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Taking Stock of aQuarter Century of theIslamic Republic of Iran

by

Wilfried Buchta

Islamic Legal Studies ProgramHarvard Law School

ILSP

Occasional Publications 5June 5

5 by the Presdent and Fellows o Harvard CollegeAll rghts reservedPrnted n the Unted States o Amerca

ISBN --5-1

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The Islamic Legal Studies Program s dedcated

to achevng excellence n the study o Islamc law

through objectve and comparatve methods. It seeks

to oster an atmosphere o open nqury whch em-

braces many perspectves, both Muslm and non-Mus-

lm, and to promote a deep apprecaton o Islamc law

as one o the worlds major legal systems. The man

ocus o work at the Program s on Islamc law n the

contemporary world. Ths ocus accommodates the

many nterests and dscplnes that contrbute to the

study o Islamc law, ncludng the study o ts wrt-

ngs and hstory.

Frank Vogel Director

Per Bearman AssociateDirector

Islamc Legal Studes Program

Pound Hall 5115 Massachusetts Ave.Cambrdge, MA 1, USA

Tel:1--1Fax:1--

E-mail: lsp@law.harvard.edu

Website: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lsp

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Table of Contents

Preace v

Text, byWilfriedBuchta 1

The Frst Republc: The Khomen Decade The Second Republc: The Era o the

Duumvrate o Rasanjan/Khamen

The Thrd Republc:

Khatam and the Process o Reorm

Concludng Remarks

Endnotes 51

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v

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v

Preface

A ascnatng convergence o ndvduals, deas, and papers

came about at a conerence our Program organzed n Berut

n January5on Imam Khomen on Relgon and State.

Scholars o Shsm and ts contemporary manestatons

came rom Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. As one o

our dscussants, Dr. Wlred Buchta o both the Deutsche

Orent-Insttut, Hamburg, and the Humboldt Unversty,

Berln, contrbuted to the conerence a great deal o learnng

but also much frst-hand acquantance o events n Iran,

and proved very well placed to dscuss Khomens weghty

legacy n consttutonal and legal matters. Fortunately or

us Dr. Buchta had recently completed a paper provdng

a useul ntroducton and summary o the frst quarter

century o the Islamc Republc o Iran, and agreed to al-

low us to publsh t n our Occasonal Publcatons seres.

It lays out some o the ascnatng backdrop aganst whch

our conerence occurred, and serves as a valuable memento

o the event.

Frank E. Vogel

Director,IslamicLegalStudiesProgram

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v

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Taking Stock of aQuarter Centuryof the Islamic Republic of Iran

Wilried Buchta

In February2004 the Islamic Republic o Iran held

or the twenty-th time its annual ten-day celebra-

tion to mark the victory o the revolution and the

triumphal return o the revolutionary leader Ayatollah

Ruhollah Khomeini, who was enthusiastically greeted

by two million Iranians on his arrival in Tehran on

February, 979. The Shah had already let the country

on January6. The armed orces, which had until then

been loyal to the Shah, declared themselves neutral on

February, whereupon Shahpur Bakhtiar, the last o

the prime ministers appointed by the Shah, saw that

he could no longer hold on to power and went into

hiding. Twenty-our hours later, Khomeini asked the

devout liberal Islamist technocrat Mehdi Bazargan to

put together a provisional revolutionary government,

which was recognized by the USA and the USSR the

ollowing day. In a reerendum held on March 30, 979,

97% o voters expressed their support or an Islamic

Republic. Khomeini thereupon proclaimed April the

rst day o Gods government on earth.

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2

The annual revolutionary celebrations provide an oc-

casion to look at how the Islamic Republics political

system, a theocratic-republican hybrid, has evolved

since 979. Immediately noteworthy is that it has been

remarkably stable. It is by no means obvious that this

should be so; ater all, Iranian politics have or years

struggled with ideological contradictions, the erosion

o its Supreme Leaders legitimacy, competing strains

o thought among its political elite, and a chronic

economic crisis worsened by unilateral US trade em-

bargos. Yet Irans political system has thus ar given the

lie to the Iranian exile opposition movement that has

been predicting its imminent demise since 979.

An objective examination o the 25-year history o the

Islamic Republic must acknowledge that in addition to

certain ideological and political constants throughout

this period, there have also been radical changes in

direction and shits in emphasis that allow us to divide

the entire period into three distinct phases. Adopting

a division put orward by Ebrahim Yazdi, Irans rst

post-979 oreign minister,2 we can actually speak o

three republics, namely, the decade o the revolution-

ary leader and ounder o the Islamic Republic, Aya-

tollah Khomeini (979989), the Second Republic

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3

under the duumvirate o Supreme Leader Khamenei

and President Rasanjani (989997), and, lastly, the

Third Republic that was inaugurated with Khatamis

election in 997 and is characterized by an Islamic re-

orm movement. Each o these phases is characterized

by certain specic tendencies and events, which we

will briefy outline here in order to understand how

the Islamic Republic became what it is today and in

what direction it might evolve in uture.

The First Republic: The Khomeini Decade

The rst ten years o the new regime were dominated

by the charismatic leadership o Ayatollah Khomeini,

who rom the all o978 had become the undisputed

leader and uniying gure within a broad alliance o

diverse political orces. By means o largely peaceul

opposition in the orm o huge mass demonstrations

and nationwide strikes, this alliance eventually suc-

ceeded in toppling the nationalist and pro-American

regime o the Pahlavi monarchy. Between 979 and

982 the newly established revolutionary regime un-

derwent a phase o intense inner turbulence and power

struggles. The internal power struggles o these early

years gave rise to a hybrid political system unlike any

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4

other on the planet. Its constitution embraces both

theocratic-authoritarian elements and those o a

democratic republic, although the theocratic element

clearly dominates.

That democratic elements, including directly elected

executive and legislative branches, have survived at

all until the present can be attributed to the eorts

o the religious nationalists and liberal Islamist orces

initially allied with the Khomeinists. They participated

in the drating o the December 979 constitution, and

continued at times to wield considerable infuence on

the state and government up until 98. Among the

symbolic gures within this group were Mehdi Bazar-

gan (d. 995)3 and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr. From 979 on-

wards, at the request o Khomeini, Bazargan, the leader

o the Islamic-Liberal Iranian Freedom Movement

(NAI), headed up a provisional revolutionary govern-

ment o moderate nationalists and national-religious

technocrats. But Bazargan was not able to prevail in

the struggle or power with the radical Islamists, who

enjoyed Khomeinis support. With Khomeinis ap-

proval, the Islamists had created a broadly distributed

network o revolutionary committees, revolutionary

courts, and militias, which unctioned as a shadow gov-

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5

ernment and constantly undermined the authority o

the Bazargan government. Bazargan protested in vain

against the occupation o the US Embassy in Tehran on

November 4, 979, thereby revealing his lack o infu-

ence, and resigned a ew days later together with his

entire cabinet, thus again radicalizing the revolution.

From that moment on, Khomeini supporters gradually

either politically marginalized all their opponents or

orced them into exile. This was a process that ended

in June 98 when liberal-Islamic president Abolhasan

Bani-Sadr was deposed; rom that time on, politicized

Shiite clerics have held all the key positions in the sys-

tem and thus have a monopoly on power.

The theoretical basis or this monopoly on power is

the religio-political concept o the guardianship o the

Islamic jurist (velayat-e aqih), which was developed

by Khomeini while in Iraqi exile in Naja (965978).

