Policy Sciences 25: 295-331, 1992. �9 1992 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Science and social responsibility*

RONALD D. BRUNNER 1 & WILLIAM ASCHER 2 1Center for Public Policy Research, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, U.S.A.; 2Sanford Institute of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, U.S.A.

Abstract. Science in the aggregate has not lived up to its promise to work for the benefit of society as a whole. This problem stems from the narrow perspectives that basic and applied researchers typically take to their work. Among the barriers to broadening those perspectives, the most tractable is the myth that the overriding purpose of science in human affairs is predic- tion; that such predictions are prerequisites for major policy decisions; and that scientific inputs to these decisions are objective and value-free. This article challenges the myth from three standpoints - epistemology, the historical context, and contemporary case studies - as a step toward improving the responsibility and accountability of science to society.

Introduction

Consider an important but little-noted paradox: On the one hand, science has flourished over recent decades. Between 1961 and 1988, national research and development expenditures of the five major industrial powers more than tripled in constant dollars. 1 In the United States, federal funding for basic and applied research (excluding development) increased from about S 8 billion in 1960 to $21 billion in 1990. 2 Total spending for reseach and development, public and private, reached S152 billion in 1991, or about 2.7% of gross national product (National Science Board, 1991:89). On the other hand, over the same time period, standards of income, education, housing, health care, protection from time, and family integrity have been declining in the lower class and increasingly the middle class in the United States. Moreover, 'If we look at the world as a whole, it is not at all clear that advances in science and technology have translated into sustainable advances in quality of life for the majority of the human race' (Brown, 1992).

This is a paradox for all who share the expectation that 'Research provides extraordinary benefits to society through the creation of new knowledge and the training of scientists and engineers' (OTA, 1991: 3). Such expectations are based in part on a social contract worked out between representatives of the public and publicly-supported researchers in the United States after World War II.

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium on 'New Paradigms for Managing Post-Industrial Societies' at the meetings of the International Society for the Systems Sciences, Denver, Colorado, July 14, 1992.

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This social contact implied that in return for the privilege of receiving Federal support, the researcher was obligated to produce and share knowl- edge freely to benefit - in mostly unspecified and long-term ways - the public good. (OTA, 1991: 4)

Such expectations are reinforced if not inflated when specific proposals to invest in science or science-based technology are justified by some concep- tion of the public good. For example, the public has been led to expect nu- clear power too cheap to meter, the winning weapon in the cold war, a cure for cancer? Failure to meet such expectations fosters the suspicion that public justifications for additional investments are means of exploiting the public on behalf of special scientific interests.

The problem is that science in the aggregate has not lived up to its promise to work for the benefit of society as a whole. This is not to deny the achieve- ments or the potential of science to improve the human condition, as manifest in the quality of life already enjoyed by many in modern societies. Nor is this to say that science is solely responsible for social and policy outcomes that are also shaped by public officials, among many others. But is appropriate to hold science responsible for the public expectations that science creates, and much depends upon it: Over the long term, continued support for science will be jeopardized to the extent that science serves scientists and their political allies at the expense of the general public. More importantly, the sustainability and progressive evolution of modem society may depend upon better scien- tific insights into the complex policy problems of our time.

Possible improvements in the social responsibility of science depend upon diagnoses of the problem. We believe the problem is a symptom of the narrow perspectives that basic and applied researchers in the physical, natural, and social sciences typically bring to their work. Scientists tend to become pre- occupied with increasingly specialized research problems and with small cir- cles of sponsors, colleagues, and rivals. However, what appears to be reason- able, perhaps necessary, to fund, conduct, and publish the research, and to sustain research programs, may be unreasonable if the broader social con- sequences of the research are taken into account. The broader social con- sequences of scientific research are seldom taken into account, however, even though many scientists are quite sincerely concerned about them.

One barrier to broadening perspectives is a positivist myth about the role of science in socie ty . 4 Those who accept and use this myth, wittingly or unwit- tingly, tend to presume that:

1. The overriding purpose of science is prediction with precision, scope, and accuracy, including prediction of the consequences of policy alter- natives.

2. Such science-based predictions are prerequisites to major policy deci- sions intended to ameliorate or solve the problems of society.

3. Scientists are different from others who participate in these decisions because their scientific input is objective and value-free.

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The myth arose from spectacular achievements in the mastery of nature through science-based technology, but has been generalized to problems of society that are much less technical and much more complex: People have asked, for example, if we can put a man on the Moon, why can't we solve the problems of the ghetto? The effect of the myth is not only to justify new investments in science and science-based technology, but also to obscure the actual consequences of those investments in over-generalized faith that the public will benefit. 5

Another barrier to broadening perspectives is the lack of institutions designed to bring the actual social consequences of science to the attention of scientists and the public. For example, the National Science Board (1991) publishes indicators of the state of science and engineering, but not indicators of the state of society as affected by science and engineering. Similarly, under the professional norms of the scientific disciplines, individual scientists are evaluated according to the number of publications, citations, and other indi- cators of their contributions to science, but not according to their contribu- tions to society.

Perhaps the most fundamental barrier to broadening perspectives is the increasing specialization of expertise, a structural characteristic of modern society affecting science as well as other professions. 6 Typically, as people acquire enough professional expertise to raise questions of social responsibil- ity, they also acquire a professional interest in suppressing those questions. The public and the elected representatives of the public typically lack the expertise necessary to pursue such questions; hence there is little they can do in the absence of disagreements among the relevant experts. Margot O'Toole, the famous scientific whistleblower, recently observed that, 'all professions are conspiracies against the laity' (Anon., 1992). Much will depend on the exceptional professionals who are motivated and able to serve the public good through their professional activities.

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the pervasive myth about the role of science with respect to the complex policy problems of society, as a first step toward improving the social responsibility of science. The myth is a mat- ter of perspective and therefore more tractable than the second and the third barriers, which are institutional and structural, respectively. Furthermore, any improvements in the social responsibility of science, like any reform, will arise from challenges to conventional perspectives and the circulation of alterna- tive perspectives. The perspective taken here is that of the policy sciences, an approach to theory and practice that was crystallized by Harold D. Lasswell about a half century ago. 7 The successful diffusion of more realistic and worthwhile perspectives on science in society will provide the basis for sur- mounting the other barriers.

The main sections of this paper critique the pervasive myth from three dif- ferent standpoints. The first is epistemological, emphasizing what science can and cannot know about society and its complex policy problems. The second is extensive, reviewing science in political and social context in the modern

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era. The third is intensive, focusing on contemporary cases involving science and science-based technology in different policy processes. The conclusion suggests what those who are concerned about the social responsibility of science might do, individually and collectively, to become more responsible to science and to society.

1. Epistemology

The positivist myth about the role of science in society can be challenged by making a distinction between objects in nature and living forms. So far as we know, the 'behavior' of planets in orbit, falling apples, or swinging pendulums is determined by external forces. In contrast, the behavior of living organisms is selective according to predispositions, instinctive or acquired, that modify and differentiate responses to the external environment. This distinction has a bearing on the limits and the potential of science with respect to the complex policy problems of society, in which people are both the primary actors and the primary objects of concern.

Logical and empirical foundations

In the policy sciences, the selective characteristic of behavior is described by the maximization postulate. The postulate

... holds that living forms are predisposed to complete acts in ways that are perceived to leave the actor better off than if he had completed them differ- ently. The postulate draws attention to the actor's own perception of the alternative act completions open to him in a given situation. 8

The maximization postulate is in fact a postulate, a logical point of departure for empirical inquiry, rather than a testable theory. 9 The postulate directs attention to observations of acts, and is used to infer the predispositions in terms of which the acts 'made sense' to the actor in question. What those pre- dispositions may be in any situation is a matter of empirical inquiry, not a priori stipulation. Such observations and inferences are the basis for con- structing specific theories of how the actor might act and interact with others in various situations, as well as more general theories of political and social process.

The most fundamental empirical proposition consistent with the maximi- zation postulate is that a significant difference exists between 'the world out- side and the pictures in our heads. '1~ We act on the pictures in our heads, but the consequences of those acts in the world outside may turn out to be quite different from the consequences that were expected or preferred when action was taken. Differences between intended and actual consequences indicate

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that people are boundedly, rather than objectively, rational. The principle of bounded rationality holds that

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solu- tion is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world - or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. (Simon, 1957: 198)

In other words, no mortal or machine has the God-like omniscience that would be necessary to specify all the alternatives relevant to a complex prob- lem, all the consequences of those alternatives, and all the preferences for evaluating those consequences - and then to integrate all these considera- tions into a decision that is objectively rational. Even a problem as well- defined and well-bounded as winning a chess game defies a complete solution in practice. Without significant differences between 'the world outside and the picture in our heads,' there would be no need for theorizing (scientific or otherwise) to improve the rationality of decisions) 1

Moreover, without differences among the pictures in our heads (and the possibility of changing them), there would be no practical need for politics in the narrow sense - that is to say, propaganda and other promotional activities to coordinate perspectives and behavior on behalf of collective interests. The partial reconciliation of differences is necessary for sustainability at various scales of organization. A society must reconcile differences among the spe- cialized groups that arise in response to unmet needs or opportunities in the division of labor. A group must reconcile the differences among its members; such differences exist because socialization into the distinctive preferences and expectations of any group (family, interest, class, or cultural) is incom- plete. A personality must reconcile the differences among the groups identi- fied with the primary self; such differences exist because of the primary self identifies with many groups through the normal process of socialization. For example, a scientist loyal to science may insist on truth and openness in the lab, but also tolerate exaggeration as a politician lobbying on behalf of the lab, and withhold scientific information as a stockholder concerned about patents or as a patriot concerned about national security.

