8

4CO54/978/1,No.96:LetterFromGGPonnambalamtoMrHallontheTamilMinorityCase,2ndNovember1945,inK.M.DeSilva(Ed.)(1997)BritishDocumentsontheEndofEmpire:SriLanka(London:InstituteofCommonwealthStudies):p.145.5Ibid:pp.156-7.6ResolutionsoftheCeylonCommunistParty,15thOctober1944,inR.Edrisinha,M.Gomez,V.T.Thamilmaran&A.Welikala(Eds.)(2008)Power-SharinginSriLanka:ConstitutionalandPoliticalDocuments,1926-2008(Colombo:CentreforPolicyAlternatives):pp.111-2.7K.M.DeSilva&H.Wriggins(1988)J.R.JayewardeneofSriLanka(Vol.1)(London:AnthonyBlond/Quartet):p.169.8J.R.Jayewardene’sDraftConstitution,29thNovember1944,inM.Roberts(1977)DocumentsoftheCeylonNationalCongressandNationalistPoliticsinCeylon1929-1950(Colombo:NationalArchives):p.2593.



AlthoughthedraftprovedpopularamongcertainsectionsoftheCNC,theconceptofaBillofRightswasultimatelyruledout,withtheagreementofD.S.Senanayake,byIvorJenningswhoinsistedthatitfailedtoprovideadequateflexibilityforgovernments.9At the same time,many Buddhists in Ceylon, particularly lay Buddhist organisationssuchastheAllCeylonBuddhistCongress(ACBC),objectedtoSection29(2)becauseitdidnotredresstheinjuriesthathadbeendonetoBuddhismduringthecolonialperiod,andbecauseitfailedtoprotectthecurrentinterestsofBuddhistlaymenandmonks.InalettersubmittedtoCeylon’sfirstPrimeMinister,D.S.Senanayake,bytheACBCin1951,G.P. Malalasekera, the group’s President expressed the “disappointment, almostresentment,growingamongtheBuddhistsofCeylon,”andprevailedonthegovernmentto“extendtoBuddhismthesamepatronageaswasextendedtoitbySinhaleserulersofold.” 10 When, three years later, Senanayake failed to act upon the ACBCrecommendations, the Buddhist Congress created their own Buddhist Commission ofInquiry. The ACBC Commission undertook a two-year investigation to explore theextentoftheinjuriesdonetoBuddhismduringthecolonialperiodandtorecommendactionsthatthestateshouldtaketorepairthem.In1956theCommissionpublisheditsreport,whichitinsisted,amongotherthings,thatthegovernmentshouldincorporateaseparateBuddha Sasana Council (buddhaśāsanamaṇḍalaya) consisting of elected layandmonasticmembers,whichwouldguaranteeforBuddhismthesame“specialrights”(viśēṣaayitivāsikam)thatitenjoyedintheeraofBuddhistkings.11 1950sand60s:PoliticisingConstitutionalReform,PairingConstitutionalCriticismDuring the 1950s and 1960s, both criticisms of Section 29(2) – those couched in thedemands for the elaboration of fundamental rights and in the demands for specialBuddhist privileges – gained prominence in national politics. During the primeministershipofS.W.R.D.Bandaranaike,thesetwincriticismswerefilteredintotwolargegovernment initiatives.Ononehand, calls to reconsiderconstitutionalprotections forminority and individual rights were addressed in a Joint Select Committee for theRevisionoftheConstitution,whichwaschargedwith,amongotherthings,formulatingachapteronfundamentalrights.Ontheotherhand,callstogiveBuddhismstatesupportandprotectionweredirectedtowardsanewlyappointedgovernmentbody,theBuddhaSasanaCommission,whichwasmandatedto investigatetheclaimsandsuggestionsof

9A.Welikala,‘‘SpecialistinOmniscience’?Nationalism,Constitutionalism,andSirIvorJennings’EngagementwithCeylon’inH.Kumarasingham(Ed.)(2016)Constitution-makinginAsia:DecolonisationandState-buildingintheAftermathoftheBritishEmpire(London:Routledge):Ch.6.10AllCeylonBuddhistCongress(1951),BuddhismandtheState:ResolutionsandMemorandumoftheAllCeylonBuddhistCongress(Maradana:OrientalPress):p.3.11All-CeylonBuddhistCongress,BauddhaToraturuParīkṣakaSabhāvaVārtāva(Colombo:visidunuprakāśanayaki,1956),371.SeealsoSchonthal,Benjamin(2016),Buddhism,PoliticsandtheLimitsofLaw(NewYork:CambridgeUniv.Pr.),Ch1.



the report of the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress and recommend administrativemeasurestostrengthenthepositionofBuddhisminthecountry.12PromisestointegratefundamentalrightsintoSriLanka’sconstitutionhadbeenavisibletheme in S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s political agenda since he separated from the rulingUnitedNationalParty(UNP)andformedhisownpoliticalparty,theSriLankaFreedomParty (SLFP), in 1951. Shortly after becoming PrimeMinister, in November 1957, heintroduced a parliamentary motion to establish a Joint Select Commission on theRevisionoftheConstitution,saying:

In our present Constitution there is no adequate statement of fundamentalrights;fundamentalrightsasaffectingallcitizens,fundamentalrightsmaybeasaffectingtheminoritysectionsofthegeneralcommunity.ThereisnostatementbeyondSection29whichitselfisnotverysatisfactory.13

The Joint Committee created by Bandaranaike – which included prominentrepresentativesfromtheSLFP,UNP,FederalParty14andtheLeftparties,manyofwhomhad proposed their own amendments to the Soulbury Constitution in the 1940s –producedacomprehensivelistoffundamentalrightsoneyearlater,onewhichincludedpoliticalrights,economicrights,“culturalandeducationalrightsofminorities,”rightstoenforcefundamentalrights,anddiscreterightstofreedomofreligion.Undertherightsto freedom of religion, the Committee included provisions for the “freedom ofconscienceandworship,”“freeprofessionandpracticeofreligion”andthefreedomtomanagereligiousaffairs.ThislistwasbasedcloselyontheIndianconstitutionalmodel,reiteratingitsprovisionsverbatiminmanycases.15In order to examine the question of special state protections for Buddhism,Bandaranaike,asnotedabove,createdaBuddhaSasanaCommissionconsistingof tenmonksandsixlaymen.16TheCommissionwasformedin1957withanaimtoevaluatethe proposals of the ACBC commission, to recommend measures for effectivelymanaging temple properties and educating the sangha, and to formulate a plan forplacing all Buddhist monks and temples on a national register.17In its report, theCommissionconfirmedthesuggestionoftheACBCcommissionthatthegovernmentset

12SessionalPaperNo.XXVof1957:TheInterimReportoftheBuddhaSasanaCommission(Colombo:GovernmentPress):p.1.13S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike,‘RevisionoftheConstitution’(SpeechMadeAsPrimeMinister,7thNovember1957)inG.E.P.DeS.Wickramaratne(Ed.)(1961)TowardsaNewEra:SelectedSpeechesofS.W.R.D.Bandaranaike(Colombo:GovernmentPress,):p.137.14S.J.V.ChelvanayakamwithdrewfromtheCommitteein1958,followingthefailureoftheBandaranaike-ChelvanayakamPact.15Religionwasalsomentionedinthesectionon“culturalandeducationalrightsofminorities,”ensuringthatstategrantaidwouldnotbediscriminatoryonthebasisoflanguageorreligion.J.A.L.Cooray(1973)ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLawofSriLanka(Ceylon)(Colombo:HansaPublishers):p.69.16SessionalPaperNo.XXVof1957,opcit.:p.2.17Ibid:p.1.



up a Buddha Sasana Council, and further specified that the Council should overseeordaining and registering bhikkhus, help supervise a code of conduct for monks,promotethespreadofBuddhism,andmanagetempledonations.TheCommissionalsomadesuggestionsforimprovingmonasticeducation,settingupBuddhistpublicschoolsfor laity, creating temple trusts forruralvillages, regularising thebuildingof temples,establishingsanghacourts(sanghadhikaraṇa)anddraftingaBuddhaSasanaActwhichwould formalise the state’s supervisory role over Buddhist monks, property and layofficials.18Both the Committee on the Revision of the Constitution and the Buddha SasanaCommissionweredissolvedfollowingBandaranaike’sassassinationon26thSeptember1959.19However, the agendas of both bodies were taken up by the major politicalparties and governments that succeeded Bandaranaike. Mrs Bandaranaike, who tookover the leadershipof theSLFP in1960,promised inher firstelectionmanifesto thatshewouldpursueboth initiatives:shewouldworktocreatearepublicanconstitutionwhich included a chapter on fundamental rights, and she would implement thesuggestionsoftheBuddhaSasanaCommission.20Bythemiddleofthe1960s,eventheUNP–thepartywhosefoundingfather,D.S.Senanayake,workedtoimplementthe1948Constitution–begantoadoptsimilarlanguageandapproaches,promisingintheir1965ElectionManifesto:

While restoring Buddhism to the place it occupied when Lanka was free andKings ruled according to theDasaRajaDharma (Ten Buddhist Principles) weshall respect the rights of those who profess other faiths and ensure themfreedomofworship.21

Laterthatyear,attheparty’snationalconferenceinNovember,J.R.Jayewardenewentfurtherandproposedthatanewconstitutionforthe“DemocraticSocialistRepublicofLanka is tobeestablishedonFeb4,1966[sic]”andthat itshouldcontainaprovisionthat“Buddhism,themajorityreligionofthecountry,wherethepopulationisabout75%,beinggiven its rightfulplace.”22In1967, theUNP-ledgovernmentevenreappointedaJoint Select Committee on the Revision of the Constitution to carry on withinvestigationswhichbeganunderS.W.R.D.Bandaranaike’sgovernment,chargingitwithinvestigating the same issues as the 1958 Committee, including the inclusion in theconstitutionofachapteronfundamentalrights.2318SessionalPaperNo.XVIIIof1959:BudhaŚasanaKomiṣanVārtāva(BuddhaSasanaCommissionReport)(Colombo:GovernmentPress):pp.277-290.19TheCommitteeontheRevisionoftheConstitutionultimatelymadelittleheadwayonfundamentalrights,concentratingitsattentionsprimarilytowardsthere-delimitationofelectorates.20Warnapala(2005):p.157.21UnitedNationalParty(1965)PartyManifesto:TheUnitedNationalParty.22WorldBuddhism(Nov.1965),Vol.14(4):p.17.23TheJointSelectCommitteeoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesAppointedtoConsidertheRevisionoftheConstitution,ParliamentarySeriesNo.30,3rdSessionof6thParliament,,13thJune1968,(Colombo:GovernmentPress).