Khomeini succeeded in overcoming numerous sources

o resistance to have this concept enshrined as the su-

preme principle o the state in the constitution o the

Islamic Republic o Iran, which was adopted in No-

vember 979.4 As a result, a theocracywas established

in Iran, the maniest expression o which is the oce

o the Ruling Jurist (vali-ye aqih), which is derived

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6

rom the velayat-e aqih; the term is also synony-

mous with the title o Supreme Leader (rahbar). The

Supreme Leader has the authority to counteract the

decisions o the executive and the legislative branches.

He can remove the president rom oce and appoints

the head o the judiciary and o the regular and revolu-

tionary armed orces, security orces, and police orces.

The velayat-e aqih as practiced in Iran is a completely

new political institution, without precedent in the doc-

trinal structure o the Shia, because it empowers thehe Shia, because it empowers the

theologically and politically most experienced cleric

to exercise sole political power. By breaking with the

practice that high-ranking Shiite clergy would abstain

rom political matters, which had been observed up to

this time, Khomeini revolutionized Shiite theology; the

velayat-e aqih did away with the principle that until

the return o the 2th hidden Imam o the Shia, namely,

the Mahdi, any kind o political rule is undamentally

illegitimate. In this way Khomeini widened the scope

o the jurists authority so that it became identical

with the all-comprehensive authority o the Prophet

and the Imams.5

Based on their monopoly o power, Khomeini sup-

porters set about reorming the state, the economy, and

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7

society along lines that were deemed true to Islamic-

revolutionary dogmas. The result was the Islamiciza-

tionbetween the years 979 and 982o the justice

system, schools, and universities, the nationalization

o most o the economy, the establishment o a oreign

policy that was hostile to the USA and was aimed at

exporting the revolution, the enorcement o the Is-

lamic dress code or women, the revocation o reedom

o the press and o the reedom to orm political par-

ties, and much more. Starting as early as in 979, but

in particular in the years 98 to 982, violent excesses

occurred in the way in which actual and assumed

deviants and enemies were dealt with. The act that

radicalization peaked in 98 was connected with the

regimes ght or survival against the Iranian Peoples

Mujahedeen (MKO). Following the victory over the

Shahs regime, the Islamo-Marxist MKO, which had

originally been allies o Khomeini, became danger-

ous rivals challenging the Khomeini government or

power. Ater Khomeini had removed the moderate

president Abolhasan Bani-Sadr rom power in June

98, the MKO took up arms and attempted to topple

the regime by launching massive terror attacks on its

most important representatives and ocials. But the

MKOs calculations ailed and the regime did not come

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crashing down. Instead, the terror exercised by the

MKO radicalized and brutalized the political climate

in Iran in a way that had never been seen beore. The

regime was goaded into launching a brutal anti-terror

campaign and blindly instituting retaliatory measures,

and by the end o982 it had killed several thousand

captured supporters and underground ghters o

the MKO and o other militant letist groups.6 By the

spring o982 Irans security orces had conquered the

MKO militarily, destroyed their underground cells, and

killed their military leaders. The political leadership o

the MKO under Masud Rajavi had already fed into

exile in July98, rst to France, and ater 986 to Iraq,

where Iraqs dictator, Saddam Hussein, granted the

MKO massive political, military, and nancial assist-

ance and made use o them or his own purposes.

But rom the end o 982 onwards, ater years o

revolutionary uror, extremely violent internal po-

litical power struggles, and ethnic and social unrest,

the regime, which had been ghting or its existence,

was nally able to assert itsel. The war against Iraq,

rom 980988, caused many Iranians, who were

critical o the regime but patriotic at heart, to rec-

ognize Khomeinis leadership or the sake o saving

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the atherland and preserving national unity, and it

also contributed something towards permanently

consolidating the system. Thus, rom 982 onwards,

the rulers in Tehran were able to direct their attention

towards stabilizing the internal political situation by

consolidating the newly created institutions. This striv-

ing towards moderation was expressed in the special

8-point decree issued by Khomeini in December 982,

which was directed at the revolutionary courts, judi-

cial apparatuses, revolutionary committees, and the

revolutionary armed orces and security orces. The

decree put an end to the worst revolutionary excesses

in the orm o arbitrary seizures o private property,

arrests, and extra-legal executions o alleged counter-

revolutionaries.

Since the establishment o the Islamic Republic,

a minority group o the Shiite clergy, numerically

small but large enough or the purpose o governing

the state, has oered its services to the government.

They have been seduced by the temptations o power

and today orm a national elite enjoying certain po-

litical privileges. Most o the Shiite clerics, however,

continue to cling to the tradition o political absti-

nence; they thereore avoid public opposition, but

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0

still silently reject the regime. On the other hand, the

regime is anything but ideologically homogeneous.

To this day, it has not been able to bring together in

one united party all the Khomeinistic clerical ac-

tions, some o which are violently competing with

one another. Although the Islamic Republic Party was

established in 979 with this aim in mind, in 987 the

government was orced to dissolve the party because

o the bitter actional disputes between its right and

let wings.

These struggles between the two wings o the party

were mainly caused by disputes centered on economic

policy. While Islamic-conservative Khomeini sup-

porters, including the present Supreme Leader, Ali

Khameini, invoked the law o property legitimized

in Islam, their letist-Islamic opponents emphasized

Islams desire to create social justice. Because o the

victories they have scored in the parliamentary elec-

tions, which have been held regularly every our years

since 980, the let-leaning Islamists, who include

the current president o the country, Mohammad

Khatami, have had the upper hand in the legislative

branch. But, according to the constitution, all laws

passed by parliament must be reviewed by the Council

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o Guardians, a body that unctions as an upper house

and is dominated by conservative clerical jurists, in

order to veriy that they are consistent with Islam. In

many cases the Council o Guardians, which has the

right o veto, has rejected the laws. This has meant

that it has not been possible to develop any logical

policy in many important areas, such as agricultural

reorm.

This blockade o political institutions is a threat to the

maintenance o the system, and in order to overcome

it and to give the government some reedom to act, in

January987 Khomeini declared the principle o the

Absolute Rule o the Jurist (velayet-e motlaqeh aqih).

According to this concept, the decisions taken in the

interest o the Islamic state by the Supreme Leader

have precedence over religious rules, even over such

undamental commandments as those o prayer, ast-

ing, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the end, practical

constraints orced Khomeini to allow reasons o state

to take precedence over religionthis was a policy

that he had criticized in the time o the Shah, and he

had hoped to eliminate it by introducing a theocracy

in which the highest political and religious authority

would be combined in just one person.

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2

While already many Iranians regarded Khomeinis

directive o January987 as a fagrant deviation rom

the revolutionary dogma o the supremacy o religion

over the state, Tehrans surprising adoption o UN

Cease-Fire Resolution 598 must have appeared to them

as another ideological sin.7 Ater all, this was a de acto

admission that one o Tehrans most important ideo-

logical goals, namely, the exportation o the revolution

(sodur-e enqelab) to other Islamic states in the name

o pan-Islamism, had ailed and the Islamic revolu-

tion would remain an experiment restricted to Iran

only. By mid-988 this step had become unavoidable.

