Brusis, Between EU Requirements

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Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics,and National Traditions: Re-creating Regions in theAccession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe

MARTIN BRUSIS*

The article studies the impact of the European Union (EU) on the reformsof regional administration in Central and East European (CEE) accessioncountries. It analyzes the motives, process and outcomes of regional- ormesolevel administrative reforms in five countriesBulgaria, the CzechRepublic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakiaconsidering whether the EUhas shaped these reforms to a higher degree than in relation to its incum-bent member states. The article finds that the EU Commissions interest inregional self-governments with a substantial fiscal and legal autonomy hasprovided an additional rationale and an incentive to re-create regional self-

governments. Advocates of regional self-government and an institutional-ization of regions in the accession countries have referred to Europeantrends and (perceived) EU expectations of regionalization. Thus, the Com-mission and the preaccession framework have become catalysts for a process

in which most CEE regions have already enhanced and will further increasetheir political salience. However, the trajectories and outcomes of regional-level reforms can be better explained by a combination of domestic institu-tional legacies, policy approaches of reformers and their adversaries, andthe influence of ethnic/historical regionalism.

INTRODUCTION

Many Central and East European countries (CEECs) are currently rebuild-ing their regional levels of public administration. These reforms occurin the context of the preparation for the accession to the European Union(EU) and aim at creating the administrative capacities for the implemen-tation of EU legislation. In particular, Central and East European gov-ernments intend to enable regional administrative bodies to participatein the management of the EU Structural Funds, which are envisaged to

become the main instrument of EU economic assistance after an applicantcountry has joined the EU. In this perspective, the rearrangement of thei l l l tit t i l t f th E i ti


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European countries are currently undergoing. At the same time, it iscaused by the need to establish a modern intermediate level of adminis-tration that links local self-government and central government levels,which were both democratized during the political transition in the early

nineties and have hitherto been subject to administrative reform.This article seeks to contribute to the Europeanization debate by focus-

ing on the impact of the EU accession constellation on regional-leveladministrative reforms in CEE accession countries. It analyzes themotives, steps, and outcomes of regional- or mesolevel administrativereforms in five countriesBulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,Poland, and Slovakiain greater detail and tries to identify the role ofthe EU and its preaccession policy in generating these outcomes. These

countries were selected because they are similar insofar as they have acommunist past, define themselves as unitary states, prepare for EUmembership, and are faced with the task of reforming public adminis-tration in the context of their postcommunist transformation. The sam-ple includes both countries expected to join the EU in 2004 (the CzechRepublic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and Bulgaria as a prospectivelater entrant, in order to test whether EU policies differ between the twogroups. The analysis does not cover all ten CEECs mainly due to the lack

of sufficiently detailed empirical knowledge, but occasional references toother CEECs are made. The aim is to assess whether and to what extentEU governance or the interplay of domestic legacies, actor constellations,and policy approaches have shaped the configuration of the new regionaladministrative bodies.

The paper starts with an overview of the debates on the Europeaniza-tion and regionalization trends induced by European integration. Thesecond section maps differences and similarities among the institutional

arrangements the five CEECs have established as their regions. The thirdsection develops an explanatory framework that explores the influence ofpolicy objectives, conditions, and expectations communicated by the EU,national institutional legacies, competing objectives of major politicalactors, and the salience of historic and ethnic regionalism in shapingregional-level reforms. The conclusion evaluates the influence of the EUin shaping reform outcomes.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEANIZATION DEBATE

With t t W t E t i t di h

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second is concerned with the strengthening of subnational regions underthe influence of the EU policy process.

In the first debate, some authors have contended that the constitutionaland institutional arrangements of member states arealbeit slowly and

partiallyconverging towards one common model, since, in response tosimilar challenges faced in the EU policy-process, member states have toimplement reforms and adaptations leading in a similar direction. Sucha convergence could be observed with respect to common trends towardsregionalization, strong sectorization, high administrative coordination,and a reduction of parliamentary influence (Rometsch and Wessels, 36,329, 345).

In contrast to the convergence thesis, other studies have emphasized

the persisting relevance of national constitutional traditions and struc-tures (Schwarze, 544) or of mediating domestic institutions (GreenCowles, Caporaso, and Risse, 231234). It has been shown that thenational implementation of EU legislation depends on the level of adap-tation pressure perceived in the member states. Adaptation pressureincreases if EU regulations affect national institutional arrangements thatare deeply embedded in the national administrative traditions (Knill). Theimpact of the EU on national administrations is only one among several

driving forces of institutional change that tend to be underestimated byEuropeanization studies (Goetz). A study on the Europeanization of smallWest European states concludes that the governments of these states haveadapted to European integration by changing their administrative struc-tures in an incremental and ad hoc way, building upon pre-existingdomestic traditions and arrangements (Hanf and Soetendorp).

This debate raises the question of whether the administrative struc-tures of the applicant countries converge with best or shared practice inthe EU or whetherand howEU influences are moderated by nationalinstitutional arrangements and traditions. It is easy to develop a strongargument for institutional convergence in the accession process:

1. Since the democratic transitions, the postcommunist countries haveundergone what may be termed as an imitative transformation,copying successful institutions from existing Western models (cf.,e.g., Jacoby).

2. The simultaneity of transformation, coping with EU requirements,and an accelerated diffusion of innovations through internationalagencies and regimes exerts a particularly high adaptation pressure

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implies adopting the complete body of EU norms, which representsa mandatory adaptation without the possibility to influence therules to which the accession country has to adapt (Grabbe; Lippertand Becker, 59).