Evolutionary dynamics

If it is true that everyone's perspective falls short of God-like omniscience in ways that are not entirely shared, then every interaction is a matter of trial and error in some degree. One cannot be certain about the payoffs, even if one has strong expectations and preferences based on previous experience. Hence the dynamics of behavior are evolutionary.

The relatively successful trials, which leave people satisfied that they are

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better off, tend to be reinforced. This is most apparent in the routines we develop to cope with the mundane chores of daily life, like getting to the office or the lab each workday. More importantly, reinforcement over a pe- riod of time may stabilize patterns of perspective and behavior as practices that are characteristic of a personality or of a group. For example, every group tends to evolve procedural and substantive norms that are expected to be observed if not enforced among its members; and every personality tends to develop a general propensity (weak or strong) to conform to such norms. Stabilizing a practice is economical with respect to time and attention, in addition to any other payoffs that may sustain it. For example, socialization into a general consensus on the fundamental aims, methods, and exemplars of science - approximately what Kuhn (1970) called a paradigm - allows scien- tists to take the consensus for granted. This frees up time and attention for specific issues of normal science, and facilitates resolution of those issues so long as everyone attempts to justify their particular positions through appeals to the general consensus.

On the other hand, the relatively unsuccessful trials leave people dissatis- fied and therefore predisposed to search for better alternatives. For example, sheer boredom, construction, or a transit strike may make the normal route to the lab unsatisfactory and motivate the search for an alternative route. Simi- larly, competition, a scientific breakthrough, or the cumulation of anomalous results may disrupt the routine of normal science in the lab and precipitate a crisis. A crisis is a sign that practices are maladapted to circumstances; how it is resolved depends, in general, on the flexibility of the circumstances, the practices, or both. For example, a crisis of anomalous results may be resolved by modifications in the experiment or by modification of the paradigm under which the results were interpreted. Otherwise, if there is little flexibility, the stage is set for a revolutionary crisis in which consensus on the paradigm is no longer taken for granted and eventually breaks down. Resolution comes with the displacement of one paradigm (and those who espoused it) by another.

The history of science, politics, religion, and other fields of human endeav- or can be summarized as the transition from one fundamental consensus to the next. 12 Specific claims of scientific truth, like claims of political or divine authority, are contingent upon a fundamental consensus that is constructed by people and subject to change by people. The fundamental consensus, in turn, is necessary to adjudicate competing claims. For this purpose, it must be so generalized that it is accepted primarily as a matter of faith, not reason. 'The modern positivist is a man of faith as much as the medieval mystic' according to the historian White (1971: 95). These fundamentals of social process were summed up rather well by the anthropologist Sapir (1934: 495): 'Thus individual and society, in a never ending interplay of symbolic gestures, build up the pyramidal structure called civilization. In this structure, very few bricks touch the ground.'

Three points are worth emphasizing in the evolutionary dynamics that fol- low from the basic empirical proposition that everyone's perspective falls

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short of omniscience in somewhat idiosyncratic ways. First, human behavior is not completely determined by the forces of nature nor perfectly regulated by the norms we construct, observe, and modify as individuals and in groups. Second, other things being equal, the range of significant choice increases with crisis, which weakens faith in the old practices and strengthens recep- tivity to the new. Third, during crisis, leadership by the few can make the most difference, for better or for worse, by reshaping the perspectives and behavior of the many. Advice from scientists and other experts can be most influential under these circumstances.

Implications

Bounded rationality and the evolutionary dynamics of individual and collec- tive behavior are bases for challenging the presumptions of the positivist myth about science in society. On these bases, we contend that there are intrinsic limits on the predictability of human behavior; that science is not necessary for major policy decisions; and that scientists cannot be entirely objective in the decision process.

Faith that science can predict human behavior with precision, scope, and accuracy stems from a false analogy. That fact that scientists can predict the orbit of a planet, the statistical properties of a cloud of gas, or the 'behavior' of other objects in nature, does not mean that we can predict the behavior of human beings with comparable results. The latter have internal points of view that mediate and differentiate their responses to the environment; the former do not. The occasional accurate prediction of human behavior can be attri- buted to the regularities in behavior that people create for themselves, indi- vidually or collectively. However, these regularities are contingent upon cer- tain predispositions and factors in the environment. Hence the accuracy of predictions can be expected to decay as a function of the time: The longer the time horizon, the more things can and probably will happen to modify the predispositions and environmental factors that sustain behavioral regularities. In fact, the record shows that the strongest correlate of the accuracy of policy- relevant forecasts is the time horizon of the forecast: The longer the time hori- zon, the less accurate the forecast (Ascher, 1978). The record also shows no aggregate improvement in the accuracy of policy-relevant forecasts since the early 1950s, which predates the widespread use of computers to build com- plex forecasting models. There are intrinsic limits on the ability of science to predict human behavior. 13

Faith that science is a prerequisite for major policy decisions is similarly misplaced. The fact that scientists and engineers needed Newton's laws of motion to land a man on the moon does not mean that we must wait for func- tionally-equivalent laws to make reasonable policy decisions on behalf of all other goals. James Watt did not wait for the laws of therrnodynamics before improving the steam engine as a means of pumping water from mines; yet a

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long series of experiments with heat engines, among other things, sub- sequently helped scientists crystallize the second law of thermodynamics which has been useful in improving many devices. The barons who forced King John to sign Magna Carta in 1215 did not wait for an empirical theory of democracy before exercising their feudal right of defiance; yet their act contributed significantly to the theory and practice of democracy, which is still evolving through trial and error. The historian Lynn White Jr. (1971: 163) cautions that it is not historically justified 'to assume a hierarchy of values which puts practical achievements lower than theoretical....' Practical achievements do not necessarily depend upon a deep or comprehensive theo- retical understanding of the underlying principles involved. 14

Scientific principles are nevertheless useful, if available, as one input to rea- sonable policy decisions. For example, Keynes (1965) understood that cycles of unemployment were not merely frictions in the smooth adjustment of a market economy. This creative insight provided a scientific basis for signifi- cant improvements in fiscal policy decisions to reduce the unemployment of economic resources. But predicting the consequences of such decisions for employment is complicated by uncertainties about the diverse perspectives of the millions who will respond directly or indirectly to the decisions. Such decisions are further complicated by other policy goals, including currency stability and deficit reduction, that are also affected in ways that are not en- tirely predictable. Such decisions are still further complicated by the continu- ing evolution of the economy, which means that both the context and the con- sequences of action may differ significantly from one fiscal policy decision to the next. Finally, the different perspectives on what can and should be done in any given fiscal policy context need to be reconciled through politics. For these reasons, there is no single or optimal scientific solution to a complex policy problem, although some solutions will be better than others.

Finally, faith in the objectivity of scientists in decision processes is partially misplaced. The fact that most scientists strive to be objective in their research (because the results are expected to be replicable, if for no other reason) does not mean that they can be entirely objective, especially in applied research on complex policy problems. Scientists, like everyone else, are less than omnis- cient but nevertheless make choices among the perceived alternatives accord- ing to their own expectations and value preferences. Hence their choices can- not be objectively rational with respect to the real situation, nor can their choices be independent of their own limited points of view. As a study of risk analysis concluded, 'objectivity should always be an aspiration, but can never be an achievement of science. When public and experts disagree, it is a clash between sets of differently informed opinions' (Fischhoff et al., 1984: 125). Moreover, the expectations and preferences entailed in a choice of one alter- native and another need not be scientific. They may reflect the scientist's interest as lobbyist, shareholder, or citizen, for example, or simply the scien- fist's personal interest in advancing a career. Scientists have interests that go beyond science and scientific objectivity.

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In summary, science has succeeded in clarifying underlying principles for the mastery of nature, and science-based technology has succeeded in apply- ing such principles to the solution of technical problems - those problems for which the means are largely understood and the objectives are not in dispute. However, faith arising from such successes is misplaced when generalized to the complex policy problems of society. In particular, faith in the predictions, the necessity, and the objectivity of science is misleading when the perspec- tives of human beings - and therefore uncertainties, ambiguities, and political differences - are taken into account. Reducing complex policy problems to mere technical or scientifc problems tends to enhance the political position of scientists and to inflate public expectations about what science can do for society. At the extreme, the positivist myth supports the idea that the behavior of human beings, like inanimate objects, should be uniform, predictable, and controllable under the impersonal laws of nature that scientists understand better than anyone else.

2. Sc ience in context

The positivist myth can also be challenged by reconsidering me roles of sci- ence and scientists in the world revolution of our time and in the inner work- ings of contemporary political institutions. Analysis suggests that scientists have been gaining political power at an increasing rate over the last century of the modern era, and that the social purposes actually served by science in the aggregate are far from neutral or objective or unquestionably benign. In short, the social responsibility of science is a long-term structral problem that has become more serious in the late modern era. The policy sciences, as Lasswell conceived them, are a response to the problem and a direct challenge to the main presumptions of the positivist myth.

The world revolution of our time

In the simples terms, a world revolution is the most significant change in the composition and justifying myth of the ruling elite. Historically, world revolu- tions have been associated with an eruptive center. For example, the revolu- tion in Paris, 1789, marked the decline of the aristocracy and the rise of the bourgeoisie who justified their ascendancy in terms of human dignity for all. Similarly, the revolution in Moscow, 1917, marked the ascendancy of the Communist elite who, in the name of the working class and on behalf of uni- versal socialism, liquidated the ancient landed and growing business classes. Each revolution reshaped world politics as its distinctive myth and techniques diffused from the eruptive center, but neither realized its aspirations to unify the world in a single political order.

