20

Click here to load reader

British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908Author(s): L. P. MorrisSource: The Historical Journal, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 657-675Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639273 .

Accessed: 04/01/2014 06:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheHistorical Journal.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

The Historical Journal, 27, 3 (I984), pp. 657-675 Printed in Great Britain

BRITISH SECRET SERVICE ACTIVITY IN KHORASSAN, 1887--1908*

L. P. MORRIS University of Exeter

When great powers quarrel their lesser neighbours are often worst affected. Cajoled and wooed, they are drawn into conflicts they would prefer to avoid. Such involvement may exacerbate internal weaknesses and end by damaging them long after the causes of the original dispute have faded. Nineteenth-century Iran became drawn into Anglo-Russian rivalries in Central Asia as each sought to secure her assistance. Spectators of the so-called 'Great Game' were not allowed: the boxes were part of the field of play.

The great period of Russian expansion into Central Asia began after the Crimean War. Khiva was annexed in I873, Kokand in I876, whilst the khanate of Bokhara was reduced to a Russian vassal in i868. One year later the first Russian toehold on the south-western shore of the Caspian Sea had been established with the foundation of Krasnovodsk.1 From there a steady stream of expeditions took Russian military surveying parties into the deserts northeast of Persia and north of Afghanistan. In the absence of defined frontiers the Turcoman inhabitants of these areas had owed theoretical allegiance to each of their various neighbours successively.2 It had been very shadowy, for no single state had been powerful enough to control the warlike nomadic tribesmen. This area was the field for the final chukka of the Great Game.

The frontier between Persia and Russia from the Caspian Sea to the town of Sarrakhs on the river Tejend was defined in i 88 i. The Perso-Afghan frontier had been defined under British arbitration in I873 and delimited by a commission headed by General Goldsmid.3 There were no other regularly defined and fixed frontiers in the area. Negotiations between Russia and Britain in I872 and I873 had resulted in a rather loose definition of a frontier

* I am indebted to the Gulf Studies Centre of the University of Exeter for financial assistance which made the research for this article possible.

1 R. A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, i867-I9I7 (Berkeley, I960); G. Wheeler, Modern history of Soviet Central Asia (London, I964); M. A. Terent'ev, Istoriya zavoevaniya sredney azii (3 vols. St Petersburg, I906).

2 Royal Geographical Society, The country of the Turcornans (London, I977); L. P. Morris, 'The subjugation of the Turcomans', Middle Eastern Stutdies, xv, 2 (I979), I93-2IO; Capt. Hon. G. E. Napier, memoranda I876 and I877, India Office Records, L/P & S/i8/c. 24, C. 25 and C. 27. These and other records in the India Office are crown copyright and appear by permission of the controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

3 Sir F. J. Goldsmid, Eastern Persia ... the Persian Boundary Commission, i87o-I-2 (2 vols., London I 876).

657

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 3: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

658 L. P. MORRIS

line for northern Afghanistan, but it had never been laid down on the ground.4 It was this vague area of uncertain allegiance where British susceptibilities were most sensitive. In particular the Turcoman tribes and the land they occupied controlled the only major gap in the mountain chain stretching from the Caspian to the Pamir mountains. It was this that made the Tejend, Merv and Panjdeh important strategically, for occupation of them would open the road to the city of Herat in southern Afghanistan. That point was widely accepted as being of the utmost strategic significance for India, for its occupation by a potential enemy would turn the flank of the defences of the north-west frontier where the mountains provided a formidable natural obstacle. Colonel T. H. Holdich, the eminent military cartographer, wrote to Herat: 'From this central point great lines of communication radiate in all directions to Russian, British, Persian and Afghan territory.'5

As Russian expansion focused attention on this region it became quickly apparent that there was an almost total lack of reliable information as to developments there and especially of Russian military and political prepara- tions. Information reached the government of India in a haphazard and unsystematic way. Casual travellers, rumour collected by the local authorities in the Punjab, merchants trading into Central Asia, reports from occasional official missions or from native agents sent secretly to survey and map the territories beyond the frontiers provided intermittent and highly unreliable news. There was no established machinery to collate and sift the material thus acquired. Such organization as did exist was based on the Quartermaster- General's Department of the army of the Bengal Presidency. It was concerned with information about India and not with materials relating to the regions beyond the frontiers. In I873 Lt.-Col. F. S. Roberts, then officiating Quartermaster-General, called for the creation of a full-scale Intelligence Branch under his aegis. It would be located in the Staff of the commander- in-chief, would cover all India and her immediate neighbours and would not be the responsibility of a regional command. He argued:

It is of primary importance for officers to study the language and customs of the people, and to have a personal knowledge of the chiefs, priests, and leaders likely to have the most influence among them; a note should be made especially of those men on whom reliance could probably be placed in times of difficulty; in fact every scrap of information regarding the district and its inhabitants, which might probably, or even possibly, be of use in case of war, should be carefully collected.

Initially shelved for lack of money, the idea was revived in I 876 under the new Viceroy, Lord Lytton. His military secretary played a major part in re-examining the proposals and in December I877 the report of a special committee was issued. Packed with supporters of the proposal it wholeheartedly

4 D. Gillard, The strugglefor Asia, i828-I9I4 (London, I977); Dr Rouire, La rivalite anglo-russe au xzxe siecle en Asie (Paris, I908).

5 'Herat', Encyclopaedia Britannica, I ith edition (London, I 91 ); for contemporary opinions see C. Marvin, The Russians at Merv and Herat (London, I883); D. C. Boulger, Central Asian questions

(London, I885); C. B. Malleson, Herat, the granary and garden of Central Asia (London, i88o).

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 659

endorsed the original suggestions of Roberts, amplified and developed under the impact of further Russian advances. By January I879 the government in London had endorsed the scheme, and the new Intelligence Department began work in March i88o.6

It is questionable whether it was ever conceived as a purely information- gathering organization. Staffed by army officers who believed that covert Russian activities threatened India, its representatives both central and local seem to have seen themselves as principals actively engaged in a political battle whose weapons were influence, intrigue and the dissemination of propaganda and disinformation. Like the Indian Political Service, whose members were also mainly drawn from the ranks of the army, its advice and the information which it provided were not disinterested and had to be treated with considerable reserve.7 The operations of both bodies were thrown into prominence in the crisis which developed.

After the second Afghan War British relations with Afghanistan and her new amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, were sensitive. He was an enigma having passed many years of exile in Russian Turkestan.8 His continuing refusal to allow British officers to reside on Afghan soil prevented the gathering of information, vital if an adequate and timely response to any Russian threat were to be made. Whilst the fullest use was made of all opportunities,9 in the opinion of the Indian authorities the situation remained unsatisfactory.