Widespread weariness o war among the population,

alarming military deeats in various sectors o the

ront, bottlenecks in the supply o ammunition and

war material, almost empty state treasuries, and an

overall dramatic economic crisis were all actors that

made even the most stubborn deenders o the war

among the Iranian leadership change their minds. The

view inexorably gained ground that Iran, which was

internationally largely isolated, could no longer win

the war against Iraq, which enjoyed military superior-

ity thanks to the massive support provided by the West

and the East, and that i the war were to be pursued,

the system might even collapse. Thereore, on July6,

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3

988 Khomeini was orced to admit, in an internal

letter written to leading ocials in the regime, that

there was no way to avoid accepting UN Resolution

598. Khomeini described his decision to stop the war

in the ollowing words: This decision was as bitter to

me as drinking a cup o poison (in tasmim baraye man

chon zahr koshandeh ast), and he justied it by point-

ing out that the preservation o the Islamic Republic

(heazat az jomhuri-ye eslami) took precedence over

all other goals.8 Khomeinis reerence to the absolute

priority that should be given to maintaining the system

revealed that Irans leadership had betrayed another,

hitherto stubbornly deended revolutionary ideal, and

again had given priority to reasons o state instead o

to Islamic ideology.

However, the acceptance o the cease-re also har-

bored some incalculable internal political risks. Ater

all, this war, which had been ought in the name o

revolutionary ideology, had demanded severe eco-

nomic deprivation, massive material damage, and

heavy loss o human lie rom the Iranian people,

and all these sacrices must now have seemed to

them to have been in vain. The rulers were correct

in earing that the population would react with a

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massive and long-lasting loss o trust in the regime.

It was thanks only to the charismatic authority o

Khomeini, who inormed the people o the bitter

truth in a TV address broadcast on July20, that the

anger and disappointment elt by many Iranians over

their senseless sacrices did not turn into violent

protests that endangered the system.

But the regime also made use o this precarious

transitional phase rom war to peace to liquidate its

most dangerous opponents, who were being detained

in the countrys prisons. The excuse or doing this

was supplied by the MKO, which on July2, 988 had

attempted to invade the country rom their military

bases in Iraq. They had crossed the border and oc-

cupied some small border towns in Iran in order to

use them as jumping-o points or overthrowing

the system in Tehran. The MKO oensive ended in

a asco because the military-tactical and political

planning had been amateurish. The Iranian armed

orces, which were numerically ar superior to their

opponents, completely destroyed the MKO units in

some brie and violent engagements. Most o the

prisoners were killed on the battleeld, while the rest

were taken to Tehran.

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5

Just a ew days ater the MKO oensive, Iranian

government authorities issued the secret order that

the most important political prisons in the country

should be isolated rom the outside world. This

order applied in particular to the prisons o Evin,

Qezel Hesar, and Gohar Dasht in Tehran, which

are especially inamous or their size and the harsh

conditions under which prisoners are kept. Towards

the end o July988 special commissions made up

o lawyers, chairmen o revolutionary courts, and

high-ranking oicials rom the VEVAK (the Min-

istry o Inormation and Security) visited the pris-

ons and presented all the political prisoners rom

the letist opposition with a list o cleverly devised

and tricky questions, the answers to which would

decide whether the person responding would live

or die. The aim was to ind out whether the per-

sons interrogated could be regarded as Muslims or

non-Muslims, and in the latter case whether they

still proessed their ormer anti-regime ideology.

Prisoners who gave unsatisactory answers were

also among those separated out. All the people

selected in this manner were quickly executedin

most cases hangedin the prisons soon ater their

interrogation.9

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6

In this way, between the end o July and December

988, the Iranian government executed several thou-

sand letist prisoners along with an unknown number

o MKO prisoners o war who had been captured

in 988. This was done in great secrecy and without

proper trials. Supporters and leaders o the MKO paid

the highest price in blood. To this day the exact num-

ber o victims is not known with certainty. Amnesty

International has documented the names o more

than 2,000 victims.0 According to data provided by

Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri (b. 92), who was at

that time Khomeinis designated successor, between

2,800 and 3,800 prisoners were executed in 988. In

July and August 988 Montazeri had written two let-

ters to Khomeini himsel and one to the executioners

in which he spoke out sharply against the executions,

which he condemned as un-Islamic and shameul. To

this day, the government in Tehran ocially denies the

mass executions that took place in 988. They are a ta-

boo topic. It still remains uncertain which debates and

decision-making processes among Irans privileged

class nally resulted in the almost total liquidation

o all the letist opposition prisoners detained by the

regime, thus causing the regime to relapse, or a short

while, but with serious consequences, into the worst

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excesses o violence o the kind seen during the early

phase o its existence. It is interesting to note that in

the documents appended to his memoirs, which ap-

peared in 200, Montazeri includes an undated writ-

ten command rom revolutionary leader Khomeini

himsel, in which the latter orders the execution o

the imprisoned members o the MKO. On the other

hand, Montazeri stresses that he doubts the authentic-

ity o this letter and hints that close condants o the

revolutionary leader in the Imams Tehran oce were

the true instigators o this action.

Given the ar-reaching political consequences o the

mass executions, it is worthwhile to show the confict-

ing lines o arguments o the Imam and his heir-appar-

ent or having the MKO prisoners be killed or spared

as documented by the letters in Montazeris memoirs.

Khomeinis atwa or the execution o the MKO pris-

oners, which in all probability was issued between July

22 and 25, 988, reads as ollows:2

In the name o God, the merciul, the compassion-

ate. Because the treacherous hypocrites [MKO]

do not believe in Islam and what they say is out o

cunning and dissimulation, and because their lead-

ers have become apostates, who wage war on God,

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8

and because they have as collaborators and spies

o Saddam Hussein and the Bath-party o Iraq inthe north, west, and south o the country started a

conventional war against our Muslim nation, and

because they have together with the World Arro-

gance [the United States] dealt us insidious blows

rom the beginning o the Islamic Republic up till

today, it is decreed that those who are in prison

throughout the country and who remain loyal totheir hypocritical conviction, are waging war on

God and are condemned to execution (kasani-ke

dar zendanha-ye sara-sar-e keshvar bar sar-e moze-

e neaq-e khod pa-eshari kardeh va mikonand

mohareb va mahkum be edam mibashand).The

passing o the sentence in Tehran is incumbent on

the Sharia judge Hojjatoleslam [Jaar] Nayeri, theprosecutor [Mortaza] Eshraqi, and the representa-

tive o the VEVAK [Ministry o Intelligence and

Security], ater having agreed upon it by a majority

o votes. According to this principle, the sentences

must be carried out in all other prisons and provin-

cial centers o the country by the competent judges,

prosecutors, and representatives o the VEVAK on

the basis o a majority o votes. It is naive to show

mercy to those who wage war on God. The decisive

way in which Islam treats the enemies o God is

among the unquestionable tenets o the Islamic

system. I hope that you will earn the satisaction

o the exalted God by the manner in which you

will let the enemies o God eel the wrath and the

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9

vengeance o the revolution. The men who are

responsible or the passing o the sentences mustnot all prey to hesitation or doubt and must be

keen on showing the maximum degree o severity

towards the unbelievers. To have doubts about the

judicial system o the Islamic revolution is to ignore

the pure and innocent blood o the [revolutions]

martyrs. Peace be upon you. Ruhollah al-Musavi

al-Khomeini.3

Montazeris rst letter o protest, which is dated July

3, 988, reads as ollows:

In the name o God, the merciul, the compas-

sionate. To his Excellency Grand Ayatollah Imam

Khomeini. With regard to your latest order or

the execution o the hypocrites [MKO] in the

prisons, do allow me to say that the nation and

the people will accept the execution o those who

have been captured [rom the battleeld] in the

recent event and this will surely not have a nega-

tive eect. However, allow me to say something

with regard to the execution o those who were

already in prison:

First, under the present conditions their ex-

ecution would be ascribed to the [regimes] hatred

and vindictiveness.

