The original documents are located in Box 2, folder “Brown, Gen. George S. (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff)” of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential

Library.

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Digitized from Box 2 of The Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library

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(T~nnscr~pt from an ~?arfect tap~ of a portion of an intarviev w~th Geor~.a S. Brown~ and ~.anan. Lurie on Apr:11 12. 197(, • t-r.anscr~bed · · .; Octobar 18, 1976) -.·.· '···;•,- ... ~--·

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Q:: ." :t~. K~~ya"! '·\. ·· . . • .. . A:· • ~ ~T~- st::u:~ .. d~l~y~.:~y· +\~. tb).·i:ty day~, .. ~·.! :coul_;dn!t d~ tl-iae • . Th~ only 'Wr::.y S··~

. could nuppljr Israel. was to t:lke J.t or,1t: of our O\.rt\ forces. So we do_n' t ·ha.~e ·i:i1at. O~r ro.!.ta of modern1.znt1on ia f~r GlO"-'C.t" chan t:hcir-to and soma of oura • armored V-£hi.el.o-'l! pr:L~ari1y; .aircr:sft ·1.." not: '{ui.tc a:J bic, in d1.6p.:tr:lt:y. So·.:I sny tha~ if

· Con:;ress doesn't: start: by <-ct1n;; faV~\rably on this bud_&'!t rcquc.st. nnd I t:tu9t. .. 10;;.y tr.a t the si.gns ar<! reason~\bly encouraging at this point. but that' a . . 1!ot: · · ~. ·

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to eo!'l.tinue and thi:J is th-e'". thins th111: tha country has eoc to realize · that ·:lt: · i:::n' t going to be done thi:~ yc.ar. it'.; got t:o conl;inu·e ·over tha years. The So·.r :: c~::. Un.Lon -- anti it's too bad .that. we can't aor::ehow find a '~ay to divul.ge to the pee•: :c. o:= 'Cl't<: worl.d at la.:rgc: tn<lt cviuence .WJ! havu 'in ,;upL><Jrt of these thiuss~ . but thcr(;· c nlw.-:.ys ::he worry thee you' 11 compromise a aource or the nh~<lnG by which you ac<p.d .r a · ths:: knowledge and therefore we sta::-.p cv~rythinu in 30me way that. do•~!3n't: perrxLt: us . to sh:u·e it with the people that l1a.ve got to kno~T, it d,J~~m't: do a.ny &('od fct.· un ::o sit there and talk to each ot:he.c. If '~"' could find it p.ossib.le to tnl)r~ adequately 1.nforin the people oo thnt: t:hay in t:urn could prcs3 on the .Cortgress t•:-dv wh.?.t must be done aeems to me th.:1.:: it would be far more useful. There's so~c :interest in doinz t:h:i.s·. 'Iher.e' G no ::nnall conven>ation about it, eo t think they will l.oos~n upon what:· I (inuudi.hle).

Q:. Didn't tl1~ 1973 I1iddlc. I::aHI': War bl:ing to . tha llt.tcm.tion of . th~ world ;-.'ht.\ fnct that: you just broueht up thnt th•:! Ruo:.ians con supply their loieVcrnl Al~i ... s wi.th ...-ha.tever they \.JO.nt: and I have b""~n on t.he 11th of Oc'tober I happened ·-eo be . on the I.:;t;~.le1:1.-Syr:lan front: . and 1 simply couldn't believe my cyea, I held my h.::.nd on Scvi.et nt3de tank::; which lmd. <~nd half trucks, \.:hich hud twenty ldlomet:ers en their n.r1nament. Even .(bre.uk in tape) hr.::~nd ·ne\,.., and they're producing, I belii:v .. ~, that t.;hile t.;.:: "are produc1o3 nhout: hC>w msny--JOO tunt<s, · 400 tanl<:.s, a mo.>nth, they

· al:'e prbdu~l.ng. "can prod·uce ten t:it:1e:o~ llfi m•Jch p~~r month. ·· · ... . A: r ·wi.Gh " we· ~.·cl:'e: ·p.roduclne· 400 n mont:h , " ~-tu'r~ proclucins·; \-70'rA'. ;solns 1:•'

·gat a l:Lttle over a thousand n year in anot:h<o:r year or two -- 120'). · ·

Q: Th:!.s is almost nume-r.ir.ally , i.t: 's a · jok~<~ in comparisol\ to what the Russ~r.;1.::> · nra do:lng?

A: Exactly .

Q: A."'ld I wondo;;-r t<~h.;:\t, the vnly thine that thl-l Ru~Hd .. ans really have to do . :1:1 to out meaneuver us • shall \•It~ say politi.colly, to a situation . whet'e ·n.o side cr;.n i:i'-:= atomic ·weapons and just t•e:rna1n in the conventional field, t:h3t's :it.