In 1935, when the threat of monolithic world Communism was still taken

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seriously in the West, Lasswell anticipated that the Soviet model would be dif- ferentiated into various models as it spread from Moscow, and that world unity under Communist rule was highly improbable (Lasswell, 1965a: v). Parochial identifications with nations, classes, and other groups in world politics were still too strong, and were likely to be reinforced through the self- reference effect: The Soviet model would stimulate non-Russian, non-pro- letariat, and other counter-identifications around the world, just as the French Revolution had stimulated the rise of nationalism in Europe. Thus, while some groups would accept the Soviet model as advantageous from their paro- chial perspectives, others would adapt it selectively according to their particu- lar interests, and still others would resist it altogether as a threat. If monolithic world Communism directed from Moscow was highly improbable, what might be the next world revolution?

Lasswell considered the possibility that the major powers in the world arena, subject alike to modern material conditions, might move toward internal homogeneity. 'If so, the pattern of homogeneity is the true world revolution of our time' (Lasswell, 1965a: v). He concluded the main possibil- ity was

... the probable shift of the dialectic of [world] development from the class struggle to the skill struggle. Centralized and collectivized states, or semi- socialized states would be dominated by the rival power demands of specialists upon the management of violence, propaganda, goods, and ser- vices. Intellectuals would appear in every coalition and make articulate the sub-myth of every ally (Lasswell, 1965a: vi).

In other words, Lasswell foresaw movement toward a skill revolution, which was not associated with any specific eruptive center but was characteristic of the modern epoch generally. A skill group is defined by the exercise of any distinctive operation that can be learned or taught, such as the manipulation of symbols (censorship and propaganda), goods and services, or violence. The middle-income class would become more fragmented into different skill groups, and the differences among skill groups would become more signifi- cant for politics than their similarities with respect to income.

Over the next three decades, Lasswell introduced several other develop- mental constructs as specialized versions of the skill revolution: The garrison state construct, the unnamed revolution, and the unspeakable revolution, which we shall consider in t u r n . 15 A developmental construct is a tentative interpretation of the transition from the last world revolution to the next. It is not a prediction but a guide to the selection and timing of policy research, basic and applied, in the broadest context.

The garrison state construct was introduced in 1937, amidst the Sino- Japanese crisis and other crises of insecurity that led to world war (Lasswell, 1937). A discussion four years later considered more fully

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the possibility that we are moving toward a world of 'garisson states' - a world in which the specialists on violence are the most powerful group i n society. From this point of view the trend of our time is away from the spe- cialist on bargaining, who is the businessman, and toward the supremacy of the soldier (Lasswell, 1941: 455.).

The supremacy of the soldier would be driven primarily by the expectation of violence at home and abroad. When people expect that differences will be resolved by violence, they tend to subordinate all other concerns to fighting effectiveness and defer to the relevant experts, the policy and the miltary. Persistent crises of insecurity could eventually consolidate their power into garrison-police states. The construct allowed for transitional a n d mixed forms, in which major decisions were made by or shared with other special- ists, such as party propagandists and the organization men of the party. What was new was not a military state dominanted by traditional officers, but the possibility of 'a military state combined with modem technology' (Lasswell, 1941: 457) in which the military men would acquire the skills of modern ci- vilian management. Two decades later, Lasswell (1962: 67) wrote that 'the garrison hypothesis [still] provides a probable image of the past and future of our epoch,'

The unnamed revolution was introduced in 1965 (Lasswell, 1965b: 80-94). Alternatively described as 'the permanent revolution of modernizing intellec- tuals,' it was called the unnamed revolution to emphasize its tentative char- acter and perhaps to underscore the fact that intellectuals themselves were not fully conscious of a distinct identity. In this construct,

The major transformation is the decline of the businessmen (and of earlier social formations) and the rise of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals to effective power. In comparatively nonindustrialized countries the principal ideologies ... are chiefly 'national,' 'socialist,' pro-'modernization,' and pro- 'industrialization? In relatively advanced countries the principal ideology accepts a permanent revolution of scientific and technological change (Lasswell, 1965b: 85).

It was unclear whethe this revolution would be progressive from the stand- point of human dignity. But it was rather clear that 'The science-based tech- nology of Western European civilization is moving toward universality' (Lass- well, 1970: 117).

Lasswell attributed the original formulation of this interpretation of history to a Polish Marxist, Waclaw Machajski. Machajski scandalized some revolu- tionaries and inspired others in the years before the Bolsheviks seized power in the name of the working class.

Machajski suggested that the most important development of our epoch is the rise to power, not of the working class as a whole, but rather of the

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intellectual worker, whose capital is his knowledge. Relying on the superi- ority of his knowledge, the intellectual wins the support of the manual workers, whom he exploits mainly for his own benefit (Lasswell, 1965b: 29).

Other images of the intellectuals (or symbol specialists) in political positions include the philosopher-king of Plato, the Confucian scholar of China, the bureaucrats of the modern state, and the scientists and engineers who have achieved more prominence in Western European civilization than in previous ones. The rise of the intellectuals would be driven by the increasing speciali- zation and fragmentation of society. Under modern conditions, decision makers need more assistance to evaluate the policy significance of specialized knowledge; and each new specialization in the modern division of labor gen- erates a subgroup of modernizing intellectuals to assist in that task. Moreover, symbol specialists are increasingly needed to justify group demands to the broader society as society becomes increasingly fragmented? 6

The unspeakable revolution was also introduced in 1965, although some of the basic ideas appeared in prim as early as 1956.17 This construct was sug- gested by a disturbing precedent, the racist ideology of Nazi Germany, which restricted the doctrine of universal human rights to ~kryans? The concern was that intelligent but non-human forms - functional equivalents of races in human history - might be created or encountered through the technology of the most scientifically-advanced powers. What are the possible forms of 'transhumanity'?

Among the relevant factors to be assessed is the future of computers .... The question is whether they will be constructed in ways that prevent them from constituting a superior caste that relegates man to a subordinate role.

In a world of contingency it is inappropriate to overlook the future of bio- logical research and the development of new and possibly superior species of life ... .

We are on the verge of astropolitics, and we perceive even now that the elites of the Earth may encounter higher forms of fife in space (Lasswell, 1965b: 95).

Before these possibilities are dismissed as science fiction, recall that super- power rivalries led to the landing of men on the Moon two decades ago and that a 10-year, S 100 million Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) is underway (Kerr, 1992); that DNA from one species is routinely spliced into others as work proceeds on mapping the human genome (Kevles and Hood, 1992); and that attempts to mimic the more sophisticated capabilities of the human mind include Japan's Real-World Computing Program, successor to the Fifth Generation project, and the U.S. High Performance Computing and

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Communication project (Pollack, 1992). The issue is not whether humans will create or encounter transhumanity, but whether we should consider the pos- sibility.

Contact with transhumanity could subordinate the political divisions of human history to political divisions among intelligent beings of different forms (including humans). This would mark the reemergence of racism - or the emergence of racism in a new form - as the basis of world or astro poli- tics. It would also open up new policy questions. For example, should the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights be extended to intel- ligent but non-human forms? 'The unspeakable revolution' is a label intended to suggest 'the disturbing consequences that follow if man's knowledge con- tinues to be poorly translated into policies that harmonize with his professed aspirations' (Lasswell, 1965b: 96). For present purposes, it is also a vivid and shocking image of how serious the problem of social responsibility could become under a de facto 'policy' of blind faith in science and technology.

Political institutions

To understand science in the inner workings of contemporary political insti- tutions, it is worthwhile to recall how modern science-based technology spawns increasing numbers of specialized skill groups that combine and com- pete for political power. The basic process has been well-understood for at least a half century:

Thousands of technical operations have sprung into existence where a fdw hundred were found before. To complicate the material environment in this way is to multiply the foci of attention of those who live in our society. Diversified loci of attention breed differences in outlook, preference, and loyalty. The labyrinth of specialized 'material' environments generates pro- found ideological divergences that cannot be abolished, though they can be mitigated, by the methods now available to leaders in our society (Lasswell, 1941: 458).

For example, science-based technology transformed traditional agriculture into many specialized occupations and, at the same time, oPened up many new occupations in manufacturing and services for displaced agricultural workers. Modernization continues to uproot millions but seldom nurtures social and cultural roots as strong as those of tradition. This contributes to alienation, a relatively recent phenomenon in human history, and to perma- nently-high levels of tension and discontent withfia the general public.

Modernization thus leaves intellectuals in a position to exploit public ten- sions and discontents in order to defend or advance the interests of more and more specializations. Meanwhile, the knowledge critical to modern society becomes more specialized and less widely shared. Hence non-specialists are

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increasingly disadvantaged because they lack the requisite knowledge of more and more specializations - even when they depend on that knowledge and insist on its socially-responsible use. Specialists can more readily exploit their knowledge to gain political power or anything else they value for themselves or others.

The result is the widespread expectation that 'knowledge pays' (Lasswell, 1970: 119), whatever the value frame of reference, and everyone who shares the expectation adapts accordingly. On the demand side, decision makers tend to support research and education on the expectation that knowledge is instrumental to national defense, economic competitiveness, public health, or merely to political advantage on policy issues. Political advantage was a sig- nificant motivation in the diffusion of knowledge and skills in policy analysis from the Department of Defense in the early 1960s to other federal agencies, the Congress, and eventually to the states and localities. TM By the mid-1980s, as the former director of the Congressional Budget Office observed,

the principal decision-makers at the top of the federal government no longer go to meetings unarmed. Assistant secretaries never show up just to state their views. They bring a study, perhaps several, to support their posi- tions. And on the floor of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the same is true. No debate on any serious issue.., takes place without some- body citing a public policy study (Rivlin, 1984: 18-19).