The Copenhagen European Council of 1993 introduced additionalbroad political and economic criteria for EU membership that reachbeyond a mere transposition of norms and endow the EU with an encom-passing mandate to monitor, control, and guide policy-making in theaccession countries. The Accession Partnerships adopted by the EU estab-lish priorities for the accession preparation that transcend the obligationsderiving from the acquis communautaire and that envisage sanctions in case

of noncompliance (Grabbe). Thus, the Europeanization pressure faced bythe accession countries appears even stronger than in the case of the EUmember states. Accordingly, there seem to be stronger incentives andpressures for institutional convergence. Recent studies on the impactexerted by the EU accession on national polities and administrations ofaccession countries have argued that the relations between the applicantcountries and the EU are dominated by the concept of convergence onthe path of integration (Lippert and Becker, 5859; Lippert, Umbach,

and Wessels, 1003). A study on the adaptation of governments in theVisegrd countries to the EU observed that the decision-making andimplementation mechanism of the Phare program generated converg-ing institutional structures and triggered administrative streamlining ofthe centers of government (Rupp).

The second debate refers to the growing political salience of regionsinduced and encouraged by European integration. The most importantpolicy framework has been the EU cohesion policy, with its notion of a

partnership between national, regional, and local government (Hooghe).The European Commission has involved the regions of EU member statesin policy deliberation and formulation in order to gain their supportfor its policies. Several scholars have argued that the EU changes theintrastate relationship between central government and regions by mobi-lizing regions and enabling them to use the EU as a source of politicaland economic support (Bullmann; Jones and Keating; Marks, Nielsen,Ray, and Salk). More recent studies have shown that the regional

mobilization effect induced by the EU is differentiated, depending onthe power resources of regions in the different national contexts off d l/ i li d it i b t t (B d Eb l i

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and political weight, and since member states have been considering theirregional-level institutions as integral elements of their national constitu-tional order, there is no consensual and codified acquis of commonrules with respect to regional government. Lacking harmonized, formal

rules, the Commission has triggered increased policy-making activities ofthe regions by indirect and underformalized methods (Tmmel 1997).

This debate suggests that the accession process is likely to causea growing political role of regions in the CEEC, especially if one takesinto account the strong power position of the EU in the accession con-stellation, enabling it to more forcefully promote a model of multilevelgovernance. The moderating and differentiating effects of national con-stitutional orders and the distribution of powers they have established

between levels of government may be less salient, since the constitutionalstatus of regions in accession countries is less settled than in the consoli-dated EU member states.

Both debates provide support for the hypothesis that the EU shapesthe course and outcomes of mesolevel reforms in Central and EasternEurope to a higher degree than in relation to its incumbent memberstates. However, they also lend support for a competing explanation thatemphasizes the persistence of national diversity. This article tests these

hypotheses by studying the policy actions of the EU in relation to otherexplanatory variables taken from the research on the postcommunisttransformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Before the influence ofthese variables is explored, the following section describes and classifiesthe changes in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, andSlovakia.

DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES IN MESOLEVEL REFORMS ACROSS

ACCESSION COUNTRIESPublic attention and political debate in the accession countries havemainly focused on the territorial changes linked to the new administra-tive bodies. In Poland and Slovakia, for example, the number and bound-aries of regions (wojewdztwo and kraj) have been highly controversialamong politicians. While the territorial aspects of regional administrationreforms have become the most visible issues, the core problems of thereforms are democratic accountability and effective governance. Up tonow, administrative reforms have progressed to a different extent in eachcountry, leading to institutional arrangements that are not yet consoli-



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TABLE 1Differences and Similarities of Regional Government

Bulgaria Czech Republic Hu

Representation of No Senate (81 seats, Noregions in directly elected innational electoral districtslegislatures largely coinciding

with administrativedistricts)

Number and size 28 oblast since 14 kraj since 2001, 19 megyof regional 1/1999, average average 737,000 537,000governments 317,000 inhabitants, inhabitants, 4,895 km

3,964km2 5,633 km2

Regional self- No Yes; kraj assembly Yes; megovernment directly elected, assembl

four-year-term, elected,since 2000 year-ter

1994Regional tier Yes Yes Yesof stateadministration


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Relationship of Integration Separatioregional self-government andstate administration

District self- No; 279 rayon, No; 77 okres; No; distrgovernment rayon assembly okres assembly of bodies of

of delegates delegates from administfrom local self- local self-governments governments

Local self- 4,032 obchina; 6,242 obec; 3,071 nkgovernment mayors elected mayors elected by mayors e

directly council directly (towns) ancouncil

NUTS-2 regions 6 statistical 8 statistical regions 7 statisticregions since since 12/1998 regions s6/2000 10/1999


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Czech regional assemblies have a right to submit bills to Parliament. Boththe Czech and the Polish second chamber have not yet found their rolewithin the emerging new administrative set-up. Their necessity is ques-tioned, and Senate elections in both countries have had very low turnouts.

Regional self-governments exist in Hungary, the Czech Republic,Poland, and Slovakia. Only Bulgaria considers its regions (oblasty) anintegral part of the state administration and has not established legalprerequisites for self-governments at the regional level. In the other fourcountries studied here, regional self-governments are institutionally inde-pendent bodies of public law, performing self-governmental as well asstate administrative tasks. Accordingly, regionsor, to use a term focus-ing on the institutional setup, countiesconsist of a state representative

and a self-governing organ. Hungarian county assemblies already have acertain tradition, since they were elected directly by citizens in 1994 andfor a second term in 1998. In contrast, the first direct elections to Polishcounty assemblies took place in October 1998, and the first direct elec-tions to the assemblies of the Czech and Slovak counties were held inNovember 2000 and December 2001, respectively.