A: Well , I think, we've r<!ach~d thnt. poln t. cotlay in the s tt"ategic nuclea~ fi.ald to~here we've said we hAvn 11 rour;h tlquivr~lency, but thnt would menn "'~'ve 60C, you ktto•.,, all theue th_ines -- th~y 1 v.: r,ot tnr.>rl! and l~t'Z<!r mial:l:l.les i t.•e 've c;ot. mor~ o;.nrrhends ; ....,e•rc more uccur~lt;t'\, It's kim\ of a sca~tdoff, I don ' t think.

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i11. my o·;.m judgment that either :.:l.de \w:J the! nb.i.l.i.ty to launch a d1Aabling first . :itrika. That: coul.d change over~ ti~e. Aj!...:l:in·, I say coul.(l, becaust! if t:.h~· cot:r: ·r.:.~;o:.~ wich the momentum even under th<: SALT Li:r.titat:iontJ Get up by U.:~.d:lvost:ol~, t!1~Y ·~ ·:: 1 · ·

t:inue. wi!:h the rt:ornentum they h<lVi~, and we don • t do anything, then conce1v~1>1y .:!..t cou.ld g:lve the Russinna t:hA poittt l.lh-.rc you rncntion~d where! they rule out tita st:rateg:tc nuc~ear thinJ! and you're left: with th~ noh-uuclcllr genP.ral purpo.:;c for~""­and t:herc is nn imbalance t:h~: ce in just the s 1.: r a.lght U.S. vs Soviat. It co~es r.: \.: :\ ne01rl~· into balance when you take all of NATO into a.-:count t·.rith nll of the Wat.-~Hl" Pe2.ct, pa rti.cularly i.£ you add the Ft",mch. You can't r .ulc. out the French, at l•~:l !·~·..: the Russ:t.<tn planner can't:, bacau~'e while th0v h.:1.vn s;dd they will not r<!linqui~.h. co';l!;.;lan.i of their forces in pc3cotl1:~C; tlu~y \.rlll not join the mi.litary thin:;; Ch~y h~v.: tto!: b::o~en; they .nrf! ut:lll n ~c:nh.1r of ~:A'ro; thay •n·a t>till plcds~d to th•~ ba,;ic iJrealiSe of NATO. 'Iharefore. I think the Ru!>ainn plannet' has to es::wmc~ th.:;. t:

France Will be in the force in tim~ o£ .,1ar.

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(Transcript fro:n an imperfect tupc ot 11 portion of an interview ~:!.t:h Gc:l~ral Geor&c S. BrUt•"tl.• <.1nd Rannn Lurie on April 12, 1976 tr~nseribed October 18, 1976)

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'It's more :im'i>ortant thnt the Ru6s:lan planner be concerned w.ith that than the ..\:le-r:i..cans. -

! think there's an accel>tl.lnco of the~e trends tod<~y a a I go around the country and tall~ to people. It's sort or a frightenin3 story but paople·_ .-are l.iscening and taking it s~riour.ly where two ye1.1rs at;o they could have· csred lac!;;·

Q: It'o all fnsc:lnntin& how p~r~llal we arc now from qu.ito a few aa?ects politically and m.ili.tnrily to th<! thirt:ies (,/here we had a quite a parallel o i.tur.t:lon ~nd the adv:1nt~~;c woe; Corm<:~ny, Na~1 Ce1.·many. and bu:Lld.ins a.ll the D.'::':J•.::-.HlG and co on, ;:md I wonder why no one br:in~o up the fa<:t: chat 1-fuasol.ini. i.nv.:!.ded ~thiop:La only a.ftcr he l~:arned chat the students o! Catnbridze ilttd Oxfo-rd siz,:l~d p~titiom> snying that they are not goine to join the military and that cncoL:~·~::;-~d him to invade Et:hJop11l lll:lr.uminc thuc th~ Bt·tt'lr;h -would ltot fight;. ;,r..:;_ I~:ttle.'l:' ·made hia moves in the lutter pnrt of the 30's when he lcc.rncd that 11 xrd.l.l.icn Eri.cinh ~>icncd again thin kind of petition. To h:lrn. it was: an obvioue f;;.c.:; that: the British do no·t \-mot to ficht. They w111 not fight ·and he could

.e.ffo,:<.! anything 1 and hia gamble was not that bad. lie pushed quite t\ lot t~<7fcp< the Et:itiah !:loved in.

A: Of course, thllt's th~ one ching ~o•c haven't talked about and thac is thac it'S · the th:lne that. we don't .,.p,!nd much timn -- we don't spend ~much · til:lc ~sonizing over that qucGtion a« we do over programs for hardware and budgetc, rcadinc!la of forces nnd the nor1nnl thingR we do and that is the will of our goc.i pco?l!:~. ":1d, of cour~>c. "'e carne ouc of a very long and traumatic c~periance in \'i'ltr:.s.-;n. W<! 're !Jtartins; to come out of it; pco{)le will tall~ c.bout these t:hinr;s, as I aay t:v7o or three years a&o they wouldn't. . And I <tm still enou&h of a•t . opt:!.ud.at to think that once the ·Amcriclln people arc informed • they will make th•~ ~:!.;;ht C.eci!lions on things thilt nrc really in1portant. I think the Conaress ,_il_l: coo. I think they will step up t:hinSR thnt ut·e n'oat 1:mportant. 'But ~c ce:rt:a:t,.t~l:f d:Ldn 1 t act that '.ray in Angola and no one involved in Congress is pt:ohi.bi.ting tn;

fro-;;.;. S?e-ading money to provide · Gomc:- bnlnnc.c to tl1c Soviet initiative wh:ich we conce:ivubly could ha•.tc -- thnt it: would huvc done locally wasn't as important, :t th:!.nlt. ll!l whn.t '~~1<3 wo·uld have done in the lons range in tcrmr. of Sovi.et atnl<:::5C­

r;:ent: of the United States. And not only Sovi_et but everybody else.