These circumstances brought Persia to the fore. The best alternative location for a centre for gathering intelligence on events in Central Asia was the Persian province of Khorassan. The recent delimitation of its boundaries with Afghanistan and Russia had had little impact on the traditional links which tied it with the lands stretching east to Bokhara and north to the kazakh territories of the Russian empire. Historically the whole area had been known as Khorassan. Information on developments throughout the region could be obtained from the province, whose principal city, Mashhad, was a great religious centre. The shrine of the eighth shi'a imam, Imam Reza, attracted pilgrims in large numbers.10 It was also a great trading centre with connexions with India, Europe and China. It had a large floating population of pilgrims and merchants.

6 IOR L/Mil/7/7793; for a thorough appraisal of the development of the Intelligence Department in Britain see W. C. Beaver, 'The development of intelligence Division and its role in aspects of imperial policy making I854-I90I' (D.Phil. Oxford, I976).

7 Sir T. Creagh Coen, The Indian political service (London, I97I); the argument is developed fully in M. E. Yapp, Strategies of British India (Oxford, I980).

8 V. Gregorian, The emergence of modern Afghanistan (Stanford, i969); Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed Khan, The life of Abdutr Rahman (2 vols. London, I900); Sir P. M. Sykes, History of Afghanistan (2 vols., London, I940)11, I IOff.

9 For the use made by members of the Boundary Commission between i884 and i886 see A. C. Yate, Travels with the Afghan Boundary Commission (London, i887); C. E. Yate, Northern Afghanistan, or letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission (London, i888).

10 'Meshed', Encyc. Brit. I Ith edn; Colonel C. M. McGregor, Journey through Khorassan (2 vols., London, i879), I, 277ff.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

66o L. P. MORRIS

British and Indian interests at Mashhad were represented by a native Persian consular agent, Mirza Abbas Khan. He was described as a very able man, and he tries, in every way in his power, to obtain information, but he has not the necessary knowledge of Europe and European affairs to enable him to judge of the importance of news.1

Once the area acquired a new political significance this arrangement was inadequate. Initially the need was met by posting officers for periods of special duty to Khorassan and the north-eastern frontier districts. The first of these was Capt. G. E. Napier, whose prolonged period of special service began in i874.12 He was followed by Colonel C. E. Stewart, who in August i88i was deputed to Khorassan and based at Khaf, from where he was recalled in August i882.13 The following February he urged that a British officer be permanently placed in Khorassan. Although he had been replaced by Condie Stephens, second secretary to the Legation in Tehran, Stewart believed the practice of sending out officers on temporary duty was insufficient. As concern for Russian intentions over Merv and Panjdeh increased, Stewart was sent back in March I 883. His secondment was extended in March I 884, but in June his health broke and he left. His place was taken by Alexander Finn, the consul at Resht.14

The policy of special deputation followed for a decade ensured the presence of a British officer in Khorassan, but it did not ensure that uninterrupted continuity of contact essential for the construction of a satisfactory network of intelligence contacts. Moreover, it was unclear whether the official was responsible to London or to India, which had different priorities and pre- occupations. Continuity was provided by Abbas Khan, but he was not thought to possess the necessary training to report on military developments. The only regular service of news came from his correspondents, who were members of his family or men dependent upon him. One was located at Dereghez, one was at Merv until the Russian occupation in I884, and one wrote from Sarrakhs.15 The limitations of this sketchy system were exposed when none reported the submission of the Turcomans of Merv to the Russians in February I884. The first news came from the Russian newspapers and was sent to Stewart from the Tehran legation.16

11 Lt.-Col. C. E. Stewart, 'Report on the north-east frontier of Persia and the Tekeh

Turcomans', IOR L/P & S/i8/c. 32.

12 Capt. Hon. G. E. Napier, Collection of journals and reports from Persia, 1874 (London, I876).

Intelligence officers in London had a poor view of Napier's worth as an intelligencer: Beaver,

Development of the Intelligence Division, p. I59. 13 Lt.-Col. C. E. Stewart, 'Report on special duty on the Perso-Afghan frontier, February

i883', IOR L/P & S/3/242, Pp. I205ff.; and 'The country of the Tekke Turcomans and the

Tejend and Murghab rivers', Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, new series, i I I (i 88I ),

5 I 3ff. 14 IOR L/P & S/3/242, 649ff., 737ff. and 789ff.; L/P & S/8/i I; see Thomson to Granville,

I 00, 2oJune I 884, Public Record Office. FO 60/46 I. These and other records in the Public Record

Office are crown copyright and appear by permissioni of the controller of Her Majesty's Stationery

Office. 15 Stewart to Sanderson, 9 Feb. I883, IOR L/P & S/3/242/657. 16 Thomson to Granville, 25, I3 Feb. I884 and 42, 8 Mar. I884 and 46, 28 Mar. I884, P.R.O.

FO 60/460.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 6: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 66i

The occupation triggered off a prolonged crisis, with repercussions in Persia long after the final demarcation of the Russo-Afghan frontier. Its immediate effect was to confirm the need to delimit the northern frontier of Afghanistan, and for that purpose the formation of a joint Anglo-Russian boundary commission was agreed. Assuming that work could begin before winter set in, the British commissioner left in September i884. This proved premature, for the Russian government delayed the dispatch of its commissioner and called for prior agreement on the criteria for delimitation.17 That was not reached for another year, long after the clash between Russian and Afghan troops at Panjdeh in March i885, and the delimitation did not begin until December 1885. However, the British decision to dispatch Sir Peter Lumsden immediately enhanced the importance of the Mashhad agency. The rapid transmission of information to and from the commission was crucial for its work, and the easiest route for this was through Tehran and Mashhad, using the telegraph line under Persian administration. Lumsden travelled by way of Tiflis and Tehran, reaching his destination in October i884. Thereafter he communicated by telegram via Mashhad with a special courier service to the commission camp. Despite the presence in the Mashhad office of a British clerk with unrestricted use of the wire at night when the Persian office was closed, the system was defective. The line from Tehran only worked intermittently during winter. Its condition was deplorable.'8 In an effort to ensure an improved postal arrangement and adequate communications, Condie Stephens was sent once more to Mashhad in March i885, from where he joined the commission in September. The new role and significance of the agent was recognized by raising his salary from [300 to [480 per year.19 The line did not improve. In July i 885 Colonel Murdoch-Smith, director of the Persian section of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, suggested that the expenses of repair, estimated at about f2,000, be advanced to the Persian government jointly by the Indian and British governments. As the latter refused to subscribe to the costs of the boundary commission, the proposal failed. Finally the 66o-mile line was taken over by the Department, whose representatives in Persia assumed responsibility for it. Between December i885 and April i886 the line was surveyed and repaired at a cost of ?96o. In August i886 the government of India agreed to maintain the line for approximately 20,000 rupees annually or C 1,520. In February I887 the British Treasury finally agred to assume five- seventeenths of the cost, backdated to October i 886, in an arrangement which lasted until September i89i.20

Parallel to this a decision was taken to strengthen permanently the information-gathering system in Khorassan by replacing the succession of

17 Ministerstvo Innostrannykh Delakh, Afganskoye razgranicheniye: peregovory mezhdu Rossiey i

Velikobritaniey i87-1i885 (St Petersburg, i886). 18 Telegraphic exchanges between Tehran and London, August to October i884, P.R.O.