Second, the execution would inuriate and

stigmatize many o the amilies who still have

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20

preserved to some extent their religious convic-

tions and their allegiance to the revolution to sucha degree that they will break away rom it.

Third, many o the prisoners are ready to

renounce [the MKO] but because the people in

charge treat them in such a harsh manner, they

reuse to.

Fourth, since due to the pressure and recent

attacks o Saddam Hussein and the hypocritesagainst us, we have at present the image o the

victim and many journalists and politicians deend

us, it is neither in the interest o the system nor in

your interest that a propaganda campaign against

us begins.

Fith, the execution o persons, upon whom

courts have passed beore and according tonormal regulations a sentence less than capital

punishment and who have neither received any

notice nor committed any new misdeeds means

a disregard or all judicial principles (bi-itinai

be hame-ye mavazin-e qazai)and or previous

sentencespassed by judges, and will have atal

consequences.

Sixth, our responsible judges and prosecutors

and VEVAK-representatives are not on the level o

[the Su] saint Ardebili, which makes them subject

to numerous errors or agitation [against the MKO].

Thereore the latest order o your Excellency will

probably result in the execution o people who are

innocent or have only committed minor sins.

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2

Seventh, until now we have not achieved

anything by murders and acts o violence (ma tahal az koshteha va khoshunatha natijei nageretim)

except that we have increased both the [enemies]

propaganda against us and the attraction o the

hypocrites and the counter-revolutionaries. There-

ore the time has come or us to oer them or a

while more mercy and compassion so that we can

win over many o them to our cause.Eighth, i you should stick to your decisionEighth, i you should stick to your decision

then you should at least order that the criterion

[or capital punishment] should be unanimity o

opinion among the relevant judges, prosecutors,

and VEVAK-representatives and not the major-

ity o votes. In addition, [you should order] that

women should be spared, above all pregnantwomen.

Finally, the execution o several thousand

prisoners within several days has atal conse-

quences, as it implies that errors will occur and

that some pious judges will get very angry. It is

appropriate to heed the saying o the Prophet

(hadith-e shari), which says: Gods Prophet said

Avoid corporal punishments (hudud) or the

Muslims and i there is no other way let, let them

go unpunished, or it is better i the Islamic leader

(imam) pardons somebody by mistake than that

he punishes him by mistake ( a inna al-imam

an yukhtia f l-aw khayr min an yukhtia f l-

uquba). 4

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22

t

The supremacy o the interests o the state over the

original religious and ideological doctrines o the

revolution was made particularly clear by the way in

which the matter o Khomeinis successor was settled.

His closest condants instituted a rule that delivered a

heavy blow to the legitimacy o the concept ovelayat-

e aqih, a blow rom which it has still not recovered.

Given the importance o the vali-ye aqih, it was vitally

important or the regime to guarantee a smooth trans-

er o power in the case o Khomeinis death. According

to the Shiite tradition enshrined in the constitution

o979, Khomeinis successor was required to be the

most scholarly and honest Shiite legal expert, and a

source o emulation (marja-e taqlid), i.e., a Grand

Ayatollah. However, it soon became apparent that the

sum o these criteria applied solely to Khomeini. With

the exception o Montazeri, none o the other Grand

Ayatollahs t Khomeinis concept ovelayat-e aqih. In

addition, none o Khomeinis other clerical condants

and co-workers enjoyed a theological reputation that

was comparable to his, not to mention his personal

charisma and political authority. Put another way: Be-

cause they were quietists, the most prominent theolo-

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gians were politically unsuitable to succeed Khomeini,

while at the same time the politically active clerics,

most o whom belonged to the lower or middle ranks

o the hierarchy o theologians, lacked the necessary

theological qualications. The only one o Khomeinis

loyal ollowers who had managed to attain the rank o

Grand Ayatollah by continuing his theological studies

up until the mid-80s was Montazeri. He was a ormer

close student and companion o Khomeini in Qom,

who had spent 8 years in the Shahs prisons rom

965 to 978 because o his activity on the side o the

opposition. From 980 onwards, he had been quietly

built up by Khomeini and those closest to him to be

Khomeinis unocial successor.

At rst sight, the succession seemed to have been

settled when, in November 985, the Council o Ex-

perts, which had been given the task o choosing the

successor, ocially announced that Montazeri had

been designated Khomeinis successor as the vali-ye

aqih. But by that time Montazeris power had already

peaked and was on the way down. The turning point

came in the all o 986 with the Iran-Contra aair,

the secret weapons-or-hostages deal that had been

struck between Tehran and Washington and that had

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24

been made public by Mehdi Hashemi, a close ollower

o Montazeri. As a result o this, the systems ideologi-

cal credibility suered negative consequences. With

Khomeinis approval, Mehdi Hashemi, who until then

had been in charge o a special unit sponsored by Mon-

tazeri or the purpose o exporting the revolution, was

arrested in October 986 by the secret service ministry

(VEVAK). This dealt a severe blow to Montazeris posi-

tion o power in Irans privileged class. In September

987, Mehdi Hashemi was executed on the orders o a

special court o the clergy, created or this very purpose,

which accused him o various counter-revolutionary

oences.5 The aair involving Mehdi Hashemi, whose

execution Montazeri tried in vain to stop at the last

minute, inficted immense damage on his reputation

and seems to have been one o the reasons why he ell

out o avor with Khomeini in 989.

The nal, irrevocable break with Khomeini came in

February989, when Montazeri again stepped up his

harsh public criticism o internal aults in the system.

In a mysterious letter, dated March 26, 986, ocially

ascribed to Khomeini, Montazeri was called upon

to resign rom the oce o successor.6 In a letter o

reply, Montazeri gave up his post and, on Khomeinis

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26

When Khomeini died on June 3, 989 the Council o

Experts quickly convened in order to prevent a power

vacuum. Its choice ell on the president o the country,

Ali Khameini, who, however, merely held the lower

rank o a Hojjatoleslam. A little later, Khameini was

given a higher theological ranking in an act o acclama-

tion orchestrated purely politically by the government

media, and rom that time on he was known as an

Ayatollah. Nevertheless, this theological promotion o

Khameini to the higher rank o an Ayatollah, which is

still not recognized by the majority o the orthodox

Shiite clerics, could not disguise the act that when he

took oce, the de acto highest religious and political

authority was no longer combined in one person, as

it had been previously under Khomeini. The smooth

transer o power to Khameini had again demon-

strated the stability o the system, but his assumption

o oce conronted the regime with a new dilemma:

How can a state ounded on the usion o religion and

politics prove its legitimacy i its highest representa-

tive, unlike Khomeini, cannot call upon the general

allegiance o the people, and, in addition, the leading

Shiite religious authorities deny him the recognition

o the rank o Grand Ayatollah? All attempts made by

Khameini to acquire the highest religious authority

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27

and to be given the title o Grand Ayatollah have so ar

ailed. His last attempt was made in November 994

when the only Grand Ayatollah who was close to the

Iranian government, namely, Muhammad Ali Araki,

died at the age o03 in Qom. Shortly ater his death,

Khameini claimed the now vacant oce o a source o

emulation. But numerous leading Shiite clerics both

inside and outside Iran put up such massive resistance

to this claim that he rapidly abandoned it.7 To this

day, Irans revolutionary leader is not recognized by

the large majority o Shiites inside and outside Iran as

a Grand Ayatollah. Because o this, he has a theologi-

cal Achilles heel which is gradually undermining not

only the legitimacy o his oce but also that o the

entire system.