GivingBuddhismtheForemostPlaceIn the early 1970s, the talk of a new constitution, which had existed in the politicalscenesincethe1950sfinallygavewaytoactualconstitutionalchange,andinthe1970-1972 Constituent Assembly process, members debated a Draft Basic Resolution onBuddhism(DraftBasicResolution3),whichread:

IntheRepublicofSriLanka,Buddhism,thereligionofthemajorityofthepeople,shallbegivenitsrightfulplaceandaccordingly,itshallbethedutyoftheStatetoprotectandfosterBuddhism,whileassuringtoallreligionstherightsgrantedbyBasicResolution5(4).24

This resolution,entitled “Buddhism,” ties together the twomajorcriticismsofSection29(2) in the Soulbury Constitution. It refers both to a state obligation to protectBuddhism (here underscored as “the religion of the majority of the people”) and to“assure” certain fundamental rights to all religions.RegardingBuddhism, thepassagedraws from the language used in SLFP policy statements and manifestos during the1960s,anditreiterateddirectlytheelectionmanifestooftheUnitedFrontfrom1970,whichpromised:

Buddhism,thereligionofthemajorityofthepeople,willbeensureditsrightfulplace.Theadherentsofallfaithswillbeguaranteedfreedomofreligiousworshipandtherighttopracticetheirreligion.25

DraftBasicResolution3onBuddhismalsomadereferencetotheproposedchapteronfundamentalrights,whichread:

Everycitizenshallhavetherighttofreedomofthought,conscienceandreligion.Thisrightshallincludethefreedomtohaveortoadoptareligionorbeliefofhischoice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others inpublic or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,practiceandteaching.26

Unlike the language regarding Buddhism, which was drawn up by the SLFP, thelanguage of Section 5(4) on freedom of religionwas imported verbatim from Article18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)whichwasadoptedbytheUnitedNationsin1966.27

24ConstituentAssembly(1972)ConstituentAssemblyCommitteeReports,1/17/72:pp.88-9.25UnitedFront,JointElectionManifestooftheUnitedFrontoftheSriLankaFreedomParty,LankaSamasamajaPartyandCommunistParty(Colombo:GovernmentPress,1970),12.26ConstituentAssembly,ConstituentAssemblyCommitteeReports,1/17/72,pp.90-1.

27TheICCPRwasadoptedandopenedforsignature,ratification,andaccessionbyGeneralAssemblyResolution2200A(XXI)on16thDecember1966,butonlyenteredintoforce,inaccordancewithArticle



Members of the Constituent Assembly put forth three amendments to the BuddhismChapter,whichseemtoechothetoneandcontentofsubmissionstothePRCin2016.ThefirstamendmentacceptedtheideathatBuddhismshouldhavespecialrecognition,but sought to add to it, explicit recognition for the country’s other major religioustraditions of Islam, Christianity, and Hinduism. As proposed by A. Aziz, head of theDemocratic Workers’ Congress (a coalition partner in the United Front), thisamendmentread:

“IntheRepublicofSriLanka,Buddhism,thereligionofthemajorityofthepeople,shallbegivenitsrightfulplaceandaccordingly,itshallbethedutyoftheStatetoprotectand fosterBuddhism,whileassuring toHinduism,Islam,ChristianityandallreligionstherightsgrantedbyBasicResolution5(4).”28

Such an amendment, Aziz insisted, would “give a certain measure of confidence” toHindus,MuslimsandChristians,allowingthemtofeelequallyincludedandrepresentedintheconstitution.29Like some of the submissions to the PRC in 2016, members of the 1970-1972Constituent Assembly also proposed an amendment designed to strengthen theBuddhismResolution by incorporating language from theKandyan Convention. Thisamendment was proposed by the leaders of the UNP, J.R. Jayewardene and DudleySenanayake:

IntheRepublicofSriLanka,Buddhism,thereligionofthemajorityofthepeople,shallbeinviolableandshallbegivenitsrightfulplace,andaccordingly,itshallbethedutyoftheStatetoprotectandfosterBuddhism,itsrites,Ministersanditsplacesofworship,whileassuringtoallreligionstherightsgrantedbybasicResolution5(4).30

Jayewardeneexplainedtherationaleforhisamendmentbysayingthattheexpression“rightfulplace,”ornisitaena,wasvagueandpeoplewouldnotknowwhatwasmeantbythephrase.InordertofurtherclarifythisdutyofthegovernmentandtomakesurethatBuddhist interests were protected, particularly the preservation of Buddhist sacredsites,he insistedthat languagefromtheKandyanConventionwasappropriate,andsotheterms“inviolable”and“itsrites,ministersandplacesofworship”wereaddedtotheresolution.

49,on23rdMarch1976.SriLankaratifiedandaccededtotheICCPRon11thJune1980.ThusatthetimeitslanguagewasusedbytheConstituentAssemblytheICCPRhadnolegalforce.28ConstituentAssemblyDebates(1972)(Colombo:CeylonGovernmentPress):Col.640.29Ibid:Col.642.30ConstituentAssembly(1972)ConstituentAssemblyCommitteeReports,2/27/72:Col.226



Finally, andalso like someof thosewhomadesubmissions to thePRC in2016, thereweremembers of the 1970-1972Assembly that proposed an amendmentmaking SriLankaasecularstate.InadraftamendmentintroducedtotheConstituentAssembly,theFederalParty(FP)arguedthattheconstitutionshouldnotprivilegeasinglereligionbutshouldincludethefollowingclause:

The Republic of Sri Lanka shall be a secular State but shall protect and fosterBuddhism,Hinduism,ChristianityandIslam.31

TheAssemblyspeechesregardingthisFPamendment,mostofwhicharepreservedintheofficialrecordinTamil,32raiseanumberofconcernsthatarerelevanttothe2016constitutional deliberations. These concerns, it should be said, exceed the standard,liberalobjectionstogivingBuddhismaspecialconstitutionalstatus. Ontheonehand,these debates point to the vexed legal implications that follow from giving specialprotectionsandstatustoaparticular“religion”(āgama)or“dispensation”(Sasana).FPassemblymemberspointedoutthat, legallyspeaking,itwasunclearpreciselywhatorwhomwouldbethebeneficiariesoftheselegalprotectionsandprivileges.Ontheotherhand,theFPpointedtoanincommensurabilitybetweenthedraftconstitution’sstatedprivileges for Buddhism and its protections for religious freedom:whereas Buddhistprivileges redound to a religion, fundamental rights protections apply to individualcitizens.Therefore,theFPinsisted,oneprovisiondidnotbalancetheother,asColvinR.DeSilvaclaimed.Beyond these issues, one also sees in the debates over the FP’s amendment theimportant, and often unacknowledged, role played by multiple languages in theconstitutional debates – something that the 2016 Constitutional Assembly ought toconsider. Most of the Constituent Assembly did not read the FP’s amendment in itsTamil original and this lead to some important (andunintended!)miscommunicationamong assemblymembers. The English – and Sinhala – language versions used thephrases asecular state and lōkāyatta rājyayak respectively. However, neither phraseaccurately rendered the connotation of the FP’s Tamil original phrase oru matacārparraaracu,whichconnotednottheactiveseparationofreligionfromthe“worldly”affairsofstate(amessageincipientparticularlyintheSinhalaadjective lōkāyatta)butthe “non-leaning” of the state towards a particular religion (matam). Properlyunderstood,itsuggestedtheideaofagovernmentthatsupportedallreligionsequally.33

31ConstituentAssembly(1972)ConstituentAssemblyCommitteeReports,2/27/72:pp.225-26.32ThesespeechesaretranslatedandanalyzedcloselyinSchonthal,Benjamin(2016),Buddhism,PoliticsandtheLimitsofLaw(NewYork:CambridgeUniv.Pr.),Chapter4.33InfactmatacārpārraisusedregularlytotranslateintoTamiltheethosofNehruviansecularisminIndia,namelytheidealof(inHindiandSanskrit)sarvadharmasambhava,or“[benevolent]neutralitytowardsallreligions.”



(Learning from this, the2016ConstitutionalAssembly shouldmakesure topaycloseattention to potential distortions that might accompany of translation among thelanguages.)UltimatelytheUFmajorityintheConstituentAssemblyvotedtoacceptBasicResolution3. However, in the versionof the resolution that appearedninemonths later in thedraftconstitutionthatColvinR.DeSilvapresentedatapressconference,thelanguageof thechapteronBuddhismhadchangedslightly.34 In January1972,Resolution3on“Buddhism”,whichbecameSection6ofthenewconstitution,read:

The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place andaccordinglyitshallbethedutyoftheStatetoprotectandfosterBuddhismwhileassuringtoallreligionstherightsgrantedbysection18(1)(d).35

Whilethecurrentconstitutiondiffersveryslightlyinitswording(replacingthesecond“Buddhism”with“BuddhaSasana,”theimplicationsofwhicharediscussedbelow),themainstructureoftheBuddhismChapterremainsunchangedfromthe1972process.ThreeReflectionsonHistory361. The long-standing grievances and demands that gave rise to the BuddhismChapter in the 1970s are similar to those expressed today; and they emergeinitiallyinreactiontothe1948Constitution.AlonghistorystandsbehinddemandstogivingBuddhismitsrightfulplace(nisitaena)andtoguaranteefundamentalrightstoreligiousfreedomforallpersons.Thelanguageof the Buddhism Chapter – and, indeed, the terms of the debate over Buddhism andreligion provisions today – remains in thrall to this history and to the struggles forindependence, sovereignty, and cultural recuperation that define the period from the1940sto1972.2. The Buddhism Chapter is not, and was never intended to be, a precise andunivocal provision; rather, it was designed purposefully as a vague andmultivocalclauseinordertoavoidand/orbridgethedemandsofmultiplegroups.

34BetweenMay1971andJanuary1972,DeSilvaandthedraftingcommitteeadjustedtheresolutiontoreflecttwoaspectsofthedebates.Firstly,thedraftersreplacedthetermrightfulplacewiththestrongerphraseforemostplace(S:pramukhasthānaya).Secondly,there-draftedresolutionremovedthephrasequalifyingBuddhismas“thereligionofthemajorityofthepeople.”35DraftBasicResolution5(iv)wasincorporatedasSection18(1)(d),althoughthewordingremainedidentical.36Note:Wedonotreflecthereontheproceduresandprocessesofthe1970-1972process.Welikalahasaddressedthisinotherplaces.



TheBuddhismChapter,as itexists today, ispurposefullymultivalent. It isneither theresult of unchecked Buddhism majoritarianism nor is it the result of some fullyconceived vision of “Buddhist secularism.” ColvinR. de Silva, himself a self-describedsecularist,designedtheprovisionasahard-wroughtmulti-partbargainoverreligion,inacontextofstrongandcompetingpoliticalforces,bothwithintherulingUnitedFrontcoalition and outside of it.37In drafting the language, De Silva sought to broker twotypes of compromise: an inter-religious compromise between those who demandedspecial prerogatives for Buddhism and those who wanted equal protections for allreligions; and an intra-religious compromise between Buddhists who wanted greaterstatesupervisionoverBuddhismandthosewhowantedtoprotectmonasticautonomy. 3.ManyofthedeepestdisagreementsregardingtheBuddhismChapteroccurrednotbetweenBuddhistsandnon-Buddhists,butamongBuddhiststhemselves.OneofthemainreasonsthattheBuddhismChapteradoptedthelanguageof“foremostplace” was because Buddhists could not agree as to how much influence thegovernment should have over the affairs of Buddhist monks. Disagreements on thisissue, which we continue to see today in Sri Lanka (e.g. the recent Kathikavata Billaffair), had been lingering since the 1940s. By the late 1960s, however, two majorfactionsemerged.Onefaction,ledbyelite,urbanBuddhistlayorganisations,suchastheACBC,arguedthatthegovernmentoughttocreateacentralregulatorybody,aBuddhaSasana Mandalaya, to oversee Buddhism on the island and, in particular, to helpadministerthesangha.Theotherfaction,ledbythechiefprelatesoftheSiyamNikaya,rejectedstrenuouslyanystateoversightovermonastic life.This factionpressuredthegovernmenttoincludeintheBuddhismChapterspecificprovisionsthatwoulddeclarethesanghaautonomous.

37DeSilva,infact,hadoriginallydraftedachapteronreligionthatmadenomentionofBuddhism.



II.TheCaseLawontheBuddhismChapter38ItisdifficulttodefinethejurisprudenceoftheBuddhismChapterfortworeasons.First,SriLanka’scourtshave,withsomeexceptionsdiscussedbelow,beenreluctanttoofferstrong interpretations of theBuddhismChapter.When comparedwith other areas oflawinSriLanka,thereisaconspicuousdearthofreferencestotheBuddhismChapterinreported cases. Second, even in the few published cases, minimal effort is made torespond to earlier decisions and/or systematise interpretations of the BuddhismChapter as an evolving streamof staredecisis. Therefore, in order tounderstand thelegalimpactsthattheBuddhismChapterhashadonSriLankansociety,onehastoaskanotherquestion:HowhavelitigantsandjudgesusedtheBuddhismChapterandwithwhat effects? By formulating thequestion in this (broader)way, one canbetter takestockofthemanywaysinwhichtheBuddhismChapterhasaffectedlegalandsociallifeinSriLanka.Generally speaking, theBuddhismChapter has beenused in litigation in Sri Lanka infourways,eachofwhichinvolvesdifferentassumptionsaboutwhatBuddhismis,howitshouldbeprotected,andwhoorwhatthreatensit.Inapreviousarticle,Schonthalhasdescribed this as four “idioms of litigation.” These idioms are summarised andcomparedbelow.IdiomOne:ProtectingBuddhistAutonomyfromtheStateTheearliestusesof theBuddhismChapterdate to the1970s,not longafter the1972Constitutionwasenacted.Inthesecases,litigantsusedthestate’sdutiestoprotectandfoster Buddhism as part of petitions for judicial review from the newly formedConstitutionalCourt. In two importantcases, the judgmentsofwhichwerepublishedby the Registry of the Constitutional Court,39litigants used the Buddhism Chapter tochallengetwogovernmentbills. Inthefirstcase,from1973,oppositionpoliticianandlawyerPrinsGunasekeraopposed“ThePlacesandObjectsofWorshipBill,”whichgavethe Director, Cultural Affairs strong powers over the construction and renovation ofreligious sites. In his petition, Gunasekerawarned of “anti-Buddhist” attitudeswithinthe government andwarned that thebillmightplaceBuddhismunder threat. In thesecondcase,from1976,threeseparategroupsofpetitioners,includingBuddhistmonkslay organisations, opposed a “Pirivena Education Bill” which aimed to restructure38ThissectiondrawsuponbutdoesnotreproduceanalysesfromBenjaminSchonthal,"SecuringtheSasanaThroughLaw:BuddhistConstitutionalismandBuddhist-interestLitigationinSriLanka,"Mod.AsianStud.:1-43.Italsooffersnewinformationaswell.39GovernmentofCeylon,“DecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtonPlacesandObjectsofWorshipBill,”inDecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourtofSriLanka(Colombo:RegistryoftheConstitutionalCourt,1973);GovernmentofCeylon,“DecisionoftheConstitutionalCourtonPirivenaEducationBill,”inDecisionsoftheConstitutionalCourtofSriLanka(Vol.IV)(Colombo:RegistryoftheConstitutionalCourt,1976)



Pirivenaeducationinwaysthatgavethestategreaterauthorityoverit. Theyclaimedthat thebill gave the statepowers to interfereperniciouslywithwhatwereproperlymonasticinstitutions.The Constitutional Court did not uphold either petition.40 Nevertheless, in itsjudgments, it indirectly affirmed two claimsmade by the petitioners. It affirmed theideathattheconstitutionoughttosafeguardBuddhismagainstunwantedinterventionsby state, even if it did not agree that the bills in question constituted a threat toBuddhism. It also affirmed the idea that protections for Buddhismwere essentially asub-species of fundamental rights for religion: Buddhism, like all religions, could bebisected into “belief” and “manifestation,” the second of which was limitable underSection18(1)(d)ofthe1972Constitution.41Theseearlycasesalsosetthegroundworkforthelitigationtofollow.Bythelate1970s,itwasclear, even if itwasnotexplicit in theconstitution, that theBuddhismChapterwas justiciableandthat,under therightconditions, itcould in factbeusedtocompelthegovernmenttoalteritsbehaviour.Idiom2:ProtectingBuddhistOrthopraxyStartinginthelate1970s,onecanseeasecondwayofusingtheBuddhismChapterinSriLanka’shigherjudiciary. Inthesecases,litigantsinvokedtheBuddhismChapterinordertopreventwhattheyconsideredtobegrossbreachesofmonasticcomportment.The first case of this type occurred in 1978. In this case, several Colombo-basedBuddhist layorganisations filed anobjectionwith theSupremeCourt against the factthata robedBuddhistmonk,Ven.NakulugamuwaSumanaThero,whohadcompletedhis lawexaminations,was scheduled tomake formalapplication to thebar.Thecase,whichChiefJusticeSamarakoondeclaredtobe“thefirstofitskindintheannalsofourCourts”,washeardbyafive-judgebenchoftheSupremeCourt.42Intheirsubmissions,the petitioners insisted that the state had an obligation to stop Ven. Sumana frombecomingalawyerinthenameofprotectingBuddhismbecausethecodesofBuddhistmonastic discipline (Vinaya) forbidmonks fromdoing so.Moreover,were Sumana tobecomealawyer,hemightencourageothermonkstodoso,andthis,inturn,wouldlead40ThisfactisunsurprisingconsideringthefactthatBandaranaikehadappointedthemembersoftheConstitutionalCourtherselfandtheywere,therefore,unlikelytostrikedowngovernmentbills.41InitsearlyBuddhismChapterjurisprudence,theConstitutionalCourthadathirdnotablefeaturetoitsinterpretations.TheCourtborrowedliberallyfromforeignjurisprudence.Inboththe1973and1976cases,thecourtsgaveprominencetoUSSupremeCourtdecisions(e.g.Reynoldsv.U.S.,Cantwellv.Connecticut,andDavisv.Beason)andIndianSupremeCourtDecisions(e.g.Saifuddinv.MoosajiandStateofBombayv.NarasuAppu).ComparisonswerealsomadebetweentheconstitutionalprovisionsofIrelandandBurmaandthatofSriLanka.42IntheMatteroftheApplicationofRev.SumanaTherotoBeAdmittedandEnrolledasanAttorneyatLaw(1978)ascitedin(20053SLR370).