The size of the regional units in the five countries studied here variesconsiderably. The newly established Polish counties (wojewdztwo) are by

far the biggest units, with an average population of 2,416,000 inhabitantsand an average territory of 19,544km2. Hungarian counties (megye) andthe new Slovak and Czech counties (kraj) range between 537,000 and737,000 inhabitants, and Bulgarian counties are approximately half as

big. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia increased the numberof regional administrative units in the course of their reforms, whileHungary has maintained its inherited administrative-territorial division.Poland reduced the number of counties, but this reduction was supple-

mented by the creation of a new, lower tier of districts (powiat).The district level of administration between the county and the localself-governments differs strongly across the countries studied here:Hungary does not have a district level of public administration, Polandhas introduced self-governed districts with directly elected assemblies,and the districts in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are part ofthe state administration.

Contrary to the district and county level, local government reform was

perceived as a priority of democratization by the new political elites inCentral and Eastern Europe (Baldersheim, Illner, and Offerdal; Horvth).I di t l ft th liti l t iti th l l t d li t

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Deconcentrated sectoral and territorial state administration has beenintegrated with regional self-governments to a different extent in eachcountry. County and district self-governments in Poland took over manyfunctions from regional bodies of the general territorial state administra-

tion and from the regional units of sectoral ministries, but they are insti-tutionally separated from the state administration. Self-government andstate administration have historically been most clearly separated inSlovakia and the Czech Republic (Koudelka). Slovakias legislation of2001 established an institutional separation of county assemblies andcounty offices of state administration. In contrast, the Czech Republicdecided on an integrated model in which elected representatives have dis-cretion over the organization and personnel of regional state administra-

tion. Hungary has established numerous coordinating institutionsbetween its institutionally separate tiers of self-government and territor-ial and sectoral state administration (e.g., regional development councils,county labor market councils) (Bende-Szab).

Since specific and comparable data are missing and the scope ofregional government has not yet been fully defined in most countries, thecompetences of regional governments cannot be compared here. Super-visory powers appear to be regulated very similarly in all five countries

studied for this article. As a rule, local self-governments may deal withall local public affairs that are not explicitly assigned to the state admin-istration or higher levels of self-government, based upon a law. Apartfrom this encompassing competence, local self-governments carry outtasks of state administration that are transferred to them (transferred com-petences). Usually, the representative of the state administration at thecounty level exercises only the legal supervision of county (in Poland, dis-trict as well) and local self-governments, and specialized audit officesensure a financial control.

Until 1997, administrative de-centralization was not paralleled byfiscalde-centralization, as World Bank (216217)/International Monetary Funddata on subnational government budgets between 1990 and 1997 indicate.According to the World Bank, the share of subnational government intotal public expenditure rose only in Hungary, and subnational govern-ment increased its share of the total tax revenue only in Hungary andLithuania. This corresponds to the assessment that Hungary has been afrontrunner in de-centralization (Baldersheim, Illner, and Offerdal; Illner).Compared to West European countries, expenditure levels rangedbetween that of Portugal and France (11.6% and 18.6% of total public



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regions are required for the so-called objective-1 assistance, which is tar-geted at regions with an average per-capita gross domestic product of lessthan 75% of the EU average and amounts to two-thirds of the total struc-tural assistance. After accession, most of the territory of the new member

states will become eligible for objective-1 support, which is allocated toprograms based upon NUTS-2 regions. NUTS-3 regions are the basis forobjective-2 support, which is provided for regions facing socioeco-nomic change (cf. European Commission 1999a, Articles 34). NUTS-2regions of EU member states have an average population of 1.8 millionand an average territory of 15,700km2, and they participate in the struc-tural policy of the EU.

Regions of such a size are in contrast with the traditional small-scale

administrative-territorial structures of the accession countries and con-tradict the tendency of postsocialist reformers in Bulgaria, the CzechRepublic, Slovakia, and Poland to subdivide previously integrated terri-torial units.3 Only Poland, the largest country of the five, was able to createregional self-governments that match the NUTS-2 level in size. The newcounties established in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and theHungarian counties are much smaller and correspond only to NUTS-3.

The precise legal status of the newly established NUTS regions is still

subject to discussion. The Czech government has created NUTS-2-compatible cohesion regions, with corresponding councils that consistof representatives elected from the county assemblies. In June 2000, theBulgarian government adopted a decree to create NUTS-2-compatibleregions, each endowed with an interministerial Commission for Eco-nomic and Social Cohesion that is to perform a consultative function. Inaddition, the Regional Development Law of March 1999 set up county-level councils for regional development to assist governors. The county

councils are chaired by governors; they consist of mayors of the munici-palities and one member of each municipal council. Slovakia created aprovisional classification of four NUTS-2-compatible regions and, in 2002,established regional monitoring committees composed of delegates fromthe local and regional self-governments, state administration, andregional socioeconomic partners. Hungary established macroregions withregional development councils in October 1999 on the basis of precedingvoluntary structures.

TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF REFORM PATHS AND OUTCOMES

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and domestic factors acting in parallel, and domestic political actors mayuse EU requirements and advice instrumentally to legitimize their ownpolicy objectives. This section addresses this difficulty. First, it analyzesEU policy actions concerning the regions of the accession countries in

more detail, assuming that EU behavior is very closely observed in theaccession countries and that policy messages communicated by the EUmatter to the background of the preaccession constellation. Second, itdraws on the body of research on the postcommunist transformationand comparative government in Central and Eastern Europe and studiesthe explanatory power of determinants identified in this literature. Ifthese determinants explain reform outcomes and trajectories with suf-ficient plausibility, it is assumed that the EU has not had a significant

influence.On the basis of studies comparing institutional change, public admin-istration reform, and de-centralization in the Central and East Europeancountries, one may distinguish three main variables. First, historical lega-cies of the state socialist and presocialist times, together with the legacyof the democratic transition, provide institutional constraints for the pro-tagonists of administrative reform and influence their choices (Crawfordand Lijphart; Hesse 1993, 1997; Illner; Wollmann 1995, 1997). The compe-

tition between political actors with centralist and localist policy approachesconstitutes the second variable (Hesse 1997; Illner). The third variablerefers to the existence and impact ofhistorical or ethnic regionalismthatis, regionalist identities, mobilization, and the perception of regionalismfor the political context and the outcomes of mesolevel reform (Hughes,Sasse, and Gordon; Keating and Loughlin).

Policy Concepts and Preferences of the European Union

The EU institutions neglected regions of the accession countries until1997. The Commissions White Paper of 1995, for example, pointed to thegeneral necessity of administrative capacity-building but did not refer tothe restructuring of administration at the regional level. In March 1997, aCommission expert still suggested eschewing an overtaxing of regionaladministrations by restricting the participation of prospective newmember states in the Cohesion Fund, which is administered only by thenational governments (Hallet, 27, 29). This reluctance was grounded indevelopmental economics: assisting backward regions would imply aredistribution of resources from prosperous regions and thus impede



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moment of their accession, including all rights and obligations (EuropeanCommission 1997). The Commission responded to the economic criticisminsofar as it suggested dividing the cohesion policy resources for newmember states on the basis of a 1:2 relation between the Cohesion Fund

and the Structural Funds (the current size relation of the funds is approx-imately 1:10).4

The principle of adopting the entire acquis upon accession implied thataccession countries needed to improve their administrative capacities atthe regional level in order to manage Structural Funds (Brusis). Thus, theEU directed an increasing part of the Phare resources to prepare the coun-tries for this task in the framework of preaccession assistance. In addition,technical assistance was provided in the framework of the twinning

program. Regional development institutions and administrative capacity-building became a priority in the first Accession Partnerships, adopted inMarch 1998. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia were explicitlyasked to establish the administrative structures and budgetary proce-dures of a regional policy that would allow them to participate in EUstructural policy after accession. In its updated Accession Partnershipsfrom December 1999, the Council called upon Slovakia and the CzechRepublic to adopt and implement public administration reform programs

and upon Bulgaria to improve its institutions of financial control, includ-ing regional control bodies.While the Accession Partnerships constitute unilateral decisions of the

Council, which the applicant countries are expected to reflect in theirNational Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis, the annualregular reports of the Commission serve to evaluate the progress made

by the applicants in implementing Accession Partnerships and nationalprograms. The Commissions opinion on the membership applications

from July 1997 (avis) and the regular reports from November 1998,October 1999, and November 2000 assessed the state of administrativereforms in each country and gave some policy advice, often veiled inopaque and diplomatic language (European Commission 1997, 1998,1999b, 2000, 2001b). Over time, the reports have become more differenti-ated and have developed a code of graduated assessment and bench-marking. The Commissions remarks on regional administration indicatethat its preference appears to be democratically elected regional self-

governments that possess a substantial financial and legal autonomy (cf.Fournier, 115). This preference, however, is expressed only indirectly andi li itl I i t i i 2001 d i t th C i i

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regional government, often conveying preferences only through factualstatements.5 It noted, for example, that the higher units of territorial self-government envisaged by the Czech constitution were lacking (1997) andhad been established (2001).

The Commissions opinion on Bulgaria (1997) expressed the expecta-tion that the envisaged Bulgarian counties (established in January 1999)might be granted the right of self-government. With respect to Slovakia,the Commission (1997) criticized the fact that the newly establishedSlovak counties and districts received competences at the expense of localself-governments. This criticism, however, was placed in the context ofan opinion regarding Slovakias failure to establish democratic stabilitythat is, to meet the political criteria of Copenhagen. After the change of

government in Slovakia, the Commission (1999b) recommended devel-opment of de-centralization and public administration reform. The gov-ernment should pay attention to partnership with regional and localpartners (European Commission 2000, 65). For Bulgaria and Hungary,the 2001 report stressed that genuine partnership structures should beestablished at the regional level. The Commissions 1999 (1999b, 13) reporton Poland praised the new territorial-administrative structure that willprovide significant opportunities for economic and democratic develop-

ment at all levels of Polish society.

Financial Autonomy of Local and Regional Authorities

While the Commission took the view that local self-governments wouldrequire sufficient financial resources to make use of their autonomy, it didnot formulate a specific expectation with respect to the extent of fiscalautonomy. The 1997 report on the Czech Republic noted that local self-governments would still face difficulties in using their autonomy, sincetwo-thirds of their budget depended on state subsidies. In 2000 (19), theCommission stated that [I]mportant decisions remain to be taken regard-ing the financing and staffing of the de-centralization process. ForHungary, the Commission (2000, 14) observed that the reduction of thelocal government share in the personal income-tax revenues (from 13.5%to 5%) proved that the gap between the political autonomy granted tothe local governments and their financial autonomy increased further.In the Commissions (1997) opinion, the autonomy of Polish local andregional governments was still restricted and should be expanded, par-ticularly in its financial aspects.



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ernment to clarify the division of powers between state administrationand self-governments. In Poland, the division of responsibilities betweenthe chairmen of the county assemblies and the county governors, therepresentatives of the state administration, needed clarification and a

clear division of responsibilities (European Commission 2000, 2001).The 2000 report on the Czech Republic noted progress insofar as the acton the counties extended delegation of state administration to countyself-governments.

