The Culture, Media and Sport Committee Inquiry into Tourism. Narrative response on behalf of British Destinations.

1. British Destinations. We are a trade Association representing the interests of major Destinations in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and previously in Scotland. We have been doing so in various guises since 1921. Much has changed in the intervening 93 years but in living memory, at least, many of the apparently important issues remain surprisingly familiar. For example, dipping randomly into our records we find a dozen of the matters raised at our 1959 AGM and conference are still exercising the minds of the industry today, including: changes to British Summer Time, staggering school holidays and above all the need for robust, well-resourced national tourism structure to address inherent market failure issues in both the domestic and international markets. This a full 10 years before the 1969 Tourism Act and the eventual creation of our much loved, vital but increasingly under resourced and all too often meddled with framework of National Tourist Boards.

2. Introduction. We applauding your timely intervention but are concerned at the scale and breadth of the questions, most of which we feel may be worthy of their own 3,000 word responses and some, singly or combined, even their own inquiries. This is not meant as a criticism, as we accept the need to start the process by addressing as many potential headline issues together, if any are to be addressed at all. We merely wish to make the point that if you are forced to ask a good number of by necessity short but far-reaching questions and those answering by necessity then respond with very short concise answers, don’t be too surprised if what you get is some overly simplistic, seemingly contradictory views on what are very complex, often competing tourism issues; issues that whilst increasingly recognised are still not yet that commonly understood.

2.1. We needed to say this at the outset because past experience shows that well intended actions born out of a broad knowledge of the symptoms, rather than a detailed understanding of the underlying context and the range of causes, has served to create solutions in tourism that move problems around or correct some things but at the expense of others of equal or greater importance. Essentially it can result in a rob Peter to pay Paul approach to strategy and can spawns what we regarded as sticking plaster tourism policies.

2.2. Arguably this is illustrated by the number of times VisitEngland has been reversed in and out VisitBritain and the two have undergone radical reorganisations. Over much the same period their combine core funding has been more than halved and yet to our minds the central issues to be addressed by or between the two organisations have not themselves significantly changed, or at least not to the degree that justifies regular, radical reorganisation or cuts in funding of this magnitude. It has resulted in great change and granted always in some “improvement” in the latest specific areas of immediate concern. Yet today we are still left pondering the core issues of how we and they might best support UK domestic, domestic outbound and international inbound tourism, of which two of the three are without doubt the direct and essential functions of these two organisations. Instead of moving tourism deckchairs around, whilst occasionally taking the odd chair away, it is time to sit down and identify what are the real problems, what amongst them is the consequence of genuine market failure and what therefore truly warrants and, critically can only be resolved by Government initiated intervention. In doing this it is absolutely vital that we recognise that true market failure is seldom eradicated but more often merely masked or mitigated. A lack of

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current symptoms therefore is often simply an indication of the ongoing success of an intervention and not a signal that it is no longer justified.

2.3. We are taking the unusual step of presenting a narrative response, covering all 10 questions most in some detail. As a consequence our comments are well in excess of the recommended 3,000 word limit. However we hope that you will still accept the response, have time to read it and that you find the observations, rather than facts, that it contains helpful in framing your inquiry. We would welcome the opportunity to give further brief written or verbal evidence on any or all of issues addressed below if it is of assistance to you:

3. Question 1. Encouraging tourism outside London and the few other heavily visited cities to other parts of the United Kingdom.

3.1. Summary: If there is an issue, it is about the greater dispersal of inbound international tourism and not domestic tourism. We are uncertain that this is a pure market failure issue, nor are we totally convinced that, even if it is, that it is a failing that can be resolved at a worthwhile scale and/or to an acceptable cost benefit ratio. We should not be considering dispersal purely for dispersals sake, nor doing it at public expense if it is at significant risk or predictable cost to the established “honey pot” locations within the UK. Dispersal like much else in the arena of international tourism is primarily about marketing or promotional activity and not about other tourist board functions, for example that of encouraging appropriate product development.

3.2. Dispersal is unlikely to benefit the bulk of the UK individual businesses to a noticeable degree, nor will make a significant impact on all destinations, let alone all places. If it is to be done, and we do not discount its value as an adjunct to domestic tourism, it would need to be done with additional, new public funding and not at the expense of support to domestic tourism, which is the mainstay of the majority of tourism business, in most of the UK’s destinations. VisitBritain’s role, using its current or increased core resources, remains to bring international leisure and businesses visitors to Britain. Dispersal to destinations beyond London within England should be a funded role for VisitEngland, as it already is within the other home nation’s boards. Wherever practical, VisitEngland should try to conduct this new activity with, or via VisitBritain’s existing networks.

3.3. We view committed, current and past UK visitor as the key target markets for dispersal messaging and the relatively large pool of current visitors to London as potentially the most fruitful market place. Although London, as the iconic, emblematic British Destination, is as likely to benefit from repeat and dispersal promotional activity conducted in London for the rest of the UK, we consider it naive to assume that London’s tourist businesses and London’s promotional agencies will willingly embrace and participate in any proactive dispersal marketing efforts conducted in London, or amongst its committed, current or past customer base. This friction should be acknowledged and built in to any dispersal strategy, rather than ignored.

3.4. There are a raft of issues and measures that singly or combined would improve the UK’s general competitiveness and thus increase the potential pool of international customers that might then be persuaded to disperse further afield. Most are tactical in nature but if applied or, in some cases, if they are not applied, they will have a major strategic impacts. For example, correctly addressing UK airport capacity and location issues represents a major opportunity; failures to address them

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correctly or to address them in sufficient time to create the required new capacity in the right place(s) are major threats.

4. The context to question 1: We are puzzled by this question, since we believe that the critical issue it means to address is the popularity of London and a few subsidiary “honey pot” cities, places and attractions as international destinations, as opposed their general popularity as destination for both international and domestic tourism. London, or more accurately central London, plus some of its gateway suburbs and the other honey pots are not to our knowledge markedly more popular within the domestic market, relative to their size and therefore their tourism capacity, than any of the other UK destinations. What sets them apart as honey pots is the additional inbound, international tourism they attract and especially therefore London which always has, does now and almost certainly always will receive the lion’s share of the UK’s inbound business and leisure tourism. The benefit of this is not purely in terms of increase numbers. International leisure and business tourists do often spend more per head, per holiday, just as the British often spend more per head per trip when abroad. This is a function, in part, of the type and the nature of any overseas holiday taking, but it also reflect the fact that the world market place is infinitely larger than the domestic equivalent and there is far more opportunity to target far more of the more affluent, if that happens to be your businesses’ principal market. Overseas visitors are by no means all affluent and they do also offer potential opportunities for most, but not all types of popular UK tourism provision.