President Bush (1992: 1349) put the point in an international context when he affirmed his support for the Superconducting SuperCollider: '...in an age when knowledge is king, we want America to wear the crown,'

On the supply side, research and educational institutions expand to meet the demand for specialized knowledge and specialists, and in the process recruit a larger proportion of people who share the expectation of the con- ventionai culture that knowledge is instrumental to other values.

Those who, in effect, 'have skill, will move' make themselves understood and available to the demand of decisions makers at every level. These are the mid-elite and rank and file of science and scholarship. From them are recruited the thousands who cement the interdependence of science and the established structures of society (Lasswell, 1970: 118).

There are exceptions, however: A relatively small and highly-respected scien- tific elite comprised of those who 'are oriented toward knowledge as an end in itself, or as an end that ought to be employed for the benefit of the whole nation of man rather than its parochial subdivisions' (Lasswell, 1970: 118).

Despite the exceptions, science in the aggregate reflects and reinforces the established structures of society. Contemporary observers seldom point out the obvious, as Lasswell did in 1970:

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... the aggregate impact of the scientific revolution has failed to revolutionize the basic structure of world politics . . . . This divided and militant struc- ture ... preceded the era of science, and has succeeded thus far in subordi- nating the institutions of knowledge to its perpetuation ....

[Moreover] knowledge is more commonly used for the relative benefit of the few than for the benefit of all. This is most obvious in the contrast between the suburban ghettos of the prosperous and the poverty-stricken ghettos of rural and urban slums (Lasswell, 1970: 117; emphasis in the original).

However objective the conduct of scientific research might be, the aggregate consequences are value-laden. These consequences are contrary to En- lightenment aspirations and commencement-day affirmations that science and scholarship are universal, transcending the many divisions among human beings to work for the benefit of all.

The rise of science in the established political structures of the modern epoch does not leave science invulnerable. On the contrary, 'science has grown strong enough to acquire visibility, and therefore to become eligible as a potential scapegoat for whatever disenchantment there may be with the earlier promises of a science-based technology' (Lasswell, 1970: 119): Con- sider, for example, promise and reality with respect to political power:

If the earlier promise was that knowledge would make men free, the con- temporary reality seems to be that more men are manipulated without their consent for more purposes by more techniques by fewer men than at any time in history. 19

Note in this connection how electoral campaigns have been transformed by the science and technology of public opinion (including polls, computers, and television) now at the disposal of candidates, their campaign managers, and especially expert consultants (Yankelovich, 1991). Such differences between promise and reality cannot be ignored indefinitely. This history of the world- revolutionary process suggests the possible collapse of yet another discredit- ed system of militancy and oligarchy, but with scientists and allied specialists among the targets of 'massive seizures of disruptive rage at the humiliations imposed on human dignity.." (Lasswell, 1970: 119).

Of course Lasswell was not alone in recognizing the importance of science- based technology in modernization, and the complicated position of science in modern politics. In his 1961 farewell address, President Eisenhower warned that 'we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex' - which he attributed to the 'technological revolution of recent decades' (Eisenhower, 1961: 1038). He also urged that 'in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite

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danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-tech- nological elite' (p. 1039).

More recently, President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia observed that the fall of Communism marks the end of the modern era.

Communism was the perverse extreme of [the modern attitude]. It was an attempt, on the basis of a few propositions masquerading as the only scien- tific truth, to organize all of life according to a single model, and to subject it to central planning and control regardless of whether or not that was what life wanted (Havel, 1992).

Among the many threats to civilization, according to Havel, are the widening gap between the rich and poor nations, nuclear terrorism and regional wars, and the ozone hole, the greenhouse effect, and the depletion of the biosphere. We cannot cope with such threats, he argues, within the modern attitude that subjects everything to objective explanation and control according to the scientific truth. 'Man's attitude to the world must be radically changed' (Havel, 1992).

Still more recently, George Brown Jr., the Chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology in the U.S. House of Representatives, sug- gested that our problems are more human and cultural than technological: We already have the knowledge and many of the technologies necessary to reduce human suffering throughout the world, but we have failed to implement them. In this context,

our faith in the power of science, and the knowledge and technology that it creates, may be an explicit roadblock to social action. The very benefits that science promises to deliver may be withheld from us because it is easier - politically, economically, socially, scientifically - to support more research than it is to change ourselves. The promise of science - a miracle cure - serves the politicians, who are looking for patent medicine to sell to the public, and it serves scientists, who understandably seek to preserve their special position in our culture. But it may not serve society as adver- tised (Brown, 1992).

Neither Brown, nor Havel, nor Eisenhower can be dismissed as anti-science. Each believes that science and science-based technology can help improve the human condition, even though blind faith in science and science-based technology is not warranted when the broader social and political context is taken into account.

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The policy sciences

The policy sciences, as Lasswell conceived them, are an outgrowth of the skill revolution and an effort to harmonize the aggregate impact of science with the basic aspiration of human dignity for all, not just the privileged few.

If we are in the midst of a permanent revolution of modernizing intellec- tuals, the succeeding phase obviously depends in no small degree on perfecting the policy sciences that aid in forestalling the unspeakable con- tingencies latent in tendencies already more than faintly discernable (Lasswell, 1965b: 96).

The premise is that 'science and scientists in the aggregate need not serve political power in the future as they have in the past' (Lasswell, 1965b: 77).

From a policy sciences perspective, the purpose of science in human affairs is not prediction with precision, scope, and accuracy, a purpose which pre- sumes a deterministic world with little or no latitude for choice. The purpose of science in human affairs is freedom through insight. Insight brings uncon- scious and unperceived factors in the self and the environment into the focus of conscious awareness, so that people are free to take them into account in making choices. 'Insight is a potential base value for all value choices; this is the fundamental significance of science for freedom' (Lasswell, 1965b: 77). Notice that insight undermines forecast accuracy when people take previous- ly unconscious or unperceived factors into account and modify their behavior accordingly.

From a policy sciences perspective, science is not a prerequisite to policy decisions. Science is a means of eliciting whatever potential for rationality exists among all those who interact in a given decision context. The relevant standard is not the ideal of objective rationality, but practical improvements in rationality. Such improvements can be realized through scientific or non- scientific ways of thinking. Non-scientific ways of thinking clarify policy goals and create new policy alternatives.

Scientific ways of thinking sum up past routines. When the interactions of people are described, the description may be brought to the attention of the individuals involved, who may modify their future conduct in order to take advantage of added insight (Lasswell, 1965b: 77).

Insight is a potential consequence of action, not a prerequisite for action in a boundedly-rational world. Moreover, in a non-positivist epistemology, insight is not a trivial matter: 'Probably the act of perceiving new configurations is the most formative act in the process of shaping human history.' Consequently, 'It is probable that the study of attention frames will occupy the crucial position in accounting for social development' (Lasswell, 1965b: 76).

Finally, from a policy sciences perspective, a commitment to be as objective

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as possible in scientific inquiry does not make the scientist an objective par- ticipant in a policy process. The choices of a scientist, like everyone else who participates in a policy process, are commitments to serve some values. It is rational to make the most basic value commitments explicit to oneself, at least, and to specify what they mean in particular circumstances.

A fundamental issue is whether the overriding aim of policy should be the realization of the human dignity of the many, or the dignity of the few (and the indignity of the many). If the goal is the former, decision outcomes should aim at achieving equal opportunity for participation in power, wealth, well-being, and all other valued outcomes .... In contrast, the goal of dignity for the few, rather than the many, calls for the permanent ascend- ancy of some men (Lasswell, 1971: 41; emphasis in the original).

The goal of dignity for the few is partially specified in imperialist myths that purport to justify the permanent ascendancy of one religion, class, race, or other division of humanity over all others. The goal of universal human dig- nity is partially specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

3. Contemporary c a s e s

Contemporary cases in the application of science and science-based technol- ogy in different policy processes serve to challenge the positivist presump- tions from a third perspective. The cases also serve to illustrate the continuing relevance of the modernizing intellectuals construct and the growing problem of social responsibility. The knowledge and skills essential to modern and modernizing societies are becoming more significant relative to other bases of power and less widely-shared. Hence those in command of such knowledge and skills are increasingly in a position to serve special interests over common interests and frustrate social responsibility.

International development

Development economists at the World Bank surely qualify as modernizing intellectuals. Their influence in establishing the prevailing paradigms of eco- nomic development theory is difficult to exaggerate. The World Bank lends over USS29 billion annually to developing countries, further magnified by the large volume of co-financing along with other development agencies and its leverage over policy choices made by governments trying to qualify for attractive World Bank loans. It is clearly the world's most influential and vis- ible international development organization. With huge resources to under- take and commission research and policy design on development issues, the World Bank is the premier 'development think tank'; its annual World Devel-

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opment Report is probably the single most visible statement of the state of the art of development theory.