Administrative-Territorial Division

The Commission expected the accession countries to define regions cor-

responding to the NUTS classification, but it remained vague on whetherthis would require changes to the territorial-administrative structures,too. With respect to Poland, the Commission (1997) recommended thatthe division of the state territory needed to be improved in order to imple-ment Structural Funds. The 1998 progress report noted that Bulgariaplanned to establish 28 counties, Poland had decided to establish self-governed regions and districts, and the Czech Parliament had decided toestablish 14 regions. Sinceperhaps althoughthese factual statements

were not further qualified, one can assume that they expressed a cau-tiously positive acknowledgement of a progress and of its relevance.The Commission requested clarification of the status of NUTS regions,

but did not express a preference as to whether the level of the politicalbodies representing a region should be NUTS-2 or NUTS-3 (EuropeanCommission 1999b on Bulgaria and the Czech Republic; European Com-mission 2000 on Hungary). The 2000 report on Hungary appreciated thatthe importance of regions corresponding to NUTS-2 was increased by an

amendment to the regional development law. The Commission (2000) alsoseemed to support the reintegration of overly fragmented municipalitiesinto larger unitsfor example, Hungarys policy of forming microregionsof small municipalities.

Summarizing the assessments and statements, one may conclude thatthe Commission has been very cautious in its advice and has avoidedurging a comprehensive regionalization. It has been more explicit: (1)where the acquis provides a more specific mandate, such as in the case of

financially independent local and regional authorities; (2) where points ofreference exist in international law (e.g., the European Charter for LocalS lf G t) i ti l l ( th C h C tit ti

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Presocialist, State Socialist, and Transition Legacies

Administrative reform in Central and Eastern Europe did not take placeby implementing the blueprints of international advisors or domestic

policy planners in an institutional vacuum. Rather, reform has beenshaped by the institutional and cultural legacies of the presocialist times,the authoritarian state socialism, and the transition phase. An importantpresocialist legacy is the dualist model of public administration, datingback to the municipal statutory law of the former Austro-Hungarianmonarchy (1862) (Illner, 1415). According to this model, which wasapplied in the Czech lands, Hungary, and Galicia (the southeastern regionof Poland), powers of self-government and state administration were con-

sidered to be of separate origin and were vested in separate tiers of stateadministration and self-administration.6 After 1989, the dualist modelinfluenced the conceptual thinking on administrative reform, particularlyin Czechoslovakia and its successor republics, since reforms of theregional level were framed as questions of how to balance elements ofstate administration and self-government (cf., e.g., Samalk). In contrast,regional administration in Bulgaria lacks the dualist legacy and insteadreflects the legacy of a prefectoral system influenced by Russian and

French examples.The state socialist legacy of state administration consisted of a politi-cization of decision-making and administrative staff, the restriction ofprofessional autonomy, the absence of detailed legal regulation guidingadministrative action, and the discretionary application of legal pro-visions (cf., e.g., Hesse 1993). In an attempt to modernize and centralizestate administration, the state socialist governments of Czechoslovakia,Hungary, and Poland had already embarked on reforms of the adminis-trative division of their territories. Czechoslovakia reduced the numberof districts and counties and centralized competences in 1960. With itsreforms of 1975, the Polish government abolished district-level bodies ofadministration and increased the number of counties from 17 to 49 (Taras,2223). In 1984, Hungary also abolished its districts (jrsok) and shiftedcompetences to the county level.

Due to the power-stabilizing political intentions linked to these earlierstate socialist reforms, the new democratically elected governments per-ceived regional-level administrative bodies as relics of authoritarian rule.As a consequence, in 1990 Czechoslovakian reformers decided to dissolvethe county-level bodies in order to strengthen the autonomy of local self-



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A different legacy results from the fact that Czechoslovakia andBulgaria had orthodox state socialist systems until 198990, while thepretransitional state socialist systems of Poland and Hungary are

better described as liberalizing authoritarian regimes. Thus, the latter two

countries could draw from a longer conceptual debate on administrativede-centralization and local self-government. The Solidarity trade unionmovement in Poland had traditionally emphasized local self-governmentas an important dimension of civil society and an instrument to builddemocracy (Benzler). Accordingly, in 1991 the National Assembly of Self-Governments proposed to dissolve the counties and transfer their powersto district and local self-governments.

Reform-socialist Hungarian incumbents and the countrys mainly

intellectual opposition circles had criticized the countys administrativetutelage over municipalities and agreed in the resolve to introduce strongdemocratic local self-governments (Pln Kovcs). This may explain whyHungary rearranged its regional-level institutions immediately after thepolitical transition and set up elected county self-governments in 1994.Hungary was much faster than Poland in implementing reforms becausethe successive Polish governments during the first years after the transi-tion lacked a stable parliamentary basis and were preoccupied to a larger

extent with consolidating their power.Another explanation for the differing progress of reforms refers to thetransition legacies constituted by the different paths of transition. Sincethe Polish transition was based upon negotiated power-sharing betweenSolidarity and the state socialist regime, the Solidarity-led governmenthad to confine itself to the re-establishment of local self-governments,refraining from a comprehensive reform of the county level (Benzler,322323; Illner). In Hungary, the early split of the opposition movement

in the course of the liberalization and transition supported a policycharacterized by compromise and incrementalism (Fowler; Navra-csics, 286287). The velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia provided the cit-izens movement of 1989 with the power and legitimacy to quickly abolishthe regional administrative levels, which were considered to be one of thestrongholds of the ancien regime (Illner; Malkov and Mihlikov;Vidlkov). Since Bulgaria experienced a delayed transition and the suc-cessor party of the former Communist Party managed to win the first

democratic parliamentary elections, the government could implementonly gradual and reluctant reforms, leaving the county level by and largeh d