I had a d:iscussion last wc.-:k in London with the Fir,;t. Sealord, I guess Ashmo-re i!l his nat:te, and we w~1.·e juat tulking ar; dinner about the problems of_ the ~•orld, the Hid-E3:it, and fir~>t and fore:r.ost NATO community, o.nd he said ', :10\> kno;-:, wa h.:!dn.' t touched th~~ pr:l.t:te problem in the wo-rld. And I said, "•hat:' s tlu: t 1 lie ~:~aid th~ big qudstion m<lrk about tile Unitl:\d St.ntes. Hns the Unitc?cl St~t:c·~ ~ ·· raally sot: che sl:oo•••ch for thi.a? Arc they golns co sc<~ ic througb?

Q: ~~~~ did you answer? A: I aaid, no, we hadn't. l w;lrHI.'t going to discuss it with him> I _would

lik~ to 6<:knowledge it is one ~hnle of a prublem. And I could have be~n naaty ::.-ad t:.:o.!.d, wall., you al.l have c,;pcricnc,~d th;lt • how do YO'-' see it, or somct.h:l.I'lf:, b~et:u~e th~y did just whet you sald -and then. Creat Britain, :Lt's a pathet:tc th1.n:> It juot makea you want to c.ry. Th~y ar~ no longer u world po\.,eX'. All th.a~· have r;ot are s~nerals and admiral,; and bands.

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{'rrmu<:ript from an imperfect tlll,)C .of ll port10t\ of an :1nt~r.V.1!.!W . ~i~h Gencr~l Georse S. Bro~~. nnd Ranan Lu~ie on April 12, 1976 &r~~~cri~ed Oct~ber 18, l976)

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4. Q: A..-.d h:1story'l A: T~~Y do thineG 1~ grcae ~tyle --.&rand Gtyle, Cod, they do them b1g'

o:-. tha protocol s:tde -- but it m>ll~en you a:1c.k to sec their forces -talk about l~;~at they can de ••• to feGl like they can come back sometimes 1 and we're soing ::.o tt..lss thr~m, they are going to miao them in the l-U.ddle East. tl1ey had a way w:l.&:h tho~e peo11le out there thAt we juat llavcn't:, we couldn't acquire 'i.n I ~~enty-f:tve or th:1rty ycara.

Q: Speaking about the l-1iddle Eaot from n purely m1.11tary point of vi.ew, ~-~;>ulc }'OU .aay thllt from the AmcriCJill elobal ot-rntegic intel:eat. militarily. :'..c I~ra.~l ~ntd its forcer; more a l>urdcn or tnorc a. blcfloinS £rom a pure military ?Oint of view. to the United Stf.l.t:ea'?

A: t,'cll. I think, :1t's _just cot to be cot,Gidcrcd n burden. r · had this sa·C:le conversatton with Javits right aft:er I got in trouble do~.'ll ut Duke. We had breakfa&t and were talkine and he 6nid to me, can't you aee the great strategic ,_•a.l.l\~ of It>::•:~cl to the United StatcG and I nuid franttly no, which w~tsn' t the point I t.:~s tall~ing about at Duke at: all, but my concern there is that they're a burden, now if the tr~nds were reversed, then I could -sec in the lonG term '"h..:re that l!',ieht be.· a tremcnd,-,us .(l.t>:i!Ct, whct.·c they would ga:1n po-wer and could b:-ing about stabil.it:y in the area.

Q: If Israel would win for inst•lnco'l A: Yeah, but you see the problt-.m today is, todiJ.y there is stal)ility

hccausc Israel is strong. She could t.;hip Syria nnd E&'J'Pt handily v.nd there i:; nobod:~· clce ~n control in that nrea unlcns the Russians took a direct hand· By that ! me::tn send forces in uddl tiun to equipm,·.nt et'1d advisors and that's n<.'t l..l.lc:ely, it's just not 1<70'"1:h the sain llt: thin point.