The World Bank is thus in a stronger position than any other institution to legitimize or discredit development strategies and priorities. Therefore it is especially problematic that several highly compelling development ap- proaches have been dismissed by the World Bank for what seem clearly to be bureaucratic and careerist motives. Despite the theoretical potential and com- pelling normative bases of these approaches, they were rejected as World Bank strategies largely because of their professional, institutional, and ca- reerist inconvenience, i.e., on the basis of considerations that are far removed from defensible appraisal criteria. The tragedy is that this rejection led the approaches to be discredited by nearly the entire development community. The two most blatant cases have been the rejections of social rate-of-return analysis (also called 'social benefit-cost analysis') and integrated rural devel- opment.

Social rate-of-return analysis. The methodologies of social rate-of-return analysis were developed in the 1960s. They give greater weights (i.e., utility) to benefits targeted to the poor than to the wealthy. They are defensible from a rigorous welfare-economics perspective (although they do have their techni- cal critics), inasmuch as the same economic benefit has a higher utility to a poor person than a wealthy one (Squire and van der Tak, 1975; Ray, 1984).

As documented by Left (1985), the World Bank devoted considerable effort to developing the techniques of social rate-of-return analysis and ini- tiated the use of the technique as a standard part of the Bank's project evalua- tion process in the late 1970s. Several prototype applications of the meth- odology demonstrated its viability and the fact that significant differences do arise in the advisability of alternative projects when social rate-of-return anal- ysis is employed rather than the more conventional 'economic rate of return' analysis that regards all monetized benefits as equivalent regardless of who receives them; thus the results justify the extra work entailed. Yet the resist- ance to the technique, stated most vehemently by division-chief level manag- ers within the World Bank, blocked its adoption as a required component of project appraisal reports (Ascher, 1983). Since the analysis requires consid- erable analytic effort, and is not mandatory, it is hardly ever applied in the World Bank's project evaluation (Little and Mirrlees, 1991: 360).

Why the rejection? The internal debate focused on whether the weighting of utilities was arbitrary and judgmental; how much more valuable is a dollar going to a poor person? The method's supporters responded that it is even more arbitrary and judgmental to assign the same utility to a 'dollar's worth' of benefit regardless of who receives it. The key point is that the arbitrariness and judgmental nature of the assignment of weights in the social rate-of- return analysis is explicit, while the arbitrariness of the conventional ap- proach is implicit.

The underlying objections were hardly theoretical. The first was that the

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application of social rate-of-return analysis exposed the World Bank intel- lectuals to professional and career risks. This is consistent with the bulk of the complaints registered in the flurry of internal memoranda in reaction to the prototype applications of the methodology in the late 1970s, namely that the data on income distribution and project impacts required for the social rate- of-return approch were quite uncertain, thus requiring the analyst to assume responsibility for apparently less rigorous analysis than was usual. The response from the World Bank's leadership was that uncertain estimates were better than ignoring the distributional issue altogether. Yet these assurances were not sufficient to overcome the analysts' concerns that they would be held accountable among their professional peers for poor estimates and 'loose anal- ysis.' Moreover, it was quite clear that the extra time required to undertake social rate-of-return analysis made the approach unpopular in a careerist con- text in which prompt, tight, unassailable analysis and controversy avoidance are seen as the most secure way to rise to higher positions with the World Bank.

The second source of resistance to the social rate-of-return approach is a broader opposition to explicit cost-benefit analysis in general. This is in some ways very peculiar, because the technical image of the World Bank is based on the presumption that decisionmaking is dominated by economic algorithms. Yet the reality is quite different. Lyn Squire, the author of the World Bank's most ambitious appraisal methodology, agrees:

To the successful this approach to implementation [of rigorous cost-benefit analysis applied voluntarily by World Bank staff] requires two ingredients: enough well-qualified analysts to conduct the appraisals and an environ- ment that encourages such effort. The World Bank had the first but not the second (Squire, 1991: 383).

What is missing from the environment? Little and Mirrlees, who also docu- ment the World Bank management's failure to get its own staff to adopt moderately rigorous cost-benefit analysis for its projects, point out that

good project appraisal is done by people with their own incentives, within organizations that wittingly or not set these incentives. Both environments of project appraisal, the intellectual and the political-organizational, are keys to the quality of selection overall. This needs to be most seriously con- sidered by those who manage and create these environments (Little and Mirrlees, 1991: 377).

Nathaniel Left (1985: 70-71) argues that the rejection of rigorous rate-of- return analysis on the part of World Bank analysts and decisionmakers is due to their adherence to a different conception of how to choose development projects, namely by first deciding on sectoral priorities and then choosing the most cost-effective projects within those sectors. However, this cannot reflect

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an objection in principle of the cost-benefit framework, since if a particular sector deserves priority treatment, the rates of return of the best projects in that sector will have correspondingly high rates of return if the analysis is valid. Thus the a priori sectoral approach reveals a profound lack of trust in the explicit cost-benefit methodologies. Many World Bank economists main- tain only the appearance of using explicit rate of return methods.

Explaining this veneer of explicit methodology gets to the crux of the tech- nocratic claim of certain varieties of modernizing intellectuals whose man- date rests on their technical expertise. In turn, the legitimacy of delegating authoritative decisions to such experts on the basis of their technical expertise presumes that their decisions are technical. 'Technical' means that procedures as objective as possible are employed to meet criteria of merit pre-established by policymakers. Where implicit judgments (including values) effectively dis- place these explicit procedures and criteria in delegated decisions, the experts become unaccountable to policymakers - unless the latter can find the means of making the implicit bases of delegated decisions explicit.

Therefore the subtle abandonment of social rate-of-return analysis, and rigorous project evaluation in general, in an escape from responsibility and accountability. An even harsher interpretation would cast the strategy of maintaining the facade of rigorous, explicit analysis as a charade that gives the World Bank staff significant discretion to impose their values under false pretenses.

Integrated rural development. The idea of integrated rural development is that the bottlenecks to sustained socio-economic development can only be overcome if support for production is accompanied by coordinated inputs of social services and infrastructure. The malnourished worker cannot be pro- ductive; the uneducated farmer cannot take advantage of productivity-en- hancing agricultural technology; the bumper crop cannot be moved to market without adequate roads. The implication of an integrated strategy to address multiple bottlenecks simultaneously is that each targeted area requires inten- sive treatment. Single programs that provide a particular input across a wide geographic area are unlikely to be effective, even if they are administratively straightforward. Rondinelli (1979: 390) found that integrated rural develop- ment initiatives throughout the developing world were 'remarkably similar' efforts to increase agricultural output and productivity, stimulate agri-busi- ness to diversify rural economies and provide employment, and increase the poor's access to social services.

Toward the late 1970s the initiatives in integrated rural development be- came strongly discredited. The most objectionable aspect of the dismissal of integrated rural development was the lack of systematic appraisal. By the time a few large, central-government-run projects showed signs of very poor coor- dination (especially cases in administratively weak African countries, such as the Lilongwe Land Development Project in Malawi and the Kenyan Agricul- tural Development Project), the conventional wisdom was established that

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such projects were hopelessly unwieldy. In essence, the Bank managers and staff allowed the initiative to be killed via the ridicule of a few notorious cases. It is significant that other initiatives that fit more conveniently within the pro- fessionalist and careerist orientations of the World Bank leadership and staff are not dismissed so cavalierly.

The attacks on integrated rural development, focusing largely on the inad- equacies of a few projects in countries with severe bureaucratic rigidities, were at once mocking and condescending. 'How could anyone have believed that you can get five ministries to work together in a country like this!' These ad hoc negative assessments were often applied to projects that others indeed rated as moderately successful. Yet in the ambience of the World Bank, defending a position that has been harshly criticized has long been a risky undertaking in terms of credibility and standing.

During the period that saw the dismissal of the approach, the World Bank did not engage in a systematic, thorough evaluation, i.e., an assessment of how well integrated rural development projects were doing, a diagnosis of their weaknesses, and an analysis of whether these weaknesses were surmountable. Why were the systematic assessments delayed (primarily into the 1980s), leaving them the function of 'justifying' rather than shaping the decision to abandon integrated rural development?

The first possibility is that the dismissal of integrated rural development was simply premature; the broad assessment that it was a problematic ap- proach could only be substantiated later. But certainly more systematic evalu- ations could have been done earlier. Therefore a second possibility becomes plausible: an earlier diagnosis could have revealed that the failure, in consid- erable degree, lay in the World Bank's own remediable approach of dealing predominantly with central governments rather than sub-national units. While it is easy to say that the coordination of multiple agencies and minis- tries engaging in top-down planning and top-down delivery of multiple devel- opment inputs is simply infeasible, this convenient dismissal of integrated development projects ignores the fact that the responsibility should not rest with centralized ministries in the first place. The integrated rural development concept implies greater community involvement, in so far as the local com- munity is the only practical locus for planning multiple inputs. In contrast to the traditional pattern of funding single-input programs through the central- ized ministries, leaving them to decide where the inputs (e.g., health, educa- tion, agricultural credit) will be targeted, the new strategy would have to depend on the local communities to decide what mix of multiple inputs each community would need (Ruttan, 1984). Montague Yudelman, the World Bank's director for rural development and one of the few top-level Bank staff to continue to express support for integrated rural development, argued in 1977 that:

The experience of the Bank with the range of projects in which it has par- ticipated has led to several conclusions. A major conclusion is that it is

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possible to design projects that will assist large numbers of the rural poor to expand production and increase their incomes; there are significant qualifications, however... Another issue is that of local participation. In practice, villagers are rarely consulted at either the initial stage of a rural development project of during its implementation (Yudelman, 1977: 18).