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policy approachesthat is, sets of beliefs and ideas that legitimize polit-ical interests and link policy communities of parties, experts, and interestgroups. While advocates of a centralist approach strove to maintainand/or widen the central governments financial, legal, and political

control over regional and local activities, supporters of a localist modelaimed at increasing the autonomy of regional and local governments. Inthe early nineties, the parties emerging from the former dissident oppo-sition advocated localist policy approaches, whereas the successor partiesof the former state socialist parties were reluctant with regard to de-centralization. Since then, the composition of localist (centralist) policycoalitions has differed across countries and does not correspond to thefamiliar labels of conservative, liberal, and social democratic parties.

The delayed establishment of regional self-governments in the CzechRepublic can be explained by the centralist policy of the government ofVclav Klaus, ruling the Czech Republic and dominating its politicallife until 1997. The Klaus government argued that economic reformshould be treated as a priority and its implementation should thus not beimpeded by administrative rearrangements (Vidlkov). Its reluctance toshare powers with other actors and institutions was rooted in an eco-nomic interpretation of civil society. The Klaus government questioned

the legitimacy of any intermediary political institution between state andcitizen, including institutionally independent counties (Illner, 2526). Thisprincipal position was supported by the argument that only municipali-ties were legitimate units of territorial self-government at the subnationallevel. Higher-level self-governing entities should emerge from the vol-untary association of municipalities in a bottom-up process, not by theartificial creation of regional bodies from above. The centralist policyapproach of Klaus was also reflected in the opposition to reorganizing theCzechoslovak federation and to institutionalizing a co-operation betweenthe Visegrd countries.

The social democratic minority government of Miklos Zeman has beenmuch more positive towards de-centralization, and it introduced regionalself-governments in November 2000. The new Czech law on the self-administered county linked counties to the second chamber of the CzechParliament, insofar as it entitled the county assemblies to submit bills tothe Senate.

In Slovakia, the opposition between centralist and localist policyapproaches became one of the main dividing lines in the power strugglebetween the government of Vladimr Meciar and the opposition parties.



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aries largely regardless of the territorial units the municipalities hadchosen by forming regional associations.

After the opposition parties defeated Meciar in 1998, the new govern-ment declared de-centralization one of its main policy priorities and

has since embarked upon an ambitious, comprehensive administrativereform. To justify the need for de-centralization, the governments reformteam referred to the subsidiarity principle of the EU Treaty, interpretingit as a principle to structure Slovakias domestic administrative setup anda decisive criterion for the accession negotiations with the EU (Govern-ment Office of the Slovak Republic, 4). The reformers also envisaged anelement of a federal model by proposing to create a second chamber ofdelegates from the county assemblies. However, their concept was

rejected not only by Meciars party but also by parts of the governingcoalition, which managed to add centralizing amendments when the par-liament adopted the acts on the county self-governments and the elec-tions to county self-governments in July 2001 (Niznansky and Kling).

In Hungary, the broad localist coalition of the mid-1990s relieved thecounties from their state-administrative and supervisory function andconfined them to a mainly consultative role, transferring legal supervi-sory powers to the commissioners of the republic (Navracsics; Pln

Kovcs). When the liberal opposition parties won the municipal electionsof October 1990, the localist-centralist polarity re-emerged between localself-governments and the central government composed of conservativeand Christian Democratic parties. The government, faced with this powerconstellation, transformed the commissioner of the republic into a gov-ernmental control organ of local self-governments and other bodies ofstate administration (Navracsics, 286287). After 1994, the socialist-liberalcoalition government abolished the increasingly unpopular institution of

the commissioner and tried to strengthen the county by introducing itsdirect election and acknowledging it as a territorial self-government(terleti nkormnyzat). This county-based approach was justified interms of EU accession; but those aware of the shortcomings of the county-

based conception also appealed to Europe (Fowler, 34).The conservative government led by Viktor Orbn has comple-

mented this territorial-administrative structure by establishing statistical-planning regions on a mandatory basis and microregions of small

municipalities (kistrsgek). With its 1999 amendment to the 1996 Re-gional Development Law, the Orbn government leaned towards a moret li t h i it t th d th t ti f

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of powers (Instytut Spraw Publicznych). Some supporters of de-centralization even proposed taking steps towards a federal model bytransferring certain legislative competences to voivodship assembliesand transforming the Senate into a parliamentary chamber represent-

ing local self-governments. The Sejm majority rejected these proposalsand refrained from linking the Senate with the new counties.

According to the alternative, more centralist approach, voivodship self-governments should be restricted to tasks of regional development and aseparate tier of state administration should be maintained. While theparties emerging from the Solidarity movement advocated a more com-prehensive de-centralization, the postcommunist parties (the DemocraticLeft Alliance and the Polish Peasants Party) were reluctant to transfer

state powers to voivodships and did not undertake steps to create directlyelected voivodship self-governments during their period of government(Dawson; Regulski). The ensuing government, affiliated with the formerSolidarity, set the legislative basis of regional self-government. However,concerns of the major force in the governing coalition (Electoral ActionSolidarity) about a too far-reaching de-centralization induced the gov-ernment to reduce the powers of voivodship assemblies and to create 16new voivodships instead of the initially envisaged 12 voivodships.