But ~dth all the money, the wealth, that the Arabs have throuch Saudi t•"t:ab1.a. (in~:.td Lbl.e) p'L"i1uarily , um\ Lihya in ru.:conl1cry. To buy weavons, to t1:~in r.copla. and they're br~eding at a hell <>f a. rate. Thei-r birthrt\te -­::hoitit· POl"!Ul<tt:ion gro~-1th is ;ar ereutcr tban I1Jruel, and the long tern outlook i::~ thac che A:;:ab stnc.-~s are going to overcome the c!cfic1ency t:h"t they've had, ~.-h:Lch. i.s le.-ldcrship. and technology, nnd educated people. 1. just don • t see <ln)" -- i.t' s soins to t:al~c n c.omrlcte change i.n outlook on Iarael' s part. where \!P to thiu poi.nt at l~ast t:hG's maintained her poeition. Ant! I· must so.y :if I K•::r.;: in th.~ir shoe~;. I don't know, I'd be in u terrible dilemma QCCause she's 5ttr.roun<lad by people who ~o.•ould j ua t 111J soon s~c her puoh!!d into the sen.

Q: You don•t believe they really want to do :tt, to have a legit:1.mate do·-7n-to-e~rth peace. the il.rahG 1 ·

A: I think they do in their 6l1ort tcl:'m, by that I !!lean in 15-20 years, they have l't\) other option. I would thiti!(. thAt if, for inf.ltt~nce, Saudi Arabia, ·t~h:tch 1~ th~ ~n:r to the thing as she hn~=> the bulk, CO\Il d j uot go on a nation-buildll'lS' pt."Ol;r<un. t.o k~cp totall}• occupied for a lons tir.:c nnd thet\ they help~d Egypt ::o uet: on her feet economically at one time. 'Ihny couldn't worry llbout Israoal, but th~y 'vc eot a th1.ng, they' r~ v~ry. very oinc.~ro about tho so Uoly Lat\ds, And Mo=-.c accot>to<:!u::i.on has got to be fo•.md where Je't"utH\lc~:~ c;1n be shnrcd by tho ~eli0~onB co whom it would be ~cnnincful. nut I cun't uee Israel as an asset co the Uni.t;ed Statea tod.:ly.

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... . 1 (Transcript fro:1 ·an it:lperfect tape of n portion of nn interview with .-..:, .. G~~a=al Cuorgo s. Brown, and 'Ranoa\ Lurie, on Ap-ril 12, 1976, tra.}\scribed

October ~s. 1976) 5.

Q: This theory thnt'e paralleling it, for instance, to France once rranc~ dctaehi$d hc"t'self from Iorael, the fnct is thnt Fnmce lost any levera&e whatso­ever l'>he" hs.d with the Arnbs because she put herself out of the game.

A: Yes.

Q: Right now the United States is the only power, the only force in the world that has any leverage whntaoever on tho Israelio. Therefore, the7 have trcir,endous cl.out w.ith the ArabR.

· .\; That i;s exactl.y. ri.~ht. t.Ja h:1vo got . n l.ittl.e with the Saud:f.s, I tbini~ if we uae it wise~y becau~e of the Saudin concern for communism.

Q: Ri.Bht. A: You know, I think, gcnu:t.ncly the Saudis aro more concerned with the t...

Soviets probably than they. nrc wi.th the Is1:aelia. I

Q: R:1.ght. r .t...: I think the Saudis ar~ g~nu1ncly concerned about the Sovi.et suppliel!'.

Th.:1y -~re conccrn¢d about Iarnel. prinun:i.ly because of the Holy Land, they bough t: an e-:it:ree into Jerusalem. I th:lnk they genuinel.y bavc u concern for the PLC _.,_,,,; all theac other g.;.:1eral problem!l that arc not real. heartburn issues with the:n, at lea~t that's what I detect from my conversations.

Q: Among yot.:r way of think:lng, whi.ch I happen to ogree very much .about thH s~udis cowput:ing the co"l!'.muniat background 11nd so on, I wonder i.f the S11uO::L• are rc:a..tly that fanaticnll.y in love with the PLO, due to the fact that: chc Pi..O bs.aicnlly once they establish themselves, you are soing to have nnother P..lbi:n'.:L,'-1

A.: (Inaudibl.e)

Q: Sure. Therefore, mnybe it i.s jur.t aome kind of lip'service because baeicnlly I don • t know- if they arc so h>lppy t:o have thia kind of th-reat becaJ,.15c.. · •

A.: ~ot only that. they s.ct some land e.nd establish the Pa~cstin.ian &ta!;.;;~ it's not go:lng t:o be a vi~ble thing, somebody'& going to hnve to sur>port th"''-'· l

Th~~y' re goi.ng to look .at othct: Arubs and the fellow with the money i.s Saudi t .. rl::ul,· . .L

Q: Rich uncle. A: That's rieht. Now the ocher concern over tlu~rc is Iran and there o;.f.:;.s:.; t:

::tny question of why she 1 s buildin& auch a tremendous mi.l:l.tary force. She. co1.:ilAr1'-:: 'With her popula.ti.on, do Dnytbing that t-fould provida protection from the Sov!et Union, there's a real threttt. She's got nde<\u:lte pOt-lCX' now to ·handle Afghe.nL:t ::; .: and ?ckistan, so that's -- so if th.cy were a thrent you can discount. that. lr:-.;., Ch::l' a a little better tnntch for. Iraq now. Gosh, the programs the Shah patr •. ·· c:om:l..na, it just makes yuu wonder about whether h~ doasn' t "som~ de.y have v:Lsi.c:l··, of the Persi.an'Empire.