to the degradation of the sangha on the island. Petitioners used passages from theVinayaas evidence, alongwithevidencegivenby someseniorBuddhistmonks (fromoutsideofSumana’s fraternity). Ven.Sumana, forhispart, alsoused textualevidencealongwithlettersofsupportfromseniormonksfromwithinhislineage.In deciding the matter, the Supreme Court found itself in a bind. One group of layBuddhists and senior monks called upon the court to protect monastic orthodoxy.Another group, defending Sumana, called upon the court to preserve monasticautonomy.Inafive-to-onesplitdecision,themajoritydecidedinfavourofSumanaandinsisted that monastic sects must be allowed to govern themselves on matters ofmonastic discipline. In a long and strident dissenting opinion, however, JusticeWanasundara defended the other position. It is important to note that, today, it isWanasundara’s dissent that seems more influential and widely cited as opposed toSamarakoon’smajorityopinion.SincetheSumanacase,therehavebeenseveralotherinstancesinwhichthecourtshavebeen called upon to regulate the behaviour of Buddhist monks.43Most recently, in awell-publicisedcourtcasethatbouncedaroundSriLanka’shigher judiciary fornearlytenyears, theCourtofAppeal intervened topreventVen.Dr.ParagoḍaWimalawansaThero, a senior monk living inWaskaduwa, near Colombo, from obtaining a drivinglicence.44Unlike the Sumana case, it was themonk, Ven.Wimalawansa, who initiallyfiledawritpetition to compel theCommissionerofMotorTraffic to issuehimwithadriving licencing, after he was denied a licence by an officer at a CMT office. In hispetition,Ven.Wimalawansa cited, amongother things, the fact thatbydenyinghimalicence the CMTwas impeding his abilities to fulfil hismonastic religious obligationsand therefore undermining the protections declared in theBuddhismChapter. (As inthe first idiom of litigation, he used the Buddhism Chapter to protect Buddhistautonomy against an over-reaching state.) Inmaking his submissions,Wimalawansagathered supporting letters from other Buddhist monks and offered his owninterpretations of the Vinaya. However, in a manner similar to the Sumana case, anumberoflayandmonasticgroupsintervenedagainstWimalawansa’spetitioninsistingthatmonksdriving,likemonksworkingaslawyers,contravenedthenormsofmonasticlifeasoutlinedintheVinayaandthereforedamagedBuddhism.AsintheSumanacase,thecourtwascalledupontoruleonadisputeoverquestionsofmonasticorthopraxy.This time, however, Justice Gooneratne, speaking for the Court of Appeal, issued astrong judgment rejecting Wimalawansa’s petition and insisting that monks drivingtransgressedtheVinayaand,therefore,constitutedathreattoBuddhism.Gooneratne’s43ForexampleRev.WarapitiyaRahulaTherov.CommissionerGeneralofExaminationsandothers(2000)relatingtoamonkworkingasasocialworker.SeealsothedebatesaroundtheproposedKathikavataBillinearly2016.44ForacompletesociolegalanalysisofthiscaseseeSchonthal(2016)“TheimpossibilityofaBuddhistState.”AsianJournalofLawandSociety3(1):1-20.ThecaseisParagodaWimalawansaTheroandOthersv.CommissionerofMotorTraffic(2014).



opinion is remarkable for its long excurses into the proper norms of Buddhism andBuddhistmonasticism.(ItisthemostthoroughgoingcourtopiniononBuddhismsinceWanasundara’s dissent.) The opinion is also notable in that, rather than cite themajority opinion in the Sumana case, which considered very similar issues, it usesWanasundara’sdissent.Idiom3:ProtectingBuddhistSpacesSincethe1970s,litigantshavelookedtotheprotectionsforBuddhismspelledoutintheBuddhismChapterasawaytoprotectwhattheyconsidertobeBuddhistspacesfromavarietyofperceivedthreats.ThesethreatshaveincludedtheLiberationTigersofTamilEelam (LTTE), Christian proselytisers, andMuslim settlers. Inmaking these types ofclaims,litigantspointedtoaparticulartermintheBuddhismChapterwhichwasaddedduring the 1978 Constitutional reforms, the term “Buddha Sasana.” By replacing thephrase“protectandfosterBuddhism”with“protectandfostertheBuddhaSasana”–or,in Sinhala, replacing buddhāgama with śāsanaya – those who drafted the 1978Constitution, and thosewho have subsequently interpreted it, sought to broaden theambitofstateprotectionsforthemajorityreligion.Sasana, the argument goes, applies to more than āgama. Where āgama impliesdoctrinesandbeliefs,sasanaalsoencompassesrelics,temples,texts,persons,customs,materialobjectsandevenspaces.45Buddhistlayorganisations,suchastheYoungMen’sBuddhistAssociation(YMBA),usedthisargumentaboutthespatialnatureofsasanatopetition against the establishment of Provincial Councils in the 1987 ThirteenthAmendmentcase.46Bypermittingthedevolutionofpoliticalauthoritytotheprovinces,theargumentwent,thestatewouldbeplacingnon-Buddhists(intheNorthandEast)incontrolofBuddhistsites;andthatarrangementwouldviolateconstitutionalobligationsto protect Buddhism. Like the Sumana case, this argumentwas not validated by themajority opinion. Yet, it was affirmed in an important dissenting opinion by JusticeWanasundara. In recent years, that dissent has become something of a de factojurisprudentialdoctrineinSriLankaandisregularlyquotedincourtsubmissionsandjudgments.47

45See,forexample,definitionsofSasanaasofferedbythe2002PresidentialCommissiononBuddhism.46IntheMatteroftheThirteenthAmendmenttotheConstitutionandProvincialCouncilsBill(1987)2SLR33347Thispointcannotbeoverstated.Thisdissentingopinionregardingthespatialand“compendious”natureofthephraseBuddhaSasanaisveryinfluential.LikeWanasundara’sdissentintheSumanamatter,manylegalprofessionalsrefertoitregularly.Forexample,inacasefrom1994,theSupremeCourtselectivelyvalidatedthisinterpretationoftheBuddhismclausebyreferringtothisdissentingopinionratherthanthemajorityopinion.SC(SD)1/1994IntheMatteroftheAntiquitiesOrdinance,Hansard3May1994.



Since the Thirteenth Amendment case, litigants and lawyers have continued tomakesubmissions that emphasise the need to protect Buddhist spaces from non-Buddhistthreats.Theseargumentsappearprominently,forexample,inthewrittensubmissionsfromcasesrelatedtotheconstructionofChristianchurchesinBuddhist-majorityareas.While thosewhoopposechurch-buildingciteanumberof legal rationales– includingzoning,buildingcodesrestrictions,permitviolationsandotherthings–theyoftenbuildintotheirpetitionsargumentsthatsuchconstructionsmightalsothreatentheBuddhistspace of that particular village. Many of these cases are settled rather than decided;therefore,frequently,onemustlooktothecasefilestofindevidenceofthisdynamic.The defence of Buddhist spaces was prominent is the important Dighavapi case of2008.48In that case, the Supreme Court heard fundamental rights petitions from anumber of petitioners, many of them Buddhist monks and lay organisations, whoobjected to the distribution of houses to predominatelyMuslim families as part of atsunamirelocationproject fundedbySaudiArabiandonors.Themost influential legalpoints inthecase fromtheperspectiveof thecourtpertainedtotheprotocolsof landalienationanddistribution.Nevertheless,ifonelooksatthesubmissionsinthecase,aswell as themedia attentionaround it, one sees that theBuddhismChapterplayedanimportantroleaswell:amajornarrative in thesubmissionsand journalisticaccountswasthefactthatthisMuslimsettlementwastooclosetothehistoricDighavapitemple,anditthreatenedtodivide–spatially-thetemplefromtheBuddhistcommunitiesthatlivednearbyand,throughdonationsandservice,maintainedthetemple.Inthiscase,asintheonesdescribedabove,litigantsandthepublicinvokedtheBuddhismChapterinordertocalluponthestatetoprotectthe“spaces”ofBuddhismontheisland.Idiom4:ProtectingBuddhismfromProfanationIn addition to protecting Buddhist autonomy, orthopraxy, and space, the BuddhismChapter has also been used to protect Buddhism against the effects of “profaning”religion,bywhichismeantthepurportedlyimpropermixingofthingsdeemedreligiouswiththosedeemedeconomicorcommercial.49Inthesecases,petitionerscalluponthecourt to prevent other groups from undertaking practices which might damage thereputationorprestigeofBuddhism,orthesizeoftheBuddhistcommunityinSriLanka.The most prominent cases of this type relate to attempts made by Buddhist groupsduring the 2000s to prevent “forcible” or “unethical” conversions. In the threeincorporationcases from2000 to2003,50aswell as in the JHUbill cases in2004and48SC(FR)178/2008Ven.EllawalaMedanandaTheroandothersv.SunilKannangaraandOthers49Schonthal,"SecuringtheSasanaThroughLaw:BuddhistConstitutionalismandBuddhist-interestLitigationinSriLanka,"33.50SC(SD)2/2001(8June2001),RegardingChristianSahanayeDoratuwaPrayerCentre(Incorporation)Bill.SC(SD)2/2003(18Feb2003),RegardingNewHarvestWineMinistries(Incorporation)Bill.SC(SD)19/2003(5Aug2003),RegardingProvincialoftheTeachingSistersoftheHolyCrossoftheThirdOrderof