4.1. There are of course a significant number of “other places” in the UK that get relatively few tourists of any kind, but that is because they are not established destinations, never have been and probably never should be. Consequently they have no real social or economic dependence upon tourism and for that reason, let alone the disproportionately high cost of creating an international tourism product and then establishing a marketable brand; they should be consciously discounted from this debate. Any thought that places with no real current domestic, let alone international tourism appeal might suddenly become the next must see international destination is frankly a nonsense; albeit that there are always the occasional, often small scale niche opportunities, even in the most unlikely locations. However, exceptions to general rules should be accommodated on an as needs be basis within our national tourism strategies and policies and not used to calibrate them.

4.2. London, for historic reason, through ongoing hard work and through the occasional significant refresher events like the London Games has achieved and maintains an iconic status in the international tourist market. London is not just iconic but in many markets it is also emblematic of Britain and everything British and vice versa. The world over, most international visitors, given the opportunity, will choose to visit the key national icons, in this case London first and then other lesser iconic, honey pots, potential, but not necessarily, second. Then in all likelihood, if not proactively encouraged, some other country’s iconic destination, well before other places in Britain they, and to be frank many domestic tourists, are unaware of. This rule of thumb applies both to the typical overseas touring holiday and the patterns of annual holiday taking. For many London, Paris, Berlin is currently a far more likely tour itinerary or subsequent holiday wish list than say London and any combination of British towns and cities. The happy coincidence of being a relatively small and compact country and our proximity to the rest of continental Europe; a major positive in attracting European tourists from what is in consequence a familiar market, can be a major disadvantage for UK when trying to gain and then retain travellers from more distant markets. If you can physically

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take in three European capitals in three days, then don’t be overly disappointed if that is precisely what some people choose to do.

4.3. London’s iconic status is not of course simply made, maintained and reinforced by the excellent work of VisitBritain and others in tourism but it’s ingrained and reinforced almost everywhere. Bond never visits M in Norwich, international fashion houses don’t proclaim themselves to be of Birmingham, New York and Paris, nor do nervous international businessmen flick to the business pages to see how the Sheffield Stock exchange is doing. The aspiration to encourage, we assume more international leisure and business visitors and then spread them more widely is laudable, but it needs to be developed in the knowledge that replicating London’s success, let alone replicating London and its portfolio of world class cultural and historic attractions is not something that can be easily or quickly achieved, if it at all. Nor will the additional business generated necessarily benefit every place or every tourism business across the UK and seldom ever to the degree that they will then see sufficient commercial return to justify them then contributing to its costs. Even where the promised return justifies investment it is almost always a chicken and egg process; marketing needs funding to make it work and to have worked before it truly proves its worth.

4.4. Since the bulk of money spent by international visitors to the UK is essentially external new revenue, the clear winners from additional inbound tourism is not the tourism industry as a whole but the UK economy, the UK Government’s tax take and a small number of often large businesses, like international carriers and to a lesser degree UK based inbound travel operators, whose main business purpose are inextricably linked to international travel. For that reason any “campaign” should be resourced principally by the UK Government and, as now, partnered largely by those relatively few direct, usually larger corporate beneficiaries. It should of course be recognised that who actually partners and the willingness to contribute is directly related to hardnosed commercial negotiation informed by the actual benefit offered at the time and not on some speculative or theoretical debates beforehand. This hardnosed commercial reality is well illustrated by the much greater enthusiasm to partner in response to and during a short-term crisis; a degree of willingness that quickly wains with improving conditions and that is seldom if ever matched at other times.

4.5. Any thought that the “private sector” in general or as a whole will pay should be abandon as the nonsense which it is. Moreover, we should also recognise that for the vast majority of individual businesses in the tourism industry and most destinations outside London and the few other established honey pots, international tourism is largely or totally unimportant. Domestic tourism is their principal economic driver and whilst many would say, “yes please” to efforts to encourage a few more international visitors the answer would be a resounding, “no thanks” if you were to add the caveat that it would have to come at a cost to support for the domestic market. Therefore, not only should any effort to grow international tourism outside London be largely funded from the public purse, if it is done at all, it need to be done with new and additional resource and not by the more traditional method of reallocating priorities and moving already scare resources from other more vital tourism tasks.

4.6. Given the scale and known difficulties of dispersing international tourism we believe that the primary targets audiences has to be those who are already familiar with Britain; essentially by default those already committed to come, those who are here and those that are known to have visited very recently. For all practical purposes this means those travelling to or from and those

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physically here in the UK are, theoretically at least, the most easily reached. Key partners are the carriers, major suppliers, for example car hire and inbound tour operators, secondary icons or honey pots and those attractions and places where we may already have some limited traction, for example: certain historic houses, some English Heritage properties or niches like the Lake District and the appeal to the Japanese market of Beatrix Potter.

4.7. We do also have concerns around the nature of these partnerships and the current match funding and target arrangements. Partnering with and contributing to promotional activity that directly supports the marketing efforts of a few major commercial businesses, like those mentioned in the previous paragraph flies in the face of, rather than addresses the critical market failure issues experienced by the tourism industry as a whole. The “usual suspect” partners who are willing and able to take part and thus contribute the target for match funding set by Government, are often the very same, relatively few that have the resource and the reach to communicate effectively with either domestic or international customers directly themselves. Generic, nonpartisan promotion of places and the essence of English/Welsh/Scottish/Irish tourism and not of a particular products and services is what is required to address the critical market failures in tourism.

4.8. Traditionally the role of coordinating such activity with an international audience would fall to VisitBritain as the international experts; however, we feel that their role and focus should be to continue to bring tourist to the UK in the largest numbers possible. Indeed we would argue that the nature of the typical value and volume targets set of them make this all but inevitable, since pursuit of the harder to reach, in preference to low hanging fruit would be almost suicidal given the nature of the current priorities (targets) gifted to them. The role of greater dispersal outside London amongst those that have been persuaded by VisitBritain, should now fall to VisitEngland, just as it already falls to a greater degree to Visit Wales, the Northern Ireland Tourist Board and Visit Scotland in those home nations. VisitEngland would of course need to continue to work very closely with VisitBritain, preferably using VisitBritain’s existing data sources and expertise and networks abroad rather than having to replicate them.