Q: Ce"t't~i.nly. 1

A: They don't cnll that thG l>orl31an Cutf for nothina. Dut, lof com:nc.. o·.-·,.. concern ~•!th the Hiddlc East :to her trem~ndomt oil. Our dependc.n.ce runs ahcu!: · 17-~8 pe~cent now • :t cu~s;;. of our n;ltionnl. consutuption and you have e.tl · of; E~.:·..-n?•l Ja?nn, :lt 1

G just got to COntl.nu~ t:O f~oW or the Worl.d :ls t;o:lng. to chang.a, i.t 1 $ f'.•h

going to be the world we know.

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I · (T-ranacript from an icperf.,.ct t~ll"' or a portion of n.n :f:ntcrview Hith ··Gcl:'l.~ial Georges; Bro• .. n\, and P.anan 1..urie,· on Apr:f:l · J,-2 ·, '1976, trunsc-;ibed Oc~ober ~-a-, ... l9J6) · .· · ·

·' ... ... ' .. Q: As to the · per~on :lnvolv.:tcl (tnaudibl~) as to us, there ,.,ere so many

Ar.c! th.!t-.:e arc so m~ny of the rtunor:J r:Lght no1.r abouc U!J being behind- the Rusa_:L~n~ • bttec\:\ing the second most pol.;rer!ul nnt:1.on·• · QO you a~ree wit:h that? .

A: I do on one aeswnpti.on. It's a ver:y bi<; "if" o.1nd the "if" is :if it if; p~r:n.tcced tQ happGn but Cl;lL'tainl:,r \JiJ hav~n' t rcac~hfld that: point to,iay, an<! if t:hc United States people decide .c<r1et Cont;-ccss t:o, that it's not worth .:o,e!lc!.ln::: the m.oney to· invest resources ~~e no:::ed to do the Defense job, . then obv1.ous~y -we a1:e goi.n3 to fall behind. Trendt:l over i:he past five year.s and :Ln s.~:n-~ ca~es tea. yea:pt are l:l:l.Sl!!adine; in thl$:1r appearnnces. Therefore, these t-rend:.::. h~ve got to _be reve-rr;ed; we've cot to chnnge tht.."lll . . And _that 's whot t:hi:; Prasi.<!.ant start$ to do} it: does, in fact, h.:>ve som~. t>omc rc:tl :Lnvestme~"\t about t•o pel:' cent, wh:Lch isn't a lot:, but· it doc:s bre~k thac cuxva.

SQ~, the thing that, there 'u on crrono=~ot·,~ opinion h<!ld by too many "peop:!..e c;,ae th:!.n military establishment in t:his country kind of feeds on i.tsolf; th<:it; t!t~ need fo:- new weapor-..s syste1:1s, invent4lent in hard;,r:Jre, wouldn' c be th.a-re if t:!--.e ?e.::.ta.gon wasn't: ah1ayG pushing to huvc :it: there. \~ell, that's not true. '!he m!.l:!.tary establish:nenr:, you know really has no life of its O~·m, it' B bosed

. C!l. wha.r: l.,.c ·see; as the threat, otl the ta:1k to be p.:.rformed, and '"hat risk$ t:h<n;-c.,_ nra. ~{o~. the tasl<. to be performed is &<!t do-;.'T\ in effect in basic nationa!. sec~,trity policy and they' rc the gener:11 t;ort of: t:hin~s that you \•tould, expuct sue!. 0!!.3 sharL"lt; tlte. continuE>cd ~:~afct:y of t-he country. of det:err:l.ng war; now i.f tl~e C:at;ut:r•."!nce fail9. being able to fit;ht on r.~a~on<:~ble tcrr.w, ~these 1<:-indu of th:Lr.fi, <~ •

Now- th•::! threat; the-re'll only one threat nnd that comes from -the Sovi~t Unio_.-:. a-.."ld the cst:ioa~e of that thre_;:~.t within t:hlr.; ~;ovc-rnmt:nt is a3rced :i.f there i.s cnl}· n di.ff<:I.'ence of view when you get into the o utycar:.; at~d t:her1! 're the viet-;s ex­pL·es-se·! :tn the band _of an c!>t:imlll'~ h!.&h nnd low, The Congrt;ss then, he.ari.ng

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t:h~ Defense posture t:tatc~::lent of the Secr.,:!t"ry nnd my t::tater.lent :ln suppot:t: of ·it; I =<!e on the !nt:e~~iscnce si.de. c;m do t."..•o ::hincu. since it c<1n' t chn.n3e t:he th:· -· -i.t Cil-::1. che.nge the tasks we huve but: j u:;:: don't have the oth~l: re.soucc<.!S to do th:. ·. oc it c.-:n ask the country to act:cp:: u b1r,:;cr risk th:1n the Chief!.> feel is prutl.-2:.:; <: • l!uvinz e:-:pressed that r.i!Jk ::o the St!crct:ary und th-i Nnt:ional Security Co:.mc:i 1 -!H'·; tha Pre&1dent:, aod h~tvi.ng that: ~greed in the Executive Branch, then the bud~f:t ::."' st:-::ucturc.d, presented to the Congrc:;n, end .at: I say sine\! they can't change the: t:h-r.aac, they've not f;Ccn fit to chnnt~c ~h~ t.ask to be performed, can otlly ask th·· country to assume a greater r~ok.