Similarly, Venon Ruttan notes:

Some burden of responsibility for this failure has been due to the failure of assistance agency personnel to understand the difference between decen- tralized administration and decentralized governance - between locating the administrative offices of centre ministries at the provincial or district level and the strengthening of the fiscal and administrative capacity of local government (Ruttan, 1984: 395-397).

Yet we would challange whether this bias is simply a matter of 'failure to understand.' It is institutionally inconvenient and perhaps professionally less rewarding for international organization experts to work directly with local communities or to plan projects that require control by local communities. The reliance on working through central government betrays a seriously flawed technocratic orientation toward centralization; confining its efforts largely to interacting with central governments advances the Bank's institu- tional power and efficiency, since it can negotiate with national-level minis- tries and avoid having the planning function drawn down to subnational levels. Individual staff can continue to deal with the more professionally and career rewarding 'big issues.'

Modernizing intellectuals are often at a particular advantage in certain aspects of the appraisal process. When the assessment of performance is complicated by complex causal relationships, or when the rating of perfor- mance itself is arguable, then outcomes alone cannot be directly translated into judgments of performance without invoking theories of causation and optimal performance, a~ When experts evaluate whether development ap- proaches have worked or can work, they tend to dominate the field, and they can decide when systematic appraisal is to be undertaken and when an ap- proach is to be killed through impressionistic evaluation. Responsibility to other actors, who typically presume that experts' judgments are based on thorough appraisal, is again compromised. 21

US. civil space program

The U.S. civil space program is a monument to NASA's persistance on behalf of the grand vision of human exploration and eventually colonization of space - despite persistent opposition to the vision on practical grounds. 2e In Sep- tember, 1969, in its report to the President on The Post-Apollo Space Pro-

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gram, the Space Task Group expressed the vision in an ambitious program which focused on a manned mission to Mars and included a space station and a space transportation system based on a shuttle. When the Nixon Adminis- tration concluded that the nation had no requirements for such an ambitious program, supporters of the vision did not set it aside but persevered through a series of 'next logical steps,' beginning with a manned, reusable Shuttle.

The vision was not sufficient to justify the Shuttle. After hearings on the FY 1971 budget, NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine (1970: 27) concluded that 'the current congressional mood was for diversified and practical space goals pursued at a moderate and economical pace? Consequently, for FY 1972, NASA promoted the Shuttle on the utilitarian grounds of cheaper and routine access to space. Among other things, cost estimates were reduced to politically-acceptable levels, and flight rates were set high enough to force almost all payloads onto the Shuttle (and higher than all projected payloads required). Hence nearly all projects involving spaceflight were coupled to the Shuttle, and almost all expendable launch vehicles were phased out, making the Shuttle the indispensable centerpiece of th e space program. The depend- ence of many projects on the Shuttle, as well as its large scale and long term, attracted a large industrial and Congressional constituency with an enduring stake in defending the Shuttle program.

The tactics successfully employed to promote and defend the first 'logical step' were adapted for the next, the Space Station, which was first approved for FY 1985. NASA selected the largest permanently-manned concept expected to be politically acceptable, promoted it with a low and incomplete design-to-cost commitment of $8 billion (in 1984 dollars), and coupled it to the Shuttle and other projects. The Station is entirely dependent on the Shuttle for assembly and supplies, but the Shuttle also depends on the Station for a large proportion of its flights. Hence these centerpieces are jus- tified by their mutual dependence, and are further justified by science or applications projects such as the space telescope that are designed to depend on them. Promoters of such projects learned to move them from the periph- ery to the center of the space program by coupling them to the Shuttle or the Station.

While the civil space program is structured to promote and defend each 'next logical step' toward the vision, the structure systematically compromises project performance relative to the promises made to win project approval. The program structure is, in the words of former NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher,

... an integral, interdependent whole - and therefore, vulnerable to serious dislocation in the face of even small perturbations. The funds being re- quested do not permit us the luxury of backups, of alternatives, of pro- grammatic robustness. Virtually every element of the program is being pur- sued on a success schedule... (Fletcher, 1989: 299).

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'Success' schedules assume unrealistically that projects will work out as planned. Perturbations are departures from 'success' schedules, including technical problems not covered by margins or reserves, personnel turnover, micro-management, and cuts in NASA's annual budget request. The space program's vulnerability to serious dislocation is a deterrent to perturbations by the Administration or Congress and an incentive for them to raise the annual budget constraint when perturbations of any kind occur.

Perturbations inevitably occur because NASA cannot entirely prevent them or anticipate them in 'success' oriented plans, and because the large scale of the centerpieces leaves them especially vulnerable. For example, technical and managerial problems tend to increase with the number of non-redundant human, hardware, and software elements that are critical to the success of the whole program, because every element is subject to failure. Moreover, a pro- gram as large as the Space Station invites micro-management because the high visibility makes problems relatively difficult to ignore; and such a large program invites budget cuts because there are more alternative uses to which its budget can be put. Dislocations anywhere tend to ripple throughout this interdependent structure, forcing capability cutbacks, schedule slips, and cost overruns in many projects. In short, the civil space program as preseiatly structured lacks the resilience necessary for projects to perform as promised despite budget cuts and other perturbations.

The lack of resilience shows up in performance shortfalls. The Shuttle's first flight in 1981 was delayed three years because of unanticipated technical problems with rocket engines and thermal tiles. The Shuttle program achieved only 37 flights through 1990, or 94% fewer than the 580 promised in 1972. Total Shuttle development and operations costs through 1990 were $65 billion (in 1990 dollars), or 27% more than the 1972 estimate. The aver- age cost per flight through 1990 was S1.7 billion including development costs, or 19 times more than promised in 1972 (Pielke and Byerly, 1992). The Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (1990: 32) concluded in December, 1990, that 'the most significant deficiency in the nation's future civil space program is an insufficiency of reliable, flexible and efficient space launch capability.'

For the Space Station, permanent manned capability has already slipped about six years to 2000. Among the capability cutbacks, crew size has been reduced from 8 to 4, the habitat modules and central truss have been short- ened significantly, and many program elements have been deleted, including a closed life support system, an improved space suit, solar dynamic power, vari- ous 'hooks and scars' for attached payloads, and co-orbiting and polar-orbit- ing platforms. In March, 1991, the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council concluded that the redesigned Space Station

... does not meet the basic requirements of the two principal scientific dis- ciplines for which it is intended: (1) life sciences research necessary to sup- port the national objective of long-term human exploration of space, and

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(2) microgravity research and applications (National Research Council, 1991: 1).

Meanwhile, despite these cutbacks in capabilities, estimated total develop- ment costs have approximately quadrupled from the 1984 design-to-cost commitment of $8 billion to about $32 billion in 1984 dollars, or $40 billion in 1991 dollars. 23

The disruption of other projects through the ripple effect is easily illustrat- ed. In 1981, the Shuttle program was behind schedule and urgently needed for operations, so funds were diverted from other projects to the Shuttle. James Van Allen (1986: 27) called the widespread disruption of space sci- ence projects 'the slaughter of the innocent" In 1986, the Challenger accident grounded the remainder of the Shuttle fleet for more than two and a half years, disrupting all projects that depended on the Shuttle for launch ser- vices. 24 In 1991, the Space Station program was rescued from termination by diversion of more than a half billion dollars from space science and applica- tions projects. Each project disrupted incurs capability cutbacks, schedule slips, and/or cost overruns. Such disruptions waste between a quarter and a hal of the space science budget according to informal estimates.

Such performance shortfalls reflect a rigid commitment to the vision and certain failures in the decision process that frustrate accountability. NASA controls the process of technical design, and uses that control to lock-in the centerpieces. The smaller, quicker, cheaper and decoupled projects that could provide the basis for a resilient program tend to be eliminated before the elected representatives of the public have the opportunity to consider them. When insiders know that the performance 'promises' made at the time of project approval are not enforceable or expected to be enforced, then the 'promises' become fig leaves of respectability to disguise special interests that cannot survive public scrutiny. For example, project managers can choose to underestimate schedules and costs and exaggerate capabilities as necessary to sell a project. Headquarters can choose to tolerate or encourage the practice in order to help the agency survive and prosper relative to other agencies in the current budget cycle. When shortfalls in performance materialize, space scientists and engineers who want to work in the civil space program tend to mute their criticism. Elected off• can choose to look the other way, de- spite their oversight responsibilities. They tend to do so because the space program is a useful pawn in playing Washington power games, in associating with popular sentiments about exploring the final frontier, and in delivering money and jobs to their constituents. Outsiders can know little about the situation, and do less, even with an extraordinary investment of time and effort.

The vision of human space exploration was not and is not sufficient to jus- tify in public the Shuttle, the Station, or the proposed manned mission to the Moon and Mars. Nevertheless, the technocratic keepers of the vision and their political allies have been able to lock-in two of the 'next logical steps"

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despite the waste of time, talent, and funds that otherwise could have been invested more productively. Moreover, promising a certain capability, sched- ule, and cost, delivering something less, later, and at higher costs - and con- sistently getting away with it in project after project - exploits the society that pays the bills and evades responsibility and accountability to the public.

Global warming

Scientific claims and record-high temperatures in recent years have height- ened public concern about global warming, among other global changes and their human impacts. The Bush Administration defined the primary policy problem as scientific uncertainty and made scientific research a prerequisite for policy. 25 According to testimony by the President's science advisor in late 1989, 'we should not move forward on major programs until we have a rea- sonable understanding of the scientific and economic consequences of those programs "26 Early in 1990, in a letter introducing a report to Congress on the U.S. Global Change Research Program, he wrote that

The research program presented here is a key component of the President's overall approach to the global change issue. The approach has, as its cen- tral goal, the provision of a sound scientific basis for developing national and international policy on global change (Committee on Earth Sciences, 1990).