FO 60/462 and Thomson to Granville, I 46, 3 Oct. I 884, FO 65/ I 2 I I. 19 Granville to Thomson, tel. 40, I Apr. i885, P.R.O. FO 60/47 I. 20 P.R.O. FO 60/537; see, too, the Telegraph Department records now in the IOR

L/PWD/7/43 I.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 7: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

662 L. P. MORRIS

temporary officers with one permanently stationed at Mashhad. The cost was to be borne by the government of India, which selected Colonel C. S. Maclean of the Punjab Cavalry and the Indian Political Service. Appointed in March I885, he was to replace Finn, who returned to Resht in May taking the opportunity of his return journey personally to instruct correspondents as to the nature of the information desired by the British authorities.2' Maclean arrived in Tehran in March i 886, leaving immediately tojoin the commission. When its work was completed, he was to remain. His duties were explained to him orally, and no file copy was kept.22 It seems clear that he was to play a wider political role than that of information collecting.

As war threatened after the Panjdeh engagement good information was vital. A poor opinion was held of that supplied through Abbas Khan.23 He was moreover unable to establish a satisfactory relationship with the governor- general of Khorassan, Asaf ud-Dowleh, and part of the blame for this was attributed to him.24 This was especially unfortunate as good relations were necessary to ensure that Asaf ud-Dowleh appointed to the governorships of frontier districts men well disposed to Britain rather than to Russia. Maclean's task was twofold: to acquire the most accurate information as to Russian activities and especially troop movements and military preparations, and to establish and maintain friendly relations with the local Persian authorities to ease the gathering of information and to hinder similar Russian activities. To these may be added a third. On the accession of Abdur Rahman as amir at Kabul prominent supporters of the family of the late amir Shir Ali had fled. In particular, the second son of Shir Ali, Ayub Khan, and his partisans were living in conspiratorial agitation in Khorassan.25 Maclean was to watch them and to try to persuade them to quit the frontier and to prevent their being used by the Russians. His purpose was summarized by the Viceroy in August I 887

[General Maclean] is the main channel of information with regard to the movements of the Russians in Central Asia, and he has been directed to watch the course of events in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. It is also desirable that he should gain influence in Eastern Persia itself, and establish friendly relations with the local Governors and officials on the Khorassan frontier. Finally, he has to control the Afghan refugees in Meshed and the neighbourhood, and if possible to prevent them giving trouble to the Ameer's Government.26

21 Thomson to Granville, tel. I09, 4 May I885, P.R.O. FO 65/I242. 22 H. M. Durand, foreign secretary to the government of India, to Colonel C. S. Smith, 5I4F,

2I Mar. i885, IOR L/P & S/3/262; Thomson to Rosebery, 44, 29 Mar. i886, P.R.O. FO 65/I284.

23 See the dismissive minutes attached to information supplied by him: IOR L/P & S/9/i87. 24 Thomson to Granville, 25, 27 Feb. I884, IOR L/P & S/9/I87. 25 Ayub Khan, Governor of Herat in I879, defeated British forces at Maiwand and was

subsequently beaten by Roberts at Kandahar in September I 88o and later fled to Mashhad, where in January I882 he became a pensioner of the Shah. In summer I888 he accepted an invitation to go into exile in India: Sykes, Afghanistan, II, I38-55; Sir W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan

(London, I 950), I 5 I, I 54 and I 7 I . 26 Viceroy to secretary of state, 5 Aug. I887, IOR L/P & S/3/294.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 8: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 663

These objectives continued after the delimitation was concluded. As the government of India acknowledged in December I886 when asked to pay to maintain the Mashhad-Tehran telegraph line.

The centre of our future system of Central Asian intelligence must be in the neighbourhood of Meshed, and it is very desirable to have certain and rapid means of communication with that point.27

In September I886 the Anglo-Russian commission broke up after a serious disagreement over the final portion of the frontier. The matter was referred to London and St Petersburg and Maclean returned to Mashhad, where he was attached to the agency whilst Abbas Khan continued as agent. The resulting friction was not surprising. It was finally resolved in I889 when on the establishment of a Russian consulate-general the agency was wound up and replaced by a British consulate-general.28 Maclean, promoted to the local rank of Brigadier-General, became consul-general, and Abbas Khan was pensioned off on condition that he lived elsewhere than Mashhad, where his presence was considered inimical to the establishment of an effective intelligence-gathering network. The basis of the new system was to be regular correspondents writing at intervals of two weeks or a month, reporting under standardized headings items of interest in their localities.

For his work Maclean was allocated substantial sums of secret service money. Initially there was no ceiling, but during summer I888 he was restricted to a maximum of 2,500 rupees per month - approximately ?igo, or 6250 qrans

(625 tomans) in local currency. Vouchers detailing expenditures were submitted monthly to India. At first recorded in the Foreign Department's Secret Frontier series, after March I888 they were filed amongst routine business papers and not remitted to London. The files in the National Archive of India are incomplete, with gaps for the periods between March i 888 and September I889, September I899 and April I9OI and for the first six months of 1907. In

June I908 the accounting system was changed and the vouchers ceased.29 By then there were two officers, the consul general and a military attache, each of whom operated a separate fund. In June I908 they were authorized to validate their own accounts.30

Maclean began by building on contacts made by the boundary commission and by opening links with Afghans living in Khorassan. An early recruit was

Hajji Muhammad Hussain Khan. The son of a Mashhad merchant who

originally came from Hamadan, he was compensated for property lost at Penjdeh and was first employed to watch the local community of Afghan

27 Government of India, tel. 24, I4 Dec. i886, P.R.O. FO 60/537. 28 The Russian request, made in October I888 and agreed in December, led to a formal

invitation for an equivalent British institution in January I889: IOR L/P & S/3/293. 29 They are located in the National Archives of India, New Delhi. For permission to use these

and other records from the archives I am indebted to the Director of the National Archives of India, New Delhi.