The Bulgarian reform of public administration was dominated by acentralist policy approach, originating from the fact that the postsocialistBulgarian Socialist Party won the free parliamentary elections of 1990 and1994 and managed to stay in power until 1997, interrupted only by a briefopposition-led government in 199192 (Jepson). The opposition-led gov-ernments after 1997 were preoccupied with the deteriorating economiccrisis and did not show an inclination to transfer powers to regions thatran the risk of political disintegration and obstruction (Borissova). Inorder to retain its commitment to fiscal discipline, the Bulgarian govern-ment has also been very reluctant to provide municipalities with morebudgetary resources.

Historical and Ethnic Regionalism

Apart from the policy-related opposition between centralist and localistapproaches, the existenceor perceived threatof regionalist politicalmovements has been important for the political debates on regional-leveladministrative reforms. Theoretical and analytical conceptualizations ofregionalism are faced with the problem of delineating precise analytic



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ial unit, usually the territory inhabited by the group. Historic regionalismpresupposes a territory with a particular history distinct from the rest ofthe countrys territory. The current inhabitants of that region may not nec-essarily consider themselves ethnically different from other citizens, but

they link their identity to their regions history and articulate, throughparticular organizations, political demands related to their region.

Among the five countries studied here, only the Czech Republic andPoland are composed of subnational territorial units with a distincthistory, such as Moravia, Silesia, Pomerania, and Greater Poland. Onemay identify an eastern and a western historical region in Hungary(Hunnia and Pannonia), but these regions ceased to exist as distinct units

before a modern Hungarian nation-state was built in the course of the 19th

century.7After the political transition, political actors in the Czech Republic and

Poland tried to claim regional interests and demands by referring to thehistorical regions. A Moravian political movement proposed to structurethe Czech territory into the historical lands of Bohemia, Moravia andSilesia, but was subsequently marginalized and did not re-enter parlia-ment in 1996. In Poland, groups linked to the National Assembly of Self-Governments proposed the establishment of autonomous regions shaped

according to historical regions and the introduction of federalist elementsinto the state structure. However, they were rejected by the majority ofpolitical parties, which, reacting to these tendencies and perceivedrisks, reinforced the commitment to unitarism in Polands Constitution of1997.

A basis for ethnic regionalism exists in those Central and East Euro-pean countries that have a significant and politically active nationalminority.8 Among the countries of this study, Slovakia has an ethnic

Hungarian minority amounting to 10.8% of its population, and Bulgariahas an ethnic Turkish minority (9.4%). Only the ethnic Hungarian partiesof Slovakia in 2000 proposed to design the boundaries of a county insouthwestern Slovakia so as to coincide with the ethnic Hungariansettlement area, in continuity with their 1996 proposal to establish anautonomous region in that area (Brusis and Niznansky). Neither the 1996act on the administrative-territorial division nor the 2001 acts took intoaccount the ethnic Hungarian proposals. The ethnic Turkish community

in Bulgaria, which constitutes local majorities in the counties of Haskovoand Rousse and articulates its interests through the Movement of Rightsd F d h f t d l d i il t f t it i l

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Romania, which has a particular historical region (Transylvania) and a

significant ethnic Hungarian minority, and Latvia, with the distinct his-torical region of Latgale and a considerable ethnic Russian community.One may argue for the addition of Poland, with its ethnic German minor-ity in Silesia, but this group amounts only to approximately 0.8% of thepopulation and its representatives have not exerted a significant politicalinfluence on the outcomes of the mesolevel reform.

The incongruence of regionalisms has impeded and prevented themobilization of support for regionalist claims. Political actors have found

it difficult to legitimize an ethnically based regional autonomy with his-toric reasons or to base claims derived from the historical distinctivenessof a region upon a distinct ethnic identity of its inhabitants.9 Governmentshave neither needed to respect regionalist interests nor been inclined tosupport regionalist mobilization by designing regional units accordingly.As a consequence, up to now, county territories in the countries of thisstudy have been designed neither according to historic regions nor withrespect to ethnic affiliations. The disinclination towards triggering region-alist dynamics induced a parliamentary majority in Slovakia to make theentry of force of county regulations contingent upon prior governmentapproval. For similar reasons, Polish and Czech governments refrainedfrom linking the reform of their second parliamentary chambers to thecreation of regional self-governments.

CONCLUSION

This article has described major similarities and differences in the reformsof regional administration implemented by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. It has related reform trajectories and out-


TABLE 2Ethnic and Historic Preconditions of Regionalism

Historic Regions since No Modern TraditionNineteenth Century of Regions

State with significant national Romania, Latvia Bulgaria, Estonia,minorities (>10%) Slovakia, Lithuania

Homogenous nation-state Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia(minorities


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advice on how to structure the state territory, whether to establishelected regional self-governments, and how to institutionalize NUTS-2-compatible regions. This restraint is guided by the principle that suchquestions belong to the internal affairs of EU member states and that

there is no basis for an EU intervention in the treaties.On the other hand, the Commission has, inter alia through its progress

reports, conveyed an EU preference for democratically elected regionalself-governments with substantial financial and legal autonomy. Thispreference may be explained by the EUs encompassing political com-mitment to democratic stability and the rule of law in the CEEC expressedin the Copenhagen criteria for membership. An additional argument foran active promotion of regionalization can be derived from the partner-

ship principle guiding the management of EU Structural Funds. Tobecome credible partners representing regional interests in programdevelopment and implementation, regional authorities need to have anautonomous standing. This rationale is fused with the rationale to set upNUTS-2 regionsthat is, regions sufficiently large for generating endoge-nous development and comparable across Europein order to qualify aseligible areas for objective-1 support from the Structural Funds.