Viewed overall, one can state that the Khomeini decade

o the rst Islamic Republic is identied by two charac-

teristics. Firstly, there is the lasting consolidation o the

revolutionary structures and institutions which made

the system so stable that even the death o Khomeini

and the succession crisis could not harm it. Secondly,

since 982, and even more so since 988, there has been

a recognizable tendency to de-radicalize the domestic

and oreign policies o the system; this has gone hand

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28

in hand with the act that, in cases o doubt, priority

is always given to the preservation o the system and

to pragmatic national interests over ideological dog-

matism. Regardless o brie lapses into radical patterns

o behavior, such as the case o the mass executions

in 988 and Khomeinis atwa on Salman Rushdie in

February 989, this trend grew steadily stronger up

to the time o Khomeinis death and beyond in the

Second Republic.

The Second Republic: The Era of the Duumvirate

of Rafsanjani/Khameini

Ater Khomeinis death, power was shared by the

revolutionary leader Khameini and the ex-speaker

o the parliament, Rasanjani, who is regarded as a

pragmatist. In July989 Rasanjani had been elected to

the oce o president, which was now provided with

greater powers ollowing a constitutional amendment

that included the abolition o the oce o prime min-

ister, which had been a powerul position up until that

date. Since 982, this go-getter speaker o parliament,

who was pragmatic to the point that the true posi-

tions which he held were no longer recognizable, had

gradually advanced to becoming the strongest man in

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29

the regime ater Khomeini himsel. Rasanjani, around

whom a small but infuential group o moderate-Is-

lamic technocrats among Irans leadership elitethe

so-called right-wing modernistshad gathered, was

regarded as the architect o constitutional reorm.

When he took oce, Rasanjani ound a population

that was exhausted by war and the turmoil o the revo-

lution, and he was also aced with a wartime economy

that had collapsed. In addition, as a result o a oreign

policy that had been driven or almost ten years by

radical ideological dogmas, Iran was largely isolated

on the international stage.

During his two periods in oce as president (989

997), Rasanjani supported a process o partial de-ide-

ologization o Irans domestic, oreign, and economic

policy. For example, in the sphere o oreign policy he

steered a moderate course aimed at integrating Iran

into the international community, achieving careul

rapprochement with the West, and normalizing rela-

tions with neighboring countries in the region, his goal

being to put an end to Irans costly isolation which was

injurious to the countrys development. At the same

time, he supported the liberalization o economic

policies in order to rebuild the technical-industrial

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30

inrastructure o the country, which had been severely

damaged during the war. He also permitted a certain

amount o cautious and limited liberalization o soci-

ety, although this was only o secondary importance.

But during Rasanjanis term o oce, no signicant

progress was achieved either in economic policy nor

in securing and expanding social reedoms and rights.

There are a number o reasons why this is so and they

will be briefy discussed in the ollowing.

In order to achieve his goals, Rasanjani made an e-

ort to centralize economic and political power in his

own hands. But in order to do this it was necessary to

strip power rom the powerul elite o the let-wing

Islamists who, thanks to the support they had received

rom Khomeini up until 989, were setting the tone

in the executive and legislative branches as well as in

large sectors o the countrys economic bureaucracy.

They were a thorn in Rasanjanis side because they

were steering a radical-revolutionary course in the

eld o oreign policy and were pursuing an economic

policy oriented towards socialist state control. During

Khomeinis lietime there was serious, never-ending

confict between the socio-political conservatives and

the let-wing Islamists that led to partial paralysis o

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3

the government and oten rendered its policies in-

consistent and contradictory. Khomeini was always

being called upon to arbitrate between the two groups,

but he never permanently sided with either o the

elite actions; instead he tried repeatedly, sometimes

through clever maneuvering, sometimes by energeti-

cally exercising his authority, to balance the opposing

tendencies, at least or a while.

The alliance between Rasanjani and Khameini was

ounded in the common desire to strip the let-wing

Islamists o power. Between 989 and 990 Rasanjani

did in act manage to drive the let-wing Islamists

not only out o the government but alsowith the

exception o Parliamentout o most o the other

important government institutions, and to replace

them with ecient non-ideological technocrats. The

cooperation between pragmatists and conservatives in

the elections or the Council o Experts held in Octo-

ber 990 resulted in the majority o let-wing Islamic

candidates being disqualied. Since, according to the

constitution, the Council o Experts has the authority

to depose a revolutionary leader whom it regards as

unt to hold oce, any potential threat to Khameini

was thus permanently eliminated.

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32

Prior to the parliamentary elections o May 992,

renewed cooperation between the government and

the conservative-dominated Council o Guardians,

whose unction is also to veriy the various candidates

loyalty to the regime, resulted in the disqualication

o most o the letist Islamists who wished to stand or

election. As a result, in the 992 elections the majority

o the 270 seats went to the Conservatives, while the

letist-Islamist action shrank to only a small minority

in parliament. They were orced to the periphery o

the apparatus o power and, despite occasionally using

their newspapers to direct some hard criticism at the

governments policies, they withdrew rom everyday

politics and hoped or better days to come.

Once the letist Islamists had been weakened, the stage

was cleared or proceeding smoothly with implement-

ing the reconstruction strategy, but the costs caused

by the war, which Rasanjani put at US$,000 billion

in August 994, were right rom the start a consider-

able burden to bear. At the same time, Rasanjani was

aced with the enormous material expectations o

the population. While the war was in progress, the

regime had been able to use the excuse that the lack

o economic and social progress was due to the war

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33

with Iraq. But, once the war was over, this excuse was

no longer valid. During the reconstruction process

the government gave top priority to restoring the oil

and petrochemical industry, which is a rich source o

oreign currency earnings, and particularly because

oil has always traditionally been Irans main source

o revenue.

The economic liberalism o the technocrats and con-

servatives constituted a clear break with the economic

policy o rigid state control pursued by the letist

Islamists. The technocrats were in avor o privatiz-

ing ineicient state-owned plants, abolishing the

system o subsidies, uniying the anarchical system

o multiple exchange rates, supporting the return

o emigr Iranian experts, and borrowing money

rom abroad. In general, during his rst three years,

Khamenei supported this course, which Rasanjani had

incorporated as a program or reconstruction in the

rst ve-year plan (990995). In addition, in 990,

Rasanjani went ahead with borrowing money abroad,

a policy which up until then had been rowned upon

or ideological reasons and in order to maintain the

countrys independence rom the West. Once it was

ree o all restrictions, the governmentwhich had

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34

exercised strict discipline over consumption during

the warstarted to import consumer goods almost

totally without restraint. By 993, this process had

assumed such gigantic proportions that Tehran was

almost insolvent. Iran had emerged rom the Iran-Iraq

war practically debt-ree, but by the end o 993 its

debts stood at about $28 billion. Although at that point

Tehran instituted countermeasures, and by994 had

greatly cut back its annual imports, also negotiating

debt restructuring agreements with its creditor coun-

tries in the West, it had a hard time carrying the burden

o its previous consumption binge. Because, starting

in the spring o 992, the rate o infation increased

so much that the middle and lower income brackets

were more and more seriously aected. In the spring

o992 irritation and dissatisaction started to spread

and nally erupted into social unrest and violent

protests, which were harshly suppressed in a number

o Iranian cities such as Mashhad, Shiraz, and Tabriz.