2005,51petitioners and intervenient petitions used the Buddhism Chapter to justifyattempts to limit the activities of Christian groups that, they alleged, had improperlymixed proselytism and financial inducements in order to gain converts. During thesame period, and extending into the present, one also sees attempts – by way offundamental rights petitions52and criminal charges53– to prevent merchandisers,artists,andtouristsfromdefamingtheimageoftheBuddha.Here,aswell,petitionersandprosecutinglawyersaimedtoprotectBuddhismthroughpreventingtheimpropermingling of Buddhist symbolswith commercial practices andwith other images thatmight diminish or violate the perceived sacrality of those symbols. Although theBuddhismChapterisnottheonlylawinvokedinthesecases–partiesoftenuseChapterXVofthePenalCodeon“offencesrelatingtoreligion”–thegovernment’sconstitutionalduties to protectBuddhismare oftenhighlighted as an additional, if not overarching,justificationfortakingfirmanddecisiveaction–particularlyinpublicdebateandmediacommentarysurroundingthesecases.ThreeReflectionsonCaseLaw1. When invoked in litigation, constitutional duties to protect Buddhism lead,almostinevitably,todebatesoverwhatitmeanstoprotectBuddhism.Themandate “toprotectand fosterBuddhism” isbynomeansself-evident. This facthas been obscured inmany debates about the Buddhism Chapter because defendersandcriticshaveconcentratedmoreonitsexpressivedimensionsthanonitsregulatorydimensions.Whenone lookscloselyathow litigantsand judgeshave interpretedandinvoked the Buddhism Chapter, however, one sees clearly the broad range ofinterpretations possible. The mandate to protect and foster Buddhism can meanprotecting Buddhists’ autonomy from the state or using the state to neutraliseheterodox Buddhist practices. It can mean securing the Buddhist-ness of particularspacesorpreventingtheimpropermixingofBuddhismwithcommercialactivity.Itcanjustify judges’ readings of Buddhist texts or it can give to bhikkhus alone ultimateauthoritytopronounceonBuddhism.(Onlyinonecase,theMenzingendetermination,didtheSupremeCourtaffirmtheideathatthestate’sdutiestoprotectBuddhismcouldoutweigh the religious rights of other groups.) We could extend this further, but thepoint remains:by includingenforceableprotections forBuddhism in the constitution,

SaintFrancisinMenzingenofSriLanka(Incorporation)Bill.51SC(SD)2-22/2004RegardingtheForcibleConversionofReligonBill;SC(SD)32/2004Regardingthe19thAmendmenttotheConstitutionBill.52SC(FR)237/2004,Ven.KusaladhammTherov.IndradeSilvaandOthers(2004)53Schonthal,"SecuringtheSasanaThroughLaw:BuddhistConstitutionalismandBuddhist-interestLitigationinSriLanka,"36-41.



draftersinducedisputesoverwhatitmeanstoprotectBuddhism—disputesintowhich,withafewexceptions,thecourtsareunderstandablyreluctanttointervenedecisively.2.Contrarytowhatmanyassume,disputesoverprotectingBuddhismfrequentlyend up deepening and exacerbating existing divisions among Buddhist monksandlaypersons.Inmanyofcases,usingtheBuddhismChaptereffectstheoppositeofwhatdraftersoftheBuddhismChapterintended.RatherthansecuringthewellbeingandintegrityofSriLanka’s Buddhists it aggravates long-standing lines of fissure within the island’sBuddhistcommunitybyraisingthestakesofdebatesovertheparametersoforthodoxBuddhism. To take just one example, in the case of the drivingmonk, the courtwascalledupontointerveneinaseriesofcontentiousquestionsthathavesplitBuddhistsinSriLanka fordecades,evencenturies: Whohas the finalauthority todeclarewhat isorthodox and heterodox? Should monks from one monastic fraternity or chapter ortemple have authority to discipline monks from another?What is the state’s role insupportingortemperingthatauthority?Whatarethelimitsofmonasticparticipationinworldly (laukika) affairs? What is the proper jurisdiction of Vinaya? What happenswhenVinayaandstatelawcomeintoconflict?When thestateand thecourtsarecalledupon toenforce theBuddhismChapter theyendupcallingattention to, raising thecostsof,and(oftenunwittingly) intervening inthese difficult, divisive, and old debates. Moreover, insofar as judges are laypersons,thesecasesinevitablyplacelaypersonsinthemorallyawkwardthepositionofhavingtodictatethetermsofBuddhismtoBuddhistmonks.3. Rather than serving as an instrument for addressing existing threats toBuddhism, theBuddhismChapter givesopportunities and incentives to citizensandgroupstoclaimawidevarietyofsocialandpoliticalphenomenaasthreatstoBuddhism.ItmayalsoheightenasenseofcrisisoverBuddhism.Visible in almost all of the court cases related to Buddhism are the ways in whichconstitutional mandates to protect Buddhism permit, perhaps even incentivise, themaking of legal claims about Buddhism. This can happen in both passive and activeways. Passively, an awareness of the constitutional duties to protect Buddhismmayheighten one’s awareness of (or anxiety regarding) the condition of the majorityreligion.Actively, the factof constitutionalprotections forBuddhismmay lead legallyminded persons to thrust Buddhism into a variety of other existing social conflicts.GoodexamplesofthiscanbeseenintheThirteenthAmendmentCaseaswellasintheDighavapicase,wherelitigantsinvokedtheBuddhismChapterasanadditionalstrategyofcontestingthelegalityofaparticularlegalorexecutiveactionthat,inmostcases,wasnotprimarilyperceivedoriginallyasa threat toBuddhism. AsSchonthalhasargued,



litigation related to the Buddhism Chapter has increased in recent years, in whatappearstobeagrowingcultureofBuddhist-interestlitigationandlegalactivism.54III.Options,AdvantagesandThingstoConsiderBroadlyspeaking,fouroptionsareavailabletodrafters.Weoutlinethesebelow,whilereflectingontheadvantagesofferedbyeachaswellascompetingfactorsthatshouldbetakenunderconsideration.Ourrecommendationwillthenbediscussed.Option 1: Declare in the constitution a principle of equal status for religions,religiousneutrality,orsecularism,whileomittingspecialtreatmentforBuddhism.Today, as in the past, numerous constitutional submissions call for the inclusion of aclausethatannouncesthestate’simpartialitytowardsreligion.Thisimpartialitymighttake several forms: equal state patronage towards all religions, strict neutrality/non-discrimination with respect to religion, or a statement of separation or non-establishmentbetweenstateandreligion(asoneseesinmanycountriesthroughouttheworld).ThePRCprocessyieldedanumberof recommendations to this effect. Someof theserecommendations appear in Section 4, on religion, while others appear in othersections. In Section 4, one finds the following: “Sri Lanka shall be a secular state”(4(iv)), “SriLankashallbeasecularstatewhilerecognising theroleofreligion in thespiritual development of the people” (4(v)), “the Republic of Sri Lanka will give allreligionsequalstatus”(4(vi)).TheAdvantages:Intermsoftheexpressivefunctionsoftheconstitution,announcingaprincipleofimpartialitytowardsreligionwouldgiveaclearsignalthattheconstitutionaimstobemoreinclusivethanpreviousconstitutions.TheConstitutionalAssemblywillbe well aware of the tremendous expressive significance of such a signal for non-BuddhistsinSriLanka.Theregulatoryeffectsofsuchachangewoulddependuponthewordingoftheclausesinquestion(seebelow)andwhetherthoseprincipleswouldbeexplicitlyjusticiable.Important Things to Consider: Secularism, as a legal principle and term, is no lesscontestedormultivalentthanBuddhism.Forexample,thesecularism(laïcité)ofFrance

54Ibid.,38-41.



and Turkey are entirely different from that of India and the U.S.55Furthermore,interpretationsofthemeaningofsecularismcanbejustaspolemicalandexclusionaryas protections for Buddhism. Consider, for example, the fact that, in India, ideas ofsecularismhavebeenusedbyHindutvagroupstoadvanceanti-Muslimagendas.56Thepoint is that declarations of secularism do not always lead to greater inclusion andimpartiality on the part of the state. The rubric of secularism, too, can be usedilliberally.In the light of Sri Lanka’s history and culture, it can also be hypothesised that betterresultsintermsofrecognitionmightbeachievediftheconstitutionweretoforegroundthevalueofpluralismratherthanarigidnotionofequality(intheformalisticsenseofidentity, uniformity or isomorphism among religious traditions) in approaching theissue of religion(s) in the constitution and public life more broadly.57That is, analternativeapproachmightbetoemphasisetherichdiversityofreligioustraditionsandthe concomitant tolerance, syncretism, cross-fertilisation, and co-existence that havelongcharacterisedthepracticeandenjoymentofreligionsamongpeoplesontheisland.Puttingaside theexpressive implicationsofaconstitutionaldeclarationofsecularism,for the moment, some important points also pertain to the regulatory implications:Where constitutions attempt to declare equal status for major religions – such as issuggested in4(vi) – clear regulatoryproblemsmay result.Mostobviously, the courtswillbecalledupontoruleonwhichparticulardispensationscountas“religion”andaretherefore worthy of equal status: is Mahayana Buddhism a separate religion andtherefore deserving of equal status? Is secular humanism? One can easily see theproblems.TakingtheSriLankancase,inparticular, itseemstomatterlesswhattheconstitutionsaysandmorewhatthe judiciarydoes. That is, themosteffectivewaystouse lawtocreateneutralitytowardsreligionmaybethroughjudicialdecisionsandcommonlaw.In this regard, however, as the PRC also has noted, Sri Lanka’s higher judiciary hasrecognisedacommonlawprincipleofsecularismonmultipleoccasions.Thisprinciplemaybebetterstrengthenedandclarifiedthroughthecourtsthanthroughchangingthesubstanceofthewrittenconstitution.