30 Government of India I70 secret, I Dec. I904, IOR L/P & S/io/85 and 3I7.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 9: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

664 L. P. MORRIS

refugees. InJanuary I887 he was sent to Merv as a special correspondent. His brother Mirza Muhammad Khalil was recruited in January I887 and sent to Ashkhabad as another special correspondent. He too was a merchant. Both were discovered in the autumn as a result of information sent to the Russian authorities from Mashhad and their activities ended.31 Amongst the Afghans, the amir's newswriter at Mashhad, Mirza Muhammad Yusuf Khan, was an early informant. From November I886 he was being paid a regular monthly sum varying between twelve-and-a-half and twenty tomans. He was described as ' an able man [whose] services are of importance'. He received regular letters from an agent of his own in Tehran and copies of important telegrams were passed to him by the staff of the Persian telegraph office in Mashhad.32 Despite Maclean's best efforts the amir learnt of the connexion and in autumn I888 he dropped out of the picture.33 Another regular source of information was Mirza Haider Qoli Khan, who supplied information on the Afghan refugee community at Mashhad and who received intermittent sums from November i886. Subsequently he joined the regular payroll, being described as 'the Confidential Local Reporter' and in receipt of twenty-five tomans a month. He continued to draw this until his death in February I892. In addition to these, Maclean recruited Mirza Hajii Muhammad Hussain to act as a confidential organizer of agents and correspondents. He operated from Mashhad and from Dereghez, being used to contact potential correspondents and to act as an overseer and paymaster for them. He eventually became superintendent of a circle of contacts, known as agency D, which expanded during the I89os to include correspondents in Russia at Kerki, Krasnovodsk, Samarcand and Sheikh Junaid, and in Persia at Pul-i-Khatun.

These regular sources of information were complemented by special messengers sent to gather information and by occasional contacts with prominent Turcomans such as Gul Jamal Bai, the widow of the famous chief Nur Verdi Khan and mother of Makhdum Qoli Khan, the governor of Tejend. Such occasional contacts, however, were inadequate for the provision of sustained and detailed intelligence. Russian troop movements, her contacts with Afghanistan, internal developments at Merv and along the frontier and the mood and attitude of the Turcomans to the Russians, and activities and proclivities of Persian frontier officials and the movements of Afghan refugees required a steady flow of news from agents whose reliability could be assessed over a long period.

It was difficult to establish and maintain contacts in a region now part of the Russian empire without arousing the suspicions of the tsarist authorities. This problem was met in part by utilizing the services of Turcomans who had worked for the British commission both before and during the delimitation

31 NAI Secret F, July I887, 346 and 358 and April I888, 78 and 93. 32 NAI Secret F, July I887, 346 and October i888, 337. 33 He may not have been as reliable as Maclean thought for he was on intimate terms with

Abbas Khan, who provided him with information: memorandum by Guinness, Tehran, 3 I July I889, IOR L/P & S/3/297.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 10: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 665

work between I884 and I887. Foremost amongst these was Sihat Bai. Originally domiciled at Panjdeh, he had left in I884 when the Russians occupied the area and had come to Mashhad. His wife and children had not been permitted to join him and his property had been confiscated.34 He was able to muster sufficient wealth to set up as a carpet dealer.35 He was engaged to operate two separate services. In public, he was the Turcoman post contractor, engaged to operate the agency's postal communication system with India via Herat. The men engaged on this regular service between Mashhad and Herat, where the service was taken over by Afghans, were all Turcomans and former employees of the boundary commission. His second, secret role was to open a network of regular agents in the Turcoman territories of Russia. This was in operation by February I887, when Sihat Bai was receiving 70 tomans monthly for its maintenance.36 This sum steadily increased. The agency came to be known as the 'C Agency' and had regular agents at Panjdeh, Kerki and Russian Sarrakhs. In addition, Turcomans made tours through the region gathering information before returning to Mashhad. The distances involved required a substantial provision of mounted messengers: as Maclean explained in June I 890:

messengers must be mounted men, as the distance to be traversed by them is great. They are not kept in attendance at the News Agents' house, but come when wanted. They thus need not necessarily attract attention as mounted Turkomans are the rule, not the exception... the Russians are now on the watch, and it is becoming more dangerous every day for the Turkomans to perform this duty.37

Inevitably it was expensive though it was by no means clear that the moneys expended were going to the Turcomans. Finally Russian watchfulness became too great and the agency was wound up in March I89I.

One other agency was created in I887 and continued to operate throughout the I89os. This was known as the 'B Agency'. It had fewer contacts, only two of whom were regularly maintained, one at Bajgirha and the other at Krasnovodsk. Like the C and D agencies, it had its own superintendent, who acted as recruiter and overseer of news agents. Both B and D agencies were run down at the end of the century and had in effect ceased to exist by April I9OI. Their erstwhile superintendents continued to be paid, however. The former superintendent of the B agency received forty tomans a month until May 1902, whilst Hajji Muhammad Hussein's stipend of thirty tomans monthly was not discontinued until November 1904.

This development of contacts and correspondents inevitably had reper- cussions in Persia. The establishment of a regular news-gathering agency in the capital of a major province was not a matter likely to escape notice. The

34 NAI Frontier B, Nov. i 896, 107-I X. 35 Sihat Bai's tangled affairs embraced both larceny and bigamy. The money to set him up

in business may have come from Maclean. NAI Secret F, Aug. i887, 305. 36 NAI Secret F, July I 887, 364. 37 Maclean to Barnes, under secretary in the Foreign Department, 28 June i890, NAI Frontier

B, Sept. i890, 65.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 11: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

666 L. P. MORRIS

acquiescence if not the active assistance of local officials was essential if the operation were to succeed. There was inevitably a tendency for intelligence gathering to be extended from Russian to Persian territory. Local officials knew about it. At the end of I 885 the governor-general, Asaf ud-Dowleh, complained to Abbas Khan of the presence of British news correspondents in the province. The Tehran legation advised that he be quietly ignored:

no special authority has ever been requested for the residence of news agents at their several posts; and their presence, though within the knowledge of the authorities, has never been objected to... I have told him [Abbas Khan] that it would be well for the news agents to keep quiet, and not draw the attention of the authorities and of the public unnecessarily to their presence.38

Such protests might be inconvenient, but more serious would be harassment of agents. To avoid this the goodwill of local officials was essential. Their active assistance was also invaluable in smoothing the passage of letters and messengers to and from Russia.