4.9. Provided VisitEngland was utilising new and additional resource, VisitBritain would be left in a position to continue to do what it does best for the UK and no other part of the UK would be significantly disadvantaged by it. The principal desired outcomes would be to persuade visitors to stay longer, to come back and whilst here to see more of England/the UK alongside, or in addition to the iconic destinations like London. How this is might be achieved in detail is not at this stage particularly important, although it is worth noting that those most likely to benefit outside London, initially at least, are the subsidiary honey pots and not necessarily the other destinations that we assume the concept might aim to support. It ithat given its emblematic and gateway status London would also benefit from greater promotion of England, however hard we might try to avoid it. This does give potential to obtain buy-in from London, but we believe that in all likelihood it would be on an individual business or a business sector and not a pan London tourism basis.

4.10. Given that the bulk of international tourists come to London the logical place to promote dispersal to current visitors is in London. It is easy to assume that London tourist businesses and the London promotional agencies would be the logical partners in the process. We feel that in reality there are major conflicts of interest involved and that the difficulties of competing for the attention between the current actual and future potential visit should not be underestimated. Essentially we

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think it would be naive to assume that the London based industry would willingly cooperate in any programme designed to disperse future, let alone current international visitors. The activity therefore would need be conducted and funded by VisitEngland and delivered in competition to the promotion of London and London attractions, albeit doubtless working alongside a few London based partners who could see some clear future benefit.

4.11. We also believe that VisitEngland needs to be resourced and enabled to promote England in a few, mostly nearer European markets. These are “familiar markets” where the UK isn’t necessarily so much of a mystery and the relative proximity, relatively lower cost of travel etc. makes these customers far more a kin to their domestic equivalents, than the rest of the international market. These are markets where a trip for a weekend or a visit to a concert or a football match is as likely as a longer holiday. The market failure issue her isn’t so much a matter that individual business can’t reach these customer but that the England brand hasn’t and isn’t being promoted independently or as well as that of the other UK home nations or as well as other competing European based destinations. Therefore the awareness and appeal of the place as opposed to the reach of individual products is lacking. England needs the resource and the authority to promote in Europe but it doesn’t necessarily then mean that they have to do the promotion or use VistEngland own international assets; this could and probably should be done largely via VisitBritain. Whether VisitBritain’s deliberately slimmed down presence in “mature markets” is now fully fit for this purpose is questionable.

4.12. Tactically there is a whole raft of other, hopefully familiar, tasks and asks that would help increase inbound tourism and/or dispersal including:

Resolve airport capacity and location issues. Reduce VAT on tourism products. Reduce air passenger duty. Continue to improve visa procedure and reduce visa costs. Reduce delays and improve the quality of welcome at ports of entry. Address London’s free national museums competitive advantage (preferably widening it to

other public and private attractions outside London, rather than removing it in London). Adequately resource those national agencies and bodies charged with preserving,

enhancing and giving access to our national culture, arts, heritage, sports and environmental assets.

Encourage the growth of great cooperation between agencies and bodies who receive public money. (but only as a means of increasing outputs and not as a means of justifying reduced funding).

Adequately resource local public bodies and authorities to enable them to better maintain, develop, manage and service our major urban and rural destinations.

5. Question 2. Consolidating and building on London’s success as a tourist destination.

5.1. Summary: Consolidation of the London market is not in our view a major issue. It’s a function of VisitBritain doing what it does best by attract international visitors to the UK and of London and Partners working to manage both international and domestic tourism within London; albeit that the nature and scale of tourism and London’s natural popularity will always mean that there are competitive tensions between the Capital City and much of the rest of England and the UK. Given

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the disparity between public and private sector investment and ongoing public and private sector infrastructure development within London, as compared to that across the rest of the UK, it’s hard for those outside London to see what else it is that London feels it needs in order to consolidate its appeal.

5.2. We do believe that London’s position would be greatly enhanced and indeed the pool of visitor to be dispersed would be grown by reversing the resource driven reduction of VisitBritain’s efforts in the “mature markets”. Markets like North America may be established but the fundamental market failure that required VisitBritain to promote Britain there in the first instance have merely been suppressed by their activities, not eradicated. The significant reduction of their efforts in these mature markets may have allowed them to focus on new markets in recent years, but the consequences are that these important large markets are withering. Slowly at first, since market messages have residual resonance, but this quickly fades if not regularly replayed. We are rapidly approaching a tipping point in many key and consequently soon to be former key markets. Once lost to us they will not be quickly or inexpensively regained, especial given the increasing number of competing destinations and the level of their combined marketing spend in what are becoming their key markets.

6. The context question 2: We believe that within limited resources available to it VisitBritain is addressing the inherent market failure issue in the international market; those of a disparate, mainly micro and SME based tourism industry’s inability to communicate and instil an awareness of Britain and the British business and leisure tourism products to a vast, distant and culturally different audience or more accurately audiences. It does so efficiently and effectively and it meets and exceeds all the Government targets set of it. It promotes Britain but, as we know, many who heed the call then visit the more iconic UK destinations, and especial London. On this basis alone the clear answer to how to consolidate London’s success is to keep doing what VisitBritain does now and preferably do more of it. Just as we believe VisitEngland should manage the international tourists, once in England, there is a clear case for London and Partners to do much the same for London in both the international and domestic markets. As noted above there is likely to be areas of conflicting interests between London and England involved within this, however, competition is inevitable and is a function of a healthy market and not a failing of it. The key is to recognise the problem and then very deliberately work around it rather than to ignore it and to try to work through it.

6.1. There is markedly more public and private sector investment and development taking place within London than there is across the rest of the UK. Given that tourists visit places and the attractiveness and vibrancy of the public realm and services and private provision are paramount in the experience, it is very hard for those outside London to think what more London needs in order to consolidate its historic appeal to the international and domestic tourist markets. It is, however, important to recognise that London’s success in the international market is a potential serious weakness for London and potentially for the wider domestic market too. London has developed a product, a lot of which is honed for the international market and within it, the far larger pool of relatively more affluent visitors it gives them access to. This makes London not just far more reliant on international tourists but also far more reliant on the affluent international visitor. Consequentially, it is far more vulnerable to a multitude of external international influences, than the rest of the UK combined. It also means that when international tourism becomes problematic, London’s first reaction is to start to sell its distressed stock at discount to the domestic market and

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therefore at an immediate cost to other more domestically focused destinations. Keeping London full and full of more wealth international tourists is therefore arguably in the whole industry’s best interests and not just in London’s and the UK economy’s interests.

