Brittain, Charles, And John Palmer_The New Academy's Appeals to the Presocratics_Phronesis, 46, 1_2001!38!72

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1/36

The New Academy's Appeals to the Presocratics

Author(s): Charles Brittain and John PalmerSource: Phronesis, Vol. 46, No. 1, Problems of Matter and Evil in the (Neo)Platonic Tradition(Feb., 2001), pp. 38-72Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182663 .

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2/36

The New

Academy's Appeals

to the Presocratics

CHARLESBRI1TAIN

AND

JOHN PALMER

ABSTRACT

Members of the

New Academy presented

their

sceptical position as

the culmi-

nation of a progressive development in the history of philosophy,which began

when certain

Presocratics

started to

reflect on the epistemic

status

of their theo-

retical claims

concerning

the natures

of things. The

Academics' dogmatic oppo-

nents accused

them of misrepresenting

he early philosophers

in an illegitimate

attempt

to claim respectable

precedents

for their dangerous

position.

The en-

suing debate

over the extent

to which some

form of

scepticism might

properly

be attributed

to the Presocratics

is reflected

in various

passages in

Cicero's

Academica.

In this

essay, we try to

get clearer about

the precise nature

of the

Academics'

historical claim

and their view

of the general lesson

to be

learned

from reflection

on the history

of philosophy

down to their

own time. The

Academics saw the Presocratics

as

providing some

kind

of

support

for the the-

sis that things are non-cognitive,or, more specifically, that neither the senses nor

reason furnishes

a

criterion

of truth. As this

view is susceptible to both

'dialec-

tical' and

non-dialectical

readings,

we consider the prospects

for each.

We

also

examine the

evidence for the varied functions

both of the Academics'

specific

appeals

to individual Presocratics

and of their collections

of the Presocratics'

divergent

opinions. What

emerges

is a better understanding

of

why

the Acad-

emics were concerned

with

claiming

the

Presocratics as

sceptical

ancestors

and

of

the precise

mannerin

which

they advanced this claim.

Ever since philosophy

attained

a measure of maturity

as a

discipline, philoso-

phers

have looked

to the

great

figures

of the

past

for

inspiration

and,

equally importantly, have reflected upon the lessons to be learned from

their

discipline's history.

The

members of the

New

Academy

were no

exception, and

the

past

few decades

have

yielded

a better understanding

of some of the ways

in which they were able plausibly

to

present

them-

selves as

true defenders of their Academic

inheritance.' But the

Academics

Accepted September2000

'

See

W.

Burkert,

Cicero als Platoniker

und Skeptiker.Zum

Platonsverstandnis

er

Neuen

Akademie',

Gymnasium

72 (1965),

175-200;

H.-J. Kramer,

Platonismus

und

hellenistische Philosophie (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter,1971), 14-107; J. Glucker,

Antiochus

and the Late Academy,

Hypomnemata

56

(Gottingen:

Vandenhoeck

&

Ruprecht,

1978),

31-64; G.

Calogero,

'Socratismo

e scetticismo

nel

pensiero antico',

(

Koninklijke

Brill

NV, Leiden,

2001

Phronesis

XLVIII


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3/36

THE NEW ACADEMY'S APPEALS TO THE

PRESOCRATICS 39

also presented their philosophy as the culmination of trends in epistemol-

ogy that began as

far

back

as Xenophanes.

This

claim deserves more

attention

than

it has received,

not

only

because of its importance for

understanding the sceptical stance

of

the New

Academy,

but

also

because

it offers

a

particularly intriguing example

of

how Greek philosophy

tended

to develop through reflection on its

own

history.2

The Academics'

appeals

to the Presocratics

also

made

for

a

lively

debate with

their

dogmatic oppo-

nents

over the

extent

to

which some

form

of

scepticism might properly

be

attributedto the early Greek philosophers.

This

question continues

to be

controversial even today; since it arises largely because the interest the

ancient sceptics took

in these

figures proved responsible

for

the preserva-

tion

of

a substantial

portion

of

our

evidence

for

Presocratic

epistemology,

it seems worth asking what

the

sceptics'

view of the question was.

Modem

views

on the legitimacy of attributing

some form of scepticism to the

Presocratics of course vary, but there is general agreement that none of

the early Greek philosophers subscribed to the radical form of scepticism

promoted by Arcesilaus. The Academics

also agreed about this, which

makes

it all

the more

interesting

that

they

should have used the Presocrat-

ics in articulating their own sceptical stance.

in

G.

Giannantoni ed.),

Lo

scetticismo antico,

vol.

1, Elenchos

6

(Naples: Bibliopolis,

1981), 35-46; P. Woodruff, 'The skeptical side of Plato's method', Revue Inter-

nationale

de

Philosophie 40 (1986), 22-37; A. A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic phi-

losophy', Classical Quarterly 38 (1988), 150-71, repr. with afterward in his Stoic

Studies

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996), 1-34,

at

1

1-16;

J.

Annas,

'Platon

le sceptique', Revue de metaphysiqueet de

morale

95 (1990), 267-91; C. Ldvy, 'Platon,

Arce-silas, Carnmade

-

Reponse

'a J.

Annas', Revue

de

metaphysique

et de

morale

95

(1990), 293-306; J. Annas, 'Plato

the

sceptic',

Oxford

Studies in Ancient Philosophy,

suppl.

vol.

1992, 43-72, repr. with afterward in P. A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The

Socratic

Movement

Ithaca,

NY:

Cornell

University Press, 1994), 309-40;

C. J.

Shields,

'Soc-rates among

the

Skeptics',

in

Vander Waerdt (1994), 341-66;

A. M.

loppolo,

'Socrate nelle tradizioni accademica e pirroniana',

in

G. Giannantoni (ed.), La

tradizione

Socratica:

seminario di studi

(Naples: Bibliopolis, 1995), 89-123;

and

J.

Glucker,

'Socrates in the

Academic books and other

Ciceronian

works',

in

B.

Inwood

and

J. Mansfeld

(edd.),

Assent

and Argument:Studies

in

Cicero's Academic

Books

(Leiden/New York/Koln: Brill, 1997), 58-88.

2

There has been no previous study devoted specifically to this topic. When the

more prominent,general works on ancient scepticism mention the subject, they do so

more or less incidentally and tend towards paraphrase f Cicero or Plutarch.See, how-

ever,

D.

Sedley,

'The

motivation

of

Greek skepticism',

in

M.

F.

Burnyeat (ed.), The

Skeptical

Tradition

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 9-29,

at

9-10 and

15-16; and

M.

F.

Burnyeat, 'Antipater and self-refutation', in Inwood

and

Mansfeld

(1997), 277-310, at 295-7.




4/36

40 CHARLES BRITTAIN AND

JOHN

PALMER

In trying to understand the Academics' appeals to the Presocratics, we

shall not be directly concerned with the

modern question of whether some

variety of scepticism can properly be

attributed to any of the early Greek

philosophers: we shall not be arguing

that the Academics' engagement

with the Presocratics tells us something

significant about the Presocratics

in

their

own right. Our concern

is

rather

with

sketching

the

main features

of a philosophically significant use

of

the Presocratics, regardless of

its

historical accuracy,

in

the hope

of

furthering

our

understandingof the

New

Academy.