To win and maintain this goodwill there flowed a steady stream of presents debited to the secret service account. The Persian new year, the nuruz, falls in March and was a suitable pretext for gifts. At the nuruz in I887 such local dignitaries as a brother-in-law of the Mutamin us-Soltaneh and a son of the Vakil ud-Dowleh received cash presents. As important were the local religious leaders, whose representative, mullah AbdulJavad, was also gratified. Straddling both categories was the indigent qajar prince 'Ata' Khan Mirza, doubly significant as a father-in-law of the Shah and as keeper of the Shrine library. His friendship was important in helping offset local prejudice. The large cash present made to him in March paved the way for his agreement in April to rent his house to Maclean, who was thus enabled to establish a suitable base.39 Other presents were made from time to time: carpets for the governor-general and a diamond ring for the leading religious figure, mujtahid Agha Mirza Ahmed, both in May I887; shawls to various village headmen; champagne for the governor-general; a present to the leading civil official in Mashhad, the beglarbegi, on the occasion of his son's marriage in November I889.40 As important were the small cash presents, made to servants and clients of various influential local figures. In August I887 these were made to servants of the Shrine hajib ul-towlia, of the beglarbegi, of Sheykh Abu Muhammad, mujtahid, of the postmaster of the province, of 'Ata' Khan Mirza, of the British agent at Herat and of the Afghan news-writer at Mashhad; to two confidential servants, or pishkhemats of the governor of Herat, who received the relatively large sum of twenty tomans each; to the gholam or messenger of the Tehran

38 Thomson to Salisbury, i, 6 Jan. i886, P.R.O. FO 60/479. 39 NAI Secret F, July i887, 364 and 369. 40 NAI Secret F, Aug. i887, 305 and April i888, 89; Frontier B, Mar. i890, 134 and 137.

Maclean acknowledged that he had aroused expectations: 'I know that the Prince Governor of Khorassan, his prime minister [sic], and some of the Mashad Mujtahids will expect me to bring them something on my return [from leave in Britain] and I think it would be a pity to disappoint them.' Private letter to the Political Secretary, India Office, 21 June i889, IOR L/P & S/3/296.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 12: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 667

legation. Other sums went to various people connected with the Shrine, to poor Hindus and to sundry messengers. To this should be added the purchase of a camel for sacrifice at the 'id-i-qorban. Despite the large number of recipients, the total sum involved was relatively small.41

Expenditures to influence local opinion were made on occasions of public celebration. The annual muharram celebrations offered an opportunity to conciliate local sentiment. Donations were made towards religious recitations, the ruzehkhaneh, and presents given to the inhabitants of the mahaleh, the quarter of the city where the agency was situated, as well as to the leader of the mullahs. At the annual celebration of the Queen's birthday the agency was illuminated, a festive gesture intermittently accorded also on the Shah's birthday.

As time passed the list of gifts came to include more exotic items. Sho'a ud-Dowleh, governor of Quchan, received cigars in October I890; hyacinth bulbs were presented to the Sahib Divan whilst he was governor-general, and three pairs of coloured spectacles went to Agha Mirza Ahmed inJanuary 1893; six dozen bottles of cognac for distribution were procured in December 1893.42

The climax came in January 1902 when an artificial limb was presented to a notorious local robber who had lost an arm in an attack on a caravan.43 After that the flow of unusual gifts was stemmed. Alcoholic drinks had already been forbidden in November I895.

More important and more insidious were the payments made to procure active assistance. The earliest public figure to appear regularly in the vouchers was Hajji Abdul Qasim, described as the 'Postmaster-General of Khorassan'.44 Maclean characterized him as

likely to be of the greatest use to us hereafter. His father was, I believe, at one time British Agent here. His brother is one of the wealthiest merchants in the place. [He] will probably do anything we ask him.45

He had been instrumental in arranging the establishment of news-writers at Ashkhabad and Merv, and by August I887 was managing agents at Bujnurd and Quchan, both on the sensitive frontier with Russia. The arrangement seems to have come into effect in May I887. For this he received fifty tomans a quarter. He subsequently superintended the 'B' agency, his stipend being increased to thirty tomans a month. He retained his post in the local Persian administration. Another Persian official receiving regular payments was the assistant telegraph master at the Persian telegraph office, who by July I887

was receiving ten tomans monthly for the supply of 'telegrams bearing on Russian or Afghan affairs'. He also provided copies of any other telegrams of interest which passed between the governor-general and Tehran.46 This

41 NAI Secret F, Apr. i888, 8i. 42 NAI Frontier B, Dec. I890, II9 andJune I893, I47 and Mar. I894, I5I.

43 NAI Frontier B, July I 902, 220.

44 Hajji Mirza Abul Qasim Khan, Mu'affak ul-Molk. His uncle Hajii Mahmud Kabuli was the former British agent. He had opened the first post office in Mashhad in I877: 'Notes on the leading notables of Khorassan', NAI Secret F, October I903, 357.

45 NAI Secret F, July I887, 365. 46 NAI Secret F, Apr. i888, 79.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 13: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

668 L. P. MORRIS

arrangement petered out in the autumn, for by then the head of the office was receiving fifteen tomans monthly for the same service.47 This has come to an end by October I889, yet there was a contact in the local telegraph office, as was admitted in June I894. It may be that the head of the office continued to receive his monthly retainer, for an official designated as 'Officer M' was receiving eighteen tomans each month under an arrangement which did not come to an end until I 899. The identification of another local Persian official whose assistance was secured must remain equally tentative. In June 1894 it was acknowledged that the customs officer posted on the Russo-Persian frontier at Bajgirha was receiving a regular payment.48 Probably this was the officer identified as 'Officer F' who had been receiving fifteen tomans a month since January I89I. This was later increased to twenty and was kept up until the officer retired in June I9OI.

These contacts in the posts, telegraph system and customs were of great value in facilitating contacts with agents in Russia. They could also be used to secure information about events in Persia itself. Whatever Maclean's original instructions, he quickly became interested in extending his contacts within Khorassan. He explicitly urged this in June i888, writing

as Russian intrigue is apparently entering into a renewed phase of activity in Khorassan, it seems to me absolutely necessary to establish news-agencies in the interior of the country also if we are to keep ourselves acquainted with what is going on. The Russian Agent at Meshed has, I believe, correspondents at Turbat Haideri, Tabbas, Yezd, Khaf, Kani [sic] and Kirman.