6.2. Where there is a serious failing is that in order to promote in the new and emerging international markets, with much the same or in fact a reduced resource VisitBritain has been instructed to reduce its efforts in established markets on, we assume, the assumption that these “mature markets” no longer need to be so actively pursued. This is short-sighted, for whilst VisitBritain previous activities in say the North America market may have effectively mitigated the market failure issues, it did not and cannot eradicate them. North America is still a distant, vast market with cultural differences that place it well beyond the promotional and awareness build reach of the average British tourism business and the vast majority of Britain’s urban and rural destinations. The residual impact of national marketing and promotional efforts do tend to tail off rather than drop off but 3 to 5 years in we are now rapidly approach the point at which these neglected mature markets suddenly becoming old and dying markets. The best and simplest way therefore to consolidate London’s position is to reinvest and reinvigorate VisitBritain’s efforts in all the mature markets before they die and to do so alongside and in addition to the new and emerging markets. It is not a case of either or, but of doing both. The how or the what needs to be done is simple: it’s what VisitBritain do best and that is to promote awareness of Britain in the certain knowledge that a disproportionate percentage of the business created or retained will end up in or passing through London.

6.3. Tactically the ways to help consolidate London’s position is everything on the tactical bullet points above, less perhaps redressing the commercial advantage imparted by the concentration of free to enter museums and galleries. If that were ever to be done by removing the free entry concession or limiting it to say UK or EU residents, the impact on London’s and therefore UK’s popularity could considerable.

7. Question 3. Reversing a long-term decline in seaside destinations.

7.1. Summary: The decline in in seaside destination based tourism has already been arrested and has been reversed in most of a seaside resorts, helped by a period of sustained investment in the physical infrastructure during the late 1990 and early to mid-2000s. Tourism in coastal resorts has continued to grow even during the recession and still accounts for more than a third of all domestic tourism activity by both value and volume.

7.2. What has not been addressed is the residual legacy issues around redundant tourism infrastructure, problems of managing public realm on a grand scale and a raft of non-tourism related issues. Issues like poor quality Houses in Multiple Occupation, that act as direct barrier to tourism growth and cause a disproportionate drain on local resources that might otherwise be used to support the non-statuary public services vital to successful destination based tourism. Successful resort tourism needs strong local destination management and partnership structures which include local authority involvement. Those structure and that involvement has been steadily weakened and has been or is in grave danger of being removed entirely, due to public funding constraints.

7.3. The current Coastal Community Fund could be restructured to provide more targeted support to coastal destinations. Much could also be achieved simply by promoting a more positive image of the

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England’s/the UK’s coastal resort to the public in order to counter the popular myth that coastal resorts and coastal resort tourism is in terminal decline. Resorts themselves need to re-establish business confidence and to that end we would recommend core or seed corn funding of destination management to include local government engagement where tourism is clearly a key, well establish economic driver. The degree of resource proportionate to such things as the size of the destination and the value and volume of tourism it hosts.

7.4. There are number of tactical improvement that could enhance popular tourism and by default coastal destinations, where a significant proportion of that activity in known to takes place. The only coastal specific actions relate to coastal protection, and particularly beach and bathing water management which is of course largely unique to coastal destinations.

7.5. The context question 3: It is vital when considering the necessary improvement to our small, medium and large seaside destinations that we recognise that the spiral of seemingly near terminal tourism decline that was triggered by advent of the popular package holiday travel from the mid 1970 onwards, was largely arrested in the 1990 and has been steadily reversed since in most seaside destinations of any real tourism consequence. The nature of holiday taking has changed and in common with other destinations coastal resorts have benefitted from this. Significant regeneration also started to take place from the mid to late 1990 and peaked in the mid 2000s, much of the latter development being a consequence of some of the Regional Development Agencies and their investment priorities, many of which specifically recognised: the need for coastal resort regeneration, the role of public infrastructure within it and the importance of tourism as an economic driver, especially in already well-established destinations.

7.6. Even in the face of the recent recession, seaside tourism as a whole has continued to show growth since the mid 2000s, albeit at a lower than pre-recession rate. However, there have been marked socio economic and geographic variations, with in general the more affluent, often smaller less “popular market” orientated destinations, doing better relative to their size than some of their much larger more mainstream, popular tourism orientated counterparts. This appears to be a function of socio economic and geographical variations within the recession itself and more recently within the recovery from it. To put it crudely where the bulk of their established customer base resides and the typical socio economic profile of the customer the destination largely appeals to are the key drivers of this variation in fortune.

7.7. Numerous report of different socio economic and tourism types all evidence this, as do the annual national tourism statistic, which clearly show steady growth in seaside resorts alongside other destinations types and a combined contribution of over a third of all tourism activity within Great Britain. In 2012 that equated to c98m nights and £5.2bn in earnings from staying visits and c163m trips and £4.7bn earning in day visits. Tourism we believe is still very much alive and well in the coastal destination and critically it still represents a key part of the social and economic solutions to many of the inherent issue that come with being communities on the periphery of a small island nation.

7.8. Whilst the decline in tourism has been arrested and reversed, what has not been addressed is the inevitable underutilisation and redundancy within certain parts of the private sector tourism infrastructure and the often excessive, still vital but commercially unsustainable public realm that was created in times when labour and maintenance costs were relatively inexpensive. Unfortunately

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the public realm is often what makes seaside destination special places if it is maintained and utilised; how that is achieved, with what, is now a major part of the problem, especial in an era of declining deployable public funding.

7.9. To function as pleasant places to live and work and by default also to be place that are pleasant to visit, requires access to appropriate seed corn development funding and proactive management based on a realistic vision, strong leadership (diplomacy) and robust, but always voluntary public and private sector partnership. Traditionally the role of coordination and, in particularly, the provision of the dull but essential administration for this partnership was provided by the local public sector. Pressure on public expenditure is such that even in some of those destinations where abrogating their obvious responsibility should be unthinkable, it now has to be considered. Many small, medium and occasionally large destinations have already seen the public sector disengage. This has to be addressed, if we are to avoid a rapid return to a true spiral of decline, prompted by a failure to coordinate and manage the diverse portfolio of public and private assets in the coherent manner that makes any old town, in this case by the sea, a “destination” or to use the old and less fashionable but probably more accurate term a “resort” (to go customarily or frequently, a place popularly frequented).

7.10. Many seaside destinations now face legacy issues from former tourist infrastructure that now serve as a positive barriers to tourism development. Poor quality Houses in Multiple Occupation (HMOs), probation hostels and similar commercially run social services provision are attracted in unsustainable numbers by the availability of large properties, at relatively lower costs than the areas from which they aim to attract their clients base. Poor quality HMO provision, in particular, breeds transience and propagates many serious social and welfare issues. These increase local welfare and social costs and further reducing the deployable budgets of local authorities for non-statutory activities like leisure and tourism, the maintenance of the public realm and services like the provision of public toilets, of litter collection and of art cultural and other events all of which help make or break the visitor experience.

7.11. The direct link between poor quality and transience is critical. The more effective the local social interventions are, the more likely it is that the individual assisted will then wish to move on to better accommodation, only for then to be replaced by someone else who’s circumstances force them to accept often the most appallingly low standards of accommodation on offer. The cycle has to be broken if intervention is to work for everybody in these towns and it’s the properties not the people that are at issue. More robust licencing regimes, new powers to set lower limits on the rental rates paid by the benefit system for substandard accommodation and the power to retrospectively apply current and new standards to older conversions, that are current exempt, would go a long way to addressing the barrier to progress that HMO’s currently present; HMO’s that in coastal towns uniquely operate cheek by jowl with tourism and other commercial businesses in or on the fringes of the town’s commercial hub. Other categories of towns have HMO issues but seldom on this scale and never normally within their commercial heart.

7.12. Similarly higher levels of retirement to popular destinations over many years has distorted the demographic profile leading directly to greatly increased NHS and social welfare costs, none of which are properly recognised and therefore adequately funded within seaside destinations. Recognising and then dealing equitably with these non-tourism issues would significantly enhance the appeal of

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almost all coastal destinations by giving the local authorities the financial headroom to invest in destination management and the necessary place making that is required.

7.13. These legacy issues were clearly identified during the 2006-07 Communities and Local Governments Coastal Town Inquiry but very only limited progress was made before a change Government and priorities took place, for example agreed changes to HMO registration schemes in England were cancelled post General Election. One of the subsequent positive outcomes of the work done post inquiry was the creation the Coastal Communities Fund now in its third year of an extended 4, now possibly 5 year programme. We believe that this fund could be reworked and refocused to act as a seed corn funding mechanism for general development of seaside destinations, rather than as a general coastal challenge based, direct employment driven project funding mechanism, as it is now. The current funds available represent 50% of the steadily growing Crown Estates annual maritime revenues that are projected to more than double to c£120m by 2020. The fund is shared between the home nations; with England get the bulk at c£23 of the c£28m and slowly rising total. A higher proportion (100%?) and a guarantee of a much longer period of certainty of at least 5 and preferably 10 or more years would provide both the confidence and something approaching the level of funds needed to address the legacy issues across the majority of English and other home country coastal resorts.

7.14. In parallel, and as part of the confidence building process, work needs to be done to address the popular, self-fulfilling myth of terminal decline. In a highly fashion conscious, experiential market place selling the benefit of coastal resorts is difficult enough without then adding the perception that you need to visit now before they close for good! As the guardians of much of the tourism based research and intelligence that proves coastal tourism’s worth and as professional in generic destination based marketing and public relations VisitEngland, if adequately resourced to do it, is ideally placed to help rebuild the image and generic brand of England’s seaside resorts, as the other home nation boards already generally do.

7.15. Whilst potential visitors need a degree of short term confidence before, during and after their visit, existing businesses and critically potential investors need sustained confidence and not just in their business and the destination itself but in the consistency and longevity of the local vision, the leadership and the quality of destination management and maintenance, especial maintenance of the public realm. Investing where no one else is, including the public authorities, isn’t an investment but a high risk gamble, which understandably very few businesses are willing to take. Rebuilding and maintaining confidence within the individual resorts themselves is we believe a matter for each resort; however, there is clear need for public, private sector partnership and as ever a resource issue involved. We do not think that all places should necessarily have publically core or seed corn funded destination management but where tourism is patently a key, well-established economic driver some provision should now be made and made relative to the physical size of the destination, its tourism capacity and the actual value and volumes being routinely achieved.

7.16. Tactical enhancement that would improve the fortunes of coastal resorts and tourism in general include many items in the previous bullet list of improvements for international tourism including for example reduction of VAT on tourism services, but these are desirables and not essentials. Additionally domestic tourism, in general and therefore resort towns in particular, would benefit from:

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Double summertime. A carefully managed spread of main school holiday dates across England/UK (as opposed to

the anarchy of local determination on a school by school basis). Mandatory registration and basis minimum standard of provision for serviced and non

serviced accommodation provision. Provision of business advice and/or grant and/or loan facilities for approved enhancement

to and/or the redevelopment of tourism businesses (linked to agreed participation in appropriate quality and grading schemes).

Better basic skills training within the existing education system.

7.17. Additionally and specific to coastal destinations adequate provision needs to be made for coastal protection and, in particular, for tourism purposes, beach and bathing water management issues. The coasts and within that coastal resorts has become far more popular for sport and leisure activities that don’t generate public revenue but do generate significant additional management costs. Other issues like more stringent EU Bathing Water Directive Standards all combine to increase the demands on the public services during a period a significant public spending constraint. It is difficult to see how you can hope to grow tourism, maintain standards and yet also decrease spend on servicing the existing and new tourism activity. For example who pays for lifeguarding on public bathing beaches in the recognised summer bath season and what are the direct and indirect tourism and wider costs and risk associated with not providing it?

8. Question 4. Reducing regulatory burdens on business.

8.1. Summary and context: Whilst we support the principle of reducing regulatory burden on businesses we would suggest that the aim should be to reduce unnecessary legislative burden and, as far as practically possible, move to developing more short-term or limited lifespan legislative mechanism and leavers. All legislation is enacted for a purpose and often that purpose is to counter some abuse of the system, or to close a loophole that is allowing an unacceptable practice. Often, once the immediate problem has been resolved the legislation then appears to linger on. But we are also aware that seemingly redundant legislation often isn’t and that there is no longer an obvious perceived problem, simply because the legislation remains in place. Achieving a balance between retaining necessary legislation and reducing the overall combined burden of legislation can’t be easily achieved, but it could perhaps be better explained? The purpose of new legislation is generally clearly stated; the continued purpose and the need to retain it is perhaps not made as clear as it could or should be and, whilst understanding might not lessen the burden, it might reduce some of the unnecessary perceptions of injustice.

8.2. We support the principle of reducing the cost of legislative compliance and measures like the creation of more online and simplified tools, more cooperation and shared inspection regimes between enforcement and other agencies, all of which are already tried and tested mechanisms. We would also like to see continued emphasis on risk based assessment on the one hand and a properly resourced and thus robust enforcement in whatever, area of business the legislation pertains to, on the other. We are also aware that many of the internal resource issues faced by various public bodies and agencies have been resolved, in part, simply by moving the onus and administrative burden for reporting and monitoring compliance away from themselves and on to the end user businesses. The rational for making the end user pay is understood but we do wonder whether it is

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now, how we administer necessary legislation as much as the legislation itself that is creating a burden on business? Perhaps, rather than less legislative burden, we actually need a more customer focus service ethic that ensures compliance but involving rather less time and effort to achieve it on the part of the businesses involved?