Not,r th3.t 1 a what they've done in th~ pa!Jt. For the p:.1sr X-yasrs, I gucs::;: f-<,~ or G:U:, .s:inc~ I've iookcd a.!: th~ fieurc!>, :l.t' ~ bctl.rc.:n $30 ;:;.nd $40 billion in groo:;; t:e:cm!> t:l1uc thay've t.:tkcn frurn the Prc:;fdc,H:'o - bu<lr,·~t: i't:om year to ),.~.;~ r . In th~<o meal:'.ti.mc. the Russlans h:lv<~ "'l''~nt:, th•!!. Soviet Union has bc.on. buildine .a Yery, very powerful 4l:llitary m•H:hlne '-ltl.:l l don't. C.:!t cm:riud m-tny with the n t:!:.: u;.;~e.<.H;:~.-~n t: in doll11r-rubla l:i~l:rn:.>; othc1.·:; ur.'-! t.ot.'llly ttbuurbed in that~ b•J~; ·ln~l>>; · 'Zh(,! t:hi~t~ I notice is thac they Olre able to equip their forces -- th~y al:"e tr.cc•~:.:- - .: i~i.ng cons::.antly and they have cquf.pmunc reatly t:o c>-.port. t-!hcn they go, li~.:o :t - :. ·. w~el' . t:.o Kenya (s:t.c)•~ and made a coar.ntt:nuilut: ••• . -*Libya_

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(":ransc-ri:Jt frau• an imperfect tnpe of a portion of en interv1et.Y wi.th 6. Cotn&'t'~l Gaori~P. S. Bro-...-n·, ·and Rnnnn Lurie, on A!>ril 12, 1976, tranacri.bed October 18, 976)

Q: What about Lebanon, right now, ch(lnutng 1nto what:. ''c cnn cnll in ?~.:l~~tic t~r~3, a new ~cry Cl:t~croc lcfc rcgim~ in n very Vital Spot?

A: It could, but I'm r.ot prepared to. be quite that optimistic. If chis .:cu:i;)fire •••

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Q: I'm sorry, I'm peaaim1.atic, bcctlunc I anid it'a becocdns a lcfc regi-e:~. A: I say, you're pessimiatic, I'm a little norc optir.usti.c. I think that

1!: thi.~ ceaccfi.re holds throuzh the "·'"' of the rnnth. whi.ch it must, which they ha·.-e that: .a);cen:;::to.n. until today ••• tlH~ Syl~ianl'l . hllvc been very const1.·nincd in their militaJ:y outl.oo!~ sn.u have provided the ~;t~biliz:1.ng balance then~ i.f you could get a re!;itiH!, IJ,j!!lfoll:hitl& .::omc.o out of this election that h:l.H not ns radical aa you suspect it ::U~~H: lH~. it \-.'ill hnve Syrian SUElpOrt and tMybc. just tMybe. they can curry .it out. !f it co~c.s out coo radical. I think wo're &Oins to have p~enty of trouble ov~~ chet:.:!. .

Q: Interior? A: Cl)nt'i.nued trouble within Lebnnon. Ic's nnazing. It's been amazing to

t:H'; that. they've been able. to fight thia lont; on n ocale that; they have and the t:re:;:.;.;;t<Jous destruction and disruption of the country and hnve the rest of the H:!.d~l.e Enst: k:ln<l of keep hands off. SyrintU-J have sort of bo>~cd it it\ order co • m.::.i~lt.ail1. nome de:grce: of contr.al· without llct:u•llly givinG in. cmd forcing th<:m to t::..kc 'this place ovar. The I~:>ro.cl:I.R hav.~ been very restrained. Both have watched it; both have mnde ntat~mcntli the othl!l:' underst:and~.

Q: Are . t:hese Israelis. res trained also beCilliHe of t:he American pressure? A: As far a::J I know :f t huan' t: been neccB~w.ry to apply it. I thin!~ they're

rc.utratr.ed pric;;~.rily because t:his ian' t: a provoc.'ltion ovc.r wll:!.ch they are pr.::pared t•> ~~o to \.t;:lr, and ::he ~eGson of the la!';t \-lllr to them was that the casualite6 were .., hoac:.. of a lot: heavier th<J.n they t<lcre prcpat:c.d t:l1 take. A few years azo :to. some ~·~ th"l e.:'!rlJ.-.r -.tart'>. they were quickly dec:Lc.ive·, tho casualti~s were reasonable · (;;.nd/or) didrl' t .. ,ant to take c.~lY . Thin last ti:m~, they took ver:y heavy 1 ' ; .:.-~;u.J..!.tieo the first four or five w~el<.s. · I con' t: think that anwll country wants . ::;., si::e t1":.at acnin or can afford· to sec politically c<ln' t:.,do . .i.t ·1 don't thiok, they :~.~v.:-: had cre-.ne11dous inearnal problcr.1s .us you l~now, bett:er thlln I, you 've bc'!n ove:::­:he~~ (i~audiblc) . They are o~ar~xt:cnded bcc.nuae of ehe tremendous militn~y burden Cho~ have , and I &ucss that if we were in their strllights, we would be too.