This proposal was turned down in October I888 when he was instructed to restrict his activities to the frontier districts.49 The network of contacts established here by the early I89os produced a steady supply of information from agents at Bujnurd, Quchan, Persian Sarrakhs, Kelat and Muhamma- dabad. This completed the network of permanent agents covering the whole area and reaching to the river Amu Darya.50

Whether Maclean intended these news-writers based on Persian soil to restrict themselves to reporting on events connected with the Russians is a moot point. The weekly abstracts of intelligence compiled by him and sent back to India contained examples of telegrams exchanged between Mashhad and Tehran covering a wide range of internal Persian matters, and especially the relationships between governors-general and their subordinates, and between them and the central government. Much of the information in the newsletters of Persian agents related to economic matters and to the movement of foreigners and distinguished local personages. The impression that Maclean

4 NAI Secret F, Apr. i888, 83. 48 NAI Secret F, June I 894, 37. 49 Maclean to Durand, 88, 6 June i888 and Durand to Maclean, 2452F, 27 Oct. i888, NAI

Secret F, Oct. i888, 337 and 338. 50 Maclean's reports were often sensational and over-coloured, which led to their being heavily

discounted by the Intelligence Division in London: Beaver, Development of the Intelligence Division, p. I79.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 14: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 669

and his successors were interested in more than Russian activities is given added weight by occasional payments recorded in the vouchers. For example, in February i 888 the assistant mostufi of Khorassan, Mirza Hussein, provided copies of the revenue registers for the province, whilst in March I890 a copy of the summary of revenue papers for Khorassan and Sistan was acquired.51

The other important and powerful local group was the clergy, whose influence over the local population and network of contacts throughout the shi'a world placed a premium on its favour. Maclean early set about making contact with the principal mujtahids of the city, employing as his contact the mullah Abdul Javad.52 It was he who arranged a meeting between Maclean and Haiji Sheykh Abdul Rahim, the second-ranking mujtahid of Mashhad. The other main link with the local clerics was the chief mullah, Hajji Muhammad Qoli, mullahbashi, who from July I887 received a sum of three tomans monthly with occasional additional presents to him and his sons. He remained on the payroll until about I900. The mujtahids Agha Mirza Ahmed and Sheykh Abu Muhammad also received occasional presents. The most important and influential mujtahid was however Sheykh Muhammad Taqi, whom Maclean was able to arrange to meet in April I887. On that occasion the mullahbashi acted as intermediary and received a shawl for his services.53 Sheykh Muhammad Taqi's influence rested in part on his reputation for not accepting money. Yet in October I890 he requested and received the sum of ten tomans for distribution amongst the needy.54 Whilst he personally had not received money previously his sons had. In May I887 they had accepted fifty gold Russian imperials, the equivalent of 140 tomans. In the same month Agha Mirza Ahmed had been presented with a diamond ring, valued at ioo tomans, and Maclean had entertained Haji Sheykh Abdul Rahim and other mullahs.55 Such contacts may have been helpful in recruiting mullahs in territories under Russian control. The vouchers provide little information as to the identities of the news- writers whose periodical letters reached Mashhad, but a very partial list forJuly I887 identifies mullahs as correspondents in Bokhara, Kerki and Ashkhabad.56

By I 900 the number of active correspondents was decreasing. The vigilance and efficiency of the local Russian authorities improved and made regular correspondence more and more difficult. As the local populations were reconciled to becoming Russian subjects they were probably less willing to act as informers. The supply of information depended on prolonged visits to Russia, on casual information or on connexions with local officials and headmen of villages on the Persian side of the frontier. The thrust of intelligence-gathering thus shifted from Russian to Persian soil. This change increased the importance of certain locations on the frontier. The chiefs of the nomadic Jamshidis and the village headmen in the neighbourhood of Pas Kumar were already being

51 NAI Secret F, Aug. I 887, 305 anid May i 888, 283; Frontier B, July I 890, 44. 52 NAI Secret F, July i887, 364. 53 NAI Secret F, July i887, 368. 54 NAI Frontier B, Dec. I890, I I9.

55 NAI Secret F, July i887, 305. 56 NAI Secret F, Apr. i888, 77 and 78.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 15: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

670 L. P. MORRIS

visited regularly by special messengers in I890 and i89i.57 Pul-i-Khatun too was served by a regular messenger as early as i89i, and finally became the location of a permanent news-writer in June i894,58 an arrangement which lasted until the network of agents was dissolved at the turn of the century. Similar links were developed with areas of Khorassan bordering on Afghanistan. Here the Bakharz and Khaf areas were centres of activity, with Taiabad and Muhsinabad especial centres of interest. These operations were reinforced by the tour made by Lt.-Col. C. E. Yate during winter i893-4. The acting consul-general went into the province of Sistan before returning to Mashhad.59 His tour in autumn and winter i894 covered the districts of Dereghez and Quchan and ended in the Gorgan area.60 These visits enabled him to consolidate existing contacts and to conciliate friendly inclinations byjudicious gifts.

By the mid- I8gos the consulate at Mashhad was in communication with local chiefs and officials throughout Khorassan. Whatever the objective, the impact of these operations in Persia was extremely important. The basis had been laid for an extension of activity within the host country should conditions require it. The first indications that this might happen came with the crisis occasioned by the granting of a concession for a tobacco monopoly to the British subject, Baron Reuter. In the ensuing upheaval, the consulate turned in i89i and i892 to those local clergy already contacted. It was a matter of especial congratulation for Maclean to be able to report in October i89i that Sheykh Muhammad Taqi had accepted fifty imperials, about I40 tomans.A In December patients from the local hospital sent by the mujtahzid received grants from the secret service funds.62 The nuruz in I 892 offered a suitable opportunity for Ney Elias, Maclean's successor, to acknowledge the useful services rendered.63 Three hundred and five tomans were presented to Sheykh Muhammad Taqi, and a further 250 were sent to Agha Mirza Ahmed, who had also rendered 'useful services '.64 Thereafter each nuruz brought further presents to them: in I 893 the former received the equivalent of 4 I 6 tomans, the latter 405 ;65 in I 894 they received a total of 929 tomans.66 They were always given Russian gold imperials. When Sheykh Muhammad Taqi died in summer i896 his two sons were offered appropriate financial condolences: Haji Sheykh Murtaza who succeeded his father got sixty tomans and Haiji Sheykh Muhammad forty.67

57 NAI Frontier B, Apr. I 89 I, I 4 and I 7 and July I 89 I, 5 and Aug. I 89 I, 43-8. 58 NAI Frontier B, Oct. i894, 74. 51 NAI Frontier B, June I894, I87-9o and Oct. I894, 67. 60 NAI Frontier B, Apr. i895, 36, 39 and 42. 61 NAI Frontier B, Mar. I892, 74. 62 NAI Frontier B, Mar. i892, 83. 63 A civilian explorer with life-long interests in China and Turkestan, Ney Elias had uneasy

relations with other officers in the Indian Political Service who were predominantly soldiers. His time in Mashhad was dogged by illness and difficulties with colleagues: see G. Morgan, Ney Elias (London, I97I)-

64 NAI Frontier B, Sept. i892, 43. 65 NAI Frontier B, June I 893, I 53. 66 NAI Frontier B, June I 894, i 86. 67 NAI Frontier B, Nov. i896, I75.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 16: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 67I

Probably each subsequent nuruz brought further gifts, but thereafter they were subsumed under the blanket description of gifts to mujtahzids, and precise identification is impossible.