In 994 in Qazvin and in 995 in Islamshahr, a satel-

lite city o Tehran, economic and social distress again

gave rise to locally limited but unusually violent social

unrest. Because the regular Army reused to take any

action against the people, the only choice the regime

had was to resort to special revolutionary military

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35

units to quell the disturbances. In the sixth round o

presidential elections held in May 993, Rasanjani

scored only a lackluster victory and lost an enormous

number o the votes he had received during the 989

elections. His poor perormance at the ballot box told

Rasanjani that the popularity o his policies, but also

the trust placed in him as someone who could lit Iran

out o its economic crisis, had taken a dramatic turn

or the worse.

Until mid-992 Khameini, who lacked theological

qualiications and political charisma, was largely

overshadowed by the dominant Rasanjani, but with

the parliamentary victory gained by the conservatives,

the balance shited in avor o the revolutionary leader.

The alliance between the two men had been charac-

terized right rom the start by concealed rivalry, but

it had unctioned well as long as Rasanjani enjoyed

great popularity as the link between the governing

clerics and the ordinary people governed by them,

who very much wanted to see an improvement in

their economic status. When, however, economic

success ailed to materialize, the initially euphoric

mood o the people swung in the opposite direction.

As Rasanjanis popularity plummeted, Khameini

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36

and the conservatives were the beneciaries o this

situation. Khameini increasingly became a magnet

or all the groups in the regime who saw their in-

terests put at risk by the reorms. Because he was

concerned that continued economic liberalization

measures might oment social unrest and thus en-

danger the legitimacy and existence o the regime,

starting in late 992 Khameini, together with the

conservatives, changed the course o his economic

and social policies and adopted positions held by

the let-wing Islamists. This oten went so ar as to

openly undermine Rasanjanis political strategy, as

happened, or example, in the case o the decision

taken by Rasanjanis government to eliminate the

massive state subsidies or gasoline and oil products,

to which the Fourth Parliament reused to give its

approval in the spring o994.8

In addition, ollowing the presidential elections o993,

Khameini took it upon himsel to exercise his political

prerogatives in an even more uninhibited ashion than

beore and to secure important political posts or his

close riends. In this way, he prevented Rasanjani rom

rationalizing and reducing the size o the administra-

tive apparatus and also rom removing inecient civil

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37

servants, managers, and mayors rom their positions.

Furthermore, Khameini made sure that his right-wing

traditionalist protegs remained in important gov-

ernment oces, and saw to it also that some o them

became new ministers in Rasanjanis second cabinet.

At the same time, they extended their infuence to im-

portant positions o power in the spheres o domestic

and cultural policy in order to ward o the cultural

invasion o the West (tahajom-e arhangi-ye gharb),

which is anathema to them. One o their rst victims

was Mohammad Khatami, the Minister o Culture and

Islamic Guidance (ershad), who was responsible or

censorship o books, news media, and lms, because

they considered him to be too liberal. Khatami was

generally regarded as a moderate and open-minded

let-wing Islamist who, despite the deeat suered by

the let-wing Islamists, had been re-appointed to his

oce by Rasanjani. Following violent attacks rom

the ranks o the new parliament, he was orced to

resign in August 992. Conronted with this swing

to the let by Khamenei, Rasanjani had only two

choices, viz. to capitulate or to allow his opponents

to extract compromises rom him that would dilute

his economic and oreign policies to the point where

they were unrecognizable.

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38

The great majority o the population waited in vain

or Rasanjani to keep the promise that he had made

in 989, namely, to reward them with a peace divi-

dend ater years o revolution, war, and deprivation.

Instead, the opposite happened. During the First

Republic under Khomeini the average per-capita

income had dropped by 50% between 979 and

989.9 Although under the new regime consider-

able progress was made in terms o basic medical

and social services, inrastructure, and literacy, the

distribution o income had grown dramatically

worse compared with the period o the revolution.

According to UNDP estimates, in 996 about 53% o

all Iranians were living below the poverty line. As i

that wasnt enough, under Rasanjani, corruption in

the country and in the government increased to a

level never seen beorebut the ew cases o national

banking scandals and o civil servants enriching

themselves and their amilies in connection with

the privatization o the economy, which became

public ater 995, were only the tip o the iceberg.

Given these negative phenomena, many Iranians

were sceptical and cynical about the statements

made by government politicians who, in their eyes,

had strayed innitely ar rom the ideal o Social

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39

Justice (edalat-e ejtemai), a slogan expressed at the

start o the revolution.

In the last three years o his presidency, Rasanjani had

become so powerless that he was no longer able to over-

come the resistance mounted by the conservative estab-

lishment to the constitutional amendment proposed by

his political riends, an amendment which was supposed

to have guaranteed him a third term in oce.20

The Third Republic: Khatami and the Process of

Reform

The liberal Shiite cleric Mohammad Khatami emerged

as the victor rom the presidential elections o May

997.2 Ater he was sworn in, in August 997, he initi-

ated a policy o cautious reorm o state and society

which, however, remained within the ramework o

the constitution o the Islamic Republic o Iran dating

rom 979. But, right rom the start, the reorm pro-

cess launched by Khatami was exposed to increasing

obstruction on the part o the dominant conservative

wing o the Iranian power elite, and ultimately this

has led to the stagnation o the reorm process since

Khatami was re-elected in June 200.

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40

The main impediment to the process o democratic

change remains the dualism between theocracy and

republicanism that is laid down in the constitution

in the orm o an Islamically-legitimized Supreme

Leader on the one hand, and a legislative branch as

well as an executive leader both directly elected by

the people, on the other hand. The reorms are made

dicult by the unequal balance o power, anchored

in the constitution, that exists between the Supreme

Leader and the president, and by the complexity and

large number o dierent centers o power, most o

which are conservative. By ar the most important

center o power is that o the Supreme Leader, who

possesses the general power to establish political

guidelines. As mentioned above, he appoints the

leaders o the judiciary, o state TV and radio, o the

regular Army, the army o Revolutionary Guards,

the revolutionary police, and o the revolutionary

oundations. In addition, Supreme Leader Khameini,

who belongs to the conservative camp, selects the

members o the Council o Guardians and o the

Expediency Council, two important bodies in the

legislative process.22 All these conservative-dominated

institutions constitute veto powers and political en-

claves that work against the executive and legislative

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4

branches, which since the parliamentary elections o

the year 2000 are in the hands o reormers. Due to

its lack o power the governments room to maneu-

ver on the domestic political ront was very limited

right rom the start, and the government itsel was

relatively deenseless against the counterattacks by

the conservatives. In the minds o many observers

this gave the impression that the government was

actually the party in opposition.