55Kutu,AhmetT..2007."PassiveandAssertiveSecularism:HistoricalConditions,IdeologicalStruggles,andStatePoliciesTowardReligion,"WorldPolitics,59(4):568-9.Bhargava,Rajeev.2008."PoliticalSecularism,"inTheOxfordHandbookofPoliticalTheory,editedbyJohnDryzek,BonnieHonig&AnnePhillips.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.56Cossman,Brenda&RatnaKapur.1996."Secularism:Bench-MarkedbyHinduRight,"EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,31(38):2613-2617,2619-2627,2629-2630.Sen,Ronojoy.2010.ArticlesofFaith:Religion,Secularism,andtheIndianSupremeCourt.NewDelhi:OxfordUniversityPress.57Westressthatweareherenotimpugninglegalandpoliticalequalitybetweenindividualsasaliberalconstitutionalvalue.



Option2:ReconfigureBuddhism’sspecialstatusandspecialprotections.AsecondoptionistomaintainlegalprotectionsforBuddhisminthenewconstitution.Thisoptiondoesnotappearveryprominently in thePRCdocument;however, itdoesappear prominently in public opinion polls58and media coverage. Broadly speakingfouroptionspredominateunderthisrubric:(1)ThenewconstitutioncoulddeclareSriLankatobea“Buddhiststate.”(2)ItcoulddeclareBuddhismtobe“thestatereligion”(e.g., as is done in Cambodia). (3) It could create special administrative bodies foradministeringBuddhism(suchasthe“SupremeCouncil”proposedintheKumaratungagovernment’s 2000 Draft Constitution).59(4) It could retain the basic architecture ofArticle 9, while playing with the adjectival modifiers (e.g. including a phrase thatspecifiesthatBuddhismis“thereligionofthemajorityofthepeople”asappearsinthe2008ConstitutionofThailand).TheAdvantages:GivingspecialstatustoBuddhisminSriLanka’sconstitutionhaslongbeenapopulardemandamongBuddhistsontheisland.Althoughlinkedinsomecasesto exclusionary forms of ethno-religious nationalism, requests for a special place forBuddhism in the constitution have also reflected bona fide desires to recognise theimportant role thatBuddhismhasplayed inSriLankanhistory.Thereare liberal andinclusively-minded citizens fromall religious backgroundswho accede to the idea, inmore or less enthusiastic ways, that the constitution might recognise Buddhism.Evidence for this can be seen in the results of a 2010 poll conducted for the APRCcommitteebyColinIrwinandCPA.60By including carefully-worded protections for Buddhism in the new constitution onemightsimultaneouslysatisfythedesiresofBuddhistsfromacrossthepoliticalspectrum– and thereby enhancing popular buy-in for the constitution as awhole –while alsohelping insure that the language for expressing those desires is framed in the mostinclusive way possible. More pressingly, even for committed secular liberals, givingBuddhism a special status may be a necessary point of compromise or concession58SeetheveryhelpfulpollingdoneatCPAhere:http://www.cpalanka.org/opinion-poll-on-constitutional-reform/;http://www.cpalanka.org/democracy-in-post-war-sri-lanka-april-2016/;http://www.cpalanka.org/democracy-in-post-war-sri-lanka-dec2015/59The2000ConstitutionBillproposedchangingArticle9asfollows:

7.(1)TheRepublicofSriLankashallgivetoBuddhismtheforemostplaceand,accordingly,itshallbethedutyoftheStatetoprotectandfostertheBuddhaSasanawhilegivingadequateprotectiontoallreligionsandguaranteeingtoeverypersontherightsandfreedomsgrantedbyparagraphs(1)and(3)ofArticle15.

(2)TheStateshall,wherenecessary,consulttheSupremeCouncil,recognizedbytheMinisteroftheCabinetofMinistersinchargeofthesubjectofBuddhaSasana,onmeasurestakenfortheprotectionandfosteringoftheBuddhaSasana.

60Irwin,Colin.“‘WarandPeace’andtheAPRCProposals.”May,2010.Availableathttp://www.peacepolls.org/cgi-bin/documents.



necessaryforensuringthatconstitutionsucceedsintheenactmentprocess,bothintheparliamentaryandreferendumstages.ImportantThingstoConsider:TherearesomeheavycoststogivingBuddhismspecialconstitutional protections. Some of these come from the expressive functions of suchclauses:nomatterhowcarefullyonewordstheseclauses,theycannothelpbutsignalinsomewaythatotherreligionshavealesserstatusontheisland.This,inturn,weakensconstitutional commitments to individual equality, citizenship, and ultimately, evennationalidentityandsolidarityinapluralsociety.EquallyconcerningforBuddhists,however,aretheregulatorydisadvantagesthatcomefromimplementingBuddhistprotectionsinthecourts.Ashasbeeninindicatedabove,BuddhistsolidarityandmonasticautonomyhavethemselvesbeenharmedthroughthelegalimplementationofArticle9.Moreover,initsenforcementofArticle9protections,the courtshavebeenplaced in themorally challengingand, inmanycases,a-śāsankaposition of dictating Buddhist norms to monks. There are, therefore, also significantreligious costs to giving the state authority to protect (and therefore manage)Buddhism.61Forthisreason,namingBuddhismas“thestatereligion”ortomakingSriLanka a “Buddhist state” could be particularly hazardous choices for constitutiondrafters;westronglyrecommendagainstthis.Wenote that some representations to thePRC suggested that a distinctionbedrawnbetween“Buddhism”and“theBuddhaSasana”inanefforttotakethesanghaoutofthepurviewofthestate.62However,suchadistinctionmaybelegallyuntenable.Take,asjust one example, the matter of Buddhist temples: Are they part of “Buddhism” andtherefore well within the ambit of state control or “Buddha Sasana” and thereforeproperlyobjectsofmonasticcontrol?Manyotherexamplesmightalsobeadduced.Option3:JointogetherOptions1and2.A thirdoption also exists, onewhichholdsmore closely to the current constitutionaldispensation.Rather than enhancing either constitutional commitments to secularismor Buddhist supremacy, the Constitutional Assembly might attempt to express bothcommitmentsinthesamesection,asisalreadydoneundertheexistingtermsofArticle9.AvarietyofoptionshavebeenproposedbythePRC:

i. RetainArticle9(ChapterII)ofthecurrentconstitutionwithnochange.ii. ChangethetitleofChapterIIofthecurrentconstitutionto‘Religions’(rather

61Interestingly,JamesMadisonmadeasimilarobservationaboutthedangersofChristianestablishmentclausesinthecontextoftheU.S.ConstitutionandBillofRights.Seehis“MemorialandRemonstranceAgainstReligiousAssessments”(1785).62PRCreport,16



than‘Buddhism’)iii. RewriteArticle9asfollows:“TheRepublicofSriLankashallgiveallreligions

equal status. The State shall protect and foster Buddhism and the BuddhaSāsanawhile assuring to all religions the rights grantedbyArticles 10 and14(1)(e)ofthecurrentConstitution.

The Advantages: By creating a constitutional clause that suggests both the specialstatusofBuddhismandthegeneralrightsofallreligions, theConstitutionalAssemblymaybemore successful in satisfying abroader swatheof politicians, interest groups,andthepublic.Historically,thiswasthestrategyofallpreviousconstitutionalrevisionexercisesafterthe1940s,includingthoseundertakenin1957-8,1967-8,1970-2,1978and2000. Suggestions(ii)and(iii)tryto‘rebalance’Article9inwaysthatwillsoftentheexclusivityoftheprovision.ImportantThingstoConsider:ThemajordisadvantageofOption3isthatitleavesinplace a number of legal contradictions and inconsistencies,whichmay, under certaincircumstances, prove troubling. As it stands now, neither the text of Article 9 nor itscase law gives a clear indication as to the intended balance between Buddhistprerogatives and fundamental rights. Some believe that Article 9 permits religiousrights tobe limited in the interestofprotectingBuddhism(as in theSupremeCourt’sMenzingen determination). Others believe that fundamental rights should takeprecedence (which seems to be the dominant position). Adding to the ambiguity isanother sematic inconsistency, referred to above in Section I:Article 9mentions thatBuddhism will be protected while “assuring” that “all religions” are grantedfundamentalrightstofreedomofreligion;yettherightstowhichitrefersaccruenottoreligions but to individuals. At the same time, there are disagreements overwhetherand/or how Article 9 should be enforced by courts. If one leaves these ambiguitiesunaddressed, it leavesopen thepossibility thatanactivist judiciary–oraveryactivepublicinterestlitigationcampaign-mightdisruptwhatisaveryprecariousbalance.Option 4: Join together Option 1 and 2while clarifying questions of balance andjusticiability.Theremaybeways tomake small clarifications toArticle 9 and/or to the other PRCsuggestions listed in Option 3, which have beneficial regulatory effects. Twoclarificationsstandoutasmostproductive.First, the Constitutional Assembly might further clarify the relationship betweenBuddhist prerogatives and fundamental rights. For example, could be done throughreplacingthelanguageof“assuring”63withmorepreciselanguagesuchas“subjectto,”meaningthattheBuddhismChapterwouldread:

63Art.9.TheRepublicofSriLankashallgivetoBuddhismtheforemostplaceandaccordinglyitshallbethedutyofthestatetoprotectandfostertheBuddhaSasana,whileassuringtoallreligionstherights



The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place andaccordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the BuddhaSasana,subjecttotherightstograntedbyArticles10and14(1)(e)toall.