Q: t-T!t.:lt about this peculiar ui.tuntiotl that t:ATO ia facing right now t,•1.th, I c~<n envis ion beinz a cartoonist Dlycel.f , NATO wnr room \dt:h t>ome Communist •~·!•· . .::::.al:-~ , or .;)i: Cf>ur~c, I am talltinr: extrcmO:!Il hui·a but gcnorala wll<:> r.,,prcsent •a !:!>'"t:L'nH;.•;.L.t that tr.a.y have a com.'":luniut !·tlniater of Dcfenae or at least n communist ~!inioter of Tl.·<lr-.cportation.

A: \-'ell, of course, Kissinger haD Gaid we cun't pcrr.dt it.

Q! ,,'1-ult can we do in order to execut:P. thit.> non-pcrmiss1.on? A: ~·:ell. we cAn do several thinca. The Council of Ministers, c.nd unde"t" that,_

t:il~ SacrE:t:n:y Cen<:•l~al :md Defenue l·!l.t\is;tc.r:J cnu actually take etc.ps to restrict the­ci:;tr"lbu<:ton of any classified r.laterilll. They c::an ha.vc reut:r:f.cted sc!ltdona of coy COI.!ncil, pn.rticularly on the m:Llit.:lry Gidc. as we hsve done from titne to t:f.m~ Yi.th I'or~;uzal. t·!e have done continuously with Frunce whun she opted out: of tha ~tlitary ~ida and we have done to a degree with

( END OF TAPE )

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OCTOBER 18, 1976

Office of the \\'hite House Press Secretary ---------- -------- --- --------------------------------------------- -- - - - - --- --- - .

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President has reviewed the material made public today

by the Defense Department concerning General Brown's interview.

The President also has discussed the matter with Secretary

Rumsfeld. The President made it clear to Secretary Rumsfeld

that he does not agree with the General's poor choice of words in

portions of the interview.

Based on General Brown's statement issued today and Secretary

Rumsfeld's news conference, the President considers the matter

closed.

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.. ~ ,' . . • ~ ' ;-· t . · : · 1. a.~. adyi$e(l th~t ~ir.t& FiH1turt1a Syndic.o.te bt'ls. ~~r w:Ul lJOOti .rele.ase an

artiele~.,ba~~d ~n an:··int~-r;vi~w tll'ith 'roe last AVril, e;ow~ six months ag0 7 ·a'nd' dtrit th<t arti~l~ contains G,oroe quotes attributed ~o ~e,. · · ~

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I. "'iah eo :'ha1f~ my thoujlht~ u.ndcrato::>d 'o!lod P.lae~'d in p-ro-pet context.. ' . .. . . . . ' I .

• ' • • r ~ , • ·• . . i:·. . , . I was ~sk~~ whetlte't. f~9m a . purely mi.l1.t&ry p~~tn: o! vi~w Ia-rtv~l and

· ittl arm~d forcM I were ''root'~ of a ~urdcin or mo.re of. a: blessinsu to [tlopal . S~t\'it.tt:·i;fc: . iTttetesta; It is correct 't.hat' {l.'Ol%1 that narrow point of view~ l

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~>.-ne~;-,et·e-.1 t:hat I tbpu.~hr; .it ltad to 1>~ conllidered $. 'bu;t.·deri; hut I added t1'l.t-t.t ! could ·sea in · the long t.et'.tu ~11nre. thG}f ,mf&nt b~ 4l {nnrir.;p<L0.1JA csset Vb6i.~·~ thcty ~rould l'r~rtS Gtabil.it.:Y t;l!l tho. ar<t.Q. l

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.·.· · .z.·u~Eh~t ~· ~Y, p~int was :thJft . n~s1:st1nt I,a1:a;i G~ :~~ did . and: iii -my v.to""'• . . a.s wet. ~hOll.J.d h~ve., di4 in f.nct ;ruquire that we draw po\o"P some TJ. s. , eq,u~pmJ:1.t1t.~ That is a fact of wb'ir.l"i.. eve'ryon~ is ·nware, but. it should n<'1t. be seen a.s. lileat~;lns th~t l i~}tity "''.'1}~ • disqgt:G.'e'd ~ith U.S, policy then ' o:r now. ·t ·did !not end 1 do not. . . . " ,f