8.3. The focus of discussion is often on the burden of complying with legislation; however, we believe that many businesses are equally perturbed by the need to comply with legislation that isn’t then seemingly effectively enforced and especially compliance with legislation where it is apparent that poor enforcement gives non-compliant businesses a competitive advantage. For us in destinations the failure, or more accurately the resource driven inability, to adequately enforce necessary legislation is potentially a far more worrying trend than the scale of the legislative burden carried by the individual businesses in the destinations.

9. Questions 5. The application of taxes and fees to visitors from overseas, for example in relation to VAT, Air Passenger Duty, visa and other costs.

9.1. Summary and context: Whilst we fully recognise the value and importance of the international market, the international visitor and economic gains made by individual businesses and, critically, the economic benefit to the UK as a whole, we don’t view the overseas visitor as the critical component of our business. Nor do we believe that the vast majority of the individual businesses working in the majority of UK destinations do either.

9.2. We do recognise that for UK Plc there is an issue around taxation and fees; do these in their totality disadvantage the international visitor to the UK and/or contribute directly to the UK being seen as uncompetitive, as compared with the ever growing number of competing world class destinations? We also ponder whether these taxes and fees are being charged for the right reasons and whether the monies raised are being used for the right purposes or, more pointedly, for the express purpose original or currently claimed? For example, is APD a green tax and is the revenue being used for environmental purposes? Are visa fees merely covering the basis cost of providing the necessary visa or are they paying for something else in the visa system, or indeed something elsewhere in the responsible department or the government’s portfolio? Especially in relationship to things like visas and notwithstanding the unavoidable shoe box mentality of interdepartmental funding; would a lower costs to the user not encourage more visitors and raise far more money in the UK via other general taxation?

9.3. Are there better or different ways of the UK government raising tax revenue from tourist whilst they are visiting the UK, than the blunt instruments of charging high rates of VAT on tourism products than many of our European competitors, Air Passenger Duty and seemingly excessive visa fees, which singly or combined are in all likelihood dissuading them visiting in the first instance, or deterring them from returning? We think answer is yes, but we do not profess to understand the fine detail, nor do we wish to engage in an area of debate that right belong to those part of our industry that are far more reliant on international visitor. That said we do wish you to note that there are parts of domestic industry that see APD as a contributing factor in helping to retain domestic resident’s tourism activity. We are as yet undecided on the issue, as there have been no conclusive, independent assessments of all the pros and cons conducted. In regard to ADP a full independent study, not conducted for or by the various vested interest groups, is needed to

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evaluate all the cost benefits to domestic, domestic outbound and international inbound tourism and thus to allow a full and far more informed debate to take place.

9.4. We do not necessarily believe that reducing VAT, adjusting APD or radically changing the visa fees will on their own make a strategic difference to UK tourism, but we do believe that they are powerful tactical tools, capable of influencing the strategic direction of tourism and for that reason they have been previously mentioned within our responses to the question of dispersal of international visitor, consolidating London’s position and in improving the fortunes of coastal resorts.

10. Question 6. Visa and border arrangements.

10.1. Summary and context: In relationship to visas, the fee itself may not be the biggest barrier. Some excellent work has been done to improve the practical processes of applying for, completing and receiving UK visa and indeed in improving the understanding of the system, the perceptions of which can be far worse than the reality. Providing a smarter better quality of service may be as important as reducing the cost of obtaining a visa. However, one approach increases cost the other reduces revenue, so at some point somewhere in the process there will have to be additional investment made if we are to generate more visits in order to reap higher tax revenues.

10.2. We are aware of recent, past criticisms of UK visa and border arrangements, but believe action has been taken to make improvements. We believe entry and exit from the UK is a critical part of the holiday experience and thus it is vital that that quality of that experience should be maintained. We also recognise that visa and border controls are a necessary filter and that currently those filters can and do become congested by increased flows, whether as a consequence of occasional peaks or by sustained increases in activity. If a filter can’t cope with the flow, you have three basic choices: temporarily bypass it and accepting things that shouldn’t might get through, accept the backlog and the resulting poorer quality of service, or provide a more efficient or bigger filter so the congestion never occurs. If the visa and border controls are really still an issue, then the only acceptable security v tourism option is to enhance the process, which clearly has resource implications; implications that in this instance we believe are fully justified on the grounds of avoiding damage to reputation and lost opportunity costs.

10.3. Some of the issues which we believe may have been resolved around visa and border controls do still leave us wondering as to the level of interdepartmental cooperation and the degree to which seamless planning processes are applied. If it is UK policy to promote travel to the UK in countries where there are visa requirement and it is decided to do more of it, then we can’t understand why the consequential cause and effects don’t necessarily appear to have been proactive planned for. More promotion will result in more demand for visas. The more visas issued the more people will present themselves at the UK border with them and the more resource will be needed to deal with them. Similarly more or better promotion in non visa countries will also lead to more visitors flowing through ports of entry and ultimately the need for the capacity to handle predicted peak flows. Aircraft don’t for example just arrive in the UK unannounced and passenger numbers are, we assume, known before departure to the UK. We get a sense that perhaps at the more strategic level planning has been more reactive that proactive in the past, although we do also recognise that judging scale and the time lag may make it impossible to assess the level of border staff need in Heathrow next year as a consequence of a campaign in China today. We must simply trust that the

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UK is in fact seamlessly planning and coordinating these activities and that some of the issue we believe have been experience by travellers to the UK in recent years were merely either glitches or problems that have now long since been permanently resolved?

11. Question 7: Improving the competitiveness of hotel accommodation in comparison to other countries.

11.1. Summary and context: Other than reducing VAT on tourism to European levels we are unaware of any demand for action that would significantly improve UK hotel competitiveness in comparison to that in other countries. Looking at the typical leavers for enhancing competitiveness they are either unacceptable for broader reasons, for example, reducing direct and indirect UK wage costs, or alternatively they are not applicable because you are not comparing like with like. For example, we might not have tourism taxes where others do, but they might not have value added tax, as we do. Other failures to compare like for like include comparing the cost base of operating in older building with the cost of operating in say the USA, where much of the domestic hotel stock is isn’t simple renovated but regularly demolished and rebuilt to a set template. We don’t often have that option and whilst we might not benefit from competitive advantage we do have the advantage of some variety and some history within our accommodation stock. Equally some of countries we attempt to compare to pay lower wages but tipping is the norm but that isn’t always part of the comparative cost analysis.

11.2. It should also be noted that in last decade the UK accommodation sector has seen radical change, most notably in the exponential growth of budget hotel accommodation almost everywhere. The model for this type accommodation is based on high levels of productivity and it is a highly competitive product. The growth of course is not without cost elsewhere in the industry. We are aware of evidence that shows for example bed stock in major destinations growing, whilst at the same time mid-range hotel and especial guest houses style accommodation numbers have fallen, often dramatically in some localities, alongside the numbers of individuals employed in the accommodation sector. The accommodation stock remains in place, the visitors are still accommodated but some of the local socio economic impacts are readjusted. Change is essential, it is generally good in the longer term but making an industry sector more efficient and more competitive is seldom achieved without some pain and can’t therefore be promoted as a strategic goal without an understanding of all the consequences.

11.3. We are not sure that the UK is that seriously disadvantaged by lack competiveness in accommodation sector, if it is we are uncertain that it can be corrected. Nor can we find any recent references to this being an issue that is exercising our destination member’s minds or it being raised with them by their local accommodation partners. More telling is the fact that none of the other trade associations with whom we regularly liaise appear to view this as a critical strategic issue.

12. Question 8. Increasing skills and training within the domestic tourism sector.

12.1. Summary and context: Other than within some key skills and for some business types, for example the training chiefs for catering establishments, we not overtly aware of any major specific to tourism industry training gaps. That said there has been a major change in the last 5 years to the way training is delivered by whom and for what purpose and this has radically changed the training landscape. It is perhaps therefore for the organisations that deliver that training and those that

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need the trained staff to comment on the specific consequences of these changes and any weaknesses in the new and emerging replacement training systems.

12.2. Our general observations are that for the majority of the tourism industry the skill sets required are the product of a good general all-round education; articular, well presented, reliable individuals, preferably with good natural interpersonal relationship skills. Sadly these are not the skills that all pupils leave school with and as they are also the key base skill for most employment, competition for those with these skills is keen. This means that good young employees are in demand from other industries and those that do work in tourism and hone their basic skill, often then rapidly progress to other employment. For example, the service industries that make up tourism are traditionally the places that university students find employment during and between studies. This may also help explain the high numbers of relatively well-educated overseas works who take up employment in the industry, typically for a number of years but seldom on a permeant basis. Rather than bemoaning the turnover of good staff we believe that we should deliberately celebrate tourism’s role in honing the skills, especial interpersonal relationship skills, which are then so often used to great effect across all other industries. Tourism is in effect an enabling profession as much a profession for life and perhaps therefore we need to structure the industry to cope with that fact, rather than invent a training regime to try and permanently fill what may be in effect a permanent void.

12.3. If there is real weakness in skills training for tourism, (for employment in general) it relates to the social and basic skill training conducted or imparted by the education system. Not all those who might benefit from the opportunity of employment in tourism are being equipped by the education system or indeed increasingly by society to easily fit into what is essentially a well-mannered, considerate, caring profession. They are extreme examples but for illustrative purposes: if you never eat a meal off a table at home and your only experience of restaurant involves eating with your hands, are you then best placed to start work in a hotel restaurant? If you don’t learn to say please or thank you by nature in your formative years are going to do it by professional necessity? However, the counter to that is that those equipped with the basic 3 R’s and some interpersonal skill are invariably trained on site, on the job by their employers, so the lack of personal experience and skill may not be the end of the issue.

12.4. Given the nature and scale of many tourism businesses we do wonder whether the level of training for the on-site trainers is adequate. Many of these are small business owners and whilst it would reasonable to hope that they understood the essence of their own businesses, they may not be well placed to understand or keep up with the changing landscape of the education and training for the staff joining them, nor fully aware of ever changing market conditions and changing customer expectations. Many don’t have staff as such and are reliant on and police their own standards. The old regional tourist boards and subsequent RDA based tourism system in England delivered specific training support and advice to owners and senior staff on these matters and a number of staff training and training the trainer courses. The demise of both we believe may have left a void in this provision, that needs to be filled on a consistent national basis, to a consistent standard, albeit that it could be delivered by local, regional or national means, but only if there were structures in place to enable this to happen.

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12.5. Some of the small business skills gaps were previously addressed by things like the voluntary quality and grading schemes, that checked, advised on and reward good quality physical provision and, as an adjunct, good quality basic skills. These schemes fell out of favour with the current Government and Visit England role as guardian and advisor on standards and product development has been diminished. If we wish to deal with skills standards in the domestic industry then we need to recognise that much of the industry is vested in micro business that often fall outside the reach of general skills training provision. We would like to see England’s role in maintaining training standards reinvigorated, but that cannot be achieved in the current absence of a functioning national network between them and the individual businesses and through which, in part, VisitEngland previously delivered such services.

13. Question 9. Assessing the success of campaigns such as “GREAT” Britain.

13.1. Summary and context: Campaigns like VisitBriatin’s GREAT and VistEngland’s RGF funded campaign share a fundamental weakness and that is Government’s insistence that such campaigns should be largely matched pound for pound by the industry. This limits the scale and nature of the businesses who can participate and critically it subtly changes the nature of the campaign from a generic promotion to generic and product, or in some case pure product promotion. Come to Britain becomes, come to Britain and whilst there stay in a Happy Holiday’s Hotel or see England becomes see England in an Aldis hire car… This undermines the effectiveness of the promotional message, it disenfranchises much of the industry and instead of giving reach to those who can’t achieve it on their own, and it ends up essentially subsidising the activities of those who often already can. We don’t reject match funding as a requirement but do believe that we need to accept that a smaller total funding pot, properly targeted at a known market failure should achieve much greater improvement. Improvement equals new growth and new growth brings higher returns for all, including Government.

13.2. The effort needed to assess external non-DCMS funding is excessive. In particular, fitting tourism to rigid RGF employment criteria and producing acceptable targets and measures has meant that far more of the additional resources gained have been expended on shaping, delivering and, especially, on then measuring and proving success, than should have been. Had the RGF money been core funding, and given to VisitEngland for it to deploy as it deemed necessary, far greater success could have been achieved for the money spent, or the same levels of success obtained for less expenditure, clearly the former would be our preference. RGF criteria also resulted in the funding being targeted at relatively few partners, in relatively few pre designated destinations, across England. Part of that was due to time constraints and the complexity of putting together a robust multi partner based bid to RGF.