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According to the report, a sound scientific basis for policy would be ~ n improved predictive model of the integrated Earth system and a better under- standing of human interactions with this system...' (Committee on Earth Sciences, 1990: 1). Such justifications have served to divert concern and demands for action into research, and to support the President's request of S 1.37 billion for global change research in FY 1993, up 24% over the FY 1992 budget.

The policy (as opposed to scientific)justifications for public investments in global change research are questionable on grounds of rationality. First, a pre- dictive model of the integrated Earth system is not sufficient for policy pur- poses. Clarifying the probable consequences of alternatives (by predictive model or other means) is only one task in a rational decision process. Other tasks include clarifying goals, evaluating action alternatives, and reconciling inevitable differences on substantive issues through the political process. Second, a predictive model is not necessary for policy purposes. It is pro- cedurally rational to act despite uncertainties, ambiguities, and the limitations of present scientific models, provided the actions are modest and designed (in part) to discover what works through trial and error in the field. For example, prototype programs to reduce CO2 emissions could be field-tested in diverse localities, and the more cost-effective alternatives could then be selected and

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adapted to other localities. Finally, for policy purposes, a predictive model of the integrated Earth system is empirically less promising than another alterna- tive. Model advocates have not yet specified criteria for certifying when a pre- dictive model is 'operational' for specific policy purposes; however, chaos theory (Glieck, 1987) and experience with complex forecasting models (Ascher, 1981) suggest that it will be difficult if not impossible to meet the cri- teria implied in the model's policy justification. Meanwhile, model advocates discount or ignore a decentralized, trial-and-error alternative for reducing CO 2 emissions that was unwittingly field-tested following the 1973-74 oil embargo.

At that time national energy policy focused on increasing supplies of energy through expansion of centralized production and distribution facilities, and through demonstration of centralized supply technologies for the future. At the periphery were efforts to reduce energy consumption through conserva- tion and efficiency, and to begin a transition toward renewable energy re- sources (such as solar and low-head hydro) as long-term substitutes for fossil fuels and nuclear power. The peripheral technologies are typically easier for households, businesses, and municipal, county, and state officials to under- stand and adapt to their diverse needs and circumstances. If these people share and compare dependable information on their program experiences, they can evolve more effective programs though trial and error (Brunner, 1980).

Millions of decentralized decisions combined with the peripheral elements of national policy made the most positive difference in the decade or so fol- lowing the 1973-74 oil embargo. According to various estimates (Iott, 1992), savings in energy consumption through conservation and efficiency contri- buted more than additions to energy supply in meeting national needs. Among the additions to energy supply, the development of renewable re- sources contributed more than fossil fuels. While nuclear power was a major factor in additions to energy supply, the nuclear power industry scaled back its total planned and installed capacity by a factor of two over this period. The nuclear industry is holding on, but the demonstration projects for a breeder reactor, synthetic fuels, and shale oil production are either moribund or ter- minated.

Reducing CO 2 emissions through a decentralized energy strategy is only one response to the threat of global warming, but as an initial response it has many advantages over a predictive model intended to be used as a basis for comprehensive national and international decisions. A decentralized strategy is more realistic and worthwhile within the democratic aspirations and the institutional fragmentation (functional and federal) prescribed by the U.S. Constitution. Recall that the 'comprehensive' and 'carefully balanced' Nation- al Energy Plan developed by the White House planning staff in 1977 was taken apart by Congress, which then considered most of the proposals more or less independently. A decentralized strategy proved to be the least-cost alternative for meeting the nation's energy needs by the test of experience, not

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just theory, and reduced C O 2 emissions as a positive externality. Moreover, the potential for further progress through a decentralized energy strategy in the U.S. is still vast, according to the standards set by the most energy-efficient industrial nations and to engineering estimates (Rosenfeld and Hafemeister, 1988). Finally, a decentralized strategy leaves us with a more energy-efficient and competitive economy and no regrets if global warming turns out to be less than a serious problem. Otherwise, a decentralized strategy helps us miti- gate the magnitude of the problem and learn how to cope with the diverse local and regional manifestations of global warming through decentralized decisions.

Why is the Global Change Research Program evidently misjustified on poli- cy grounds? More intensive research may confirm that the justification is a rationalization that diverts public attention from the special interests served by the Program. For some, the Program and its policy justification may be convenient means of avoiding action and explanations for inaction while appearing to address public concerns. Various others may support the Pro- gram primarily as a means to advance or defend other interests - for exam- ple, interests in sustaining certain scientific facilities, in profiting from R & D contracts, or in shaping policy decisions. More fundamentally, a predictive model to be used as a basis for comprehensive decisions both reflects and reinforces established structures of power. Besides moving money beyond the Beltway that encircles Washington, policy decisions based on an integrated model of the Earth system would keep technocrats in Washington in the cen- ter of the action. The technocratic propensity toward concentration of power through centralized and comprehensive policies cuts across conventional distinctions between Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, or environmentalists and others.

The policy justification is effective in obscuring these interests and expand- ing the Program because it appeals to certain presumptions of modern, espe- cially American, culture and because mechanisms of accountability evidently have failed. Americans tend to presume that big problems like global warm- ing require big (centralized and comprehensive) solutions; that accurate scientific predictions over the relevant future of such big problems are both feasible and necessary if not sufficient for rational policy decisions; and that the origins and impacts of scientific research are politically and ethically neu- tral. Those who are in a position to know better and who have a direct stake in the Program are not likely to challenge these presumptions in public. Most others lack the knowledge, motivation, or power to challenge these presump- tions effectively in public. Unless they divide among themselves on the major issues and appeal to the public, the experts are effectively unaccountable.

It is true that appropriations in excess of a billion dollars a year can support many worthy scientists and scientific projects. But if the Program does not meet the expectations established by the policy justification, public support for the Program will be jeopardized sooner or later. And it the threat of global warming turns out to have been grossly exaggerated, the credibility of science

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and scientists will be further compromised. Skeptics already wonder what resulted from earlier crises involving energy, acid precipitation, a new ice age, and nuclear winter - other than to raise the visibility of science and transform it into the political equivalent of public works. Meanwhile, as research con- tinues and society continues to pay the bills, we remain largely unprepared to mitigate or cope with global warming if it occurs.

Conclusion

Rising levels of social tension appear to be characteristic of the modern era, in which people around the world have striven for decades to overcome tradi- tional constraints and to industrialize without obvious limits. At least the pre- sent heightened tension levels predate the end of the Cold War and extend will beyond the United States. In any event, rising tension levels are signs of a growing crisis precipitated by rigidities in perspectives and behavior that interfere with smooth adaptations to emerging realities. These rising tension levels increase the vulnerability of the ruling elite to seizures of mass outrage. Hence scientists, as increasingly visible members of the ruling elite, have a stake in reconsidering their own roles in broader perspective than peer ap- proval, agency interests, or research funding.

Scientists can begin by comparing positivist presumptions about science in political and social context with non-conventional alternatives that may turn out to be more adaptive under late-modern if not post-modern circum- stances. A review of epistemology, science in the modern era, as well as con- temporary cases in international development, civil space, and global warm- ing policy suggests some points of departure. First, the purpose of science in human affairs is not prediction on the Newtonian model, but freedom through insight. Moreover, the potential to predict with more precision, scope, and accuracy is quite limited in human affairs, especially compared to the poten- tial to choose more intelligently. Second, science, as knowledge of fundamen- tal principles of nature, is not a prerequisite for ameliorating particular policy problems, nor are experts in command of such knowledge the only qualified participants in policy processes. Using what knowledge is available, we can proceed on a trial-and-error basis with non-experts involved in evaluating what works and what does not. Third, objectivity, a worthy aspiration in the conduct of research, does not mean that the selection of research problems or the consequences of research are value-neutral. Nor does objectivity mean that there is only one reality, independent of the researcher's perspective, to discover and verify.

There are alternatives to objectivity as a cloak to conceal the actual and potential roles of scientists. For example, one can be explicit about the identi- fications, expectations, and value preferences that one brings to bear on the selection of research problems and the evaluation of research consequences. These perspectives are an important part of the context of one's own research.

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One can acknowledge the legitimacy, in principle, of different identifications, expectations, and value preferences that bear on the selection and evaluation of research by others. These different perspectives are also an important part of the context of research. Finally, in sorting out conflicting scientific claims, one can appeal not only to scientific norms accepted by scientists, but also to specifications of the most general norm broadly accepted in society, human dignity for all. The point of these alternatives is to make the special interests involved in research explicit for purposes of accountability, and to bring those interests into alignment with common interests. As a first approximation, common interests can be identified and distinguished as those both used and accepted as justifications in open public discussion and debate.

In principle, the individual scientist can rethink conventional ideas about science in social context, and then begin to act in accord with an enlightened sense of professional responsibility to science and to the basic aspirations of society generally. Self-discipline is the crucial requisite, because scientists can frequently use their expertise to avoid accountability to non-experts, and because more effective accountability mechanisms might will increase the tendency of science to serve power. In practice, however, self-discipline may be very expensive under conventional institutional arrangements. Hence scientists might choose to invest some thought and collective action in adapt- ing the relevant institutions. For example:

1. The availability of funds affects the selection of research problems, espe- cially in the highly capitalized area of science. To what extent can scien- tists become more independent in the selection of research problems? Among other possibilities, scientists might lobby against over-invest- ment of public research funds in certain societal needs (e.g., defense) and under-investment in others. They might also consider copyright and patent pools to fund themselves.

2. The evaluation of research need not be limited to the number of publica- tions, citations, or grants received. To what extent can scientists bias institutionalized appraisals of research toward emphasis on contribu- tions to society? Among other possibilities, scientists might consider how non-experts can be brought into the appraisal process through the enforcement of promises made to win grants and contracts, through decentralized prototypes, and other means.

3. The aggregate effects of science and science-based technology on soci- ety are worth monitoring to stimulate social responsibility and to revise scientific priorities accordingly. To what extent can the lessons and lega- cies of the social indicators movement (Innes, 1990) be adapted for these purposes? Among other possibilities, case studies might be com- missioned to supplement estimates made by comparing aggregate data on scientific inputs and outputs with aggregate data on the problems of society over suitable periods of time.

More generally, we need to improve the possibility that scientists will feel free to express their differences on public issues in public, and to do so at accept-

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ab le cost . D e m o c r a t i c accoun tab i l i t y in an inc reas ing ly c o m p l e x w o r l d d e p e n d s u p o n the exper t s w h o c lar i fy a l te rna t ives o n the m o s t s ignif icant issues for the pub l i c (Schat t schneider , 1975 Ch. 8).

D a u n t i n g as such a d a p t a t i o n s m a y seem, the po l i cy sc iences p r o v i d e in te l - l ec tua l r e sources a d e q u a t e to gu ide them. W i t h a n o r m a t i v e c o m m i t m e n t to max imiz ing h u m a n dignity, the po l i cy sc iences can avoid the pi t fal l of goa l subs t i tu t ion that ca ters to the ins t i tu t ional and p ro fe s s iona l in teres ts o f the scient is ts themse lves and b l ind ly adhe re s to the n a r r o w d i c t u m tha t ' sc ient i f ic k n o w l e d g e is g o o d in and of itself. ' W i t h its e schewal of the pos i t iv is t e m p h a - sis o n f inding single, s imple , over -a rch ing laws, the po l i cy sc iences can de -

ve lop mu l t i p l e m o d e l s to b e tes ted t h rough p r o t o t y p e s and adap t ive m a n a g e - ment . W i t h its e m p h a s i s on the p o l i c y m a k i n g p r o c e s s as well as the subs tan- t ive con t en t o f pol icy, the po l i cy sc iences can de ve lop p r o m i s i n g (if as ye t no t ful ly tes ted) m o d e l s for b r ing ing sc ient is ts t oge the r wi th the pub l i c and its r ep resen ta t ives to in tegra te scientif ic and soc ie ta l asp i ra t ions . T h e cen t ra l ques t ion is w h e t h e r enough scientists , in con t r a s t to r is ing el i tes in ea r l i e r t imes , wil l achieve suff icient ins ight to u n d e r s t a n d the i r own long - t e rm in te r - ests and to h a r m o n i z e t h e m with the bas ic a sp i r a t ions of soc ie ty o n a sus ta in- ab le basis.

Notes

1. Nationai Science Board (1991: 5). In constant 1982 dollars, the total for France, West Ger- many, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States increased from approximately $65.2 billion to $202.9 billion in 1988.

2. OTA (1991: 4). These amounts are expressed in constant 1990 dollars and include the social and behavioral sciences as well as the natural sciences and engineering.

3. More generally, according to Winner (1989: 106), 'It is not uncommon for the advent of a new technology to provide an occasion for flights of utopian fancy. During the last two cen- turies the factory system, railroads, telephone, electricity, automobile, airplane, radio, television, and nuclear power have all figured prominently in the belief that a new and glorious age was about to begin.'

4. An influential and representative source on positivism is Friedman (1953). We use 'myth' in the technical sense of the most basic perspectives used to explain and justify the posses- sion and use of some value - for example, authority in a political arena, truth in a scientific forum, holiness in a theological court. Experience inside a policy process typically reveals that the myth is not a literally true description of the facts; however, the literal truth is not central to the necessary functions of a myth. Politically sophisticated scientists who use the myth in policy processes might not accept it personally, just as the rulers in Plato's ideal Republic might not accept its myth. For an introduction to the theory of political myth see Lasswell and Kaplan (1950 Ch. 6) and Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool (1970).

5. Brown (1992: 2) quotes Koshland (1992): 'It is the conviction of scientists that more basic research will profit not only the globe, but also the specific countries in which it is carried out. The former is essentially obvious.' See, for example, Mayer (1990: 298): 'What makes the [savings and loan] outrage so important a piece of American history is ... the demonstration of how low our standards for professional performance have fallen in law, accounting, appraising, banking, and poli- tics - all of them" The allegation is that knowledge and skill were not used for professional service, but for professional self-service at the expense of the general public.

6.

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7. Lasswell outlined the basic ideas of the policy sciences in a memorandum on 'Personal Policy Objectives' dated October 1, 1943, which is included in the Lasswell archive at Yale University. For an introduction to the policy sciences, see Lasswell (1971). Among the more recent overviews are Torgerson (1985), Ascher (1987), and Brunner (1991a).

8. Lasswell (1971: 16), with emphasis added. For the simpler forms of life, predispositions and perceptions are limited by the sensory apparatus and responses to a limited range of stimuli from the environment are largely instinctive.

9. The plausibility of the postulate is nevertheless apparent when the obverse is considered: That living forms act in ways that are perceived to leave them worse off. The obverse is absurd if due allowance is made for the unconscious impulses and inhibitions as well as the conscious perceptions, incomplete and possibly mistaken, that are overtly expressed in an act. In our culture, the major alternative is the postulate of positivism that behavior is determined by impersonal laws of nature that can be discovered through science. The plausibility of this postulate is questionable even in physics (Horgan, 1992).

10. This is the title of the first chapter in Lippmann (1965), a classic in political science first published in 1922. For approximately equivalent formulations of the difference, see Boulding (1961) in economics, Rappaport (1979) in anthropology, and Rorty (1979) in philosophy. The most influential formulation of the difference is the principle of bounded rationality, the basis of behavioral theories of rationality for which Herbert Simon earned a Nobel Prize in economics.

11. As Lippmann (1965: 17) put it, 'The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their pseudo-environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining el- ement in thought, feeling, and action. For if the connection between reality and human response were direct and immediate, rather than indirect and inferred, indecision and fail- ure would be unknown.. ? See also Simon (1957: 199).

12. Kuhn (1970: Ch. 9) was quite explicit about the nature and necessity of scientific revolu- tions and their similarity to political revolutions. On the latter, see Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: Ch. 10) on'Process. '

13. See Ascher (1981, 1982, 1988). Compare Rivlin (1984: 20): 'The poor showing of fore- casters is not due to any lack of effort of ingenuity.... The real problem is that the eco- nomic system is battered by forces outside itself which are inherently unpredictable, such as the weather or foreign wars. I doubt we will ever improve the accuracy of forecasting very much?

14. In molecular biology (Culotta, 1992) and computer science (Holland, 1992), researchers who employ evolutionary methods report practical achievements with little theoretical understanding of the particular problems involved.

15. Lasswell (1965b: 86) characterized the unnamed revolution (or the permanent revolution of modernizing intellectuals) as 'a more specialized version of the broad transformation we have characterized as "the world revolution of middle-income skill groups."' See also Lass- well (1965b: 92-93) on relationships among the garrison-state, modernizing intellectual, and other constructs.

16. Compare Lasswell (1941: 459) on the diversification of material and symbolic conditions in modern societies: 'Concerted action under such conditions depends upon skillfully guiding the minds of men; hence the enormous importance of symbolic manipulation in modern society.' For a recent account of the rise of 'symbolic analysts,' whose skills go well beyond propaganda, see Reich (1991 ).

17. See Section VI of Lasswell (1965b: 94-96) and the Introduction to Lasswell (1965a). See also Sections II and HI on Production and Evolution, respectively, in Lasswell (1956), which is titled 'The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry Into the Possible Recon- ciliation of Mastery and Freedom? 'Mastery' in the subtitle refers to mastery over nature through science-based technology.

18. See, for example, Schlesinger (1968) on systems analysis and Easterbrook (1986) on think tanks.

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19. Lasswell (1970: 119). In the same paragraph, Lasswell compares promise and reality with other values, in addition to political power.

20. In contrast, in some situations overall performance or competence is often gauged by the public in a straightforward, directly empirical fashion, and the role of intellectuals in putting a different 'spin' on the results is quite limited. Thus incumbent presidents are either lionized or rejected at election time depending on overall economic performance as indicated by rates of unemployment, economic booms or busts, and inflation.

21. More generally, it can be said that World Bank experts have gained decisionmaking power vis-a-vis the representatives who could be held accountable by the the member countries, by increasing the experts' monopoly over information and expertise. Hurni (1980: 83) points out: 'Because the staff has worked with a project all through the originating and con- sensus-forming phases, its share in influencing the approval decision is greater than that of any single Executive Director who often does not hold his seat for a very long time and is, therefore, less familiar with the project than the operational staff. It appears that, in the 1970s, the technostructure gained in concrete decision-making power; first, because the projects have become technically more diversified and, secondly, because there are more of them presented.'

22. This case is documented and developed more fully in Brunner (1992). 23. For appraisals of the Space Station program see Brunner and Byerly (1990); Charles

Bowsher (1991); and the General Accounting Office (1991). 24. For a case in point, see Lerner (1989). 25. For further documentation and development of this case, see Brunner (1991b). 26. D. Allan Bromley as quoted in Brookes (1989: 97).

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