Nor

do

we propose

to

discuss

in any detail

the

important role

played by the Academics in the development of the sceptical strain within

the

doxographical tradition,3

since

a more

precise understanding

of

the

philosophical use the Academics made of

the

Presocratics seems a neces-

sary preliminary

to

any investigation

into this

complex subject.4

Our

attempt to understandthis use concentrates

on Cicero's

Academica, as

this

is the only source that provides detailed and direct information regarding

the Academics'

appeals. Proper

assessment

of

any

further

evidence

in

other

sources

will

have

to

depend

on a

fuller understanding

of

the Academics'

strategies as represented in this text. Perhaps the most notable case

in

point is Plutarch's report that Arcesilaus was accused by certain contem-

poraries

of

attributing

his own

views

regarding epoche

and

akatalepsia,

not

only

to

Socrates and

Plato,

but

to

Parmenides

and

Heraclitus

as well

(Col.

112

1F-

122A).

The more detailed evidence

of

the Academica

sug-

gests

this

report

needs

to

be

treated

with a

fair

amount

of

caution.

The

Academics' appeals

to

the Presocratics

as

represented

in

the

Academica are remnants of four broader

contexts. What now passes as

Cicero's Academica are

in

fact lengthy

fragments of

two

separate

and

complete

versions

of

the

work

(Academica II,

or

the

Academica

Priora,

is the second book of the two-volume first edition; Academica I, or the

Academica Posteriora,

is

about half

of the first book of the four-volume

second

edition). Behind

these works lie the

original

debates between

the

Stoics

and

Academics

over

the

history

of

philosophy

and

their

continua-

tion

by

Antiochus and

Philo

(and

their

colleagues),

which Cicero tried

to

summarize

for

a Roman audience. Since

so

much

of these

original

con-

texts

is

lost

to

us, our purpose

in

this essay

is

modest.

We

try

to

explain,

3

Lactantius informs us that Arcesilaus collected the renowned

philosophers' con-

fessions

of

ignorance

as well as their mutual recriminations Inst. 111.4.1 Brandt).

4

See, however, J. Mansfeld,

'Theophrastus and the Xenophanes doxography',

Mnemosyne 40 (1987), 286-312,

at 295ff., repr. in his Studies in the

Historiography

of Greek Philosophy (Assen/Maastricht:

Van Gorcum, 1990),

147-73.




5/36

THE NEW

ACADEMY'S APPEALS TO THE

PRESOCRATICS 41

on the basis of the available evidence, why the Academics appealed

to the

Presocratics by

examining

the

general

strategies

underlying the

Academics' use of

the Presocratics in the

texts and

by

setting out

some-

thing

of the

complexity

of their

specific

appeals

to individual

philosophers.

Rather than

relying

on

speculation

about the sources of

the various

parts

of Cicero's

work, or even

assuming

at

the outset that the

extant

portions

of its two

editions

provide a

single

coherent

picture,

we examine

sepa-

rately

the sketch of an

Academic

history

of

philosophy

in

the

Academica

Posteriora

(section

I)

and the

evidence of the

Academica Priora con-

cerning the controversial Academic interpretationsof the Presocratics (sec-

tion

II)

before

attempting

to draw

some

general

conclusions.

I. The Academica

Posteriora

The

Presocratics'

position

in

the Academics'

general picture of the

lesson

to be

learned

from the

history of

philosophical

inquiry

is perhaps

clearest

in Cicero's

response to

Varro's invitation

to

explain Arcesilaus's

'defec-

tion'

from

the Old

Academy (Acad.

1.43).

Cicero

begins with an

account

of Arcesilaus's relation to his predecessors:

We

hold that

Arcesilaus's entire

struggle with

Zeno arose not from

obstinacy or

rivalry

...

in

my

view, at least

-

but from

the

obscurity of just those

subjects

(rerum

obscuritas) which had

previously led Socrates

to his

confession of

ignorance

(confessio

ignorationis).

Just

as, even

before

Socrates,

Democritus,

Anaxagoras,

Empedocles,and

practically all

the ancients had said

(A) that

noth-

ing could

be

apprehended,grasped, or

known,

(B)

that the senses are

limited,

our

minds

weak,

our

lives'

period

brief,

and

(C)

that,

as

Democritus

said,

truth is

submerged

in

an

abyss,

everything is

subject

to

opinions and

customs,

no truth

is

left, and

everything is

surroundedby

obscurity.5Therefore Arcesilaus

used to

say that there was nothingthatcould be known- not even that claim itself, which

Socrates had allowed

himself

to know

-

so hidden

in

darkness

did

he

consider

everything

that

nothing

could be

discerned or understood6

Acad.

1.44-5).

The

successive

pronouncements attributed to

the ancients here fall

natu-

rally

into three

groups, marked

(A),

(B), and

(C)

above.

(A) gives vari-

ous formulations of

the

general thesis that all

things are

non-cognitive,

I

On

the

echoes of

individual Presocratics

here,

see Appendix.

6

Each view

Cicero

attributes o

Arcesilaus

echoes a

view

attributed o

the

Presocratics

earlier in

the

passage:

negabat

esse

quidquam

quod sciri posset

(1.45) - nihil sciri

posse

(1.44); sic

omnia

latere

censebat

in

occulto (I.45)

=

rerum

obscuritate,

in pro-

fundo

veritatem

demersam,omnia

tenebris

circumfusa

(1.44);

neque esse

quidquam

quod

cerni

aut

intellegi

posset

(1.45)

=

nihil

cognosci, nihil

percipi (1.44).




6/36

42

CHARLES

BRITTAIN AND JOHN PALMER

while (B) and (C) reflect the two aspects of this thesis marked in the

earlier

portion

of the sentence

as rerum obscuritas and confessio

ignora-

tionis.

The

principal

conclusion, that the Presocratics

support

the

akatalep-

sia thesis (A),

is

explicitly justified

in this

passage by pointing

to

their

discovery

of

the apparent inability

of either reason

or the senses to guar-

antee apprehension

of the

nature of

things (B).

This leads in turn

to

their

various characterizations

of their epistemological

predicament

(C).

The

passage

is particularly

valuable for its indication of

how

the

Academics presented their

own

refined variety of scepticism

as the cul-

mination of a progressive development in the history of philosophy going

back

to the time when philosophers

first

began

to reflect on the epistemic

status of their theoretical

claims.7

Their view seems to have

run

more or

less as follows. As ambitious

in their theorizing and as diverse

in their

methods and views as the

great philosophers

prior to

Socrates may

have

been,

they nonetheless appreciated

their limited ability

to

grasp the

true

natureof

things.

This recognition (A)

manifested itself

in

various unqualified

assertions to the

effect

that all things are non-cognitive

(B)

and

ultimately

in a dogmatically sceptical

stance

regarding

our relation to truth

(C).

Socrates's scepticism introduced a new stage in the history of philosophy,

which

was at once

more reflective

and

more moderate. His confession

of

ignorance resulted

not from any theoretical

beliefs about either

the nature

of

things

or our cognitive apparatus

but from his own experience

in the

elenctic examination of

various self-styled

experts. Socrates

is

represented

as

dogmatic

in

that

he claimed to know that

he

has no

cognitive

grasp

of

anything,

but he did not

go

so far

as

to assert that

things

themselves

are

non-cognitive

since he had no further

views about why

his

elenctic exper-

iments had turned out as they had.