This formula would clarify the relationship between promoting Buddhism andprotectinggeneralreligiousrightsguaranteedbythechapteronfundamentalrightstoindividuals,whichmoreoverareenforceablebytheSupremeCourtunderArticle126asaspecialconstitutionaljurisdiction.Incidentally,thoseindividualreligiousrightswouldalsoapplytoBuddhists, thusensuringthatstateactionstopromoteBuddhismdonotinfringeuponthereligiousrightsofindividualBuddhistsorBuddhistgroups.Second, the new constitution could clarify the mechanism of enforcement for theBuddhismprovisions. This could be done inmultipleways. The first is to render theBuddhism clause non-justiciable and more a guiding principle by moving it to thechapter on directive principles of state policy. While this is perhaps the mostappropriatewaytogiveexpressiverecognitiontoBuddhism,theopinionpolldatacitedabovesuggestslittlepublicsupportforsuchareform,anditislikelyBuddhistopinionwould be as outraged by this seeming ‘demotion’ as if the Buddhism clause wasremovedaltogetherfromtheconstitution.IfthereforetheBuddhismclauseshouldremainjusticiable,thenthereareotherwaysofensuring that it is not invoked except in significant caseswhere there is a clear andjustifiableneed for judicial intervention.Thisaimcouldbeachievedbyestablishingaspecial leave to proceed requirement being met prior to any pleading of or on theBuddhismclausebeforethecourts.Likewise,ifaConstitutionalCourtisintroducedbythenewconstitution(whichwouldnotbeafinalcourtofappealbutonlyhearcasesofgraveconstitutionalsignificance64),thenexclusivejurisdictionfortheinterpretationofthe Buddhism clause could be vested exclusively in this court and, perhaps, to anidentifiedgroupofspeciallyqualifiedjudgeswithrequisiteexpertiseinBuddhism.Advantages:Someadvantagesofclarifying the languagehavebeenmentionedabove,namelyspecifyingaproperbalancebetweenBuddhistprerogativesandreligiousrights.Yet,therearealso–somewhatcounter-intuitive–benefitstoclarifyingand/orlimitingjusticiabilityofprotectionsforBuddhismintheconstitution.

grantedbyArticles10and14(1)(e).

64SeeWrittenSubmissionsofCPAtotheSubcommitteeoftheConstitutionalAssemblyontheJudiciary,availableat:http://www.cpalanka.org/written-submissions-by-the-centre-for-policy-alternatives-to-the-subcommittee-of-the-constitutional-assembly-on-the-judiciary/



Making protections for Buddhism advisory or aspirational – or specifying theparameters of justiciability for it – preserves the expressive importance of theprovision, while curbing its regulatory downsides. To put it simply, it ensures thatBuddhism isnotamatter tobedealtwith throughnormal legalprocedures.Afterall,thesebodiesarepopulatedbylaypersonswhoare,withafewexceptions,non-expertsinBuddhism,particularlyvis-à-vismembersofthesangha.TakingBuddhismoutofthecompetence of judicial authorities opens up the possibility for it to be moreproductivelysupportedbyothergovernmentandnon-governmentbodies,suchastheMinistryofBuddhistAffairsandthesanghaitself.Thesebodiesmayhavetheauthority,experience,andexpertisetoassistBuddhismintargetedandspecialisedways.Takingthe mandate to protect Buddhism out of the courts also avoids the conundrumsdescribed inSection IIabove,wherebyavarietyofmonasticandnon-monasticactorsfightoverwhohastheauthoritytospeakforBuddhism(see,also,SectionIIandOption3above).ItisimportanttonotethattheapproachofgivingspecialconstitutionalprotectionstoBuddhism, which are non-justiciable is common among other Theravada Buddhistcountriesintheregion,suchasThailandandMyanmar.Inthosecountries,supportforBuddhismtendstobechannelledmainlythroughgovernmentoffices(liketheMinistryof Buddhist Affairs),dāyakas, and the sangha itself, rather than through court ordersandwrits. Legally speaking, Buddhistswould continue to be protectedunder generalreligiousrightsprovisions,PenalCodeprovisions,andotherlawsandregulations,andBuddhism and the Buddha Sasana would be supported in more useful ways byexecutiveandlegislativeaction.ImportantThingstoConsider: Inthe1970s,ColvinR.DeSilvawasadamantthatnochangeshouldbemadetotheambiguousrhetoricoftheBuddhismChapter,whichhesaw as a productive ambiguity designed to satisfy a highly polarised population.Attempts to tweakArticle9maygive rise to fiercepolitical competition andpossiblyaggravatetheverylinesoffissurethatthearticlewasdesignedtosidestep.Thisisanotasmallrisk.



Summary:LessonsLearnedandReformOptionsThree Lessons from History before the Constitutionalisation of the BuddhismChapter(Art.9)Lesson1:The long-standinggrievancesanddemands thatgave rise to theBuddhismChapter – and its parallel provisions for promoting Buddhism and protectingfundamental rights – are similar to those expressed today. These demands emergedinitiallyinreactiontothe1948Constitution,whichwasfelttobeinadequateinregardto the state’s role in the protection of Buddhism and other religions. Even today,debates over these provisions bear the imprints of these struggles for independence,sovereignty,andculturalrecuperationthatdefinetheperiodfromthe1940sto1972.Lesson2:TheBuddhismChapter isnot,andwasnever intended tobe,apreciseandunivocal provision; rather, it was designed purposefully as a vague and multivocalclauseinordertoavoidand/orbridgethedemandsofmultiplegroups.Theformulationadoptedbythe1972Constitution,andwithaslightamendmentthe1978Constitution,seeks toreflect twotypesofcompromise: first,an inter-religiouscompromisebetweenthosewhodemandedspecialprerogatives forBuddhismandthosewhowantedequalprotections for all religions; and second, an intra-religious compromise betweenBuddhistswhowantedgreaterstatesupervisionoverBuddhismandthosewhowantedtoprotectmonasticautonomy.Lesson 3: Many of the deepest disagreements regarding the Buddhism ChapteroccurrednotbetweenBuddhistsandnon-Buddhists,butamongBuddhiststhemselves.OneofthemainreasonsthattheBuddhismChapteradoptedthelanguageof“foremostplace” was because Buddhists could not agree as to how much influence thegovernment should have over the affairs of Buddhist monks. These disagreementscontinueintotoday.Three Lessons from theCase Lawafter the Constitutionalisationof theBuddhismClauseLesson1:When invoked in litigation, constitutionalduties toprotectBuddhism lead,almost inevitably, to debates over what it means to protect Buddhism, because themandate “to protect and foster Buddhism” is by nomeans self-evident. This fact hasbeen obscured inmany debates about the Buddhism Chapter because defenders andcritics have concentrated more on its expressive dimensions than on its regulatorydimensions. But the case law reveals both thewide range of interpretations that arepossibleand,consequently,thescopeformajordisagreement.Byincludingenforceableprotections for Buddhism in the constitution, drafters induce disputes over what it



meanstoprotectBuddhism;disputesintowhich,withafewexceptions,thecourtsareunderstandably reluctant to intervene decisively. No constitutional Buddhism clausecanthereforebeaconclusivesettlementoftheissue.Lesson 2: Contrary to what many assume, disputes over protecting Buddhismfrequently end up deepening and exacerbating existing divisions among Buddhistmonksandlaypersons.RatherthansecuringthewellbeingandintegrityofSriLanka’sBuddhists, it aggravates long-standing lines of fissure within the island’s BuddhistcommunitybyraisingthestakesofdebatesovertheparametersoforthodoxBuddhism.Who has the final authority to declarewhat is orthodox and heterodox?What is thestate’sroleinsupportingortemperingthatauthority?WhatistheproperjurisdictionofVinaya?WhathappenswhenVinayaandstatelawcomeintoconflict? Whenthestateand the courts are called upon to enforce the Buddhism Chapter they end up callingattention to, raising the costs of, and, often unwittingly, intervening in these difficult,divisive andolddebates.Moreover, it alsoplaces judges as laypersons in themorallyawkwardthepositionofhavingtodictatethetermsofBuddhismtoBuddhistmonks.Lesson 3: Rather than serving as an instrument for addressing existing threats toBuddhism, the Buddhism Chapter gives opportunities and incentives to citizens andgroups to claim a wide variety of social and political phenomenon as threats toBuddhism.ItmayalsoheightenasenseofcrisisoverBuddhism.Inapassivesense,anawarenessoftheconstitutionaldutiestoprotectBuddhismmayheightenawarenessof,oranxietyregarding,theconditionofthemajorityreligion.Moreactively,constitutionalprotectionsforBuddhismmayleadsomepersonstothrustBuddhismintoavarietyofotherexistingconflicts.OptionsforReformorReformulationoftheBuddhismChapterItcouldbeverylikelythatconstitution-makerswouldconclude,onabalanceofpoliticalcosts and benefits, that the best option would be to retain the present BuddhismChapter intact in thenewconstitution,withoutany changes. Indeed, this seems tobethe position that has garnered themost support. However, if some change is in factcontemplated, itwouldseemthat the followingare theavailableoptions. Webelievethat,ifachangeistobemade,Option4isthemostpreferrable.Option1:Declareintheconstitutionaprincipleofequalstatusforreligions,religiousneutrality,orsecularism,whileomittingspecialtreatmentforBuddhism.Advantages:

• A principle of impartiality towards religion would give a clear signal that theconstitutionaimstobemoreinclusivethanpreviousconstitutions.