Khatamis electoral victory opened up a new phase

in the history o post-revolutionary Iran. For the rst

time since 979, the ollowing question was publicly

raised in Iran: To which o the two undamental

principles o the system, theocracy or republican-

ism, should priority be given? In order to increase

his organizational scope Khatami endeavored to

expand the reedom o speech and o the press and

to deend the guarantee o constitutional civil rights,

so as to turn public opinion into a political orce

controlling the various powers. Encouraged by the

government, the number o licensed, mostly reorm-

ist newspapers and journals increased to more than

600 by early2000. The reormist publications with

the largest circulations ormed powerul ora or a

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42

dissenting public to mercilessly criticize the politi-

cal bastions o the conservatives, or example in the

judicial sector, in the security services or in the army

o the Revolutionary Guards.23

Thanks to the channels o public dissent, a critical pub-

lic discourse was generated centering mainly around

the re-evaluation o the relationship between Islamic

tradition in the dominantly theocratic orm in which

it has existed in Iran since 979, on the one hand, and

western modernism with all its concepts o democracy,

rule o law, and human rights, on the other hand. But

rom mid-2000 onwards, the dynamism o the reorm

movement was brought almost to a standstill by the

hard counterattacks o the conservative opponents o

reorm. President Khatami was and is largely powerless

in the ace o this activity.

Even under Khatami, Irans economy was unable

to nd a way out o its chronic crisis, the causes o

which can be traced back to, among other things,

the Islamic-socialist and state-controlling economic

policy pursued by the regime since 979. For example,

in 979980, most o Irans industry was nationalized

or became the property o revolutionary ounda-

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43

tions24 in which mismanagement and corruption

are daily events. Industrial recovery is additionally

hampered by Irans one-sided dependence on oil,

which was already a well-established actor under

the monarchy o the Shah. Tehran obtains about

80% o its oreign currency earnings rom the sale

o oil, but this makes the country very susceptible to

fuctuations in the world price or crude oil. Repeated

attempts to diversiy the sources o oreign export

earnings have largely ailed. Oil export revenues still

at present account or about 50% o the national

budget. In addition, Irans economy is also suering

rom other structural problems, such as a lack o any

general legal conditions or oreign investments. Un-

der Khatami as well, periodically recurring spikes in

the economic crisis led repeatedly to minor outbursts

o social unrest and demonstrations in various towns

and cities in Iran, but these were or the most part

locally limited.25 The desolate economic situation

and the lack o political prospects or many Irani-

ans constitute one o the main reasons or the rapid

increase in negative social phenomena, in particular

prostitution and drug addiction, to name just two

actors. According to UN data, about two million

Iranians are addicted to drugs.

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44

Against the background o a rapidly increasing and

extremely young populationmore than 50% o the

people entitled to vote are under 30 years oldTehrans

government is aced with major problems. Irans popu-

lation has almost doubled rom 979 (36 million inhab-

itants) to 2003 (approx. 72 million). The demographic

actor is one o the chie driving orces in the reorm

process, because the people who vote or and support

Khatami are to be ound mainly among the youth and

the emale population o Iran. The generation o Ira-

nians born in the 70s and 80s, who do not harbor any

deep resentment or the Shahs reign, which was barely,

or not at all, consciously experienced by them, and who

did not participate actively in the revolution, is disap-

pointed by the Islamic regime. The principal reason or

this is that the revolution has not ullled the promises

o social justice and material prosperity that were made

in 979. The young people are pressing or political and

economic liberalization. They are calling or reorms

that will create jobs, slow down infation, and improve

the standard o living. In addition, they want an easing

o the rigid social and cultural restrictions that deter-

mine the lives o most Iranians, especially in areas such

as the Islamic dress code or women, the relationships

between the two sexes, and the possibilities o accessing

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45

western culture and western media.26 Furthermore, a

majority o Iranians wants to see an end to Irans isola-

tion in terms o oreign policy, which is mainly rooted

in the hostility o the regime towards the USA. It has

so ar not proved possible to overcome this hostility,

which is based partly on the negative historical experi-

ences o Iran with the imperialist policies o the USA

during the Shahs regime, and partly on the ideological

dogmas o the 979 revolution.27

Nevertheless, the act that a large section o the popu-

lation is disappointed with the Islamic regime should

not lead to the alse assessment that the stability o the

system in Iran is seriously jeopardized. So ar, despite the

widespread dissatisaction, no undamental opposition

that is both capable o orming a majority and is well

enough organized, as well as able and willing topos-

sibly violentlytopple the entire system, has ormed

within the population. Nor have the orces o the exile-

Iranian opposition posed a real threat since the mid-80s;

they are disunited and have no mass basis o domestic

support. The growing pressure or change being exerted

by the population is instead directed at reorming the

system within existing constitutional boundaries. This

was evident in the election results recorded or Khatami

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46

in the presidential elections o997 and 200, in which

he obtained 69% and 77% o the votes.

I we take stock o Khatamis policies and achievements

since 997, we are struck by the discrepancy between

the successes scored in oreign and domestic policy.

While there is no doubt that Khatami was able to make

considerable progress in improving Irans relationships

with its Islamic neighbors, especially the Arabic states,

and was able by and large to normalize the relation-

ship with the EU, he was not very successul in the

sphere o domestic politics. Since 997 Khatami has

publicly supported views aimed at promoting toler-

ance towards persons o dierent opinion, seeking a

balance o interests through internal social dialogue,

and ensuring compliance with constitutional and

legal standards. The intellectual Khatami, who beore

and ater he took oce as president in 997 stressed

that he was a convinced supporter o the velayat-e

aqih and wanted to work his reorms solely within

the ramework o the existing constitutional and legal

system, is not a revolutionary plotting the downall o

the system. Khatami clearly believes that he can hu-

manize Islamic theocracy without touching its core.

Typically, to this day Khatami has not himsel called

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47

or any limit to be placed on the absolute authority

o the Supreme Leader by amending the constitution,

nor has he lent his support to any initiatives taken in

that direction by some radical reormers. Instead o

using the overwhelming outcome o the election to

conront his opponents and wrest concessions rom

them, which would be easy or him to do by mobiliz-

ing his supporters to engage in street demonstrations

and thus exert pressure that way, Khatami preers

to seek consensus solutions in his conficts with the

conservatives. This has watered down the principles o

reorm, weakened the reorm movement as a whole,

and embittered many o his loyal supporters. A large

number o them, especially youths and students, have

in the meantime turned away rom the reorm process,

disappointed and discouraged.

It is at present still too early to declare that the re-

orm movement has zzled out. Nevertheless, there

are many signs that its uture is uncertain; one sign is

the massive deeat o the reormers in the municipal

elections o spring 2003, when many voters did not

even bother to vote because o their disappointment

in the Khatami governments unullled promises to

institute reorms.

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48

Concluding remarks

When we try to take stock o the successes and ailures

that have occurred during the 25-year existence o the

Islamic Republic, it is necessary to ask what criteria

should be applied. I we apply the criterion o stability

o the system, it cannot be denied that the new regime

has been able to secure and perpetuate its control by

establishing numerous institutions that should be able

to guarantee the existence o the regime or a long

time to come. I, however, we judge the Republic by

the promises, such as social justice, that were made

by the ideology o the revolution and by its leaders to

the majority o the Iranian people, who wanted the

downall o the Shah and believed in the revolutionary

leadership, then the balance sheet looks dierent.

Many Iranians sought their salvation in Islam as a

counter to the Shahs rapid modernization and the ar-

reaching processes o social and economic change with

which they were burdened. This was especially the case

since the imported western philosophies and con-

cepts o nationalism, socialism, and constitutionalism

had ailed them. Ayatollah Khomeinis proposal to re-

turn to the undamental principles o Islam as the cure

or the current malaise in a Muslim society seemed

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49

to many thereore to be the most authentic, amiliar,

and simple solution. The return to Islam did not end

with the all o the Shah and the establishment o the

Islamic Republic, however; the Islamic revolution had

also to demonstrate that its religio-ideological dogmas

were suitable or overcoming the social crisis. In this

it has clearly ailed. The question o what conclusions

can be drawn rom this ailure will probably become

increasingly relevant in uture years.

One man who will contribute to the answer to this

question is the lay-theologian philosopher Abdolkarim

Soroush, who is regarded as one o the theoretical

pioneers, i not the theoretical pioneer, o the reorm

process. Appointed by Khomeini in 980 to the Cul-

tural Revolution Council, Soroush became in the early

990s one o the most infuential dissidents against the

Iran regime, whose numerous writings have greatly

infuenced many o the most prominent activists o

the reorm movement under Khatami. In his writings

Soroush has ormulated a new hermeneutics the main

concept o which is the de-ideologization o Islam. By

distinguishing between religion and religious knowl-

edge, Soroush argues that there is no justication or a

privileged access to the essence o Islam and thereore

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50

no reason to accept a privileged religious establish-

ment. Soroushs continued critique o the ideological

society that has been set up by the Islamic Republic

brought down upon him the ire o the conservative

powers-that-be, so that he was eventually compelled

to leave Iran in the late 990s, residing since then ei-

ther at dierent universities in the USA, among which

Harvard, or in Europe as a visiting scholar.28

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5

Endnotes

Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton982, p. 529.

2 Yazdi calls the phase that started with Mohammad Khatamispresidency the Third Republic. For details o Ebrahim Yazdisdenitions, see Se Jomhuriye [Three Republics], Tehran 200,pp. 34-352.

3 See the short biography by Wilried Buchta, Mehdi Bazar-gan, in Orient36 (995), pp. 585-590.

4 Mohsen M. Milani, The Making o Irans Islamic Revolution.From Monarch to Islamic Republic, Boulder, Colorado 994,pp. 84-89, 54-60.

5 See Hamid Mavani, Analysis o Khomeinis Proos al-WilayaAnalysis o Khomeinis Proos al-WilayaAnalysis o Khomeinis Proos al-Wilayaal-Mutlaqa (Comprehensive Authority o the Jurist), inLinda S. Walbridge (ed.), The Most Learned o the Shia. TheInstitution o the Marja Taqlid, New York: Oxord UniversityPress, 200, p. 83.

6 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o the Ayatollahs, New York 984,pp. 27-230.

7 Saskia Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran, Lon-don: I.B. Tauris, 999, p. 32.

8 For the text see Bakhshi az khaterat-e aqih va marja-e aliqadr hazrat-e Ayatollah Montazeri (A Part o the Memoirso the Jurisprudent and Source o Distinguished AbilityAyatollah Montazeri), neshani-ye internet (www.montazeri.com), 2000, pp. 23-24. (Page numbers are taken rom theprinted book, still orbidden in Iran, which was given to theauthor by Ayatollah Montazeri himsel on May, 2004.)

9 See, or details, Reza Ashari, Human Rights in Iran. TheAbuse o Cultural Relativism, Philadelphia 200, Chapter 8,pp. 04-8.

0 Amnesty International, Iran: Human Rights Violations, 987-990, p. 6.

Bakhshi az khaterat-e aqih va marja-e ali qadr hazrat-e Ayatol-lah Montazeri (A Part o the Memoirs o the Jurisprudent andSource o Distinguished Ability Ayatollah Montazeri), p. 620.

2

Idem, p.624

.

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52

3 Ibid.4

Idem, p. 629.5 Wilried Buchta, Die Inquisition der Islamischen Repub-

lik Iran: Einige Anmerkungen zum Sondergerichtsho derGeistlichkeit [The Inquisition o the Islamic Republic oIran: Some Comments on the Special Court o the Clergy],in Rainer Brunner (ed.), Islamstudien ohne Ende. Festschritr Werner Ende zum 65. Geburtstag[Open-ended Studies onIslam. A Festschrit or Werner Ende on his 65th Birthday],Wrzburg 2002, pp. 69-78.

6

In his memoirs, Montazeri doubts the authenticity o thisletter and believes that it was written by the Imams sonAhmad Khomeini, who by means o intrigue wanted tostrip him, along with other unnamed leading members othe regime, o his power. See Bakhshi az khaterat-e aqih vamarja-e ali qadr hazrat-e Ayatollah Montazeri (A Part o theMemoirs o the Jurisprudent and Source o DistinguishedAbility Ayatollah Montazeri), p. 642.

7 For more details, see Wilried Buchta, Die Islamische Re-

publik Iran und die religis-politische Kontroverse um diemarjaiyyat [The Islamic Republic o Iran and the Religio-Political Controversy Surrounding the marjaiyyat], in Ori-ent36 (995), pp. 449-474.

8 Ahmed Hashim, The Crisis o the Iranian State, London 995,p. 2.

9 Patrick Clawson, Irans Challenge to the West: How, When,and Why?, Washington, DC 993, p. 26.

20 See Wilried Buchta, Rasandschanis Ohnmacht [Rasan-

janis Impotence], in Frankurter Allgemeine Zeitung,5 October 996, p. 0.

2 Wilried Buchta, Liberale Epochenwende im TehranerGottesstaat? Die iranischen Prsidentschatswahlen vomDie iranischen Prsidentschatswahlen vom23. Mai 997 und die neue Regierung [An Epochal ChangeAn Epochal ChangeTowards Liberalism in the Theocracy in Tehran? The IranianPresidential Elections o23 May997 and the New Govern-ment], in, in KAS-Auslandsinormationen(St. Augustin) 9/997,pp. 28-74.

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53

22 For the duties and powers o the president and Supreme

Leader, and also o the Council o Guardians and the Expe-diency Council, see Wilried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? TheStructure o Power in the Islamic Republic, Washington, DC2000, pp. 22-64.

23 However, in the period rom 2000 to early2003 the judiciaryordered the closure o more than 90 reormist newspapersand also gave orders or the arrest o a large number o criti-cal journalists, student leaders, clerics, writers, intellectuals,lawyers, and even high-ranking ocials in the executive

branch and the state administration who are close to Presi-dent Khatamithese people were then sentenced on fimsypolitical charges. Several trials are still in process againstleading members o liberal-Islamic and national-religiousopposition groups who are loyal to the constitution and whoreject the monopoly on power held by the politicized Shiiteclergy. See Abbas William Samii, Sisyphus Newsstand: TheIranian Press under Khatami, inMERIA5/3 (200), pp. -4.

24 See Jahangir Amuzegar, Irans Economy under the Islamic Re-

public System, London 992, pp. 3-40.25 On this topic, see or details the International Crisis Group

Middle East Report No. 5, Iran. The Struggle or the Revolu-tions Soul, August 5, 2002, pp. 24.

26 See Mark Gasiorowski, The Power Struggle in Iran, inMid-dle East Policy7/4 (2000), p. 23.

27 Wilried Buchta, Iran, in Siegried Faath (ed.),Antiameri-kanismus in Nordarika, Nah- und Mittelost[Anti-American-ism in North Arica, the Middle, and Far East], Hamburg

2003, Mitteilungen vol. 68, pp. 24-260.28 See Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Contentious Public Religion:

Two Concepts o Islam in Revolutionary Iran: Ali Shariatiand Abdolkarim Soroush, in International Sociology9/4(2004), p. 54.

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