The EU, the accession constellation, and the Commissions interest in

regional self-governments with a substantial fiscal and legal autonomyhave provided an additional rationale and an incentive structure forCzech and Slovak governments to re-create regional self-governments.The Hungarian government has used the EU context as a rationale tofurther institutionalize pre-existing macroregions and regional develop-ment councils. However, mesolevel reforms in the Czech Republic,Slovakia, and Poland, as well as the less far-reaching reforms in Bulgariaand Hungary, were mainly driven by an interest in public-sector reform

that is, to link local self-governments and central government on the onehand and self-government and state administration on the other. Bulgariahas not created regional self-governments, not because of a different EUpolicy with respect to second-wave entrants but because Bulgarian publicadministration has been shaped by a centralist legacy and the dominanceof centralist policy approaches. In the Czech Republic, Poland, andSlovakia, governments refrained from implementing more far-reachingproposals of regionalization or federalization to avoid initiating any

regionalist dynamics.The adoption of legislation on new counties in Bulgaria, the CzechR bli d Sl ki i 2000 d 2001 h b t d b th EU

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gles and a stronger politicization of the issues in Poland delayed theagreement on a new administrative setup.

Advocates of regional self-government and an institutionalization ofregions in the accession countries have referred to rationales, European

trends, and (perceived) EU expectations of regionalization. However, thepoint is that arguments referring to an EU-induced need for regionaliza-tion cut across the main policy cleavage of centralism-localism andhave been used not only by political actors arguing for a greater de-centralization of state tasks, but also by actors supporting, for example,a reintegration of local self-governments.

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia havecreated statistical and planning regions that correspond to the NUTS

classification used in the EU. The creation of these units is a mandatoryrequirement for EU accession. However, the extent to which NUTS-2regions are institutionalized differs strongly between the countriesstudied here. The weak position of NUTS-2-level institutions in all coun-tries except Poland indicates that they constitute artificial elements in thetraditional (and re-created) territorial-administrative structure. The diver-gence of institutional arrangements also shows that the EU Commissiondid not seek to homogenize the status of these envisaged partnership

institutions for the Structural Funds.It remains to be seen whether NUTS-2 regions in the accession coun-tries will subsequently become further institutionalized, proving func-tional in enabling endogenous development and an economic catch-upprocess with the current EU member states. So far, the EU influence in thepreaccession constellation resembles the indirect impact the EU and theeconomic and political integration process have had on the re-emergenceof regions in Western Europe. The Commission and the preaccessionframework have become catalysts for a process in which most Centraland Eastern European regions have already enhanced and will furtherincrease their political salience. However, a process of institutional con-vergence has been discernible only with respect to the adoption of theformally codified components of the acquis communautaire. Regionaladministrative structures vary in detail and the re-creation of these struc-tures has been strongly influenced by a combination of domestic legacies,policy approaches, and political constellations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS



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referees of Governance, Vesselin Dimitrov, Claus Giering, Klaus Goetz,Heather Grabbe, Wim van Meurs, Hellmut Wollmann, and RadoslawZubek for their valuable comments and information.

NOTES

1. Apart from the Czech Republic and Poland, Romania and Slovenia are theonly states in Central and Eastern Europe that have second chambers intheir parliaments. While the Romanian Senate represents the regions, theSlovenian Senate is an institution of functional-interest representation, withrepresentatives from employees and employers associations and otherorganizations of civil society (Ziemer 1996).

2. The territories of EU member states are divided into five statistical units

according to the so-called Nomenclature des Units Territoriales Statis-tiques (NUTS). For example, the German Bundeslnder belong to NUTS-1and the Regierungsbezirke constitute NUTS-2. This classification is not stip-ulated in European Community law, but it is used in the regulation of theStructural Funds and by the Statistical Office of the European Communities(Eurostat).

3. These problems are known in Western Europe, where unitary memberstates have also had difficulties in integrating NUTS-2 regions into theirterritorial-administrative setups. The United Kingdom, Portugal, Sweden,and Greece have established NUTS-2 regions mainly for the purpose of par-

ticipating in EU structural policy (Bullmann, Goldsmith, and Page 1997, 135;Hooghe and Keating 1996, 224). Ireland, Denmark, and Luxemburg havenot created NUTS-2 levels because Irelands entire territory was qualifiedas an objective-1 area and the other two countries lack eligible areas.

4. The Commission also tried to reconcile regional development and nationalcatch-up objectives: Where a whole country is eligible under Objective 1,however, the Structural Funds need to contribute to the development andstructural adjustment of the whole national economy, though addressing atthe same time regional disparities within the country (European Commis-sion 2001a, 4).

5. These policy messages are not only ambiguously formulated, but also mis-understood in the accession countries. In an internal document summariz-ing the experiences of twinning projects in the field of cohesion policy, theCommission (2001b) noted a widespread misunderstanding in the accessioncountries, according to which the eligibility for Structural Funds woulddepend on a de-centralization of political and administrative structures.

6. Note that the original dualist model of the municipal statutory law (Reichs-gemeindegesetz) was inspired by ideas of enlightened authoritarianism andsubsidiarity: The participation of citizens in state administration, corre-sponding to the participation in the legislation of the constitutional state, isnot the principle dominating the self-administration of Austria. Rather, self-administration rests on the principle of a maximum separation of tasks and

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10% of the population are considered significant. The following figures aretaken from the census data quoted in Brunners book.

9. This linkage is weaker in Latvia than in Romania, because most of todaysethnic Russians were settled in the country after Latgale had lost its regionaldistinctiveness, and nowadays the ethnic Russian community is spreadthroughout the country, mostly living in cities.

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Documents

Brusis, Between EU Requirements