Considerations:

• Secularism, as a legal principle and term, is no less contested than Buddhism.Interpretations of the meaning of secularism can be just as polemical,exclusionaryandilliberalasprotectionsforaparticularreligion.

• InthelightofSriLanka’shistoryandculture,betterresultsmightbeachievedbyforegrounding the value of pluralism rather than equality (in its more rigidformalistic sense as uniformity) in approaching the issue of religion(s) in theconstitutionandpubliclifemorebroadly.

• A constitutional declaration of equal status for major religions may result insignificantregulatoryproblems.Mostobviously,thecourtswillbecalledupontorule on which particular dispensations count as “religion” and are thereforeworthy of equal status (e.g. is Mahayana Buddhism, or secular humanism, aseparatereligionandthereforedeservingofequalstatus?).

• Themore effectiveway to use law to induce impartiality in regard to religionmaybethroughjudicialdecisionsandcommonlawratherthantheconstitution.Sri Lanka’s higher judiciary has recognised a common law principle ofsecularismonmultipleoccasions.

Option2:ReconfigureBuddhism’sspecialstatusandspecialprotections.Broadlyspeakingfouroptionspredominateunderthisrubric:(1)Thenewconstitutioncoulddeclare Sri Lanka tobe a “Buddhist state”; (2) It coulddeclareBuddhism tobe“the state religion” (e.g., as is done in Cambodia); (3) It could create specialadministrative bodies for administering Buddhism (such as the “Supreme Council”proposed in the Kumaratunga government’s 2000 Draft Constitution); (4) It couldretain thebasic architectureofArticle9,whileadjusting theadjectivalmodifiers (e.g.including aphrase that specifies thatBuddhism is “the religionof themajorityof thepeople”asappearsinthe2008ConstitutionofThailand).Advantages:

• Some Buddhists request changes in this respect, and this may help secure areferendummajorityforthenewconstitution.

• Although linked in some cases to exclusionary forms of ethno-religiousnationalism, requests fora specialplace forBuddhism in theconstitutionhavealso reflectedbona fidedesires to recognise the important role thatBuddhismhasplayedinSriLankanhistory.

• Including carefully-worded protections for Buddhism in the new constitutioncouldsimultaneously satisfy thedesiresofBuddhistswhilealsohelping insurethat the language for expressing those desires is framed in themost inclusivewaypossible.



Considerations:

• NomatterhowcarefullyaBuddhismclauseisworded,itcannothelpbutsignalinsomewaythatotherreligionshavealesserstatusontheisland.Thisweakensconstitutional commitments to individual equality, citizenship, and ultimately,evennationalidentityandsolidarityinapluralsociety.

• Buddhist solidarity and monastic autonomy have themselves been harmedthroughthelegalimplementationofArticle9.Thecourtshavebeenplacedinthemorallychallengingand,inmanycases,a-śāsankapositionofdictatingBuddhistnorms to monks. Making Buddhist a “state religion” or Sri Lanka a “Buddhiststate”wouldworsentheseissuessignificantly.

• The a distinction between “Buddhism” and “the Buddha Sasana” some havedrawn in an effort to take the sangha out of the purview of the statemay belegallyuntenable: e.g., areBuddhist templespartof “Buddhism”, and thereforewithin the ambit of state control, or “Buddha Sasana”, and therefore properlyobjectsofmonasticcontrol?

Option3:JointogetherOptions1and2.Rather than enhancing either constitutional commitments to secularism or Buddhistsupremacy,theConstitutionalAssemblymightattempttoexpressbothcommitmentsinthe samesection. Avarietyofoptionshavebeenproposedby thePRC, including theretentionofArticle9(ChapterII)ofthecurrentconstitutionwithnochange,changingthetitleofChapterIIofthecurrentconstitutionto‘Religions’(ratherthan‘Buddhism’),and rewriting Article 9 as follows: “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give all religionsequalstatus.TheStateshallprotectandfosterBuddhismandtheBuddhaSāsanawhileassuring toall religions therightsgrantedbyArticles10and14(1) (e)of thecurrentConstitution.Advantages:

• A constitutional clause that suggests both the primacy of Buddhism and theequal rights of all religions may be more successful in satisfying a broaderswatheofpoliticians,interestgroups,andthepublic,thanonethatprivilegesoneorotherview.

• May be thought to (re)balance competing demands using ambiguous legalrhetoric.

Considerations:

• Perpetuates a number of legal contradictions and inconsistencies.As it stands,neither the text of Article 9 nor its case law gives a clear indication as to theintended balance between Buddhist prerogatives and fundamental rights. Ifthese ambiguities are left unaddressed, it leaves open the possibility that anactivist judiciary – or a very active public interest litigation campaign -might



disruptwhatisaveryprecariousbalance.

Option 4: Join together Option 1 and 2 while clarifying questions of balance andjusticiability.ThisisourrecommendedoptionifArticle9istobeamendedinthepresentexerciseinconstitutional reform. There may be ways to make small clarifications to Article 9and/ortotheotherPRCsuggestionslistedinOption3,whichhavebeneficialregulatoryeffects.Twoclarificationsstandoutasmostproductive.First, the Constitutional Assembly might further clarify the relationship betweenBuddhist prerogatives and fundamental rights. For example, could be done throughreplacing the languageof “assuring”withmoreprecise language such as “subject to,”meaningthattheBuddhismChapterwouldread:

The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place andaccordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster the BuddhaSasana,subjecttotherightstograntedbyArticles10and14(1)(e)toall.

This formula would clarify the relationship between promoting Buddhism andprotectinggeneralreligiousrightsguaranteedbythechapteronfundamentalrightstoindividuals,whichmoreoverareenforceablebytheSupremeCourtunderArticle126asaspecialconstitutionaljurisdiction.Incidentally,thoseindividualreligiousrightswouldalsoapplytoBuddhists, thusensuringthatstateactionstopromoteBuddhismdonotinfringeuponthereligiousrightsofindividualBuddhists.Second, the new constitution could clarify the mechanism of enforcement for theBuddhismprovisions. This could be done inmultipleways. The first is to render theBuddhism clause non-justiciable and more a guiding principle by moving it to thechapter on directive principles of state policy. While this is perhaps the mostappropriatewaytogiveexpressiverecognitiontoBuddhism,theopinionpolldatacitedabovesuggestslittlepublicsupportforsuchareform,anditislikelyBuddhistopinionwould be as outraged by this seeming ‘demotion’ as if the Buddhism clause wasremoved altogether from the constitution. If therefore the Buddhism clause shouldremainjusticiable,thenthereareotherwaysofensuringthatitisnotinvokedexceptinsignificantcaseswhere there isaclearneedand justification for judicial intervention.ThisaimcouldbeachievedbyestablishingaspecialleavetoproceedrequirementbeingmetpriortoanypleadingoforontheBuddhismclausebeforethecourts.Likewise,ifaConstitutionalCourtisintroducedbythenewconstitution(whichwouldnotbeafinalcourtofappealbutonlyhearcasesofgraveconstitutionalsignificance),thenexclusivejurisdictionfortheinterpretationoftheBuddhismclausecouldbevestedexclusivelyin



this court and, perhaps, to an identified group of specially qualified judges withrequisiteexpertiseinBuddhism.Advantages:

• Making protections for Buddhism advisory or aspirational – or specifying theparameters of justiciability for it – preserves the expressive importance of theprovision,while curbing its serious regulatory downsides. To put it simply, itensures that Buddhism is not a matter to be dealt with through normal legalprocedures.Afterall,thesebodiesarepopulatedbylaypersonswhoareforthemost part non-experts in Buddhism vis-à-vis members of the sangha. TakingBuddhismoutofthecompetenceofjudicialauthoritiesopensupthepossibilityfor it to be more productively supported by other government and non-government bodies, such as the Ministry of Buddhist Affairs and the sanghaitself. These bodies do have the authority, experience, and expertise to assistBuddhism in targeted and specialised ways. Taking the mandate to protectBuddhismoutofthecourtsalsoavoidstheconundrumsdescribedinSectionIIabove,whereby a variety ofmonastic andnon-monastic actors fight overwhohas the authority to speak for Buddhism (see, also, Section II and Option 3above).

• Theapproachofgiving specialbutnon-justiciable constitutionalprotections toBuddhism is common among other Theravada Buddhist countries such asThailand andMyanmar. In those countries, support for Buddhism tends to bechannelled mainly through government offices (like the Ministry of BuddhistAffairs), dāyakas, and the sangha itself, rather than through court orders andwrits.Legallyspeaking,Buddhistswouldcontinuetobeprotectedundergeneralreligious rights provisions, Penal Code provisions, and other laws andregulations,andBuddhismandtheBuddhaSasanawouldbesupportedinmoreusefulwaysbyexecutiveandlegislativeaction.

Considerations:

• The currentBuddhismChapter is a productive ambiguitydesigned to satisfy ahighlypolarisedpopulation.AttemptstotweakArticle9maygiverisetofiercepolitical competition and possibly aggravate the very lines of fissure that theprovisionwasdesignedtosidestep.Thisisanotasmallrisk.