13.3. Some match funded thematic activity to give opportunities for those not otherwise directly involved was also included in the RGF programme. The match funding requirements and the design of the campaign to accommodate a match funded element appears to have dissuaded some of those who perhaps could have, from participating. The consequence, despite the thematic opportunities, was that some destinations and some businesses didn’t feel as engaged as they might have done had the activity been broad-brush and purely generic “England” in its nature. Marketing products and to a degree destinations, especially within the domestic market, is not an area of market failure,

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whereas promoting the simple concept of holidaying at home and, in this case, the virtues of holidaying in England is something the industry can’t do alone or without central coordination.

14. Question 10. Structural arrangements for tourism promotion, including public funding for and the roles of local enterprise partnerships, VisitBritain, VisitEngland and similar organisations in the rest of the UK.

14.1. Summary and context: We are disappointed to see that this critical question is framed specifically in terms of future promotion. The role of VisitBritain and, in particular, VisitEngland’s role goes well beyond the creation of product awareness. The broader based management and coordination, research and intelligence and, to a degree product development, are all roles that are included within the essential remit of an effective national tourist board. Moreover, these roles become all the more important the closer to the individual destination management level you get. At the local level the tourism structures needs to manage tourism more than they market or promote it; promotion being only one of the four P’s in the classic marketing mix of: price, product, promotion and place.

14.2. Since the demise of the RDA’s we have had no Regional tourism network in England, a network first created as a consequence of the 1969 Tourism Act and the formation of Regional Tourist Boards; boards which were subsequently dismantled by or absorbed into the RDA’s. All RDAs had some form of regional tourism body until their demise, each working with the management organisations in each of the individual urban and rural destinations within their region. These local management organisations were either public sector based and led, or more often public private sector partnerships, though often by necessity administratively underpinned by the public sector. The system worked; most business that wanted to could engage at an appropriate level and via that level they could communicate locally, regionally or nationally. The structure also meant that regions could communicate and cooperate together and VisitEngland could also deliver agreed national programmes via or with the assistance of the Regional Tourist Boards and subsequently the RDA network.

14.3. As repeatedly indicated we are more than content with the structure roles and functions of VisitBritain and VisitEngland, less so about the resource each has available to do its tasks but thorough disconcerted by Government’s constant meddling conducted seemingly under a banner of achieving greater efficiency, when clearly the only objective has been to cut combined costs. VisitBritain and VisitEngland should be retained, retaining their relatively newly created separate boards and wherever practical continuing to share headquarter buildings and common administrative services in order to obtain administrative savings.

14.4. The real structural failure is at the more local level. The regional framework was removed by the current administration, to be replaced by existing and new local destination management organisations. The nature of these local bodies was not proscribed, save for the fact that they needed to be natural alliances, conforming to recognised destination boundaries and specifically led by the private sector. Whether intended or not “led by” has been taken to mean largely funded by and this, subsequently reinforced by public spending cuts has encouraged many local authorities to disengaged from tourism and, thus, most now no longer underpin the administration of destination management. More local authorities, and some that patently should not, seem likely to be forced to disengage in the near future.

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14.5. Many new destination management organisations have been created since the demise of the RDAs but most of these are financially vulnerable because of a lack of private sector funding, the bulk of which when it is made available is used for marketing activity and not the dull but vital administrative activity that allow these voluntary partnerships to function . A lot of these destination management organisations are in fact marketing or promotional bodies. So whilst we are told there are some 200 DMOs covering a patchwork across England, there is in fact far more destinations than this number might suggest, which remain unmanaged and working without any local public private sector partnerships coordinating their key local destination functions, other than to promote what’s already there. The existence of a DMO does not guarantee that local businesses engage, especially when the prerequisite is that participating businesses now pay or pay more than they previously did for the privilege. As a consequence of this some of the destination management or marketing organisations are not actually that representative of the businesses in the destinations they purport to represent, whilst a very small number are little more than marketing consortia acting for a handful of major business interests in a much larger destination area.

14.6. As a replacement for national coverage based on a regional structure overlaying a local network of destination management and appropriate destination marketing, the new private sector led local destination management model it is a very poor substitute. Many of the DMO’s, old and new, are excellent and perform well for their local destinations but, through no fault of their own, there is now no effective sub regional, regional or national connectivity. The Local Enterprise Partnerships were of course intended to replace regional economic development structures with a more local focus. Few if any LEPs are truly local, indeed most are more regionally or sub regionally based and most lack dedicated resource and administrative substance themselves. Most, but by no means all, recognise tourism as an important economic driver, but few can see the merit in or the need to fund the organisational capability, that turns a host of competing tourism businesses into a functioning saleable destination. Even where they do, they are not in a position to seed corn fund the destination management, for the dozen or more recognised destination within their large area of responsibility, although some do see merit in working with and/or funding wider area based marketing, say at a County level. Most simply see their remit to fund physical developments and, thus, they might consider supporting the development of a new hotel or an attraction but they are not necessarily willing or able to support or underpin destination management organisations, whilst none have yet tried or are capable of performing the functions of a DMO themselves.

14.7. Having dismantled an imperfect but functioning regional and local destination management and promotional structure and replaced it with a loose patchwork of vulnerable individual destination marketing and some management organisations, it is difficult to see how this can now be resolved without some public funding to reinvigorate public and private sector based partnerships. Whilst it appears that strategic market failure case for destination marketing has long been recognised the more fundamental failure that of creating the management structures needed to bond businesses, public service and the community into a functioning destination in the first place, to then be marketed has been largely ignored. In the increasing absence of discretionary deployable local authority funding this may now have to be seed corn funded from core national tourism funds. VisitEngland current DCMS budget is insufficient to do all that we might wish of it, let alone to support local management. A proportion of a higher level of dual core funding for VisitEngland could, however, be used to fund some basic destination management functions. In return the DMOs and their private partners might then have to expressly agree to support or

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participate in some of the generic England promotional activity, business support and product development and other key central functions of the national boards.

14.8. Throughout this response we have made reference to the need to engage local government in partnership with business. This is vital because tourism product is largely experiential and much of it about places and most places are essentially a loose grouping of public and private sector assets. At the point of delivery local government owns, manages and services many of critical assets within a destination; they also set the local condition through planning and licencing for many of the private sector activities undertaken in a destination. This we think this is probably broadly understood and recognised. What is never recognised is that local government is also the only body in most places capable of represent the local host community interest, the buy-in from which is absolutely central to the success of any place as a destination. We hope the committee will look at the need for partnership in tourism between the public sector, the private sector and critically also the host community and not simply the traditional partnerships between the public and private sectors.

15. Conclusion. We hope our comments on your ten questions are of assistance and we apologise for the length of the submission but hope that the more detailed answers are helpful in explain some contextual background to our and other organisations responses.

Peter Hampson CEO British Destinations 5 October 2014

www.britishdestinations.net

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