If the original impetus had been lost by I 900 and the information-gathering network in Russia noticeably run down by I903, the process was reversed in

1904, as the real possibility arose of British involvement in the Russo-Japanese War in the event of the I902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance being invoked. During the summer the government of India supplemented the consul-general with an intelligence officer, stationed at Mashhad but with a roving commission throughout Khorassan and Transcaspia. Captain Smythe stimulated a pro- nounced increase in the flow of information. Following Maclean's model regular correspondents were established at Patakissar, Merv and Tashkent and by mid- I 905 a new chain was in being, with Tashkent, Patakissar, Sarrakhs, Sheik Junaid, Merv, Ashkhabad and Krasnovodsk each having a permanent contact, whilst travelling informants operated out of Tashkent, Merv, Charjui, Kokand, Ashkhabad and 'on the river Oxus'. The only news-writer taken over from the old system was the permanent correspondent at Krasnovodsk. This resurgence was probably made possible by the contemporary chaos in Russia. It convinced the government of India that the presence of a specific military officer to gather information was highly desirable, and it recommended that a military attache be stationed permanently at Mashhad.68 The office was effectively established in summer I905, with two separate grants of secret service moneys, one to the consul-general and the other to the officer described as the military attache. In fact the position was not formally regularized until May I9I3, when it was sanctioned by the British government and the War Office assumed half the costs and expenses. From September I905 therefore the expenses of the intelligence-gathering operation were borne by the grant to the military attache, who returned totals of sums expended and not individual details. These showed a decrease in the sums in mid-i907, and the new lower levels were maintained until the returns ended in June I908. As tension fell after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Entente in I907 and as the spheres of influence of the two states were mutually agreed the need for and level of information gathering in Russia fell. Officially however the purpose of the operation at Mashhad remained unchanged, being defined in May I 9 I O

as occupied by

an Intelligence officer, forced by circumstances to reside outside the country on which he is expected to report.69

Activities within Persia also reflected this new tempo. As the network of contacts within Russia was refurbished expenditure within Persia did not fall. The pattern of activity however changed. The growth of the nationalist and constitutionalist movement produced an intensification of disbursements to Persian officials. One centre of interest was Turbat-i-Haidari. Gholam Muhammad Khan acted as contact there and was the recipient of a regular,

68 Government of India, Secret I70, I December I904, IOR L/P & S/io/i85. 69 Government of India, Army 42, I2 May I9IO, IOR L/P & S/IO/3I7.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 17: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

672 L. P. MORRIS

though varying sum between February I903 and April I904. Other irregular payments went to various religious figures in the area or to their relations. By I904, however, the southern part of Khorassan was also being irrigated with secret service moneys from the new consulate in Sistan. More interesting was the extension of activity in Mashhad itself.

As earlier, the key to influence in Mashhad lay with the clergy and officials of the Shrine. In May I902 the architect of the Shrine, Haji Muhammad Ismail, appeared in the returns for the first time. He received 50 tomans for 'secret political work', and similar sums were paid to him at irregular intervals until the returns ended in June i908.70 Occasional sums went the way of the servants of the mutavalli bashi, or chief custodian of the Shrine, and on at least one occasion the incumbent, Mehdi Qoli Mirza, Saham ul-Molk, received a large nuruz present. As interesting was the monthly 30 tomans paid regularly after autumn I904 to an unnamed 'high Persian official'. Gifts in kind continued to play an important role. In July I904 the governor-general received a year's subscription to French newspapers and examples of similar presentations to later governors-general occurred subsequently. In March I908

the French publications were enlivened by the addition of the Illustrated London News.7' Between I904 and I908 other gifts to various local officials included rifle cartridges, flower and vegetable seeds, an automatic tea-making machine (which subsequently required repair and a fresh supply of methylated spirits), spectacles, Persian books from India, a milk churn and, in one especially ironic instance, a presentation copy of Morier's celebrated satire on Persian customs and venality, Haji Baba of Ispahan.72 The provision of gifts on a more or less systematic basis was an inexpensive way of maintaining good working relationships with local officials. However, coupled as it was with increasing cash payments, there were serious implications as the precarious internal balance of the country worsened and the political crisis deepened during I907

and I908.

The returns of expenditure for the period July I907 until I908 revealed a systematic pattern of regular payments designed to achieve more than friendly feeling or lack of harassment of British contacts with Russian Turkestan. The machinery devised to gather intelligence and further political contacts within Russia and Afghanistan now become oriented towards internal Persian politics. In the light of the professed patriotic sentiments of the participants in the constitutionalist and nationalist movement certain payments acquired particular interest. The mujtahids and tullab of the Shrine, described as 'the Professors and Students', were paid 22 tomans monthly.73 The president of the Mashhad nationalist organization or anjuman, described as 'the local Assembly', might have been unapproachable but his servants were not, and they received

70 NAI Frontier B, Aug. I903, 26. Hajji Ismail, Muavin us-Sanaya, shared the office with his father, Hajii Muhammad. He also build the British consulate-general in Mashhad: 'Notes on notables', Secret F, Oct. I903, 357.

71 NAI Frontier B, June I 908, 88. 72 NAI Frontier B, Apr. I908, i66-77 andJune I908, 84-9 and Aug. I908, 4I9-26.

73 NAI Frontier B, Apr. I 908, i 66.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 18: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 673

regular small payments until September I907. . The secretary of the anjuman was certainly not unapproachable. He was on the payroll throughout the period, receiving I5 tomans monthly until December I 907 and 20 thereafter.75 A mullah, described as 'a prominent local preacher', received I o tomans: he may have been the same 'leading popular preacher' named Iftikhar ul-Vaizin who received a special payment of 50 tomans at muharram, which fell in February I 908.76 Local officials continued to receive their regular stipends. A telegraphist in the telegraph office got I 5 tomans, one of the governor-general's pishkhedmats also received 15, and an official in the customs got io.