hr<l~l s~·ares witb the' Uni.tcd :scates baaic d~~~~~ratic valuas long' . ·~li~r.:t$1\.e;d: i~ our .C.Olii\t;ry • . ·_The ddeus~ of th~~\G · val'H~tt iE' cruc;~a.l to the survival'i Of·:·li ·>::.:::. l.lcq of life on th.is planet wh~eh is •com~atibl~ with :o\lr ideals. Besausc. :o~ . . these oyetti~in& c.onside rtit.iol:\s. 'u.S. policy . to"·ai:·d ~st·ne~ over .t.he-. yaats .has b~e.n clear: we are ful:J.Y. Ct"tmndt:tud to itG aec:urity and a.urviva.J:. 1 bel.ieve. in· that policy wb~lehG~artediy; '·Nv 'pe-.rson.al llctions ·~n BI.\J?f>Ort of !GraeX, and :t.r.. tb~ ftu:·ch~·rance. of it,s ~Hitai}t .n~e~a and it;a t?dl;~tary &ec~r1ty siv~ · PF9?.£, to -mY ful.l p.~rsonal com.mitruenl: to the s'ecuri~Y. ~n(f s.ur.vival of . th~ ~re~ . s~a.t.e

· of Isue.l. · · · · ! } · ") F \ Th~ · at~i.cl.e Cl:i:~o. l~1ives the impr~.'ssion thl)t I s . .:li.d the United. Stat'~~

doeE. not ll;>lV~ t.he. "stomaeh" to face up tc cha1hn&l#~·. As our x:e:c.ot"~11.~S of. ttl~ ·intuvht.~ ,in~i.~atea. I ~id not: ' say that. I hJtd :returwil to a tc;c.et\t

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~o~ver~>Jati:,.n •. which . ranaed ovex: mo.u)' p1:o~,lema of fh~ wot'ld, .in. ·wh~ch - I tta.:t.d that th~ .1ndiv·tdual r had been telk1na witl1 ()bsf!rved that v~ ha~ oa~

·. ye:t . discussed the u-pr.ime pi·oblem o( che ··-4orld." t\l~ ' question about' the · tlr.-i.ted States . and ~hethex- th...., U.S. had · "really ~ot, t:)ut oto111ach for t~is. 11

·r ~ns~,1ered --'.'No; we h&dn.'r;" :._ -c.•hic.h m<!a.nt., nove )uidtl't dis.cu~sed .. tb~t i~i;ue. H:~. ans\ier did 'OOt wean that tho u.s. didu't ·have the ·stontac.h, "I · beli.~ve this iri'te-r.pretaHon is cle.ar £rom our -re.c.ording. .certainly·, it, .{s what ! meant • . ···For ' example; in t.hat interviav, t c!Httphatii.zed that the .Americ~n

· p6ople and the. Ca~grt:~ss ·. m&l<;e ·"tbe riaht ·dueidoas on; th:Lnga that a:re reallj'. 'i umox:tarit .-" .: : ' · . · · · · · t .. ' .. I . . ' ·I ; .

·. 'Remari<.o e:onckrt~ins: the A1:mad 'Forces of tl•e Onitkd JUn~dom '-·~'re spoke)l : "O·ut of compassion lmd · ·uoders.tanding. ! said ~e "•oulp misa th'etn i\1 the . . . . Hiddle· East • where the.y ·were withdra"'•ing their fo:tctt&. becaus:e of their .lo'!ls.'

.. u:Pe-rience. · ·At::e:d.<:ans 'understand •~nu sywpathi~:c- vith the. current economic · · difficulties the nr.:ithh paople are &oin& tli-rou&h~ . :we also knov.• their . gallantry. The"!='e dl;'e no br~v<n.· peaph. 1 hllVII t:hf: Graote~t adtll;i.~at:t.on : at\d re&pe~t ·for Her· Maj4sty's hi&hly t'tofcl'.t~ion&l,Artned l'orces. .

• • • • t • • • • ·: • • • • • . • • • ,, • .t. Finally. I . Wc'ictt to s:a}• 'that, i\'1 tny view; thG- .Shah of It"an hae· done _ap.d·

b· · doin~ an :i,mm'e.n&e atr.ount for thia' CO\tn~ry, He' ·nas~ done ~o 'in a . \Jay th~t . has demc-Mtl'a.ted his ·cotumon intet't;:f1t.e ·"'·ith th~ Unite(! States a1.\d it~ al.lies. Re ~orre.c.t.lj'. uee.s . a ne~d f. or !'rAn . to be mili t.QTil)\ s~rons. and ~hus·. : is . . .. . Btr~ngt~erling his Armad ·Force~> -- under C:Ot'ld~tions t .ha.t e.erve. no-t only l,r_at\' S · · seeurity i.nteTeats, but nlso those of the '1-'reC! ·'"odd: I have no r~asori 'to · . · l>el£eve t·hat he hae any .. nspiiati.ona beyood continuing to ably ' lead hie natiott. and contribute .t;~ ~tabi;-tit'y .: ~ti t.ha't part, o! t.he wo'rl~. ' · ' · · · ·. . .

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