Arcesilaus's

innovation

introduces a

I

Although Cicero's

immediate source

for our passage may

have been Philo,

it

would

be a mistake o

suppose hat he

historical

view it presents

s doctrinallyPhilonian'.

Acad. 1.44, 'ut

accepimus',

indicates that

what follows

is a view that has been passed

down within

the Academy for

some time;

'Cum

Zenone...

Arcesilas sibi omne

cer-

tamen instituit'

means that

he did not, pace

Varro

(cf.

Atad.

1.43),

attack the

mem-

bers of the

Old Academy, not

that

he only began to

generate

his

philosophical

ideas

when

he locked horns

with Zeno; 'ut

quidemmihi

vide'ur'

is not an indication

that

the historical

sketch

represents ust

Cicero's (or

Philo's)

view but is merely

a polite

aside as he voices

disagreement

with the opposition's charge

of

pertinacia (cf.

Acad.

11.18).Section II.1 below will show that both Lucullus and

Cicero (in the Academica

Priora)

take somethingvery

much

like this to be the

standard Academic'

history (i.e.,

one which does not depend

on Philo

-

see Acad.

11.12);

and Acad. 11.15

and 16

fur-

nish good

evidence

for supposing

that its origin stretches

back to Arcesilaus

himself

(cf. infra,

n. 12).




7/36

THE NEW


PRESOCRATICS

43

still more moderate position, since he does not even claim to know that

he

knows

nothing. Rather than

asserting,

as Socrates had

done,

that

he

has

no

cognitive

grasp of

anything,

he

merely reports

that

it

appears that

none of his

impressions are

cognitive.

For all he

knows,

however,

some

of his

impressions

may

be

cognitive.

He is

just

in no

position

to

deter-

mine when this

might

be the case. His reaction

to this situation

-

with-

holding

assent or

suspending

judgement

(epoche)

-

distinguishes

his

sceptical

stance from those of both

Socrates

(followed

by

Plato,

Acad.

1.46)

and the

Presocratics. For

despite

their

respectively qualified

and

dog-

matic assertions of akatalepsia, they had nevertheless been willing to en-

dorse various

propositions

they

admittedly

did

not

know to be

true.

Thus

the Academics' view of

the

history

of

philosophy

is

designed

to

present

their

own

advocacy

of

epoche

both as

something

new and as the

culmination

of a

gradually more

reflective

turn.

At first

sight, it

may

be

tempting to dismiss this

whole

story

and

agree

with

Lucullus

(Antiochus's

representative in the

Academica

Priora)

that

the Academics

are

simply

misrepresenting

the Presocratics

so as to man-

ufacture

respectable

precedents for their

own

sceptical

innovations. But

even if, in the end, one might want to side with Lucullus on the accuracy

of the

Academics'

interpretation

of

the

Presocratics, their

general

view is

scarcely the

implausible

caricature he

makes it

out to be.

After

all, the

Presocratics

cited

by

the

Academics, engaged

as they were in

elaborating

the distinction

between

reality

and

appearance,

took

the real nature of

things to be

quite

different from how

things appear to us in

perception

and

thus

came to

question the

veracity

of

these appearances.

Furthermore,

although

they

relied

primarily upon

reason in

constructing their

accounts

of the

nature of

things,

at least

some of them

came to have

certain

doubts

about whether human reason is in fact capable of providing anything more

than

plausible

speculation

about how

things really are as

opposed to how

they appear

to

us.

(These

doubts, of

course, did

not prevent

them

from

continuing

to

pursue

their

various

physical and

metaphysical

inquiries.)

While

important

qualifications

on

this basic

story

would

obviously be nec-

essary

for

individual

thinkers, it

might

still

seem a

plausible

enough view

of the

position

of those

Presocratics

who reflected

upon

the

epistemic

standing of their own

theories.

What should

we

suppose to be the relation

between

Arcesilaus's view

of the Presocratics, as reflected here, and his own sceptical stance?

Accounts of the

origins of Arcesilaus's

scepticism tend to

focus upon

two

principal

factors:

his

debate with

Zeno

over

the

cognitive

impression

and

his return

to a

Socratic style of

philosophy. The

conclusion Arcesilaus




8/36

44

CHARLES BRI'TAIN AND

JOHN PALMER

drew, on Cicero's account, from reflectionon philosophy's history- namely,

that one

should

avoid maintaining,

asserting,

or

assenting to

anything

(Acad.

1.45)

-

is

also, of course,

the conclusion

of the

familiar

Academic

argument:

(i) everything

is non-cognitive;

(ii) where things

are

non-cog-

nitive,

one should

suspend

judgement;

therefore

(iii) one should

suspend

judgement

about

everything. Arcesilaus's

conclusion

in Academica

1.45

clearly

depends

on the intermediate

premise

taken from

the Stoics

that

the

sage

will withhold assent in cases

where

no cognitive impression

is avail-

able (cf.

Acad. 11.77), and

the arguments

for the crucial

first premise

are

usually taken to be drawn from the Academic attacks upon the Stoic doc-

trine

of the

phantasia

kataleptike.

Academica

1.44-5,

however, represents

Arcesilaus's

reflection

upon (Socrates's

and) the

Presocratics'

epistemo-

logical quandary

as having

led

him to

advance

the premise that things

are

non-cognitive:

'Therefore

(itaque) Arcesilaus

used to say

that

there was

nothing that

could

be

known'. Thus

Cicero's

reply to

Varro

indicates that

this initial premise

in the familiar Academic

argument

was

also secured

by appeal

to the

Presocratics,

and

it looks

as if this

second

means of secur-

ing

the initial premise

was

supposed

to

be as important

for Arcesilaus

as

the first.8So it seems that Arcesilaus, ratherthan merely seeking to sup-

port

his

position

by

claiming

that

it was

prefigured

to some extent among

the

earliest

philosophers,

may

have actually

developed his position

in

part

by

a more active

engagement

with their

views.

It is not yet clear,

however,

how

Arcesilaus's appeal

to the Presocratics

supports

the akatalepsia

premise

because

his appeal

is

susceptible

to

both

a 'dialectical'

and a

'non-dialectical'

reading.

In the first

place,

it

is

pos-

sible to

see the

appeal

as functioning

within

the context

of debate with

the Stoics,

in such a

way

that it

is

designed

to

rely

upon

his

opponents'

respect for the ancients. 'Consider those thinkerswhose venerable author-

ity you yourselves

acknowledge,

and

you

will find them

repeatedly

declar-

ing

that neither the

senses nor reason

constitutes

a criterion

of

truth.'

Much

of the

more extended debate

in the Academica

Priora

over the lesson

to

be

learned from the

Presocratics

does,

in

fact,

depend

upon

Antiochus's

(and

hence, presumably,

the Stoics')

acknowledgement

of

their

authority.

The non-dialectical

reading, by

contrast,

rests

on the fact that

the Aca-

demics

themselves seem

to think more

highly

of the Presocratics

than

of

8

Premise (i), that everything is non-cognitive, is shorthandfor the two distinct

claims

to

the

effect that

the

criterion

of truth

is located neither

in

the senses

nor

in

reason.

Section

II.2-6

below shows

that

the

specific appeals

to the

Presocratics

n

the

Academica

Priora

were taken

by the Academics

to

provide

support

for both

claims.




9/36

THE

NEW

ACADEMY'S

APPEALS TO THE

PRESOCRATICS

45

any other thinkers apart from Socrates and Plato. This is not merely

because their

arguments can be

seen,

in

one

way

or

another,

to

lend

cre-

dence to the view that

neither the

senses nor reason

furnishes

a

criterion

of

truth.

(If this

were the

case,

then

one

might

expect

the

Academics to

be

less

dismissive

of, for

instance, the

Cyrenaics' restriction of the

objects

of

perception to

the

sensations

of

which one

is

immediately

aware.)

Rather,

the

Academics

seem to

have

respected

the

Presocratics

because

they

saw

reflection on

these

early

thinkers as

having

had a

formative

influence

on

Socrates's

confession of

ignorance.

Since

the

Academics

avowedly modeled themselves upon Socrates, they may have been will-

ing

to

present the

Presocratics'

dogmatic

scepticism, which

they

saw as

having

influenced

him, as

also

influencing their

own

somewhat

different

position.

'When

we

consider

those

thinkers who

speculated most

aggres-

sively about the

nature of

things, we find

that

even as

they

pursued these

speculations

they were

careful to

qualify

the epistemic

status of

their

own

theories

and to

admit their

inability

to know

the

truth of

their

claims either

on the

basis of

the

senses or

reason.

While

we, like

Socrates, do

not

actively pursue

such

inquiries

ourselves, our

reflection on

the

experience

of those who have done so makes it seem reasonable to us to suppose that

everything is

non-cognitive.'

While it is

not always

obvious

whether the

Academics'

general

appeal to the

Presocratics is

or is

not

supposed to be

merely

dialectical,

it is

clear that

the

two

readings

are

not

incompatible.

On

either

interpretation,

moreover, the

appeal to

the

Presocratics

in

sup-

port

of

the

akatalepsia

premise

would

have

served the

Academics as

one

way to

secure the

premise

without

endorsing it

themselves

(which

would

obviously

amount

to a

dogmatic

form

of

scepticism). We

can

thus begin

to

see how

the

Academics could

have

appealed

to the

Presocratics, who

were seen as manifesting a dogmatic variety of scepticism, without equat-

ing

this

earlier

form of

scepticism with

their

own.

II. The

Academica Priora

1.

Lucullus's

Accusation

and

Cicero's

Reply

In the

lost first

book of

the

Academica's

first

edition,

Cicero

presuma-

bly

had

Catulus

explain

the

general nature of

the

Academics'

appeal to

the Presocratics. What survives in the second book, however, is only

Lucullus's

criticism of

the

appeal

(Acad.

11.13-15) and

Cicero's

response

to that

criticism

(11.72-6).

The

latter is

mainly

taken

up

with

detailing

and

defending

some of

the

Academics'

specific

appeals to

individual

Presocratics




10/36

46

CHARLES

BRITTAIN AND JOHN PALMER

rather than with explaining why the general appeal was made in the first

place. This loss

of context raises

two problems concerning the relation

between the exposition

of the Academic view in the

two editions. The

first

is controversial

but relatively straightforward:

did both editions originally

offer the same general historical

views? It will turn out to be fairly

straightforwardto show that there

is good reason to think that the outlines

and detailed content of the historical

views were quite similar (if

not

absolutely

identical). The second,

more

interesting,

though generally

neglected, problem concerns the

context or motivation for the general

appeal in the first edition. For even if we come to accept that both edi-

tions

offered more or less the same historical

picture,

it is still

possible,

if

not likely,

that it may have been deployed for somewhat

different ends.

The history

in the extant portion of the Academica

Posteriora is presented

as a

way

of

explaining

Arcesilaus's motivation for

his

sceptical

innova-

tions

(hence

the inclination

towards a 'non-dialectical'

reading); yet

it

is

also a

response

to a critical question posed against

the

background

of Varro's

own Antiochian version of the history

of

philosophy

(and

hence allows

for a 'dialectical'

reading).

The lost general history

of the first edition

might have been similarly ambiguous, but it may possibly have been more

clearly

dialectical or more clearly

non-dialectical. Our examination

of

the

appeals

to

specific

Presocratics in the extant

portion

of the

Academica

Priora

(which

are without

analogue

in the extant portion

of the Academic a

Posteriora)

will at least

suggest

that

we should

keep

the dialectical

option

open.

At

any rate,

there

seem to be sufficient reasons to evaluate the

his-

torical claims of the

first edition

separately.

The Antiochian

Lucullus begins his discussion

of Arcesilaus and

Carneades

by

criticizing

the Academics' citation

of the ancient

philoso-

phers as precedents for their own subversion of philosophy (Acad. II. 13-

15).9

Lucullus is

willing

to

admit that the ancient

natural

philosophers

were liable, on occasion,

when stuck over

some difficult

point,

to

give

vent to their frustration in various aporetic pronouncements

(Acad. I.14).

Despite

these

occasional

outbursts, however,

the natural

philosophers

were, on Lucullus's view,

if

anything

too confident

in their claims to

I

He compares

the Academics to

seditious

Romans

(such

as his

contemporary,

Saturninus)

who recall famous

figures of the

past with seemingly

popular

leanings

so

as to claim that in their own efforts to throw the republic into turmoil they are fol-

lowing the

established

practice

of their ancestors.

The Academics

are no better,

he

charges,

when

they

seek to

overthrowa well-established

system

of

philosophy

and,

in

so doing, compare

their own

audacity

to the

modesty (verecundia)

of the famous

figuresof

antiquity.




11/36

THE NEW

ACADEMY'S

APPEALS TO

THE

PRESOCRATICS 47

knowledge. So Arcesilaus was disingenuous and deceitful when 'he hid

behind the

authority

of those who had denied that

anything

could

be

known or

grasped (in

eorum auctoritate

delitisceret,

qui

negavissent quid-

quam

sciri aut

percipi

posse)' (Acad. 11.15).

Lucullus's

remarks in this section indicate that the

Presocratics

ap-

pealed

to

by the Academics included

(at

least)

Empedocles, Anaxagoras,

Democritus,

Parmenides, and Xenophanes. His

summary

of

the content of

the

Academic

appeal to these

figures

is

given

in the remark

cited above:

the

Academics claimed that these Presocratics were

sceptical

of the

pos-

sibility of achieving knowledge (i.e. they supported the Academic thesis

of

akatalepsia). But Lucullus also

ascribes to them four more

specific

'sceptical' theses: 'all

things are

hidden,

we

perceive

nothing,

we

discern

nothing with

the

intellect,'

we can discover

the character of

nothing at

all (abstrusa

esse

omnia, nihil nos

sentire, nihil cernere,

nihil omnino

quale

sit

posse reperire)' (Acad.

11.14).

Although one

might trace

the first

and fourth of

these formulations to

specific

source-statements

by

individ-

ual

Presocratics, neither is a direct

paraphrase, and the

generality

of

the

second and third theses

suggests that

we have here a set

of

claims intended

to represent the kind of scepticism manifested among these Presocratics

collectively.

Taken

together, these four

theses outline a

sceptical-sounding

argument: because all

things are concealed

from us (first

thesis),

we are

Although

the verb 'cernere'

does often

have the

sense of 'to

discern with

the

eyes' or even

'to

perceive with the

senses', it

also often has

the

sense of 'to

discem

with

the

intellect'. In the

Academica,

the verb

is more

often used in

this latter

sense;

see

1.21,

30,

45

(where 'cerni' is used

synonymously

with

'intellegi'), II.20,

22

bis,

54, 129. J.

S.

Reid, M. Tulli

Ciceronis

Academica

(London:

Macmillan, 1885:

repr.

Hildesheim: Olms, 1966), 188 ad loc., notes that 'cernere' in the present passage

'probably refers

to

the mind, as

sentire to

the senses'.

Although it

remains possible

that the use of

'cernere'

alongside 'sentire' is

simply

a

case

of

rhetorical

variatio

on

Cicero's

part,

we follow

Reid in

supposing it more

likely

that Cicero

draws

a dis-

tinction with his

use of the two

verbs,

a

distinction which is

perfectly

appropriateand

even to be

expected in this context.

11

The first

thesis may

seem an

echo of

Democritus's

declaration

that truth

s in the

abyss (Democr.

ap. D.L. IX.72

=

68B117

DK:

iT?r4 ?e oU&v

'16'8rv ?v

V06 y'ap

'i

&XkOeita).

ontrast,

however,

the actual

paraphrase f Democritus B 117

at Acad.

II.32:

naturam

accusa, quae

in

profundo veritatem ut ait

Democritus

penitus

abstruserit.

Xenophanes's famous

'sceptical' fragment

(Xenoph.ap.

S.E. M. VII.1

10

=

21B34

DK)

might likewise appearto lie behind the final thesis, with its emphasis on the impos-

sibility of

discoveringthe

natureof

things. But

'nihil

omnino quale sit

posse

reperire'

is

clearly

not a

direct

paraphraseof

Xenophanes's

pronouncement.Thus in

each

case,

the echo, if there

is one, is not meant

to

be distinct

(contrast

the

echoes at Acad.

1.44,

discussed in the

appendix).




12/36

48 CHARLES BRITTAIN AND JOHN PALMER

in no position to apprehend the nature of things by either perception or

reason (second

and third theses).

Since these

two

options exhaust our

cri-

teria for apprehension,

we

are unable to

discover by any

means

the true

character of

anything whatsoever

(fourth thesis).

As an ordered

set,

then,

these four theses

constitute

an argument for

the conclusion

that all

things

are non-cognitive

(akatalepsia).

However,

this

will not be a straightfor-

wardly

Academic argument,

since

its first premise

depends

on a dogmatic

claim about the nature

of things.

Cicero's eventual

response to

Lucullus's criticism

of

the Academics'

appeal to the Presocratics is to deny that it is disingenuous: 'we Acade-

mics say

that we hold the same

views

that you yourselves

admit were

held

by

the most

noble philosophers' (Acad.

11.72).

It

is natural to suppose that

Cicero is referring specifically

to the fourfold thesis

Lucullus attributed

to

the Academics at 11.14.

In the event, however, it

becomes clear

that he

takes the Academics and

Presocratics

to hold the

same views only

with

respect

to the conclusion

that everything

is non-cognitive

(even

though

what

it means for

each group to

'hold' the view

may

well be different).

For the

specific

claims Cicero

goes

on to make about individual

Pre-

socratics show that he takes the Academics and Presocratics to agree about

little

else. One general

reason

will turn out to be precisely

because he

takes the Presocratics' views

to

rely

on

dogmatic

theories

about the real

nature of things.

But Lucullus's criticism

has

already

indicated

a

second

crucial

difference

(agreed

by

all

parties

in the

Academica):

whether

or

not

the

Presocratics can

be seen

as subscribing

to some form of the

akatalepsia

thesis,

they plainly

did not

conclude,

as the Academics

did,

that

given

the

incognizability

of

things

the best

course is to

suspendjudge-

ment

universally.

The significance

of these

two

general

differences

will be

clearer if we make a short detour into Academic history of philosophy as

presented

in

this

edition of the Academica.

Although

the

historical

understanding

from which Cicero's

claims

spring

is not

pellucid

in the Academica

Priora,

there is sufficient evidence

to discern

the

general picture.

We can

begin

with

two obvious

points.

First,

it is clear

that Lucullus's criticisms

are motivated

by

the familiar

Antiochian view of the history

of

philosophy.

On this

view,

Plato's

estab-

lishment of a

'discipline'

of

philosophy,

a

systematic

set of

philosophical

doctrines,

marks the

division between

'ancient' and 'modern'

philosophy.

Hence Lucullus distinguishes the 'veteres' in Academica 11.13-15 - the

subjects

of the Academics'

appeal,

including

the

Presocratics as well

as

Socrates

and Plato

-

from the 'moderns'

in

IL.16-18

- those

belonging

to

the

period

from Zeno and Arcesilaus

to Philo and

Antiochus. Two

of




13/36

THE NEW

ACADEMY'S APPEALS TO

THE PRESOCRATICS

49

Lucullus's criticisms of the Academic appeal rely on further distinctions

of sub-periods within these major

divisions.

For in

II.15

he criticizes

Arcesilaus's appeal,

in

particular,

for

ignoring

the fact that

philosophy

had

moved

on since the hesitant first

steps

of the natural

philosophers:

Plato

had subsequently established

a

'discipline'

of

philosophy,

that

is,

the

sys-

tematic doctrines

of the

Old

Academy

and

Peripatos. Then,

in

11.16-18,

he criticizes Cicero's use of the Academic appeal for ignoring the fur-

ther developments since Arcesilaus fought Zeno, presumably the sub-

sequent

defense of the Stoa

by Chrysippus

followed

by Antipater

and later

Antiochus's own 'Academic' recension of Stoicism.'2 Thus Lucullus's pre-

sentation

of the Academic

appeal

is situated within his own view of

the

history of philosophy, which sees a progression from its hesitant birth with

the Presocratics

(11.14-15),

its

development by (Socrates and)

Plato

(11.15),

and

its

maturity,beginning

with Zeno

(11.16)

and

culminating

with Antiochus

(11.17-18). On this view, the Academics' appeal to the Presocratics is quite

perverse (even

if

they

were

occasionally 'sceptical'

in

some sense).

Cicero's historical claims in Academica 11.72-8 are a direct

response

not

just

to Lucullus's

charge

of

disingenuousness

but also to his

view

of

the history of philosophy. His reply to Lucullus's criticism of Arcesilaus

shows that the Academic position in this edition of the Academica also

relied on a

developmental view of history. For in 11.76-7, after the review

of the Presocratics'

sceptical tendencies that comprises the bulk of his

reply

to

Lucullus's

initial

charge, he responds to the particular criticism

by noting

that it is unclear how much

philosophical progress has actually

been

made, except

in

one vital

respect: Zeno,

unlike all his

predecessors,

had correctly seen that the wise cannot hold opinions.'3 Furthermore, as

2

Acad. 11.15:nonne cum iam philosophorumdisciplinae gravissimae constitissent

tum

exortus est. . . Arcesilas

qui

constitutamphilosophiam everteret et in eorum auc-

toritate delitisceretqui negavissent

quicquam

sciri aut

percipi posse.

11. 6: Sed

fuerint

illa vetera si voltis

incognita:

nihilne est igitur actum, quod investigata

sunt, postea

quam Arcesilas

Zenoni ut putatur obtrectans ..

conatus est clarissimis rebus tenebras

obducere. These

passages show,

moreover, that there is solid evidence for

taking

Arcesilaus himself

to have introducedthe appeal to

the Presocratics(i.e., his name is

not

just

a

metonym

for 'the

Academics').

1'

Acad. II.77:

nemo umquam uperiorumnon

modo expresserat sed ne dixerat qui-

dem

posse

hominem

nihil opinari,

nec solum posse sed ita necesse esse

sapienti. visa

est Arcesilae cum vera sententia

tum

honesta et

digna sapienti.

Holding

no

opinions

implies suspendingjudgement universally for Arcesilaus and Cicero, of course, since

they maintain

akatalepsia.

Cf. the discussion

of Acad. 1.44-5 above

and also Cicero's

more Philonian ake

on 'the most ancientand learned hinkers'at Acad.

II.7:

etsi

enimom-

nis

cognitio

multis est obstructa

difficultatibuseaque est et in ipsis rebus obscuritas




14/36

50

CHARLES BRIT7AIN AND JOHN

PALMER

Cicero's reply to the second criticism (of his own use of the Presocratics,

II.16-18) shows, on the

Academic view, the progress in

the history of phi-

losophy culminates with

Arcesilaus.'4 The claim that the

Academic

view

of the

history

of

philosophy

centers on the radical change

which

occurred

at the time of

Arcesilaus (a

distinction equivalent to

Lucullus's between

the ancients

and moderns) does

not,

of

course, get us very far. It does

not

seem to be

stretching the evidence,

however, to

suggest that the Aca-

demics

saw

Socrates and Plato

(cf. II.74) as

marking

a

major division

within the

earlier period. If

so, the historical picture in the

background of

the Academica Priora had three stages, involving the Presocratics, then

Socrates

and

Plato, and

finally the modem period from

Arcesilaus. It now

seems

likely that

we can identify the point of this

philosophical history

by combining the

notion of a progression

culminating

in Arcesilaus's embrace

of the

suspension

of

judgement (on

the

basis

of

the

akatalepsia

thesis and

Zeno's novel

thesis that the wise cannot hold

opinions)

with the philo-

sophical interpretation of

the Presocratics as dogmatic

sceptics (whose

support for akatalepsia relies on

theories about

the

nature

of things).

For

we can now

discern a

progression from dogmatic

scepticism, through the

more reflective (and methodological) scepticism of Socrates and Plato, to

the radical

scepticism of Arcesilaus.

This allows

us to

make better sense

of the

general

claim

involved

in

the Academics'

appeal

to

the Presocratics:

far from

being

an

implausible claim of

identity,

it

is

the measured and

respectable

view of the

history

of

philosophy given

explicitly

in

Aeade-

mica 1.44-5.

Can we now be more

precise

about

why

the Academics made their

gen-

eral

appeal

to the Presocratics in the first

place, especially

if

they

did not

claim

that those

philosophers

furnished a direct

precedent

for their

own

views? Not immediately, since, as for the history at 1.44-5, both dialecti-

cal and

non-dialectical

readings

of the

general appeal

are

available.

But

in the case

of

the Academica Priora we have some context

against

which

to situate the

general appeal:

the Academics'

specific appeals

to individ-

ual

Presocratics.

Since these

appeals

show that the Academics' under-

standing of the Presocratics is more

complex

than the

general

claim

et in iudiciis nostris infirmitas,ut non

sine

causa

antiquissimi et

doctissiml

invenire

se posse

quod

cuperent

diffisi

sint, tamennec illi defeceruntneque nos studium xquirendi

defatigati relinquemus.

14

In Acad. 11.78,Cicero points out that, althoughsome sceptical Academics thought

that there had been

a

significant change since

Arcesilaus over the

question

of

sus-

pension

of

judgement,

the basic

controversy

with the Stoics remained the same: it was

still about

akatalepsia.




15/36

THE NEW


PRESOCRATICS

51

(expressed in Cicero's initial response to Lucullus) suggests, it will be best

to

return

to the

question of which

reading of

that claim is

preferable after

examining

its

context. For it turns out

that the Academic

appeals were not

always

offered in

terms of a collective

interpretation of the

Presocratics,

that their

appeals

may

not have even been

based on

general

interpreta-

tions of the

individual

figures,

that

they

did

not

always

make the same

appeal to each

figure,

and that

they

did

not even claim

that

all of them

were

sceptical

in any

sense. We

shall follow

Cicero's

order in

Academica

I1.72-4

and

treat in turn

Anaxagoras,

Democritus,

Empedocles, and

Xenophanes and Parmenides.

2.

Anaxagoras

'Anaxagoras said

snow is black.

Would you tolerate me if I

were to

say

the same

thing? You would not if I

were even to wonder

whether it is so.

Yet

who is this man?

Surely no sophist

(this is what

people

who

prac-

ticed

philosophy

for the sake

of show or

profit

used to

be called).

He was

a man with the

greatest

reputation for seriousness

and

intellectual

ability'

(Acad.

II.72). Cicero

clearly does not mean to

identify

Anaxagoras's

asser-

tion that snow is in reality black

(given

that

water, from which snow

is

formed,

is

black)

as

something the

Academics

themselves endorse. It is

not

clear that

Anaxagoras

is

represented as

'sceptical' in

any

sense here:

if he

doubts the

reliability

of

the

senses,

it is

only

because he has

certain

beliefs about

how

things

are in

reality.

Cicero's

point is that his

Antio-

chian

opponent

will

not tolerate an

appeal

to a

universally

recognized

au-

thority like

Anaxagoras's

to call into doubt whether snow is in fact

white.

The

strategy

here is similar

to that of Sextus

Empiricus

when he cites

Anaxagoras's

argument

(that since snow is frozen

water,

and water is

black, snow is therefore black) as something the sceptic may appeal to in

opposing nooumena to

phainomena

(PH

1.33).

Cicero

reports

that,

when

asked whether snow is

white

(something which

might

seem

quite

obvi-

ously

the

case),

the

Academic will

not

go

so far as

Anaxagoras

and

deny

the

phainomena.

The Academic

is

willing, however, to

point

out how

Anaxagoras's

dogmatic

theory

about the

nature

of

things

led him to

deny

the

phainomena, and the Academic

takes this to

support

his own unwill-

ingness

to

make

any

positive assertion

regarding the actual character of

things

on the

basis of how

they appear. We

might

call this

a

defensive

'5 Cf. De

orat.

III.138,

Clazomenius ille

Anaxagoras,

vir

summus in maximarum

rerum

scientia.




16/36

52

CHARLES BRITTAIN

AND JOHN PALMER

appeal to Anaxagoras: when confronted by his opponents with the pur-

ported absurdity

of withholding

assent

on

the most obvious

matters,

the

Academic

introduces a

figure

whose authority

his opponents

acknowledge

and who

goes even

farther than

he himself

is willing to in opposing

what

is supposedly so

obvious.

The appeal thus

serves

in a somewhat

indirect

way

the Academics'

general position

that the senses

do not furnish

a

cri-

terion

of

truth.

With the

subsequent

appeal

to Anaxagoras

at Academica

11.100

the

Academics go

on the offensive against

their dogmatic

opponents.

The

con-

text is the Academic response to the Stoic apraxia argument. Cicero says

at 11.98-9 that

he will draw upon the

first of Clitomachus's four books

on

the means of

withholding

assent (de sustinendis

adsensionibus)

to clarify

Carneades's view

of the differenttypes of

impressions.

Carneades

is

reported

to have identified

two ways

of classifying

impressions:

(i)

as either cogni-

tive or non-cognitive

(quae percipi

possint

&

quae

percipi

non

possint

=

KOxtaXlnnllrKaCi

&KCTaUqxirot),

nd

(ii)

as either plausible

or implausible

(probabilia

& non probahilia

=

m0avai

& ai9Oavot).

The former repre-

sents the basic Stoic classification,

while the

latter

is Carneades's alter-

native. He rejected the existence of cognitive impressions on the grounds

that, contrary

to the claims

of the

Stoics,

there

is no

impression

of

such

a character that it is

impossible

for there

to be a

qualitatively

identical

impression

that

is

nevertheless

false. However,

this does

not mean that the

sage

will have no impressions

to

rely upon

for

guidance

in the course

of

his

life,

for

he

is

perfectly

able to

employ plausible

impressions

as a

guide

for

living

as

long

as

nothing

contradicts

them. Cicero

is

likely

still

draw-

ing

upon

Clitomachus 6

when

he introduces

Anaxagoras

to

clarify

the

sense in which Carneades

held that the sage

would be able

to

rely

upon

such impressions as a guide: 'he will draw his deliberations regardingboth

action and

inaction

from

impressions

of this

type,

and he will be

more

amenable to accepting

that

snow is white than

was

Anaxagoras,

who said

not

only

that it was not white,

but that it did not even appear

to him to

be

white,

because

he knew that the

water out of which

it was solidified

was

black'

(Acad.

11.100).

16

Reid (1885),

295, supposes

that in Acad.

11.99 Cicero

is actually

quoting from

Clitomachusand that the quotation breaksoff with Etenimcontra nlaturam sset...,

where Cicero

resumes speaking

in his

own voice.

It is

not as clear

as Reid supposes,

however,

that Cicero's

use

of Clitomachus

amounts

to

simple quotation;

and

there

seems no

good reason

to deny that

what

follows regarding

the use Carneades

made

of the

distinction

between types

of impressions

continues

to

depend upon

Clitomachus.




17/36

THE

NEW

ACADEMY'S

APPEALS

TO THE PRESOCRATICS

53

The Academic, that is, does not claim to know whether snow is really

white or

black,

but he does

grant

that it appears

white and claims

that

plausible

impressions

of this

type

furnish

him with a

reliable

enough

cri-

terion

for action.

Although

'he does not endorse Anaxagoras's

argument

for its being

in

reality

black, he is nevertheless

willing

to

appeal

to

this

argument to

call into

question

whether

snow really

is

as

it appears

to

us

or perhaps

has some

other,

non-apparent

character.

So much

is already

implied in the initial

citation of Anaxagoras

at

11.72. The renewed

appeal

at

11.100,

however, goes

farther than

this so as to present

a

special

chal-

lenge to the Stoic (or any other dogmatist) who is prepared to allow

his dogmatic, theoretical

beliefs to undermine

his reliance upon appear-

ances. Here the

Academics

assimilate the dogmatic

Stoics to the dogmatic

Anaxagoras

in

such

a

way

that their apraxia

argument

redounds

against

them. In allowing

his theoretical beliefs to

undermine his reliance

upon

appearances,

Anaxagoras

left himself without

a viable criterion

of

action

in

many cases,

both in

so far as

he would have

fallen into

apparent

error

if he

had

attempted

to

rely

upon his dogmatic

view of things

as a

guide

and

in so far as he would

have had

no

guide

at all

in

cases

where he

admitted his inability to access the real nature of things. This seems clear

enough

in the case of Anaxagoras's

declaration

that because he

knows

that snow is really black,

it no

longer

even appears to

him white. But such

also seems to be the point being

made against

the equally

dogmatic Stoics

when Carneades

argues

that even

the Stoic sage

will have to

rely

in

many

cases

upon probabilia

when cataleptic impressions

are unavailable (Acad.

11.99).

Thus the first

thinker on

Cicero's

list is a Presocratic

predecessor

who is

not in fact presented

as a direct

ancestor.

It is not

entirely clear

that

Anaxagoras

is

supposed

to be a

sceptical

ancestor

at all. At least when

we come to the second passage which makes use of his denial that snow

is

white,

his view seems to serve more

as an

embarrassing

parallel

to the

unreasonable

dogmatism

of the Stoics than as a

sceptical precedent.

3. Democritus

Cicero turns next

to

Democritus: 'What should

I

say

about

Democritus?

Whom can we

compare,

for

magnitude

of

spirit

as well as

intellect,

with

this man

who was bold

enough

to

commence with the

words,

These

things

I

declare

concerning

the universe ?'7

He

exempts

no

subject

from

1

Haec loquor

de

universis. Cf. Democr. ap.

S.E.

M. VII.265 = 68B 165

DK: AfljO6K-

ptto;

&

E

j

TA

6

;wvj

itap&tKaC6pvoa

;

I

kXyOv

Tcz8E nEpi

TdV

4tugaVTOwV....




18/36

54

CHARLES BRIUIAIN AND

JOHN

PALMER

discussion, or what cantherebe outsidethe universe?Who does notplace

this philosopherabove

Cleanthes,Chrysippus, nd the others of the later

age,

who seem to me

to belong to the fifth class when comparedwith

him? And yet he does not say what we do, who do not deny that there s

any truthbut do deny that it can be apprehended.He denies outright hat

there is anything true, and he does not say that the senses are dim

(obscuros) but dark (tenebricosos)

-

for so he calls them' (Acad. I1.73).18

With Democritus,as

with Anaxagoras,partof the Academics' strategy s

to appeal to a figure

whose philosophical eriousness

s

acknowledgedby

their Stoic opponents.Democritus s represented s more radicallyscep-

tical than

the

Academics

themselves,

and

the

particular ppeal

to him is

in

the first place a defensive manoeuverdesignedto force theiropponents

to admit thattheirown

more

moderate

position

is also

respectable.

The

appeal

to

authority,

herefore,

has a

largely

dialectical

force.

It also

provides

the Academics an

opportunity

o

clarify

their own

stance

by contrasting

t

with a

dogmatic

brand

of

scepticism

with which

it was in danger of being confused. Rather han introducingDemocritus

as

a direct precursor,Cicero states

plainly

that 'he does

not

say

what

we

do'. What exactly, then, is the positionascribedto Democritusand on

what basis? Here one

needs to compareAcademica11.73with the appeal

to Democritus

reportedby Lucullus

at

11.32.

Lucullus

says

thatdifferent

Academicsgive different

esponses

o the

objection

hat

if

their

arguments

are

true,

then all

things

will

be

uncertainomnia

ncerta

=

irrzvta 18ka).)9

To this charge,he says, some membersof the Academyreply, 'Whatdoes

that matter

o us?

Is it our

fault?

Blame

nature,which,

as

Democritus

ays,

has completelyhidden

truth in an

abyss'.

He

proceeds

to contrast

this

response

with

the more

refined

response

of other

Academics

who intro-

duce a distinctionbetween what is incertumor nonevidentand what is

non-cognitive.

The identification

f

the

figures

alluded o

here has

proved

unnecessarily ontroversial.20iven that

Lucullus

himself

has said

that

he

18

Cf. the passage from Democritus'sCanons

contrasting

he 'genuine' cognition

of

reason with

the

omcoiul

r 'dark' cognitionof the

senses (Democr.ap. S.E. M. VII.138-9

-68Bl1

DK).

19

Cf. Acad. 11.54:Ea dico

incerta, quae

oar5xa

Graeci.

20

For a review of the various

positions on the problem, see

J. Allen, 'Carneadean

argument in Cicero's Academic Books', in Inwood and Mansfeld (1997), 217-56, at

238-9 n.

21. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley,

The Hellenistic

Philosophers, 2 vols.

(Cambridge:Cambridge

University

Press, 1987), ii, 441, incline

towards identifying

this first group

of 'hard-line Academics' with 'philosophers

like

Aenesidemus'.

But

Cicero

nowhere

mentions Aenesidemus or shows

any familiaritywith the Pyrrhonian




19/36

THE

NEW

ACADEMY'S APPEALS TO

THE

PRESOCRATICS

55

will dealwith the scepticismof Arcesilausand Carneades Acad.11.1 -12),

the

most

straightforwardption

is to attribute

he

appeal

to

Democritus

o

Arcesilaus and the more

refined

response

to

Carneades.

A

parallel

pas-

sage in

Numenius,

drawing

irtually he

same

distinction

etween

Arcesilaus

and

Carneades

as Lucullusdraws between

the

two classes

of

Academics,

confirms his dentification:

After

hese[sc. LacydesandEuander]

Carneades

inherited

he

school

and

established

he

Third

Academy.

He

employed

the

manner

of

argumentation

hat

Arcesilaus

had,

for he too

used

to

practice

dialectical reasoning

and demolish

the

statements

of

others.

He

differed

from him only in his accountconcerningsuspensionof judgement,say-

ing

that

it is impossible for a

human being to suspend udgementabout

everything,

ut

hat

here

s a difference etween

what

s

non-evident

a`kXov)

and

what is

non-cognitive (docatacXnrVov),

and that

all

things

are

non-cog-

nitive, but not

all

things are non-evident'

Numen.ap. Eus.

PE

XIV.7.15).

The

Stoics

claim

that the Academics' argumentsagainst the

criterion

makelife unlivableandrob us of the naturalactivity of our mind (Acad.

I1.31). When

faced with

the

charge that this renderseverythingnon-evi-

dent, Arcesilaus makes

what

again appears

to

be

a

largely

dialectical

appealto Democritus.Arcesilaus finds himself in the positionof being

unable

to

judge

whether

he

impressions

he

has of

things

are

true or

false.

The

Stoics,

by contrast,

feel

that

they are

in

a

position

to

make such

judgements,

and

they provide

an elaborateaccount

of how we

are put

in

contact with

the

truth

of things. Arcesilaus himself has no particular

account

to give

of

why he

finds

himself in the position he does.

He is

willing, however, to introduceDemocritus as someone

who

appears

to

agree

with

him

about

things

being

non-evidentand

who

does

have some

explanation

of

why

this should

be the

case.

Arcesilausappearsto

take

Democritus'sdeclaration hat 'we in realityknow nothing,for truth s in

an

abyss' (68B117 DK)

as

indicating

hat there is

such a

greatdistance,

if not

necessarily

otal

separation,

between our impressions

of

things

and

their

real

nature hat

we can

never

rely upon

our

ordinaryexperience

of

things

to

put

us

in

contact with the

truth.Democritus hus

has

positive

views

(however qualified)

about

the

real

nature

of

things

which lead

him

revival. (He

does

once

mention

'Pyrrhonei'

at De orat. III.62, but there

he

classes

them togetherwith the Eretrians,Erillians,and Megariansas now extinct schools that

once claimed

to

be upholding

the

Socratic legacy.)

Long and Sedley also identify Philo

and his followers as the Academics with the more refined

response. Allen, 218-19 and

237ff., tentatively suggests that

all

the views espoused

in Acad. 11.32-4 should be at-

tributed

o

Carneades

himself.




20/36

56 CHARLES BRITTAIN AND JOHN

PALMER

to adopta dogmaticscepticismregarding ppearances.Arcesilaus s will-

ing

to

appeal

to

Democritus

as if

to say

to

the Stoics, 'Don't ask me why

things are like

this -

ask Democritus';and yet he wants to maintain he

requisitedistance between his own non-dogmatic nd Democritus'sdog-

matic scepticism. This distinction is not as apparentas it might be in

Academica 11.32,perhapsbecause the hostile Lucullus is not especially

interested n keeping it clear;

but,

as noted, care is taken to preserve he

distinction n 11.73.

Comparing

he

two passagespresentsa problem,however,since on the

face of it they creditDemocrituswithratherdifferentpositions:Academica

11.32attributeso him the view that naturehas hiddenthe truth rom us,

whereas n 11.73he is creditedwith what seems the strongerpositionthat

there is

nothing

true

(ille

verum

plane negat esse).

A

number

of

possible

ways of dealing with

this

apparent ontradiction uggest themselves.One

option

would be

to

suppose

hatDemocritushimself said

conflicting hings

on

the subjectand that differentpronouncements

re

reflected

n

our two

passages.

This

would

not

be

surprising,given

how

difficult t

has

often

seemed

o

bring

his various

emarks

n

epistemology

nto

a coherentwhole.2'

Alternatively, he two passages might possiblyreflectappealsby different

membersof the

Academy.22 t seems more likely, however,

that the

dif-

ferencebetween

the

positions

attributed

o

Democritus

n the

two

passages

is

merely superficial.

Here

we need to get clearer about the Academics'

view regarding he extent of Democritus's cepticism.Did they see it as

extending merely to

the

reports

of the

senses

or to

both

reason and

the

21

Although we seem

to

have no fragment

in

which

he

goes so

far as to declare

that there

is

no truth, one should compare our two passages with one

of

Aristotle's

remarkson Democritus n Metaphysicsr.5. There Aristotle reports hree types of argu-

ment that certain thinkersemployed to demonstrate he impossibilityof deciding which

among conflicting appearances

should

be

judged true (1009a38-bl1). From

its

being

unclear which of such appearancesare true and which false, these thinkers conclude

that

the

one

is

no

more

true than

the

other but

that

both are equally true. Democritus

is cited by Aristotle as having drawn the ratherdifferentconclusion that 'either noth-

ing is true, or it is unclear to us

(6to

ATlgo.tptto6q

e

pnlaiv

`-ot

ouOcv

?ivai

&xnloe;

il

11gtv

y'

a`81Xov)'

1009bl

1-12).

Documents

Brittain, Charles, And John Palmer_The New Academy's Appeals to the Presocratics_Phronesis, 46, 1_2001!38!72