These regular payments were made anonymously. In addition certain payments were made regularly to named individuals during these years. Four in particular recur: Mirza Qasim Khan 'of the Imperial Bank', Mirza Hassan Ali Shirazi, Mirza Reza and Mirza Ali Asghar. Beyond their names no indication was given in the returns of their positions or of the purposes for which they were paid. One preoccupation of the consulate did emerge clearly. The local anjuman was the source of continuing interest. An emissary to it from the majlis in Tehran and one of its own members both received presents inJanuary I908 at the religious festival of 'id-i-ghadir, whilst in the same month 25 tomans were expended 'to different people for supplying information about secret societies of Meshed', and 'a Professor in the Shrine' was paid IO for the same purpose.77 Secret service moneys were funding political intelligence-gathering and propaganda purposes in Persia, whatever the purpose for which they had originally been approved.

It was not surprising that the consulate used to the full the power and influence which payments gave. Similar ones no doubt flowed from the Russian consulate in Mashhad, and whilst payments were offered they were also accepted. There was no doubting the willingness of Persians to take advantage of the opportunity. The contacts made covered every section of local society, governors-general, officials, religious dignitaries, village headmen, servants, gatekeepers, students. The decline in the efficiency and authority of the qajar government reduced its capacity to control the spread of foreign influence. A blend of caprice, favouritism and venality governed appointments, promotions and tenure of office and did nothing to encourage loyalty or probity. There was no security of ownership of property. It was a vicious circle. As foreign representatives interfered increasingly in the internal affairs of the country, the weaknesses and inefficiency of the government were exacerbated, in their turn encouraging more interference.

The secret service returns illustrated some of the ways the consulate exerted influence. It was not the only centre of British activity. Every consulate had its own secret service funds by the start of the twentieth century. The one at Mashhad was not the only centre for disbursement in Khorassan, for after

74 NAI Frontier B, Apr. I 908, i 66 and I 70. 75 NAI Frontier B, Apr. ig08, i66ff. 76 NAI Frontier B, June I 908, 86. 77 NAI Frontier B, June I 908, 84.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 19: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

674 L. P. MORRIS

February I 90 I the newly established consulate for Sistan overlapped somewhat in its area of competence, and throughout there was involvement by the legation in local matters.78 Whatever the source of the funds and regardless of whether they came from British or Russian representatives, the result was the creation of alternative loyalties and career opportunities. Payment, patronage and promotion were available from the intervention of foreign representatives, who offered protection in the shape of foreign nationality and put pressure on the Persian authorities. An example was the Turcoman sowars, who had served the boundary commission and subsequently manned the postal system operating between Mashhad and Herat. They received regular, paid employment and their position was strengthened by the issue of registration certificates placing them under British consular protection. Sihat Bai and Qoli Sardar received them in June I892 and Naubat Gildi in February I893.79 A good example of pressure on the Persian authorities to further the career of a protege came in August I906.

A Persian telegraphist at Meshed, named Ovanessoff, who had been useful in the past to Her Majesty's Consul-General, has been removed from his post at the instance of the Russian Legation. Ovanessoff was very unpopular with the Russians owing to his constant opposition to their efforts to obtain undue control of the Sistan and other lines in Khorassan. His Majesty's Charg6 d'Affaires has approached the Minister of Telegraphs on the subject who has promised to give Ovanessoff a good post in Tehran as compensation.80

A further example of intervention in the affairs of the telegraph came from Turbat-i-Haidari, where a regular payment was made to the master at Shusp as he

was transferred from Neh where he could increase his income by 'mudakhil' [pre- requisites] to Shusp where he can make nothing, at our request in order to be a check on the Russian contractor. He has given us very good information, and is always ready to help us.81

In this case the officer not merely owed his post, albeit an inferior one, to the consulate but also a substantial proportion of his income, initially io and subsequently I5 tomans a month. Pressure could also be used to keep an official in his post. Injune i888 Abdul Qasim Khan, in charge of the province's postal services and the operator of an agency of news-writers, was reported to have been dismissed. In fact he held on to his post for a further ten years in an

78 Maclean complained of the difficulties caused by divided jurisdiction: NAI Secret F, Oct. i888, 337.

71 NAI Frontier B, Sept. I892, 52I and June I893, I50. The protection given was a source of great embarrassment when Sihat Bai was first exposed in I895 as a thief and extortionist. He abandoned his common-law wife and took refuge in the Russian consulate whence he was transferred back to Russian Turkestan where it was feared he would expose the work of British news-writers. The British consulate was left to pacify claims against its certificate holder. See Morgan, Elias, 259ff.

80 'Monthly news summary, i6 March I906', NAI Secret E, Feb. I907, 588. 81 NAI Frontier B, May I906, 449.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 20: British Secret Service Activity in Khorassan, 1887-1908

SECRET SERVICE IN KHORASSAN 675

unusually long tenure of office by local standards. It was possible that one factor in ensuring his success was discreet pressure from the consulate.

In a country where payment of officials was laggardly and where pishkesh, the present to a superior, was regularly required of office holders, the steady payments offered by the consulate must have been very tempting. Even when these were not accepted for direct personal gain, they went some way to meeting the expenses of the retinues of followers which clustered around important men. The servants, ferrashes and pis/khedmats who received small sums of money testified to the value of the facility for local governors, chiefs, officials, karguzars or official representatives of the Foreign Ministry who alone were authorized to deal with foreigners, and village headmen and others. These could provide their followers with money at no cost to themselves. Mujtahzids too were expected to support retinues and associates. The greater a religious figure and the more influence he wielded the larger his retinue and the calls upon his charity. An elegant variation on direct payment was the sums received by sons of officials or clerics. Major figures more often took their reward in kind. The flower bulbs and seeds, gold-framed spectacles, newspaper subscrip- tions, ammunition, cloth, silverware, oleographs and brandy and champagne added a touch of exotic luxury difficult to obtain in the remote setting of Mashhad and redolent of the civilization of Europe which many educated Persians were starting to copy.

From its original objective of acquiring information about Russian and Afghan activities the consulate had become another source of money and career advantage, with serious implications for the Persian government. As its citizens were drawn into contact with the consulate and came to look to it inevitably their loyalties became confused.

This content downloaded from 66.77.17.54 on Sat, 4 Jan 2014 06:11:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions