BRITISHBATTLESHIPS

1919–1945

BRITISHBATTLESHIPS

1919–1945RABURTSeaforth

PUBLISHING

Titlepage:Ramilliesfreshoutofrefit,Devonport,April1927.

AcknowledgementsTheauthorisindebtedtothefollowingestablishmentsandpersons:

ThestaffoftheNationalMaritimeMuseum,Greenwich.

ThestaffofthePublicRecordOffice,Kew.

InparticularIshouldliketoextendsincerethankstoJohnRobertsforallhishelp;toJ.Hitchon,A.S.NorrisandR.Wilsonforhelpwithmaterial;andappreciationisalsoduetoT.W.Ferrers-Walkerformaterialandforgreatencouragementthroughoutthepreparationofthebook.

Finallytomywife,Janice,whoputalotofeffortintothisbookinthewayofresearch,typingandchecking.

RABurt

Copyright©RABurt1993

ThiseditionpublishedinGreatBritainin2012bySeaforthPublishing,animprintofPen&SwordBooksLtd,47ChurchStreet,BarnsleyS702AS

Reprinted2013

www.seaforthpublishing.com

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ISBN9781848321304

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproducedortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronicormechanical,includingphotocopying,recording,oranyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,withoutpriorpermissioninwritingofboththecopyrightownerandtheabovepublisher.

TherightofRABurttobeidentifiedastheauthorofthisworkhasbeenassertedbyhiminaccordancewiththeCopyright,DesignsandPatentsAct1988.

TypesetanddesignedbyStephenDentPrintedandboundinChinaby1010PrintingInternationalLtd.

ContentsPreface

EvolutionoftheDreadnoughtPost-WarReorganizationandNavalTreatiesIntroduction

EarlyClassesthatSurvivedtheGreatWarIronDukeClassQueenElizabethClass

RoyalSovereignClassRepulseandRenownTheGenesisandDevelopmentoftheAircraftCarrier

FuriousGloriousandCourageousHood

NelsonandRodneyKingGeorgeVClassConclusion

BibliographyIndex

Preface

The period from 1919 to 1939, although a time of peace between the major powers,probablyproducedmorewartimeideasthanthehostilitiesthemselves.Thenavaltreatiesthatbroughtahalttocapitalshipconstruction(from1921)meantthatthetimeandmoneyavailablewasspenteitheronthereconstructionofexistingwarships,oronbasicallynewdesigns tobebuilt as soonasnewprogrammescouldbegin. Itwasa timewhen ‘Jack’couldjoinupandseetheworldwithoutfearofhavingtofightforhiscountry(althoughalwaysreadytodoso).

Commissions came and went, bringing a much needed showing of the flag, and nomemories are fonder thanwhen an old ‘salt’ recalls his happy days aboard one ofHisMajesty’s battleships. During those years it seemed that the Royal Navy was still themajorforceontheoceans,eventhoughhershipshadreducedinnumbertoparitywiththeUSNavy.TheUnion‘Jack’stillcountedforsomethingandtheRoyalNavywasstilltheSeniorServiceinmorewaysthanone.Indeed,ithadthemostbattleexperiencedshipsandcrews,andhadcarriedoutsomeofthemostmeticuloustestsagainstoldbattleshipseverwitnessed.

Althoughtherewasmuchchangesofarasreconstructionwasconcerned,onthewholetheadministrationandpoliciesoftheRoyalNavywerelittlealteredandFleetpracticeandexerciseswerecarriedoutinafashionsimilartothosecurrentduringtheFirstWorldWar.The Admiralty saw no reason to change its thinking in this regard; it considered thebattleshiptobesupremedespitethemanycriticswhobelievedthatthedayofthebigshiphad passed. The aircraft carrier, still not fully developed, came into its own during theinter-waryears,butatthattimethemainstrengthwasstillenvisagedaslyinginstraightbattledivisionsthatwouldengageanenemylinewhenrequiredtodoso.

True,futureactionwoulddifferfromtheGreatWar,giventhegreatlyreducednumbersinthetype,buteventhoughJapanandtheUSAwerelookingtowardstheaircraftcarrierand submarine, all major powers still struck up a massive construction programme ofbattleshipsduringtheyearsleadinguptotheSecondWorldWar.Britishbattleshipdesignsoften take a knock, and lately it has become trendy to highlight their faults, but this isprobablybecauseitiscomparativelyeasytoanalyseaservicethathassuchalonghistoryof battle experience. Most British battleships were a compromise – no battleship everconstructed was perfect, but they contended with attacking aircraft, torpedoes, mines,submersibles, contemporary battleships and finally all weathers in all sea conditionsthroughouttheworld.

Itisasimplemattertocompareshipagainstshipstatisticsonpaper,butitmeansverylittle in practical terms; actions speak louder than words and when one examines therecordoftheBritishbattleshipfrom1919to1945,theRoyalNavy’sdesigners,thecrewsservingthemandthevesselsthemselves,itbecomesclearthattheyhadlittlereasontopayheedtoderogatoryopinions.Theydidallthatwasaskedofthem–andsometimespaidaheavyprice.Aswarapproachedin1939theAdmiraltywasall tooawarethattheRoyalNavywas ill equippedandunready,butnaval treaties,politicsand financial restrictionshadall takentheir tollof theservicesince1919.Warwashardfor theNavythesecond

timearound,andby1941capitalshipshadbeenseriouslydepleted.Therewerefewnewshipsandmanyof theolderoneswereingreatneedofmodernizationandlong-awaitedrefits.Thebattlewaspursued,however,andby1942thetidehadturned,butthebattleshiphadtakensecondplacetotheaircraftcarrierasthemostimportantunitinthefleet.PolicyandbattletacticsintheAtlanticandPacifichadaltereddrasticallyanditnolongerseemedimperativetohaveamassivebattlefleetashadbeenthecase in1939.Theall-importantweapons were carriers and fast light AA cruisers to look after them. The new enemywouldnowcomefromtheair,notfromoverthehorizon.

Andwhatoftheshipsthemselves,themightybattleships–thosefloatingleviathansoftheworld’soceans,thathadinspiredtheserviceman,thejournalistandthegeneralpublicforgenerations.Thesightofa‘friendly’battleshipimpartedasenseofvisualpleasureandpowerfulreassurance.CrowdswouldflocktotheseafrontatPortsmouthandDevonporttoseeonereturnfromacommission.Onmanyavisit toaforeignporthundredswouldgather tosee theBritishFleetentering theirharbour.Theywouldglide in,gondola like,overasun-blessedsea throughschoolsofdolphins,whileoverheadconvoysofseagullskeptclosevigilfortitbits.Onboard,acacophonyofnoiseastheoff-dutywatchpreparedtocomeupondeck.Manyweresun-worshippers,particularlythosethathadjustlefttheinclementweatherofPompeyorGuz.Hatchesandscuttleswereopenedandtheawningswould go up as soon as the anchor had been dropped. The King’s ships had enteredharbour in all their glory – usually with main armament at salute elevation – freshlypainted in the light grey (almost bleachedwhite in the bright sunshine)Mediterraneancolours. ‘Anchorsaweigh!’soundedandtheFleetcametorest–‘Jack’was inforsomewell-earnedleaveashoreandhewouldhope,agoodstretchbeforehavingtoreturntoahomeport.Romanticitmaysound,anidyllicpictureitmayseem,butthiswasthescenethat had not changed for hundreds of years; this was the life to which ‘Jack’ wasaccustomed (even though times in general were extremely hard during the 1920s and1930s),andthesewerethebattleshipswithwhichhewassofamiliar.Lifewasneverdullforlongwhenservingonboardacapitalship–onedaynothingmuch,butthenextmightwellbringadoubleshift.Duringthelullincapitalshipconstruction(1919to1939)thecrewscarriedonregardlesswithwhatshipstheyhad.ThefollowingviewsshowalifestylethatwasfamiliartotheBritishmatelot.

HoistingatorpedoonRamillies.Carefulprocedurewasneededwhenhandlingtorpedoesbecauseaslipcouldmeanbrokenbodiesaswellasdamagetotheweaponitself–worthmorethan£2,000each.

‘Inforadip’–nothingwouldbemorewelcomeaftercoalingorheavyworkontheanchorpartythanarefreshingswim,especiallywhenatatropicalport.SomeoftheladsareshownhereworkingtheirwayalongaboomonRoyalSovereign,9August1920.

‘Alllitupatnight’.Afamiliarandspectacularsightinforeignportsandonethatisrememberedwithgreatfondness.Thesuperstructureandforward15inturretsofRamilliesareilluminatedwhileanchoredatAlexandria,1930.

‘Standeasy’.Afterworktherewasaperiodwhencrewscouldeitherrelax,playcardsorwriteletters,etc.HeresomeofthecrewareseenlazingontheforecastleofMarlborough.

‘Crossingtheline’.EverytimeashipcrossedtheEquatortherewereceremoniesandgamesonboard.Anynewratingorofficercertainlywentthroughit.ThephotographshowssomeofthecrewonRepulsereceivingaduckingc.1926.Notetheever-presentNeptuneontheextremeleft.

In January 1948,when LordHall announced the scrapping of certain ships, he said:‘TheFirst SeaLord and I feel like padres taking a funeral service for a number of oldfriends.TheshipstheAdmiraltyisscrappingareoldfriendsineverysenseofthewordtoeveryofficerandmanintheNavy.’Withoutdoubt,thiswasalsothefeelingofthegeneralpublic.The period itself is probably themost popularwith naval historians, enthusiastsandcollectorsalike,andwhencastingbaittoascertainwhatkindofbooktheywouldnextliketosee,theanswercamebackloudandclear–anotherbattleshipbook,butwithfreshinformation if possible, new drawings and different photographs. The first tworequirements have not proved easy to furnish and the latter were even more difficult.Therehavebeenafewbooksonthesubjectoverthepasttwentyyearsandareal‘dig’wasneeded to secure the required items.Massesofofficialdocumentshavebeenconsulted,butunfortunatelymanyhavebeeneitherdestroyedorhavegonemissingovertheyearssoacertaindegreeofcontinuityinthematerialislacking.PrivatepapershavebeenincludedandthedrawingsarefromofficialAdmiraltysourcesaswellasunofficialonesfromtheauthor’s archives. The photographs have been carefully selected so as to avoid the oft-repeatedshots;thoseseenherewill,inmostcases,nothavebeenpublishedfor40years.

Although the sailors and theman in the street were fiercely proud of the fleet, theyprobably never took much account of the technical changes that were taking place,perhapsbecausethegeneralwayoflifeitselfwasundergoingprofoundchange.Thisbookcontains,Ihope,ablendofingredientstointerestnotonlythetechnicalman,butalsotheenthusiast, naval photograph collector, model maker and the general public, and is atributetoall thecrewsthatservedintheRoyalNavy’scapitalshipsfrom1919until theendofthewarin1945.

R.A.Burt,Rayleigh

‘Theconcertpary’.Aspotoflightrelieftocheerupthecrewsandrestoremorale.Oftentheactingmemberswould‘sendup’theofficers,whichalwaysreceivedgoodapplause.RoyalOak.

ChristmasDayatsea.Thefestiveseasonwasnotthebesttimetobeawayfromhome.NeverthelessJackmadethemostofitandtherewasmuch‘splicingoftheMainbrace’andplentytoeat.

‘Footballteam’.Eachcapitalshiphaditsownteam,andtherewasfiercecompetitionbetweenthesquadrons.Oftentherewereperiodicalsforserviceuseonlytoshowwhowaswinningwhatinfootball,rowingorboxing.Repulse,BCS,1931.

Avisittoaforeignportandwelcomeshoreleave.HMshipsQueenElizabeth,Resolution,Revenge(indrydock),ResourceandaLondonclasscruiserareseeninthefavouriteportofMaltac.1935.

OneofJack’sfavouritepastimeswastogethisheaddownfor‘fortywinks’.Newcomerstohammockssaidthattheytookalotofgettingusedtobutoncemasteredtheyweremorecomfortablethanconventionalbeds.

EvolutionoftheDreadnought

Thebeginning of the 20th century saw themetamorphosis inBritish battleship designthat signalled a departure from the practice of the previous ten years duringwhich thebasic design had adhered to a uniform layout (Majestic, 1893) with little or noimprovement (see R. A. Burt, British Battleships 1889–1904). By 1902 there was agrowingappreciationoftheadvantagesoflongrangeanditwasbeingrealizedasaresultof practical experience that action could be commenced at ranges up to 10,000 yardsrather than the 3–4,000 yards that had been the norm up to this time. It also becameobvious that fire control would have to improve greatly if the all-important accuratespottingofthefallofshotweretobeachieved.MoreovertherewasaneedtogiveBritishbattleshipsaheavierarmament(only4×12inforthelasttenyears)sothatanenemyshipcouldbeoverwhelmedbyahugeweightofbroadsidebeforehecouldbringhisowngunstobear.

In1904–5intelligencereportsfromtheRusso-JapaneseWarconfirmedmanyofthesetheories and suggested that itwouldonlybe amatterof timebeforeoneof the leadingmaritimepowersseriouslyconsideredbuildinganallbiggunnedship tosuit long-rangefighting requirements. After hearing a general intimation from abroad that Russia andJapan were thinking along these lines for any future construction, and that the UnitedStates had indeed gone farther by actually laying down such a vessel, the Admiraltyneedednofurtherstimulus.

WhenAdmiralSirJohnFisherwasappointedFirstSeaLordinOctober1904,thefirstthinghedidwas togather a staffwhowereof the samemindashimself– thatBritainshouldbethefirsttobuildthefirstnewtypeofship.Hispositionanddriveensuredthataprototype was laid down in October 1905. Named HMS Dreadnought at Fisher’sinstigation,thevesselwasbuilt inanunprecedentedlyshorttime(1yearand1day)andbecamethefirstallbiggunnedturbine-drivenbattleshiptogotosea.

Fred Jane, the eminentnavalhistorian,once asked ‘What is aDreadnought?’ and forsomestrangereasonthequestionagitatedmanypeople.InthecolumnsofTheScientificAmericanduring1909,aMajorBoerumWetmoreofAllenhurst,NewJerseyputforwardthevesselRoanoke as the first trueDreadnought typeandstated thatwithher two15inandone11in guns she should rightfully take this position in history.What he forgot tomention, however, was the fact thatRoanoke was a converted frigate which had beenrazéed,platedwithiron,armedwithlargegunsandwas,onthewhole,veryexperimental.Shealsoprovedtobequiteunsatisfactory.ShewasprecludedfromserviceinConfederatewatersandalthoughservingwith theNorthAtlanticSquadronforayearproved tobeaterribleseaboat,theweightofhergiantturretsmakingherrolldangerouslyandthethrustofherspindlesalwaysthreateningtoforceheroutofkeelwhentheturretswerekeyedupforaction.

DREADNOUGHT

AMrPercivalHislamrepliedtotheMajor’sletter,defendingtheclaimsofearlyBritishvesselsandputtingforwardtheRoyalSovereignof1864asacontender.‘ThisshipwasthefirsttrueDreadnoughttype,’hesaid.AswasRoanoke,RoyalSovereignwasaconvertedwoodenhulledshipwhichhadbeenironplatedandarmedwithfive10.5ingunsmountedalongthecentreline,andcouldrightfullyclaimtobethefirstBritishturretship.

TheundauntedMajorreturnedthechargewithOnandanga,anothermonitorauthorizedbyCongressin1861.Hestatedthat,‘…shewasofhighfreeboardand,armedwithtwo15inguns,musttakepreferencetotheRoyalSovereign’.Thissmallwarofwordsswelledthe columns in the Press for some time, and it seems as if the conclusionwas that thedefinitionofaDreadnoughtwas‘aseagoingallbiggunnedship’inwhichcasetheUnitedStatescanrightfullylayclaimtohavinghadthefirstvesselsofthistype.In1859inhisbookTheNaviesoftheWorld,HansBusk,MAwrote‘AtalleventstheauthoritiesintheUnitedStateshavenotyetabandonedtheprincipleofbuildinggiganticvessels,inordertocarryafewheavyguns.’ThecontextreferredtocriticismsthathadbeenvoicedabouttheAmericanidea,andpredictedthatitwouldbeshortlived.Theseshipswereofficiallyratedas40-gunfrigates,butactuallycarriedonlytwelve,allmountedsoastoensurethatsevencouldfireoneitherbroadside.Theywere345ftlonganddisplaced5,013tons.ThelargestBritish warship of the day wasMarlborough, a three-decker, 131-gunned screw shipdisplacing4,000tons.Clearly, thoseAmericanshipsembodiedtheprinciplesof thetrueDreadnoughtconcept.

Althoughthesefactsshouldnotbeforgotten, thenavalhistorianof todaywhenaskedthe question ‘What is a Dreadnought?’ would almost certainly refer to the BritishDreadnought herself, built in 1906, and others that followed her being loosely dubbeddreadnoughts or super dreadnoughts. This in no way reflects on any of the vesselspreviouslymentioned,butthereisadifferencebetweenmodifyingandexperimentingwithanexistingvessel,andthedesignandconstructionofatruesea-goingallbiggunnedship.Itwould,however,beincorrecttoclaimthatHMSDreadnoughtof1906wasthefirstto

be designed as such, or indeed even the first to be laid down.Nevertheless,when onecomparesherinnovatoryfeatureswithexistingorevenproposeddesignsof1906,aclearmargin of superiority is apparent and at the time of her completion there was nocomparable ship afloat; regardless of debate then andnow, she can rightfully claimherpositioninnavalhistoryasthefirsttrueallbiggunneddreadnoughttype.

WhenF.T.JanegavehisfirstopinionofHMSDreadnoughtin1906afterhehadseenherinPortsmouthHarbour, itwasobviousthathewasmorethanalittle impressed.HisreactionspublishedinTheNavalandMilitaryRecordsayitall:

As regards thosedetailswhichmost strike theeye,perhaps thechiefone isthebignessofeverything.Themast,whichisthemostconspicuousobject,hasapeculiarmassivenessaboutit.Itisatripodaffairbuteachtripod-legislikethetrunk of some enormous forest tree. Similarly the funnels. They are notparticularlyhigh,andend-ontheyarenarrowtoreducewindresistance,butseenfrom the broadside they have the characteristic immenseness of theDreadnought.Aft, the eye is caught by a couple of square box-like erections.Theyareapparentlysomekindofventilator.Eachisaboutthesizeofthetowerofavillagechurch.Everythingisbig;everythingisonthegrandscale.

BELLEROPHONCLASS

Sheisnotinanywayone’sconceptionofaship.RegardedasashipIsupposeshe is ugly, because she is unconventional. But her ugliness is that of one ofBrangwyn’s best pictures alongside the oleographic effort of the conventionalR.A. There is no Alma-Tadema about her. But she looks what she is – theembodiment of power, of solidity, of all that we delight to call English and

which some neurotics call Philistine.One’s first and last conception of her isthat.

ItiswelldocumentedthatDreadnoughtstartedoneofthegreatestarmsraceseverknown,but for all that it wasGreat Britain that hadmanaged to lead the field in constructiontechnologybythetimetheGreatWarhadstartedin1914.Sufficetosaythatneverbeforehad a single type of ship caused such controversialmayhem and practical upset – andcertainlyneversince.

FromDreadnoughtonwards thevessels remainedasourceofdebate,but remain theywould for the next forty years as the supreme capital ship in the navies of the world.Toppledsomewhatbytheever-increasingsubmarinewarfareandfinallythearrivaloftheaccurate airborne torpedo-bomber launched from aircraft carriers, the battleship wasslowlyrelegatedtosubsidiaryduties.Herdemisewasforecastaslongagoas1920butshestillservedonwithdistinctionthroughouttheSecondWorldWarandinfactwasstillatseaaslateas1991intheUSNavy,provingthattherehasbeenlittletocomparewithherpowerevenbymodernstandards;thebattleshiphasnoequalandattimesthereisstillademandforheavygunfire–notabadrecordforatypeofvesselprimarilydesignedmorethan100yearsago.

SomeoftheBritishbattleshipsthatfollowedDreadnoughtwereasdifferentfromherasshehadbeenfromtheMajesticof1893,buttheyallhadonethingincommoninthattheywerealldesignedtocarrytheheaviestpossiblearmamentonaloaddisplacement.Infact,gun sizes increased dramatically from 12in diameter to a massive 15in in just a shortperiodoftimewhenitwasrealizedthatmodernlayoutscouldonlymustertenbiggunsindifferent arrangements without cramping the basic design. AfterDreadnought in 1906came the following classes: Bellerophon, St Vincent, Neptune, Colossus, Orion, KingGeorgeV,IronDuke,QueenElizabethandRoyalSovereign.

STVINCENTCLASS

NEPTUNEAscompleted

HERCULESANDCOLOSSUS

ORIONCLASS

KINGGEORGEVCLASS

IRONDUKECLASS

QUEENELIZABETHCLASS

Three war purchases supplemented the Royal Navy’s inventory during the war,Agincourt, Erin andCanada, and theworld’s first battlecruiserwas laid down in 1906(Invincible class) followed by the Indefatigable, Lion, Queen Mary, Tiger, Renown,CourageousandFuriousclasses.

During the Great War many improvements were made internally and externally ofnecessity because of action damage, and by 1918 theBritish capital shipwas themostcapableofitstypeintheworld.TheearlyDreadnoughtssawlimitedappearancechangeswhichusually amounted to littlemore thanbridgeand searchlightdevelopment,but thevesselsthatescapedthegreatscrappingprogrammeof1921underwentdrasticmeasuresto keep pace with modern-day requirements. With no new ships (except Nelson andRodney)enteringservicefrom1920,itbecamedifficulttokeepsomeofthevesselsfitforfront-linedutiesandsomeofthedesignssufferedasaresult.Nevertheless,itwasataskthatallnavieshadtoundertake.

Itisdifficulttogiveacomprehensiveaccountofinternalalterationsmadefrom1920to1945 because many of the refit documerits have been lost or destroyed, but at leastphotographicevidence,whereexisting,showsustheexternalalterationsthatweremade,and it is hoped that the small-scale drawings in this chapterwill give an insight to theprocedureofdevelopmentfromDreadnoughtin1906throughtoRoyalSovereignof1913(thelastbattleshipstobebuiltduringtheGreatWar).Someofthebasicchangestolookforare:

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS

Extendedbridgework.

Anti-torpedonetremoval.

Drasticsearchlightredistribution.

AAgunsadded.

Searchlighttowersaroundfunnels.

Removalofallflyingdecks.

Secondaryarmamentclosedinandgivensomeprotection.

Firecontrolinstalled.

Newheavyforetops.

Reductionoftopmasts.

Clinkerscreenstofunnels.

Aircraftflying-offplatformsontopofmainturrets.

Post-WarReorganizationandNavalTreaties

AlthoughtheGreatWarhadhitBritain’seconomyhard,itwasrealizedthatnoreductionin her navy could be planned immediately hostilities ceased because of a great deal ofuncertainty about the future.Burdenedwith amassive fleet it certainly did not need inpeacetime, theRoyalNavywas anxious to reduce it, but bothAmerica and Japanwerebusyplanningmassiveconstructionprogrammes.Facedwiththeseproblemsandthefactthat theTreasurywasnotexactlyforthcomingwiththeappropriatefunds, theAdmiraltyhadtodecidewhetheritwouldbebeneficialtobuildnewshipsorreconstructsomeofthemanywarships in service thatwere fast becomingobsolete.Eithermeasure representedsevere financial outlay, but, given its international commitments, the Admiralty waspracticallyforcedintoanuneasysituationofabattlefleetreconstruction.ThewarendedinNovember1918,butitwasanuneasypeacesofarastheRoyalNavywasconcerned.WhatwastobedonewiththemassiveGermanfleetthathadjustarrivedinScapaFlow–not to mention the crews aboard the ships? Writing for the Admiralty ReconstructionCommitteeSirWilliamMaystated:

The work of the A.R.C. cannot be satisfactorily proceeded with unless adefinitionofpolicyonwhichtoworkisdecidedupon.ThemajorityofquestionstobeconsideredhingeexactlyonthepeacetermsandconsequentlythestrengthatwhichtheNavyistobemaintained.Whatpeacetermsmaybeisimpossibletosaydefinitely,buttheymightbeonthetermsofthefollowing:

1. A patched-up peace, i.e., one which would be little more than anarmisticeandinwhichthenationswouldcontinuetodeveloppreparationsforpossiblefuturehostilities.2.Peace termswhich, thoughapparently lasting,wouldnotbindentirely,any or all of the opposing nations to a definite demobilization of theirarmed forces, or which would entail only a partial reduction in thepreparationsforwar.

Itisnotthereforepossibleatthepresenttimetobaseareconstructionpolicyonthe future termsofpeacebut itmaybeassumed thateconomicconsiderationswillgovern thispolicy.Whatever thepeacenegotiationsmaydetermine, therecanbelittledoubtthatallthebelligerentnationswill,fromthefinancialpointofview,dotheirbesttoreduceexpenditureandcutdowntheirarmamentstoavoidinvolvingthemselvesinfurtherexpenditureonwarrequirements.GreatBritainwithothernationswillhavetoreduceexpenditureonthenavy

to the lowest possible point compatible with retaining it in such a state ofefficiencyandsuperiorityaswillenableittomeettheGermanNavyincaseoffurtherwar.

On21June1919theGermanNavyceasedtobeaproblemwhenitscuttleditshugefleetwhile at anchor in Scapa Flow, but this was not entirely to the satisfaction of theAdmiraltybecausetheGermanshipscouldhavebeenputtogooduseintheRoyalNavy

byusingmaterials,orbyscrappingthemandusingthefundstowardsfreshconstruction.ButtheHighSeasFleethadgone.

PortquarterviewofIronDukeinWeymouthBay,1929.

During the second post-war year (1920), however, a situation came about to promptconsiderationofnewconstructionatanunprecedentedlevelsofarasbattleshipsizewasconcerned.Itseemedthatthewarhaddonelittletoendthestrugglefornavalsupremacy,butmerelysubstitutedJapanforGermany.Moreover,Americawaspreparingtorebuilditsbattlefleet completely to meet any challenge world-wide. On the drawing-board were:America: six battleships (Indiana class, 43,000 tons); six battle-cruisers (Constellationclass, 43,000 tons); Japan: two battleships (Kaga and Tosa, 40,000 tons); twobattlecruisers(AmagiandAkagi,43,000tons);twobattleshipscompletingwith16inguns(Nagato andMutsu, 33,000 tons). It was impossible forGreat Britain to ignore such athreatandpreparationsweremadetomeetthenewships.

Earlyin1921ordersweregiventoscrapdozensofthe1914–18veteranstomakewayfornewconstruction.TheoriginalDreadnoughtplusallbattleshipsandbattlecruisersbuiltfrom1907to1910weresold–thelargestscrappingprogrammeuptothatdate.

AtastroketheRoyalNavyhadreduceditspowerofseasupremacytoanall-timelow.Gonewasthe‘TwoPowerStandard’ofthelate1900sandthestrugglewasontomaintainasuitableleveltomeetdifferentrequirements.Bytheendof1921theDNCandstaffhadproduceddesigns forwhatwereprobably the finest andmostpowerfulwarship todate.The1921battleships andbattlecruisersmatched (inmost cases completelyoutmatched)anythinginforeignnaviesandmovesweremadetolaydownfourofthemsimultaneously(seeNelsonclassandG3designs).

Whenthefiguresfortheseshipswerereleased,bothAmericaandJapanwerelessthanpleasedbecauseitmeantthattheywouldhavetobuildevenlargershipsthanenvisaged.The only solution was to call a meeting to consider a disarmament policy that would

considerablyreducewhatwasperceivedasafuturewarprogramme,withGreatBritain,America, Japan, France and Italy all invited. The delegates met in Washington on 12November 1921 to discuss a suitable treaty and without going into the very difficultnegotiationsthattookplaceandthefactthatGreatBritainconcededmuchmorethananyothernation, itwillsuffice toshowtheactual results.The treatymadeprovisionfor thescrappingofaverylargeamountoftonnage:Americatoretaineighteencapitalshipswithan aggregate of 500,650 tons; Great Britain to retain twenty-two with an aggregate of580,450tons(AmericatoretainasmallernumberofcapitalshipsbecausetheAmericanshipswere, ingeneral, later and larger than thoseofBritain). Japan retained ten capitalshipsaggregating301,320tons.Themaximumforanyreplacementtonnagewasfixedat525,000tonsforAmericaandGreatBritainand315,000tonsforJapan.Franceretainedtenshipsforatotaltonnageof221,170tonsandItalytenaggregating182,800tons.Eachnationwaspermittedtolaydownnewtonnagein1927,1929and1931.

Eachnationwasalloweda replacementallotmentof175,000 tons. Itwasagreed thatnoneof thepowersshouldbuildareplacementcapitalshipdisplacingmorethan35,000tonsandarmedwithgreaterthan16inguns,andtheagelimitforcapitalshipswasfixedattwentyyears.Itwasalsoagreedthatnopowershouldbuildmoreshipsthantheminimumrequired.Afteraheateddebate,andasaconcessiontoGreatBritain,theRoyalNavywaspermitted to construct two ships of 35,000 tons armed with 16in guns (Nelson andRodney) because the American ships under construction (Colorado, Maryland, WestVirginia) and the Japanese pair (Nagato andMutsu) were armed with 16in guns. Theagreementwassignedon6February1922.

ThereweremanyinGreatBritainwhosawtheWashingtonNavalTreatyastheendoftheRoyalNavyasthesupremepowerintheworldsoceans,andinastrictsensethiswastrue.TheDNC,SirEustaceTennysonD’Eyncourt,wrote:

DearMrLloydGeorge,IwishtoplacebeforeyoumyviewsonthesubjectofthepresentConference

atWashington,more particularly regarding the proposal for aNaval Holiday.There appears to be a tendency to set on one side the opinion of naval andtechnicalmenonthesubject.This is very dangerous, and asChiefTechnicalAdviser to theAdmiralty, I

feelitmydutytogiveyoumydefiniteopinion.Aten-yearnavalholidaywouldresultinacompletedebacleinthematterof

efficientnavalmaterial.Itwouldtakeusmanyyearstorecoverthegroundlostandweshouldabsolutelyceasetoretaintheleadwehaveheldforsolonginthematterofthoroughefficiencyofourships.Ineednotwearyyouwithallthedetailsandargumentsonthesubject,butit

is in my very carefully weighed opinion that our present ships would bealtogether obsolete in a few years. Some of them are nearly so now, andweshouldbeunabletoproducethebestshipstoreplacethemafteralongperiodofinactivity such as proposed. We have had practically four years’ ‘Holiday’already.YouwillneverproduceA1materialifyoustopconstructing;withoutanA1

Navywearefinished.

TheFrencharelogicalinaskingthegreatpowersiftheycangiveassuranceand guarantees against aggression from Germany. If not the French say theymust have the army they consider necessary.We should be equally logical insaying‘canyougiveusaguaranteeatsecuringourcommunicationsourfood,etc.,incaseofwar?Ifnot,wemusthavetheNavyweconsidernecessary’Insistence upon a thoroughly efficient if not large navy should be our

equivalentcrytotheAmericanMonroedoctrine,anditisfarmorevitaltous.Aten-yearNavalHolidaywouldrenderthisimpossible.There are thosewhowish deliberately towreck our capacity for producing

efficientwarmaterial.Thatcannotbepermitted,asweshouldbeatthemercyofotherEuropeanpowers–perhapsGermanyandRussiaoralatincombinationinthefuture.These‘peaceatanyprice’peoplemayarguethatwecanrestoretheNavyat

anyfuturetime;thatisadelusion.Whenonceithasbeenallowedtogodown,itwill take years to restore; this applies to both material and personnel. It isthereforeabsolutelynecessarytocontinuebuildingatareducedrate,butnottostop.TheNavyisthesolelife-assuranceofthenation.The careful householder may effect economies in many directions, but he

neverallowshisinsurancepremiumstolapse.Possibly theoldsayingSivispacemparabellum requiresqualification,but

theconversesivisbellumparapacemiscertainlytrue.

During the years following the Washington Treaty there were constant talks aimed atfurtherreducinganyshowofnavalstrength:

LeaguePreparatoryCommission,1925

Attheendof1925theCounciloftheLeagueofNationsbroughtintobeingaPreparatoryCommissiontotakeovertheworkwhichhadbeengoingonsince1921.Itstatedthatthemaintenanceofpeacerequiredfurtherreductionofnationalarmamentstothelowestpointofconsistency.Althoughagoodideainprinciple,itwasfoundthatitdidnotdoawaywiththe‘germ’ofrenewednavalcompetition.Itbecameasimplecasethatthegreatmaritimepowers could not agree on a suitable limit to tonnage and just howmanywarships ofdifferenttypesshouldbescrappedandwhatshouldremain.

GenevaConference,1927

On20June1927Britain,AmericaandJapanmetagainforrenewedtalksonthefurtherreductionofthearmedforcesofeachnation.ItalyandFrancedidnotattendintheirfullcapacitybutsentobserversinstead.Thefailureofthemeetinglayintheinabilitytoagreeoncruiserstrengthbecauseofeachnation’sdifferentrequirements.TheBritishsuggestionthatcruisersbedivided into twoclasses:10,000 tonsand8inguns,andsmallercruiserswith6ingunsdidnotgodownwellwiththeAmericans.

PactofParis,1928

Apactbywhich56nationsagreedtorenouncewarasaninstrumentofpolicywassignedon27August1928.

Anglo-Americanconversations,1929

Talks between Ramsay MacDonald (Prime Minister) and President Hoover took placeduring June 1929 when the President stated: ‘Wemust find a yardstick with which tomakereasonablecomparisons’ofnavalunits.Duringmostofthetalkssince1921ithadbecomeincreasinglydifficulttogetallthepartiestoagreeonanything.Eachcountrystillinsistedondoingwhatwasbest for its ownnavy.Therewasmuch talkof constructingsmallerbattleshipsthanwerereallyneededandscrappinglargerbattleshipsthatwerenotyet obsolete. Britain sawAmerica as being particularly awkward and America felt thesameofBritain.Japan,ontheotherhand,wasseentobebecomingmoredistantfromallpartiesconcerned.

NavalTreaty,1930

Talks finally evolved into action during the 1930 discussions when Britain, America,Japan,FranceandItalyallprimarilyagreedtolimitwarshipconstruction.

1.Thefivepowersagreednottobuildanynewbattleshipsbefore1936,butFranceandItalycoulduseuptheirunusedtonnageallottedtothemfrom1927and1929.2.AmericawouldscrapthebattleshipsUtahandArkansas.BritainwouldscrapthebattleshipsIronDuke,Benbow,Marlborough,EmperorofIndiaandthebattlecruiserTiger(IronDukeandArkansas toberetainedas trainingships).JapanwouldscrapthebattlecruiserHiei(shewas,infact,retainedasatrainingship).

Furtherscrappingwouldtakeplaceoverthenextfewyearsaftertheconference.Aircraftcarriers were limited in size to 10,000 tons (new construction) and an even tighterlimitationwasproposedoncruiserconstruction.

FromthatdatethenavalsideofBritishaffairswaslefttodecayandmanyoftheskilledworkers, draughtsmen and shipbuilders left the service. Battleships themselves werethought tobecompletelyobsoleteand therewererenewedcalls toscrap the lot,but thesituation in Germany, where the military element was on the move once more, led todisquietthroughoutEuropeandamongthePacificpowers.

TherewastobenomorenewconstructionuntilJanuary1937bywhichtimeGermanywasbecomingarealthreatandJapanhadlonggoneherownwayandwasmostsecretiveaboutherintentions.Whenthelongcapitalshipholidayendedithadbeenagreedtolimitnewconstructionto35,000tonsand16inguns.ThisagreementwasnotatfirstfavouredbytheBritishwhohadinstigatedamovetowardsasmallerbattleshipwhichwouldhaveonly 12in guns (see design notes) and displace about 25,000 tons. America, however,wouldnotagree to thisandacompromisewas reached.No limit to thenumberofnewshipswasfixed,butitwouldbegovernedbyfinancialrestrictionsimposedbyindividualnations.

Freed from the treaties that had so hampered it during the twenties, and thirties, theRoyalNavybeganapanicconstructionprogrammeinJanuary1937,butwasnevereveragainonaparnumericallywithAmericawhoselargeresourceseasilyoutmatchedalltheothermaritimepowers.ThusGreatBritain’sbattleshipsenteredtheSecondWorldWarillequipped,underpoweredandatastageofmidconstruction.

IntroductionDesignAlthoughtherewerebasicideasregardingdesignthathadbeenformulatedinthelightofwar experience, it becamenecessary to re-evaluate theentire issuewhenpreparingnewships, given the financial restrictions imposed after thewar.Before and during thewartypesof shipsweredeveloped forcertainbasic roles,but itwas found that theyneededmany additions and alterations if theywere to be efficient inmultiple roles.Manynewtypeswerebuiltforspecialpurposes(Renownclass,etc.),butasBritishcapitalshipshadtobeallthingsandcarryweaponsofalltypes,itwasseenasunnecessarytoloadashipdownwithallsortsoffittingsitreallydidnotneed.Itwasarguedthatifashiphadamainrolethedesignerwouldhaveaclearerideaofwhatwasrequired.Thequestionaroseastowhether thedifferingqualitiesandfunctionsof thebattleshipandthebattlecruisercouldbecombinedinoneshipasacompromise.Itseemedthattherewasnoreasonwhysuchatype should not bemore efficient than the two specialist types – the heavily armouredslowshipandthelightlyarmouredfastship.ThedevastatingoutcomeatJutland,wherelightlyarmouredshipscameintocontactwiththeenemyfleetbeforetheslower,heavilyarmouredships,madetheprospectofafast,heavilyarmouredshipanappealingone.

After thewar therewasno shortageofpersonalopinionsand theDNC’sDepartmentwasoftenbombardedwithsketchdesignsfromservingofficersaswellasfromtheprivatesector.OnesuchsketchdesigncamefromRear-AdmiralSirRichardPhillimore,KCMG,CB,MVO(PresidentofthePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,10October1919):

Is thereany intentionofradicallyaltering thesystemonwhichourshipshavehithertobeenarmouredandplacingthebulkofthearmourinahorizontaldeckcoveringtheships’vitalsinsteadofonthesideoftheship?Ifnot,pleasestatewhatreasonsareconsideredtomakethisimpossibleasthemainideaincapitalshipconstructionortomaketheplacingofarmourat20degreestothenormalpreferabletoplacingitat70degrees.WhatconclusionsweredrawnbytheDNCDepartment fromthe trials recentlycarriedoutonHMSSwiftsureanda targetrepresentingarmouredprotectionofHoodabreastcertainmagazines?10×16in;16×5.5in;4×TT;6,000miles radius;speed25knotsmaximum;armour6inhorizontal;splinterproofcontrolstructures;noconningtower.

IntheAdmiraltycorridorstherewasmuchtalkofsubmersiblescarryinglargeguns,supershipsshowingridiculousfeaturesand,asalways,theschoolofthoughtthatwasinclinedto ‘scrap the lot!’. Aftermanymonths of post-war debate it was concludedwith greatclaritythatifthebiggunwasstilltobetheprimaryweapon(whichitwas)theshipshouldbe designed accordingly. 1. Make battleships as strong as possible. 2. Do away withtorpedotubesinlargeships(theyweredangerousincaseofdirecthit).3.Giveprioritytospecial-purpose ships – cruisers, destroyers, etc. The argument against having twodifferentweapons of offence requiring different tactics andmaking life difficult for theoperatorswasasoundonethatwasheededduringthosepost-waryears.Torpedoattackswerebettermadefromspecialistvessels:torpedo-boatdestroyers,submarinesortorpedo-cruisers.Anyweightsavedbydeletingthisweaponfromcapitalshipscouldbebetterused

inprotectionqualities.

TheinfluenceoftheWashingtonTreatyondesignintheRoyalNavywasprofound,butBritain accepted the proposals, admitting that with regret she was no longer able tomaintain the ‘two power standard’ she had enjoyed before the war. Since 1919 theAdmiraltyhadbeenengagedinthewholesalescrappingofoldervessels,butmanyweregoodshipsthatneednothavebeenscrapped.TheWashingtonTreatyonlymademattersworse;aletterintheGermanGazettesaiditall:‘TheWashingtonConferencemayprovetobeamilestoneinthenextwar.’

The outstanding feature of the Washington Treaty was that naval strength was stillclassed in terms of capital ships, in complete disregard of the strong opposition thatmaintainedthatthedayofthebattleshipwaspast.Theever-forcefulSirPercyScottwroteinMarch 1922: ‘Naval strength is no longer measured by the number of battleships acountryhasbutbythenumberofaeroplanecarriersandaeroplanes.’Clearly,however,ithadbeenproved that although the submarines and aircraftwere an essential part of themodern fleet, they were certainly by no means a substitute and future designs wereprepared accordingly. Although no official sketches of a hybrid battleship/carrier wereprepared,manyunofficialsketcheswereputforwardandmakeinterestingreading.

Official sketchesdrawnupduring1920/21before theWashingtonTreaty took effect,showshipsofmassiveproportions.ThefirstfewweremerelydevelopmentsofHood,butlater culminated in a completelynew type (G3)with18inguns.Therewasobviously aneed for a fast battleship and a slower, heavier armoured battleship, and these earlysketchesreflectedjustthat.Thebattlecruisertypehadinfactevolvedintoafastbattleshipandthebattleshipintoahuge,well-armed,heavilyarmouredandcapablewarship.Mostof the sketches sported18inguns at the largest and16in at the smallest.To reach finallayouts byNovember 1921 (N3–G3) proved quite complex and the designs hadmovedthroughmore than eighteen stages (full development of type is described inRaven andRoberts’ Battleships of World War Two). They came to nothing, however, and navaltreaties were expedited to stop the very expensive, over the top, programmewhich nocountry could sustain financially. Some of the designs prepared for the G3 group andothersthatfollowedareshownintheNelsonclasschapter,buttherewerealsomassesofdesignsproducedinanendeavourtogetroundtheWashingtonTreatylimitationsandtheyseemtohavebeenproducedmerelyspeculativelyandtogoonrecordforfutureuse.

WhenoneconsidersthepolicyandstrengthoftheRoyalNavyduringtheWashingtonTreaty discussions, one concludes that there was little realization at that time that theproposals as finally agreed would seriously restrict the decisions of those who wereresponsibleforthedesignandconstructionofmajorfightingunits.Infactthelimitations,although feasibleonpaper,were just not practicable.AsNelson andRodney completed(1927)andwithaconstructiongloomformanyyearsduringandaftertheirconstruction,itwasonlynaturalthatnewdesignsshouldbeproposed.Thosethatwere,however,wereacompromisestillbasedonsevereweightandsizerestrictionsandthesketchesshowthismostclearly.Unofficiallythebattleship/carrier(seesketch)ideawasbeingdebatedandintheory and practice it was actually feasible, but unfortunately it was never seriouslyconsidered.

DESIGNFORHMSHOODSubmittedbythePresidentofPost-WarQuestionsCommittee,1919

BATTLESHIP-CARRIERPROJECT

After debate, staff requirements in 1928 for new battleships showed an improvedNelsontype,butareturntofourtwinturretsmountedforeandaftaswasusualstandardAdmiraltypracticebeforeNelson.Twelve6ingunsremainedassecondaryarmamentbutweremorewidelyspacedthaninNelson(40feetcentreofturretsasopposedtoNelsons30feet).Thetertiarybatterywaseight4.7inguns,andgeneralfirecontrolwasarepeatofNelson.TosaveweighttheaftDCTwasomittedandcontrolwastobefrom‘X’turret.Inthepast theprincipalobjectionstothedirectingturretwere:1.Thedirectinggunhadtocease fire, since the loadingoperation interfered toomuchwith the director layer. 2.Ahumanlinkwasintroducedintotheelevationandtrainingtransmissionwhichintroducedlaganderrorsintothesystem.Boththeseobjectionswerelargelydiscountedbymodernmethodsofsightingturretgunsandhigh-speeddirectelectricaltransmission.Thesystemwasadmittedlynotsogoodasanindependentdirectorposition,butwasgoodenoughforararelyusedalternativeandcertainlysavedtheuseofpersonnelandofficers.

Protectionwassimilar to thatofNelsons,but theserious threatposedbydivingAPCshellsvis-à-vis,forexample,Nelsonsshallowbeltwasnowrealized.Nelsonsarrangementofsidearmourhaditsadvantages,butitwasconsideredthatplacingthebeltinboardfromthe waterline could result in projectiles glancing down to explode inside the ship and

possibly passing under the armoured belt (see drawings). Nelsons belt was severelycriticized officially in 1927 and this fault was at last given serious consideration. Theweakness, however, was never officially acknowledged. A meeting was held on 20November1928todiscussDesign545-A+Bandmostitemsontheagendawereprimarilyagreed.

DuringthosedoldrumyearsitwasnecessaryforBritaintowatchforeigntrendscloselyandstronglyresistanycommitmenttosingletypes(suchasDeutschlandandDunkerque)being laid down. Certainly no group of shipswas planned until it was certain that thedesigncouldmatchanyforeignadversaryDisplacementandguncalibrewerefixed; thetwo remaining factors being speed and armour. In this respect itwas considered soundpolicytogiveanynewshipsnormalbattleshipspeedsandgoodprotectivequalitiesratherthanstrainthedesignforahighspeedwhich,itwasthought,usuallyfelloffwithage.OneparticularpointinallthedesignsforwardedwasthatthemainarmamentstronglyfavouredthestandardtwinmountingsasintheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereigngroups.

AmeetingwascalledbytheFirstSeaLordon10January1934todiscussthequestionofsizeoffuturebattleships in the lightof theapproaching1935NavalConference.Thefollowing factors governed the situation: 1. A proposal made at Geneva by Britain toreducethesizeoffuturebattleshipsto25,000tonswith12inguns,oralternativelyshipsof22,000tonswith11inguns.2.TheproposalbyJapanforashipof25,000tonswith14inguns.3.TheAmericanwishtopreservethepresentsizeofshipandgun,namely35,000tonsand16inguns.4.TherecentconstructionbytheFrenchofabattlecruiserof26,000tonsand13.5inguns(Dunkerque).5.TheexpressedwishoftheGermanstobuildalargerbattleshipthanDeutschland.

With severe financial restrictions in force and an unwillingness to build a fleet ofgiganticbattleshipswhenthetreatiesallowednewconstructionagain,itwasthoughtthattheUSNavymightbewillingtoagree,undergentlepressurethatis,toareducedsizeofcapitalship–about28,000tonswith12inguns.Theyweretobebuilttostandupagainst16ingunfire,attackfrom2,000lbbombsand750lbtorpedoes.TheControllerwasaskedto investigatedesignsofashipcarryingeight,nineor ten12ingunswithaspeedof23knots.Sketchdesignswereprepared(seetable)accordinglyandaftersomedebatesuitablearrangementswereagreed.Unfortunately,however,noothermaritimepowershowedtheslightestinterestinconformingtosuchmoderatedimensions.

Thesketchesfortheseshipswerewelllaidoutandsomeofthefeaturesdeservetobehighlighted:

1.Armourandprotection.Thebeltarmourwasplacedontheoutsideofthehullandnot,asinNelsonandRodney,slightlyinboard.ExperimentshadshownthattheventsprovidedintheupperportionofthebulgesofNelsonandRodneycouldbeomittedwithout disadvantages. The outside position of the armour belt necessitated adifferent formofbulge from that inNelson,butexperiments showed that itwasaseffectiveasthatinthelatterships.2.Alowerandthinnerbeltwasproposedtobeplacedbelowthemainbelt tomeetthe impact and explosion of long-range projectiles falling short as in number fourround against the targetEmperor of India and afford protection to the magazines

againstsuchplungingshellfirehittingbelowthemainbelt.3.Mainarmament.VerysimilartothatintheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclassesbutbetterlocationarrangementsweremade.4. Secondary armament. In most cases this was protected in turrets but someprovisionwasmadeforarmouringtheturretsandbarbettes.

Thesmallbattleshipproposalshavingbeendispensedwith,theAdmiraltyreturnedtothemaincharacteristicsofthestandardbattleshipwhichhadbeenthoroughlyworkedoutbyNovember1933.(FormaindimensionsseeKingGeorgeVclass,1937.)Designsonpaper,althoughofgreat importance for theoryand thehistorical record,donot in factmeanagreatdeal.Itiscomparativelysimpletooutlinerequirementsinasketchdesign,buttoputthese intopractice,whichmeans financial support and the solvingof conflictingdesignrequirements, is another matter. As can be seen from these notes designs took manydirectionsandinfactthe1933capitalshipdesignswereverydifferentfromthoseplannedduringthe1920swhentheAdmiraltywaslookingaheadtothetimewhenGreatBritaincouldrenewherbattlefleet.Thegoverningfactorindesignsalthoughnotstraightforwardare in fact easy to understand: 1. Financial considerations have priority. 2. Informationabout development abroad. 3. Fleet and staff requirements. 4. Balanced design (wellarmed,protectedandgoodspeed).5.Unrestricteddisplacement.

Without a freehandon all these requirementsnomaritimepower in theworld couldhavebuilttheshipsthatitneededatthattime,andtheresultwasthatthoseshipsthatwerebuiltshortlybeforetheSecondWorldWarwereuntriedand,ifthetruthbetold,generallyleftmuchtobedesired.

ArmourWith the cessation of hostilities in November 1918 some of the longest and most

important debates concerning standards in capital ship design began. Looking back atcertaindisastersduringthewaritwasconsideredatsomelength(since1916)thatviewsregarding protectionwere over-influenced by the losses of the battlecruisers at Jutland.Apart from those tragic losses thewar in general had highlighted the fact thatmodernbattleships’ (bothBritish andGerman) armour hadwithstood gunfire verywell. In facteven shipswithpre-war standardsofprotection,whichonpaperdidnothave completeimmunityfromexistingattack,stillstoodupverywelltoseverepunishmentandinmostcaseshadmadeitbacktoportundertheirownsteam.

It was considered that this capacity to take heavy punishmentwas the criterion of agooddesign,andallprotectionbeyondtherequirementofbeingabletowithstandheavyhitswasthoughttoamounttowastedweight.Whattherequiredprotectionratioshouldbe,however,variedagreatdealfromshiptoship.SofarasarmouredplatingwasconcernedtheRoyalNavyenteredthewarbelievingthat,atthefightingrangesfavouredin1914,9insidearmourand4¼inturretroofplatingwasimmuneagainst12ingunswhichtheGermanbattleships possessed in great numbers. In 1920, however, the Post-War QuestionsCommitteedismissedthesethicknesses,andalthoughsomefavourwasgiventomedium-range armour it was questionable whether the present-day thicknesses (13in inQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereign)wouldbeimpervioustotheever-increasingpowerofthelatestAPCshellsbeingdeveloped.

BecauseithadstoodupsowelltoBritishshelling,theperceptionofGermanarmourasbeingsuperiorhadbeenexaggerated,thetruthbeingthattheoldBritishAPCshellswereincapableofpenetratingthemagazinesandothervitalareasofGermanheavyshipsinafitstateforbursting,sonottoomuchimportanceshouldbeattachedtothefactthattheshipswereable to return toharbourafterhavingbeenhit.Defects inpre-1917APCshellsof12in and greater calibres were: 1. They broke up on oblique impact having only beenprovedatnormal;2.Thebursterwas toosensitive tobecarried througha thickarmourplate; 3. Some failed at proofTheGerman ships never faced theAPC shells thatweredevelopedafterJutland.

Luckily forBritish ships itwas found that theGerman shellswere not always up tomucheither;forexamplein1915an11inshellhitthebattlecruiserLionatDoggerBankand,althoughhavingpiercedthearmourplate,theshellwasfoundlyingonthecrownofoneoftheturretmagazines,thefuseshavingfailedtodetonate.

ThelatestshipattheendofthewarwasthemightyHoodbutherprotectionhadfuelledcontroversyfromtheoutset,anditwasproposedthataseriesoftestsbeheldwithaviewtoimprovingherifpossible,andanyothercapitalshipthatfollowed.TheRoyalNavywaswellawareofdeficienciesinhorizontalarmourandasearlyas1921madethefollowingstatement:‘Wecanlaydowntheimportantaxiomthatitmustbemadeimpossiblefortheenemy to destroy your ship by one fortunate hit, i.e., itmust be impossible for him toigniteyourstoreofexplosives.Nothingelseisofsuchvitalimportanceasthis.Hitswhichdamage some of the engines and boiler rooms or turrets are of secondary importance.Acceptingthisprincipleitcanprobablybeassertedthatitisimpossibletoarmouralltheimportant parts of a ship completely against the gun you carry and which it must bepresumed the enemywill also carry, but if yourdesign andmaterial are superior to theenemy’syouwilltakecorrespondinglylessrisk.’

Theformofprotectiontodate(1920)wasbasedontheprinciplethatarmourfulfilledits requirements if it remainedunholed after attackby shells, and to this end the platesweresodesignedthattheirresistancetobeingholedwasmeasurable.Themeasurementofimperviousnesstoparticularshellswascalledthe‘limitofresistance’oftheplateagainstthe shell. The power of attack up to 1917 made it possible to armour capital shipssufficiently well to render them capable of resisting shell attack (inmost cases) at therangesthenenvisaged.TheintroductionofthenewAPCshellgreatlymodifiedthevaluesofshellandarmourandthesubjectofrelativestrengthcameundergreatscrutiny.ItwasfoundthatifnewconstructionwastobeimmuneagainstheavyAPCshellsof15incalibreand greater, maximum armour thickness would have to be applied. These findings,however,didnotquitecoincidewithaquote from theDNC; ‘If suchprotectionaswillgive,onpaper,completeimmunityagainst18inattackbeadopted,thereareboundtobemethodsofdefeatingtheshipanditisnotdifficulttopictureahuge,superblyarmouredvesselwithitssuperstructureandcontrolpositionsobliteratedanditsmachinerypersonnelgassed,driftingatthemercyofthesubmarinesoraircraftattendingtheenemyfleet.Suchhoweverislikelytobethefateofashipinwhichoffensivepowershavebeensacrificedtodefenceagainstavesselinwhichsuperiorityinoffencehasbeenthefirstconsideration.’

After tests had shown just how good the APC shells were, the entire design of theNavy’snewshipswasopentoquestion,andtheConstructionDepartmentwasconstantlyengagedindesigndevelopment.Thenewshellswouldgovernnewstandardsofprotectionbecause itwasobvious thatothermaritimepowerswouldsoon(if theyhadnotdonesoalready)reachadequatelevelsofshellability.Trialsshowedthatalargeproportionofanytargetwasrepresentedbythedeck,andmakingashipinvulnerabletoshellhitsinthisareawas exceedingly difficult within the limitations of capital ship design. Variousmodifications were tried, but the general conclusion was that unless some new radicalformofarmourweredevelopeditwasimpossibletoimprovearrangementsinheavyshipsother than by increasing armour thicknesses far beyond the present level (1920 = 3inaverage)whichwouldinvolveunacceptableweightaddition.

Itisimpossibletodealwithasingledesignfeature,suchasprotection,inisolation.Thedesignerhastoconsidertheshipasawhole,allfeaturesdependingupononeanother.Atthat time (1920–21) speed was considered a most important factor in relation to otherfeaturesofaship,asitaffectedtheotherelementsofthelayout,withtheexceptionofthearmament.Ifmachinerywerereducedthelengthofthemachineryspace,thelengthofthearmouredcitadel, theamountof fuel, theamountofdeckprotectionwerealso reduced,leading to, finally, a smaller hull with fewer fittings and less equipment. This wasimmediatelyapparentwhenthedesignofabattleshipofsay22or23knotswascomparedtothatofabattlecruiserofsay30knotsanditwasatoncefoundimpossibletogivethesamethicknessofprotectiontothefastershipastotheslower.InHMSHooditwasfoundpossible toprovide theprotection andeven increase it over thatof theRoyalSovereignclassbattleshipswhilemaintainingthesamearmamentandgivingthespeedof31knots,plus a very heavy weight of underwater protection. This result, however, was onlyachievedbymakingaverybigshipofgreatlengthandgoingtotheextremedimensionsthatthelargestdockscouldaccommodate,anditwasherethatBritishconstructorscameupagainstadifficultproblemsincetheexistingdocksprecludedshipsofevenaslightlylargersize.Untillargerdockswerebuilt(whichtheywerenot)theAdmiraltywouldhave

tocontentitselfwithvesselsofnogreaterdimensionsthanthoseofHood.

Valiant1919,anchoredinScapaFlowoverlookingtheGermanbattleshipBadenwhichwouldlaterbeusedforfiringteststohelpevaluatearmourprotection.

Ithad longbeenknownthat thedeckprotectionof the latestgiantbattlecruiserHoodleftalottobedesired,andasshenearedcompletionthePost-WarQuestionsCommitteecalledforaseriesoftrialsrelatingtoherdeckstrength.ItwasdecidedtousethenewAPCshell,whichwascapableofcarryingthroughandburstingabout40feetbeyondthefirstplate struck, to determine any critical weaknesses, the main question being, was sheadequateagainsttheNavy’s15inAPCshell?Duringtheautumnof1919platesarrangedtosimulateHood’sarmourweretested.Test1.Shellperforatedandburst40feetbehind7inarmourinthemagazine.Test2.Withmagazineroofthickenedfromlinto2in.Shellperforatedandburst34feetinrearof7inarmour.Roofplateblowntopieces.Test3.(Seepage27).Target:2inHTplate,3inHTplateand2inHCplate(magazineroof).Projectile15in APC (weighted). Angle of descent 32 degrees striking at 1,350 feet per second.Corresponding range 25,000 yards. Aweighted shell was used and the 3in HT platingrepresentingthemaindeckwaswrecked,buttheshelldidnotpenetrateandglancedoff.Thus the modification to the main deck (as seen in the drawing) gave fairly good

protectiontomagazinesfromshellshittingthesidearmour.

At theconclusionof the trials itwas seen that theweightavailable toprotectHood’smagazineswasinadequateagainstplungingfireunlesstheshipwerere-builtwithanewdeck of thick homogeneous plate. Later, however, it was proposed that more trials becarriedouton theHood deck target,with themaindeckbeing reinforcedby4¾in roofplate quality armour. No approval for this was sanctioned, however, and although thematter was not dropped, it was seen to be impossible to modify a ship that had beendesignedto1916standards.

FurthertestswerecarriedoutagainstarmourinthecapturedGermanbattleshipBadenin 1921 andHMSSuperb in 1922 (seeNelson chapter), and these yielded an amazingamountofdata for futureuse. Itwasconcluded in1921–2 thatamainbeltof14inanddecksof7½–8inwerenecessary tokeepout16inand18inAPCshellsatmodernbattleranges and it was these thicknesses that were envisaged for the G3 design. By 1937,however,ithadbeendecidedthatthicknesseswouldhavetobegreatlyincreasediftheyweretokeepoutmodernbombsandshells,andtheprotectionofthelaterKingGeorgeVclass(1936)wasdesignedaccordinglybutwithinthelimitsofamaximumdisplacementof35,000tons.

MODELTESTSFOR1928BATTLESHIPDESIGN

SomecomfortwasofferedinanotebyDNCTennysonD’Eyncourt:‘Lookedatbroadlyitisconsideredthattheactionoftheshellwillnotbequitesoseriousasthetrialshithertomadewouldseemto indicate.Theconditionsofactualwarfaredonot ingeneral testsoseverelythearmourandprotectionofshipsasdothetrialsspeciallymadeonthematerial.Thisispartlyduetotheangleincidenceoftheshellbeingfrequentlylessthanthattaken,andpartlytothefact that inadditiontotheverticalordeckarmourwhichiserectedforspecialtrials,thereisalwaysthestructureoftheshipwhichaddsveryconsiderablytotheprotection afforded in practice and the chance of the shells hitting some of the verysubstantialstructureofourcapitalshipsisaverygreatone,andthereforethethicknessofthe protection given on paper is considerably augmented by the structurewhich ismetwithinthepassageoftheprojectile.’

In general this applied to ships that served during the SecondWorldWar. It was toprove that shellfire was not themost important threat but aerial and underwater attackprovedthemostfatalofall.ThenewPrinceofWales’s6inarmoureddeckwasnotpiercednor was her 14in or 15in belt, but she was most effectively sunk beyond the armourlimitations.(ForfurthertestsagainstarmourplatesseeOperation‘Bronte’inNelsonclasschapter.)

ChemicalWarfareGasandchemicalwarfarehadshowntheirdeadlypossibilitiesforthefirsttimeduringtheGreatWar. Themustard and respiratory gases, that could burn, blind or chokemen to

death,wereobviouslyseentoposeamajorthreatinanyfutureconflict.Althoughneverusedatseaduring theGreatWar, ithadbecomepossible toattackshipsatseawithgasdroppedfromanaircraft,andtheproblemofanti-gasdefencewasmuchdebatedduringtheinter-waryears.

TheAdmiraltysetupaChemicalWarfareCommitteewhichhelditsfirstmeetingon7July 1920.One of the first battleships to undergo gas-attack testswasRamillies (RoyalSovereignclass)during thewinterof1920but resultsshowed thatwithheropenbridgework and conning arrangements it was practically impossible to keep out poisonousfumes,anditwouldbeanabsolutenightmareifpersonnelfacedsuchattack.Moretestswerecarriedoutduringthenextfewyears–themostnotablebeingintheaircraftcarrierCourageousin1922,butagain,becauseofhernumerousopeningsitwasquicklyrealizedthat it would be extremely difficult to rendermany compartments gas tight. In August1923 their Lordships received an article entitled ‘Protection of Capital Ships againstPoisonGas’whichhighlightedtestsandtrials inwhichtheUSNavyhadbeenengaged.Thearticlehadthreeheadings:

1.Methodsofproducingagascloud2.Individualprotection3.Collectiveprotection

Methodsofproducingagascloud:

1.Atime-fusedsmokefloat.2.Liquidgassprayedonthesurfaceofthewaterfromaircraftoutofgunrange.

Individualprotection:

Thewriteradvocatedtheuseoffourdifferenttypesofmasksforthepersonnel:

DIVINGSHELLTESTS,HOODANDMALAYA

1.Manuallabourmask–containercarriedontheheadsoasnottoimpedethearmsorbody2.Diaphragmmask–foruseoftelephoneoperatorsetc3.Opticalmask–foruseofrange-takers,gun-layers,etc4.Acombinationofbandc–forfirecontrolofficers

The BritishAdmiralty favoured the use of a singlemask for all ranks and ratings andprovidedthatthisuniversaltypeprovedefficient(anewversionwasbeingdevelopedatthat time) the question of special masks for special duties would not arise. It wassuggestedthatanopticalmaskbebuiltintorange-findersandtelescopes,oneadvantagebeing that the userwould be better accustomed to action conditions thanwould obtainfrom intermittent use of a personalmask. Serious considerationwould be given to this

proposalshoulddifficultiesarisewiththenewversionoftheindividualmask.Protectiveclothingagainstmustardgaswasconsideredanditwassuggestedthatspecialoverallsbeissuedinwartimeforactiononly.

OntheforecastleofBarham,showingsomeofthecrewundergoingchemicalwarfarepracticeandtheuseofgasmasks,c.1925.

Collectiveprotection:

Thewriterdealtwiththissubjectexhaustively,varioussuggestionsbeingmadeastohowtopreventgasenteringaship.Theopinionwasthatthewholeshipbelowtheupperdeckshouldbemadegastightincludingturrets,ammunitionpassages,secondarybatteries,etc.,andevenengineandboilerrooms.Briefly,compartmentsweretermedeithersemi-closedorfully-closed.Forthefirst,theideawastomakethecompartmentasgastightaspossiblewithregardtofightingefficiencyandtopreventgasfromenteringbykeepingthespacesunderairpressure.Tokeeptheairpressureupandatthesametimefiltertheair,useofthe‘seco spray’machinewas suggested.With regard to the fully-closed compartments, theideaseemstohavebeenforanagentforabsorbingCO2andtoreplenishtheoxygenfromtanks or cylinders in the compartment. There was emphasis on the need for collectiveprotection everywhere to avoid the loss of efficiency resulting from the wearing ofrespiratorsbypersonnel.Atthesametimeitwasadvocatedthatpermanentgasmasksbefitted as part of range-finders, gun-laying telescopes, etc., which should be used at alltimes,thusacceptingareductioninefficiencyoftheusersoftheseinstruments.

TheAdmiraltytooktheviewthatthewriterhadlostsightofthefactthatashipmaybehit during an action and that in almost any compartment that was not well protectedcollectiveprotectionwoulddisappear.Itwasalsothoughtthatthewriterinhiseffortstobring thegasmenace to thenoticeof theUSNavyhadratheroverstated thecase.Suchconditionsashepostulatedmightbepossibleinthefuture,butnotatthepresenttimeandthefirstrequirementwastoexaminethemeanswherebygascouldbegotintoashipandonlythendeterminepracticalmethodsofdealingwithit.

IntheDirectorofNavalOrdnance’sopinion,thecorrectlinetotakewas:

1.Stake everythingon a goodgasmask, and regard this for the timebeing as theprimaryandmosteffectivedefence.2. Carry out further research on methods of getting gas into a ship in order toascertainjusthowgreatadangerthenewthreatmightposeduringawar.3. Investigate systematically the means of making some of the more importantstationsgastight.

It was thought that any proposals tomake the engine and boiler rooms gas tight weresomewhatfantastic.

Thesprayingofgasfromaircraftwasconsideredworthyofinvestigation,notonlyfromthepointofviewofpossibleuseinanavalaction,butalsoasmeansofdefendingbeachesfromhostilelandings.

With regard to the proposals to provide anti-gas apparatus of different types to suitspecific duties, Admiralty experience to date suggested that it was possible, but it washighlyimprobablethatanydefinitiveapparatuscouldbedevised.Itwasrealizedthatthechancesofaship’spersonnelbeinggassedwereprobablygreaterinharbourthanduringanyfleetaction.Itwasthereforeessentialthateachmanbeprovidedwithpersonalanti-gasequipmentinthefirstplace;specialtypesforspecificdutiescouldbeconsideredwhenexperiencehadbeengainedintheuseofthenewtypeofrespiratorbeingdeveloped.

Theemphasisontheneedofprotectiveclothingagainstmustardgasandtheproposalstointroduceanoverallofprotectivematerialforuseinactionwassoundinprincipleandindicated the linesonwhich issueshouldbemadeassoonassuitablematerialcouldbedeveloped.ItwasunderstoodthatthiswasengagingtheseriousattentionoftheChemicalWarfareCommittee.

USproposalsfollowedgenerallythelinesalongwhichtheAdmiraltywasproceeding.Theair purifier, the air filter and theuseof compressed air forovercoming small leakswere all at this time under consideration for use in HM ships. The loss of efficiencyresulting from closing-in might be as great as, or greater than that resulting from thewearing of gas masks, especially at times of low visibility, a condition that wouldfrequentlyprevailduringagasattack.Foritemssuchasturrets,secondarybatteriesetc.,itwasconsideredthatinviewofthegreatpracticaldifficultiesinmakingsuchspacesevenreasonablygastight,thepolicytorelyoninrespectofthesespaceswasthatofindividualprotection. It was clear that the main questions regarding collective protection thatconfrontedtheUSNavywerethesameasthosewithwhichtheAdmiraltywasfaced.InconclusiontheBoardconsideredthatprogressinprotectingthepersonnelofshipsagainstgasshouldbemadealongthefollowinglines:

Tostakeeverythingatthistimeonagoodgasmaskandtoregardthisastheprimaryandmosteffectivedefence.TheBoardsuggestedthatthesoonerthefleetwascompletelyequipped and had gained sufficient experience in the use of the personal gasmask, thebetter.Ordersweregiventocarryoutresearchandexperimentstoascertainhowtogetgasintoaship,andtoinvestigatethemeansofmakingthemoreimportantstationsgastight.The investigations which were then in progress were considered to be on sound andpractical lines, butwould probably requiremodification or amplification in the light ofexperiencegained.

Strictproceduraltrainingwascarriedoutduringthe1920s,theoutcomeseemstohavebeenthatindividualsafetywasfavoured,ratherthantryingtomakelargeareasgastight.Nelson andRodney (andKingGeorge V class 1937)were fittedwith limited gas filterarrangements in their largesuperstructures,whichwouldat leastensure thatmostof thebridgepersonnelwouldbeprotectedfromseriousharm,butthatseemstohavebeenasfarasitwentinthedaysofbattleships.

TheArrivalofAircraftDuring theGreatWarTheTimes newspaperwas always noted for its lively reviewsonmilitarymattersandthisofcoursecontinuedintopeacetime.InDecember1920,however,aseriesof lettersregardingcapitalshipsandtheextentof theirusefulnesssparkedoffadebate in which practically everyone who was anyone in naval circles joined. Thecontroversy quickly spread to official circles and became the great discussion of theperiod.

A first article had appeared on 29 November 1920 under the title ‘The Navy – AQuestionfortheNation’andalthoughitistoolongtorecapitulatehere,sufficetosaythatit pointed out that, as a consequence of the enormous construction programme beingundertakenbytheUSAandJapan,theBritishBattleFleetwouldsoonberelegatedtothirdplaceratherthanherusualprimeposition.Itasked‘arebattleshipsreallythecapitalshipsforthefutureoraresubmersiblesandaircraftreallythenewweaponstoconquerall?’

At the end of the war even Sir John (Jackie) Fisher himself stated: ‘The greatestpossiblespeedwiththebiggestpracticablegunwas,uptothetimeofaircraft,theacmeofsea fighting. Now there is only oneword – submersibles.’ One of themost prominentnaval officers of the day, the gunnery expert Sir PercyScott,was quick to reply to thelettertoaddweighttothedoomofthebattleshipandinfacthad,asfarbackas1914,beensaying that submarines had entirely revolutionized naval warfare.Many famous nameswereseenonletterswhichfloodedinto thecolumnsofTheTimes.AdmiralSirCyprianBridge,SirHerbertKingHall,LordSydenham,AdmiralW.H.HendersonandAdmiralR.H.Bacontonameafew.ThemostformidableantagonisttothebattleshipwasofcourseSir Percy Scott who then came up with an article ‘What Use is a Battleship?’ (13December1920),andtothistherewereliterallydozensofanswers,ofwhichhetooknonoticewhatsoever.SirPercy’sarticleread:

Sir–Willyouhelpmeinmyignorance?Icannotgetananswertomyquestion‘Whatistheuseofabattleship?’ShemustbeofsomeuseortheUnitedStatesandJapanwouldnotbebuildingbattleships.Alotofnavalofficershavewrittentomebuttheyonlytellmewhatsheisnotusefulfor,theywillnotanswermyquestion.Isheruseasecretthatonlyafewknowandwillnotdisclose?WillitbedisclosedbytheCommitteeofImperialDefencewhoaregoingtotellwhattheweapons of the newnavy are to be?AdmiralHall, a young and vigorousofficer, who had wide experience during the war, will not enlighten myignorance;heisonlytellingthepublicwhatthebattleshipisnotusefulfor.Whatis the good of that?Beforewe spend 109millions on battleships and another100millionsinmakingsafeharboursforthem,weoughttoknowwhatusetheyare. Now, Sir, do try and enlighten my ignorance. Ask Lord Sydenham or

someoneelsewhoknowsallaboutnavalaffairs.

Ascanbeimaginedthepoliticalcacophonythatfollowedwasunprecedented,butoneofthe best replies came from someonewho signed himself simply as ‘naval officer’: (15December) ‘Sir, – In reply to Sir Percy Scott, on the lines of the well-known nurseryrhymeIwouldsay thecapital ship is:Theship that sinks theenemy’scapital ship, thatprotects the cruisers that sink the cruisers which protect destroyers, that sink thesubmarines thatattack themerchant ships thatbring the food that feeds thepeoplewhobuildtheshipsthattransportthearmythatdefendsthehousethatJackbuilt–theBritishEmpire.’

ThecolumnsofTheTimeswereablazeformorethantenweeks,butafterthattheeditordecidedtoendthedebateasitseemedtobegoingnowhere.Infactithadgotoutofhand.Therewascertainlynoeasyanswertobehadbythewrittenword–practicaltests,trialsandlengthyexperimentswereneededtogiveanydegreeoftruthtothequestionofhowmuchusewasthepresent-daybattleshipinthelightoffouryears’wartimeexperience.

Shipshadbeensetasideafterthewar,therebeingnoshortageofsurplusvessels.TheAdmiraltyatfirstputforwardafewofthepre-dreadnoughtstoseehowtheywouldstandupagainstmoderntechnology(SwiftsureandAgamemnon),butultimatelyexperiencewasneededinthedreadnoughttypeandasaresultMonarch(Orionclass)wasusedfrom1923to1925;Centurion(KingGeorgeVclass)becameRemoteControlTargetShip(1927–37)andEmperorof IndiaandMarlborough (IronDuke class)were used extensively as testshipsagainstshellsandexplosivesofalltypes.

Monarchaftershelltestsandinamutilatedcondition.Herfunnelhascollapsed,thebridgeworkiswreckedandtheforecastledeckhasalargeholeinit.

Probably the most experimental battleship during the 1920s wasMonarch. She wasusedextensivelyforteststoseehowarmourstrengthinBritishbattleshipswouldstandupagainst light,mediumandheavyshells (seeBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).Shewasalsousedingasandchemicalattacks,andlaterforspecialteststoseehowmachineryintheRoyalNavy’scapitalshipswouldtakeaknocktoitsvitals.

On1August1923shewasanchoredinelevenfathomsofwaterandachargeof2,081pounds ofTNTwas hung from a boom fitted 40 feet below thewaterline and 7 feet 6

inchesfromthesidesuperstructure.HermachineryhadbeenpreparedinaccordancewithAdmiraltyinstructionsandsteamwasraisedinnumbersA1,A2,A3,A5,B1,B2,B4andB5boilers.Auxiliarysteampipeswereatworkingpressurethroughouttheship.Oilfueltanks in usewere in ‘A’BoilerRoom (keel to second longitudinal port) and ‘B’BoilerRoom(secondtofourthlongitudinalport).Becauseofbadweatherthetestwaspostponeduntil4Augustwhenthechargewasignitedat09.06.After theexplosionthevesselwasboardedandthefollowingnoteswerecompiled:

At the moment of explosion boiler pressure was evidenced by the lifting of safetyvalvesimmediatelypriortothechargebeingfired.Aftertheexplosion,asfarascouldbeseen fromoutside the ship, themachinerywas continuing to run satisfactorily, thepilotlight on the aft superstructure showed that the dynamo enginewas functioning and thefunneldischargeappearednormal.Assoonaspersonnelwereallowedonboardandpriorto permission being given for theEngineRoom staff to open up compartments and gobelow,listeningatthevariousventilatingtrunks,seemedtoshowthatnormalrunningoftheauxiliaryengineswascontinuing.Soonaftertheyreturnedonboardtheyobservedthatthe funnel discharge from ‘A’ Boiler Room was diminishing and, suspecting loss ofsuctionoftheoilfuelpumpbecausetheshipwaslistingabout11degrees,shutofftheoilfuelpumpandoilfilterdischargesof‘A’BoilerRoom.Theboilersin‘B’,asfarascouldbeascertained,continuedtofunctionsatisfactorily.Atabout09.40thehydraulicpumpingengineceasedtoworkandathickvapourfromburningoilfuelwasrisingfromtheportafterfanintaketo‘B’BoilerRoom,thedynamoenginehadstoppedandsteamwasissuingto a considerable extent from the centre Engine Room ventilating trunk into the aftersuperstructure.Becauseoftheriskoffirein‘B’BoilerRoomtheoilfuelwasshutoffat10.00.At10.10thecentreEngineRoomwasenteredbutthesteamvapourwastoodenseto locate the cause. As the air cleared it was seen that the starboard main condenserinboard door was split and sea water was spurting freely through the fissure. All seaconnectionswereshutasquicklyaspossible,butitwasfoundthatthebilgehadalreadyfloodedtoadepthofjustoverthreefeet.Allseavalveswerestillworkingfreely.

AfterCenturion,Monarchwasthebattleshipmostusedforexperimentalpurposes.Hertestresultsfurnishedmuchneededinformationtowardscapitalshipconstruction.Shownhereshortlybeforebeingshelled,sheislistingtostarboardtoexposeherarmourstrake.Notethewhitebandsaroundthehull(rangetakingaids).1925.

Thesteampressurein‘A’BoilerRoomhadremainedat10psi,fanswerestillrunning,mainfeedpumpsstillmovingandallwatergaugeglassesintact;afewboilerswereshortofwaterbutA1boilerwasleakingbadlyatthestarboardandblowdownvalve.Allfloorplates were displaced, but ladders and gratingswere still in place and slight leaks hadoccurredhereandthere.TheoilfuelhadcaughtfireinthedrippansofA5boiler,butthisburntoutshortlyafter theentryof theexaminationparty.‘B’BoilerRoompressurewasthesameasthatin‘A’andtheonlydamageherewasconfinedtoafewleaksonthemainsteamexpansiongland;asmalloilfirewasinprogressinthefrontofB5boilerbutthiswaseasilyextinguished.‘C’BoilerRoomappearedtohavesufferedmorefromshockthaneither ‘A’ or ‘B’, nearly all the glass fronts of the gauges being shattered, floor platesdislodgedandmuchdustshakendown.Theboilersthemselves,however,didnotappeartohavesuffered.Mostoftheauxiliarymachineryinthearearemainedintactexceptforafewfractures to some of the sea water pumps, but on the whole there was no discernibledamage.

All engines in use during the test were tried by hand and still moved freely andappearedundamaged.

The damage as a whole was minimal, the only failure being a reduction in waterpressure. It was considered that all auxiliary machinery in those compartments notdestroyedor flooded at themomentof explosion, could still havebeenkept inusehad

immediate access been allowed. With regard to the main propelling machinery, theleakagefromthestarboardmaincondensercoverwouldpossiblyhavebeendiminishedbypadsandshorestosuchanextentastoallowtheuseofthestarboardengineswithmaincirculatorbilgesuctions inoperation.Had the turbinesbeen in runningcondition itwasconsideredtheliftwouldhavebeenmuchdiminishedsothatifthebladinghadfouledtheresultingdamagewouldhavebeenslightandtheturbineswouldhaveremainedusable.Itwassubmittedthatifanyfurthertrialsofasimilarnaturewerecarriedoutitwouldbeanadvantagetofitgaugesandequipmentontheupperdecksothatitwouldbeeasytoseewhatwasgoingondownbelow.

ThistrialwasjustoneofthehundredscarefullycarriedoutbytheRoyalNavytotrytoascertain how capital ships would fare when damaged. While these and many otherextremely valuable tests were taking place during the period of the ‘What use is aBattleship?’debate (althoughpublished in1920 it certainlynever lost its appeal for thegeneralpress), testswerebeingcarriedoutintheUSAonanoldGermanwarprize, thebattleshipOstfriesland,bytheUSAAF(UnitedStatesArmyAirForce).Thedebateoverthe ship became a fiasco after the pilot ‘Billy’ Mitchell (Brigadier General WilliamMitchell) claimedafterhehadbombed the ship that thedayof thebattleshipwas trulypast.Thesagawaslong,butbrieflywhathappenedwasthis:

MitchellhadsethissightsonwhathesawasmagniloquentAdmiralsandSeaLordsonbothsidesoftheAtlantic,andafterattackingallofthemverballyinarticlesappearinginjournals, periodicals andnewspapers,wenton to test his theories in apracticalmanner.Afterknocking theoldcoastaldefencebattleship Indiana tobits,hemademoves togetOstfriesland allocatedasa sitting target tobedestroyedbyaircraft.Trials startedon20July1921whentheshipwasattackedwith230lbbombs,butof33bombsdroppedonlyeighthitswerescoredon themaindeckanddid littledamage.Later,600lband1,000lbbombswereusedbutnoneseemedtoaffectthewaterintegrityoftheoldbattleship.Nextday, however, sixmore 1,000lb bombswere dropped, but only twomade contact.Onecausednodamagewhatsoever,buttheotherwasanearmissontheportsidewhichcausedthehulltocaveinfromthe‘waterhammer’effect–itopenedheruptotheseaandshebegan to sink.Disappearing beneath thewaves in about fortyminutes, it looked like avictoryforthearrogantMitchellandtheanti-battleshipbrigade.InfactthetesthadprovedlittlesofarastheBritishAdmiraltywasconcerned–amatterofanold,unmanned,sittingtargetsunkasaresultofconstantbombing.Wouldnotacrewaboardhavesavedherbyisolatingtheareaofdamage?Wouldshenothavebeenamoredifficulttargetifunderwayandyetmoredifficult if firingat the attackingaircraft?TheAdmiralty, although takingnote of the ‘interesting’ trial, concerned itselfwithmoremethodical testswhichwouldfurnish themwith sound information regarding the real strength ofmodern battleships.EventhecommitteesetupintheUSAhadregistereditsverdict:‘Itcannotbesaidthatthebattleship has become superfluous because of the possibility of bombing attacks byaircraft.Thebattleshiprepresentsthehighestandultimatefightingstrengthofthefleet.’

In 1923more debates took place in theHouse ofLords regarding the capabilities ofcapitalshipstodefendthemselvesagainstattackingaircraft,anditwasaskedwhetherthewingsofseapowerhadbeenclipped?Itwaspointedoutasusualthatnewnavalweaponshadbeendeveloped(namelysubmarinesandaircraft)whichgreatlyweakenedtheoffencein modern sea power. Forces could not, as before, be carried across the seas. A weak

powerwithoutanavycould,intheory,challengethestrongestseapowersimplybyhavingastrongminefield,anadequateaircraftandahandfulofsubmarines.

Even thegreatAdmiralVonScheer,whocommanded theGermanHighSeasFleet, astaunch believer in battleships, was forced to concede that by the time the GreatWarendedthesubmarinehadproveditsworthandcould,intheory,holdoffafleetofcapitalships. It was a known fact that had there been a fleet of submersibles present in theDardanelles in 1915 it would have been almost impossible for any surface ship toapproach the beaches for bombardment, as was so often accomplished during thatcampaign.Whatmorecouldbesaidtoprophesyandhastethedemiseandultimatedoomoftheworld’sbattleships?

It isobvious that therewasmore thanadegreeof truth in theargumentsof theanti-battleship lobby, but during thedecade from1920 to1930 therewasmore to the affairthanjustquestionsofwhatusewerebattleships,orwhatiftheywerefacedwithafleetofsubmarines, or indeed could they defend themselves against a squadron of high-levelbombingaircraft?Theentire subjectofdefencehad tobeaddressed,and theAdmiraltywas only too aware that some of the questionswere almost impossible to answer. Themainquestionofcoursewaswhatwouldreplacebattleshipsiftheywerealldeletedfromthe world’s battlefleets? Submarines and aircraft carriers at that time were not yetdevelopedtotheirfullpotential–therewasstillmuchtobedoneinthatarea.Moreoverthere was still a need of a strong, fast, heavily armed type of warship which was andwould always be needed to protect smaller ships – especially merchant vessels whichcould not be looked after by submarines or indeed aircraft at that time. Although theSecondWorldWarprovedtobethefinalfrontierforthebigbattleship,thetypeneverlostfavour with many of the world’s navies and it continued to serve until well after theconflict.

Today(2011)battleshipsasaspeciesareextinctbutitdoesseemthatevenwithallthemoderntechnology–missiles,aircraftandsubmarines–the‘biggun’stillhasaplaceinanywar.Therewasmuchspeculationwhenduringthe1991GulfWaraSilkwormmissilewasheadingfor thebattleshipMissouri,andanuninformedpress releasedeclared: ‘Shewould have been completely wrecked. Her fate would have been sealed.’ Alarmingstatements and riveting reading, but in fact these statementsweremade by peoplewhoobviouslydidnotknowthefacts.Ofcourseitwouldbefoolishtosaythattheshipwouldnot have suffered superficial damage, but it is very doubtful that shewould have beensunk.Likeallbattleships,shewasdesignedtotake(anddeliver)atremendouspounding–andthatiswhythebattleshipssurvivedthebarrageofopinionduringtheinter-waryearsandwhy they have not been completely erased from theUSNavy.TheWisconsin wasdecommissioned in 1991 and in 1996wasmoved to the Norfolk NavyYard. In 2006,along with the Iowa, she was struck off the Naval Vessel Register and they were tobecomemuseumships.

However,theUSCongresswasdeeplyunhappyaboutthelossofheavynavalgunfiresupport,andpassedaDefenceActthatrequiresthebattleshipstobekeptandmaintainedin a state of readiness should they be needed again, and further measures have beenimplementedtoensurethatWisconsinatleastcouldbequicklyreturnedtoactivedutyinanemergency.Itispossiblethenthatthehistoryofthebattleshipisnotcompletelyover.

AircraftinBattleshipsAftercountlesstrialsfrom1920to1930,therewasgeneralagreementbytheearly1930sthataircrafthadadefinite rolewithin thefleetatsea,andmanyof theolderbattleshipsweregivenhangarsandcatapultsduringtheirmodernization.Therewasastronglobbyofofficial opinion, however, that held that such aircraft should be confined to aircraftcarriers.The late1920switnessedmanydebateson the subject and theCommander-in-Chief,DirectorsofWar,StaffCollegesandTacticalSchool,DirectorofNavalOrdnanceandtheAirMinistryfeaturedprominentlyinthediscussions.Inabout1933–4thegeneralopinionwasthatfighterswerethebestdefenceagainstattackingaircraft–aviewwhichoftenchangedfrommonthtomonth.WhatwasfullyagreedwasthattheexpansionoftheFleetAirArmwasofparamount importanceand theuseofaircraft inconjunctionwithbattleships and cruisers for trade protection was worthy of serious investigation. ThefollowingpointsoutliningtheneedstobeconsideredwereplacedbeforetheBoard.

1.Operational, including the typesofoperation forwhichaircraftareessential, thefrequencyofsuchoperations,andthescaleofrequirementsofaircraftinrelationtothestrengthoftheforcesengaged.2.Technical,includingtheeffectsontheship’sdesignofcarryingaircraftincapitalships and cruisers, and the limitations inherent upon the operation of aircraft fromsuchshipsimposedeitherbyweatherorbytheshipherself.3. Financial, to determine the most economical method of carrying the aircraftrequiredfortheoperationenvisaged.

Operational. It was obvious that aircraft were required in practically every operationlikely tobeundertakenby thefleetasawholeorbydetachedforces.Moreoveraircraftwereviewedasessentialfortheeffectivecontrolofseacommunications.

Aircraftonbattleships–beforethefittingofcatapults,theonlymethodofflying-offaircraftwasbymeansofarampfittedoverthemainguns.Theaircraftenginewaspitchedtohighspeedandthenflownoff.ThisphotographshowsaSopwithPupflyingofffromWarspitec.1919.

Valiantportamidshipsshowingheraircraftandflying-offequipmenton‘B’turretc.1920.

Technical.The technical aspectof carrying aircraft on catapultswasdominatedby twomainfactors:

1.Thetechnicallimitationsoftheaircraftitselfwithespecialreferencetoitsabilitytolandandberecoveredatsea.2.The limitations imposed upon the ship herself by reason of the inclusion of thecatapultandthespaceandweighttakenupthereby.Ithadalsotobeborneinmindthatcatapult-launchedaircraftdependedtoagreatextentoncalmseaandweatherforrecovery,whichprecludedtheirdeploymentonahighpercentageofdaysintheyear.

Thelimitationsimposedupontheshipbycarryingaircraftonacatapultwerediscussedin1936.Themaintechnicaleffectswere:

1. The catapult and hangars occupied approximately one-sixth of the upper deckspace between the forward and after gun mountings in any class of ship. Theremaining space was therefore congested and limitations were imposed upon thearrangement of the secondary orHA armamentwhichwas already difficult to sitesatisfactorilyclearofblast.2. The weight of the equipment was considerable (approximately 160 tons in the1936battleship).Itwasthoughtthatwithqualitativelimitationoftotaldisplacement,tousethisweightinshipswiththefleeton‘oneshot’aircraftwasuneconomicalandwould detract from other important characteristics such as protection or offensivepower.3. The modern type of fixed catapult, necessitating operating machinery betweendecks,affectedaccommodation.4.Theaircraftonthecatapultcouldnotbearrangedsatisfactorilytobeclearofblastfromthehigh-angleorsecondaryarmament(itwasassumedthattheaircraftwouldbeflownoffbeforethearmamentwasfired).Itwasconsideredextremelylikelythat

theanti-aircraftgunswouldbefiredbeforetheaircraftwasrequiredtobeflownoff,inwhichcaseitcouldnotbeguaranteedthattheaircraftonthecatapultwouldstillbeserviceableafteranairattack.

Financial.Itwasdifficulttoassesstherelativeannualcostofcatapult-borneandcarrier-borneaircraft,butitwasthoughtthattheformerweremoreexpensive.Theinitialcostofacatapultwasapproximately£17,000.

Theargumentsforandagainstcatapult-borneaircraftwere:

For

1. They provided an increase in the required number of fighters and/or fighterspotterscarriedinthefleetsinceasmuchaspossibleoftheexistingcarrierspacewasrequiredforreconnaissanceandstrikeaircraft.2.Thebattleshiporcruiserflagshipcarryingafighterspottercouldbeself-containedasregardsairspotting(withitsattendantincreaseinhittingpowerandtheabilitytocarryoutindirectfire).3.Itwasheldbysomeofficersthatimprovedresultswereobtainedbythecloserco-operationmadepossiblebetweenshipsandaircraft’spersonnel.4.Theoffensivepowerofshipsforsubsidiaryoperationswouldbeincreased.5.Thereweremorebasketsfortheeggs.

Against

1. Aircraft on catapults were ‘one shot’ aircraft and must be refuelled or re-ammunitionedaboardacarrieronexpiryoftheirenduranceorammunition.Carrier-borne aircraftwere capable of continuous operation.Catapult aircraft could not berecoveredinweatherthatwouldnotprecludeflyingfromcarriers.2. Inclusion of fixed catapults rendered the arrangement of the upper deck andsecondary andHA armament (for long or close-range defence) unsatisfactory. TheefficiencyoftheAAarmamentwasthereforeimpaired.3.Aircraft on catapultswere liable to blast fromAAguns and arrangementswereverydifficulttocircumventthis.4. Theweight of catapultswas considerable andwould need to bemet by limiteddisplacementfromotherservices.5.Airspottingentailedalargeorganizationforreliefsetc.,andthesecouldonlybearrangedfromcarriers.6. Training of observerswas better carried out andmore easily co-ordinated fromcarriers.

In1933theCommander-in-ChiefoftheHomeFleetmadeastrongpleaformoreaircraftin thefleet,especiallyof fighterandreconnaissance types,andrequestedastatementofpolicy.Thefollowingareextractsfromremarkspromptedbyhisletter:

1. ‘In general stowage for fighters is not provided in capital ships owing to spacerestriction and difficulty of launching, a spotting aircraft being the primaryconsideration. It is therefore considered that the provision of additional carriertonnageistheproperpolicyforincreasingthenumberoffleetfighters.’(DNAD)2. ‘Asageneral rulebattleshipsdonotworksinglyor inpairsbut insquadronsor

fleetsandtherightplaceforaircraftisinaircraftcarriersattachedtothesquadronorfleetcontroller.3.‘Myconclusionisthatitisunwisetoneglectanyopportunityofprovidingforthetransport of a limited number of aircraft in capital ships provided their maincharacteristicsarenottherebyimpaired.’(ACNS)4.‘Iagreewiththegeneralviewthatwemusthaveasmanyaircraftavailableasispracticable,especiallyinviewofthevulnerabilityofcarriers,andthesmallnumberofshipswehave.’(DCNS)5.‘Itisessentialthatwemakeeveryreasonableuseofsuchaircraftcarryingpoweraswecaninvesselsotherthancarrierstostrengthenourairdefences.’(CNS)

Astaffmeetingwasheldon26May1936tofurtherdiscussthepolicyofcarryingaircraftin capital ships andcruisers even though thenewprogrammeofBritishbattleships laiddownin1936wasshowinghangarsandaircraftwithinthedesign(KingGeorgeVclass).Thesubjectwasstillunderdiscussionatsomelength.Itwasagreedthattheaircraftwerebetteroff incarrier types,but the fleetdidnotpossessenoughof the type.Moreover, itcould be argued that aircraft in battleships and cruisers would be capable ofreconnaissance on a scale not possible by other ships of the fleet (i.e., destroyers andscouts etc.). The conclusive results of the meeting saw the staff recommending thefollowing:

1.Thatbattleshipsandcruiserswith the fleet shouldnotcarryaircraftoncatapultsbutthatallfleetaircraftshouldbecarriedincarriers.2.Thatthecarrierbuildingprogrammebeacceleratedtoprovideanadequatenumberofefficientlyborneaircraftwiththefleetandfortradeprotectionduties.3.Thatthecarrierbuildingprogrammerequiredimmediatereviewinthelightoftheabove and that after arrears had been made up it should be correlated to theprogrammeofothercategories.4.Thedevelopmentof theautogiro typeofaircraftshouldbe treatedasurgentandmoneydevotedtothenecessaryexperimentsforthispurpose.

Thegeneralsummaryimpliedthatwhensufficientnumbersofarmouredcarriershadbeenbuilt,otherlightcarriersshouldbebuiltwhichwouldenablethebattleshipsandcruiserstohave their aircraft equipment removed. This policy had two great advantages: 1.Moreefficientuseofaircraftwiththefleet.2.Moreefficientuseofweightandspaceinshipsforoffensiveanddefensiveweapons.

Itwasconsidered,however,thatuntilthistimearrivedthepolicyofcarryingcatapultsin other shipswould continue. The Controller, R.G.H.Henderson, on hearing of thisgeneralconsensuswasnothappywithit:

I find myself in entire disagreement with the general policy outlined in thispaper.AlthoughIhavenowishtobeunjusttotheappreciationpreparedbythenaval staff, Ido think that thedisadvantagesofcarryingaircraft in shipshavebeenverymuchstressed,while theadvantages therefromhavebeen treated intheoppositeway.Firstly, I donot think it shouldbeargued too strongly that the existenceof

aircraft in battleships and cruisers is due to limitations hitherto imposed by

treaty,althoughnodoubtthetreatyruleshastenedthedevelopmentofsea-borneaircraft. Further, though there may now be no limitation by treaty as to thenumberof carriers,wehave it in another form,namelycost, if thenumberofaircraftforfleetuseismaintainedatahighlevel.Itmustberememberedthat,withthedesignofarmoureddeckcarrier,themaximumnumberofaircrafttobecarriedis36,and,assumingwehavetenofthesecarriersthenbroadlyspeaking,theFleetAirArmwouldconsistofonly360aircraft,and thesemightwellbedistributed all over the world for commerce protection, diversions and otheroperationswhichmustnecessarilybeawayfromthemaintheatreofthewar.Ishould think that inawar theaircraftcarrierswillbekeptbusyand thatevensubsidiarymovementsandperiodicalsweepswillnecessitateoperationsbysuchships; when they get back to their base they will want to rest and yet theCommander-in-Chief in his base will probably require daily reconnaissanceflights,whichIsuggestshouldbedonebytheship-borneaircraft.

Onlyexperienceduringthefollowingconflict(1939–45)wastosettlethedebatewhenitwasseenthatthebattleshiphadmovedasideasthecapitalshiptogiveprideofplacetothe aircraft carrier with its aircraft and their deadly bombs and torpedoes. Aircraftequipment in battleshipswas of some value for reconnaissance at the beginning of thewar,buttheweightandspaceinvolvedandthepersonnel–whocouldmorepracticallybeusedelsewhere–showed the ineffectivevalueof this typeof fitting inanythingbut theproper vessel. From 1942 all aircraft equipment and catapults were removed frombattleshipsandthespacewastakenupbystores,boatstowageandanti-aircraftbatteries.

CamouflageAlthough this book is intended to cover the period 1919 to 1939 and not merely warhistory,ithasprovedimpossibletostopshortofthe1939–45conflict(ascanbeseeninthemain chapters). Camouflage is a wartime subject and one of themost popular andinterestingitemsbyfarforseriouswarshipenthusiastsandmodellersalike,andtothatendit is thereforeworthyofsomediscussion.Camouflagewasfirstused inwarshipsduringtheGreatWaralthoughin1915itwasappliedinasomewhathaphazardfashionsothatnotwoshipswerealike.Therewerenohardandfastrulesastohowashipshouldbepainted,orindeed,astothetypeofcoloursthatshouldbeused.Someofficialinterestwasshownduring 1916–17 and observation unitswere set up after certain vessels had been givendifferent paint applications. In the beginning only a few colours were used – usuallyvariationsofgreyandblack,butlaterbluesandgreenscouldbeseen.Camouflageinbigshipsvirtuallydisappearedattheendof1917anddidnotappearagainuntilLieutenant-CommanderNormanWilkinson,RNVRdeveloped his dazzle paintingmethods and theAdmiraltysetupaproperCamouflageSchoolatBurlingtonHouseinLondonwheremanytestsusingmodelswerecarriedoutundercontrolledconditions.

Theresultofthis,sofarascapitalshipswereconcerned,wasthatonlyafewshipsweregiven the treatment: Revenge, Ramillies and the aircraft-carrying cruiser Furious allreceived fully fledged schemes. Ramillies was very different from Revenge as wasFurious,ascanbeseenfromthepaintschemes.ThebattlecruiserRepulsewaspaintedupinatwo-tonegreyat theendofthewarasanexperiment,andtheeffectwasnotunlikethatappliedtothatshipin1941onlyinlightershades.

Attheendofthewarcamouflagetookabackseat,butwaspickedupagainduringtheearly 1930s and a thorough investigation was made into the matter of how to applysuitablewarpaint todifferent typesofship.Thesubjectprovedextremelycomplexandexhaustingandalthoughtheschemesappliedwereinmostcasesratherspectacularinthebattleships, the achievement of satisfactory schemes andpatternswasnot accomplishedeasily.At the outbreak of the SecondWorldWar a few big shipswere given ‘one off’examplesofcamouflagewhichtendedtoemulatetheearlierdazzletypesbutwithfewercolours (Ramillies sevencolours,Revenge five–1918) (seeendpapers).Although thereareafewphotographsoftheseshipstakenduring1939–40,littleinformationwascollatedaboutthepatternsorcoloursbecauseinsomecasestheschemeswereonlyevidentforafew months (certainly in the case of Revenge, Ramillies and Royal Sovereign) andthereforewereneverrecordedofficially,whichleavessomedoubtastotheactualcoloursused.

Whenexaminingtheofficialaccountsoftheuseofcamouflageitisessentialtobesureof the real meaning of the word. When discussing camouflage the actual terms ofdescriptionusedare:‘invisible’,‘visible’,‘conspicuous’and‘inconspicuous’.

Invisible in plain terms means something that cannot be seen with the naked eyebecause of its nature and position. Visible objects are capable of being seen – usuallywithout aid; but some complication arises here because one can have good visibility,moderatevisibilityandpoorvisibility.Whendealingwithcamouflagethisdescriptionisbestavoidedinreferringtohowvisibleashipis.Conspicuousmeanseasytosee,obviousor striking to the eye. Inconspicuousmeans not readily seen, not bold or prominent inappearance.

Thesetwolastdescriptionsarebestwhendescribingcamouflagebecauseitiseasiertoexplainhowsomethingbecomeslessconspicuousthantodescribehowthepaintingofashipinstrongdisruptivecoloursmakestheshipseeminvisibleorofdoubtfulvisibility.Ashipcanbeveryinconspicuousifpaintedinonecolour,butonlyincertainconditions–ineitherbrightordullconditionsshewillbemostconspicuous.Ontheotherhandinmanyconditions a colourful pattern tends to scramble the outline, and the characteristics thatidentify a ship are affected to some extent. The tremendous difference in illuminationbetweensunlightandovercastconditionscanaffecttheappearanceofacamouflagedshipinmanyways,ascanamoonlitormoonlessnight.Moreover, lightdiffersgreatly fromoceantoocean;theextremehazetobeencounteredinsometropicalwaterscallsforyetmorealterationtocolourtones.

Although early camouflage (1939–40) underwent many forms in battleships, it wasclearlyunderstoodthatthefunctionofapatterninseacamouflagewastoreducetherangeofvisibilityoftheshipfromaerialobservationandfromsurfaceobservationincludingthesubmarineperiscope.Atcertainlongranges,however,thepatternsceasedtobeapparentand the ship became a uniform tone.TheAdmiralty endeavoured to achieve an overalltone to blend inwith existing conditionswhere possible – hence themany colours forhomewatersandgreysandbluesinmanyforeignwaters.Additionally,itwasdecidedthatanenemyobserverorlookoutwouldhavenodataagainstwhichtocheckamovingtarget,andhisdifficultiescouldbecompoundediftheshipwerebadlyangledfromhispointofview.Soanythingthatmightblurhisimagewouldbemorethanbeneficialinrenderinga

ship lessconspicuous.Oncea shiphadbeenspotted,however,agood,colouredpatterncouldachievetwoimportantresults:

1.Causeconfusionofidentity.2.Causeconfusionofinclination.

Sopatternhadtheseusefulfeatures:1.Reductionofvisibilitycausedbyatleastonetoneharmonizing with its background and reducing the apparent size of the object and thepsychologicaleffectoftheshapesleftpossiblyvisible.2.Theobliterationoftheviolentlyarrestive shapes of the ‘natural’ pattern of the ship resulting from the hard core ofunavoidableshadows.

From June1940 the big ships sportedmanyweird andwonderful patterns in variouscolours,butthemostusedtoneswerelightanddarkgrey(507band507c–seedrawingsandphotographs).

QueenElizabeth

AttheendofherreconstructionsheleftthedockssportinganearlyAdmiraltydisruptivetypeschemeoffivedifferentshades.ThiswaswornuntilherrefitafterbeingdamagedinAlexandriainDecember1942.

Barham

DarkHomeFleetgreyuntilthesummerof1940whenshewaspaintedupinanunofficialtwo-tonescheme(blackandwhite).Repaintedallgreyforashortperiodthenrepaintedinblack and white again under the direction of Peter Scott. Lost in this condition. (Seephotographs.)

Malaya

Dark Home Fleet grey until the summer of 1940, then painted in two-tone unofficialpattern(grey507aand507c).RepaintedmediumgreyafterleavingtheMediterraneaninthespringof1941.

Warspite

DarkHomeFleetgreyuntilthewinterof1941,thenpaintedintwo-tonegrey(asMalaya)butwithdifferentscheme(unofficial).

Valiant

DarkHomeFleetgreyuntilearly1941whenpaintedupintwo-tonegrey(507band507corpossiblyB5).WornuntilChristmas1942.

RoyalSovereign

Entered the war in medium grey tone. Summer 1940 painted in unofficial five-colour‘dazzle’typescheme.Alteredduringthisperiodtoanother‘dazzle’schemebutwithfewercolours.Repaintedintwo-tonegreybyNovember1940.

RoyalOak

Mediumgreyuntilsunk(1939).

Revenge

Dark Home Fleet grey at beginning of war until repainted in unofficial four-colour‘dazzle’typeschemebyOctober1940.Repaintedinearly1941inanother‘dazzle’schemewithfewercolours.

Ramillies

Enteredwarinmediumgreyuntilrepaintedin‘dazzle’inNovember1940(twoshadesofgreyandwhite).Repaintedallgreyinearly1941.

Resolution

DarkHomeFleetgreyfromthebeginningof thewaruntil thewinterof1940whenshewasrepaintedinanearlyexperimentaltwo-tonegreywithfalsebowwave.

Nelson

DarkHomeFleetgreyfromthebeginningofthewaruntilmid-1940whensheappearedinadarkershade.Lightergreyduringthesummerof1941.

Rodney

DarkHomeFleetgreyfromthebeginningofthewaruntillate1940whensheappearedashade lighter (colour unknown – probably grey) – wore an experimental scheme for ashortperiodinthespringof1940(seephotograph)

Renown

Mediumgreyatbeginningofwar.DarkergreyduringForceHperiod.RepaintedinearlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypeinthewinterof1941.

AfullbroadsideviewofRevengein1940,showingaone-offunofficialcamouflage.Itconsistedofaboutfourshades,thelayoutbeingverysimilartothoseusedinFirstWorldWardazzle,butitwasbasicallyanexperimentandnotcarriedforlong.

Asuperbclose-upviewofRevengeshowingclearlyher1940camouflageshades.Noradarisyetfitted.RevengeandResolutionweretheonlyunitsoftheclasswithfunnelcapsatthisdate.

RepulseintheContrastpaintwork,1941.Notethestrangelayout.

ArareviewofRodneyshowingherone-offunofficialcamouflagescheme(brown,greenandgrey)intheSpringof1940.Theschemedoesnotappeartohavebeencarriedforlong.

Repulse

Mediumgreyfrombeginningofthewaruntilearly1941whenshewasrepaintedinblackandwhite‘contrast’scheme.Lostinthiscondition(seedrawings).

Glorious

Fromthebeginningofthewarinmediumgrey.Repaintedinatwo-tonegrey.Lostinthiscondition.

Courageous

DarkHomeFleetgrey.Lostinthiscondition.

Furious

DarkHomeFleetgreythroughouttheearlyyearsofthewar.AdmiraltyDisruptive1942.

KingGeorgeV

Fromthebeginningofthewarintwo-tonegrey(possibly507variation)untilthespringof1941whenshereturnedtooverallmediumgrey.

PrinceofWales

MediumgreyuntilAugust1941whenrepaintedinearlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetype.Sunkinthiscondition.

DukeofYork

Two-tone Admiralty disruptive type (experimental) until the winter of 1941 whenrepainteddarkgrey.

During late 1940 there was some confusion regarding camouflage methods and theAdmiraltyorderedthatallschemesbepaintedoutwithaviewtofurtherinvestigations.InDecember1940,however,thecommandingofficerofRepulse(CaptainW.Tennant)sentareport on the subject of camouflage to theVice-Admiral commanding theBattlecruiserSquadron,pointingoutthesesalientfeatures:

1.HTM288orders thatcapitalshipsarenot tobecamouflaged. Isuggestthat if controlled and carefully worked out by those who have studiedcamouflageandnot left to thewhimof individualcaptainsandexecutiveofficers there are certain occasions when considerable benefit may beobtainedfromit.2.Capitalshipsare toobigtoattemptconcealmentbycamouflageexceptpossiblyundercertainconditionsoflightandwhenagainsttheland;whichconditionsareunlikelytoapplyinaFleetaction.3.On theother hand, it is consideredpossible that bymeansof efficientcamouflage it is possible tomake a ship amuchmore difficult target onwhichtoobtainanaccurateinclination.4. The gunnery officer of this ship reports to me that recently whencarrying out an inclination exercise on the ex-USA destroyers it wasexceedingly difficult to obtain their inclination due to their contrasts inpainting.

5.Isuggestthatinthecaseofbattlecruisersmuchcouldbedonemerelybycontrastoftwoshadesofgrey.6.CommanderE.B.Clark,RN(retired)ofthisship,whohasstudiedthesubject, has independently produced the attached drawings of this shipgivingsomeideaofwhatmightbedonewithtwoshadesofgrey.7. Iwould suggest that if it isdecided togive reconsideration tocontrastpaintingofcapitalships,hisideas,ingreaterdetail,mightbeofservice.

Inanswer to this itwasconcluded thatalthoughavarietyofdesignshadbeen triedandrejected since the beginning of the war, it would be an advantage to camouflage thebattlecruisers, but before proceeding with the proposal it would be necessary for thesubject to be officially studied in detail with due regard to previous evidence. Thefollowingobservationsondazzlepaintingwereoffered:

1.Itcalledattentiontothepresenceofaship.2. It made a ship more visible from the air. This occurred when HMS Naiad(camouflaged) was seen by Skuas whereas HMS Hood and destroyers (notcamouflaged)incompanyatthetimewerenotseen.3.Atshortandmediumrangesitcausedtemporaryconfusionregardingthetypeandclassofshipuntilshewasexaminedthroughglasses.4.Couldonlybesaidtohufftheinclinatorundercertainconditionsoflightandrangefavourabletotheparticularschemeofcamouflageinuse.5.Contravened thewartime policy of darkening all surfaces so as to avoid givingaircraftanaimingmark.6.Considerationgiventovisibilityatnight.

Ithadbeenestablishedoverthepasttwelvemonths(1939–40)thatdazzlepaintingwasofvalueonlyagainsta landbackgroundandthat thepresentsuggestionwasnotfordazzlebut for ‘contrast painting’ which it was hoped would render inclination difficult bycontrastinglargemassesoflightanddark.Theprinciplesputforwardwere:

1.Onlyverylargemassesofcontrastwereofanyvalue.2.‘Cutin’linesdonottellandshouldbeavoided.Theentireconstructionalfeaturesoftheshipneededtobecontrasted.3.Abowandsternpaintedcomparativelylightdid,infact,confusetheinclinatorandthehulllineneededtobebrokenifpossible.

Totestthesetheories,twomodels,ofRepulseandFurious,werepaintedasstipulated.Itwasfounddifficulttoapproximatetoseagoingconditionsbuttheexperimentestablishedthat inclinationwasmoredifficult on them thanon the samemodelspainteddarkgrey,particularly in certain conditions of light. A land background rendered them almostunrecognizable.

Repulsewaspaintedupinaverydarkandaverylightgrey–almostwhite;bothcoloursweresimilarto507band507cbutwereextreme.Aftertests–althoughwhensailingwithdestroyersitwassaidthatRepulsewasdifficulttospotatnightduringcertainconditions–thistypeofcontrastpaintworkhaddisappearedbylate1941(seedrawings).

During 1941 the Admiralty introduced the Disruptive type of camouflage on a

suggestion from the Experimental Camouflage School, but not content with limitedsuccess furtherobservation trialswerecarriedoutatScapaFlowin1941.Theobjectofthetrialswas:

1.ToobserveanyeffectsthatmightbeatvariancewithAdmiraltycamouflagepolicy.2.Toobservewhetherfull-scaletrialsconfirmedmodel-scaletrials.3.Todeterminetheadvisabilityofemployingcamouflagedesignssimilarinprincipleto Western Approaches designs for general-purpose ships, particularly cruisers,capitalshipsandaircraftcarriers.4.Todeterminetheeffectofpatternonconcealment.5.Toobtaintelephotometricreadingsforsummerconditionsintheareaobservedsothat correlations between natural and artificial conditions as produced in theexperimentaltankcouldbecheckedand,ifnecessary,developed.6.Togive designers further experienceof the effects of camouflage as seenunderfull-scaleconditions.

Manydifferent typesof vesselwereusedbut the followingobservationsweremadeonKingGeorgeV,DukeofYorkandAnsonfromtheshore:KingGeorgeVata3-milerangehad a slightly better concealment value than Anson. The Commander-in-Chief, HomeFleet,hadearlierrequestedthatthecolourMS1shouldbesubstitutedby507Awhichgaveadifferenceof9percent reflection factorand it seemed towork. Itneeded tobe seen,however,howfarthestrongercontrastingpatternofAnsonwouldproducethesameeffectat, say, three or four times this range. In sunlight and diffused sunlight both ships, byreason of their broken-up silhouettes and certainly in diffused sunlight because of theirlighter mean tones, were markedly less conspicuous than Duke of York. Only in oneparticular intensity of sunlight was Duke of York observed to be definitely lessconspicuousthantheothertwoships.

CAPITALSHIPS:Camouflage,1941ContrastPainting

RoyalSovereigninMarch1941,justoffBermuda,showingamodifiedcamouflagescheme.Thecoloursaresimplylightanddarkgrey.

Ramillies,November1940,showingherthree-tonegrey,dazzle-type(unofficial)paintwork.

RoyalSovereignatGibraltarNovember1940,showingatwo-tonegreypaintworkscheme.

Malayainanunofficialtwo-tonegreycamouflageschemewhilstoperatingintheMediterraneanduringOctober1940.Ramilliesisthebattleshipbehind.

In general the trials were very satisfactory and produced some data which wasconsidered to be of considerable value. It was felt that the results proved beneficial todesigners who were enabled on several instances to see their designs workingsatisfactorily, and in cases where designs were not so satisfactory the reason whywasusuallyprettyobviousandthelessonslearntwouldbearfruit.Observersfeltencouraged

bythegeneralimprovementincamouflagedesigns.Althoughtherewasstillmuchtobelearnedandfaults tobe remedied thegeneral trendsuggestedadefiniteadvance. Itwasfeltthatthiswasdueinnosmallmeasuretothefactthatdesignershadbeenabletoviewtheirmodelsunderconditions thatgenerally representednaturalconditionsveryclosely.Although it was felt that some slight improvement was probably possible and evendesirableinthetank,thecloseresemblancetonaturalconditionswouldonlyservetogivedesignersconfidenceinthetank’sgeneralperformance.Thehighdegreeofco-operationafforded to the trials by the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, was most satisfactory,indicating as it did, the keen interest the administrative authoritieswere showing in thequestionof seacamouflageand itscomplexproblems.Moreover, itwasconsidered thatcamouflageobservationtrialswerenowestablishedasarecognizedelementoftheweeklyprogramme of fleet exercises and it was felt that there would be little difficulty incooperatingfurthertrials.

Further research work was carried out at the Paint Research Station in Teddingtonduring1942andfinallybroughtaboutastandardizationofAdmiraltycamouflagecolours.Thisworkwas concernedwith a series of nine shades of grey chosen as standards forAdmiraltyuse.Ithadthefollowingmainpurposes:

1.Toestablishasastandardofreferencethecolourandbrightnessvaluesoftheninestandardcolourssupplied.2.Toestablishthetoleranceinbrightnessvalueallowableinthepracticalproductionofthesecolours.3.Toprepareanumberofsetsofstandardcoloursforfutureuse.

The grey shades were divided into a bluish grey series: B15, B30, B45 and B55. Thegreenishgreyserieswere:G5,G10,G20,G30andG55–thenumberofcoloursindicatingtheapproximatebrightnessvalue(thesenumbersreplacedtheoriginaldesignationsMS1,2and3,etc.).Insettingupthisrangeofcolourstandardsspecialattentionwaspaidtothecorrect choiceofbrightness levels.From late1942 thebattleships carried the followingtypesofcamouflage:

QueenElizabeth

Repainted in Admiralty Intermediate disruptive scheme on reentering service afterAlexandriadamage.SlightvariationstothisschemebyMay1943.RepaintedAdmiraltyStandard type during 1944 (blue panel on hull; light grey on upperworks). (Dark greyupperworksby1945).

Malaya

AdmiraltyDisruptivetype(seepainting)untillate1944.Allgreybyspringof1945.

Warspite

Sameschemeasin1941exceptvariationinshades.Scrappedinthisscheme.

Valiant

Unofficial Disruptive scheme painted up in late 1942/early 1943. Repainted AdmiraltyDisruptivetypeinMay1943.RepaintedAdmiraltyStandardtypein1945.Allgreybyendof1945.

RoyalSovereign

Still two-tonegrey.RepaintedAdmiralty Intermediate type inSeptember1943.Left forRussiainthiscondition.Repaintedtwo-tonegrey(darkhull,lightupperworks)1944untilscrapping(1949).

Howeinthebuilder’syardshowingheroriginalcamouflageascompletedinNovember1942.Thecolourswereslightlyalteredatthebowatalaterdate(seeHowepage401).

Revenge

Repaintedearly1942withunofficial two-tonegreywhichshekeptuntil1943whenshewasrepainteddarkgrey

Ramillies

No photographic evidence during 1942, but repainted in Admiralty Intermediate typeduring the summer of 1943.RepaintedAdmiralty Standard type 1944 (dark grey panelamidships).Allgreyagainbymid-1945.

Resolution

EarlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypeduring1942–3.Repaintedallgreyin1944.

Nelson

Two variations of Admiralty Disruptive type from 1942–4 (green type). RepaintedAdmiraltyStandardtype(bluepanel).AllgreyagaininaboutMarch1946.

Rodney

EarlyAdmiraltyDisruptivetypefrom1942untilscrapping.

Renown

Repainted inearlyAdmiraltyDisruptive type in late1941.Variationof scheme in1942until1944.AdmiraltyStandardtype(bluepanel)1945.Allgreyagainshortlyafterwar.

Furious

RepaintedinAdmiraltyDisruptivetypein1942until1943–4thenallgreyagain.

KingGeorgeV

Mediumgreyuntilmid-1942when repaintedAdmiralty Intermediate type.Repainted in1944withAdmiralty Standard type. Repainted in Pacific colours (dark blue hull, lightuppers)1945.

DukeofYork

Mediumtodarkgrey in1942, thenrepaintedwithdarkgreyhulland lightupperworks(1943). Repainted Admiralty Standard type 1944. Repainted Pacific colours (dark bluehull,lightupperworks)1945.

Anson

Entered service with Admiralty Intermediate type 1942. Repainted Admiralty Standardtypelate1944.

Howe

EnteredservicewithAdmiraltyIntermediatetype1942.RepaintedinAdmiraltyStandardtype1944.RepaintedinPacificcoloursduringspringof1945.

By1943inshipsaslargeasbattlecruisersandaircraftcarriersithadbecomeobviousthatonlystronglycontrasteddesignshadbeenreallyeffectivebecausecompleteconcealmentoftheshipswasoutofthequestion.Theexperiments,continuedthroughoutthewarandin1945mostbig shipswere stillwearing camouflageof some sort, but although the finalconclusionwasonthewholeunfavourable tocamouflage, itwasnotedthatsomeof theschemeshadshownsomelimitedsuccess.

RadarRadiodirection-finding(orFinders)wasnotaproductofwar,butratheradevelopmentofW/Ttransmissions,althoughtheSecondWorldWarcertainlypushedtheideaforwardtoaremarkabledegree. Inabout1933 thepolicywas topickupapproachingaircraftbeforetheycouldbeheardorseenandanavalRDFexperimentalworkswassetuplaterinthe1930s. The work was directed towards two main themes: 1. Long-range warning ofaircraft using awavelength of a fewmetres. Thiswas achieved using awavelength ofaboutfourmetresandrangesupto40mileswereobtainedusingmoderatepower.Thenduring1937/8thewavelengthwaschangedtoaboutsevenmetreswhichledtotheType79X.During1939 thewavelengthwasagain reduced to three to fourmetres, leading toType281.Thissetcouldalsodetectsurfacecraftatrangesoftheorderof10to20miles.Atthattimeaircraftcouldbedetectedatabout70to100milesataceilingof10,000to15,000 feet. 2. Detection of surface ships using a 50cm wavelength. At first the onlyvalvesavailablewereoftheACORDtypebutlatervalvedevelopment,notablytheGECseries, led to the introduction of the Type 282 series for gunnery, ship and low-levelaircraftdetection.

After the war started there began a period of valve development which eventuallyenabledhigherpowertobeobtainedonawavelengthof10cm.Henceby1942thereweresetsavailableforlong-rangewarningofaircraftandshorterrangeforsurfaceships(Types279and281);short-rangewarningandgunnery(Type282,etc.); short-rangeonsurface

shipsandafewmilesonaircraft(Type271series).

On the W/T side rapid advances in interception and DF enabled a technique to bedevelopedwherebywavelengthofafewmetrescouldbeinterceptedatverylongrangesand their direction found. The development was not regarded as vital, partly becauseattention was focused on longer HF wavelengths for the Atlantic battle. ResearchindicatedthelinetobepursuedifwavelengthsofafewmetresweretobecomevitalfromtheinterceptionandDFaspects.

Thefirstofmanysetsproducedfrom1938wereexperimental,butby1942theRoyalNavy’sshipshadpossibly thebestRDFequipment in theworld.Each typehad itsownfunctionandhadbeendesignedaccordingly.Battleshipsandaircraftcarriershadavarietyof aerials and strange-shaped objects to house the equipment within. Space precludesmentionofthehugenumberofradartypesandtheirfunctionthatwasdeveloped,butthemostimportantones(certainlyforbattleships)aregivenbelow.

The firstnaval setsweredeveloped forairwarning.Thenumbers in setswerenot insequence (e.g., 281, 285) but in most cases sets developed for the same purpose hadsimilarnumbers.Numbersstartedatrelativelyhighfigures,probablybecauseofthemanyearly sets being numbered in sequence with normalW/T sets. At first the early heavyaerials could only be fitted at the masthead (to obtain adequate height), and bothmastheadshadtobeused–oneforsendingandoneforreceiving.

InNovember1940orderswereissuedforoperationalfittingofanimprovedtypeofAWradar.Most of the earlier researchhadbeendirected towards continual improvement ofmeansofdetectinghostileaircraft(particularlyatlowlevel).Thenewairwarningsetwasdesignated Type 281. It was an SWG (ship warning and gunnery) set and could giverangesofsurfacetargetsaccurateenoughforgunnery.Wavelengthwasthreemetresandfrequency85to94MHz.Anintermediateset–Type280–didnotcomeintogeneraluse.Thisoutfithadawavelengthof3.66metresandafrequencyof82MHz.Theobjectwascontinuallytoshortenthewavelengthwithincreasingfrequency.Rangeswereasfollows:Type 280 – sixmiles against battleship target, fivemiles against a cruiser target, threemiles against a destroyer target, five miles against aircraft at 100 feet, sixteen milesagainstaircraftat1,000feet,65milesagainstaircraftat16,000feet.Type281–twelvemilesagainstabattleship target,eightmilesagainstacruiser target, fivemilesagainstadestroyer target, two miles against a surfaced submarine, seven to nine miles againstaircraftat100feet,38–50milesagainstaircraftat3,000feet,88–115milesagainstaircraftat 16,000ft. Accuracy: Type 280 – plus 50 yards between ranges 2,000–14,000 yards;Type281–plus100yardsbetweenranges14,000–28,000yards.Thesehigh-poweredsetshad remotely controlled rotating aerials at the masthead to enable all-round sweeping.Singled rod reflectors were used. The aerials required tall, well-supported masts, andfittingtookatleastfiveweeks;ifmastsrequiredstrengtheningoralteration,however,thisperiodcouldbetenweeks.In1940–1bothmastswereused(onefortransmittingandoneforreceiving),buttheaerialswerecombinedononemastbytheendof1942.

VARIOUSTYPESOFEARLYRADARAERIAL

These sets were first installed in cruisers; indeed the Royal Navy’s policy regardingradarconcentratedprimarilyonequippingcruisersastheycameinforrefitbecauseinallessentials theywere the‘eyesof thefleet’.Types79X,79Y,279and281wereallearlytypes and all required very tall masts which in most cases involved considerable topweight. The first set for big guns was Type 284 and it was only used for the mainarmament incapitalships.Theaerialwasmountedonthedirector(alsodoubledupandsurfacewarningequipment).Methodofoperationwas:Permanentwatchwasmaintainedon long-range warning sets (79X, 79Y, 281 and 286). On detecting a target Type 285wouldbetrainedintherequireddirectioninanendeavourtopickitup.IfsurfaceactionwereexpectedType284wouldalsobeemployed. IfaircraftattackdevelopedType285wouldengageatlongrangeand282atshortrange.

AsummaryofearlyRDFprocedurewas:

1.MastheadsearchsetspickeduptargetatlongrangeandallAAgunsweredirectedtobearingoftarget.

2.Type275or285pickedup targetand transmitted toRadarOffice.Guns (5.25inand4.5in)followeddirectorandfiredwhenwithinrange.3.Foraircraftmakingdirectdiveortorpedoattack,Types282,283and262pickedup target for 40mm or 2-pdrs, while larger HA directors (Types 285 and 275)indicatedtargetbearinginitiallytoLA.Oncelatterhadpickeduptargettheyworkedquiteindependently.

RadarsetsinstalledinQueenElizabethclass(othervesselssimilarlyfitted):

NovemberType792–1Valiant;1940Type28Malaya,Warspite,Barham;1941Types297(JanuaryQE),285(foursets),RBunitL10,Type282productiondelay,foursetsfittedbyJune, Type 284Valiant at Alexandria,Warspite towards end of year; 1943 Type 285PMalaya;1945fromJanuaryType274onforeDCTQE,Valiant,Warspite,Types277,293addedlater.

Interestingexperimentswerecarriedoutatthebeginningofthewar,usingoneaerialwithanother.TestsweremadeinNelsonduringJune1940todeterminetherangethatcouldbeobtained on surface targets using the standard Type 282 transmitter and receiver withaerials situated on the main armament director control tower. The aerials were largeparaboliccylinderswithanapertureof11feet4inches×4feet1½incheseachhavingapower gain of about one hundred times, i.e., about ten times the gain of the Type 282aerials.Beingfixedtothedirectortowerandrotatingwithit,theaerialswerekeptonthetargetopticallyorby instructions from theAdmiral’sbridgebymeansof flexiblevoicepipes.Onsearchingforaconvoyatseaoneshipwaspickedupat36,000yardsandthreeothershipswerefirstdetectedat33,000yards.

Rodneybuildingupspeedafterleavingportduring1938.Notethatthe79YRDFaerialisinplaceatthisdate.

Although thesewere experimental tests they served to show that if one aerial brokedowntheothercouldbeusedinitsplace.HoodwasfittedwithTypes282,284and285inScapaFlow,butinsuchhastethatmanyoftheinstallationswereincorrectlywired.TestswerecarriedoutrangingonKingGeorgeVwiththefollowingresults:

OutwardRun.11,000yards…saturationoftarget;14,000yards…10timesthesignal;16,000yards…6 to8 times the signal;27,000yards…VA times thesignal;27,300yards…thesignalwaslost.Theechowasveryspasmodicfrom25,000yards,buttheplotoftheruntakenfromRDFrangesandbearingswasaverygoodone.Inwardrun.KingGeorgeVcameinonanunknownbearingandwaspickedupat24,700yards;itwasthoughtthatitwouldhavebeenpossibletopickupthetargetearlierbutforthefactthatshecameinonthesamebearingas land echoes. The destroyers escorting King George V were picked up at16,300yards.

TypicalfaultsfoundwithType284were:

1.Thetransmitterandthereceiverneededtobeproperlytuned.2.Thebrilliancycontrolontherangingunitfrequentlyburntout.3.Badjointscausedoperationtobespasmodic.4.Switchpanelswereoftenfaulty.5.Voltagecontrolboardsoftenmalfunctioned.6. Aerials were often connected the wrong way round, i.e., the transmitter wasconnectedtothelowerarrayandthereceiverconnectedtotheupperarray.

Revenge was fitted with Type 279 and tests carried out on 28 April 1941 gave thefollowing results: Aerial height – 160 feet above waterline (both aerials); distance ofseparation between aerials – 116 feet; working frequency 42KHz. Type of craft: smallfishingvessel–4,700yards;averagesizemerchantship–8,000–10,000yards;convoyof41ships–13,900yards.Acertaindegreeofsuccesswasachievedwhenusingthesetfornavigationalpurposes.

Aswarprogressed theRDFsystemsbecamemoreandmorecomplexandby1944–5capitalships’mastswereliterallycoveredwithmanydifferentsets,somesingle-purpose,somemultipurposeand IFFandTBSaerialswerealso integratedwith theSWandAWsets.Injustfourshortyearsradarhadbecomeoneofthemostimportantfeaturesofaship.

——

Throughoutthelivesofthebattleships,theircrewsalmostalwayshadaffectionatenamesfortheirownvessels.Someofthemwereobvious,othersnotso,ascanbeseen.Notallships’nicknameswererecorded,butperhapsthiscouldberectifiedatalaterdate?

Thunderer(OrionClass) ‘ThunderGuts’Tiger ‘Tigs’IronDuke ‘TheDook’or‘IronDuck’KingGeorgeV(1913) ‘HMSNever-budge’Ajax ‘TheQueenofHearts’Centurion ‘Century’or‘Cento’RoyalSovereign ‘RoyalQuid’or‘TiddlyQuid’Resolution ‘RollingRessie’or‘Reso’RoyalOak ‘OldOak’

Ramillies ‘MuttonChop’QueenElizabeth ‘Bessie’,‘Lizzie’or‘Nessie’Warspite ‘Warspider’or‘OldLady’Repulse ‘Beecham’Hood ‘TheMighty’ood’orthe‘’oodhavethoughtit’Nelson ‘Nellie’or‘Nelsing’Rodney ‘Rodo’DukeofYork ‘DuckofYork’Howe ‘Anyhow’Anson ‘Andsome’Furious ‘Curious’Glorious ‘Laborious’Courageous ‘Outrageous’

EarlyClassesthatSurvivedtheGreatWar

AftercompliancewiththeWashingtonTreatyin1921,theRoyalNavywasleftwiththesmallestbattlefleetithadhadforhundredsofyears.Britishbattleshipsleftinserviceby1922were:

Orionclass: oneship(fourbuilt)Thunderer.

KingGeorgeVclass: (fourbuilt)threeshipsKingGeorgeV,Ajax,Centurion(Audacioussunk1914)

IronDukeclass: (fourbuilt)IronDuke,Benbow,Marlborough,EmperorofIndia.

QueenElizabethclass: (fivebuilt)QueenElizabeth,Barham,Warspite,Malaya,Valiant.

RoyalSovereignclass: (fivebuilt)RoyalSovereign,RoyalOak,Revenge,Ramillies,Resolution.

Battlecruisers suffered severely,with the typebecomingalmost extinct.There remainedTiger,Renown,Repulse,Glorious,CourageousandHood.WithGloriousandCourageouslooking towards full conversion to aircraft carriers, just four of the type remained inservice.

The oldest unit to survive (with the exception ofColossus as non-seagoing TrainingShip)wasThundererfromthe1909estimates.TheoutstandingfeatureoftheOrionclasswas that they were the first to carry 13.5in guns and on completion were the mostpowerfullyarmedbattleships in theRoyalNavy.Theweakest featureof theOrionsandmany of those that went before her was the location of the foremast in front of theaftermostfunnel.ThewholeclassservedwiththeGrandFleetfrom1914to1919.

Conqueror,MonarchandOrionwereplacedonthedisposallistin1922underthetermsoftheWashingtonTreaty,ConquerorandOrionbeingsoldin1922.Monarchwassunkasatargetin1925(seenotes).ThunderercontinuedtoserveasaseagoingTrainingShipforcadetsfrom1921until1926whenshewassold.

ThefourKingGeorgesfollowedtheOrionsandonlyjustsurvivedthe1921scrappingcampaign.Theyweremodifiedandslightlylargerversionsof theOriongroup,butwiththe faults of the foremast/funnel being rectified. All served with the Grand Fleet from1914to1919.Audaciouswassunkbyamineon14October1914.Survivingshipswereplaced on the disposal list or rendered non-effective in 1926 under terms of theWashingtonTreaty.AjaxandKingGeorgeVweresoldin1926.CenturionwasconvertedforserviceasFleetTargetShipin1926–7(seenotes).Re-ratedasEscortShipin1940,shesaw miscellaneous service in the Mediterranean and on the East Indies and Red Seastationsfrom1940to1944.ShewassunkasabreakwaterfortheNormandyInvasionin1944.

Theforward13.5ingunsandsuperstructureofThundererwhilstservingasaGunneryTrainingShipforCadets,1921–26.

ThundereranchoredinMaltac.1922.Shehadbeenextensivelyrefittedduring1921especiallyforserviceasaTrainingShip,whichincludedtheinstallationofnewbathroomsandmodernlaundryequipment.

TIGER1926SeenheretowardstheendofhercareerOftensaidtohavebeenthemostgraceful-lookingwarship–irrespectiveofthelaterHood-shewasthefinaldevelopmentoftheLionclassandassuchwasadistinctimprovementoverthoseships,butshewasabattlecrcuiserandinheritedthedefectsofthattype.Note:massivecompassplatformhousing,largecontroltop,threeequalfunnels,stumppolemainmastandratheroddsearchlightarrangements.

KINGGEORGEVArmouredlayout,1919

TheonlysurvivingmemberoftheOrionclassaftertheGreatWanThunderer,seenherein1923inVik,Norway,wasusedasaBoysTrainingShipformanyyearsupto1926.

TIGERArmouredlayout,1919

Tigeropentothepublicorperhapsafamilydayforthecrew.Notetheguntompions.

OntheforecastleofTigerwhilstanchoredinWeymouthBayc.1926.

TigerinWeymouthBaycirca1924.ShewasafrequentvisitortoPortlandandbecameafavouritesightthereduringthe1920s.Herpassingcausedanoutburstofregretinthepress,butitwastoolatetosaveherfromtheWashingtonTreatycuts.

The battlecruiser Tiger was the last ship for which Sir Philip Watts, as DNC, wasresponsible.TheoriginaldesignwasbasicallyamodifiedQueenMarywithslightlybetterfeaturesallround.WhileadistinctimprovementoverQueenMaryandtheLions,overallprotectionwas still inadequate to withstand heavy calibre shellfire and on the basis ofJutlandexperienceTigerwasnotgenerallyregardedashavingbeenequaltotheGermanDerfflinger inall-roundfightingefficiencydespiteaheavierarmament.SheservedwiththeBattleCruiserForcefrom1914to1918andwaspaidoffintoReservestatusinAugust1921.SheservedasGunneryTrainingShipatPortsmouthfromFebruary1924untilJune1929.After a yearwith theAtlantic Fleet shewas again paid off intoReserve in 1931under a clause of the naval treaties (see notes on treaties) and was finally scrapped atRosythandInverkeithingfromFebruary1932.HerdeparturefromservicewasseenasthepassingofthemostgracefulandhandsomeshipintheRoyalNavy,regardlessofwhatwassaidofHood.

With the scrapping of Tiger, Emperor of India, Benbow andMarlborough (see IronDukeclassfornotesofthesethree),theRoyalNavy’scapitalshipswereatanall-timelowofjustfifteenvessels.

CenturionasRadioControlledTargetShip

By1927theonlyunitof theKGVclassleftwasCenturionwhichhadbeenselectedforRadioControlledTargetShip to replace theageingAgamemnon.Paidoff intodockyardhandsforconversionon14April1926shereappearedstrippedofallsmallfittingsinJuly1927(seetable).Asshewasonlytobeusedforfleetfiringagainstshellsupto8incalibreher general appearancewas not drastically altered, but later (1933) her rigwas furtherreducedtoprepareherforhigh-levelbombingbytheRoyalAirForceandFleetAirArmin a ‘Navy versus Aircraft’ competition which would furnish information for the‘VulnerabilityofCapitalShips’debate.Manytestswerecarriedoutontheoldshipwhichwas controlled by radio from the destroyer Shikari which from a safe distance took aseriesofphotographsofthefallofshotandofbombsfromaircraft.

Continuing in this role forabout fouryears,sheservedherpurposewellbutby1937was looking like a patchwork quilt after the many hits on her hull and upperworks.Althoughthetestsdidnotgiveconclusiveevidenceofthedemiseofthebattleship,itdidhighlightthefactthatshipswerebecomingincreasinglyvulnerabletoaerialattack.

Amovingscenewitnessedonlybythecomplementsofthetwoshipsinthephotograph.CrewsofTigerandRepulsecomealofttocheereachotherasTigerfinishesherlastcommissionbeforebeingde-commissionedandfacingthescrapper’storch.ThelastcruiseofthebeautifulTigeriswellrememberedbyallwhosailedinhertothisday.April1931.

OneofCenturionslastappearancesinheroriginalconditionbeforebeingalteredasTargetShip.ShownhereatFleetReview,Spithead,26July1924.

AjaxsailsinMalta1921.

KINGGEORGEVCLASSCENTURION1914

Centurionindrydock,1920.ShewastemporarilyplacedinReserveatMaltainMarch1920butre-commissionedforfurtherservicewiththeMediterraneanFleetinAugustofthatyear

Testingthewaterlinearmouredbeltandbeingsaturatedbymedium-calibreshellfirewhilebeingmanoeuvredbythedestroyerShikari.

Close-upofCenturionaftertheGreatWar,c.1921,showingtheculminationofwartimeadditions.Notethetripodlegsontheforemast–lowdownconnectionwithsinglepoleonceabovethecharthouse.

CenturionnowpartiallystrippedforuseasTargetShip:nosearchlighttowersonsecondtunnel,all13.5ingunsandturretsout,nostumpderrickandnoupperworksormasts.22September1930.

InSeptember1937a seriesofbombing testswerewitnessedby thecruiserCuracoa.Theoutstandingimpressionofthefivedays’bombingwasthedependenceofallbombingoperations upon favourable weather. The weather at the time was described byholidaymakersasideal,yetaperfectdayforbombingwasnevertobehadandonthemostsuccessfuldaylittlemorethanhalftheprogrammewascarriedout.Itwasfoundthathigh-level bombers required a clear sky and good visibility up to the height selected. Areasonablehorizonwasalsoarequirement.Aircrafthadtoassessthewindfromtheheightat which they were flying, dodging clouds when necessary, and any error in windestimation,aswasonlytoofrequentandprobableonagustyday,hadaconsiderableeffecton accuracy, given that the duration of the bombs’ fall was in the order of 25 to 30seconds. In fact, it was seen that precision bombing in gusty weather was almostimpossible.Toofineweatherontheotherhand,withextremevisibility,laidtheattackersopentoaccurateanti-aircraftfirethroughouttheapproach.

In this connection, the first day’s bombingwasmost interesting. It took place underideal conditions. (Therewas no question of tactics during the trials.)The hazyweatherintroduced a not inconsiderable navigation problem and two aircraft failed to find thetargetatall!Theaircraft thatdidfindCenturionwereable tobombfrom10,000feet insafety because they were almost invisible from the ship. Of the 21 bombs dropped,however, only one hit the target. On the last afternoon, however, when bombing from10,000feetseveralcrewsestimatedthewindfromthatheightbymeansofaseamarkerandthenfoundthemselvesforceddowntoabout8,000feetinordertomaketheirattack.Theerrorinwindsettingcausedbythiswassufficienttoannulanychanceofsuccessfulbombing.Itwasalsofoundthatdive-bombingwaslessdependentonvisibilityconditions,

but it was noteworthy that good resultswere not achieved in strongwinds. Testswerecarriedoutat2,000feetandasexpectedtheresultsimprovedgreatly.

Theconclusionsdrawnwerethatalthoughthedive-bombersachievedthebestresults,andhigh-levelbombingwaslimitedinitsuseatsea,attackingaircraftwouldpayaheavypricewhenapproachingafullymannedandfightingbattleship–butitwasconsideredtobeapriceworthpayingiftheshipcouldbesloweddownorcrippled.

Anotherholetorepairafterbeinghitintheafterfunnel.Ashellhaspassedstraightthroughthefunnelwithoutexploding,leavingalargegapinghole.Centurion,1930.

AnexcellentportbowviewofIronDukeasshesailedtowardsMalta,c.1921.Notetherangeclockonthecontroltop.

IronDukeClassDesignThe original design was for a modified King George V 21-knot battleship with fourbroadsidetorpedotubesandnosterntube.

FivelayoutsweresubmittedtotheAdmiraltybytheDNCPhillipWatts,allfeaturingamain armoured belt of 12in thickness and running for 360 feet of the hull. AlthoughfollowingthelinesofKingGeorgeVingeneral–includingmainarmament,adistinctiveretrogradestepwasseeninthesketchproposalwhichfeaturedareverseinthemast/funnelarrangement as in the earlier Orion class of 1909 (see sketch). During preparation,however, thedisadvantageswere forciblypointedoutand the ideawasnotpursuedanyfurther.Of the five layouts (see table)M1Vwasapprovedand fundswereallocated forfour of the typewithout question, awarwithGermany seemingvery likely and soonerratherthanlater.

Enlargeddimensionsover theKingGeorgeVs and IronDuke (sonamed later duringconstruction) represented the ultimate development of the basicOrion type fromwhichthe design was evolved through the intervening KGVs. They were the first Britishdreadnoughttypewitha6insecondarybatteryandthefirsttobegivenanytypeofanti-aircraftguns.

As completed they were nominally 2,000 tons heavier than King George V withincreases of 25–26 feet overall in length, 1 foot in beam and 6 inches on the designeddraught. The marked rise in displacement was necessitated by the heavier and betterprotectedsecondaryarmament,augmentedtorpedoarmamentandslightly increasedfuelcapacity. There was a design called ‘MV’ which was the same as ‘MIV’ but with anarmouredbeltreducedto8inand7in,butitdoesnotappeartohavebeengivenanyfurtherconsideration.

Theadditionallengthinthisclasswasallocatedovertheforecastleandquarterdeck,intheformercasetoprovidesomebuoyancyagainsttheweightofthe6inbatteryandsetitbackfromthebows,andinthelattertoaccommodatethetwomaindeck6ingunsaft.ThefreeboardwasconsiderablylowerthaninmanyofthepreviousBritishdreadnoughtsand,infact,wasnotequalleduntilthearrivaloftheRoyalSovereignclassin1913.Themainarmament layoutwaspractically identicalwith thatofKingGeorgeV butwith directorcontrolinalloftheclassascompleted.

The 6in gun had last appeared in the King Edward VII class (1906–7), but as anauxiliarytothemainarmamentratherthanforanti-torpedopurposesforwhich12pdrsand3pdrswere provided and, in conformitywith the ideas of the First Sea Lord (AdmiralFisher), none of the intervening classes had carried anything heavier than a 4in anti-torpedo armament despite repeated criticismof its ineffectiveness against contemporarydestroyers.

As shown in the tables one of the original designs had featured a 4in secondaryarmament,butareportpreparedbyAdmiralMarkKerrin1909suggestingthechangeandnotingthemajorityofserviceopinionfavouredthe6ingunforanytorpedoworkaswell

asgeneraluseagainstheavyshipsduringclose-rangeaction,madethe6inbatteryalmosttheprincipalfeatureofthedesign.

PROPOSEDM4DESIGN:IRONDUKE

They were the first British dreadnoughts to be given a ratio of protection todisplacement equal to theGermanKaiser classwhich, in fact, hadbeendesigned somethreeyearsearlier.Theywereexcellentshipsascompleted,andalmostunequalleduntilthearrivalofthe15ingunnedQueenElizabethclassin1915.

BowviewofIronDuke,1929.

RigFulltripodforemastclosebeforeforefunnel.

Talltopmaststeppedabaftcontroltop.

Short topgallantmast stepped before, except inEmperorof India which completedwithshortflagpoleonly.

Heavyforwardstrutatstarfishbelowcontroltop.

Nomainmastascompleted.

W/Taerialscarrieddirecttothesternoraftersuperstructure.

Tallderrickstumpformainderrickfittedclosebehindsecondfunnel.Veryshortstumpsabeamthis(P&S).

Long derrick slung from each forward corner of after superstructure. These could betoppedupverticallyorcrossedagainstforwardfaceofsuperstructure.

TherigwasverysimilartothatofKingGeorgeVexcept that thisclasswerecompletedwithfulltripodforemast.TheywerethelastbattleshipsbuiltfortheRoyalNavywiththe distinctive single masted rig which had been a feature of the three precedingclasses.

OnthequarterdeckofEmperorofindioshowing‘Y’turrettrainedtostarboard.Notethedarkergreycolouroftheship.

EmperorofindiaongunneryexercisesintheMediterranean,1921/22.

On-deckviewofironDuke–theboatdecklookingaft,1926.

TrainingandboatdrillonboardMarlboroughwhilstbeingusedasSpecialBoysTrainingShipin1927/27.

IRONDUKEArmouredlayout,1920

Verysimplebridgeworkascompletedwhichremainedmoreorlessunchangedthroughout

theGreatWar(seeauthorsBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).

AppearanceConsiderednot suchgood-lookingshipsasKingGeorgeVmainlybecauseof the smallroundfunnels.SternwalkfittedinallexceptEmperorofIndia.

DistinguishablefromKingGeorgeVby:

1.Forecastlebatteryand6ingunoneachsideofmaindeckaft.2.Smallroundequal-sizedfunnels.3.Full-lengthtripodlegs(KGVsimilarfrom1917).

Individualdifferences(ascompleted):

IronDuke:Smallrangefinderoverbridge.

Marlborough:Norangefinderoverbridge(1914only).

Benbow:Shallowtriangularstruttoderrickstump.

EmperorofIndia:Nosternwalk;nostruttomainderrickstump(added1915–16).

After the Naval Treaty of 1930 it was concluded that the Iron Duke class would bescrappedwiththeexceptionofIronDukeherselfwhichwouldbedemilitarizedandputtouseasaGunneryTrainingShip.TherelevantclauseinthetreatystatedthatIronDukewastobe refittedas soonaspossible, in fact theworkwas tobecommencedwithin twelvemonthsof ratificationof the treaty andhad tobe completedwithin eighteenmonths.Agreatdealofthoughtwasgiventoherdemilitarizationandthequestionaroseastowhatsmallergunscouldreplacethe13.5inwhichweretoberemoved.

Twin8inwereverymuchfavouredatthetime,butthesewouldinvolveagreatdealofrearrangement of the barbettes and supports, so 6in and 4.7in were fitted, but someexperimental fittings were tested throughout the thirties with an eye to refitting otherbattleshipswithasuitablesecondaryarmamentwhentheirtimecameforreconstruction.Atotalof4,258tonswasremoved

IRONDUKECLASS:GENERALPARTICULARS,1919Displacement(tons):26,300(load),31,620(deep)(averageforclass).

Length:580ft4in(pp),623ft9in(oa)(averageforclass).

Beam:90ft1in.

Draught:28ft10in(load),32ft6in(deep).

Armament

10× 13.5in 45calMkV, 12× 6inMkVII, 4 × 3pdr 5 ×MG, 2 × 3inAA, 4 × 21 in(submerged).

Armour

Mainbelt: l2–9–8in,bulkheads:6–4in,upper sidebulkheads:8in,barbettes:10–9–8–4–3in,turrets:11–5½–4in,CT:11–6–3in,decks:forecastle1in;upper2–1¼in,main1½in,

middle2½in-1in,lower2½,magazinescreens1½in.

Searchlights:8×36in,2×24insignalling.Improvedcontrolarrangementfitted.

Aircraft

Runways on 13.5in turret tops (‘B’ and ‘Q’). Emperor of India fitted for towing kite(balloons). During post-war period aircraft not normally carried, but embarked whenrequiredforexercises.

Machinery

Parsonsdirect-driveturbinesdriving4propellers.

Boilers:18Yarrow(Babcock&WilcoxinIDandBenbow).

SHP:29,000for21knots.

Radiusofaction:8,100nmat12knots.

Fuel (tons): 900 coal normal load, 1,050 oil, 3,250 coalmax.Max. speed slightly lessthan20knotsduetoextraweightsadded.

Rig:Short topmast andno topgallant.Very long forward strut at starfish inEmperor ofIndio and IronDuke. TwinW/T spreaders on after superstructure (short inEmperor ofIndia,tallinotherthree).

Appearance

Considerably altered and generally heavier-looking than in 1914 owing to wartimemodifications. SL towers added, enlarged control top, aircraft platforms, reduced rig,turretscalespaintedupatendofwar(paintedoutbyearly1919),rangeclocksonfaceofcontroltopsandatrearofaftersuperstructureinIronDukeonly.Clinkerscreen to forefunnelinEmperorofIndiobutremovedbyearly1919.

Individualdifferences

Benbow: Small hood over director tower (only ship thus, removed 1921), shallowtriangularstruttoderrickstump(deepinothers).

Marlborough:Longmiddlebridgewings(from1916).

EmperorofIndia:Clinkerscreentoforefunnel.Nosternwalk.ShortW/Tspreadersonaftersuperstructure(tallinothers).

IronDuke:6indirectortowersonlowerbridge(upperinothers).fromIronDukeand202tonsofnewequipmentwereadded.

Benbowwasplacedonthedisposallistin1930;EmperorofIndiaandMarlboroughin1931 and 1932 respectively. From 1932 only Iron Duke was left in service. She wasdemilitarizedfromNovember1931untilSeptember1932.

‘B’and‘Y’turretsremoved(barbettesretained).6insecondaryarmamentretained.Two4.7inAAaddedonquarterdeck,bothoncentrelineonandabaft‘Y’barbette.4inAAonafter superstructure was removed. Small AA gun mounted on crown of ‘B’ barbette.RangefinderonaftersuperstructurewasreplacedbyHAdirector.TTremoved.Beltand

side armour between ‘B’ and ‘Y’ barbetteswas removed.Conning towerwas removed.Batteryarmour,deckand internalprotectionwasretained.Theforwardgroupofboilersweremutilatedandtheremainingboilersconvertedtoburnoilonly.Speedwasreducedtoabout18knots.

1933–5:4inAAreplacedonaftersuperstructure;4.7inAAonquarterdeckwasremoved(autumn1935).

1939: Twin 5.25in dual-purpose turret mounted abaft ‘Y’ barbette for experimentalpurposes.

1939–45:Moreorlessunchangedexceptthatsomeofthe6ingunswereremovedandmanyAAgunswereaddedwhileservingasDepotandBaseAAShipatScapa.

AlthoughtheNavalTreatyof1930dealtthedeathblowtotheotherthreeshipsoftheclass, it was advantageous to the Royal Navy in that these ships could be usedexperimentally todetermine thedegree towhichamodernbattleshipwould standup tobattle damage and retain her structural integrity. To this end, it was agreed to placeEmperorofIndiaandMarlboroughinthehandsofHMSExcellent,theGunneryTrainingSchool.Thefollowingtestsweremadeinthetwoshipsduringthenexteighteenmonths(from1931):

MARLBOROUGHAscompleted1914

1.Effectofgunfirefromdestroyersonbridgeworkduringnightfighting.2.Flashtightarrangements.3.Attackby13.5inshells.4.Aerialattack.5.Bridgeandcontrolpersonnelprotection,etc.6.Anti-torpedotests.7.Pressuretestsonhullandinternalbulkheads.

In1931EmperorofIndiaunderwentfiringtestsatseawhenshewashittwelvetimesandseverelydamaged.Afterpracticallysinkingandbeingraised,shemanagedtoreturnandwasscrappedshortlyafterwards.

Marlborough underwent a very different set of trials, mostly internal, and thoroughblastventilationandbulkheadstrengthcomparisonswerecarriedoutinher.Asmallcrewwasleftonboardtophotographandmakenotesoftheprocedures.Trial1wascarriedout

on21July,Trial2on24July1931,thepurposebeingtodeterminehowtheexplosionofan entiremagazine – and possible loss of the ship – could be prevented should one ormorecartridgesignitenomatterwhatthecause.

EmperorofIndiaopensfirewithhermainarmamentduringoperationsintheBlackSeaagainstBolshevistforces,1919/20.

Sub-zerotemperaturesonboardMarlboroughinJanuary1920whilstanchorednearSevastopolevacuatingRussianrefugees.

IRONDUKECLASSMarlboroughmagazinetests,21–24July1931

IronDukeinWeymouthBay1927/8.

Close-upofMarlboroughin1929,showingherfinalbridgeandfunnelappearance.Ayearlatershewaslaidupwithaviewtobeingscrapped.

EMPEROROFINDIA1925

DEMILITARISEDIRONDUKE,1937

SomeinternalalterationswereeffectedinMarlborough in thatTrial1representedthesmallest 16in magazine inNelson. Trial 2 represented the 8in magazine in the cruiserNorfolk. In both trials, one 16in charge of 498lb of size 45MCcordite plus three 16incartridgesinopencases(total249lb)wasplacedupagainstabulkheadofchosenvalue.

Bothtrialswereextremelysuccessfulinthattheexplosionventeditselfoutoftheshipby the designed route and caused no fatal damage by re-routing and setting off othermagazineshadtheybeeninlocation.Thetestswererecordedonfilm,butthefilmhasyettobefound!Theexplosionswereheard(fromthequarterdeckobservers)asafaintrumblefollowedonesecondlaterby jetsofsmokefrom‘B’13.5ingunmuzzles.Ahalf-secondlater high-pressure smoke issued from ‘B’ gunhouse including the turret aprons. Afteraboutnineteensecondsthesmokehadceased.Noflamewasobserved,butexaminationofthebulkheads later indicated that therehadbeen flameandgreatheat in theareawhichwassprayedwithwaterforeightminutes.Onenteringtheareaabout1½hourslateritwasevident that there had been much damage, particularly to the bulkheads, but the mainexplosionhadventeditselffromthehandingroomthroughtheventplatesprovided(seedrawingsforlocation).

In March 1939, with the increasing likelihood of war, the question was raised ofrestoringIronDuketoherformergloryandstrength,proponentsoftheideapointingoutthat the Japanese hadworkedwonders inmodernizing to a remarkable degree their oldbattlecruiserHiei.

AuniqueviewofEmperorofIndialayingjustoffPortsmouthafterbeingseverelydamagedandbottomedbyshellingtests,1931.Notethatallsmallfittingshavebeenremoved.Soonafterthephotographwastakenshewastowedawaytobescrapped.

IronDuke’sarmourwasthefirstconsiderationanditwasproposedthatan11inmainbeltberunbetweenherupperandmaindecks(KCarmour,1,750tonsornon-cemented,1,200 tons);hull tobulgedsimilarly to theRoyalSovereign class, and4inarmour tobelaidoverthemaindeck.The13.5inturretswouldbereplacedandthesecondaryarmamentcompletelyrenewedwithfourtoeight4.5inor5.25inguns.

The main argument against the project was the question of speed; the entireboiler/engine/machinery arrangementswouldhave to be renewed to achieve thedesiredincrease,andwithoutsideestimatesrangingfrom£920,000to£1,200,000,whichcouldbebetterspentonanewship,itisnotsurprisingthattheideawasdropped.

History:IronDukeAftertheGreatWartheIronDukeclassformedthe4thBattleSquadronandassuchwereveryeffective.(Fortheirservicehistory1914–19seeauthor’sBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne.)

21November 1918 Present in the southern line at surrender of theGermanHigh SeasFleetofftheFirthofForth.

21 March 1919 Commissioned for service as flagship of newly reconstitutedMediterraneanFleet(4thBS)onabolitionofGrandFleet.

April1919RelievedSuperbasflagship,Mediterranean.

April–June1919OperationsagainstBolsheviksinBlackSea.

11August1919LeftAlexandriaforMalta.

April1920SmallrefitatMalta,flagtemporarilyflowninAjax.

June–July 1920 Operations against Turkish Nationalists in Sea of Marmora and atConstantinople.

July1920ShelledTurkishNationalistforcesatBeicos.

9 March 1921 Recommissioned at Portsmouth for further service as flagship, C-in-CMediterraneanFleet(4thBS).

5April 1922ReachedBosphorus fromMaltawithAdmiral Sir John deRobeck on hisfarewellvisit.

14 April 1922 Left Constantinople for Malta visiting Chanak, Mitylene, Smyrna,Limassol,Haifa,PortSaidandAlexandria.

28April1922ArrivedMalta.

12May1922LeftMaltaforMarseilles.

15May1922ArrivedMarseilleswhereflagofAdmiralSirJohndeRobeckwasreplacedbythatofAdmiralSirOsmondBrock.

May1922ReturnedtoMaltaandlefttovisitAlexandriaandPortSaid.

23May1922ReachedJaffawherethefollowingdayoneofhersignalmenwasdrownedwhilebathingfromthebeach.

July1922VisitedHaifa,CyprusandSmyrna.

12July1922ReachedConstantinople.

31July1922WiththeFleetleftConstantinopleafterGreekthreattocityduringGraeco-TurkishWar.

20August1922VisitedTuzlaBay(whereSultanSelimYavuzwaslying)andKiliaLimanbeforereturningtoConstantinople.

31August1922LeftBosphorusforroundofvisitsinAdriatic.

2September1922InDoroChannelwhenshereceivedurgent instructions toproceed toSmyrnatoprotectBritishinterestsduringtheroutoftheGreekarmy.ReachedSmyrnathenextday.

9–13September1922During themassacreandfireatSmyrnashewasendeavouring tomaintainorderandassistthevictimswithAjax.

3October1922CarriedAlliedrepresentativestotheMudaniaConference.

5October1922CarrieddelegatestoConstantinoplefromMudania.

6–8October1922LyingatMudania.

17November1922LandedanarmedguardatConstantinopletoescortthedeposedSultanMahommedVItotheharbourforpassageintoexileinMalaya.

23December1922ReachedMalta.

27December1922LeftMaltaforDardanelles.

September1924RelievedasfleetflagshipbyQueenElizabethandbecameprivateshipin4thBS.

1November19244thBSbecame3rdBS.

9March 1926Alter combined exercises inMediterranean transferredwith her class toAtlanticFleetasflagshipofnewlyformed3rd(SpecialBoys’Training)BS.RelievedinMediterraneanbyResolutionandRoyalOak. 15May1928Relievedas flagship,3rdBSbyBenbow.

30May1928PaidoffintoDockyardControlatDevonportforextensiverefit;transferredintoindependentserviceasseagoinggunneryfiringship.

7 June 1929 Commissioned for service as seagoing gunnery firing ship at Portland,relievingTiger.

11June1931CarriedoutfiringtestsathersistershipEmperorofIndiaoffBognorRegis,damagingherandcausinghertosettleonthebottominshallowwater.

27 July 1931Arrived at Rosyth to prepare for demilitarization under terms of LondonTreaty.

10November1931PaidoffintoDockyardControlatDevonport.

6 September 1932 Commissioned Devonport for further service as seagoing gunnerytrainingshipandothertrainingduties(attachedtoPortsmouth).

20February1935RecommissionedforsameserviceatPortsmouth.

16July1935TookpartinJubileeNavalReviewofHMKingGeorgeVatSpitheadandafterwardsvisitedTorbay.

21 May 1936 Recommissioned at Portsmouth for further service as seagoing gunneryfiringandtrainingship.

20May1937PresentatCoronationReviewofHMKingGeorgeVIatSpithead.

12August1939PresentatReviewofReserveFleetatWeymouth.

IronDukeafterbeingbadlydamagedbybombsin1939(seereport).ShebecameTenderShipinScapaFlowandremainedinthispositionthroughoutthewarSheisseenherein1943.NoteAAbatterieson‘X’and‘Y’positionsandonthequarterdeck.

BOMBINGOFIRONDUKEINSCAPAFLOW17October1939

August1939(laterpart)VisitedFalmouthandleftthreedaysbeforeshewasduetoreachScapaFlow.

September1939–December1945ServedasBaseShipatScapaFlowandasFlagshipoftheAdmiralcommandingOrkneyandShetlands.

BattleDamageWhileinScapaFlow17October1939:IronDukewas lyingat‘C’Buoyinabout10fathomsofwaterwhenapower-diveattackwasmadefrom1,000to1,500feetbyfourbombersat10.33hours.One bomb (probably 500lb)which struck thewater some distance out on theportbowshook the shipand threwmudandwater toaconsiderableheight; asecondbombfellsomedistanceoutontheportquarter.

Themajor damage against ‘C’ boiler roomappears to havebeen causedbytwobombs(probably500lb)whichwereobservedtobereleasedsimultaneouslyand struck thewater not far out from the ship’s side. It is possible that thesebombscontactedshipssideneartheturnofbilgebeforeexploding.Theywerereleasedfromaplanewhichpower-diveddownsome1,000feet inadirectionslightlyinclinedtotheforeandaftlineofshiptravellingfrombowtostern.Athird bomb was observed to be released immediately after the two releasedsimultaneously.Thereisnorecordwherethethirdbombstruckbutitprobablycausedthefurtherdamageaft.Ship heeled to port quickly, reading amaximum angle of probably 20–25°

and appeared to steady at that angle.Main deck scuttleswere open and thesecameawashwhentheshipheeled.Estimatesofthetimetoreachthisheelvaryfrom2–5minutes,whenraidershadpassedcablewasslippedandshiptowedtoshallowwaterinOreBaybytugs.Shewasbeachedforwardabout40minutesaftertheattackandaboutanhourbeforehighwater,withdamagedsidetowardstheshore.Tugswerekeptuntilaboutonehourafterhighwaterhauling in thesterntogetshipapproximatelyparalleltotheshoretogroundherforeandaft.Withfallof tidesheslowlyrighted,vibratingnoticeably,andfinallytookupaheelof3–4°tostarboard(theundamagedside),presumablyinconformitywiththeslopeofthebankonwhichshegrounded.Shipwassecuredbytwo7½tonanchorssuppliedbyMetalIndustries.Furthereffortsweremadeatthenexthighwater to get the stern further in.Bottom in sand and shingle.Divers reported17.10.39shipgroundedforwardtoaboutafterendofengineroomand18inchto2footclearattheaftercutup.

Sheremainedinthatpositionuntiltheendofthewar.

February1946SoldtoMetalIndustriestoberaisedandbrokenup.

19April1946RefloatedatScapaFlow.

15August1946LeftScapaFlowboundforFaslane(Garetoch),awartimeportacquiredbyMetalIndustriesforshipbreaking(takingpossessionon15th).

19August1946ReachedFaslaneafterbeingdelayedfortwentyhoursbyroughseasandhighwinds.

Jellicoe’sonceproudflagshipIronDukeonherlastvoyagetothescrapyard.1946.

QueenElizabethClassDesignThe design of the ships of the Queen Elizabeth class caused a hiatus in the generaldevelopmentof‘StandardAdmiraltybattleshippractice’.Insteadofmerelyenlargingandimproving the IronDuke design, the ships of the 1912–13 estimates departed from thenorm and featured many revolutionary ideas. From the outset it had been intended toproduce something that would constitute a ‘fast battleship division’. Although officialdocumentsdonot state that thenewshipsmighthave followed the IronDuke layout inhavingfiveturrets,itwasobviousthatashipthatsportedten15ingunswouldbehighlydesirableandthereisageneralfeelingwithintheAdmiraltypapersthatthiswasso.

Despite theunusuallyhigh speed, about fourknotsaboveexistingbattleshipaverage,these shipswere by nomeans a compromise featuring reduced protection, aswere thecontemporary battlecruisers, but represented a bona-fide, well-armoured fast battleshiptype, and their unique combination of fighting qualities and speed, on very moderatedimensions (the designers would have liked another 5–6,000 tons incorporated) placedthem,oncompletion,inaclassapart.

From the threesketchdesigns (RIII,RIII⋆,RIV)RIII⋆waschosenasbeing themostsuitable,andbyNovember1912hadbecomeknownas theQueenElizabethclass.Fourshipshadbeenplanned,butthegiftofabattleshipfromtheFederatedMalayStateswasquicklyandgratefullyaccepted.

Theessentialfeaturesofthedesign,comparedwiththeIronDukes,were:

1.Nominaldisplacementatnormalloadwasincreasedbyapproximately2,500tonswithanincreaseof20feet(oa),6inbeam,and9indesignedmeandraught.2.Mainarmamentwaseight15ingunsagainstten13.5inwithanincreaseof1,369lbinweightofbroadside.3.Secondaryarmament(asdesigned)wasincreasedfromtwelvetosixteenguns.4.Armourprotectiondifferedmainlyinincreasingthicknessatwaterline,turretsandanti-torpedobulkheads,withreductiononthemiddleandupperside.5.Designedspeedwasincreasedfrom21to25knots.6.Fuelcapacityof3,400tonsoilinQEcomparedto3,250tonscoaland1,600tonsoilinIronDuke,givingapproximatelythesamenominalradius.

Theoutstandingfeaturesof theQueenElizabethdesignandthe innovations towhichitssuccess was mainly due, were the adoption of the 15in gun and oil fuel; the formerproviding a substantial increase in offensive power on practically the same armamentweightas in theimmediatelyprecedingIronDukeclass; the latterenabling therequisitehighspeedtobeachievedonmoderatedimensionsandwithoutunduesacrificeinfightingqualities.Intheabsenceofamidshipsturret,theforecastledeckcouldbecarriedaftto‘X’turretbyalightunarmouredstructureabaftthebattery,freeboardamidshipsbeingabout8feethigherthanintheIronDukes.Theforecastlesideswererecessedbeforethebatterytoallowdirectaheadfireforthefirstthreepairsof6inguns.Thesidesamidshipsbetweenmain and upper decks were slightly tumblehome, reverting to normal above the upper

deck.TheincreaseindimensionsanddisplacementovertheIronDukeclasswasalmostentirelyduetotheadditionalboilerroomspacerequiredforthehigherspeed.Weightofarmamentwaspracticallythesame,butthelengthrequiredforthiswasactuallysomewhatlessbecauseofthereducednumberofturrets.

In accordance with the 1921 Washington Treaty restrictions on new capital shipconstruction,allweremodernizedinvaryingdegreesfrom1934to1941,QueenElizabeth,Valiant and Warspite being more extensively reconstructed than any other Britishbattleships.Thefollowingprincipalalterationscarriedoutfrom1924to1933were:

QUEENELIZABETHCLASSBATTLESHIPSDesigndrawing,1912–13

Oncompletion,greatthingswereexpectedoftheQueenElizabethwithher15ingunswhenshewassenttotheDardanellesin1915.Unfortunately,howeverherindirectfire,althoughspectacular;provedafailurebecauseofthelackofsuitablespottingandrangefinding.SheisshownhereleavingfortheDardanellesatfullspeed.

1.AAarmamentincreasedandafterpairoftorpedotubesremoved.2.AircraftcatapultfittedinBarhamandValiant.3.Anti-torpedobulgesadded(Barhamthelasttobefitted).4. Fore funnel trunked into the second to reduce some interference to control top(Barhamthelasttobefitted).

Malayawasagainmodifiedfrom1934to1936,AAarmamentbeingfurtherincreasedandhangar accommodation provided for aircraftwith an improved catapult fitted.Warspite,ValiantandQueenElizabethunderwentasecondandmoreextensivereconstructionfrom

1936 to 1941 with a view to bringing their offensive and defensive qualities as far aspossibleintolinewithmodernrequirements.

1. Elevation and range of 15in guns increased. The 6in secondary armament inWarspite was reduced to eight guns.New dual-purpose 4.5in secondary armamentwasfittedinValiantandQueenElizabeth.AAarmamentwasfurtherincreasedinall.2.HangarsandcatapultfittedasinMalaya.3.Gearedturbinesandnewhigh-pressureboilersinstalled.4.Fuelcapacityslightlyincreased,butsteamingradiuswasincreasedby75percentasaresultof thegreatereconomyofthenewmachineryandboilers,especiallythelatter.5.The formerbridgework,conning towerandheavy tripod foremastwere replacedbyalargecontroltower.

Warspitecompletedin1937,Valiantin1939andQueenElizabethin1941.

DuringtheGreatWartheclasshadbeenfamousforformingthe5thBattleSquadronintheGrandFleetfrom1915to1919,beingattachedtothebattlecruisersatJutlandin1916.QueenElizabethwaswithdrawnfromthesquadroninJanuary1917toreplaceIronDukeasFleetFlagship.Theywereallemployedfrom1939to1945,mainlyforbombardmentand escort duties in home waters, Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. QueenElizabethandValiantalsotookpartinoperationsagainsttheJapaneseintheEastIndiesandPacificduring1944and1945.

After the Great War, when the time came for their first reconstruction, it was notwithoutsomeoppositionfromtheirdesignerSirPhilipWattswhopullednopuncheswhendealing with the DNC, Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt. In a letter to the AdmiraltyWattsstatedhiscase(29November1923):

DearSir,IamnowinformedthatastheshipsoftheRoyalSovereignclasshavenowall

been fittedwith bulges, it is intended to fit the ships of theQueen ElizabethclasswithsimilarbulgesinaccordancewithadecisionrecentlycometoandthattheWarspitewouldbeshortlytakeninhandforthispurpose.Itwasnecessarytofit bulges to the Royal Sovereigns as their deficient instability would havecausedthemtocapsizewhendamagedatorbelowthewaterlinewhichwouldhaveresultedinfloodingofadjacentcompartments,buttheQueenElizabethsincommonwithpreviousdreadnoughtshadandhaveamplestability.Thiswasprovedinthewar:MarlboroughandInflexiblewerebadlyhitbya

torpedoandadjacentcompartmentsflooded,buttheyremainedafloatandinnodangerofsinkingfromtheattack.IfbulgeswereaddedtotheQEstheywouldbe scarcely less liable to damage from underwater or above water attack.Moreover,theirspeed,whichisalreadyonthelowside,wouldbeconsiderablyreducedandIsubmittherewouldbenoadvantageinmakingthechange.

Having received no reply byDecember,Watts sent a letter to theDNC (29December1923):

IsawanewspaperreportsometimebacktotheeffectthattheWarspitewastofollowtheRoyalOakatPortsmouthandbefittedwithbulgeswhichIassumedwasincorrectbutvisitingSirOswynMurrayshortlyafterwardsIwasverymuchsurprisedtolearnfromhimthatitwascorrect.IthenwroteMr.Ameryaletter.Mr.Ameryhasbeenagreatdealawayfromhisoffice,butIunderstandhewillseetheletteronhisreturninafewdays.Istillthinktheremustbesomemistakeaboutthematter.

TennysonD’EyncourtseemedtotireofWatts’constanthecklingwhichhadprevailedoverthelastfewyears.Neverthelesshekeptcalmandwrotetotheex-DNCon1January1924:

Thankyouforyourletterofthe29th.Itwasdecidedalongtimeagoandhassincebeenconfirmedtofitbulgesto

theQueenElizabethclasswheneveropportunityoffersitself,andIshouldthinkitisverydoubtfulwhethertheywouldgobackontheirdecision.Thefactisthattheweightofthechargeofmoderntorpedoeshasincreasedthree-orfour-foldsince the design of Queen Elizabeth and experience has shown that theunderwater protection as originally designed is insufficient defence against amoderntorpedo.Byaddingbulgesthisdefencecanbeincreasedsufficientlytobeeffectiveagainstamodern torpedo. Idonot thereforesee that therecanbemuchobjectiontothisadditiontotheprotectionanditisnoreflectionwhateverontheoriginaldesign.Thereisacertainlossofspeedamountingtoabout¾kt,on the other hand there is the advantage that as the buoyancy added by thebulges is greater than theweight, the draught of the shipswill be reducedbyover 1 foot. The vesselswere rather deep from the very start and by variousadditions have become deeper and at low tide they sometimes ground atPortsmouth.

In the face of these technical details, Watts had no alternative but to withdraw hiscriticism.

ArmamentWhendesignworkbeganutmostsecrecywasparamount;oneoftheassistantDNCs,E.N.Mooneywritingon4May1912:‘Thisdesignistoberegardedassecretandneitherthedesignasawholenoranyfeaturesofitshouldbementioned,eitherinsideoroutsideoftheoffice toanyonewhateverexceptpeopleactuallyengagedon thedesign.’Moreover,thegunsthemselveswereregardedastopsecretforsometimeafterthedesignhadbeencompleted. Mooney, 20 June 1912: ‘Every effort is to be made to keep the nature ofarmament secret, the large gun must be spoken of and written about as the 14inexperimental.’

The adoption of the 15in gun was the outstanding feature, and one of the factorsprimarilyresponsibleforthesuccessofthedesign.Theadvanceincalibrefrom13.5inoftheprecedingclassesissaidtohavebeeninfluencedbytheintroductionofthe14inguninthelatestAmericanandJapanesebattleships.Atthisstageinthedesignwork,however,a15in gunwas not available, but to get the design underway quickly itwas decided toacceptthe15inguninprinciple,adeparturefromallpreviousAdmiraltypractice;if thegunprovedafailureitwouldbethefaultandresponsibilityoftheAdmiraltyalone.

Atestgunwasproducedandtestedandtheresultssoondispersedanydoubtsandfearsthat had prevailed during its construction. The gun proved remarkably accurate and itsperformance ingeneralwasunequalledby anyotherBritishheavygun todate.Shortlyafter completion thegunsproved theirworthat Jutland inMay1916and scoredhits at19,500yards,arecordinnavalgunneryatthatdate,especiallyathigh-speedtargets.Witha broadside 1,360 pounds heavier than IronDuke’s and a plus 50 per cent increase indestructiveeffect,theywerewithoutdoubtthemostcapableheavygunatseaduringtheGreatWar.

Themainarmamentasfittedconsistedofeight15ingunslocatedinfourtwin-mountedturrets,allonthecentreline,twoontheforecastleandtwoontheupperdeckaft,theinnerpair superfiring over the outer mountings. Turret arcs were: ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets 300°bearing direct ahead to 60° abaft the beamon each side; ‘X’ turret 310° bearing directastern to65°before thebeamoneach side; ‘Y’ turret300°bearingdirect astern to60°beforethebeamoneachside.

The original secondary armament was for sixteen 6in guns, and twenty 12pdrs (seesketch).The6inwerealllocatedonthemaindecklevel,butthe12pdrsweretobeplacedon the forecastle and shelterdecks forwardandaft.Alter somedebate,however, itwasdecided, becauseof theweight factor, and theunsuitable shellweightof the12pdrgunthat the entire12pdr armament shouldbe eliminated.The6ingunswere an increaseoffouroverthatofIronDuke,theextragunsbeinglocatedonthemaindeckaft(paireachbeam).QueenElizabethandBarhamwerecompletedlikethis,butaftertrialsinDecember1914thegunswerefoundtobepracticallyuselessandwerefrequentlywashedouteveninmoderate seas. By May 1915 two of the guns had been removed and the other tworemountedbehindshieldsontheforecastledeckabaft thesecondfunnelwheretheyhadanexceptionallyhighcommandandgoodarcsof fire.All otherunits of the classweremodified accordingly. These remounted guns were removed in 1916 because the guncrewswereinadequatelyprotectedandtherewasaninadequatesupplyofshellstothenewposition.

Forward15ingunturretsofQueenElizabethshowinggunsatmaximumelevationduringgunnerypractice,5October1922.

ArmourThebasicarmour layoutwasan improvementover theIronDukedesign,but ingeneralwasnotfullyadequateagainstthe15ingun.The13instrake,althoughbeingthickenough,wasinadequate in itscoverageandwasreducedto8inonthe loweredgeand6inat theupperlevel.Itmustbeborneinmind,however,thatsacrificeshadbeenmadetosecureahigh speed and together with the heavier armament it was obvious that on the givenoriginal displacement it would be impossible to apply a thicker armour on a greaterdisplacement. Internal protection was very fine andmore complete than in any Britishbattleships to date, the longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads being continuous betweenforward and after magazines for the first time since Neptune (1911). Despite the

exceptionallyhighspeed,all-roundprotectionwasverystrongandquiteequaltoexistingaverage battleship standards, although armouring was generally lighter than in thecontemporaryGermanbattleshipKönig, especially on themiddle and upper side,whilethe greater beam (96ft 9in against 90ft 6in) of the German ships allowed for a moreeffectiveunderwaterprotection.

The ability of the Queen Elizabeth class to withstand severe punishment withoutsignificantlossoffightingefficiencywasstrikinglydemonstratedatJutlandwherefouroftheclass(5thBS)wereforsometimeheavilyengagedwithGermanbattlecruisersandthevanof theHighSeasFleetbattleships.Although subjected toaheavyandconcentratedfire,theirefficiencywasinnocaseappreciablyimpaired,mainarmamentandmachineryremaining intact in all four ships.Later in the actionWarspite, as a result of a jammedhelm,becameagainheavilyengagedatarangeofabout12,000yardsandwashitseventimes by 12in shells which caused much structural damage although no turret waspermanentlydisabledandmachinerystillremainedintact.Theprincipalweakpointsintheprotectionwere:1.Inadequateheightofheavyarmourabovewaterline.2.Absenceofrearscreens to 6in battery guns and insufficient inboard depth (only 15 feet) of traversesbetween these, deficiencieswhichwere largely responsible for nearly 100 casualties inMalaya at Jutland when the flash from ignited cordite charges, stowed in the passagebehindtheshallowgunbays,swepttheentirestarboardbatteryandputallitsgunsoutofaction.

MachineryTheshipswereintendedtoformaspecialfastbattleshipdivisionandthedesignedspeedwas2or3knotshigherthaninanycontemporarybattleshipandnotequalledintheBritishNavyuntilafterthewar.Thehorsepowerrequiredfortheincreaseofnearly4knotsovertheIronDukeclasswasmorethan2½timesthatinthoseships,anunprecedentedclass-to-class increaseforbattleships,andwasobtainedonaverymoderate rise indisplacementlargelybytheadoptionofoilfuelonly.Itwasestimatedthatwithmixedfiring(coalandoil)notmorethanabout22knotscouldhavebeenobtainedonthedisplacementwhile25knots would have necessitated either: 1. Undesirable sacrifice in offensive and/ordefensivequalities.2.Substantiallyincreasedsizeandcosts.

Theywerethefirstbattleshipstohaveoilfuelonly.Apartfromtheabilitytoproduceincreasedpower on a givenboilerweight, oil fuel also offered the following additionaladvantagesascomparedtocoal:

1.Speedcouldbeincreasedmorerapidlyandmaintainedmoreeasily.2.Steamingradiusincreasedabout40percentonagivenweightoffuel.3.Simplifiedandfastrefuellingwithnostrainonpersonnel.4.Absenceofsmoke.

Despitetheseveryconsiderableadvantagesthedecisiontoadoptoilonlywasnotfinallytakenwithoutconsiderableapprehensionregardingmaintenanceofsupplyinwartimeandwas subjected to some criticism on the grounds that itwas highly undesirable to buildshipswhosemobilitywasentirelydependentonoverseasfuelsupplies.AlthoughintendedtobeafastdivisionwhenjoiningtheFleet,itwasfoundthattheirextraspeedwasnotasadvantageousaswasfirstenvisaged.Astheywerecompletedinwartimenoneoftheclass

ranproperspeedtrials,butifofficialdocumentsarestudieditcanbeseenthatnoneofthegroupeverreachedthehighof25knots.

QUEENELIZABETHArmouredlayout,1919

ThegeneraloverallappearanceoftheQueenElizabethclass,exceptforminordetails,isshownhereasQueenElizabethherselfpassesbyin1922.Notetheimprovedcompassplatform,rangeclocksandcontroltops.

ReplacementPlansin1933StandardAdmiralty practice held that the average life of a battleshipwas about twentyyearswhichmeant that theQueenElizabethclasswasduefor replacement inoraround1935.ThiswouldalsoapplytotheslightlynewerRoyalSovereignclass,andtherewerediscussionsabout thisduringtheearly1930s.Astherewasnoquestionofbuildingnewshipsbecauseofthenavaltreatiesinforce, itwasagreedthatsomethinghadtobedoneaboutthetwogroupsofexistingbattleshipsiftheyweretoremainfront-lineunits.

InapaperpresentedtotheirLordshipsbytheDNC,A.W.Johns,itwaspointedoutthattheQueenElizabeth class had all been built during 1915–16 and therefore had pre-warexperienceworkedintotheirdesign.Theyhad,however,undergonelimitedmodernizationandhadlaterandbetterbulgesthantheRoyalSovereignclass.

Armour protectionwas practically the same in both groups, that forRoyal Sovereignbeing slightly superior in the way of the main belt. There was, however, less space

between‘B’and‘X’turretsinRoyalSovereignandthisleftlittleroomforadditionalAAgunsandsimilarfittings.ThestabilityofQueenElizabethwasslightlysuperiortothatofRoyalSovereign.Radiiwere:QueenElizabeth18knotsgiving3,650;RoyalSovereign18knots giving 2,950;Queen Elizabeth 20 knots giving 3,000;Royal Sovereign 20 knotsgiving 2,150 nautical miles. The bridges were given some modernization during earlyrefitsandwerethereforeroomierandmorehandythanthoseintheRoyalSovereignclass.QueenElizabethwaseasier tohandleand the full speedof theclasswasmuchgreater:23.9knots(Barham)against21.9knots(Revenge).AfterconsideringtheDNC’spointsitwas provisionally agreed that theRoyal Sovereign class would be scrapped before theQueen Elizabeth class, and a table was prepared the replacement programme was asfollows:

STEAMTRIALS:19MAY1922Typeoftrial:2hoursfullpower. Draught(mean) MeanRevs HP Bottom SpeedMalayo: 32ft5in 301 79,844 foul 24.1ktsWarspite: 32ft8in 296 75,200 clean 24ktsValiant: 32ft7½in 292 69,140 clean 23.9kts

VALIANT:ASINCLINEDIINOVEMBER1940Displacement:29,696tons(lightship);33,903tons(halfoilfuelonboard),draught30ft7¾in; 35,698 tons (deep load), draught 32ft 1⅛in; 36,513 tons (deep plus waterprotection),draught32ft9½in.

GM:6.93ftindeepload;6.10ftwithhalfoil.

Stabilityrange:61.1°withhalfoiland68.5°indeepload.

STEAMTRIALS:1926TO1933(MAXIMUMSPEEDSATTAINED)

Warspite: 26March1926 76,742shp=24knots.QueenElizabeth: 14September1927 71,753shp=23.45knots.Malaya: 26January1929 75,784shp=24.45knots.Valiant: 7November1930 67,555shp=23.3knots.Barham: 20November1933 65,644shp=22.5knots.

BARHAM:INCLINED4THNOVEMBER1933(STABILITYANDGM)ANDCOMPAREDWITHRESTOFCLASS

Warspite QE Valiant Malaya BarhamDisplacement(tons): 35,060 35,480 35,710 35,380 35,970MeanDraught: 32ft6in 32ft2in 32ft2in 31ft11in 32ft6inGM: 7.01ft 6.92ft 6.9ft 6.9ft 6.78ft

Maximumstability: 40° 37° 37° 37° 33°Stabilityvanishes: 73° 69° 69° 69° 69°

TwoRoyalSovereigns(RoyalOakandRevenge)1940.

TwoRoyalSovereigns(ResolutionandRoyalSovereign)1941.

RamilliesandQueenElizabeth1942.

TwoQueenElizabethclass1943.

RemainingQueenElizabethclassandRepulse1944.

OneQueenElizabethclassandRenown1945.

Rodney1947.

Nelson1948.

Itwasconsideredthatifthetreatysituationalteredtoallowfreshconstructionsoonerthanhadbeenenvisaged,replacementcouldbeginmorequicklythanthetableimplied,butatthetimethatitwasdrawnuptheonlythingpossiblewasseriouslytoconsideramassivereconstructionprogrammewhichwouldinjectnewlifeintotherapidlyageingvessels.Itwas agreed that this, to some extent, would bring the battlefleet into the new age andprepare it for combat against all other capital ships except those of completely newconstruction.

GENERALPARTICULARS,1919Displacement(tons):30,430(load),33,625deep(Valiant,otherssimilar).

Length:Ascompleted(639ft9into643ft9in)unchanged.

Beam:90ft6inascompleted,unchanged.

Draught:33ftaverageatdeepload.

Armament:maingunsunchanged(8×15in)

Secondary12×6inunchanged.

Original3ingunschangedforlarger50calibre.

Searchlights

Malaya,QueenElizabeth,Warspite:8×36in

Barham:7×36in.

Valiant:6×36in.

2×24insignallinglampsinall.

Aircraft

Airplaneplatformson‘B’and‘X’turretinallexceptQueenElizabeth.BarhamandQueenElizabethfittedfortowingkiteballoons.

In peacetime turret aircraft were not usually carried, but embarked specifically for

exercises.Runwayswereremovedfromoneorbothturretsfromendof1919.

Platformremovedfrom‘X’turretinQueenElizabeth1924,Valiant1930, removedfrombothturretsinall1933–4.

Armour:unchangedexceptforsomeadditionalprotectiontoturretroofsandmagazines,etc.Machineryunchanged.

General appearance was rather heavier than original owing to wartime additions tobridgework,includingSLtowersaroundsecondfunnel.Theremovalofthemaintopmastdetracted considerably from their former symmetrical profile. Deflection scales paintedoutafterwarRangeclocksfittedinvariouspositionsinclass.Maindeckcasemates(6in)notyetplatedoverArmourandMachinery,1919

Mainbelt13inreducingto8inatloweredge,ends6–4in,bulkheads6–4in,barbettes10–9–7–6–4in,turrets11–13–5in,decks:forecastle1in,upper2–1½–1¼in,main1in,lower3–2–1 in, CT 11–6–3in, anti-torpedo screens 2in, CT tubes 4in, secondary battery 6in,secondarygunshields,3in,tunneluptakes1½–1in.

Armour protection unchanged by 1919 except for additional 1 in plating around themagazineareaafter

Jutlandin1916and,asopportunityarose,turrettopswereincreasedfrom4¼into5in.

Machinery

ParsonsreactionturbinesfittedinQueenElizabeth,WarspiteandMalaya;othertwohaddirectturbines.4shafts,4propellers.

Boilers:24Babcock&Wilcoxinfirstthree;YarrowinWarspiteandBarham.

Workingpressure:235psi.

Pressureatturbines:175psi.

Lengthofboilerrooms:144ft.

Lengthofenginerooms:83ft11¼in(each).

DesignedSHP:56,000from23knots;75,000for25knots(overload).

Fuel(tons):650oilnormal,100coal.3,400oilmaximum.

Radiusofaction:5,000nmat12knots;3,800nmat18knots;1,600nmatfullspeed.

Machineryunchanged from1915,but speed reported tohavedroppedslightlyowing toincreased

weightsduringthewar

Extrasignalyardfittedonmaintopmast(loweryardcarriedcloseabovestarfish).

WideW/Tyardfittedlowontopgallantmast.

BRIDGEALTERATIONSANDTHEIREFFECT,QUEENELIZABETHCLASS,1915–37

BridgeWorkAlterationsandtheirEffectAs completed in 1915–16 the Queen Elizabeth class featured the simplest of bridgesconsistingofverybasicplatformsfittedupandaroundtheforemasttripodlegs.

DuringtheGreatWar,however,experienceshowedthattherewasagrowingneedofabetter layout within the group. Practical evidence was forthcoming and there was noshortageofcriticismfromofficersservinginthevessels,whomadeitquiteclearthattherewereinadequatefittingsaboard.Lackofspaceforrequisiteequipmenttocontroltheguns,searchlightfacilities,overcrowdingofstaffinconfinedareasandprotectionforpersonnelwhenexposedonthecompassplatformwerejustafewofthegrumblesthatfoundtheirwaytothecorridorsoftheAdmiralty.

TheAdmiralty, in turn,was not oblivious of these shortcomings, andmeasureswerebeing prepared to alleviate some of the problems as the ships came in for refit duringhostilities. During the refits, bridgework was built up and platforms were extended inlength andwidth. In some ships a small roll-back roofwas placed over the charthouseplatformtoprotectpersonnel fromrainat least.Possiblybecauseofa lackofasuitabletypeofglass,nowindowswere fitted in thispositionuntil after thewarbecause ithadbeensuggestedthatitwouldimpairgoodall-roundvisionwhichwasparamountforlook-out personnel in the bridgework. The personnel, it seems, did not like being closed in.Althoughdrawingonpracticalexperiencewhenalteringtheships,thefinishedresultwasnotalwaysuptoexpectationsanditbecameacaseoftrialanderrorwhenaddingtotheupperworksincapitalshipsingeneral.

By 1919–20 the bridgework had almost doubled in size and had a very clutteredappearance.Thereweresearchlights,rangefindersandamixtureofcanvasandsheetmetal

coversaroundthebridgeworkduringtheearlyyears,butthefirstsuccessfulmethodswerereallyappliedduringtherefitsfrom1924to1930whenthefunnelsweretrunkedtogetherand the bridge-work was given a facelift in general. Levels were extended around thetripod legsnow that theywere free fromsmoke interference,andadditional shelterwasprovided for charthouse staff.Therewas also theprovisionof a large charthouse at thebackof thechart-houseplatformwhichwasbuiltaround the foremast.Theproblemsofthe staffwerenot altogether solved,however, and theyarehighlighted in the followingreports:InValianton12November1930,theopportunitywastakentoobservetheship:‘Theweatherwas cold andwindy and the raised compass platformwas uncomfortableespeciallywithawindonthebow.Thescreenaroundtheplatformisabout5ft6inhighand the flare of this screen throws up the wind so that a portion of the platformimmediatelybehindthescreenisshelteredfromthewind.Thedraughtdescendsatapoint5ft6inabaftthescreenattheheightofthepelorussothatitisextremelydifficulttotakeasight from the instrument under these conditions. The forcing down of the wind isprobablyduetotheexistenceofthetorpedocontrolpositionaboveandslightlyabafttheround compass platform. The down-coming draught is divided by the charthouse andplatformofficeabafttheraisedcharthouseplatform,andsweepsalongthetwosidesofthechart-houseproperwithsuchforcethatstandingismadedifficultwithouthangingon,andinvolves considerable difficulty inworking instruments. Somemitigation of discomfortcould be by increasing flare of screen. It is thought that the onlyway to eliminate thiswindistofullycovertheplatform.’

AftertheGreatWanmostofthebigshipswentthroughaseriesofsmallrefitsandtheQueenElizabethswerenoexception.Valiantisshownindrydockhavinghadherbottomcleanedandageneraloverhaul,Rosyth,1920.

TheQueenElizabethclassonavisittoCherbourg,2April1919;aphotographtakenfromBarhamwithValiantinbackground.

AmoreconclusivesetoftrialswerecarriedoutinMalayaaftershehadbeenpartiallyreconstructed in 1936. On 4 November during sea trials at a speed of 15 knots, thefollowingobservationsweremade.

Thereisanunpleasantbackdraughtaroundthecharthouseplatformespeciallyaroundthefloor.Therearenowindowsaroundtheplatformbutspacehasbeenprovidedforthem.Windspeedsreached30to40knotswhentheshipincreasedspeedto20knots.Anexperimentwascarriedoutandaflatscreenwasplacedover the charthouse on a light framework. It was tilted at various angles andthingsdidimprove.Owingtotheextremewind,however,thecanvasrippedandit is recommended thatwindows be fitted all round, and the after part of thecharthouseclosedin.

FurthertestsinMalayawerecarriedouton8January1937(seedrawings)afterwindowshad been fitted, and experimental small screens positioned at the corners to deflect thewindupwardsawayfromthecharthousearea.Thescreensfittedinthefirsttrialsprovedof limited success, butwhenmodified the tests carried out on 31 January 1937 provedmuchbetter,andthegeneralfeelingwasthat thebesthadbeenaccomplishedwithwhatwasavailable.Theconclusionwasthatthewindowsaroundthecharthouseneededtobekept shut ifdraughtwas tobeexcludedcompletely,butonamoderatedaysomeof thewindowscouldremainopenwithlittleornobackdraught.

ThequestionofbackdraughtwasaparticularpointinthetrialsofBarhamin1934aftershehadbeengivenanewbridgeandcompassplatformwhichwascompletelyclosedin.Commentsmadebystaffwhofirst testedtheshipon25September1934referredtothecompassplatformandthatitwasdraughtyandgenerallyuncomfortable.

Ifthewindowswereleftopenaroundthecompassplatformitwasnottoobad,but if a back doorwere open at the same time, the condition became almostintolerable if there were any sort of tail wind following the ship. The new

bridge,whichwasnowfullyclosedin,wasconsideredonlypartiallysuccessfulbecauseitsdefensivequalitieshindereditsoffensivemeasures.

Thebridgehadtobehabitableinallweathersandprovidethebestall-roundvision,butasfitted Barham and others of the class, with their roofed-in bridges, proved extremelydifficult to reflect this feature and still be tenable when windows were opened. Thewindowsdefinitelyhadtobeopenatcertaintimesandcausedallsortsofproblemsinside.Requirementsforbetterconditionsinbridgeworkandcompassplatformswererecordedasfollows: Captain’s bridge: armouringwas desired and the control office should also bearmoured togivesomesortofprotectionagainstaircraftattack;searchlightcontrol, starshell control and torpedo control should all bewithin reach. Itwas felt that the bridgeshould be free from serious draughts.The shapewas not always correct and instead ofbeingsquareitshouldberoundedoffsoastocheatthewindfromallangles.Moreover,itwouldbeadvantageoustobeabletoseeboththebowsandsternofthevesselfromthisplatform.Obviouslytherewasmuchtobedonebywayofimprovements,butinpractice,nomatterhowwelllayoutsweredesigned,theresultswerenotalwaysacceptable.

EvenwhenWarspite was fittedwith her new bridge structure after reconstruction in1937theproblemswerenotover.On23September1937theC-in-CwasinvitedtoinspectthemockupbridgeforthereconstructedbattlecruiserRenown,andatthesametimelookover thenewbridgeofWarspite.Aftera thorough inspectionatPortsmouthhewrote totheDNCtosaythattheconningtower(withinthesuperstructurehousing)wastoolightlyarmouredandthat itshouldbecapableofwithstandingclose-rangeattackfrommediumcalibreshells.

InWarspite,thefrontandsidesofthenewconningtowerwereonly3inwitha2inback,1½inroofandlinfloor.SimilarprotectionwasintendedforRenown,QueenElizabethandKingGeorgeV.TheprotectioninWarspitewasintendedtogiveimmunityagainstshellsandbombsburstinginthenearvicinity,butitwasnotintendedtogiveprotectionagainstdirecthits.Tokeepoutshellsof4.7incalibreat2,000yardswouldrequire4inNCarmour;6in shells at 4,000 yardswould require 6½in cemented armour, and 8in shells at 4,000yardswouldneed9¾incementedarmour.

At this stage, of course, progressive demands for extra armour could not affectWarspite,butinanyfuturereconstructionitwouldbemostadvantageous.Nevertheless,tomake the increases mentioned above would require 4, 9½ and 18 tons in weightrespectively, and would require additional framework. This extra weight would not besignificant inRenown,Warspite andQueenElizabeth, but it would be in the newKingGeorgeV.AsregardsthedraughtfactorinWarspite,thenewlargestructureasfittedwasavast improvementoverprevious layoutsbut stillnot absolutely free frombackwinds ifanydoorswereopen.

Valiant’sbridgeasreconstructedin1939receivedaslightlybetterreview:‘TheCOwasverypleasedwiththebridgewhichwasfreefromvibrationandunpleasantdraught.Thedraughtatthesearchlightsightswasslight.TheCOdid,however,complainthatthecharttablewas too large resulting in the compass platform being too cramped.Considerabledraughtwasexperiencedbythelookoutsthroughopenings,withwindonallbearings.Thedoors to thesepositionshad,however,been takenoff forgun trials,andwhen thesearefittedandcloseditisanticipatedthatthingswillbebetter.Ingeneral,theCaptainandstaff

werepleasedwiththeship’ssplendidbehaviour.’

FunnelExhaustProblemsWhentheshipswerebeingreconstructedduringthe1920sthetwinfunnelsweretrunkedandsmokeproblemstothebridgeweremoreorlesscorrected.During1938,however,itwasbroughttotheDNC’sattentionthatcomplaintswerebeingvoicedaboutgasesfromthe funnel entering the main boiler intake and the two aircraft hangars on either side.Experiments were conducted at the National Physical Laboratory’s AerodynamicsDepartmentwithamodelbuilt toascaleof⅛in=1foot.Thesamemodelwasused torepresent each of the four ships, only the funnel being altered as necessary. Therewassomeinitialdifficultyinestablishingasuitableproceduralmethod.Thefirstnecessitywastointroduceanidentifiablesubstancewhoserouteafterleavingthefunnelcouldbetracedand quantified.To this end ameasured quantity of finely powdered corkwas projectedintothefunneldischargeforfoursecondsduringeachtest.Subsequentlyitwasnecessarytomodifythemodelsothatheatedaircouldbedischargedatscalevelocities,andaboilerintakewasconstructedintowhichaircouldbedrawnatappropriaterates.Anyparticlesofcork drawn into the boiler intake passed along a tube andwere discharged outside thewindtunnelon toasmallstickydetector towhich theyadhered.Wheneverpossible theparticles were counted so as to form a table of comparison for the various conditionstested.

Theexperimentsestablishedtheexistenceofalargeeddyingregioncausedbythemastandneighbouringstructure,and indicated thatgas from the funnelwouldbedrawn intothiseddyingregionandintothemainboilerintake.

Voliantundergoingherfirstmajorreconstructioninwhichhertwinfunnelsweremergedintoone,June1930.

MALAYA,QUEENELIZABETH,VALIANTANDWARSPITEModeltestswindeffectonfunnelgasesatbridge

Malayo

Ananalysisoftheflowintheregionofthefunnelandhangarsisshownindrawings1and2.Thisanalysis,ofatestwheretheairwasheatedbyhotwires,showedanextensiveeddycausedbythemastandnearbystructurewhichgaverisetoaconsiderablebackflowinthefirstfewfeetabovethedeck,somedistanceaftofthefunnel.DrawingNo.2wasbasedonobservationsmadebyplacing¼instripsofgummedpaperoneatatimeacrossthemodelshipatapoint5.2inchesbehindtheafteredgeofthefunnel.Forthefirst2inchesabovethedeckthestripsweremountedwiththestickysidefacingaft,whileinthetop3inchesthestickyside faced forward.Thecorkdustdepositon the top3 inches thereforecamedirectlyfromthelowerfringeofthefunnelstreamontothedetectors,whereasthatonthelower2inchesturnedintheeddyandtravelledinthedirectionofmotionoftheship.

Asaworstpossiblecondition,theequivalentofawindspeedof17feetpersecondanda boiler intake of 8.5 cubic feet per minute were selected, and tests were made asdescribed.Itwasfoundthatfromeachchargeintroducedintothefunnelstreamsome300to370particleswerefoundonthedetectorattheexitsoftheboilerintake.Anexperimentwas then conductedwith themast and surrounding structure removed.With the ship inthisconditionnodepositwhateverwascollected.

Anumberoftestswasmadeinthecourseofwhichthefunnelheightwasprogressivelyincreased.Theresultsofthesetestsareshownbelow,anditwillbeseenthattheadditionofsome5inches(40feet)wouldberequiredtothefunnelbeforeallgaswascarriedsafelyaway.

Testswerealsomadeoftwoslopingfunneltops,buttheamountofcorkdepositedwasnotnoticeablyreduced.

From themanner inwhichcorkparticlesweredepositedondetectorsplacednear thefunnel,itwasstronglysuspectedthatthetroublesomegaswascomingfromtheedgesofthe funnel,where elementswereprobablydischarged at lowvelocity and carried roundinto theboiler intake. Itwasconsidered that if theseedgeconditionscouldbemodifiedandtheoffendingparticlesforcedupintothemainfunnelstreamanimprovementmight

beeffected.Someattemptsatbringingthisaboutbymeansofbafflesanddeflectorswereunproductive, chiefly because the influence of the mast and other structures made itimpossible tocollectenoughair to influenceconditionsat thefunnelwithoutdrawing itfromthemainstream,whichwouldentailtheuseofbafflesorguidesofanunacceptablesize. It was decided, therefore, to endeavour to blow the edges of the funnel clean bymeansof a current of air obtainedmechanically.Accordingly, anouter casingor jacket0.1in(9.6in)inwidthwasconstructedroundthetopportionofthefunnel,andthebottomofthecasingwassealedsoastoformanannularchamber.Intothisasupplyofairwasfedfromthe insidebyablower,andwasdischargedfromthe topof the funnel,completelyencirclingthenormalfunneldischarge.

HeightofFunnel Depositatboilerintake (percentageoforiginal)Original    100Lengthened 1in(8ft)    82   ” 2in(16ft)     3   ” 3in(24ft)    23   ” 4in(32ft)    10½   ” 5in(40ft)     1½

Warspite

TestssimilartothosedescribedaboveweremadeonthefunnelofWarspite.Thisfunnel,whichwasdividedverticallyintothreesections,wastestedwithandwithoutjacket,andineachcasethefrontandrearcompartmentswerealternatelyinuse.

QueenElizabethandValiant

The funnel was divided into two compartments only, and tests were made with thesealternatelyinuse.Withtheoriginalfunneltheexperimentsshowedthatwhentherearhalfofthefunnelwasinuserelativelynotroublewasexperienced,butthatwiththeforwardhalf in use a heavy deposit was recorded. The same deposit was obtained when bothsectionswereworkingsimultaneously.

BARHAM1920Profileanddecksascompleted

Warspite,QueenElizabeth(andValiant)

Acomparison of the results obtained on theQueenElizabeth (andValiant) funnelwiththoseobtainedforWarspiteshowsthatwhileintheformercasetheforwardsectionofthefunnel gave trouble, in the latter case itwas the rear portionwhichprovided the heavydeposit. This result is almost certainly to be attributed to the different placing of thefunnelswithrespecttothemast,theWarspitefunnelbeingmuchfurtherforward.

The conclusion of the experiments were forwarded to the DNC but whether or notanythingwaseverdonetorightthesituationisnotevident–certainlynotfromrecordsorevenphotographs.

AppearanceChanges,ModificationsandRefitsQueenElizabeth

No other British class of battleships changed their appearance more than the QueenElizabeths. At the end of the Great War they were considered to be the best-lookingbattleships in the Royal Navy. Their twin amidships funnels, heavily built-up tripodforemastandfourtwin15in-gunnedturretsgavethemasymmetricallookunequalledbymostothersintheheavyweightgroup.In1918thebridgeworkwassimilarinallfive,butthereweremanysmalldifferences,anditwasquiteeasytotellthemapartandidentifytheindividualships.QueenElizabethandBarhamweremoreeasilyidentifiablethantheotherthree.

Queen Elizabeth: No aircraft platforms on turrets (added February 1919); a topmast toeachmast.

Barham:Searchlightfittedonsmallplatformclosebelowcontroltop;smallplatformclosebelow control top (abaftmast); lower yard on foremast at starfish level;Gaff belowstarfish(onmain).

Malaya:Loweryardonforebelowstarfish;Gaffwellbelowstarfish.

Valiant:Strutsatstarfishinplaceofyards;gaffbelowstarfish;navigatinglightonmainstarfishwasbelowmast.

Warspite:Loweryardonforeatstarfish;gaffwellbelowstarfish;navigating lightabaftmast.

QueenElizabeth:1919–20:Foretopenlarged; largebaserangefinderfittedat rearof‘B’and‘X’turrets;deflectionscalesonturretsdeleted;tworangefinderclocksfittedbelowforward control top andover ‘X’ turret; high-angle rangefinder fittedon fore controltop(original,smallrangefinder).Originalsmallrangefinderontorpedotowerreplacedby medium base rangefinder; aircraft platforms on ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets in place byFebruary1919;1921–22:topgallantfittedtomainmast;1922–3:searchlightsremovedfrom main and after superstructures (platform retained); 1924–6: range clocksremoved; 3in guns replaced by 4in (two fitted August/September 1924 (£2,000));aircraft platform removed from ‘X’ turret; after superstructure built up at rear, andsternwalk replaced; refit June 1926–October 1927: (cost of bulges and bridgework,£195,000);underwaterbulgesaddedwhich increasedbeam;control topenlargedandmodified;twoextra4infitted;aftercontroltopremoved;rangeclocksretainedover‘X’turretonly;high-anglerangefinderretainedoncontroltop,extrahigh-anglerangefinderadded in small tower over bridge; torpedo control tower removed and rangefinderremounted on small platform; RDF equipment fitted; DF cabinet fitted at rear ofdirector platform with aerial over control top; 36in SL removed from bridge;bridgework greatly modified and funnels trunked into one unit; flag signallingtransferredfromforetomainmast,aftersuperstructurebuiltuptoaccommodatesignalstaffandequipment;foretopmast,togetherwithsignalyardandsignalstrutsatstarfishremoved,tallertopgallantfittedtomainmast.

Warspitewasthefirstoftheclasstoundergomajorreconstruction.During1926shere-appearedlookingmuchheavier;withthemassivetrunkedfunnel.ThephotographshowsherinApril1926leavingPortsmouthfortrials.

ReconstructionofBarham,Dec1930toOct19331.BeamanddisplacementchangesasQueenElizabeth.2.Rangeclocksover‘X’turretremoved.Multiple2pdrAA(eightbarrels)addedportand starboard on raised platform abeam funnel. Multiple 0.5in AA (four barrels)

addedportandstarboardonsuperstructureabeamconningtower.HA-RFoncontroltopreplacedbyHAdirectorandremountedinsmalltoweroverbridge.HAdirectorfittedonplatformonmaintripodlegs.AAlookoutpositionaddedportandstarboardbelow control top. After pair of torpedo tubes removed. Torpedo rangefinderremovedfromaftersuperstructure.3.RDFequipmentfittedasinQueenElizabeth(1930typeaerial).4.SL towers around funnelmodifiedbut arrangement ofSLunchanged.Two24insignallingSLremountedonlowerbridge(exforwardsuperstructure).5.Trainingtypecatapultfittedonstarboardsideof‘X’turretroofwithstraightarmcraneabeammainmastonstarboardside.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets.6.Anti-torpedobulgesfittedasinQueenElizabeth.7.Bridgeenlargedandmodifiedandfunnels trunkedas inQueenElizabeth.Upperbridgecompletelyenclosedinadditionandlowerbridgeextendedfurtheraftthanintheotherships;entirebridgestructurenowmergingwithtripodlegs.8. Tripod legs fitted to main mast to support HA director. Arrangement of signalstrutsbelowcontroltopmodified.

Modifications,BarhamMarchtoJune1938

1.Single4inAAreplacedbytwinenlargedshields.HA-RFoverbridgeremoved.2.36inSLreplacedby44in.

SecondReconstructionPeriod,1934–41In 1934 a secondmodernization programme for the class was initiated with a view tobringing the ships in linewith existing requirements, especially in respect to increasedhorizontalprotectionagainstplungingfireandaerialattackbythepowerfulmoderngunsand bombs towhich all older battleshipswere very vulnerable. Themenace of aircraftattackandthenecessityforimproveddefenceagainstthis,bothbygunsandarmour,hadbythisdatebecomeaparticularlyvitalfactorinbattleshipdesign.Underwaterprotectionagainst increasingly efficient torpedoes and mines was also considered to requirestrengthening as far as possible.Malaya andWarspite were taken in hand in 1934 andcompletedin1936and1937respectively.ValiantandQueenElizabethfollowedin1937,Valiantbeingcompletedin1939andQueenElizabethin1941.

Modifications inMalaya, however,were limited, being confinedmainly to increasedAAarmamentandprovisionofhangaraccommodationforaircraftandanimprovedtypeofcatapult;protection,machineryandboilersremainedunchanged.Buttheadditionaltopweightimposed,andforwhichnorealcompensationwasmade,resultedinsomelossofstability associatedwith a substantial increase in displacement, deeper draught, reducedfreeboard, dryness and speed.Displacement increased by approximately 1,000 tons andmaximumspeedreducedtojustover22knots.

QUEENELIZABETH:LEGEND,1927AFTERREFITDisplacement(tons):31,300(standard),35,480(deep)(withoutwaterprotection),36,295(withwaterprotection).

Length:644ft3in(oa).

Beam:104ft.

Draught:28ft4inforward,29ftaft(standard),31ft5in(deep).

Freeboard:26ft1inforward,16ft3inamidships,17ft10inaft.

Heightof15ingunsfromwater:‘A’,31ft;‘B’,40ft11in;‘X’,33ft1in;‘Y’,23ft.

Speed:(estimated)23?knots.

Totaloilcapacity:3,500tons.

Armour:

16ft abovewater line at loaddisplacement, 4ft below.Mainbelt unchanged.Bulkheadsandbarbettesunchanged.Turrets11infaces,roofsincreasedto5in.Decks:forecastle1in,upper2–1¼in,main1¼in,middle1in(2inovermagazines),lower3–1in.

Generalweightsbeforeandafterrefit(tons): 1918 1927 Armour 17,500 21,110 Armament 4,550 4,950 Machinery 3,950 3,890 Generalequipment 750 700 Fuel(min.) 650 650

1930: Range clocks removed from over ‘X’ turret. High-angle rangefinder replaced byhigh-angledirector.

ImprovedtypeDFaerialfitted(earlyin1930).

1933–4:Aircraftplatformsremovedfrom‘B’turret.

Otheroftheclasswereallverysimilarduringthisperiod(seeBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne).

WARSPITE:REFIT,18JULY1924–APRIL1926

Weightadded(tons):bulgeplatings 575(totalweightofbulge1,140tons)Transverseframing 280Longitudinalframing 125Bulkheads 55Woodfilling 15Bilgekeels 50Rubber 17Pipingandvalves 5Paint,etc. 18Additionaldynamos 30

4×4ingunsandammunition 602pom-poms 35

Increase in displacement from 1919 to 1924 was approximately 200 tons. 33,625 tons(deep) 1919.Displacement (tons) after bulging (1926): 30,380 (light), 31,300 (legend),34,970(deep),35,770tonswithwaterprotectioninbulges.

Typicalrefitforthewholeclassduringthisperiod.

Warspiteasfollows:

Controltopenlargedandmodified.

Aftercontroltopremoved.

Rangeclocksretainedover‘X’turretonly.

HARPretainedoncontroltopwithextrapairaddedinsmalltoweroverbridge.

36inSLremovedfrombridgeandSLplatformsfrommainmastandaftersuperstructure.

ForsmallerrefitsseeBattleshipsofWorldWarOne.

ThereconstructionofWarspitewasconsiderablymoredrastic,theprimaryobjectbeingto secure a substantial advance in offensive and defensive qualities without additionaldisplacement and further loss of speed, maintenance of the existing 24 knots beingconsideredessentialinviewofrisingbattleshipstandardsinthisrespect.Inadditiontothemodifications in AA armament and aircraft accommodation as carried out inMalaya,elevationandrangeofmainarmamentwasincreased,secondaryarmamentwasreduced,AA armament was further increased, horizontal protection materially strengthened,internalsub-divisionimproved,speedmaintainedandsteamingradiusextendedby75percent.Thiswasaccomplishedonanestimatedreductionof500tonsindisplacement(seetable), mainly by the adoption of improved and lighter machinery in boilers whichconstitutedthegoverningfactorinthewholeschemeofreconstruction.

MALAYA1919

The modernization of Valiant andQueen Elizabeth followed similar lines to that ofWarspite, but was even more extensive, incorporating an entirely new dual-purpose(HALA)secondaryarmamentandsomemodifications indetail.Estimateddisplacement

increasedby420tonsinValiantand1,600tonsinQueenElizabethwithcorrespondinglyincreaseddraughtandreducedfreeboardascomparedtoWarspite.Although ithadbeenplanned to maintain the speed of 24 knots, it was reduced to about 22/23 knots as aconsequenceofthesubstantialriseindisplacement.Bridgework,superstructure,generallayoutandriginallthreeshipswasdrasticallyaltered,thenewdesignrepresentinginthisrespectaprototypefortheKingGeorgeVclass.

Although all-round efficiency in these three ships was officially considered to haveincreased by 50 per cent, subsequent war experience indicated that horizontal andunderwater protectionwas still belowmodern requirements.Barham was to have beenmodernizedafterValiantandQueenElizabeth,buttheoutbreakofwarin1939precludedthis.Ithadbeenintendedtore-modifyMalayaasinValiantandQueenElizabeth,buthereagainthewarintervened.

Queen Elizabeth 1935, July to October modifications. Twomultiple 2pdr AA (eightbarrels)addedonsuperstructureabeambridge;twomultiple0.5inAA(fourbarrels)addedonafter superstructure; aircraft spottingposition fittedport and starboardbelowcontroltop.

Close-upofWarspite’ssuperstructurelookingbackfromtheforecastle,1926/8.

ReconstructionofMalaya,Oct1934toDec1936Reconstructioninvolved60percentofstructure.

1.Draftanddisplacement increasedby8inand944 tons respectivelybyadditionalweightsimposed.Theconsiderableextraanduncompensatedtopweight,especiallythe heavy hangar structure, involved a slight loss of stability which was acceptedbecauseoftheincreaseinoriginalstabilityresultingfromtheadditionofbulgesonthe first reconstruction.Thedegreeof stabilitywasquite low,however, andwouldnothavebeenapprovedunderlaterstandards.Asaconsequenceofreducedfreeboardtheshipwasverywetinanyseawayafterreconstruction.2.The 6in director towerswere re-located port and starboard on extensions of the15indirectorplatformabaftthetripodlegs.Thesingle4inAAwerereplacedbytwin

4in in large shields, the after pair being sponsonedout at sides.Multiple 2pdrAA(eightbarrels)wereaddedportandstarboardonahighplatformabeamthefunnel.Multiple0.5inAA(fourbarrels)wereaddedportandstarboardon‘X’turret.HARFoncontrol topwas replacedbyHAdirector (raisedwellclearof top)andaseconddirector was added on the after superstructure. HA RF over bridge was removed.Remainingtorpedotubes(forwardpair)wereremovedtogetherwithtorpedocontroltowerandRF,torpedoarmamentbeingreportedasnotworththespaceandpersonnelitabsorbed.

Close-upofQueenElizabethshowingimprovedbridgeworkandtrunkedfunnelafterrefit,November1927.Notetheheatshieldonthebaseofthefunnel.

GENERALPARTICULARSFORCLASS1934Displacement(tons):QueenElizabeth36,295(deep)(asinclinedAugust1927).

Length:634ft6in(wl),643ft9in(oa)(Warspite).

Beam:104ftoverrubbers.

Draught:29ftto34ftmax.(variedinall).

Armament

Originalmaingunsunchanged,secondarygunsasin1918.

4×4inAA. 16×2pdrs(2×8barrels)inBarham. 8×2pdrs(1×8barrels)inValiant.

8×0.5inAA(2×4barrels)inBarham. Protection:Asoriginalexceptforbulgesaddedandsomeadditionalarmouronturrettopsandaroundmagazines

OriginalsalutinggunsandMGs. (seerevisedlegendof

2×21inTT(forward). QE1927afterrefit).RadiodirectionalfindersinBarham,QueenElizabethandValiant. Machineryandboilersasbuilt.

Searchlights:4×36inonfunneltowers,2or4×24insignalling.

Speedreducedslightlytoapprox.23.6average.

Aircraft

TrainingcatapultinBarhamandValiant.OneFaireyIIIreconnaissanceseaplane.BarhamcarriedaWalrusamphibianforashortperiodin1934.

GeneralAppearance

Enlargedandmodifiedbridgeworkinall,whichextendedrightroundtripodlegs.UpperbridgecompletelyenclosedinBarhamandValiant.Forefunneltrunkedintosecond.Anti-heatplatefittedonlowerpartoffunnel.Tripodmainmast inBarhamonly.Sternwalk inQueenElizabeth,BarhamandWarspite.Signal strutsat starfishbelowcontrol top (veryshort in QE) and no yard on foremast. Yard at starfish on main in Malaya, QueenElizabethandWarspite,withextrasignalyardontopmastabovethisinQueenElizabeth.Asreconstructed,theywereverydistinctiveandnotablyheavierandmorepiledupthanin1918. The unbalanced rig (low on foremast and high on main) detracted from theiroriginal symmetry, although with a reversed arrangement to that in 1918 and aconsiderablymoremarkeddisparitybetweenrelativeheightontheforeandmainmasts.

Theprincipalfeatureswere:

Large trunked funnel. Enlarged bridgework, extended completely around tripod legs.Heavycontrol topanddirectorplatformbelow.Prominentwaterlinebulges.Catapulton‘X’ turret inBarhamandonquarterdeckrightaft inValiant.Lowrigonforemastandhighonmain.TripodmainmastwithdirectortoweronlegsinBarham.DFaerialabaftcontroltopinBarham,QueenElizabethandValiant.

Thetrunkingofthefunnelshadbeenwellarranged,andtheresultantenormousflat-sidedfittingsconstitutedamostimposingfeature,beinglessunsightlythanmighthavebeenthe case.Mainmast, with topmast and topgallant, was very tall, and the height wasaccentuatedbytheabsenceofanyforetopmast.

Easily distinguished from theRoyal Sovereign class by trunked funnel, no shelterdeckamidships.Shorter6inbattery,notcarriedabaftamidships.

Directorplatformonforemastwasnoticeablylower.

Individualdifferencesin1934

Barham:(1)Tripodmainmastwithdirectortowerhalfwayuptripodlegs.(2)Catapulton‘X’ turret and crane abeammainmast (port side). (3)Lower bridge extended farther aftthan in theothers. (4)Projecting lips toSLtowersaroundfunnel. (5)Sternwalk.QueenElizabeth: (1) Enlarged after superstructure. (2) Extra yard on main topmast. (3)Sternwalk.

Valiant: (1) Catapult and crane on quarterdeck right aft. (2) Strongly projecting lip toforwardpairofSLtowers.(3)Nosternwalk.Warspite:(1)Sternwalk.(2)Flagpoletotopmainmast.

Malaya:(1)Nosternwalk.(2)Noflagpole.

BARHAMProfiles,1928and1937

MALAYAProfiles1926and1930

QUEENELIZABETH,MALAYAANDWARSPITEModifications,1920–37

Malaya’srevampedbridge(donein1936refit)photographedin1939.

3.MD/DFequipmentwasfitted,amodified typeofDFaerialbeingfittedonmaintopmast.4.The36inSLwerereplacedby44inandtheirdistributionmodified,two(portandstarboard)onsuperstructurebeforefunnelandtwo(portandstarboard)onplatformabaftfunnel.Formercontroltowersaroundthefunnelwereremoved.5. Two aircraft hangarswere provided (port and starboard) in superstructure abaftfunnel, opening at the rear.A straight arm electric cranewas fitted on top of eachhangar and a fixed athwartships catapult on the upper deck abaft hangars.Accommodation for four aircraft (maximum): two stowed in hangars, oneondeckoutside and one on catapult. Swordfish T/S/R and/orWalrus Amphibians carried.Firstbattleshiptohavehangaraccommodationforaircraft.6.Originalmachinery andboilers retained.Speedwas reduced as a result of extraweights added in reconstruction (ship unable to maintain station withValiant andWarspitein1940/41).7.Newtype,completelyopen,upperbridgefitted,thisdesignbeingotherwiseonlyadopted inRoyalOak (see notes on bridges). After superstructure abaft mainmastwas enlarged. Boat stowage rearranged to accommodate hangars and catapult, themajorityofboatsbeingstowedontopofhangarsandhandledbyaircraftcranes.Theoriginal main boat derrick was removed. Accommodation, ventilation and generalequipment was modernized but habitability at sea suffered from the reducedfreeboard. 8. Main topgallant mast replaced by flagpole. Forward and after strutsremovedfrommainstarfishandyardraisedwellabovethis.

ReconstructionofWarspite,March1934toJune19371. The estimated draught and displacement was reduced by 4in and 500 tonsrespectively, mainly because of the reduced weight of newmachinery and boilerstogetherwith theremovaloffour6ingunsandtheirarmourandtheoriginalheavyconning tower. Original stability was adequately maintained. Forecastle flare wasextendedaftalmost to‘A’ turretand thedeckwaswidenedso that thesideflushedwithwhatwasformerlythesecond6ingunport.Thesidewasplatedupovermaindeckcasematesaftanddeckedover.Hullstrengthwassatisfactorilymaintainedandalthough the removalofheavyweights amidshipsduring reconstruction caused thehulltobepermanentlyhoggedtotheextentof4½intheshipstoodupwellunderverysevere tests.Theextensionof forecastle flareandplatingup to the forwardpairofbatterygunportstendedtoassistdrynessinheadseas.2.Elevationofthe15ingunsincreasedto30°,themaximumprovidedinanycapitalship to that date for guns of 12in or higher calibre. Range substantially increasedfromapproximately23,400yardsto32,200yards.Newfirecontrolandrange-findingequipmentwas fitted,witha15ft and9ft rangefinder.Newandmuch larger (15in)directorwasfittedontopofanewbridgetower.ThearmouredRFpositionformerlyovertheconningtowerwastransferredtotheaftersuperstructure.Theforwardandafterpairsof6inguns removed to accommodate additionalAAarmament, and thehullsidewasplatedupflushoverthevacantgunpositions.Thiswasnotconsideredto involve any loss in actual fighting qualities because secondary guns that wereunavailable for use against air as well as surface targets had become virtuallyobsolete.The6indirectortowerswererelocatedportandstarboardonthenewbridge

towerbelowandabeamthe15indirector.Thesingle4inAAwas replacedby twin4ininlargeshields.Fourmultiple2pdrAA(eightbarrels)wereadded.Twoenlargedsponsons were fitted on top of the superstructure amidships abeam and abaft thefunnel, the after pair being carried noticeably higher than the forward pair. Fourmultiple 0.5inAAwere added, two port and starboard on ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets.HAdirectorfor4inAAwaslocatedportandstarboardatrearofbridgetowerbelowandabaftthe15indirector.Theremainingtorpedotubeswereremovedtogetherwiththetorpedo control tower and RF; the torpedo flats were used for extra ammunitionstowage.3.MF/DFequipmentfitted,DFaerialateachmasthead.4.The36inSLwere replacedby44inanddistributionwasmodified: twoportandstarboardonsponsonsat sidesofbridge tower, twoportandstarboardonplatformagainst fore side of funnel. The former control towers around the funnels wereremoved.5.AircrafthangarsandcatapultwereinstalledasinMalaya.6. The 6in battery was removed from vacant gun positions and the after batterybulkheadwas shifted forward of the original after pair of guns. The originalmaindeck casemates aft were plated up, but casemate armour was retained to form anirregular-shaped bulkhead between ship’s sides and ‘Y’ barbette. Horizontalprotection was considerably improved, but war experience showed this to be stillinadequateagainstmodernhigh-poweredbombs,theshipbeingbadlydamagedbya500lbbomboffCreteon22May1941andcompletelydisabledbya3,000lbgliderbombatSalernoon16September1943(seebattledamage).Onthefirstoccasiononeboiler room had to be temporarily evacuated while on the second the bombpenetratedsixdecksandburstinNo.4boilerroom,completelydemolishingthisandflooding all the others. Armour modifications comprised: main deck from ‘A’barbette to forward bulkhead increased from 1¼in to 3in. Middle deck increasedfromlinuniformto5½inovermagazinesand3½inovermachineryandboilers.Totalhorizontalprotectionovermagazines6¾in(1¼inupperdeckand5½inmiddledeck).Totalovermachineryandboilers5¾in(linforecastle,1¼inupperand3½inmiddledecks).Armouronboilerroomuptakesincreasedfrom1½into4in.Originalconningtower and lower navigating position was removed and a new armoured positionplacedhighupinthebridgetowerat theforwardendofNo.3platform,thisbeingfittedasanewlowernavigatingpositionwitharmouredcommunicationtubetothebaseofthetower.Splinterprotectionwasprovidedforbridgepersonnelandat2pdrAApositions.Internalsubdivisionwasextensivelymodifiedandimproved.Existingbulge protectionwas retained, but sub-division inside the longitudinal anti-torpedobulkheads was substantially increased. A centre line bulkhead was fitted inmachinery and boiler spaceswith eightwatertight compartments inmachinery andsix inboiler space. In theeventofheavydamageport and starboardengine roomscould be completely isolated from one another and the pumping capacity wasincreasedfrom950to9,050tonsperhour.

WARSPITE:AFTERRECONSTRUCTION,1937

Before AfterArmament 4,970tons 5,264tonsMachinery 3,691tons 2,300tonsEquipment 1,287tons 1,420tonsArmour 5,431tons 5,980tonsHull&ProtectivePlating 16,250tons 17,130tonsOilfuel 3,431tons 3,735tonsReserveFeedWater 497tons 267tonsDraughtForward 33ft2inmeanDraughtAft 32ft1inGM 6.63ftnormalload 6.82ftdeeploadDisplacement 33,842 tonshalfoilcondition, 34,228tonsordinarydeepcondition, 31,446tonsstandard, 36,911tonsdeep (includingwaterprotection)Boilerweights 1,461tons 900tonsEngineRoom 1,737tons 967tonsConningTower 339tons 102tonsBatteryProtection 339tons 105tonsDeckover(protective) magazinesforward 260tonsDeckover(protective) magazinesaft 189tonsDeckover(protective) EngineRooms 253tonsDeckover(protective) BoilerRoom 456tonsHullweights 16,250tons 17,130tons

WARSPITE:GENERALPARTICULARS,1939Displacement(tons):36,911(deep)asinclined.

Lengthandbeamasin1934.

Forecastleflarelengthenedgivingincreaseddryness.

Sideplatedupoveroriginalmaindeckcasematesaft.

Armament:

Mainarmamentasoriginal.

8×4inAA(twin).

32×2pdr(4×8barrels).

16×0.5inAA(4×4barrels).

OriginalsalutinggunsandMGs.

Notorpedoarmament.

Radar:MF/DFequipmentfitted.

Searchlights:4×44in,2×24insignalling.

Armour

Asoriginal,plusincreasedhorizontalandinternalprotectionandminusoriginalconningtowers.Newbridgeprotection:3inplates(NC)onfrontandsides,2inback,l½inroof,1infloorNewbridgetoweralsomadegasandchemicalproofasfaraspossible.

Totaldeckarmour:6¾inovermagazines,5¾inovermachinery.

Eightwatertightcompartmentsinmachineryandsixinboilerspaces.

Machinery

Parsonsgearedturbines.

6Admiraltytype3-drumboilers.

Fuel:3,730tons.

General: Large tower structure replacing former bridgework and conning tower Boatstowagerearranged,accommodation,ventilationandequipmentallmodernised.

Rig:Lightpole foremastwith topmast and topgallant.Shortpolemainmast.Nocontroltop.DFaerialonpoleateachmasthead.

Reconstructioncosts:£2,800,000.

Complement:average1,183.

GunnerypracticeatseaduringannualFleetmanoeuvres,1934.ThephotographshowsMalayanearestthecamera,thenWarspite,RodneyandNelson.

ExcellentviewofWarspite’snewlayoutafterhercompletereconstruction.SheisseenonherwaytojointheMediterraneanFleetatMalta,January1938.

7.Theshipwasre-enginedandre-boileredbyParsonswithParsonsgearedturbinesandsixAdmiraltythree-drumhigh-pressureboilersarrangedinthreecompartments,grouped together. The original arrangements of turbines and propeller shafts wereretained.Horsepower increased toapproximately80,000shpfor24knots.Separatedieseldrivengeneratorswereprovided,thesebeingentirelyindependentofthemainsteam system.Generating capacity increased from700kW to2,400kW.Becauseofthe reduced number of boilers (six against original 24) the original forward boilerroom was no longer required and became available for other purposes, includingdieseloiltanks,bombandsub-calibremagazines,secondarywirelessandtelegraphyoffice, telephone exchange andHACP, turbo-generator rooms, SL stabilizing roomand stores. Total saving in weight and space on machinery and boilers was

approximately1,480tonsand4,540squarefeet(seetable).Concentrationofallthreeboiler rooms in one groupwas aweakpoint as all steampowerwas cut offwhenthesewere flooded by bomb damage at Salerno in September 1943. Fuel capacityincreasedby300tonsandnominalradiusincreasedfrom7,670milesto13,500milesat 10 knots by the greater economyof the newgeared turbines andmore efficientboilers,especiallythelatter.8.The formerbridgeworkandconning towerwas replacedbya largesplinterandgasprooftower,amodificationofthetypefirstintroducedintheNelsonclass(1925),designed tomeet the requirements of a fleet flagship and accommodating the firecontrol top and director position formerly located on the tripod foremast.Arrangementoftowerfrombaseupwards:shelterdeck–generalreadingroomandoilskin store; No. 1 platform – Officers’ sea cabins. CPOs’ reading room,midshipmen’s’ study;No. 2 platform – sea cabins forAdmiral, Chief of Staff andCaptain,Master ofFleet andNavigatingOfficer, twobathrooms;No. 3 platform–lowered armoured navigating position in face. Signal office DF and cipher office,signalofficer’scabin,SLandlookoutpositionatsides;Admiral’sBridge–Admiral’sshelterandcharthouseatforwardend,remotecontroloffice,plottingoffice,6inandHAdirectorsatrear;theroof–15indirector.Thetrunkedfunnelwasreplacedbyasinglemuchsmallerfunnel,affordingspaceforadditionalAAarmamentwithcleararcsof fire.Boat stowageandhandlingarrangementsweremodifiedas inMalaya.Accommodation,ventilationandgeneralequipmentwascompletelymodernized.

Warspitestrippedrightdowntothehullforcompletereconstruction.SeenhereatPortsmouthshowingnoupperworksexceptforthenewlowersuperstructuretakingshape.

Warspitealmostcomplete.Thenewguiseisnowonview.‘Newwineintooldbottles’onecriticstated.Nevertheless,almostnewshewas.Close-upofsuperstructureandfunnel.March1937.

9.Rigmodified.Originalheavytripodforemastwasreplacedbylightpolesteppedatthe rear of control towerwith short topmast and topgallant and tallDF aerial pole(actual light polewas part of originalmainmast).No control top. Short polemainmastwithDFaerialathead.SignalandWTyardonforemast.WTyardonmain.

ValiantleavingGibraltarinApril1931.Overagainstthemole,Renown,TigerandRepulsecanbeseen.

Warspitestarboardbowview,March1937.

ReconstructionofValiant,March1937toNov1939Reconstructioninvolved90percentofstructure.

1.Nominaldraughtanddisplacementincreasedbyapproximately3½inand420tonsbyadditionalweights imposedon reconstruction,whichwerenotentirelyoffsetbythelightermachineryandboilersandweightofitemsremovedashadbeenthecaseinWarspite. Nominal displacement as reconstructed about 920 tons heavier thanWarspite. Compared to pre-construction figures, the estimated weight of hull andarmour increasedby1,163 tons, armamentby596 tonsandequipmentby87 tons.Machineryandboilerweightsreducedby1,485tonsgivinganestimatednetincreaseof361tons.Asaconsequenceoftheremovaloftheentire6inbattery,theforecastlesidemodificationswereconsiderablymoreextensivethaninWarspite.Theoriginalrecessed forecastle was built out into a normal curve extending to a point abaftamidshipswhereitangledintothecentrelineof‘X’turretasbefore.Thesidewasplated up over main deck casemates aft and decked over as inWarspite. Specialmeasuresweretakeninthisship(andQueenElizabeth)topreventanyhulldistortion(hogging) as had occurred in Warspite during reconstruction as a result of theremovalofheavyweights(machineryandboilers)amidships.

QueenElizabeth.FleetReviewswereafavouritepublicgatheringandnonemoresothanwhenthebigshipswerepresent.QueenElizabethisshownhereduringthe1935Review(thelastforHisMajestyKingGeorgeV).

VALIANTProfiles,1924and1940

VALIANT:PARTICULARS,1939Displacement(tons):35,698ordinarydeepcondition,36,513(includingwaterprotection).

Lengthandbeamasin1934.

OriginalrecessedforecastleandflareasinWarspite.

Armament

Maingunsasoriginal.

20X4.5indual-purpose(10twinturrets).

LightAAasinWarspite.

OriginalsalutingandMGs.

Notorpedoarmament.

Radar:AWType79Z,MF/DFaerial.

Searchlights:6×44in,2×24insignalling.

Armour

Mainbeltasoriginal.AsrefittedsameasreconstructedWarspiteexcept:4inspecial‘D’armour on upper sides amidships in place of original 6in battery. Main deck armourincreased to4¼inaroundouter faceof ‘Y’barbette. Increasedsubdivision inboilerandmachineryspaces.

Machinery

Parsonsgearedturbines.

8Admiraltytype3-drumboilers.

Fuel:asWarspite.

General

SameasWarspiteexceptforbridgeslightlydifferentinshape.

Rig: Same as Warspite except light tripod legs to foremast. Reconstruction costs:£3,000,000(approx).

Appearance: Similar toWarspite except: Secondary turrets port and starboard, no 6inbatteryupperpartofbridgetowerextendedfartheraft,tripodforemast,nosternwalk.

QUEENELIZABETH:PARTICULARS,1941Displacement(tons):37,696(deep)(includes699tonswaterprotection),35,930averageactioncondition.

Lengthandbeamas1934.

ArmamentasValiant.

Radar:AWType279fittedJanuary1941,improvedMF/DFasValiant

Allother featuresalmost identicalwithValiant anddifficult to tell themapart at certainangles.

GENERALPARTICULARSFORCLASSIN1944Malaya in Reserve from October 1944 owing to relatively unmodernized conditioncomparedtoQueenElizabeth,ValiantandWarspite.Displacement(tons)

QE::37,385(deep)June1944;38,450(deep)1945.

Valiant:35,647(deep)1944;38,908(deep)1946.

Malaya:37,710(deep)1945.

Lengthandbeamas1939.

Armament

Mainandsecondaryas1939.

Malaya:48×20mmAA(singles)(plus32×2pdrs).

Warspite:35×20mmAA(plus32×2pdrs).

QueenElizabeth:32×2pdrs.54×20mmAA.

Valiant.32×2pdr47×20mmAA.

Radar

Type284formainguns.Type285for4inAA.Type282forlightAA.AWType281.SWType 273 (Type 284 replaced by 275). Various IFF aerials plus Type 650 anti-missileaerialsseeninMalayaandWarspite.Searchlights;asin1939.

Aircraft:allremovedandareausedforotherequipment.Catapultsremoved.

Protectionasin1939.

Machinery:asin1939.

Speed: Greatly reduced owing to many wartime additions and doubtful it any of thesurvivingvesselscouldsustainmorethan22knotsforlongperiods.Warspitereducedinspeedevenmoreafterhittingminein1944(about16knots).

AllHACSequipmentgreatlyimprovedfrom1939to1944.

Allvesselsoverweightby1944andverywetinaseaway

2. Main armament and fire control modifications were practically the same as inWarspite.The6insecondarybatterywasreplacedbytwenty4.5inDPHA/LAgunsintenlighttwinturretsofaspecialgas-tightpatternwithmushroomcrownsarmouredagainstaerialattack.Theturretswerearrangedfiveportandstarboardamidshipsintwogroups,threeonforecastledeckabeambridgetowerandfunnelandtwofurtheraftonupperdeckabeamafter superstructure.Rateof firewasabout18 roundsperminuteundergoodconditions.Theturretsrevolvedonweatherdeckwithtweendeckmountingstravellingonrollerpathsondeckbelowandpermittingbothflatandhightrajectoryfire.Blasteffectsbetweenturretswasoftenreportedassevereandspecialarrangementsweremadetopreventcatapultfrombeingdamagedbyblastfromtheafterpairofturretswhentrainedahead.Thegunswerecontrolledfromfourdirectors,twoportandstarboardonbridgetowerabaft15indirectorandtwoportandstarboardonafter superstructure.Ammunitionwas suppliedbyendlesschainhoists.The4inAAarmamentwasremoved.

The change to dual-purpose gunsmarked the beginning of a new cycle of capital shipsecondaryarmament in theRoyalNavy inwhichdefence against air attackwas to takeprecedenceover surface torpedo attack.Mediumcalibre guns,which couldnot beusedagainstbothairandsurfacetargets,werenolongerconsideredworththeweightandspacetheyabsorbed,andscreeningcruisersanddestroyerswerereliedupontobreakupenemydestroyerattacks;4in–5ingunsbeingconsideredadequateagainst smaller torpedocraft,thesegunsbeingalsowelladaptedforhigh-anglefire.ThegunsselectedforValiantandQueenElizabethwere4.5ininsteadofthe5.25inoftheKingGeorgeVclassbecausethelarger gun could not have been carried in adequate numbers on their length anddisplacement. Light AA armament was increased to thirty-two 2pdr in four 8-barrelmountings,twoportandstarboardonsuperstructureamidshipsaroundfunnel,plussixteen0.5ininfour4-barrelmountings,twoeachon‘B’and‘X’turrets.LightAAdirectorswerefitted port and starboard at the sides of the bridge tower abaft funnel and on the aftersuperstructure.Thediameterofthesedirectorswasonlyabout2inlessthanthatofthe8ftplatforms on which they were mounted and the fittings were reported to be verycomplicated. Additional space for the considerably increased light ammunition supplyrequiredwasobtainedbyremovaloftheremainingtorpedotubesandareductioninboilerroomspace.

VoliontenteringGrandHarbourMalta,August1935.NotethelightgreyMediterraneancolours.

3.Airwarningradar(Type79Z)wasfitted(November1939),withanaerialoneachmainmast.ShewasthesecondBritishcapitalshiptohaveoperationalradar(fittedinRodney1938).4.The36inSLwerereplacedby44inandthenumberwasincreasedfromfourtosix,two port and starboard low on face of bridge tower; two port and starboard onplatformagainstrearoffunnel;twoportandstarboardonaftersuperstructurebeforemainmast.5.AircraftequipmentaddedasinWarspiteexceptbentinsteadofstraightarmcranes.6.The6inbatteryandcasematearmourwasremoved,partiallyoffsettingincreasedweightofnewsecondaryarmamentandammunitionsupply.Specialveryhigh-tensile‘D’-typesteelarmourwasfittedonsides inplaceofbatteryarmourbelowforwardgroupofsecondaryturrets.ImprovementsinhorizontalandboileruptakeprotectionwasasinWarspitewiththefollowingadditions:maindeckincreasedfrom1¼into4¼in around outer face of ‘Y’ barbette; lower deck increased from 3in to 3½inoutsideforwardbulkhead;totalhorizontalprotectionovermagazines,machineryandboiler spaces asWarspite plus the extra 3in on main deck around ‘Y’ barbette;conning towermodifications as inWarspite; existingbulgeprotection retained,butinternal subdivision and pumping capacity improved and extended as inWarspite,internalsubdivisioninboilerspacesbeingfurtherincreased.7. Re-engined and re-boilered by Fairfield with Parsons geared turbines and eightAdmiralty three-drum boilers in four compartments. The original arrangement ofturbinesandpropellershaftswasretained.ThenumberofboilersincreasedbytwoascomparedtoWarspiteandthearrangementextendedtofourcompartmentsinsteadofthree to provide greater subdivision. Horse power increased to 80,000shp forprovisional24knots.SeparatedieseldrivengeneratorswerefittedasinWarspite.

QUEENELIZABETHArmoureddeckasreconstructed,1940

Malaya.Firstofthefinalreconstructions,MalayaisseenhereinDevonporton10Novemberl936ThiswasasfarasreconstructionwentforMalaya,andsheneverreceivedtheextensivealterationsgiventoWarspite,QueenElizabethandValiant.

8.Bridge,conningtower,funnel,boatstowageandhandlingmodificationswereasinWarspite except that the upper part of the bridge tower extended further aft.Accommodation,ventilationandgeneralequipmentwerebroughtuptodate.9.Rigmodifiedtolighttripodforemastwithtopmastonlyandshortpolemainmastwithouttopmast.Aradaraerialonashortpolewasfittedateachmasthead.

ReconstructionofQueenElizabeth,Aug1937toJan1941Reconstructioninvolved90percentofstructure.

1.Nominaldraughtanddisplacementincreasedby14inand1,600tonsbyadditionalweightsimposedonreconstructionwhich,asinValiant,wereonlypartiallyoffsetbythelightermachineryandboilerweights.HullmodificationswereasinValiant.Thelengthened bow flare and built out forecastle side tended to assist dryness in headseasalthoughinQueenElizabeththiswasoffsettosomeextentbytheconsiderableincrease in draft and displacement with a corresponding loss of freeboard andstability.ArmamentmodificationswereasinValiant.2.Airwarning radarwas fitted in January1941 (Type279),withanaerial at eachmasthead.ImprovedMF/DFasinValiant.

3.SearchlightmodificationsasinValiant.4.AircraftequipmentasinValiantexceptstraightinsteadofbentarmcranes.5.ProtectionmodificationsasinValiant.6.NewmachineryandboilersasinValiant.7.RigmodifiedasinValiantexcept that tripodlegs(rakedforward)wereaddedtomainmast.Hullsuperstructureandfunnelwerecamouflaged.

ModificationstoOtherShipsoftheClassType79ZairwarningradarinValiantreplacedbyType279(byMarch1940).

MaintopgallantremovedinMalayaandshorttopmastfittedtoforemast.

CamouflagepaintedupinMalaya(1940),deletedinJune1941.

1941–3:1.Radarcontrol(Type284)fittedformainarmamentinallexceptBarham(1941).InQueenElizabethType285(highangle)aerialused inconjunctionwith the284set.ValiantandWarspitedidnothavethisintheMatapanaction,28March1941(fittedatAlexandrialater).RadarcontrolType285fittedfor4.5inand4inAAinallexceptBarham.FittinginQueenElizabethcommencedFebruary1941,otherslater.FittedinMalaya by July 1941. Bridge work added around 4in AA inMalaya. Light AAgenerally increased. Multiple 2pdr (four barrels) added on ‘B’ turret in Barham(1941).Multiple2pdr(eightbarrels)addedportandstarboardonaftersuperstructureinMalaya (1942–3).0.5inremovedandvaryingnumbersof twinandsingle20mmAAaddedonsuperstructures,turretsandquarterdeck,rightaft.Quarterdeck20mminQueenElizabethreplacedbyDFaerial(1943).ValiantandWarspitecarried20mmonallturretsin1943,MalayaandQueenElizabethon‘B’and‘X’only.Radar control (Type 282) for close-range barrage fire fitted for 2pdrs and twin

20mm.FittedinQueenElizabethJune1941.LAAdirectorsaddedinWarspiteasforQueen Elizabeth and Valiant. InMalaya these were located in cupolas port andstarboardoverbridge.2.Airwarning radar (Type 281) added inBarham,Malaya andWarspite aerial ateachmasthead.Surfacewarningradar(Type273)added1942–3.AerialonmaintopinMalaya, on foretop inothers. ImprovedMF/DFequipment fitted inMalayaandWarspite(asQueenElizabethandValiant).AerialandaftersuperstructureinMalayaandonfaceofbridgetowerinWarspite.AdditionalDFaerialfittedonquarterdeckrightaftinQueenElizabeth,replaced20mmAA.3.ProminentventilatingtrunksaddedatbaseofmainmastinMalaya(1942–3).SternwalkremovedinQueenElizabeth1943.4.CamouflagepaintedupinMalaya,ValiantandWarspite(seecamouflagechapter).

1944:1.Aircraftnotcarriedafter1944.Hangarsandcranesretained.2.Pacific-patterncamouflagepaintedupinQueenElizabethandValiant (inEasternFleet).

1945:

Proposed in January 1945 to fit improved radar in Queen Elizabeth and Valiant asopportunity occurred.Gunnery Type 284 to be replaced by Type 274. SurfacewarningType273by277.SurfacewarningType268(navigational)andair-surfacewarningType293added.ThesemodificationsactuallycarriedoutonlyinValiantduringarefitin1945–6.

BattleDamageBarham,torpedoed28December1939Whileonazigzagcourseat19knotsoffthewestcoastofScotlandinposition58°47’N,8° 05’W,Barham was torpedoed on the port side abreast ‘A’ and ‘B’ shell rooms (48station)atadepthofabout18–20feet.Acolumnofsprayshotuptoabout150–200feetandfellbackonthevessel,inundatingthebridge,boatsandpersonnelinthevicinity.Allwaterprotectioncompartmentswerefullatthetimeoftheexplosionwhichoccurredattheforwardendofthebulgewheretheprotectionofferedwasnecessarilylessbecauseofthe‘runin’ofthebulgestructure.Generallyallcompartmentsabreast‘A’and‘B’shellroomsontheportsidefloodedimmediately.‘A’shellroomand‘A’magazinefilledquickly,butsixofthetenoccupantsescaped.‘B’shellroomand‘B’magazinefilledupslowly.Atthetimeof theexplosionwatertightdoorswere in thecruisingstate, i.e., ‘X’and ‘Y’doorswere closed and clipped except a few that had been left open by special permission ofDCOoftheWatch.Damagecontrolworkedperfectly.

WARSPITEProfileandInboardasReconstructed,1937–8

Immediatelyafter theexplosionBarham tookaheelof7° toportwhichwasquicklyarrestedbytransferofoilfuel.Nowaterwasadmittedintotheshipforcorrectionofheelandtrimuntilshereturnedtodock.Themainengineswerestillworkingsatisfactorilyandshemade off at 10 knots increasing to 16 knots later. Distance to port was about 380nautical miles zigzagging. There was no failure of primary lighting and the secondarylightingwas generally satisfactory. The explosion caused no damage to the primary orsecondaryhigh-anglearmamentexcept thatofflooding.Therewasnofireonboardandno secondary explosion. None of the vent plates on the bulge in the vicinity of theexplosionwereblownofforstrained.

Structuraldamage:

Ingeneralthebulgeplatingwasrupturedandthrownawayfrom39stationto55½station

–alengthof32feet.Verticallythemainruptureextendedfromtheloweredgeofthebulgetotheloweredgeofthesixthstrakeofbulgeplating–averticaldistanceofabout17feet.Theapproximatecentreofthedamagewasat48station.Heretheouterbottomwasturnedupandforcedinboardabovethethirdlongitudinal,andheavilycorrugatedbelowthethirdlongitudinalasfarasthemiddleline.Thedamagefadedoutataboutstations36and60.Inboardoftheruptureinthebulgeplatingtheship’souterbottom(40lb)andinnerbottom(14lb)plating(andframing)wasmissingorturnedinboardoveranareaalmostidenticalwith that of the rupture in the outer bulge plating.The thick bulkhead (two in number,40lb HT) was forced inboard and torn away at its bottom connection. At the point ofmaximum deflection it was forced back sufficiently far to have touched the magazineshellroomlongitudinalbulkhead(port),butwas latermadeabout12 inchesclearof thatbulkhead.Themaximumdeflectionat48stationwasabout78inches.

WARSPITEAsReconstructed1937GeneralArrangementsandRigProfile

Thethickbulkheadhadtwomajorruptures,onealmostexactlyopposite thecentreofthedamagerunningthefulldepthofthebulkheadandwithamaximumopeningofabout12 inches; the second started at the bottom edge at a butt at 42 station. The thirdlongitudinal bulkhead, inboard of the thick bulkhead, was also set in and ruptured.Generallytransversebulkheadsbetween36stationand68stationwerebuckled.

Casualties:fourkilledandtwowounded.

BARHAMTorpedoDamage,28December1939

Thegeneraleffectoftheexplosionwaslocalizedtoaremarkableextentandthedamageinnowayaffectedthefightingefficiencyof theship.Thedamagecontrolofficerof thewatchhadkeptapeggedrecordofthedoorswhichwereopenandhadmenstandingbytoshutthemassoonastheordertodosowasgiven.Damagecontrolarrangementsnotonlyworkedperfectly,butanengineerofficerhadbeendetailedespeciallyforthistaskandforthreemonthspriortothisincidenthadhadnootherdutiesexceptwatch-keeping.

Oneparticularlyinterestingfactwasthatnoneoftheventplatesinthebulgehadblownofforevenshowedsignsofstrain.Thefactthattheywerespecificallydesignedtoblowoutonsuchanoccasionindicatesthatthetheoryofventplatesdidnotnecessarilyholdupinpractice.

Draughtofshipbeforeexplosion31ftmean;afterexplosion,41ft6inforward,27ftaft.Onenteringdock,35ft2½inforward,32ft11inaft.

MalayaTorpedoedbyU81offCapeVerdeIslands,20March1941While on convoy dutiesMalaya was hit by a torpedo on the port side just abaft 82bulkheadabreast the forebridge,andsustainedconsiderabledamage.Draughtbefore theexplosionwas33ftforwardand32ftaft,butonehourafter thehit this increasedto35ftand33ft respectively.The ship listed1½° toport.The torpedo trackwas seen from theupper conning tower deck at about 50 yards, approaching fromRed 70°.The trackwasvisible for about two seconds and appeared almost to have reached the ship when theexplosionoccurred.Itwasconcludedthatthetorpedohadbeenrunningatashallowdepthsetting and thereforehadbeen fired at the convoy from long range andnot specificallyaimedatMalayawhichatthetimewasmakingonly7knots.

OnreachingTrinidaddiverswereputover to inspect thedamagealthoughconditionswere not good for a thorough survey at that time. The following damage was noted

however: 1. Three armour plates had been forced in above turtle back, and ship’s sideimmediatelybelowhadahorizontalsplitapproximately14feetlongand4incheswide.2.Ship’ssidewasbadlydentedbelowsplit.3.Alladjacentupperandlowerbulgeshadbeenblownaway.

Nomajordamagewasdone to anyof the armament. 15 inch:The floodingofNo.2hydraulicroomnecessitatedchangingovertoduplicatepressurein‘B’turret,andmeantthatonlythreepumpswereavailableforthefourturrets.Nomachineryintheturretswasinanywayaffected.6in:P.4mountingwasjammedfordirectortrainingbytheshockofthe explosion, and this was rectified after two hours’ work by the ship’s crew. TheremainingmountingswerequiteundamagedbutP.2andP.3jumpedteethonthedirectorelevating drive and black pointer adjustments were necessary. The entire battery couldhavebeenusedatanytimeinGunlayer’sfiring.4inandcloserange:Nodamageofanykindsustained.

BARHAMTorpedoDamage,28December1939

AsuperbaerialviewofBarhamduringthespringcruiseofMarch1937.

EngineRoom:smallleaksanddripswerenotedinmanyofthecompartmentsforwardof82Stationandbelowarmoureddeck(middle).Theseleakswerepresentwherepipes,ventilationshafts,etc.,passedthroughthearmoureddeck.Itappearedthatasthearmoureddeck was laid on top of the original middle deck, water could circulate in the spacebetweenandthuscauseleaks.

Leakswerenotedin:forwarddressingstation;lowerconningtowerflat;‘A’space;‘B’

space;searchlightstabilizingroom;gunner’sstore.

After temporaryrepairsMalaya sailed for theUSAwherepermanent repairskeptheroutofactionforfourmonths.

WarspiteandValiantDamagedByEnemyAirAttackoffCrete,22May1941Warspite andValiantwere bombed byMesserschmittBf 109s and both ships sustainedmore than superficial damage. Warspite was flying the flag of Rear-Admiral H. B.Rawlings,OBE,andwasincompanywithValiant,Gloucester,Fijiandsevendestroyers(Napier,Hero,Hereward,Isis,Decoy,GreyhoundandGriffin).Inresponsetoarequestforassistance from Rear-Admiral, 15th Cruiser Squadron in HMS Naiad, the ships weresteamingonanortheasterlycourseat20knots,andhad justpassed through theKitheraChannel. Considerable air opposition had been met during the forenoon, and as manyhostile aircraft were in sight at varying distances, the ship’s company was at RetireStations,withallHAArmamentandsupplymanned.

ThreeMesserschmittBf109sweresightedrightaheadcomingoutofthehazeatabout2,000yards,havingalreadycommencedtheirdiveontheship.Eachaircraftdroppedonebomb estimated to be of at least 500lb calibre. The bombswere droppedwithin a fewsecondsofoneanotherfromaheightofapproximately800feet,almostimmediatelyaftertheaircrafthadbeensighted.About120roundswerefiredfromthemachine-guns,butthepom-pomsdidnotfire.Beforeavoidingactionhadbecomeeffectiveahitwasreceivedonthestarboardsidenexttotheforemost4ingunmounting.Thesecondbombfell50yardsclearofthestarboardside,thethirdfellabout100yardsrightahead.

Thefirstbombpassedthroughtheforecastledeckabout6inchesfromtheship’ssidejust before the starboard forward twin 4inHA gunmounting, then passed through 112batterybulkheadunderthebeam,hittheupperdeckat116station1inchfromship’sside,shotslightly inboard(notpiercingthedeck)andbursteitheron125batterybulkheadorupperdeckatapproximately124station12inchesfromship’sside.Angleofdescent44°to45°.Distanceofpointof strike topointofburstapproximately29 feet.Thicknessofplatesthroughwhichthebombpassed,andparticularsofotherobstructionsbetweenpointofstrikeandpointofburst:1.Forecastledeck,linHTand½indoubleplatingforforward4inHAmounting;2.Batterybulkhead,1½inHT;3.Upperdeck,1¼inand¾inHT.

Majordamagesustained:forecastledeck,holedinstringerandtwoadjacentstrakesofplatingbetweenstations114and137,withbeamsunderblownupwithdeck(destroyedoveranareaof90ft×30ft);bentupbetweenstations98and140,approximatemaximum1ft 4in; between stations 112 and 125 the fore and aft girder under deck distorted andpartlyblownaway;upperdeck,holeinstrakeadjacenttostringerplatebetweenstations120and126(upperdeckbulgeddownwardsoveranarea130ftlong×30ftwide);blowndown between stations 86 and 146, approximate maximum 2 feet; beams broken atstations122and124;foreandaftgirderdistortedfromstations106to118;pillars,maintoupper decks distorted at stations 100,106,112,124 and 134; No. 3 boiler room intakebetweenforecastleandfancasingsblownin;ship’ssideplating,forecastletoupperdecks,stations103to118,platinghingedfromforecastledeckandblownoutboard;stations118to 127, plating blown out from fore end; 118 bulkhead betweenmain and upper decks

compressed;starboardafter4inHAgunssupport–platingholedandstiffenersdistorted(sizeofholeapproximately1 foot×10 inches);batterybulkhead,112station,distortedand inboard end blown forward approximately 5ft 6in; battery bulkhead, 115 station,shattered from ship’s side to vertical welded butt, 18 inches away from doorway andblownaft.Doortobulkheadblownaft,weldroundhingesonbulkheadsheared.6ingunplate bracket supports under upper deck at stations 105 and 118 distorted. Starboardforwardpom-pomgunsupportanddeckliftedapproximately12inches.

Minordamage:maindeckbentdownbetween120and126stationsforadiameterof5feettoadepthof5inchesandpiercedinthreeplacesbyholesof1ft×3in,6in×2inand3in×1½in;bulwarksplinterprotectionblownofffromforwardfaceofforward4inHAgunto130station.Shelterdeckbentupapproximately1footoneachsideofpom-pomready usemagazine and holed at 124 station. Superstructure bulkheads above point ofburst, split and distorted. Pom-pomplatformblast screens holed and distorted.Deck offorwardpom-pomreadyusemagazineholed,size1foot×4inches.Divisionalbulkheadsof warrant officers’ and gun room messes, pantries, galleys and drying room severelydamaged.Warrantofficers’messwrecked.Gunroommessseverelydamagedandgalley-fittings smashed (ovens remained in quite good state). Note: The damage abaft 125bulkhead was mostly caused by fragments from that bulkhead when it was shattered.Bakerybulkheaddistorted,ovens tornoutandfittingsdamaged.Scupperpipefractured,maintoupperdeckat124station.Firemain,freshandsaltwaterservices,heatingsteamandother small pipes fractured and damaged in vicinity of explosion.Large amount ofventilationtrunkingincludingthatofNo.3dynamodestroyedinvicinity.

Extent of damage caused by blast effect: ship’s side, 103 to 127 stations, blown out(forecastle to upper deck); forecastle deck bent up between 98 and 140 stationsapproximately maximum 1 foot 4 inches; upper deck bent down between 86 and 146stationsapproximatemaximum2feet,distortingbeams,etc.andS.3andS.4platebracketsupports;118bulkheadbetweenupperandmaindeckscompressed;112batterybulkheadblownforwardandinboardapproximately5feet6inches;divisionalbulkheadsofwarrantofficers’ mess, galleys, drying room and bakery distorted; shelter deck, superstructurebulkheads,pom-pomgundecksandblastscreensdistorted;No.125batterybulkheadonfragmenting,piercedafter4inHAgunsupportanddivisionalbulkheadsat141½and158stations,alsocuttingship’ssidefrom154station;freshandsaltwaterservicesdamagedinvicinityofexplosionandbyupperdeckbeingbentdown;No.3boilerroomfandowntakecasingblownoutfromforecastledecktofancasings.

Extent of damage caused by splinter effect (bomb appears to have fragmentedthoroughly):On112and125batterybulkheads,insideship’ssideandondeckplatingandbeamsunder forecastledeckwerenumerouspit-marksof sizesvarying from½in to2indiameterapproximately.Splintersroundedgesofforecastleandupperdecksholedplating.112Batterybulkheadholedinthreeplaces,sizes3in×lin,2in×½inand¾indiameter.Ship’ssideplating(forecastletoupperdeck)oneholeof4indiameterat123station,4feetfromdeck.Beamsat112–144stationswerepiercedinseveralplaces.Pom-pomgunblastscreens piercedwith about eight holes of approximately 1½in diameter. Superstructure,severalpit-marksandthreeholesof2½indiameter.

Effectonfightingefficiencyofarmament:Starboard6inbattery, twoofthefourguns

completely out of action. Two remaining guns in action with primary control andimprovisedtelephones.

The Squadronwas turned to the southward and all further attacks onWarspite weremadebyhigh-levelbombersonly.Thedamage to the fansupplyofNo.3boilercausedvery thick black smoke to emerge from the funnel, but this was stopped in about tenminutes.Downbelow, the fireand repairparties,assistedbyextrahands fromthemessdecks,putoutthefewsmallfiresthatoccurredinthebattery,andthenstartedremovingthe dead and wounded and clearing up. The dead were buried at sea at about 20.00hours.Thewoundedweredistributed among theboys’messdeck, the church andofficeflatsnearthemarines’messdecks,andapartofthemarines’messdeckitself.

Damagetostructure:Thelargeexpanseofforecastledeckandship’ssidewhichwereblownawayprovidedagoodventingwhichsavedfurtherdamagedownwards.Thethickforecastledeck,coupledwith theobliqueangleof impact, the lowverticalvelocity,andthethickupperdeckalsopreventedfurtherdownwarddamage.Itisinterestingtocomparethelargeexpanseofupperdeckdisheddownwards(130feet×30feet)withthesmallhole(6in×8in)inthatdeckimmediatelyundertheburst.

Temporaryrepairswerecompletedinonemonth,butfullrepairofdamageundertakeninUSAfromAugusttoDecember1941.

Valiant was the target of a stick of four bombs, estimatedweight 50kg, fuzed directactionandreleasedfromabout15,000feet.Thedirecthitswerescoredontheupperdeckport side, one just abaft 196 station and theother just abaft 210 station.Onenearmissbombburstabout4feetbelowwaterandclosetothebulgeplatingontheportsideabreast126½station.Anothernearmissbombburstoff theport sidebetween50 to60stationsand caused no damage. Detonation was complete, only a few small fragments beingfound.

Firsthit,structuraldamage:Thebombstrucktheupperdeck(30lbHTon30lbHT)portsidejustabaft196stationabout12feetfromtheship’ssideandburstonimpact.Itmadeaholeabout4feetsquareinthedeckandsplintersperforatedthe20lbsuperstructuresideplatingandfittingsinthevicinity.The10lbWTbulkhead196betweenthemainandupperdeckswasfracturedanddistortedandthetopboundaryanglewastornawayandfractured.Anumberofrivetsconnectingtheanglestiffenertothebulkheadweresheared.The14lbmaindeckwasperforatedinfourplacesanddentedinnumerousotherplaces.Themesstablesandstoolsonthemaindeckinthevicinityoftheburstweresmashedandthe7lbpantrybulkheadat192stationwasperforated.A15lbhatchcoamingabout15feetfromthepointofburstwasperforatedbysplintersand thedrumof theportafterdeckwinchwasfracturedanddistorted.

Electrical damage: The shore leads toNo. 8 dynamo used to supply degaussing ‘M’coil, supply and control wiring cables for Nos. 6 and 8 deck winches, permanentemergencyleadsfromtheportafterbreakercompartmenttomaindeckandanumberofsmallercablesweredamagedbysplinters.

Incendiary effects: There were no incendiary effects, but thick pungent smoke andfumes on themess deck abaft 196 bulkhead, port,were cleared rapidly by opening theupperdeckhatch.

Effectonfightingefficiency–nil.

Secondhit,structuraldamage:Thebombstrucktheupperdeckportsideatthejunctionofthe30lbdeckstringerplateandthe25lbsheerstrakeoftheshellplatingjustabaft210station,andburstonimpact.Itmadeaholeabout3feet×1feet6inchesinthedeckand3feet×1footintheship’ssideanddestroyedthe3½in×3½in×10lbdeckboundaryangleinwayofhole.The‘Z’barframeandbulbbeamat210stationweredistorted.Therivetsin the flangedconnectionwereshearedand thebracketdistorted.A15lbhatchcoamingabout30feetfromthepointofburstwasperforatedbysplinters.Theguardrailstanchionsinthevicinityoftheburstwerefracturedandapartofonewasblownadistanceofabout150feettothehangartopwhereitpiercedthesideofthe45ftmotorlaunch.Thebarbettearmourof‘Y’turretwasscoredinnumerousplaces, insomecasestoadepthofhalfaninch.Thedegaussing‘Q’coil,whichwaslaidonthedeckinboardoftheguardstanchions,wassevered.

WARSPITEBombDamage,May1941

OneofWarspite’sfirstknockswaswhenshewasattackedoffCreteinMay1941andhitby100lbbombs.Thedamageshownisthatonthebatterydeck.Notethe6incasemateandgun.

Effectonfightingefficiency–nil.

Nearmiss,structuraldamage:Thebombburstabout4feetbelowthewaterclosetothebulgeplatingportsideabreast126½stationandcausedaholeabout4feetwide×7feetdeepinthe30lb‘H’strakeof theupperbulgeplatingbetween125Kand127Kstations.Between127Kand129Kstationstheplatingwasforcedinwardsandtherivetsinthetopandbottomlapsweresheared.Intheupperbulgethe20lbWTbulkheadat125Kstationwas distorted and leaked; the rivets through the outer boundary angle connectionwereshearedandtheangledistorted.Thechannelbarframeat127Kstationwasdestroyed.Thechannelbarframeat129Kstationwasdistorted,threerivetswereshearedandtheflangedbracketat thebottomof the framewasdistorted.Theship’s sidearmourwasunmarkedexcept for one small indentation. In the lower bulge the 22.5lb top strake of platingformingthecrownofthebulgewasdishedtoamaximumofabout3inchesbetween125½to 127½ stations and the butt at 126½ stationwas opened to amaximum of about 2½inchesatthecentre.Therivetsthroughthedoublerivetedbuttstrapwereshearedontheforesidewhilethoseontheaftsideremainedintact.Damagewasrepairedintwomonths.

AdramaticviewofBarham‘takingitgreen’,c.1930.TheshipsoftheRoyalSovereignclasswerenotoriouslywetinaseawayandtheQueenElizabethsnotmuchbettenasthisphotographshows.MalayaandArgusfollow.

LossofBarhamWhilecruisinginsinglelinewithQueenElizabethandValiantataspeedof17knotsandzigzagging,BarhamwastorpedoedbyU331offtheLibyancoast32°29’N,26°27’Eat1630on25November1941.ThefollowingreportisfromValiantwhichwasatadistanceofjustunderthreecables.At1625theOfficeroftheWatch,Sub-LieutenantD.FTrench,RN, was taking the distance of Barham with the Stewart’s Distance Meter, when heobservedalargeexplosionontheportsideofBarhamabreastthemainmast.HerealizedimmediatelythatBarhamhadbeenstruckbyatorpedofiredfromsomewhereontheportside,andquitecorrectlyordered‘hard-a-port’.

1. Iwas not on the compass platform at themoment of the explosion but onreachingthefrontofittensecondslater,IobservedaverylargecolumnofwaterandsmokealongsideBarham,onlytheafterendofthequarterdeckbeingthenvisible.2. I immediately ordered ‘Full speed ahead together’; at the same time the

Officer of the Watch informed me that the wheel was hard-a-port, and Iobservedthattheshipwasjustbeginningtoswingtoportundertheinfluenceoffullportrudder.3.Aboutfifteensecondslaterasubmarinebrokesurfacebetween50and100

ontheportbowatadistanceofapproximately150yardsandmovingfromleftto right. By then Valiant had swung 8° to port, and was therefore headingapproximately 260°.The submarine was steering between 050° and 060°; her

speedappearedtobeabout4knots.4. Immediately on sighting the submarine I ordered ‘Amidships’, and then

‘Hard-a-starboard’ inanendeavour to ramher,butbefore therudderwashardover it was obvious that it would not be possible to check the swing to portbeforeshewasacrossthebow.Actuallytheswingwasjustaboutcheckedwhenthesubmarinepasseddownthestarboardside,andshesubmergedagainwhenabreastValiant’sbridgeatadistanceofabout50yards.Assheappearedonthestarboard sideS.l pom-pom fired19 roundsatherwithmaximumdepression,butallroundsappearedtopassoverher.ThewheelwasthenagainreversedsoastokeepclearofBarham.5. The only portion of the submarinewhich appeared abovewaterwas the

periscopeandabout2or3feetoftheconningtower,whichwasflattopped.Acertainamountofdisturbedwaterbeforeandabafttheconningtowerindicatedthe fore and after ends of the hull, and enabled an accurate estimate of hercoursetobemade.6.As soon as the smoke and spray had cleared away andBarham became

visible again, it was seen that she had developed a very heavy list to port,probablyabout20°to30°,asitwasobservedthatthewaterwaslevelwiththeafterscreendoorintothelobbyattheforeendofthequarterdeck.Sheappearedto hang in this position for about a minute, when she began to roll over onapproximatelyanevenkeel.7.Shecontinuedtorolloverandsinkdeeperinthewateruntilthewaterwas

seen to be entering the funnel. Amoment or two after this there was a loudexplosionamidships,andaverylargecolumnofblackandbrownsmokewithflame from the explosion in themiddle of it shot into the air. This explosionoccurred at 1630, or 5 minutes approximately after the torpedoes hit, whenBarhamwasjustabaftthebeamfromValiant’sbridge.8. All observers are agreed that, as the torpedoes hit, there were three

explosions,afirstone,followedaboutoneortwosecondslaterbytwoinquicksuccession, and that the explosions all occurred amidshipsbetween the funneland themainmast. It was not certainwhat caused the final explosion but thegeneralopinionwasthatitwasthe6inmagazine,anditwascertainlynot‘A’or‘B’magazine,as thecentreof theexplosionwasabaft thebridge,andIamoftheopinionthatitwasnotasfaraftas‘X’magazine.

BarhamsinkinginNovember1941TwoofthemostdramaticshotstakenduringtheSecondWorldWarshowBarhammortallywoundedaftertakingthreetorpedoesinherportside.Thefirstshowsheraboutoneminuteafterthehitsandalreadyheeling;thesecondshowsherheelingmoreandpassingthepointofmaximumstabilityNotethatsheisstillsteamingatspeed.

[Signed)C.E.Morgan.Captain

Reportbylieutenant-commanderHMSBarham:1.At 1610 hours 25thNovember, 1941, I took over thewatch as P.C.O. andA.D.O.Havingreceivedreportsfromallthearmamentclosedup,Ienteredthecharthousetoseethecyphersandtoacquaintmyselfwiththegeneralsituation.2.SoonafterIenteredthecharthouseIheardandfeltaviolentexplosion.I

was justoutside thecharthouseontheportsideof thebridgewhenIfelt twomoreexplosionsabouthalfasecondapart.Iwaslookingupforaircraftsodidnot see where the explosions took place (6in director fouled my view aft). IcontinuedmycoursetotheA.D.P.andreachedtheafterendofthebridgewhenIfeltthefourthexplosionandsawacolumnofwaterandwreckagethrownupabreast themainmast on the port side.When I reached theA.D.P. I observedfromthemainmastthattheshiphadalistof7°or8°toport.Thenasubmarine

brokesurfacebearingred120about150–200yardsawaypointingtowardsourstern. I could not communicate with the 6in armament from the A.D.P. andbefore I could get through to the 4in armament the submarine had dived.(Valiant was also foul of the range.)Valiant fired a burst of pom-pom at theswirlwherethesubmarinedivedandmadegoodshootingbuttheoversreachedBarham’sside.3.Ilookedaftagainandsawthatthelisthadincreasedslightlyinspiteofthe

factthattheshipwasalteringcourserapidlytoPort.Ithengavetheorder‘Onlifebelts’andthiswaspassedbyS.P.telephonetoallquartersalthoughwecouldnot knowwhether the orderswere received. I then told the director’s crew tocomedownandsenttheA.D.P.’screwdowntothestarboardside.Atthistime,the port side of the boat deck aft was under water and the ship was slowlyturningover.4. All traffic from aloft had ceased and I was left in the A.D.P. with

MidshipmanD.N.A.Coxandonerating.Wewerenotabletogodownsohauledourselves up to the starboard side andwaited for the sea to take us out. Ourlifebeltswereonandinflated.5.WewatchedthewaterswirlingovertheportsideoftheA.D.P.andcome

up to us in about one second. I had no control over my movements in thisswirlingwaterandexpectedsoontobeclear.SoonIfeltthreeorfourropesfoulmeroundmystomachandIwasdrawndown.WhilstIwastryingtodecidethebestmeans of escape these ropes,whichmust have been the signal halyards,parted and I started swimming for the surface. I could see that I was goingtowardsthelightbutitlookedalongway.Itouchedtwoorthreeothersboundinthesamedirectionbutdonotknowwhotheywere.AftersometimeIthoughtof taking off my clothes but decided not to as I should have to take off thelifebeltfirst.IstillseemedtohaveaverylongwaytogowhenItookmyfirstmouthfulofwaterandspatitout.Thencamecompletedarknessandsilence.Icouldn’trememberanythingof this typeinthevariousstoriesIhavereadsoIopenedmymouthandtookinthreegooddeepbreathsofair.IhadnotimetothinkanyfurtherbeforeIwasinwateragainandcouldseethelightalongwayabove.Iwenttowardsthelight.

QUEENELIZABETHProfileandPlan:asReconstructed,1940

Eventually I came to a mass of feet – it was quite dark and I had greatdifficultyinfindingaspacetogetthrough.However,Ibrokesurfaceintimeandwasseizedbytheleftarmbyaratingwhotriedtoholdmeup.Ipersuadedhimtoletgoandfindmyownwreckage.6.Thegeneralbehaviourofthemenwasofthehigheststandard.Intheship

theywerecheerful,quietandtriedtohelpeachotherandinthewaterthiswasso too.They talked toeachotherquietlyandwaitedpatiently for the rescuingboats.TherewasnorushingthewhalerfromHotspurwhichwasnearesttomebut

anorderlyqueueofmenwaitingtheirturn.WhentheboatwasfilledanumberofusheldontothelifelinesatthesidesandweretowedtoHotspurwherewewerewelcomedwitheverypossibleattentionandkindness.7.OfficersandmenofHotspurgaveupblanketsandclothesforourbenefit

andprovidedcigarettesandrefreshment.8.SincethenumberrescuedinHotspurwasnearlytwicethecomplementof

theshipthesupplyofblanketswasshort.Itissuggestedthatdestroyersandcraftused in rescue work should carry a stock of blankets for use in such anemergency.9. On arrival in Alexandria the unwounded went to Resource where we

bathedandwerefedandgivenshipwreckbags(RedCross).Asfaraspossiblethemenwere kitted up in the clothing store and all received a verywelcome£E.2withwhichtobuysuchlittlenecessitiesandcomfortsascouldbeobtainedfromthecanteen.Thiswasgreatlyappreciated.

[Signed)Lieut.CommanderR.N.

AccountbyLieutenantG.M.Wolfe,RNAtthetimeofthefirstexplosion,IwasjustoutsidemyofficewhichwasontheportsideoftheA.D.O.Flat,–thatisthefirstdeckabovetheboatdeckonthebridgestructure.Since I was leaving the office, I was facing aft, and saw the flash of the

explosionwhichappearedtobeimmediatelyabaftthefunnel.Afteraslightpause,twofurtherexplosionsoccurred,bothslightlyfurtheraft.I crossed immediately to the starboard side, where a crowd was already

gatheringontheupperdeck,andgavemypocketknifetoaP.O.whowastryingtounlashtwoCarleyFloatswhichweresecuredatthebottomoftheladderuptothepom-pomdeck.Iwent rapidlyback tomyoffice formyBurberry, and then returned to the

starboard sidewith some difficulty as therewas already an appreciable list. Idescendedtotheupperdeck,wheretheship’scompanywasalreadygoingovertheside.Ishoutedtoallnearmetofollowtheirexample–ratherunnecessarilyastherewaslittlepanicandthemenwerenotwastinganytime.Thelistwassteadilyincreasingandaseveryoneaboutmewasovertheguard

rail,Iwentoveralsoatapointlevelwiththeforwardendofthebridge,andsliddowntothebilgekeel.Bynowshewasgoingoverfast,andIreachedthebottomoftheship,nowan

almost vertical wall. Here I hesitated, owing to the difficulty of keeping mybalancebecausethefinaljumpappearedhazardouswiththebottomcominguptomeetme.Itwasthenthatabigexplosiontookplaceaft,andtheshipplungedoverso

rapidlythatIwasflungbackwardsintothewaterwithmanyothers.Afterbeingsuckeddown,weeventuallysurfacedandIswamovertoaCarley

Floatwhichappearedcloseathand.Alltraceoftheshiphadvanished.IdiscardedmyBurberry,blewupmylifebelt,andheldontothesideofthe

floatwithmanymoreuntilpickedupbyH.M.S.Hotspuronehourlater.

[Signed]G.M.Wolfe

DamagetoQueenElizabethandValiantatAlexandriaWhile lying at anchor inAlexandria on 19December 1941, bothQueen Elizabeth andValiantweresuccessfullyattackedandseriouslydamagedbyItalian‘humantorpedoes’.

Queen Elizabeth was anchored in ‘S’ berth in a depth of about eight fathoms. Atapproximately0615on19December1941therewasanextremelyviolentexplosionundertheareaof‘B’boilerroom.TwoItalianfrogmenhadmanagedtobreakthroughdefencesandplacetorpedoesagainstthehulloftheship.Thechargewasestimatedtobeabout500pounds and had been slung between the keels of the vessel. ‘B’ boiler room floodedimmediatelyand‘A’boilerroomfloodedwithin30seconds.‘X’boilerroom.Nos.1and2dynamorooms,‘A’and‘B’hydraulicroomsandafewothercompartmentsintheareaalsofilledveryrapidly,andtheshiptookalistof4½degreesstarboardandsettledbythebowto about eight feet.Although every effortwasmade to counter-measure the flooding, itslowlyspreadto‘Y’boilerroomandintocompartmentsbeforenumber82bulkhead.Thelowersteeringpositionhadalsofloodedcompletelybytheeveningofthe19th.

Theconditionoftheshipbeforetheexplosionwas:draught:33ft5inforward,32ft7inaft; after the explosion: draught: 41ft 10in forward, 33ft 10in aft.Damage to hull: Theouterlinplatingandtheinnerbottomincludingtheverticalkeel,longitudinalsandframeswerebadlydistortedandfracturedbetween82and120stations,from‘D’strakeportto‘F’strakestarboard.Thegreatestdamagewasbetween100and118stationsfrom‘C’strakeportto‘C’strakestarboard,bothinnerandouterbottomsbeingbadlyupturnedandsetupfordistancesofapproximately22feetand16feetrespectivelyat112stations.Between65and132stationstheouterbottomwasbuckledfrom‘E’strakeportto‘H’strakestarboard.The framing between 81 and 82 bulkheads and the pito-meter log compartment wasdistorted between the inner bottom and middle deck between the third longitudinalbulkheads.

100 bulkhead was distorted and fractured to a height of 7 feet above inner bottom,between fifth starboard longitudinal and third port longitudinal. The stiffeners andbrackets were distorted. 118 bulkhead was distorted and fractured between thirdlongitudinalportandstarboard toaheightofsix feetabove the innerbottom.The thirdlongitudinalbulkheadfrom82to118stationsportsidewasslightlybuckledbetweentheinner bottom and platform deck and broken away from the bottom boundary anglebetween 100 and 118 stations.The fifth longitudinal port and starboard sides weredistorted between the inner bottom and the platformdeck from82 to 116 stations.The

starboardbulkheadwasbadlybuckledbetween100and118stationsnearthebottom.

The following compartments flooded immediately or very rapidly: ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘X’boilerrooms;airspace81–82;‘B’hydraulicroom;Nos.1&2dynamorooms;pitometerlogcompartment;oilfueltanksBl–8,C1and3,C5and8,Dland3,D5and8;DBCs(68–154)thirdlongitudinal(P)tothirdlongitudinal(S).Bulges79½–109½starboard,109½–119½port;WingDBCs91–118port,109–118starboard.

Thefollowingcompartmentsfloodedslowlyand,insomecases,onlypartially:Nos.3,4 and5 dynamo rooms;Cable leadpassages abreast ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘X’ boiler rooms; ‘A’hydraulic room and searchlight stabilizing room; boiler store; Forward 4.5inmagazinesportandstarboard,andcentrelineupperand lower4.5inmagazines;DBC(68–82) thirdlongitudinaltosixthlongitudinalportandstarboard;oilfueltanksC2,4,9,12,D2,4,9,12;oilfuelworkingspacesNos.1,3and7;hammockandkitlockerroomsNos.2,3,4,5,6,7;builderscoamingroundboileruptakes;lowersteeringposition;lowpowermachineroom;protectednavigationplot;mainswitchboardroom;foremedicaldistributingstation;No.2W/Toffice;medicalstore.

On docking the following main items of damage affecting fighting efficiency werefound:

(a)Shipunseaworthy.(b)‘A’,‘B’and‘X’boilerroomsoutofaction.(c)Allevaporatorsoutofaction.(d)Twohydraulicpumpsoutofaction.(e)AllLPcompressorsoutofaction.(f)Nos.1,2and3HPcompressorsoutofaction.(g)Alloilfueltanksabreast‘A’,‘B’and‘X’boilerroomsoutofaction.(h)Mainengineroomtelegraphsoutofaction.(i) Forward 4.5in turrets except S.3 out of action through flooded pumps anddistortedrollerbearingpaths.(j)Only40percentstowageavailableinlowercentre4.5inmagazine.(k)Forwardsectionsofringmainoutofaction.

QUEENELIZABETHItalianLimpetMineDamageatAlexandria,19December1941

(l)Nos.1,2,3and5dynamosoutofaction,(m)No.2transmittingroomoutofaction.(n)Onlyonesetofmachineryavailableforeachtransmittingroom.(o)Bothautomaticplotsoutofaction.

Damagecontrol:No. 82 bulkhead was shored where possible on the fore side. No. 136 bulkhead wasshoredfrominside‘Y’boilerroom.‘A’and‘B’boilerroomhatches,‘A’and‘B’hydraulicroomhatches,Nos.3and5kitlockerroomhatchesandhatchestoescapetrunksinNos.3,5 and 7 kit locker roomswere all shored down.All portable pumpswere employed inkeepingdownthewaterincompartmentsadjacenttothosethatwerefullyfloodedbythedamage.Heelwascorrectedbyfloodingfourbulgesbetween139and179stations.Theshipwas lightenedbyeverypossiblemeans suchasde-ammunitioning,defuelling fromsoundtanks,de-petrolling,disembarkingallspareanchorsandcables,etc.

Theshipwasdockedfortemporaryrepairstofitherforpassagetoarefittingyard.Itwas estimated that she would be able to steam on ‘X’ and ‘Y’ boiler rooms. Mainarmamentwouldbeusableinanemergency.Theafter4.5inarmamentwouldbe100percentefficientandaproportionoftheforward4.5ingunswouldbeavailable.

Vouant

On that fateful day Valiant was moored at Buoy B2 in eight fathoms of water. Theexplosion took place at 0606 and caused severe damage to the ship’s bottom.Draughtbefore the explosion was 33ft lin forward, 33ft lin aft; after the explosion it was 38ftforwardand31ft6inaft.Heel4°

The port 4.5in supplymagazine flooded through a split in No. 36 bulkhead and theelectricitystoreimmediatelyabovethemagazinebegantofloodthroughtheelectriccableglandwhichblewoutofthedeck.Thesecompartmentswerepumpedoutand36bulkheadwasshored.Elevenfurthersplits in36bulkheadmadeitnecessary toabandonthe4.5inmagazine, but pumping was continued and water was kept to a minimum in thesecompartments.‘A’turretspacewasfloodedtoadepthof4feetthroughsplitsinthelowerdeckcausedby theheadofapillarprotruding through themagazine.Thiscompartmentwaspumpedout.Thepostmaster’sstorewasfloodedtothemaindeck.ThegunnersStore(36 to 52 stations, lower andplatformdecks)were flooded through a vent that hadnotbeen fully closed. Small quantities ofwater seeped through between the armour in theplatingof themiddle deck into various compartments adjacent toNo. 52bulkhead.Allpipesandfittingsintheareawerebadlydistortedandpumpswerejammed.Platingontheportlowerbulgecompartmentwasholedandanareaofapproximately60feet×30feetbetween29and52stationswasdamaged.Theouterbottomplating(25lb)between29and52stationswassplitinmanyplacesandpiercedbytheplateframes.Abovetheturnofthebilge the bottom plating was crushed into contact with the longitudinal protectivebulkhead.Theinnerbottomwasbulgedupwards3to4feetandtherewere18inand16insplits.Thekeelwasarchedtoanaverageof8inchesbetween29and52stations.No.36bulkheadwasbuckled.No.29wasbulged.Theplatformdeckin‘A’magazinewasbulgedupwards.Deckbeamsintheareawerebadlydistorted.Thelowerdeckin‘A’turretwasalsosplit.Therewasmovementinjointsofarmourat‘A’barbetteandtheforecastledeck,

‘A’ turret shield, ‘B’ barbette on middle deck. There was no machinery damage.Armamentdamage:lowerpartof‘A’turretwasdistorted.

VALIANTItalianLimpetMineDamageatAlexandria,19December1941

DamagetoWarspitefromanti-shipmissiles(TypeSK1400),14Sept1943On 14 September 1943Warspite proceeded to Salerno in company withValiant and adestroyer flotilla to support Fifth Army landings by bombarding the beaches. Aftersteamingat23knotsthroughoutthenight,SalernoBaywasreachednextdayandenemypositionswereattackedduringtheeveningofthe15thdespiteairattacks.Afterdaybreakonthe16thWarspitewasdetailedtoproceedtotheareaofoperationsofthepreviousday,butat1410,afteroneshoot,shesteamedpastthesouthernsweptchanneltotakepartinafurtherbombardmentatposition‘AvalancheNorth’.

At1425WarspitewasattackedbytwelveFw190swhichdivedontheshipoutofthe

sun. Three bombswere seen overhead close together at 6,000–8,000 yards on the portbeam. The parent aircraft were then above the ship at a height of 20,000 feet. Whendirectly overhead the bombs turned and dived at great speed towards the ship.One hitWarspite andafterpenetratingvariousdecksburst in the reserve feed tankbelowNo.4boilerroom.Theothertwowerenearmissesonthestarboardside.Oneabreastthebulgemidships was the cause of considerable near-miss damage (water hammer), the othercaused no apparent damage. At the time of attack the ship was making 10 knots inapproximately 177 fathoms.Avoiding actionwas impossible in the congested area andwould,moreover,havebeenineffectivesincethetimefromsightingthebombstothehitwasonlyabouttenseconds.Fromthesizeoftheholeofpenetrationtheweaponusedwasadjudged to be a radio-controlled Type FX1400 weighing about 3,000 pounds with a600lbcharge.Theshockwasveryviolentanditwasthoughtatfirstthattheship’sbackwas broken and that themastswould crash to the deck.Numbers 2, 3, 4 and 6 boilerrooms flooded almost immediately andNo. 5 flooded shortly afterwards.The shipwasable to proceed slowly under her own steam,main steering being available until 1500whenNo.1boilerroombecamecontaminatedwithseawaterandallsteamfailed.

Warspitewas ina serioussituation.Unable tosteam,shehaddrifted intoanunsweptarea and had shipped about 5,000 tons ofwater. In addition, shewas only a fewmilesfromSalernoandliabletofurtherairattacksatanymoment, theRDFwasoutofactionanditwasnotknownwhetherhostilesubmarineswereinthearea.TheAAarmamentwasintact, good weather prevailed and some counter-flooding had brought the main deck(starboardside)abovethewater-line.Airprotectionwasrequired,butnonewasavailableuntil nextmorning.US salvage tugs (Hope andMarino) hadWarspite in tow by 1700.WithHMSDelhiactingasRDFship,Warspiteproceeded toMaltaatspeedsofup to4knots.At1930EuryalusandScylla joinedand theformer tookWarspite in tow,but thelineparted.At1800nextdaytheonlychangewasthatthelisttostarboardhadincreasedto4½degrees,butthespreadoffloodinghadbeencurtailedbythepumps.

WarspiteenteringMaltainJanuary1938.Althoughlookingamuch‘stumpier’shipthanbeforereconstruction,hermastswerestill150ft6inabovethewaterline(fore)and127ft8in(main).

Completelyreconstructed,Warspiteunderwentafullsetoftrials.Shemade23.84knotsduringspeedtrials,onlyhalfaknotslowerthanwhenoriginallybuilt.SheisseenhereintheMediterraneanonherwaytoMaltain1938.

Thebombthathitthatshiphadapproachedatabout20degreestotheverticaland15degrees to thecentre-lineplane. It struck theboatdeck,passed through theporthangar,wardroom,galley, stokers’ aftermessdeck,kit locker flat, andNo.4boiler roombeforebursting in a double bottom reserve feed tank. Thicknesses were 10lb (MS) plus 40lb(HT),50lb(HT),14lb(MS),100lb(NC),40lb(HT),20lb(MS),atotalof6¾inches.Theholeintheboatdeckwasroughly5ft6insquareandcentredabout11feetfromthecentre-linetoportandextendingfrom128to130stations.TheForecastle,upperandmaindeckswereholed(2ft9indiameter)ontheportside,stations126to128,18–19feetfromcentre-linerespectively.Themiddledeck(100lbNCon40lbHT)washoled(2ft9indiameter).The outer bottomwas holed over A, B and C strakes, port side between 123 and 133stations,theaperturebeing20feetlongby7–14feetwide.Theinnerbottomwasblownupwardsoverthesameareas.Themaintransversebulkheads100to154(20lb(MS))bothleaked. The main transverse bulkhead 136 was holed. Other bulkheads were badlydamagedintheareaoftheblast.Thenearmisshitthewaterclosetotheship’ssideandburstnearthebottomofthebulgeatstation140,starboardside.Thebulgeplating(22½lbMS)was rupturedandbulges themselvesbetween111and159stations.Splits inseamswereevident.Theouterand innerbatteryplatformwascorrugated (maximum6 inches)overtheareaunderNo.5boilerroomandbothwereholed.Thebilgehadbeenfractured.Thecompartmentsonthemiddledeckfrom118to154stationswereflooded.

WARSPITEDamageSustainedatSalerno,16September1943

WarspiteenteringMalta,January1938.

Before theattackdraughtswere33ft9in forward,32ft6inaft,no list;onehour later,36ft 6in forward, 35ft 6in aft, slight list; after 3½ hours, 38ft forward, 36ft 6in aft, 3degreeslist;17½hoursaftertheattack,39ftforward,37ft6inaft,4degreeslist.OnarrivalatMaltaon19Septemberdraughtwas38ft6inforward,36ft1linaft.

Beforetheshipwashitalldoorshadbeenclosedanddamagecontrolstationswereatsecond degree readiness. No. 4 boiler room had been completely wrecked, the mainarmamentwasoutofactionbythelossofhydraulicpowerandWTandRDFwerealsooutofaction.

TheCaptain’s(CaptainPacker)reportontheincidentmakesinterestingreading:

Aswewere threadingourway slowly through the shipping tocommunicatewith theHQshipBiscayeneandtoAvalancheNorthforafurtherbombardmentouroldfriendstheFw190sroaredinoutofthesunandattackeduswithbombs–nohits.

Just as they finished dead overhead we suddenly sighted three new objects – gliderbombs–Irealizedatoncewhattheywere.Theywereflyinghorizontallyinformationfora couple of seconds at about 8,000ft, and then down they came absolutely vertically atterrific speed. It was clear they were going to hit us. It took two seconds. There wasnothing tobedoneand Iwatchedcarefully.The first to arrivemissedus starboard sideamidshipsbyafewfeet–afractionofasecondlateronehitusjustabaftthefunnel.Thethirdnearmissedthestarboardside.IwasnotthrownoffmyfeetbutforafractionofasecondIhadakindof‘blackout’likewhenyoutakeahardtossatfootballoroffahorse.I

could see and think perfectly clearly all the time. Black smoke and then dirt from thefunnelsandthehellofanoise.I thoughtthewholemastwascomingdownasitrockedandbentandwhipped.ImustsaythatforamomentIthoughtwewereprobablysunkandwas quite prepared for the ship to break in two.No-one lost their heads or shouted oranythingonthebridge–theywereallfirstclassandtheAAgunswhichhadopenedfirekept on firing.Thatwasgood.Then therewas a calmafter the storm. I found the shipcouldsteer,theenginesweregoingahead.Ibegantothinkthatwehadnotbeenhitafterall,onlynearmisses.Afirewasreportedinthehangar,‘Putitout’Isaid.Thentoguns,more for effect than anything, ‘If we can steam and shoot we will carry out our finalbombardmentafterall.’Isetcourseupthechannelandthenreportsbegantocomeinallverycalmandaccurate.Fourboilerroomsoutofsixflooded–steamforslowspeedonstarboardenginesonly–Ikeptgoingat6knots.Thentheshipwouldnotsteer,wewereinthesweptchannelandwesteeredroundinacircle.Istoppedengines.Wewereheadingstraightintothemines.Aminesweepersentviolentsignalstogetoutofit.Icouldnotforhelmwashardoverandfinallythestarboardengineroomdiedouttoo.Sotherewewereonce again going round in circles with our way carrying us and quite helpless. Steamjointshadbustandtheengineroomwasuntenable.The5thboilerroomfloodedleavingonlyone.Gotshiftedovertosteeringfromthetillerflatbyelectric.Thetug,theOrpi,aYank,cameroaringupandsoonhadmein towandstraightenedoutandImadeupmymindtosetofftoMaltaatonce–speed3knots.Theprospectwasunattractive.Outsidewereatleast6submarinesreportedinthearea.Ihadonly4destroyerswithme,furtherairattackswereobviouslyonthecards.Theextentofthedamagewasunknown,theshipwasbeginningtolistandwewerealreadytwoorthreefeetdeeperinthewater.Butoffweset.I called Delhi as AA protection and asked for special fighter protection fromN.C.W.N.F.F.,AdmiralHewitt,USNandfortugs.Anothertugcameupbutwouldnotstaybut I toldhim Ihadorders fromAdmiralHewitt thathewas to.Nowwehad two tugstowingusintandem.Weweremaking3½knotsand300milestogo.

Warspite’shull,showingsomeofthedamageshereceivedatSalerno.

WorspiteintroubleagainafterbeinghitbyaerialbombsoffSalernoinSeptember1943.SheisshownherelimpingintoMalta,downbythehead.Notethatthedraughtingeneralwasgood–despitethefactthatshehadthousandsoftonsofwaterinsideher.

Casualties6killedandabout20wounded.

Received message from N.C.W.N.J. ToWarspite, ‘Deeply regret the casualties anddamageyousustained.Amgratefulforyourefficientsupportwhichhasaidedsomuchtheforce ashore.When theyare relievedplease sendHopiandMarina tomehere.Best ofluck,Hewitt’

Friday 17th September – I said a few words to the sailors over the broadcaster. Acommonhazardofwar–wehaddonewhatwesetouttodoandhadbeenhit–wehadscaredthehelloutoftheGermanArmyandbracedupourownsoldiersandshouldn’tbesurprised ifwehadn’t turned thescale.Admired theirgoodhumourandhardwork.Wewouldgetthe‘oldlady’backtoMalta.

Warspitemined,13June1944On13June1944WarspitewasonpassagefromPortsmouthtoRosyth,accompaniedbythedestroyersSouthdownandHolmes at a speedof16knots.Theweatherwas slightlyovercastwith a seaof 3.1.Warspites draughtwas33ft 10in forward, 32ft 10in aft.ThedegaussingequipmentwasworkingatthecorrectsettingsandtheSAgearwasoperating.At0748,whentheForcewasinposition51°52’N,1°41’E,thatis,justoffHarwich,aheavyexplosionoccurredofftheportsideabreastWarspite’s‘X’and‘Y’15inturrets.Thedepthofwater in thispositionwasabout17fathoms.Eye-witnessesreportedanareaofviolently disturbed water close to the ship’s side and stated that water was thrown upgenerallytoupper-decklevel,butthattherewasathincolumninthecentrerisingsomedistance above this level. There were numerous gas bubbles. They estimated that thecentreoftheexplosionwasabout20feetfromtheportside.Warspitewasveryseverelyshakenbytheexplosionwhichwascausedbythedetonationofanacousticor‘Sammy’groundmine,TypeGC,containingachargeof1,500poundsofaluminizedhexanite.

Immediatelyaftertheexplosiontherewasapartiallossofelectricpowerwhichcausedmany lighting failures; all W/T and radar sets were put out of action through loss of

power,orbyshockdamage;theportoutershaftseizedup,andextensivefloodingoftheafter portion of the port lower bulge compartments caused the ship to list 3½° to portwithinfiveminutes.Thelistlaterincreasedtoamaximumof4½°.

Themainmachinerywas shut down for half an hour for examination, duringwhichperiodthenecessarydamagecontrolmeasureswereputintoeffect.Whenthemachinerywasre-startedneithertheportouternortheportinnershaftscouldbeturnedandtheshipwas forced to proceed to Rosyth using her starboard shafts only. Themaximum speedattainedwas10knotsandRosythwasreachedatabout2130on14June.

Structuraldamage:Outerbottomplating(25to40lbMS):

Althoughnoruptureoccurredtherewasextensivedishingbetweenframes,ofmaximumdepression3inches,withintheareaboundedbystations160and230,andtheport6thandstarboard5thlongitudinals.Theintensityofthedishingwasmuchgreaterontheportsideandsomeoftheplatingseamsonthatsidewereleaking.Afewrivetsweremissingfromtheconnectiontotheouterbottomofthebulgeportionsofinlettubespassingthroughtheouterbottomofthebulge.

Portbulge(22½lband30lbMS):

Afewsmallrupturesofthebulgeplatingwerecausedbyitsbeingforcedinwardsagainstthebulge framing; the largest of these rupturesmeasured2 feet×5 inches. In additiontherewasextensivedishingofthisplatingoverthewholeareaofthelowerbulgebetweenstations160and237,thatisoveralengthof145feetandadepthof36feet.Thedamagewas particularly severe over the 44-foot length between stations 202 and 223½; in thisarea plating was forced in to a maximum distance of 2 feet and bulge framing anddivisionalbulkheadswerewrecked.Betweenthesameframestations,inlettubeswereleftstandingproudfromthebulgeplating.Platingseamsoverthewholeofthedamagedareawerebadlystrainedandnumerousrivetsweremissing.

WARSPITEMineDamage,13June1944

Starboardbulge(22½lband30lbMS):

Therewerenorupturesinthestarboardbulgeplating,buttherewasslightdishingbetweenframes,ofmaximumdepression1inchatthebottomofthebulgefromstations189½to220,thatisoveralongitudinaldistanceof60feet.

Innerbottomplating(20lbMS):

Noruptureoftheinnerbottomplatingoccurred,buttherewasslightdistortioninplaceswithintheareaboundedbystations160and230,andbetweentheportandstarboard3rdlongitudinals,duetotheupwardmovementofthebottomframinginthisarea.

Transversebulkheads:

The10lbMScofferdambulkheadatstation197wasdistortedandbulgedaftamaximumdistanceof2feet.

Over a short distance on the port side the 14lb MS bulkhead at station 212 and thewatertightframebeneathitwerestrainedandmadenon-watertightbythelowerportionsbeingtornawayfromtheboundaryanglesconnectingthemtotheinnerandouterbottomplating.Thewatertightnessoftheafterbulkheadoftheportplummerblockspaceatstation216wasdestroyedbythebulkheadglandoftheportinnershaftbeingtornfromitbytheeccentricityoftheshaft.Theforwardbulkheadoftheportplummerblockcompartmentatstation230wasalsorenderednon-watertightbythelowerportionbeingtornawayabout2feetfromtheboundaryanglesconnectingittotheinnerandouterbottoms.

AfteranhourWarspitewasunderwayagainatabout10knots,andreachedportnextday.Shewasoutofactionfortwomonths.

QueenElizabethJune1943showingmid-warappearance.

History:QueenElizabethNavaltermsofarmisticewithGermanyarrangedonboardatRosyth15November1918.

BecameflagnewAtlanticFleetonpost-warreorganizationApril1919(seeBarham).

BeattypromotedAdmiraloftheFleetandhoistedUnionFlaginQueenElizabeth4April1919.

GrandFleetofficiallyabolishedandBeatty’sflaghauleddown7April1919.

ATLANTICFLEET(fleetflag)April1919toNovember1924.

SpitheadReview26July1924.

Transferred toMediterranean Fleetwith rest of class 1November 1924, replacing Iron

Dukeasfleetflag(seeBarham).

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(fleetflag)November1924toMay1926.

RelievedbyWarspiteMay 1926 and paid off at Portsmouth for reconstruction 26MayafternearlytenyearsasflagoftheprincipalBritishfleet.

ReconstructedatPortsmouthMay1926toDecember1927.

Commissionedfortrials16August1927.

Commissioned at Portsmouth 2 January 1928 for further service as flagMediterraneanFleet.

MEDITERRANEANFLEETJanuary1928toAugust1937(flagtoJune1937).

VisitedConstantinopleOctober1929asflagofthefirstBritishsquadrontoenterTurkishwaterssincethesigningofthePeaceTreaty.

SquadroncomprisedQueenElizabeth (flag),Courageous,Wanderer,WildSwan,VeteranandBryony.

RefitPortsmouthNovember1929toMay1930;temporarilyreplacedasflagbyWarspiteduringthisperiod.

FlagrehoistedatPortsmouth27May1930.

SenttoAlexandria,withRamillies,July1930tosupportlocalforcesduringriots.

Refit Portsmouth November 1932 to March 1933; temporarily replaced as flag byResolutionduringthisperiod.

SeniorflagshipatJubileeReview,Spithead,16July1935.

Stationed at Alexandria October 1935 to summer 1936 during Italo-Ethiopian crisis.CoronationReview,Spithead,19May1937.

RelievedbyBarham9JuneandpaidoffatPortsmouthforreconstruction1August1937.

ReconstructedatPortsmouthandRosythAugust1937toJanuary1941;transferredfromPortsmouth to Rosyth for completion in December 1940 because of risk of aircraftattackatPortsmouth.

RecommissionedatRosyth31January1941for2ndBSHomeFleet.

JoinedFleetatScapa21Februaryforworkingup.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoMay1941.

Transferred to Mediterranean Fleet May 1941. Left Gibraltar for Alexandria 6 May,making first part of passage through Mediterranean in company with Force H andconvoyforMalta.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)May1941toJune1942(flag1StBSand2ndfleetflagMaytoAugust1941;fleetflagfromAugust1941).

TookpartindefenceandevacuationofCrete,May1941.

WithBarhamanddestroyers,supportedairattackonenemyairfieldonScarpanteIsland

byaircraftfromFormidable26May.

Became flag 1st BS and 2nd fleet flag 27May, replacingBarham for repairs to bombdamagesustainedduringthisoperation.

BecamefleetflaginAugust1941onreturnofBarhamfromrefit.

FlagC-in-C had been flown ashore atAlexandria from24 JunewhenWarspite left forrefitinUSA.

BadlydamagedbyItalianlimpetmineatAlexandria19December1941(seefullreport).TemporarilyrepairedatAlexandriaDecember1941toJune1942,continuingtoserveasfleetflagduringthisperiod,beingrelievedbyValiantforashorttimeinApril.

AdmiralHarwoodhoistedhisflaginsuccessiontoAdmiralCunningham,20May.

LeftAlexandria27June1942forUSA,viaSuezCanal,tocompleterefit.

ArrivedNorfolkNavyYard6September.

RefittedatNorfolkNavyYardSeptember1942 toJune1943;selected forEasternFleetwhileunderrefit.

LeftNorfolkforhome26June1943.

Arrived Devonport July and commissioned there 25 July for Eastern Fleet, beingtemporarilyattachedtoHomeFleetforworkingup.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JulytoDecember1943.

WorkingupatScapa.

QUEENELIZABETH1941:CrossSections

Left Portsmouth 23 December 1943 to join Eastern Fleet, viaMediterranean and SuezCanal.

ArrivedTrincomalee28January1944andhoistedflagC-in-C(AdmiralSomerville).

EASTERNFLEET(flag1stBSandfleetflag)JanuarytoNovember1944.

UnitofforcesupportingcarrierattacksonSabang,Sumatra19April1944byaircraftfromIllustriousandtheUSSSaratoga.

TookpartinbombardmentofCarNicobarandPortBlairinthe

AndamanIslands30Apriland1May.

SupportedcarrierattackonSourabayabyaircraftfromIllustriousandSaratoga17May.SupportedcarrierattackonSabangbyaircraftfromIllustriousandVictorious25Julyand,withValiant, Renown, the FrenchRichelieu and destroyers, carried out surfacebombardmentfollowingthis.

RefitDurbanOctobertoNovember1944.

On 22 November 1944 ships selected to remain in the South East Asia area after theformationofaPacificFleet,whichwascommencedonthatdate,wereredesignatedastheEastIndies

QUEENELIZABETH1941:InboardProfileandUpperDeckPlan

Fleet, thebattle squadron for thiscomprisingQueenElizabeth,ValiantandRenown andbecomingthe3rdBS, the1stBSbeingallocatedto thePacific.QueenElizabeth flag(VA)3rdBSandfleetflagEastIndiesFleet.

EASTINDIESFLEET(flag)November1944toJuly1945.

TookpartinfurtherbombardmentofSabangJanuary1945.

BurmaoperationsJanuarytoMay1945.

SupportedlandingsonRamreeIsland21January.

LandedmarinesonChedubaIsland26January.

TookpartinoperationsagainstRangoonApriltoMay1945.

RelievedbyNelson12July1945andreturnedhome.

ArrivedPortsmouth7August1945andpaidofftoreservetoRosythonthe10th.

RESERVE(Rosyth)AugusttoOctober1945.

AttachedtoHomeFleet22OctoberasAccommodationShip.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)October1945toMarch1946.

EmployedasAccommodationShipatPortlandandPortsmouth.

Revertedtoreserve,PortsmouthMarch1946.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)March1946toMay1948.

DecisiontoscrapannouncedinParliamentJanuary1948.

SaletoBritishIron&SteelCorporationarranged19March1948.

Shipfinallypaidoff15May1948.

AllocatedtoArnottYoung,Dalmuirforscrapping.

ArrivedDalmuir7July1948.

HulksubsequentlytowedtoTroonfordemolition.

History:WarspiteATLANTICFLEETApril1919toOctober1925(2ndBStoMay1921;IstBSsubsequently).SeeBorham.

SpitheadReview26July1924.

PaidoffatPortsmouth31October1924forreconstruction.

ReconstructedatPortsmouthOctober1924toApril1926.

Recommissioned at Portsmouth 6 April 1926 to relieve Queen Elizabeth as flagMediterraneanFleet(seeBarham).

MEDITERRANEANFLEETApril1926toMay1930(fleetflagtoJanuary1928.FlagIstBSand2ndfleetflagJanuarytoSeptember1928.1stBSMarchtoNovember1929;fleetflagsubsequently).

RelievedasfleetflagbyQueenElizabethJanuary1928andreplacedBarhamasflag1stBSand2ndfleetflag.

DamagedbygroundingintheAegean12July1928.

ReturnedhomeSeptember1928forrepairs,flag1stBSbeingtransferredtoBarham.

RefitPortsmouthSeptember1928toJanuary1929.

Recommissioned at Portsmouth 22 January 1929 as private ship 1st BS. Left forMediterranean14March.

Fleet flagMediterranean November 1929 toMay 1930, relievingQueen Elizabeth forrefit.

FlagstruckatPortsmouth26MayandWarspitetransferredtoAtlanticFleet(seeBarham).

WartimeviewofQueenElizabeth(January1941)havingjustbeenmovedfromPortsmouthDockyarduptoRosythbecauseofenemybombingasshewascompletingherfitting-outstageaftercompletereconstruction.

ATLANTICFLEET(flag2ndBS)May1930toMarch1932.

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(flag2ndBS)toDecember1933.

RammedbyRoumanianSSPeleusinmouthofTagus21March1933.

RepairedatPortsmouthandrejoinedfleet5June.

RelievedbyBarhamandpaidoffatPortsmouthforsecondreconstruction23December1933.ReconstructedatPortsmouthMarch1934toJune1937.

CommissionedatPortsmouth29June1937asflagMediterraneanFleet,butdepartureforstationdelayedbysteeringdefectsandshipnotreadyforserviceuntilJanuary1938.

LeftPortsmouthforMediterranean5January1938.

MEDITERRANEANFLEETJanuary1938toOctober1939(fleetflagfromFebruary1938).

RelievedBarhamasfleetflag8February1938.

TransferredtoHomeFleetOctober1939.

LeftAlexandriaforhome28October,viaMaltaandGibraltar.

WarspitepassesRevengeonleavingtheMediterraneanFleet(forhome)withmanycheersfrombothcrewsasshesailsby,14March1930.

ArrivedGibraltar6NovemberanddivertedtoHalifaxforescortduty.

Arrived Halifax 14 November and left on 18th with convoy for United Kingdom.Detachedfromconvoy24thtotakepartinsearchforScharnhorstfollowingsinkingofRawalpindibythatshiponthe23rd.

SearchedinDenmarkandIceland–Faroesareauntilendofmonth.

Arrived Clyde 4 December and hoisted flag C-in-C Home Fleet at Greenock on 6th,relievingNelsonforrepairstominedamagesustainedonthe4th,andpendingreturnofRodneyfromrefit.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBSClydeandScapa)December1939toApril1940(temporaryfleetflagtoJanuary1940).

Home fleet base transferred fromScapa toClydeOctober 1939, pending completionofadequatedefencesatScapa.

RevertedtoScapaMarch1940.

UnitofcoveringforceforfirstCanadiantroopconvoyDecember1939.

FlagC-in-CHomeFleettransferredtoRodney1January1940.

Took part inNorwegian operationsApril 1940; on 13April, a Swordfish aircraft fromWarspite, while on reconnaissance prior to second battle of Narvik, sank U64 inHerjangsfiord(Narvik).

As flag (VA) led force of nine destroyers (Kimberley, Bedouin, Foxhound, Cossack,Eskimo,Punjabi,Icarus,HeroandForester)forsecondattackonGermandestroyersinNarvikFiord13AprilandassistedinsinkingdestroyerKoellner

Forthisoperation,WarspiteflyingflagVice-AdmiralBattlecruiserSquadronHomeFleet,transferred from Renown on the 12th and which was retained in the ship during

subsequentoperationsagainstNarvikuntil24April.

TookpartinbombardmentoftheportofNarvikanddefencesonthatdate.

OrderedbacktoMediterraneanonsamedaybecauseofincreasingthreatofwarwithItaly.

LeftClyde30April,arrivedAlexandria10MayandhoistedflagC-in-CMediterraneanonthe11th.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(flag)May1940toJune1941.

Flag of squadron (Warspite,Malaya andRoyal Sovereign) in action with Italian battlesquadron offCalabria 9 July 1940,while coveringMalta toAlexandria convoy, andwasonlyBritishshipabletogetwithinrangeoftheenemy.

ScoredhitonItalianflagshipGiulioCesareat26,400yardswhichcaused115casualtiesandseveredamagewhichkeptCesareoutofactionforfourmonths.

Took part in various bombardments in 1940–1, mainly in support of the army in theWesternDesert.

WithMalaya,RamilliesandKentbombardedBardiaandFortCapuzzo15August1940.

Flagof supporting force (Warspite,Valiant,Malaya,Ramillies and destroyers) coveringattackonItalianfleetatTarantobyaircraftfromIllustrious11November1940.

WithValiantbombardedValona18December1940.

WithBarhamandValianttookpartinbombardmentandcaptureofBardia3January1941.

Malta convoy 7–11 January 1941; starboard anchor hit by bomb on 10th during thisoperation.Nomaterialdamage.

Matapanaction28March1941.

AssistedinthesinkingofItaliancruisersFiumeandZara;five,ifnotallsix,shellsoffirstbroadsideweredirecthits.

With Barham and Valiant bombarded Tripoli 21 April 1941. Flag (RA) special forceorganizedfordefenceandevacuationofCreteMay1941.

FlagC-in-CflownashoreatAlexandriaduringtheseoperations.

DamagedbybomboffCrete22Maywhilecoveringevacuation;starboard6inbatteryand4inAAknockedout–speedreduced.

Temporarily repairedatAlexandria June1941, reverting to fleet flagduring thisperiod.Furtherdamagedbynearmissbombwhileunderrepairindock.

LeftAlexandria26JuneforBremertonNavyYardUSAtocompleterefit,proceededviaSingapore,HonoluluandEsquimalt.

ArrivedBremerton11August1941.

Refit Bremerton August to December 1941. Recommissioned at Seattle 28 December1941asflagEasternFleet,basedatCeylon.

LeftSeattle7January1942forTrincomalee,viaSydney

ArrivedTrincomalee22March1942andhoistedflagC-in-CEasternFleetthereon27th.

EASTERNFLEET(flag1stBSasfleetflag)March1942toMarch1943.

Fleet based at Colombo until April 1942, then transferred to Kilindini (East Africa).ReturnedtoCeylon(Trincomalee)January1944.

Warspiteonlyunitof1stBSactuallywithEasternFleetduring1942–3.QueenElizabethandValiantearmarkedforthisin1942butdidnotjoinuntilJanuary1944.

3rdBSEasternFleetinMarch1942comprisedfourRoyalSovereignclass.

ConveyedGeneralWavellfromBombaytoColombotoconferwithAdmiralLayton(C-in-CCeylon)followingJapaneseattacksonCeylonon5and8April.

Withotherunitsoffleet,coveredpassagethroughIndianOceanoftroopconvoycarryingAustralianDivisionhomefromMiddleEastinFebruary1943.

OrderedhomeinMarch1943andreturnedviaDurbanandFreetown.

ArrivedintheClyde10May1943andattachedtoHomeFleettoworkupbombardmentpracticeatScapapriortojoiningForceHforinvasionofSicily.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)MaytoJune1943;workingupatScapa.

LeftScapa17June1943forGibraltarwithNelson,RodneyandValiant.

JoinedForceHatGibraltar23rdandhoistedflagRA2ndincommand.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoSeptember1943(2ndflaguntil12September).

TookpartininvasionofSicilyandItalyJulytoSeptember1943.

BombardedbatteriesdefendingCatania(Sicily)17July.

WithValiant,bombardedcoastaldefencesatReggio(Italy)2Septemberpriortolandings.

UnitofcoveringforceforSalernolandings9September.

Flagofforce(Warspite,Valiantandsevendestroyers)escorting

surrenderedItalianbattleshipsVittorioVenetoandItalia,sixcruisersandeightdestroyerstoMalta10September,followingItalianArmistice.

Relievedas2ndflagForceHbyHowe12September.

EscortedsecondgroupofsurrenderedItalianwarships,includingbattleshipGiulioCesare,toMaltaonsameday.

LeftMaltaforhome,withValiant,14SeptemberbutdivertedtoSalernotosupportarmy.

BombardedenemypositionsatSalerno15and16September;62roundsof15infiredonboth days, at long range, 35 fell exactly on target and eight fellwithin one hundredyards.

Badlydamagedbygliderbombsonthe16th(seereport)

Nearmissedbyonebombandhit abreast funnelby twootherswhichpenetratedboilerroomsandblewoutbottom,floodingallboiler rooms.Allpower lost,shipunable tosteerandallarmamenttemporarilyoutofaction.

Towed to Malta by two British and two American tugs and salvage vessel Salveda,reachingthereonthe19th.

TemporaryrepairscarriedoutatMaltaSeptembertoNovember1943.

Left1November1943intowforGibraltarandarrivedthereonthe8th.

FurtherrepairsatGibraltarNovember1943toMarch1944.

Left Gibraltar for Rosyth under own steam 9 March 1944 and arrived there 16th tocompleterefit.

Required for service to prepare forNormandy invasionbefore refit couldbe completedand,afterworking-upinForthduring

April,joinedHomeFleetatScapa2Maywith‘X’turretandoneboilerroomoutofactionalthoughshipabletomake21knots.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)ApriltoNovember1944.

Working-upinForthandatScapaduringAprilandMay.

Unit of heavy bombardment force supporting Normandy invasion June to September1944.

Initially allocated to Sword Beach (Eastern) area.WithRamillies and monitor RobertsneutralizedGermanheavybatteriesatBenerville,VillervilleandHoulgateon6and7June;fired73roundsof15inatVillervillebatteryonthe6th,scoringninedirecthits.

SupportedUSforcesinUtahandGoldBeachareason10and11June.LeftinvasionareaforRosyth(viaChannel)on12thtoreplaceworn15inguns,andwasfirstcapitalshiptopassthroughtheStraitsofDoversinceScharnhorstandGneisenaubrokethroughinFebruary1942.

MinedoffHarwichon13th,whileenroute,butabletoreachRosythunderownsteamonthe14th,drawing42ftaft.

RepairedatRosythJunetoAugustsufficientlytoresumeoperationsbutabletouseonlythreepropellersandspeedreducedto15½knots.ReturnedtoNormandy25Augustandsupported attack on Brest on that date, engaging batteries at 30,000 yards andsustaining some damage from splinters. Supported attacks on Le Havre August toSeptember,bombardingenemygunpositionsatabout32,000yardson10Septemberwithaircraftspotting.TheseoperationsconcludedtheworkoftheheavybombardmentforceinNormandy.

On 9 September ship ordered to reduce to C Category Reserve in conclusion of theNormandy bombardments, but selected in October with the monitors Erebus andRoberts for the attack on Walcheren Island in the Scheldt Estuary. SupportedWalcherenlandings1November1944,thisbeingtheship’slastoperationalservice.

AttachedtoAlliedNavalExpeditionaryForceCommand(ANXF)PortsmouthNovember1944.PaidofftoReservePortsmouth1February1945.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)February1945toJuly1946.

LaiduponMotherbank.

PlacedonDisposalList,Portsmouth31July1946.

SoldtoBritishIron&SteelCorporationFebruary1947andallocatedtoMetalIndustriesLtd.,Faslaneforscrapping.

LeftPortsmouth18April1947intowforClyde.

Broke adrift in heavy weather on 20th and grounded in Mounts Bay on the 23rd,becomingatotalwreck.

WrecksoldtoBennet&Brewis,Bristol28August1947.

RefloatedJuly1950andbeachedatMarazion.

HulkresoldtoWolverhamptonMetalCo.Ltd.,September1955andbrokenupasitlay.

Duringtwowars,1914–18and1939–45WarspiteaccumulatedfourteenBattleHonours,includingJutlandMay1916,andby1945hadmorethananyothershipintheBritishNavy.

History:BarhamOnpost-warreorganization,April1919,GrandFleetbrokenupandnewAtlantic,Home

andMediterraneanFleetsformed.

AtlanticFleetcomprisedtwoBattleSquadrons,theRoyalSovereignclassformingthe1stBSandtheQueenElizabeththe2ndBS.QueenElizabeth fleet flag,Revenge flag1stBDandBarhamflag2ndBS.

ATLANTICFLEETApril1919toNovember1924(flagBStoMay1921;flag1stBSfromMay1921).

Flag(VA)ofsquadronpayingceremonialvisittoCherbourgApril1919.

InMay1921,1stand2ndBSmergedintoone,1stBS,theRoyalSovereignsformingthe1stDivisionandQueenElizabethsthe2nd.

QueenElizabeth remainedas fleet flag,Barham became flag (VA)1stBSandRevenge2ndflag.

SpitheadReview26July1924.

On1November1924,theQueenElizabethsweretransferredtotheMediterraneanasthe1st BS,withQueen Elizabeth as fleet flag andBarham as squadron flag, theRoyalSovereignclassremainingintheAtlanticFleetasanew2ndBSwithRevengeasfleetflagandResolutionsquadronflag.ThisdistributionoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereign classes remainedunchangeduntilMarch1926whenResolution andRoyalOakwenttotheMediterraneantoreplacethefourIronDukeclass(3rdBS),transferredtotheAtlanticFleet.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1924toNovember1929(flagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagtoJanuary1928andfromSeptember1928toMay1929.2ndflag1stBSJunetoNovember1929).

SenttoAlexandriawithMalaya,May1927duringunrestinEgypt.

With Ramillies, carried out special ‘flag showing’ cruise along west coast of Africa

December1927toFebruary1928,visitingSierraLeone,Sekondi,AccraandLagos.

Relievedasflag1stBSbyWarspiteJanuary1928.

RefitPortsmouthFebruarytoJuly1928.

ReplacedWarspiteas flag1stBSSeptember1928when lattercamehomefor refitaftergroundinginAegeaninJuly.

RelievedasflagbyRevengeJune1929.

InNovember1929Barham,MalayaandValianttransferredtotheAtlanticFleet,forming,withRodney,the2ndBS.

WarspitetemporarilyretainedintheMediterraneanasfleetflag,pendingreturnofQueenElizabethfromrefit,andjoined2ndBSAtlanticFleetinMay1930.

WithexceptionofQueenElizabeth (fleet flagMediterranean),allQueenElizabethclasstheninAtlanticandallRoyalSovereignsintheMediterranean.

ATLANTICFLEET(flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflag)November1929toDecember1930.

PaidoffatPortsmouthforreconstruction2December1930.

ReconstructedatPortsmouthDecember1930toOctober1933.

RecommissionedPortsmouth11January1934 to relieveWarspiteas flag2ndBSHomeFleet(exAtlanticFleet).

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflag)January1934toAugust1935.

Earlyin1935itwasdecidedtoreverttothe1924distributionoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereign classesand to stationall theQueenElizabeths in theMediterraneanandalltheRoyalSovereignsintheHomeFleet,asopportunityoccurred.

Barham and Valiant exchanged with Royal Sovereign and Ramillies to August 1935;MalayaandWarspitewithResolutionandRevengeSeptember1936toJune1937.

BarhamcommissionedatDevonportforMediterranean30August1935.

MEDITERRANEANFLEETAugust1935toDecember1939(1stBStoFebruary1935.FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagFebruarytoNovember1936.)

FlagRA1stBSNovember 1936 toMay 1937. Fleet flag June 1937 to February 1938.FlagRA1stBSFebruary1938toJanuary1939.FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagfromJanuary1939.

RelievedRevengeasflag1stBSand2ndfleetflagFebruary1936.

30November1936,flag(VA)2ndincommandMediterraneantransferredfromBarhamtoHood,flagBS,Barhamreducingtoflag(RA)1stBSonly

CoronationReview,Spithead19May1937.

Hoisted flag C-in-C Mediterranean 9 June 1937, replacing Queen Elizabeth forreconstructionpendingarrivalofWarspiteonthestation.

RelievedasfleetflagbyWarspite8February1938andrevertedtoflag1stBS.

RefitPortsmouthFebruarytoMay1938.

Became 2nd flag (VA) Mediterranean January 1939 on withdrawal of Hood fromMediterranean.

TransferredtoHomeFleetasprivateship2ndBSDecember1939.

RammedandsankdestroyerDuchessinNorthChannel13December1939whileenroutehome.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)December1939toNovember1940.

NorthAtlanticconvoydutyDecember1939.

Torpedoed in bows byU30 offHebrides 28December 1939.ReachedLiverpool underownsteam29th.

RepairedbyCammellLaird,BirkenheadJanuarytoApril1940.

Detached28August1940forDakaroperationasflagForceM(Barham,Resolution,ArkRoyal,Devonshire,Cumberland,Fiji,tendestroyersandminorcraft)andHeadquartersShipforoperation.

ArrivedGibraltar2September.

BombardmentofDakar23–25September1940;hitfourtimesbyfirefromshorebatterieson second day of bombardment. Bulges flooded on starboard side amidships.Repeatedlyhitonthirdday,nomajordamage.

TowedResolutiontoFreetownafterlatterdamagedbytorpedoon25th.

TransferredtoMediterraneanNovember1940.

ArrivedGibraltar7NovemberandleftforMaltaandAlexandriasameday,beingattachedtoForceHforfirstpartofpassageandcarryingtroopsforMalta.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1940toNovember1941(flagIstBSand2ndfleetflagDecember1940toJune1941andAugusttoNovember1941).

WithValiant andWarspite took part in bombardment and capture of Bardia 3 January1941.

Matapan action 28March 1941; assisted in sinking of Italian cruisersFiume and Zaraduringthisengagement.

WithValiantandWarspite,bombardedTripoli2April1941.

Use,withaCclasscruiser,asblockshipatTripoliproposedbyAdmiralty15April1941butideaabandonedfollowingstrongobjectionsbyC-in-CMediterranean.

TookpartindefenceandevacuationofCreteMay1941.

With Queen Elizabeth and destroyers, supported carrier attack on enemy airfield onScarpanteIslandbyaircraftfromFormidable26May.DamagedbybomboffCrete27Maywhenretiringfromthisoperation.‘Y’ turrethitandfirestarted.Alsofloodedinbulgesbynearmiss.

RefittedatDurbanJunetoJuly1941.Completedrefit30JulyandrejoinedMediterraneanFleet inAugust. Torpedoed and sunk byU331 off Libyan coast 25November 1941whileonpatrol,withfleet,betweenCreteandCyrenaica.Shiphitby three torpedoesand rolled over to port beam ends. An explosion occurred in the 6in magazineamidshipsandshesankoneminutelater.Fifty-sixofficers(includingcaptain)and806ratingslost.Vice-Admiralsurvived.

History:ValiantAtlanticFleetApril1919toNovember1924.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1924toMarch1929.

RefitDevonportFebruarytoJuly1927.

PaidoffatPortsmouthforreconstruction23March1929.

ReconstructedatPortsmouthMarch1929toDecember1930.

RecommissionedPortsmouth2December1930for2ndBSAtlanticFleet(seeBarham).

ATLANTICFLEET(2ndBS)December1930toMarch1932;

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)March1932toJuly1935.

TransferredtoMediterraneanJuly1935,exchangingstationswithRamillies(seeBarham).

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)July1935toMarch1937.

PaidoffatDevonportforsecondreconstruction1March1937.

ReconstructedatDevonportMarch1937toNovember1939.

Commissioned atDevonport 30November1939 and attached to theAmerica andWestIndiesStationforworking-upatBermudapriortojoiningHomeFleet.

UnitofescortforsecondCanadiantroopconvoytoUnitedKingdomDecember1939.

JoinedHomeFleet(2ndBS)atScapa7January1940.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoJune1940.

WithMalaya, escorted thirdCanadian troop convoy toUnitedKingdomFebruary 1940(arrivedClyde7February).

NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940.

WithRepulse covered troop convoy forNarvik expedition 11–15April. Escorted troopconvoysfromNorwaytoClydeafterevacuationduringJune.

Transferred toForceH (Gibraltar) on its formation 28 June 1940; joined atGibraltar 2July.

Took part, with Resolution, Hood, Ark Royal, Arethusa, Enterprise and destroyers, inattackonFrenchFleetatMers-el-Kebir(Oran)3July1940.

TransferredtoMediterraneanFleetAugust1940.

LeftGibraltarforAlexandriaon29th.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)August1940toMay1942(temporaryfleetflagApril1942).

WithWarspite,bombardedValena18December1940.

Tookpartinvariousbombardmentoperationsduring1941,mainlyinsupportofarmyinWesternDesert.

WithBarham andWarspite took part in bombardment and capture ofBardia 3 January1941.

MaltaConvoy7–11January1941.Sustainedsplinterdamagefromaircraftattackonthe10th;onekilledandtwowounded.

Matapanaction28March1941;assistedinsinkingofItaliancruisersFiumeandZarainthisengagement.

WithBarhamandWarspitebombardedTripoli21April1941.

TookpartindefenceandevacuationofCreteMay1941;damagedbyaircraftbombing22Mayduringtheseoperations.Hittwice,aft,butwithoutseriousdamage.

Refitted at AlexandriaMay to July Proposed August 1941 for new Eastern Fleet (seePrinceofWales).

BadlydamagedbyItalianlimpetminesatAlexandria19December1941(seefullreport).

Duringthedockyardtroublesofthe1920s–especiallyinLiverpool–itwasacommonsighttoseeabattleshipmooredalongsidesothathervastcrewcouldbeseenandusedtosettleproblemsofunrestinthedockers’disputes.Valiantisshownalongsidethelandingstage.

Bow-onviewofValiantinsummer1939afterhercompletereconstruction,givingheraverydifferentappearancefromheroriginalstate.

RepairedatAlexandriaDecember1941toMay1942.

TemporarilyrelievedQueenElizabethasfleetflag1April1942.

Completed refit at Durban May 1942 and transferred to South Atlantic Command,Freetown.

ArrivedFreetownJune1942;employedonHarbourSecurityService.

WESTAFRICACOMMAND(Freetown)JanuarytoFebruary1943.

RefitDevonportFebruarytoMay1943.

Selected for Eastern Fleet April 1943 but attached to Force H (Gibraltar) for Sicilyinvasiononcompletionofrefit.

Carriedoutspecialwork-upatScapaMaytoJune1943forbombardmentoperations.

LeftScapa17JuneforGibraltar,withNelson,RodneyandWarspite.

JoinedForceHatGibraltar23June.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoOctober1943.

TookpartininvasionofSicilyandItalyJulytoSeptember1943.

WithWarspitebombardedcoastaldefencesatReggio2Septemberpriortothelandings.

UnitofcoveringforceforSalernolandings9September.

WithWarspiteandsevendestroyers,escortedItalianbattleshipsVittorioVenetoandItalia,sixcruisersandeightdestroyerstoMalta10SeptemberfollowingItalianarmistice.

LeftMaltaforhomewithWarspite14SeptemberbutdivertedtoSalernolatersamedaytosupportarmyfollowingenemycounter-attack.

BombardedenemypositionsatSalerno15and16September.

ReturnedhomeOctober1943forrefitpriortotransfertoEasternFleet.

RefitDevonportOctobertoDecember1943(completed1December).

LeftDevonport for station23December,viaMediterraneanandSuezCanal,and joinedEasternFleetatTrincomalee27January1944.

EASTERNFLEET(1stBS)JanuarytoNovember1944.

UnitofforcesupportingcarrierattackonSabang,Sumatra19April1944byaircraftfromIllustriousandUSSSaratoga.

TookpartinbombardmentofCarNicobarandPortBlairintheAndamanIslands30Apriland1May.

Valiantascompletelyreconstructed,1939.AlthoughthereconstructiongenerallyfollowedthestyleofWarspite’s,Valiantinfactlookeddifferentfromthatshipwhenherreconstructionwascompleted.Sheisseenhereduringthetrialperiod.

SupportedcarrierattackonSourabayabyaircraftfromIllustriousandSaratoga17May.

SupportedcarrierattackonSabangbyaircraftfromIllustriousandVictoriouson25Julyand with Queen Elizabeth, Renown, French Richelieu and destroyers, carried outsurfacebombardmentfollowingthis.

BadlydamagedbybucklingoffloatingdockatTrincomalee8August(collapseofdockvariously reported as due to damage by Japanese aircraft attack in 1942 and to amechanicaldefectnotconnectedwiththis).Threepropeller-shaftAframesbent.

TwodamagedpropellersremovedatSuezandshipreturnedtodutyonremainingtwo.

LeftTrincomaleeforhomeOctober1944,viaSuez,butdraught toodeeptoenterCanal(groundedoffsouthernentrance21October)andshipremainedatSuez.

Transferred to East Indies Fleet (3rd BDS) at Suez 22 November 1944 (see QueenElizabeth).

EASTINDIESFLEET(3rdBS)November1944toFebruary1945.

LeftSuezforhomeDecember1944viaCapeandFreetown.

ArrivedDevonport1February1945andpaidofftoreserveforrefit.

RESERVE(Devonport)February1945toFebruary1948(attachedtoImperieusefromJune1946).

RefitFebruary1945toApril1946.

AttachedtoImperieuseEstablishmentasSeagoingTrainingShip24June1946.

DecisiontoscrapannouncedinParliamentJanuary1948.

PaidofftoDisposalListJanuary1948.

SoldtoBritishIron&SteelCorporation19March1948.

AllocatedtoArnottYoung,Dalmuirforscrapping.

LeftDevonportforClyde11August1948.

ArrivedCairnryan16August.

HulktransferredtoTroon10March1950forfinaldemolition.

History:MalayaATLANTICFLEETApril1919toNovember1924(2ndBStoMay1921,1stBSsubsequently).SeeBarham.

Unitofsquadronpayingceremonia!visittoCherbourgApril1919.

ConveyedInterAlliedNavalCommissiontoGermanyJanuary1920.

Left Portsmouth 14 January flying flags ofBritish (VA), French (RA) and Italian (RA)AdmiralsrepresentingtheirrespectivepowersontheCommissionwhichwastoinspectthecarryingoutofthePeaceTreatyterms.

AtWilhelmshaven, theGermannavalensignhoistedandgivena twenty-onegunsaluteforthefirsttimesince1914.

ReturnedtoPortsmouth28January.

Flying flagVA, conveyedDuke ofConnaught to India and paid special visit toMalayStatesDecember1920toMarch1921.

DetachedinSeptember1922,withRamillies,Resolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereign,toreinforceMediterraneanFleetduring

TwoviewsofValiantshowingherone-offcamouflageschemeoftwo-tonegrey.Thebroadsideviewwastakeninlate1941;sternviewinOctober1942.

NearEasttrouble,and,inMarch1923,conveyeddeposedSultanofTurkeytoMalta.

SpitheadReviev26July1924.

TransferredtoMediterranean,withrestofclass,1November1924(seeBarham).

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)November1924toSeptember1927.

SenttoAlexandria,withBarham,May1927becauseofunrestinEgypt.

PaidoffatPortsmouth20September1927forreconstruction.ReconstructedPortsmouthSeptember1927toFebruary1929.RecommissionedatPortsmouthforMediterranean21February.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)FebruarytoNovember1929.

TransferredtoAtlanticFleetNovember1929withBarhamandValiant.

ATLANTICFLEET(2ndBS)November1929toMarch1932.

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)March1932toOctober1934.

PaidoffatDevonportforsecondreconstruction20October1934.

ReconstructedDevonportOctober1934toDecember1936.

TransferredtoMediterraneanoncompletionunder1935reorganization(seeBarham).

CommissionedforMediterraneanFleetatPortsmouth19January1937.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)January1937toOctober1939(squadronflagJune1937toFebruary1938).

In collisionwithDutchSSKertesene offOportoFebruary 1937 en route to station andsustainedsomedamage.

RepairedatDevonportandleftPortsmouthforMediterranean1July.

JoinedMediterraneanFleet5July.

TemporaryFlag(VA)1stBSJune1937toFebruary1938,replacingBarham(whichsee).

FlagrevertedtoBarham8February1938.

SenttoHaifaSeptember1938(relievingRepulse)becauseArab-Jewishtroubles.

DetachedtoIndianOcean,withGlorious6October1939asanadditionalhuntingforce(ForceJ)tosearchforGrafSpee.

ArrivedAden14October.

EASTINDIESCOMMAND(ForceJ)OctobertoDecember1939.

LeftAdenonfirstpatrol14OctoberandoperatedinSocotraareathroughout.

AnexcellentviewofValiantshortlyafterreceivingnewcamouflagein1943.AllherRDFisvisiblehere(Types273,279,284,etc.).

Force J broken up 6December andMalaya transferred toNorthAtlantic Escort Force,leavingAdenforHalifax,viaUK,onthe7th.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(3rdBSHalifax)December1939toMay1940.

InNovember1939, a 3rdBattleSquadronhadbeen formed, comprising the fourRoyalSovereignclassbattleshipsengagedonescortdutiesoutsidetheHomeFleet(2ndBS)and Mediterranean (1st BS) commands. This squadron was organized foradministrative,ratherthantacticalpurposes, theshipsbeingindependentlyemployed,where required. In 1942, the 3rdBSwas allocated to theEasternFleet, as a tactical

unit,andinNovember1944totheEastIndiesFleet(exEasternFleet),bywhichdatetheRoyalSovereignshadbeenwithdrawn.MalayaattachedwhileservingintheNorthAtlanticEscortForce1939–40.

EmployedonNorthAtlanticconvoyduty.WithValiant,escortedthethirdCanadiantroopconvoytotheUnitedKingdomFebruary1940(arrivedClyde7February).

RejoinedMediterraneanFleetMay1940becauseofthreatofwarwithItaly.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)MaytoDecember1940(temporaryfleetflagMay1940.FlagIstBSand2ndfleetflagfromJuly1940).

FlagC-in-CMediterraneanhoistedinMalayaatAlexandria5May1940,theshipbeingtheonlybattleshipthereatthatdate;transferredtoWarspiteonarrival11May.

EngagedmainlyinescortworkandbombardmentofenemybasesinNorthAfrica.

Unitofsquadron(Warspiteflag,MalayaandRoyalSovereign)inactionwithItalianbattlesquadronoffCalabria9 July1940whilecoveringMalta toAlexandriaconvoy.OnlyWarspiteabletogetwithinrangeoftheItalianshipsonthisoccasion.

WithWarspite,RamilliesandKentbombardedBardiaandFort

Capuzzo15August.Unitof supporting force (Warspite flag,Malaya,Valiant,Ramilliesanddestroyers)coveringattackonenemyshipsatTarantobyaircraftfromIllustrious11November1940.

Transferred to Force H (Gibraltar) December 1940 following the reduction in ItalianbattleshipstrengthastheresultoftheTarantoraidwhichenabledMalayaandRamilliestobewithdrawnfromtheMediterraneanFleetforotherduties.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)December1940toMarch1941.

WithRenown andSheffield bombardedGenoa9February1941while aircraft fromArkRoyalattackedLeghornandLaSpeziaaspartofthesameoperation.

South Atlantic convoy dutyMarch 1941. Sighted Scharnhorst andGneisenau in CapeVerde Islands area 8March while escorting Freetown-United Kingdom convoy, herpresencesavingtheconvoyfromattack.TorpedoedbyU81offCapeVerdeIslands20March.

Repaired at New York Navy YardMarch to July 1941. Transferred to Home Fleet oncompletionofrefitandescortedHalifax–UnitedKingdomconvoyenroute.

ArrivedClyde28July.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JulytoOctober1941.

RejoinedForceH27October1941.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)October1941toApril1942(flagfromNovember1941).

ReplacedRodneyasflagForceHNovember1941.

DetachedApril1942asflag(RA)ForceFforoccupationofMadagascar.

LeftGibraltar1April1942forDurban,viaCape.

ReplacedinForceFbyRamilliesatDurban22AprilandwithdrawnfromthisoperationfortransfertoNorthAtlanticCommand.

EarlyinthemonthMalayahadbeenproposedasareinforcementfortheEasternFleetbutrejectedby theC-in-C as unsuitable becauseof her relatively small steaming radius.ArrivedatGibraltar15MayandattachedtoForceH.

FleetmanoeuvreswiththeHomeandMediterraneanFleets,March1938.Malaya(nearest),WarspiteandNelsoninbackground.Notethecontrastinpaintwork.

TwoviewsofMalayaatBermudainJuly1941,afterrepairstohertorpedodamage.

Malaya’sfinalguise,1944,showinghercamouflage,whichshekeptuntiltheendofthewar

Valiant(left)andRevengeastrainingships,Devonport1947.

NORTHATLANTICCOMMAND(attachedForceHGibraltar)MaytoOctober1942.

EmployedonsearchoperationsagainstVichyFrenchshipslatterpartofMay.

ReturnedhomeearlyJunetoescortMaltaconvoy.

LeftClydewithconvoy5June.

MaltaConvoy6–16June.

FreetowntoCapeconvoyJulytoAugust.

RefitClydeOctobertoNovember1942;attachedtoHomeFleetoncompletionofthis.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1942toDecember1943.

DetachedforUK-FreetownconvoyFebruarytoMarch1943.

Because of her relatively unmodernized condition, as compared withQueen Elizabeth,

ValiantandWarspite, itwasdecided, inJuly1943, thatMalaya shouldbewithdrawnfromservicetoreleasecrewfornewershipsalthoughshedidnotactuallypayoffuntilDecember. Used as target for dummy attacks by midget submarines, training LochCaimbawnAugust1943forattackonTirpitz;shipmooredbehindnetsintheLochfortheseexercises.

Paidofftoreserve,inCare&Maintenance,3December1943.

RESERVE(Care&MaintenanceClyde)December1943toJune1944.

InWesternApproachesCommandduringthisperiod.

RefitMarchtoMay1944.

Recommissioned 22 June 1944 for operational service in Home Fleet as unitbombardmentforceforNormandyinvasion.

HOMEFLEET(NormandyBombardmentForce)JunetoOctober1944.

CarriedoutvariousbombardmentsduringNormandycampaign, includingbombardmentofenemy-heldislandsoffSt-Malo1September.

RevertedtoreserveOctober1944.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)October1944toJune1947(attachedtoVernonfromMay1945).

AttachedtoVernon15May1945asAccommodationShipandknownasVernonII.

PlacedonDisposalListJune1947.

Sold to British Iron & Steel Corporation 20 February 1948 and allocated to MetalIndustriesLtd,Faslane,forscrapping.

ArrivedFaslane12April1948.

RoyalSovereignClassDesignThe Royal Sovereign class were the first ships for whose design Eustace TennysonD’Eyncourt was wholly responsible; he had been offered the position of DNC by theLordship of the Admiralty, and was anxious to show that he was worthy of theirconfidence.HeacceptedthejobinalettertotheAdmiraltydated9July1912.

WithreferencetoourconversationofyesterdayIhavethehonourtoinformyouthatIhavenowconsultedmydirectorsandtheyhaveconsentedtoreleasemefrommyengagementatElswickatsuchtimeasyoumayarrangewithme.Iamtherefore in a position to accept the post of Director of Naval Constructionwhichyouhaveofferedmeuponthetermsthatyouhavementioned,thatistosay the salary is to be £2,000 per annum whilst Sir Philip Watts acts in anadvisorycapacitytotheAdmiraltyandistobeincreasedto£3,000perannumwheneverthearrangementwithSirPhilipWattsceases.

HismainproblemwasthattheBoardcouldnotmakeupitsmindinwhichdirectiontogo.WouldtheybebetteroffwithanimprovedQueenElizabethtype(ten15inguns,25knots)orwouldareturntoaslower,lessheavilyarmedshipbemoresuitable?

Thevesselswouldhavetobeatleastequalinspeedtoexistingbattleships(21knots)andjustaswellarmedandprotected.Aftermuchdebatewhichshowedthatitwasalmostimpossible to comeupwith a satisfactory design to theBoard’s limited specification, afew sketcheswere produced. Because of the greater length and cost there could be noquestionofincreasingthearmamenttonineortengunsasfirstenvisaged,butallagreedthat the new ship should have 15in guns, and armour strakes equal to those ofQueenElizabeth.Moreover,becauseoftheapprehensionregardingmaintenanceofoilsupplyintimes of war, a lower speed together with other disadvantages attendant on coal wasacceptedas thepriceofsafety.Later,however, theshipsweremodifiedtoburnoilonly(late1914),thechangesbeingmadeontheinitiativeofLordFisherimmediatelyontakinguphisappointmentasFirstSeaLordinOctober1914

On31March1913theBoardapprovedalayout(markedTl)foravesselcarryingeight15ingunswithspeedsofupto21–22knots,butotherdetailsremainedtobeworkedout.A reduction in dimensions fromQueenElizabethwasmade possible because the lowerspeedenabledmachineryandboilerspacestobereduced,butotherprincipalrequirementsweresimilartotheQEs.

Theforecastleextendedaftto‘X’turretasinQueenElizabethbutthesidesbeforethebattery were less strongly recessed, the flare being unbroken as far aft as ‘A’ turret inRevengeand‘B’turretintheothers.Owingtothere-arrangementofthebattery,theafterendoftheforecastleangledintothecentrelinefromconsiderablyfartherforwardthanintheQueenElizabeths,thequarter-deckatthesidesbeingabout70feetlongerthaninthoseships.

Alightshelterdeckforboatstowage(notprovidedintheQueenElizabeths)wasfittedamidships. Metacentric height and stability were reduced with a view to securing a

steadiergunplatformthaninsomeoftheearlierdreadnoughtclasseswhichsufferedfroman irregular motion because of excessive stability. Compared to the Iron Duke class,metacentricheightwasreducedfrom5½feetto3feetwith1½feetlessbeamonthesamelength(pp)and6inchesdeeperinthenominaldraught.Thisfigurewaslowerthaninanyof theprecedingBritishdreadnoughtswhichhadametacentricheightof5–5½feet,andspecialmeasureswere taken tominimize the risk of extensive flooding in the event ofwaterline damage. These comprised: 1. Raising the height of the strongly protectedfreeboardbyplacingtheprincipalarmoureddeckatmaindecklevel,wellabovedeeploadwater-line,andcarryingamaximumthicknessofbeltarmouruptothis.2.Provisionofalongitudinal armoured bulkhead between the middle and main decks on each sideamidships.

TheGreatWarhadshownthataccurategunneryatsealeftalottobedesiredandtheinter-warperiod(1920–39)wasatimewhenmuchwasdonetoimprovethis.Resolutionisseenhereongunneryexercisesfiringafullbroadsidewithher15inguns,C.1923.

Theadditionofbulges(fittedinRamillieswhilebuildingandintheotherslater)raisedthe metacentric height and improved stability but this was again reduced by the extraweightssubsequentlyimposed.EarlyreportsthatthebulgesbeingfittedtoRamillieswereaspecialstabilitytypeintendedmainlytoreducerollingwerethoughttobeerroneous,butin fact it was quite true. The bulges fitted in all five ships were specifically for anti-torpedo purposes, but it was calculated that the improvement would enhance stabilityespecially if the bilge keels were retained. To assist manoeuvrability a small auxiliaryrudderwasfitted,butitprovedineffectualandwaslaterremovedfromtheclass.

RoyalSovereign,thelastclassofBritishbattleshipstobebuiltintheGreatWar.Theyemergedfromthatconflictvirtuallyunaltered,withtheexceptionofsomebridgeandsearchlightalterations.RoyalSovereignisshownhereoffPortsmouthinAugust1920.Notetherangeclocksonforetopandtherangefinderoverthecharthouse.

Afterthebasicdesignhadbeenreleased,theformerDNC(P.Watts)accusedTennysonD’Eyncourtofstealingoneofhisdesignsandclaimed thathehad in factbeenworkingalongthesamelinesforanewlayoutbeforeleavingoffice.Noevidenceoforreplytothisoutrageousaccusationhasbeenfound.ItwasgenerallyknownthatWattsdidnotapproveofTennysonD’Eyncourt’sappointmentasDNC.

Oncompletionin1916(Ramilliesnotuntil1917)theclassaugmentedtheGrandFleetwith a powerful presence, but the records show that from the beginning they neverenjoyed a reputation as good as that of theQueen Elizabeths or indeed even the IronDukes.Theywerefineships,thoughoftenaccusedofbeingwetshipsgiventhereducedfreeboard–butthensoweretheQueenElizabethsandtheIronDukes inanythingotherthanamoderatesea.

After the war (1919) an exhaustive examination of the captured German battleshipBaden (Germany’s final answer to the FirstWorldWar dreadnoughts) revealed that inmanywaysRoyalSovereignwassuperior to theGermanvessel.Protection towater-lineamidships and armament was very similar in both ships, weight of vertical armour,excludingturretandconningtower,was19.8percentofdisplacementinRoyalSovereignagainst21.8percentinBaden.HorizontalprotectionwasstrongerinRoyalSovereignat9.6percentagainst7.2percent inBaden, andunderwaterprotectionat2.3per cent inRoyalSovereignagainst2.6percent inBaden.Thestabilityofunderwaterstrengthwasslightly less in Royal Sovereign, but the fitting of bulges more than compensated anyadvantagesenjoyedbytheGermanvessel.

Much had been said of theGerman ships’ ability to retain a suitable conditionwhendamaged,andtheyaregenerallyadmiredfortheirstayingpower,buttestscarriedoutin1921 proved in theory at least that British ships were more or less on a par with

contemporaryGermandesigns–equal(thoughsometimesinferior)insomeareas,slightlysuperiorinothers.

WhenAdmiralJohnJellicoeboardedRevengeinApril1916hewasnotatallimpressedwithsomeofherspecifications:

I am enclosing a few criticisms as a result of a short visit to Revenge andconversationwith her Captain. She is extraordinarily wet. I prefer to alter her foralternativeFleetFlagship towaiting forRoyalOak as the latterwill be some timebefore she is efficient.We can do the work here, I think, quite satisfactorily andcertainlyatInvergordon.It isaverygreatpityandaverygreat retrogradestep that thevesselshavebeen

providedwithtwomastsandthesameofcourseappliestotheQueenElizabethclass.Icanseenopossiblereasonwhytheboatderrickshouldnothavebeenworkedfroma stumpmast, just abaft the funnel. This would meet all requirements and wouldprevent the two masts being used as they will be now, to enable the enemy toascertainourcourse.Isuggestthatinanyshipsnowbuilding,ifitwillnotdelaytheircompletion,thisalterationbeeffected.Theconningtowerisverycrampedandalsoverydifficultofaccessandegress.Consideringtherestrictedviewsaftitisessentialthat theAdmiralshouldbeable togetoutof theconningtowerquickly inorder toobservethemovementsoftheFleet.ThisisquiteimpracticableinRevengeashehastocrawlinandoutoftwoholesandwheninside,thespaceavailableisinsufficientfortheFlagshipoftheC-in-CandisconsiderablylessthanthatintheconningtowerofIronDuke.Iamoftheopinionthatagoodmanyofthecommunicationscouldbeplacedinthespacesbelowtheconningtowerinordertogivemoreroom.Thebridgearrangements are thoroughly bad compared with Iron Duke andQueen Elizabethclasses. The ship’s charthouse is one deck lower than necessary. There are nofacilitiesfortheAdmiralonthebridgeatall.ItispresumablyintendedthatheshouldworktheFleetfromthebridgeonwhichhischart-houseis locatedbutitshouldbeobvious that he is much too far away from the Captain and the compass in thisposition.IamfittingintheRevengeanAdmiral’scharthouseonthebridgebelowthestandardcompassplatformandplacingsignallingsearchlightsonthatbridge.ItisthepositionfromwhichtheFleetmustbeworked.ThepresentAdmiral’scharthouseisbeingconvertedintoanAdmiral’supperdeckcabinleavingthepresentupperdeckcabinfortheChiefofStafforCaptainoftheFleet.

OnboardRoyalSovereignduringgunnerypracticec.1923/4.Notethetallcharthousewithrangefinderontheroof.ComparethisviewwiththatofRoyalOakin1925.

Therearemanyotherpointsinthedesignwhichmightbeenlargeduponbutitisperhapstoolatetodosonow,butthereisonepointwhichiscertainlywrongandthatisthattheshipisasusualdownbythebowsandowingapparentlytohernotbeingsufficientlywaterborneforwardisevenwetterinaseawaythanherpredecessors.ItappearsfromareportoftheCaptainthatwhenpitchinginaheadseasheoffersnoresistance to dipping until the flare of the upper deck level gets underwater. Ourshipsinfactaretoofineforward,andthiscombinedwiththeheavyweightofthetwoturretsforwardrenders themunacceptableofkeepingtheirbowsabovewaterwhenpitching.

Itwould appear that the classwas never fullymodernized and therewere a number ofreasonsforthis:

1.Alldocumentsonthesubjectshowthattherewasadistinctlackofroomfromthebridgetothemainmastandanyincreaseinthelengthwouldhavetobeaddedinthisarea rather than at the ends. This could not be achieved by simply removingequipmentfromtheupperdeck;extensiveinternalstructuralchangeswouldhavetobemade.2.The fact that the shipshadavery lowGMmade it difficult to addand subtractitems without upsetting the ships’ general sea qualities and altering their originalstabilityasaconsequence.3. Themain reason seems to have been simply the enormous amount of time andexpenseinvolved.

Manypapersdiscussingtheirmodernizationwereputforwardduringtheinter-waryears,butallaremarkedwithareminderthattheshipsweredueforreplacementfrom1935.

All were modernized to some extent from 1924 to 1939, but their reduced stabilitymade thenunsuitable for reconstructionon thesamescaleaswaspossible in theQueen

Elizabethclass,andtheshorter,narrowerhullwasalsomoredifficulttoadopttomodernrequirements.

Principalmodificationscomprised:1.IncreasedAAarmamentwithimprovedcontrolequipment.2.Removaloftorpedotubesinmajority.3. Addition of aircraft catapult in Resolution, Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign(removedfromRoyalSovereignin1936–7).4.Additionofdeepbulges inRoyalOakandRamillies. Shallowbulges previouslyfitted in Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge and Royal Sovereign and remainedunchangedinthelastthreeships.5.Modifiedandmuchenlargedbridgework.

Inviewoftheirlimitedmodernizationandrelativelylowspeeditwasproposed,earlyin1939,thattheshipsbediscarded,butofcoursethiswasdroppedontheoutbreakofwar.In 1941 Churchill proposed converting two ormore of the class to supermonitors forprojected operations in the Baltic and on the enemy’s North Sea coast, and for thebombardment of Italian ports. One or two turrets were to be removed, AA armamentaugmented,deckprotectionincreasedandwiderbulgesfitted.Designswerepreparedforthis,buttheideawassubsequentlyabandonedonthegroundsthattheshipsmightbeofgreatervalue inprotectingconvoysagainst surfaceattackbyheavyships, and theworkwouldinterferewithotherandmoreurgentrequirementselsewhere.

All served in the Grand Fleet from 1916 to 1919. From 1939 to 1945 they wereemployedmainlyon escort duties.WithWarspite (Flag)Ramillies,Resolution,RevengeandRoyal Sovereign formed the 3rd Battle Squadron of the Emergency Eastern FleetorganizedintheIndianOceaninMarch1942followingthefallofSingaporeandbasedatColomboandKilindini.

RoyalOakwarloss1939.

Resolution and Revenge reduced to reserve late 1943 and employed on SubsidiaryService.

Ramilliessimilar,late1944.

Royal Sovereign transferred to Russia on loan in 1944 and renamed Archangelsk.Returned to the Royal Navy 1949. Placed on Disposal List and sold in 1949 (seeHistories).

Ramillies,ResolutionandRevengeplacedonDisposalListandsoldin1948.

ArmamentMain armament detailswere the same as those of theQueenElizabeth classwith onlyminoralterations.

Duringthedesignstageitwassuggestedthatitmightbepossibletohaveten15ingunsmountedasinIronDuke,butthisideaseemstohavebeendismissedonthegroundsthateightgunsconstitutedtheidealnumberforcontrolpurposesandthatanextrapairwouldnotprovideanincreaseinoffensivepowerproportionatetotheadditionalsize,weightand

cost involved. But serious consideration was given to a suggestion that it might bepossible tohaveninegunsif‘Y’turretcouldbefittedwitha triplemount.Therewouldhave tobesomealteration to thehull shapeaft toaccommodate the larger turret,butatthat time itwas considered essential to have asmany big guns as possible in any newdesign.Investigationsintothisthemerevealedthatthereasonsforrejectingtengunswereequally valid for nine, and to produce a triple turret at such short noticewouldmean agreatdelayinconstructiontimes.Thesamethingappliedtothesecondaryarmament.

The6ingunsnumberedtwofewerthanintheQueenElizabethsasdesignedbutwerethesameas in thoseshipsafter the1915modifications.At thedesignstage,however, ithadbeenhopedtofitamorepowerfulbatterythantheoneaccepted.IntheTllayout,avariationshoweda2-tier6inbattery,shorterinlengthandplacedmoreamidships.

ThedesignfeaturedsomedifferencesfromthatofthecompletedRoyalSovereign:1.a12in main belt; 2. barbette armour increased; 3. hull shape alteration with thickerarmouredbeltextensions.In theforwardbattery therewere twogunsontheupperdeckabreast‘A’barbette.Themidships6inwereontheupperdeck,twofiringrightahead,sixgunson the forecastle, twoon themaindeckabreast ‘Y’barbette, i.e.,eightguns firingrightahead(RSonlysix);sixgunsrightastern(RSonlyfour).

TheincreaseddimensionstoincludetheseproposalswereunfortunatelynotfavouredatthetimeandamoreconventionallayoutsimilartothatofQueenElizabethwasapprovedbytheBoard.Ascompleted,whenfiringtheaft15ingunsintheseships,itwasreportedthat thewardroomand gunroomwere severely shaken upwhen themuzzleswere on aforward bearing and firing full charges.Thiswas never remedied throughout the ships’careersandseemstohavebeennormalinallbattleshipsoftheperiod.Theall-round6inarmament, ascompleted,wasan improvementover the IronDuke andQueen Elizabethclasses,butthebatterywasstillverywetandmostdifficulttofightinaheadsea.

ThesewerethelastcapitalshipsfortheRoyalNavytohaveatweendeckbatteryforsecondaryarmamentandalsothelasttocarryanygunsbelowtheupperdeck.

ArmourFollowing the lines ofQueenElizabeth, theRoyalSovereign groupwas very similar inarmourqualities(seeWWlbook).Mainbeltstrakeswereincreasedattheloweredge(8ininQueenElizabeth)tomakea13inuniformthickness,andarmouredwidthalsoincreasedfrom13ft9in(QE)to15ft1½in.Elsewhere,onthevertical therewassomealterationinplateapplicationaswasthecaseinthedeckarmourwhentheprotectivedeckwasraisedtomaindeckleveltoimprovearmouredfreeboard.Ascompletedtheirverticalprotectionwassecondtonone.Thereductioninthicknessoftheanti-torpedobulkheads(from2into1½–lin), and the fact that the shipsweregiven lowstability,provedmost advantageouswhen the fittingofbulgeswas firstdiscussed.AlthoughRamillieswas theexperimentalship with regard to bulges for battleships (see bulges and underwater protection), herbulges were primarily for protection although they did indeed improve Stabilityperformance.

ROYALSOVEREIGNArmouredlayout,1919

Othersoftheclass,however,weregivenadifferenttypeofbulgeinthesensethatthelowersectionconsistedofsingleWTchamberswithoutanyofthetubecompartmentsorlarger chambers as in other bulged vessels. The upper portion was filled withcompartmentscontainingcementandwood.

ResolutionandRevengewerefittedwiththeirsin1917–18asanexperiment,andagainitwasfound thatstabilityandrollinghad improved.Later (1929) thebulgeswerefittedwith water and air compartments abreast the magazines further to improve theireffectivenessagainst torpedoattack.Aftercompletionandthebulgeprotectionhadbeenfitted, no extra protection was given to the class for many years, the ships beingcompletelyby-passedinfavouroftheQueenElizabethclass.Duringthe1930s,however,itwasconsideredsuitable tofitextradeckprotectionand in1934RoyalOakwasgiven4in NC plates over the main deck around the magazine area and 2½in NC over themachinery.

In1939RoyalSovereignandRamillieswereconsideredworthyofmodernization,beingviewedasthebesttwooftheclass(otherthanRoyalOak).Approvalwasgiventofit4inand2½inplatesasinRoyalOak,but lackof timeandsuitablematerialsmeant that thiswas not done.Again, in 1941, the question arose regarding theirweak deck protectionand, forced into the situation, the Admiralty called Royal Sovereign, Resolution andRamillies into the dockyard (when opportunity arose) to fit 2½in NC plates over themagazines.Fromofficial records,however, it appears thatResolutionwasonlypartiallyfittedandRevengenotatall(400tonswasfittedinRamillies).

UnderwaterProtectionandBulgesFrom1906Britishbattleshipconstructionhadprogressedfairlyrapidly,butintheareaofunderwaterprotectionthestepstakenwereretrogradeinthemain.Therewasnostandardpracticeappliedtothisaspectofaship’sconstructionandtheexperimentalapplicationsinvarious ships had been haphazard. Many vessels had only partial internal bulkheadsrunningdownfromthemaindecktotheinsideofthehull;othershadfull-lengthinternalbulkheads.Allwereofvariousthicknesses.

WhileQueen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign were under construction, however, thematterofunderwaterprotectionwasaddressedseriously.Thetorpedohadbecomeavery

potentweaponanditwasrealizedthatitwasvitaltotrytopreventanexplosioninthehullproper,and tostrengthen the internalbulkheadssurrounding thevitalsof theship.Testswerecarriedoutonsomeoftheoldershipspriorto1912,butnow(1912)Haslar,ChathamandCambridgetestcentreswereallworkingonsuitableprotectivemeasurestobeappliednotonlytoshipsunderconstruction,buttoshipsalreadyinservice.

RoyalOakportamidshipsgivingaclearviewofhermassiveanti-torpedobulgeswhichriseuptothe6insecondarybatteryOnlyRamillieswasthesame,theotherthreehavingbulgesfittedmuchlower1925/6.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:ANTI-TORPEDOBULGES,ASFITTED.Variationsonatheme

The first important tests were carried out on the old pre-dreadnoughtHood (RoyalSovereign class, 1889) which was sent to Portsmouth for that purpose on 27 February1913.Theexperimentswereasfollows(seealsodrawings):

1.Explodechargeof280lbwetguncottonincontactwithship’ssideat111station,twelve feetbelow thesurface.Compartments (111 to123) tobe filledwithoilandsome other compartments in the area to be left empty (101–111). This experimentwas to show the value of Queen Elizabeth’s underwater protection (as fitted in

design)andthevalueofoiloremptycompartmentsagainstexplosion.2. Explode charge of 280lb wet gun cotton against side at station 73, twelve feetbelowsurface.Compartmentsweretobeleftemptytoshowwhattheeffectswouldbe.3. Place charge of 280lb wet gun cotton at station 91 to test ‘A’ and ‘B’compartments.4. Fire 2lin gun cotton warhead charge in contact with net defence in position ofoppositesidetoexperiments1,2and3.ThetestswerecompletedandinJune1914thefollowingconclusionswerereached:

W.Gard.Portsmouth.1. A thick bulkhead should be placed at the outer position as in the 1stexperiment so that there shall be a greater possible chance of the innermostbulkheadremainingpracticallyintactaftertheexplosionoutboard.2.Theinnerbulkheadshouldbeconnectedtothethickbulkheadbytiesonlysothatanydeflectiononthelattershouldnotbedirectlycommunicatedtotheinnerbulkhead.3.Athickbulkheadconstructed in theprincipleadoptedfor theseexperimentscanbemadesufficientlyhomogeneous to resist suchextensivedeformationaswouldcausetheERorBRtobethrownopentothesea.

The projectile effect noticed in the 1st experiment was absent in the secondapparently due to the wings and outer bunkers being filled with water. It seemsdoubtful,however,whetherthewaterinthewingswasanadvantageandwhetherthegeneralresultwouldnothavebeenbetterifthemiddlecompartmentsorouterbunkeronlyhadbeenfilled.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:BULGES

Althoughthisandotherexperimentsfurnishedmuchdataregardingtheprovisionofmoresuitableinternalunderwaterprotectivebulkheadsinnewships,aletterfromJ.D.DickfortheDNOindicatedthatitwasnotenoughtohavejustaninternalbulkhead:

Thetwoexperimentscarriedoutwith280lbwetguncottonwereinconclusive.Themoderntorpedocarries400lbofwetguncottonorTNTwhichisequivalentto500lbofwetguncotton,andpresumablythenewGerman23.6intorpedoreportedbytheN.I.D.willbemuchlarger.Itisconsideredthatthepresenceofoilandwaterinthecompartmentshasavery

important bearing on the effect of the explosion and much valuable informationwouldbegainedfrommoretankexperiments.

Taking note of this and other reports that were received from the various departments,attentionwasturnedtowardsprovidingnotonlyagoodinternalbulkheadbutanexternaloneintheformofablisterbulgewhichcouldbefittedtonewshipsandoldervesselsif

thought necessary. But it was impossible to rush the experiments, and both QueenElizabeth andRoyal Sovereign were laid down and completedwithout external bulges.Theydid,however,benefitfromtheHoodtestsinthewayofathickerandmorecompleteinternalprotectivebulkhead.

By1915 tests hadbeen carriedout using400lbTNT, not against the hull proper butagainstvariousexternalsteelshapeswhichweresoplacedastoprotecttheinnerpartsoftheshipitself.On30ApriltheDNC(TennysonD’Eyncourt)wrotetotheDNOexplainingsomeofthemethodsthathadbeentried:

Ihavemadecareful inspectionof thedifferent small–scale targetsandsectionsof shipswithbulgeprotection,etc.,againsttorpedoeswhichhaverecentlybeenexperimentedwithbyProfessorHopkinsoninconjunctionwithVernon.Thepreliminaryconclusionsare:

1. System of bulge protection, the bulge being kept entirely outside the shipproper,isverymuchmoreefficientthansimilaramountsofprotectioninsidethebodyof a ship and experiments generally show that the permanent bulgeswehaveputonMonitorsandtheEdgars(cruisers)andalsothetemporaryattachedbulge arrangement on the old Revenge will be efficient to prevent seriousdamagetotheship.2.Averyefficientformofprotectionhasbeenevolvedbymeansofusinglayersof tubes–eachbeingsealedat theends, inconjunctionwith timbersheathinginside the tubes against the ship’s side proper and the sheathing also carriedroundoutsidethetubes.Thisarrangementperhapsinvolvesconsiderableweight,butaveryefficientprotectionagainst torpedoattackcanbeattainedbya totalthicknessoftubesandtimberofabout4to5feetwhichshouldpreferablybeintheformofabulgeexternaltotheship.

AsmentionedintheDNC’sletter,anumberofshipswerefittedwithexperimentalbulgesinanendeavourtodeterminetheoptimumbulgeshapethatwouldinhibittheeffectsoftheexplosionofatorpedo,whileexactingaminimumlossofship’sspeed.

The cruisers Edgar, Endymion, Theseus and Grafton were fitted with bulges ofenormous proportions (see drawings) which in practice proved very efficient indeed.Becauseoftheirsize,however,theywereoflimitedvalueandrestrictedtheshipstoslowspeeds and affected manoeuvring qualities. Edgar, Grafton and Endymion were alltorpedoedbutreturnedsafelytoportafterwards–proofenoughthattheworkofProfessorHopkinshadbeensuccessful.

ThecentreengineroomofRoyalSovereignTheupkeepofthenumerouswheelvalves,pressuregauges,dialsandpipeworketc.,wereaconstantsourceofhardworkfortheERstaff

Withregardtothefittingofbulgesinthebattleships,yetanothersetofexperimentshadbeenconducted.Thebattle-cruisersRenownandRepulsehadbeengiven internalbulgeson thedrawing-boardat thedesign stage,but thesewere shallow,much smaller fittingsandofcoursewerelesseffective.Thosefor thelargecruisersGloriousandCourageouswereverysimilarandhadbeenincludedinthedesign.Furious’sbulgeswerelargerthanthoseofhertwohalf-sistersbutofmoreorlessthesametype.

FortheRoyalSovereigngroupRamillieswasthetestshipandshewasgiventhemostelaboratebulgesfittedtodate(1917).Ascompleted,hershallowtube-filledbulgesprovedverysuccessfulandalsogave thestabilityaboostbydamping the rollingof thehull tosomeeffect.Approvalwasgiventofittheothersoftheclass,butthoseforRevengeandResolutionwhenfittedin1918were,infact,differentfromthoseofRamilliesinthattheyhadnotubes.RoyalSovereignherselfhad6intubesinthebulgeswhentheywerefittedin1920.

Althoughvisuallythebulgesappearedthesamethroughouttheclass,thefactisthatnotwoshipswereidenticalandallofthemunderwentmuchexperimentationandalterationto theunderwaterprotective system(seedrawingsandBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne). As the power of torpedoes increased the effectiveness of bulges and indeed thewholeof theunderwaterprotectivesystem inmanyof theolderbattleshipsbecame lesseffective.Nevertheless,RamilliesandResolutionbothtookserioustorpedohitsduringthewar (see battle damage section) and survived – a tribute indeed to the strength of theinternalstructureoftheshipsandthedesignofthebulgesingeneral.RoyalOak,however,was sunk very effectively, having taken at least three hits just below the bulge andarmouredbelts(seebattledamagesection).Examinationoftheholesinherhullshowwhyshesankinaboutthirteenminutes(seedrawing).

MachineryOriginallydesignedascoal-firedships,followingthepatternoftheIronDukesratherthanrepeating the propulsive system ofQueen Elizabeth, they were naturally slower ships.

SHPwasfixedat31,000for21knotsandtheywerelaiddownassuch.

On Lord Fisher’s return to the Admiralty, however, one of his early moves was toinstigatethefittingofoil-firedboilerstonewshipsonthestocks.ThisincreasedtheirSHPto40,000for23knotsanditwasachievedwiththeminimumoffussorinterruptiontothecontinuityofconstruction.Havingfewerboilers thanQueenElizabethor IronDuke, theshipscouldbefittedwithonlyasingleuptake,thefirstBritishdreadnoughtstohavethisfeature.Ascompletedtheclassallputupagoodturnofspeedandalthoughtheusualfullsetoftrialswerenotcarriedoutbecauseofwartimeconditions,itwasreportedthattheyallmadeinexcessof21–22knots–notquiteuptoexpectationsbutcertainlyasfastasmostBritishcapitalshipsandadequateforGrandFleetduties.ThefastestshipoftheclasswasRevenge withRoyalOak a close second. Their machinery and boilers were neverupdatedandconsequentlyin1939theyweresadlylackinginspeed;ifthehullswerefoul,theywereluckytoreach19knotsonfullpower.

BridgeworkAscompletedtheclasswerefittedwithatripodforemastandsimplebridgeworkdifferentinappearancefromtheQueenElizabethsbutidenticalinarrangement.TheGreatWarsawmany additions to the bridge and upper works in the way of SL towers, extra wingextensions,covers,windows,rangefinders,rangeclocksandcharthouses,etc.,sothattheirappearancebecameratheruniqueandtheycouldeasilybedistinguishedfromoneanotherbythedifferentbridgefittings.

During the 1920s and 1930s the canvas surroundswere removed and inmany casesreplacedbylightgaugesheetmetal;thebridgesweregivencanvascoversandsometimescompletelyenclosedwithsimilarplating(endof1930s,not inall).Extrawindowswereinstalledaroundthecharthouseandthetripodforemastwasalmosthiddenfromviewandcouldbecalledovercrowded–by1939thetripodwasinfacthiddenexceptforthesectionreachinguptothecontroltop.

Althoughthestaffservingtheseshipswerealmostalwaysatthemercyoftheelements,there was never any general complaint because the simple fact was that although thebridgeandchart-housepositionsweredraughty,wetandgenerallyuncomfortable,theall-round view and manning positions at all levels were much preferred to a completelyenclosedposition.By1940manymoreextrashadbeenaddedincludinglightAAgunsatthe base of the bridge and all upperworks becoming overcrowdedwith RDF aerials ofmanykinds.Themanningoftheshipfromopenbridgeworkwasstillpreferred,howeveroneofficer commenting: ‘We like to seewhat theGermansare throwingatus’.Duringthis period Ramillies and Royal Oak had the newest and most spacious bridges withResolutionandRSfollowing.

Aclose-upofResolutionin1924showingclearlyhowtheupperbridgecharthouseprojectedforwardofthetripod.Notethesearchlighttowersincorporatedattherearofthesuperstructure(upperandlowerlevels).

ReportfromtheBridgeinRamilliesafterherrefitinJuly1934:During the period of the trials theweatherwas fine andwarm.Conditions on thebridgewerequitepleasant.TheDNEandCommanderWadhambothvisitedtheshipandwereonthebridgeduringfullpowerruns.AlsoCommanderTushrepresentingDofN.TheCO(CaptainR.Leatham)oftheshipstatedthatfromanavigationalpointofviewthebridgewouldbereporteduponfavourablybutfromatacticalstandpointhewouldnotbeabletomakeareportuntiltheshiphadhadexerciseswithattackingaircraft.HeopenedallthewindowsonthebridgeindemonstrationtotheDNEandconditionswerenotunpleasant,theinevitabledraughtbeingatabouttheheightofthewindowsandnotlowdownaswasthecaseinValiantbeforethecompassplatform

wasenclosed.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS

Withregardtotheopencornersofthecompassplatform,theawningshadnotyetbeenfitted and therefore could not be tried. Captain Leatham made the suggestion that theopenings would be more effective if stools were provided so that the observer’s headcould be taken to just above the level of the roof.He also suggested that the openingsmight be much smaller (just large enough for an observer to place his head through)rectangularinshapeandfittedwithabullet-proofshutter.

RoyalOakin1925lookingaftfromtheforecastleupon‘A’and‘B’15inturretsandsuperstructure.(Notetheaircraft.)Duringthisperiod,bridgesonthisclassgavearathergrimandaggressiveappearance.

The view of the forecastle from the bridge is quite good enabling the Captain andNavigatingOfficertowatchoperationsondeck.

HandlingandManoeuvrabilityAscompleted theclassdidnothaveabadreputation ineitherhandlingormanoeuvringqualities,althoughtheytendedtorollslightlymorethanhadbeenintendedinthedesign.After being bulged conditions improved to a degree and the subject was practicallyforgotten. As they became older, however, and many weights had been added, theybecame rather awkward to handle in certain conditions.Although this could be said ofmany of the older battleships, it was almost customary to pay lip service to theRoyalSovereignsanditisonrecordthatsomeofthem‘playedup’especiallyatslowspeeds.

During the early months of the SecondWorldWar the Captain of Ramillies (H. T.Baille-Grohman) had nothing but praise for the old ship and some of his commentsdispersecriticismwhichinmanycaseswereunfounded:

Nodifficultywasexperiencedenteringor leavingFremantle,but immediatelyafterleaving the port at 06.30 on Thursday 21st December it was found necessary toanchor owing to overheated condensers. This overheatingwas caused by immensequantities of particularly stringyweedwhich had entered the condensers. ItwouldappearthatFremantleasdredgedisnotsuitableforwarshipsofthisdraught.StrongheadwindswereexperiencedonthefirstpartofthevoyagetoMelbourne

and subsequently a fairly heavy swell on the starboard beam or quarter. Thisnecessitatedan increased in revolutions inorder toarriveon timeasarranged.TheshiparrivedatMelbourneat13.45onChristmasDay,Monday25thDecember1939.TheshipremainedinMelbournefor63hourswhichtimewasnotenoughtoallow

boilerstocooldownsufficientlyforworktobecarriedoutonthem.

ThedistancesteamedbyHMShipundermycommandinDecember1939isofinterest,andlikelytobearecorduptodateforamonth’ssteamingbyabattleshipofanyNavy,withalsoapossiblerecordforthebestday’srun.

Distancesareasfollows:

OnpatroltoAden(1stand2ndDecember)500miles.

AdentoWellington,callingatSocotra(4thto31stDecember)8,985miles.

Totaldistanceformonth9,485miles.

Averagespeedforwholedistance16.5knots.

Bestday’srun:(24thDecember)464miles.

Averagespeedforbestdaysrun19.3knots.

FastestrunwasfromFremantletoPortPhilipHeads,1,757miles.

Averagespeed19.2knots.

Thedistancesteamedforthefirstyearofcommissionwillbeover40,000miles.

Acomparisonwithpeace-timesteamingisasfollows:

Averageannualdistancesteamedforperiod1930–1938,6,861milesatanaveragespeedof11.5knots.

Ramillieswasdocked28thOctober to6thNovember1939atAlexandria,otherwiseshehashadnorefitsinceFebruary1939.

Handling:Although anR class battleship is notoriously unsteady at slow speeds and in shallowwater, the ship handled very well throughout both passages. Recourse to working theenginestoovercomeincipientsheerswasonlynecessaryontwooccasionsonthepassageSouthandononeforthepassageNorth.ThegreatestcarewasrequiredwhenenteringarestrictedportionoftheCanalfromawider.

Close-upoftheRoyalSavereign’sbridgeafterrefitMay1938.Notethattheundersideofthebridgehasbeenenclosedtoalleviatethedraught,andthebridgehasbeenroofedin.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,ASCOMPLETED

Construction Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedRoyalSovereign PortsmouthDY 15.1.1914 29.4.1915 8.4.1916.RoyalOak DevonportDY 15.1.1914 17.11.1914 1.5.1916.Revenge Vickers 22.12.1913 29.5.1915 24.3.1916.Resolution Palmers 29.11.1913 14.1.1915 7.12.1916.Ramillies Beardmore 12.11.1913 12.9.1916 5.5.1917.

Displacement(tons):

27,970tonsload,31,130tonsaveragedeepload.

Dimensions

Length:580ft3in(pp),614ft6in(wl),620ft6⅞in(oa).(Ramillies).

Beam:88ft6in(88ft7inRevenge).

Draught:30ftload,33ft7indeep.

Armament

8×15in42calMkI

14×6in45calMkXII

2×3inAA

4×3pdrQF

10Lewis

4×21inTTinsubmergedtubes(21torpedoes).

Armour

Main belt 13in amidships; Forward strakes 6–4–1 in; Aft strakes 6–4in; Upper sideamidships 6in; Barbettes 10–9–7–6in; Turrets 13–11 in; Bulkheads 6–4in; Decks:forecastle1in;upper1½in;main2in;middle4–3–2in;lower2½in.

Machinery

Parsonsreactionturbinesdrivingfour3-bladedpropellers(diaminner10ft,outer9ft3in).18Babcock&WilcoxboilersinRevenge,RamilliesandRS,Yarrowinothertwo.Engineroomsize69ft11in.

Boilerroomsize.No.1:37ft11¾in,No.2:38ft,No.3:38ft1in,6boilerseachroom.

Weightofmachinery:2,550tons(approx).

Mainfeedoutput:(verticalsteamreciprocatingcylinder)71.4tonsperhour.

Auxiliaryfeedpumpoutput:35.7tonsperhour.

Averagedesignedrevs300rpm.

DesignedSHP:40,000for23knots.

Fuel(tons)oilnormal,3,400max.

Radiusofaction:7,000nmat10knots,3,600nmat18knots,2,700nmatfullspeed.

Searchlights:8×36ininall(11×36inRamilliesascompleted).

Complement:909RoyalOak,910Resolution;938Ramillies.

Costs:£2,570,504(RoyalSovereign),Ramilliesbeingthemostexpensiveat£3,295,810.

Itwasfound,asintimated,thattherudderhastobeusedgenerouslyandquickly.The wash caused by the ship did not appear to be any more excessive than thatcausedbyamoderatesizedvessel.

Thiswasawonderfulreportforanoldshipwhich,accordingtotheAdmiralty,wasdueforscrappinginabout1935andespeciallygiventhatthedesignhadreceivedlittleornoreconstructionsince1917.

By the end of the war (1944), however, many more weights had been added (extrabridgework, radar, AA guns, etc.) which proved too much for the old ships as thefollowingreportshows:

By 1944 Ramillies had increased her draught from 29½ft to 34½ft and wasexceedingly difficult tomanage. Coming home through Suez it was impossible tosteady ship for a moment. She had to be carried with large rudder and frequentreversalsofoneengineforhourafterhouranddespitea tugshetooktheground4times.8knotsseemedtobethemostmanageablebutnotgoodatthat.

AppearanceChanges,RefitsandModificationsWell-proportioned, fine-looking ships, they were characterized by the single large flat-sided funnel which gave then a most impressive appearance. They were easilydistinguishablefromtheQueenElizabethclassby:

1.Singlefunnel.2.Upperbridgenotextendedbacksomuch.3.Navigatingplatformprojectednoticeablyfurtherforward.4.Longer6inbattery,moreamidships.5.6ingun(P&S)onforecastledeckoversecondbatterygun.6.15indirectortoweronplatformbelowcontroltopinsteadofoverthis.

Theirappearancein1919wasratherheavierthanoriginallyasaconsequenceofthe1916–18 wartime additions, including enlarged control tops, enlarged bridge (Resolution andRevenge), SL towers and aircraft platforms on turret tops. Anti-torpedo bulges inRamillies,RevengeandResolutionwerenotveryprominentatthisstage.

CombinedannualmanoeuvresoftheHomeandMediterraneanFleetsinMarch1937.Resolutionnearest,thenBarham,QueenElizabeth,RoyalOak,NelsonandRodney.

Individualdifferences:

Ramillies LowSLtowersabeamfunnel.Loweryardonforemastatdirectorplatform.

Others: TallerSLtowersatrearoffunnel.Loweryard.

Revenge

Forecastlesiderecessedabaftoutfaceof‘A’barbette(shaft‘B’inotherfour).Upperbridgeextendedbacktonearfunnel.Middleandlowerbridgesextendedbackandwasconnectedbycurvedscreen.

Resolution MiddleandlowerbridgesasRevenge,onlytwoshipsthus.Verylonggaffatstarfish.

RoyalOakFlangehighupbetweentripodlegs(onlyshipofclasswiththis).Bridgesnotextended.Verylonggafffromheeloftopmast.

Royal BridgesasRoyalOak.Signalstrutsforwardfromforestarfish.

Sovereign Shortergafffromheeloftopmast.

RoyalSovereignRefit,May1921toSeptember1922:

1.LargebaseRFfittedatrearof‘B’turret.2.RFremovedfrombetweenSLtowersatrearoffunnel.3.Rangeclocksaddedover‘X’turretandextraonefittedovercontroltop.4.HARFfittedonsmalltoweroverbridge.5.SLtowerabaftmainmastremoved.6.Anti-torpedobulgefitted,similartothoseinRevengeandResolution.

RoyalSovereign1924–5:

3inAAgunsreplacedby4inAA.

RoyalSovereignRefit,October1927toJune1928:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Upperpairof6ingunsandcasematesremoved.3.Extrapairof4inAAadded.4.Foretopmastandyardbelowdirectorplatformremoved.5.Extrasignalstrutsfittedatstarfishbelowcontroltopandatdirectorplatform.

RoyalSovereign1931:HARFoncontroltopreplacedbyHAdirector.

RoyalSovereignRefit,JanuarytoNovember1932:

1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Multiple2pdrAAadded(8barrels)onraisedplatformP&Sonshelterdeckabeamfunnel.3.AAobservationplatformaddedeachsideof15indirectorplatform.4.Aftertorpedotubesremoved.5. New rectangular SL towers fitted around funnel, with after pair of SLs raisedaboveforwardpair.6.24insignallingSLremountedonsmallplatform(P&S)abeamlowerbridge.7. Training catapult (McTaggart type) fitted on quarterdeck, right aft, with crane(straightarm)abaftthis.8.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets.9.Bridgemodifiedandenlarged.10.Deepsupportingflangesaddedbelownavigatingplatform.11.LowerbridgeextendedbackaroundfunneltomeetSLtowers.

RoyalSovereignMaytoJuly1935:

1.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedP&Sabeamconningtower.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1919Displacement(tons)

Revenge:29,590(legend),32,460(deep),32,820(extradeep);Ramillies:30,400(legend),33,200(deep),33,570(extradeep).

Dimensions

Length unchanged. Beam: Ramillies (bulged) 101ff 5½in; Revenge and Resolution(bulged)101ft6in;Royal

SovereignandRoyalOakascompleted.

Draught:29ft3½in(legend),31ft11in(averagedeep).

Armament:unchanged.

Machinery:unchanged.

Searchlights:8×36in;2×24insignalling.Improvedcontrolequipmentfitted.

Aircraft

Platformfittedover ‘B’and ‘X’ turrets inall.Revenge fitted for towingkiteballoon. Inpost-war period aircraft not normally carried, but embarked only when required forexercises.Runwaysover15ingunsgenerallyremovedfrom1920.

Armour

AsoriginalwiththeexceptionofextraplatingovermagazinesandturrettopsasaresultofJutland.Armouredcasematesaddedtoupperpairif6ingunsinResolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereign.Machineryandboilers:unchanged.

Speed:About22knotsfull.

Fuelandradius:unchanged.

Rig: As original, plus struts forward from starfish below control top inRamillies andRoyalSovereign.

W/T:Type1–16,32,2–34,9and31.

Complement:Revenge,1,240;Ramillies,1,213;RoyalOak,1,215.

GMANDSTABILITY

RoyalSovereignafterbulging(figurestakenfrom1924incliningtests)ConditionA(legend)Displacement(tons) Draught GM Max.stability29,710 29ft5in 5.22ft 35°ConditionB(deep) 32,570 31ft11in 5.52ft 36°ConditionC(extradeep) 32,930 32ft4in 5.66ft 36½°ConditionD(light) 28,520 28ft4½in 5.30ft 34½°ComparedtoRoyalOakwithherlargerbulges,June1924.ConditionA(legend)

29,160 28ft3½in 6.3ft ConditionC(extradeep)32,800 31ft4½in 6.3ft

2.HARFoverbridgereplacedbyhighopentower.

RoyalSovereignbyMarch1937.

Multiple2pdrtemporarilyremoved(some2pdrsfromRoyalSovereignwerefittedintheaircraftcarriersGloriousandCourageous).RoyalSovereignwasgivennewguns.36inSLreplacedby44in.Catapultandcraneremoved.Catapultbaseonquarterdeckretained.

RoyalSovereignRefit,June1937toFebruary1938:

1.Single4inAAreplacedbytwinmountinlargeshields.2.HAdirectoroncontroltopraisedclearoftop.3.AfterHAdirectorfittedinplaceoftorpedocontroltower.4.Remainingtorpedotubesremoved.5.RDFequipmentfitted(aerialatheadofmaintopmast).6.Largeopenplatformaddedoverbridge,extendedbackaroundtripodlegs.7.Maintopgallantmastremoved.8.HARFonbridgeremoved.

RoyalOak1922.SLremovedfromtowersabaftmainmast.Towersremaineduntil1924–5.(SLremountedonmiddlebridgeinRamilliesonly,otherssuppressed.)

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS

REVENGEGeneralArrangementsasCompleted,1916

REVENGEGeneralArrangementsasCompleted,1916

FleetmanoeuvresintheAtlantic,March1934.Manoeuvrestookplacequiteoften,butduringthoseof1934HMshipsencounteredsomeoftheheaviestseasduringanexercise.RoyalOakisshownalmostcompletelyconcealedbyspray.

RoyalOakRefit,September1922toJuly1923:

1.LargebaseRFfittedatrearof‘B’turret.2.RFremovedbetweenSLtowersatrearoffunnel.3.Rangeclocksaddedover‘X’turret.4.HARFmountedinsmalltoweroverbridge.5. Very prominent anti-torpedo bulges fitted which carried almost to upper deck

amidships.6.Middlebridgelevelwasextendedbacktofunnel.

LegendforRoyalOakafterrefit(1924).

Length:620ft6in(oa),Beamoverbulges:102ftlin,Draught:26ft6inforward,29ft6inaftFreeboardtotopofdeck:28ftforward,16ftamidships,17ftaft.

Heightofturrets:

‘A’31ft9in

‘B’41ft6in

‘X’32ft9in

‘Y’22ft6in

SHP40,000andstillcapableof21.75knots.

Complement1,188.

Armament:

Eight15in;fourteen6in;two4inAA;four21intorpedotubes

Weights(tons)

GeneralEquipment 720Armament 5,020Machinery 2,710Fuel 900oilArmourandhull 19,650

RoyalOak,1924–5:

36inSLremovedfrommiddlebridge:

RoyalOak,Refit,March1927toJune1927:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Rangeclocksovercontroltopremoved.3.Upperpairof6ingunsremoved(casemateretained).4.Extrapair4inAAadded.5.Foretopmastandyardbelowdirectorplatformremoved.6.Extrasignalstrutsfittedtostarfishbelowcontroltop.7.Topgallantfittedtomainmast.

RoyalOak,byApril1932:

1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Forecastledeck6incasemateremoved.3.HARFoncontroltopreplacedbyHAdirector(ApriltoJuly1932).

RoyalOak1933:

Afterpairoftorpedotubesremoved.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets:

RoyalOakRefit,June1934toAugust1936:

1. 6in director towers relocated P&S on new platforms on foremast below 15indirector.2.4insinglesreplacedbytwinmountingsinlargeshields.3.Multiple2pdr(8barrels)AAaddedP&Sonraisedplatformabeamfunnel.4.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)AAaddedP&Sabeamconningtower.5.AARFremovedfromcontroltopandoverbridge

ResolutionatanchorinWeymouthBayc.1936.Notethetwin4inHAmountingontheforecastledeckabeamthefunnel,fittedforexperimentalpurposes(seedrawing).

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1927Displacement(tons)

RoyalOak29,160(legend),32,800(extradeep);Revenge30,244(legend),33,008(extradeep);

RoyalSovereign29,710(legend),32,930(extradeep).

Dimensions

Length:unchangedexceptwhenfittedwithsternwalk(625ft).

Beam:unchangedexceptRoyalOak (bulged)102ft6in;RoyalSovereign (bulged) 101ft11½in.

Draught:RoyalOak28ft3½in(legend),31ft4½in(deep).

RoyalSovereign29ft5in(legend),31ft11in(deep).

Stability:Angleofmaximumstability:35/36½°,Vanishesat62/68½°GM:5.22/5.66ft

Armour:unchangedexceptwaterprotectionaddedtobulgesin1927andtubesremovedwherefitted(Ramillies).

Machinery:unchanged.

TrialfiguresRamilliesafterrefit,July1934:

4Hours,TollandMile.

Displacement:29,540tonsloadcondition.

Draught:28ft8in.

Speed:22.03knots.

6.HAdirectorplatformfittedontripodlegs(directornotfitted).7.Four21in torpedo tubes fitted (2P&S) in recessedports in forecastlebefore ‘A’turret,forexperimentalpurposes.8.RemainingpairofsubmergedTTremoved.9.RDFfitted(aerialonmaintopmastwithDFcabinetonstarfish).10.36inSLreplacedby44in.11.NewSLtowersfittedasinRoyalSovereign.12. Training catapult (McTaggart type) and crane (large bent arm) fitted as inRamillies.13.Bridgeenlargedandmodified.Upperbridgeanewandcompletelyopendesign,adoptedonlyinRoyalOakandMalaya.14. Lower bridge extended around funnel as in Royal Sovereign. 15. Tripod legsfittedtomainmasttosupportHAdirector.16.Maintopgallantremovedandtopmastreduced.

RoyalOakRefit,byApril1939:

1.Largeopenplatformaddedoverbridgeextendedbackaroundtripodlegs.2.Smallshieldaddedatlowerbridgelevel.

RamilliesinJuly1934afterextensiverefit.Notethelargebulges,tripodmainmastandcatapulton‘X’turret.Afterthisrefitsheachieved22.03knotsonherfour-hourtrialsontheTollandMileat29,540tons.

Revenge1922:

1.SLremovedfromtowersabaftmainmast.2.Armouredcasematesfittedtoupperpairof6inguns.

Revenge1924:

1.RFremovedfrombetweenSLtowers.2.3inAAreplacedby4inAA.

Revenge1925–6:

1.Rangeclockaddedover‘X’turret.2.36inSLremovedfrommiddlebridge.3.Two24insignallingSLexbridgeremountedonforwardsuperstructureandextra24inSLtemporarilymountedon‘B’turret(removedspring1926).4. Signal distributing and remote control office added at rear of upper bridge andscreenbetweenmiddleandlowerbridgesremoved.5.Topgallantfitted.

Revenge1926–7:

1.24insignallingSLtransferredfromforwardsuperstructuretolowerbridge.2.Officeatrearofupperbridgeconsiderablyenlarged.3.Tallertopgallanttomain.

Revenge1927:

One24inSLmountedonsmallplatformlowdownbeforebridge.

RevengeRefit,January1928toJanuary1929:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Upperpairof6ingunsandcasematesremoved.3.Extrapairof4inAAadded.4.AAobservationpositionfittedP&Sbelowdirectorplatform.5.RDFequipmentfitted.DFcabinetatrearofdirectorplatform.6.ForwardsectionofeachSLtowerenlargedandforwardpairofSLbroughtfurtherforwardfromfunnel.Aftersectionraisedbringingafterpairtoahigherlevel.7.24inSLandsmallplatformbeforebridgeremoved.8.Aircraftplatformsremovedfroma‘X’turret.9.Bridgeenlarged.10. Flag signalling transferred from fore to mainmast and after superstructureenlargedtoaccommodatesignalstaff.11.Foretopmastandyardbelowdirectorplatformremoved.12.Tallertopgallanttomain.13.Signalyardatheadmaintopmastandcloseabovestarfish.

RevengeRefit,MaytoDecember1931:

1.Multiple 2pdr (8 barrels) added on raised platform side of shelter deck abeamfunnel(starboardonly,noneonport).2.AfterpairofTTremoved.3.ModifiedtypeDFfitted.4.BaseofSLtoweronstarboardsideoffunnelcutawaytoaccommodatemultiple2pdrs.5.24insignallingSLremountedonsmallplatformlowonmainmast.6.Signalstruts(rakedwellaft)fittedatstarfishbelowcontroltop.

Revenge1933:

Aircraftplatformsremovedfrom‘B’turret.

RevengeRefit,July1936toMarch1937:

1.TorpedocontroltowerandRFremoved.2.36inSLreplacedby44inSL.Letters‘RE’paintedonturrettops.3.Underwaterbulgesinspectedandreconditioned.

RevengeRefit,winter1938toAugust1939:

1.Single4inreplacedbytwingunsinlargeshields.2.Multiple2pdraddedonplatformonportsideabeamfunnel.3.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedP&Sonsuperstructureabeamconningtower.4.HAdirectoroncontroltopraisedwellabovetop.5.AfterHAdirectoraddedinplaceoftorpedocontroltower.6.DFaerialremovedfromovercontroltop.7.Modifiedtypeofaerialfittedatheadoftopgallantmast.8.BaseofSLtoweronportsidecutawaytoaccommodate2pdrs.

9.Signaldistributionofficeandremotecontrolstationatrearofbridgereplacedbysmallopenplatformbuiltaroundtripodlegs.10.Clinkerscreenfittedtofunneltop.11.Signalyardremovedfrommaintopmast.

Ramillies1919–21:

1.LargebaseRFaddedatrearof‘B’turretandslightlylaterin‘X’turret.2.Rangeclock,exfaceofcontroltop,relocatedonpoleovertop.

Ramillies1922:

SLremovedfromtowersabaftmainmast.Remountedonmiddlebridge.

Ramillies1923–4:

1.Rangeclockremovedfromovercontroltopandrelocatedover‘X’turret.2.SLremovedfrommiddlebridge.3.Armouredcasematesfittedtoupperpairof6in.4.Shorttopgallantmastaddedtomainandsignalstrutstostarfishbelowcontroltop.

RamilliesRefit,September1926toApril1927:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Upperpairof6ingunsremoved(casematesretained).3.Extrapairof4inAAaddedonshelterdeck.4.HARFmountedonsmalltoweronbridge.5.36inSLremovedfrommiddlebridge.6.24inSLtransferredfromforwardsuperstructuretolowerbridge.7.Newhigh-fittingbulgesreplacingsmalleroriginalones.8.Highslopingrooffittedtoupperbridge.9.Foretopmastandloweryardremovedfromforemast.

Ramillies1931–2:

1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Forecastledeck6incasematesremoved(byAugust1932).

RamilliesRefit,January1933toAugust1934:

1.Multiple2pdrAAaddedP&Sonraisedplatformabeamfunnel.2.Multiple0.5inAAaddedabeamconningtower.3.HARF on control top replaced byHAdirector and afterHAdirector added onplatformonnewlyfittedtripodlegs.4.AAobservationpositionsfittedateachsideof15indirectorplatform.5.AfterpairofTTremoved.6.TorpedocontroltowerandRFremoved.7.NewSLtowersasinRoyalOak.8.Trainingcatapult(McTaggarttype)fittedonportsideof‘X’turretroof,withcrane(straightarm)onportsideofsuperstructure.9.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrettops.

10.Bridgemodifiedandenlarged.11.Lowerbridgeextendedaftaroundfunnelandupperbridgemoresteeplyslopedandprominentwithsupportingflangesaddedbelow.

REVENGE1927–39

Ramillies,1935:

HARFoverbridgereplacedbyhighopentower(AugusttoOctober).

Ramillies:byMay1937.

1.36inSLreplacedby44in.2.Toweroverbridge replacedby largeopenplatformextendedbackaround tripodlegs.Red,whiteandbluestripespainteduponturretsinall.

RamilliesRefit,byJune1938:

1.Single4inAAreplacedbytwinsinlargeshield.2.RemainingpairofTTremoved.3.RDFfitted.

4.Catapultremoved,craneretained.5.Maintopgallantreducedinlength.

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1939Displacement(tons):31,560(load),33,200(deep)(averageforclass).

Length:unchanged.820ft(oa)625ftRevengewithsternwalk.

Beam:unchanged.101ft11½inRoyalSovereign;102ft6inRamillies.

Armament:Maingunsunchanged.

Secondary:12×6ininupperdeckbattery

8×4inAAintwinshields

16×2pdrAA(2×8barrels)

8×0.5inMGAA(2×4barrels)

4×3pdrsaluting

4×21inTTabovewater(RoyalOak),2×21insubmerged(Revenge).

Radar:MF/DFequipmentinall.

Searchlights:4×44in;4×24insignallinginRevenge,2inothers.

Aircraft

Catapult (training) on ‘X’ turret in Resolution and Royal Oak. One Fairey IIIFreconnaissanceseaplane.

Armour

AsoriginalexceptforadditionstoRoyalOakin1936refit.

Machineryandboilers:unchanged.

Speed:reducedtoabout20knots.Ramilliesunabletoexceedthisby1940.

Radiusofaction/(tonsperhour):6,000nmat10knots(5.1),5,500nmat12knots(6.7),4,650nm at 14 knots (9.2), 3,850nm at 16 knots (12.7), 3,050nm at 18 knots (18.0),2,250nmat20knots(27.4).

Rig:Noforetopmast.Shorttopmasttomaininall.

TopgallanttomaininallexceptRamillies(tallinRevenge,shorterinothers).TallflagpoletoforeinResolution.ShortflagpoletoeachinRoyalOak.DFaerialonmaintopmastortopgallant.Signalstrutsatstarfishbelowcontroltopinall.

Appearance:Generally notablyheavier andmorepiledup thanduring1920sowing tomanypost-warmodifications,mainlyfrom1927onwards,includingenlargedcontroltop,bridge and searchlight towers, heavymultiple AAmountings amidships and prominentdirectorsovercontroltopandonmainmastoronaftersuperstructure.DirectoroncontroltopraisedwellclearoftopinResolution,RevengeandRoyalSovereign.Clinkerscreentofunnel inRevenge andResolution, Royal Sovereign fitted 1940, Ramillies fitted 1941.

TripodmainmastinResolution,RamilliesandRoyalOak.Controltoppaintedverylightinall,contrastingnoticeablywithdark-grey(HomeFleetcolours)ofhullandsuperstructure.

Individualdifferences

Ramillies:Deepflangesbelowdirectorplatformonforemast.Highdomedroofoverupperbridge.Veryprominentbulges.Tripodmainmastwithdirectorplatformonlegs.

Resolution:HAdirector raisedwellabovecontrol top.Original typeupperbridge (onlyshiptoretainthis).Clinkerscreentotunnel.Catapulton‘X’turret.TripodmainmastanddirectorasinRamillies.

Revenge:HAdirectorraisedasinResolution.DeepflangesbelowdirectorplatformasinRamillies.

HAdirectoronafter superstructure.Lowerbridgewingsnotcarriedbackaroundfunnel(only ship thus).SmallSLplatform lowonmainmast (only ship thus).Sternwalk (onlyship thus). Topgallant to main noticeably taller than others. DF aerial at head maintopgallant(ontopmastinothers).

RoyalOak: 6in director towers on platform below 15in director (only ship with this).Wide flange between tripod legs close above bridge (only shipwith this). Square-facedopenupperbridge.

Catapult on ‘A’ turret. Recessed torpedo ports in forecastle side (only ship thus). VerylargeprominentbulgesasRamillies.LargeDFcabinetonmaintop(onlyshipthus).

RoyalSovereign:HAdirectorraisedasinResolutionandRevenge.Shallowflangesbelowmaindirectorplatform.Prominentverticalstrutoneachsidebelowdirectorplatform(onlyship thus).HAdirectoronaftersuperstructureasRevenge.Verydeepflangesonfaceofbridgebelownavigatingplatform.

Resolution1919–20:

1.LargebaseRFfittedover‘B’turretonly.2.SmalltorpedoRFoncontroltowerreplacedbylargerRF.3.Longforwardstrutsfittedtoforestarfish.

VeryfewalterationstoResolutionexceptthosesimilartoothersofherclass(rangeclocks,SLalterations,etc.)duringtheearly1920s.

Resolution:ClinkerscreenfittedtofunnelJulytoOctober1924.

ResolutionRefit,December1926toDecember1927:

1.Controltopenlargedandmodified.2.Rangeclockaddedover‘X’turret.

RoyalOakduringthestormyFleetManoeuvresintheAtlanticduringMarch1934.

3.Upperpairof6ingunsremoved(casematesretained).4.Extrapair4inAAadded.5.Trainingcatapultaddedtoquarterdeck.6.Foretopmastandyardbelowremovedfromdirectorlevel.7.Extrasignallingstrutsfittedtostarfishbelowcontroltop.8.Topgallanttomainmast.

ResolutionRefit,December1929toMarch1931:

1.Forecastledeck6incasematesremoved.2.HARFoncontroltopremovedandreplacedbyHACS.3.AfterpairofTTremoved.4. Starboard forward 4in replaced by 4in LA HA experimental gun in new typemounting.Gunandmountingprovedmostsuccessfulaftertrialson20–21February1931offPlymouth.5.Catapultremovedfromquarterdeck.

ResolutionbySeptember1933:

1.Rangeclockover‘X’turretremoved.2.Multiple0.5inAAaddedabeamconningtoweronshelterdeck.3.Aircraftplatformsremovedfromturrets.

ResolutionRefit,December1935toSeptember1936:

1.Platformformultiple2pdrfitted(noguns).

RoyalSovereign,July1928,afull-lengthportraitviewshowingthesimplicityoflayout.Notethenewcontroltop.

2.HAdirectorplatformfittedontripodlegsofmainmast,nodirector.3.HARFoverbridgeremoved.4.TorpedocontroltowerandRFremoved.5.NewSLtowersfittedaroundfunnelasinRoyalSovereign.6.Trainingcatapultandcrane(bentarm)fittedasinRamillies.7.Largeopenplatformextendedbackaroundtripodlegsaddedoverbridge.8. Lower bridge carried back around funnel as inRoyal Sovereign. 9. Tripod legsfittedtomainmasttosupportHACS.

ResolutionJanuary1938modifications:

1.Single4inexperimentaltypereplacedbytwin4inAA.2.Multiple2pdrsaddedP&Sabreastfunnel.3.AfterHACSfitted.4.RDFequipmentfittedasinRoyalSovereign.5.Maintopgallantreduced.

ResolutionTallflagpolefittedatrearofcontroltopbyAugust1939.

WartimeModificationsRamillies:Two0.5inAAremovedandten20mmAAaddedonsuperstructure,shelterdeckandquarterdeckrightaft.Clinkerscreenfittedtofunnel1941.Twoquadruplepom-pomsfittedon‘B’and‘X’turretslate1941.ModifiedtypeofDFaerialfittedtofaceofbridgein1942.Maintopgallantmastremoved1942.

Eight single 20mmAA added on and around superstructure plus four extra fitted onquarterdeck byApril 1943. Two 20mmAA added on ‘B’ and ‘X’ turret 1944. Total oftwenty-two20mmAAby1944.

VHF equipment Type 650 RDF added, prominent aerials on after superstructure(Ramilliesonly).

OthersfittedverysimilarlytoRamilliesthroughoutthewar.

Resolution: Proposed increase in 15in elevation to 30° never carried out. Two forwardpairs6ingunsremoved(fromall1942–3).Ninesingle20mmAAadded1941.Quadruplepompomsaddedto‘B’and‘X’turret1942.

RoyalSovereign:Eightsingle20mmAAplus twoonquarterdeckadded1941.Fourteen20mmAAadded1942.Sixteentwin20mmAAaddedinUSArefit1943.

Revenge:Quadruplepom-pomsaddedon‘B’and‘X’turret1942.

Light AA guns uncertain for Revenge after 1941 due to lack of photographicevidence.ExtensiveRDFfittedinallshipsofclass.Types284formainguns,Type273SW;Type285for4inAA;

Types79and279forAW.Type282for2pdrs.

Resolution:catapultremovedfromturret1944.

AlllightAAgunsremovedfromResolutionandRevenge1944.

15ingunsremovedfromResolutiononly.

ProposedSuperBulgingandRe-ArmouringTheoriginalproposalforsuchamovewasbroughtbeforetheBoardinFebruary1940atatimewhenitseemedalmostcertainthatGreatBritainwouldbeinvadedfromacrosstheChannel.

ArareviewofRamilliesinAlexandriaduring1940andshowingherunofficialthree-tonegreycamouflagescheme.

RAMILUES1932

ROYALOAK1939

ROYALSOVEREIGN

‘A’and‘B’15inturretsandnewlymodelledsuperstructure.

OnboardRoyalOak,October1937.Lookingaftovertheboatdeck,showingthetripodandnewlyfittedcrane.

Therearofthefunnel,boatdeckandsearchlighttowers.

Auniqueviewinsidethecontroltop,showinginstrumentscrammedintoeverycorner.

The ideawasfor twoRoyalSovereignsand twoQueenElizabethclass tobe taken inhand for a rough and ready job, using flame cut armour that would be supported inpositionaswellascouldbeexpectedinsuchcircumstances.Thewholeprogrammewasscheduled to take about twelve months. The situation across the Channel alteredthroughout 1940, however, and the matter of reconstruction was dropped for the timebeing.

In October 1940, after Resolution had been damaged by a torpedo off Dakar,considerationwasagaingiventoasimilarschemeontheabovelines,butforResolutiononly.Thealterationswouldtakeplaceconcurrentlywithherdamagerepairsandapprovaltoproceedwasgiven at theController’sConferenceon8October1940.The followingplanswereforwarded:

1.Sheerdraughtofnewsuperbulge.2.Generalarrangementsandrollingsizesof4inarmour.3.ArrangementofWTbulkheadsinupperandlowerbulge.4.Structuralsectionsofnewbulge.5.Bodyplanshowingbulgekeel.6.Pumpingarrangementsfornewbulge.7.Considerationforprotectiontoupperdeckopenings.8.Boilerroomuptakesanddowntakes.

Protectionwasproposedbyfitting5indrilledNCplatesinuptakesandbyextending4inarmouroverdowntakes.Itwasplannedtoreplacetheboilerroomforceddraughtfansbyturbine-drivenunitsandrenewtheboilerfrontsandpressurefeedstoenabletheSHPtobemaintained. (Armouringall round theuptakesand inmanycasesover themwouldhavereducedtheSHPbyabout10,000)

Proposals to fit 4in protection over all openings of more than 17½ inches were putforward.Armourcoversforallhatches,escapemanholesandcertainhatchesintheupper

deckwereplanned.

Theestimatesofeffectof‘superbulging’onspeedweregivenas:speedfor40,000shpas rebulged 20.3 knots; speed for 30,000shp as rebulged 18.5 knots. Estimated addedweightsfor4inarmour(leavingupperdeckopeningsunprotected):1,990tons.Protectionfor upper deck openings: 71 tons. New bulge: 930 tons. Estimated deep displacementbasedonRoyalSovereign deep of 33,235 tons,with new bulges, deck armour, verticalprotectiontouptakesanddowntakeswas36,420tons.Draught:32ft;GM:8.69ft.

RoyalOakinanactingmood,playingtheElMiranteinthemotionpictureon21February1937.Sheisshownhereinclining,tofeignsinking.

Finally, however, because of the time involved, cost,material and general age of theship,theControllerdecidedon27December1940thatworkonResolutionbeconfinedtomakinggood the torpedodamageandaminimumofAAs(whichdid include,however,increasingthetwoforemost15inturrets’elevationto30degrees,butwasneveractuallycarriedout). Itwouldappear fromofficialdocuments that thestorydidnotend in1940becauseanother‘suggestion’wasmadeinfavourofResolutionbecominga‘SuperShoreBatteryShip’inOctober1942.Thefollowingwasplanned:

1. Reinforced steel platform erected over deck to cover all vital parts. Sufficientthickness–5in.2.Heavytorpedonets(twelvefeetfromship’sside)torun40feetdeep(250tonsinweight).

ROYALSOVEREIGNCLASS:PARTICULARS,1945Displacement(tons):

Ramillies 34,032 (average action), 35,385 (deep); Royal Sovereign 33,491 (averageaction),34,836(deep);

Revenge 32,200 (average action), 33,500 (deep); Resolution 33,159 (average action),34,520(deep).

Lengthandbeamunchanged

Draught:32ft4into33ft8inaverageforclass.

Armament:Maingunsunchanged.

RamilliesandRoyalSovereign:

8×6in

8×4intwinAA

24×2pdrAA(8barrels,2×4barrels)

12to22×20mmAA(twinsandsingles)

ResolutionandRevenge:

8×6in

8×4intwinAA

Allsmallergunsremoved(seechangesfordetailsofwartimeAA).

Radar

Type284for15inguns,Type285for4in,Type282forlightAA,

Type79AWinRamilliesandResolution;Type279AWRevenge;

Type273SWinall.

Type650VHFequipmentinRamillies.

Searchlightsasin1939.Aircraft:none.Armourasin1939.Machineryunchanged.

Fuel(tons):1,875oilaverage,3,220max.

Radiusofaction(tonsperhour):4,500nmat10knots(6.8),4,260nmat12knots(8.6),3,960nm at 14 knots (10.8), 3,570nm at 16 knots (13.7), 2,900nm at 18 knots (19.0),2,280nmat26.2knots(26.2).

Speed:Barelymanaging19knotswithsquadronspeedfixedat18knots.

GM:3.90ftaverageaction,4.15ftdeepload.

Rig:Short topmast to foreandmain.No topgallants.Radaraerialatheadofeachmast,andonmaintop.

Appearance:

Nomajorchangesfrom1939,butshipsveryclutteredwithlightAAgunson‘B’and‘X’turrets, superstructure and quarterdeck (removal inResolution andRevenge), prominentRDF aerials over conning tower, on HA directors, on maintop (lantern screen) and atmastheads.Twoforward6ingunsoneachsideremovedfromall.Clinkerscreentofunnelinall.

Ramillies, Royal Sovereign still camouflaged, Resolution and Revenge repainted in allgreyafterarrivingatDevonportasTrainingShips.

Individualdifferences:

Ramillies: Deep flanges below 15in director platform. High domed roof over upperbridge.Small toweratbaseofmainmast.Prominentaerialsatbaseofmainmast.Tripodmainmastwithdirectorplatformonlegs.

Resolution:No 15in guns in turrets.HA director raisedwell above control top. Tripodmainmastanddirectorplatform.

Revenge:No15ingunsinturrets.Deepflangesbelow15indirectorplatform.HAdirectoron after superstructure. Lower bridge wings not carried back around funnel. Small SLplatformlowonmainmast.

Sternwalk.

Royal Sovereign (Arkangelsk): HA director raised well above control top. Shallowflanges below 15in director platform. Prominent vertical strut each side below directorplatform.HAdirectoronaftersuperstructure.Verydeepflangesonfaceofbridgebelownavigatingplatform.

3. All top hamper cut down – bridges, etc.Mainmast shortened andmain derrickremoved.

Againtheplanwasdropped.

ThefinalproposalforResolutioncameinJuly1943whenitwasdecidedtorenewherbridge completely, remove all 6in guns and remove the conning tower and associatedarmour.Thisplanalsowasrecordedforfuturereferencebutwasneveraccomplished.

LossofRoyalOakAfterthesinkingofRoyalOakacommitteewasappointedtoascertainthecircumstancesleadinguptoherloss(18to24October).Afullreportcoveringallaspectsoftheincidentwould require abook in itself because therewere twomain topicsofdiscussion:1. theactuallossoftheship;2.theentryoftheGermansubmarineintoScapaFlow.ThereportbyAdmiralDrax,however,sumsupthesalientpoints:

At0104on14thOctober1939H.M.S.RoyalOakwaslyingatsingleanchorinScapaBaywhenanexplosionoccurredrightforwardonthestarboardsidebelowwater.Itseffectwastobreakalltheslipsonbothcableswhichallowedtheportcabletorunout

toaclinchandletgothestarboardanchor.Theexplosionitselfandtheeffectofthecable running outwokemost of the officers and someof the ship’s company.TheAdmiral, Captain, Commander, Engineer Commander and others hurried on deckputtingonafewclothes.Manyofficerswhowereaftthoughtthattheexplosionwasinorundertheafterpartoftheship,thisbeingaccountedforbythevibrationeffectfromtheotherendoftheship.

RoyalSovereignthenRevengeandRamilliesaftertheWeymouthFleetReview,21June1938.

WitnessesintheA.D.P.andontheFlagDeckstatethatacolumnofwaterwasshotup thestarboardsideforwardanddrenchedtheforepartof theforecastle.Throughtheholeinthesideanumberofshoresandothertimbermayhavedroppedorbeenblownout.TheCaptain,onturningout,wentontotheW.D.andbeinginformedthattheslips

onthecablehadpartedwentforwardtotheforecastle.Itwasafineclearnight,thesea was calm and the sky was lit up by the Northern Lights. He arrived on theforecastle,lookedatthecables,receivedreportsfromvariousOfficers,andsenttheFirst Lieutenant down to inspect the forward compartments. He remained on theforecastle a few moments in order to ascertain whether the ship was in any wayaffectedbywhathethoughtwasaninternalexplosionintheInflammableStore.Asthe shipwasneither listingnor settlingdownby thebowshewent down the afterforecastlehatchand forward to thecable locker flat.Herehemet severalOfficers,includingtheEngineerCommander,andreceivedreportsthattheInflammableStorewas venting through the breather pipe showing that water was entering thatcompartmentandthat therewasnofire.Thecompartmentimmediatelyabaft it, theCO2 room,wasintact.Uptothistimenoonehadthoughtthat theshipmighthavebeen torpedoed, the general impression being that there had been an internalexplosion, or possibly a bombing attack by aircraft. Under the Captain’s directionorders were given for starting salvage pumps and preparing to open and examinedamaged compartments. No orders were given for closing watertight doors ordeadlights.In themeantime theS.O.O. turnedoutandwent to theAdmiral’scabinat0106.

TheAdmiralhadalready turnedout.S.O.O.madeaquickexaminationof theafterpartof the shipand returned to report ‘Nodamageaft’.Thiswasconfirmeda fewmomentslaterbytheEngineerCommanderwhohadalsomadeaninspectionoftheafter compartments. S.O.O. accompanied the Admiral on deck, but the latter thenwent forward and S.O.O. went on to the Marines’ Messdeck. He did not see theAdmiralagain.Theship’scompanygenerallywerenotmuchdisturbedbythefirstexplosion,and

thereareseveralrecordsofmenhavingturnedoutandthenturnedinagainbetweenthefirstandsecondexplosions.Duringthisintervalthelaunchandpicketboatwerecalledaway,theDrifterDaisyIIwasorderedtoraisesteam,andtwoprisonerswerereleasedfromthecells.At0116theCaptainwasstillneartheCO2roomwithseveralofficers.Inhisown

words, ‘I had no thought other than that a local explosion had taken place in theInflammableStore.ThiswasbackedupbythereportI receivedthat theCO2 roomwas intact. Ihadnoteven thoughtof theshipbeing torpedoed.I feltnouneasinessabout the safety of the ship.’ Suddenly there was another ‘shattering’ explosion,followedatveryshortintervalsbyathirdandfourth.Theseexplosionsoccurredonthestarboardsideoftheshipapproximatelybetween‘A’and‘X’turrets,andhadanimmediateandcatastrophiceffect.Theshipatoncestartedtoheeltostarboardand,with only a slight ‘hang’ for perhaps three or four minutes, heeled over withincreasingvelocityuntilshecapsizedatabout0129.From the moment at which the second explosion occurred it was practically

impossibletodoanythingeffectivetosavetheship,norwasitpossibletobroadcastthe order to ‘Abandon Ship’ as the lights went out and power failed. Officers invariouspartsoftheshiptoldthemennearthemtosavethemselves.TheCaptainwasstill in the cable locker flat.He toldOfficers andmen to clear out of the flat andwalked aft to the Messdeck which was in darkness. He sent the men up to the

forecastleandfollowedthemup.Ontheforecastleherealisedthattheshipwasgoingoverasshewasheelingsoquicklyandfeltsurethattheonlythinglefttodowastothrow over the side the Carley floats, etc., and as much wood as possible. TheCaptain and Commander got towork on this assisted by a fewmen, but the shipturnedoversorapidlythatlittlecouldbedone.Inafewminutestheyfoundthedeckbecomingimpossibletostandonsoclimbedovertheportguardrailsanduptheportsideuntiltheyslippedorwereflungintothesea.The ship capsized and finally sank at 0129, twenty-five minutes after the first

explosion and thirteen minutes after the second explosion. An Officer who hadclimbeduptheportside,overthebilgekeelandontothebottomcheckedthetimeat0133beforetakingtothewater.The second, third and fourth explosionswere observed bymen stationed in the

A.D.P.Theseexplosionswereaccompaniedbycolumnsofwaterwhich fellon theA.D.P.,alsoaflashwhichwasseenroundthefunnelcasing,andaquantityofblacksmokewhichcoveredtheafterpartoftheshipforashortperiod.After the first explosion the Assistant Torpedo Officer went to the Main

Switchboard, then on to the Messdeck, where he reported to the EngineerCommander and met the Warrant Electrician. The Assistant Torpedo Officer andWarrantElectricianagainwentdowntotheSwitchboardandthencetoNos.4and3DynamoRooms,whereeverythingwasnormal.WhilestillinNo.3DynamoRoomthe second, third and fourth explosions occurred. The second seemed to be wellforward, the thirdabreast theBoilerRooms,andthefourthclosetoNo.3DynamoRoom, but forward of it, probably at the starboard wing Engine Room. After thesecond and third explosions orange-coloured flames appeared at the top of thedynamoroomhatch.Afterthefourthexplosiontheforwardbulkheadofthedynamoroom,betweenthedynamoroomandthewingengineroom,begantobulgeinwardsandsteambegantoescape.ThetwoOfficersandtheWatchkeepermadetheirwayuptheladder.Thelightsthenfailedandtheflamesbecamelessintense.BythetimetheyreachedtheMarines’Messdecktheshiphadlistedabout25degreestostarboard.TheMessdeckwasfullofchokingfumesandburninghammocksandothermaterial.

RoyalOakleadstheclasstoseaaftertheWeymouthFleetReview,21June1938.Notehowimpressivetheseshipswerewhenviewedhead-on.

From other reports it appears that, after the third and fourth explosions, theMarines’ Messdeck was swept by flames and full of smoke and fumes. Severalhammocks caught fire and were extinguished by men near them. There is alsoevidencethatholesappearedinthedecksandthatthedeckscavedin.A sliding horizontal hatch abaft ‘A’ turret slid across and jammed in the closed

positionduetotheheeloftheshipandtothefactthatthewirestropusedtoholditopenhadnotbeenproperlysecured.Meninthiscompartmentmaynothavehadtimeto escape by another route. Sliding hatches in other positions may have closedsimilarly.Duringthisperiodthereareseveralreportsofmenbeingblownthroughdoors,up

hatches,andoutofscuttles.BythetimetheshipcapsizedalargenumberofmenhadreachedthewaterviatheForecastleandQuarterDeck.ItappearsthatfewmenweresavedfromtheEngineandBoilerRooms.TheAdmiralhadbeenontheBoatDeckwheretheEngineerCommander,onhis

wayaft, reported tohim.Later theAdmiralwasseenon theQ.D.by theCaptain’sMaltese steward,who had come up from below and collected a lifebuoy from thestarboardguardrails.ThisstewardsawtheAdmiralamidshipscallingtothemenonthePort side to jumpoverboard further forwardbecause theywere likely to injurethemselves by jumping on to the propellers. The steward climbed up towards theAdmiral and asked him to comeoverboardwith him as he had a lifebuoy, but theAdmiralrefused,saying:‘Don’tworryaboutme;trytosaveyourself.’Heremainedtherehelpingthementosavethemselvesandwasnotseenagain.Menwho tried toman the launch at the starboard lower boom had a terrifying

experience.Theycouldnotcastofffromtheboomandsawtheshipturningoverontopofthem.Metalfromtheforetopfellintothelaunchandsankher,andthefunnelcamedownintothewaterbetweenthelaunchandtheship’sside.Onemanfromthesunkenlaunchwaspartiallysuckedintothefunnelandthenblownoutagain.Otherssaw‘A’and‘B’turretsswingroundand‘fallintothesea’.After the ship capsized she rolled over to about 160 degrees, possibly righted a

little,andisnowlyingbottomupatanangleof40degreesfromtheverticalwithatrimof2degreesaft.ConclusionsoftheBoardGreatreliancewasplacedontheScapaAirRaidWarning,andifanairraidwarninghadbeenreceived,scuttlesanddeadlightswouldhavebeenclosedandridinglightsextinguished.No suchwarningwas received and itwas not until the second, thirdand fourth explosions occurred in quick succession that anyone realized that anenemy attack had beenmade. Consequently, no additional precautions were takenafterthefirstexplosion;aftertheotherexplosionslightandpowerfailedandtheshipheeledoverandsanksoquicklythatnothingcouldbedone.Individuallifebeltshadnot been supplied to the ship, so thatmen had only the limited quantity of floats,wood,etc.,whichhadbeenthrownorfloatedoverthesidetohelpthem.Thesewereveryinadequate.

RoyalOakinWeymouthBay,June1939.Shewasprobablythebestshipoftheclassafterherrefitin1936.Shewastotakethreedirecttorpedohitson14October1939,makingherthefirstcapitalshipcasualtyofthewar.

ROYALOAK:TORPEDOED14OCTOBER1939Divers’Report,October1939

Consideringthattheshipwasinharbourandthattheseawascalmthelossoflifeappearstohavebeenveryheavy.WeputthisdowntothefactthattheshipwasatAirDefenceStations,sothatanabnormallylargenumberofmenwerestationedbelowthemaindeck.Theirescapefromtheshipwasprobablyimpededbythenumberofwatertight doors that were closed. It has also been stated that a number of menprobablytookshelterunderarmourandbetweendecksin thebelief thatanairraidwastakingplace,astheyhadbeentaughttodoso.WethinkitprobablethattheattackwasmadebyaSubmarinewhichgotinatone

ofthesevenentrancesandworkeditswayalongtheEastshoreoftheFlowbetweenSkerrySoundandScapaBay,untiltheCommandingOfficersightedtwoshipsaheadwhich,fromairreconnaissance,heprobablyconsideredtobeRoyalOaknearestandRepulsebeyond.Wethinkit likely thathefiredasalvoat thefurthership,actuallyPegasus, and that one of these torpedoes struckRoyalOak in the bows. He thenreloadedandfiredasalvoofthreeatRoyalOakwhichallhit.Therewereprobablyfourexplosions,onerightforwardonthestarboardside,the

remainderextendingfrom‘A’to‘X’turretsonthestarboardside.Alltorpedoesseemto have hit the side, and there is no evidence to suggest amagnetic pistol or anyexplosionunderthebottom.Wehaveinvestigatedthesuggestionthatthepresenceofbaulksoftimberfloating

pasttheshipmayhavehadsomethingtodowiththeattack,butbelievethismaybeexplainedbythefactthatrecentlyanumberoftelegraphpoleshavebeenwashedupon the shores of the Flow andmay have floated off again on the high tide of thisnight.Also, a certain amount of timber, shores, etc.,may have dropped out of, orbeenblownoutof,theship’sforwardcompartmentsbythefirstexplosion.

[Signed]G.C.MUIRHEADGOULD,Captain.[Signed]R.H.T.RAIKES,Vice-Admiral[Signed]R.E.E.Drax,Admiral(President).

ReportofDiversafterInspectionofShipDiverscarriedoutexaminationofRoyalOak.Shipislying40°frombottomup.Trim

2°aft.Forwarddamagestarboardsidestarts80’to100’fromstemandextends40’to45’aftdepthof3platesstartingoneplatebelowwaterline.Platingisblowninboardandextremeedgesbent in.Damage surveyedaft starts10’ abaft after endofbilgekeel and extends fromwater line to bilge keel.Hole about 30’× 50’. Plating bentinboard.Bilgekeelisblownawayandbentoutboard.Midshipsectionoftheshipwasnot surveyed. Divers surveyed vicinity of mast and found no trace of submarine.Natureofbottomsoftsiltandmud.Inadditiondiversbroughtuppartofwhatwasalmost certainly part of the balance chamber or after body of a torpedo and othersmallfragmentsofinternalparts.

BattleDamageResolutionTorpedoed25September1940

On25September1940theResolutionwasstruckabafttheportbeamnearstation97byatorpedo.Itseemsprobablethatthedetonationoccurredbeforethetorpedopassedtheouterbottombecausethearmourplatesnearthestrikingpointwereforcedinwards.Depthofhitwasabout8feetfromthewaterline.

1.AverylargesplashwasobservedandtheSpottingTop’sCrewwerewetted,largequantities of water fell on the Boat Deck, and the after HighAngle Director wasfilledwithwatertoadepthoftwofeet.Thegreatheightandwidthofthesplashwasprobablycausedbythefactthatthebulgewassplitalongthetopedge,andthishadaneffectontherisingwatersimilartothatproducedwhenathumbisplacedovertheopenendofagardenhose.

Resolution,Torbay.8August1939,showinghergeneralappearancesatthebeginningofthewar.RevengeandResolutionweretheonlyunitsoftheclassatthisdatewithfunnelcaps.NotethatthereisnoRDFinstalledatthisdate.

2.Thetorpedodetonatedwithaheavythudwhichwasmistakenbypeoplewhohadnotseen theapproaching tracks,andwhodidnotappreciate thesignificanceof thesuddenlist,eitherasahitbyaheavyshellorevenonlyasthefiringofabroadside.Therewasnosubsequentvibrationorshakingoftheship.Therewerenofailuresincommunicationorlighting,nordidanybreakerscomeoffasaresultoftheshockofthedetonation.

3.On being struck the ship listed very quickly to 12½°,with amomentary partialrecoverywhenthewheelwasputamidships,buttheshipthentookupandkeptalistof12°.TheTurretscouldnottrainowingtothelistandtheshipthereforewithdrewoutofactiontothesouthward,maintainingtherevolutionsat252(19knots)untiloutofgunrange.Speedwaslaterreducedto12knots.

RESOLUTIONTorpedoDamage,October1940

4.A.4Boilerwas shut downwhen theChief Stoker saw oil fuel spraying near it.Waterwasalsospraying from theportbulkheadon toA.3Boilerand the resultingsteamledtothebeliefthattubeshadgone;A.3Boilerwasthereforenextshutdown.BythistimeoilfuelwasbeingscatteredroundaboutA.4Boiler,andoilvapourwasrisingfromtheBoilerCasingsanditwasthereforedecidedtoclosedownallBoilersandevacuatetheBoilerRoom.

5.DamageControlPartiessoonlocalisedthemaindamageasbeingbetween87and108Bulkheads.TheMainDeckMessdeckbetweentheseBulkheadsfloodedfastandasubmersiblepumpwasbroughttotryandkeepthisundercontrol.Asecondpumpwasbroughtlater.Surroundingcompartmentswereshoredup.Aleakwasseenhighup in the outboard corner of Number 2 Diesel Dynamo Room (87 Bulkhead) butalthougheveryendeavourwasmadetochecktheflow,itwasinaccessiblebehindthesilencerandpipes,andthiscompartmentslowlyflooded.6.Soonafterbeinghit,oilfuelwassluicedfromportinnerandoutertankstoDoubleBottoms, andwas pumped over to the Starboard fuel tanks, to correct the list.Nocounter floodingwas carried out. Later, thewater protection compartments on theport sidewere pumped out. Six inch ready use Shell andCordite and allmovablegear was transferred from port battery to starboard. At a later stage, when powerbecameavailable turretswere trained toport andguns run in, and15inShellweretransferredfromporttostarboardbinsin‘X’and‘Y’Turrets.Afew(12)15inA.P.C.Shellwere jettisoned from the port bins of ‘A’ bymeans of the after capstan.Theaircraftwasmovedalongthecatapulttoitsextremestarboardposition.ThewreckageoftheSecondCutter(whichwascompletelyshatteredbythesplashoftheexplosion)wasthrownoverboard.OnThursday,26thSeptemberfivetonsofaviationspiritwerejettisonedtocorrecttrim.7.Withinanhourofthetorpedohitting,itwascertainthat‘A’BoilerRoomwasonfire. Boiler Room intakes were all covered with canvas with hoses playing toimprove the air seal, but nothing could be done to block the funnel uptake. From1130to1400‘A’BoilerRoomsafetyvalveescapeswereblowingoffandthesmokefrom the funnel gradually changed fromblack to grey and then to dirtywhite: thesmokethinnedduringtheafternoon.At1230firebrokeoutinNumber20StoreandalsointheHammockCompartment,starboard87to108.ThetemperatureoftheSixInchMagazinewasrising,butfromfeelingtheheatofadjacentbulkheadsitseemedthat‘A’BoilerRoomwasfloodingupslowly.8.At1057/25thSeptemberaFrenchaircraftGlenMartin,approachedfromtheportbowataheightof9,000feetanddroppedonelargebombwhichfell300yardsonourstarboardbeam.9.At1345on25thSeptember,owingtoafailureofthelubricationsystemduetothelist, Main Engines had to be stopped. By 1400 on 25th September Engines werestartedagainexcept for theportouterwhichwashalf stopped.Revolutionsat firstwerefor6knots,andwereincreasedto10knotsat1439on25thSeptember.At1400‘B’BoilerRoomhadtobeevacuatedowingtotheheatfrom‘A’.At1915speedwasincreasedtorevolutionsfor8knots.10. One of the great handicapswas a shortage of power before ‘A’ Boiler Room.Steamwasnotavailableowingtotheburstpipewhichcouldnotbegotatowingtofire. Number 2 Dynamo was flooded. Number 1 was short of fuel: the pump forrenewingthefuelsupplywasin‘A’andevenasupplybybucketwasnotfeasibleasaccess to theshaleoil tankwas through theHammockcompartmentwhichwasonfire. The RingMain and EmergencyMain on the port sidewere flooded, and thecablepassageon the starboard sidewas in thehottestpartof the fire in ‘A’BoilerRoom. Electrical power forward had all to be supplied by emergency leads:secondary lightingandhand torcheswere invaluable in theshortageofhighpower

lighting.11.At0220on26thSeptemberMainEngineshad tobestoppedas lubricationhadagainfailed.By0445itwaspossibletoproceedat2to3knots,andat0615at4½knots,butEngineshadagaintobestoppedat0624.At0641theEnginesweremovedaheadagain,butseemedtobeunreliableaslongastherewasaheavylist.12.OnThursdaymorning‘A’BoilerRoomwasopenedup,butthefirerestarted.Itwasthereforenotpossible to investigatedamagefurther,andas thereseemedtobenoimmediateprospectofcorrectingthelistandtherebyrestoringthereliabilityoftheMainEngines,itseemedbesttobetakenintow.HMSBarhamaccordinglytooktheshipintowat1145on26thSeptemberandwentaheadwithHMSResolutionintowwithEnginesstopped.Speedwasgraduallyincreaseduntil7knotswasbeingmadegood.13.Duringthedayof26thSeptemberandthenightof26/27thSeptemberbuoyancywas maintained and the list was gradually reduced to 8°, partly by pumping outpartiallyfloodedcompartmentsortheMainDeckbefore87andabaft108,partlybypumpingout theair spaceport sideof ‘B’BoilerRoomandsimilarcompartments,partly by gradual consumption of fuel from port tanks, partly by the flooding ofHammock compartment starboard side (87 to 108) to put out the fire, and variousothermeasures.14. At about 0900 on 27th September, tide rips were encountered and steeringbecamedifficult.At0915thestarboardslipparted, thecablerenderedonthebrakeandshortlyafterwardstheport5½”wirepartedasitwastakingallthestrain.Aftertheport towparteda second6½”wirewaspassedandsecuredby1140.OngoingaheadHMSBarhamworkeduptotenknotsandHMSResolution(beingnowmoreupright)steamedwiththeinnershaftsatrevolutionsfor5knots.Beforedarkitwasnecessarytochangeovertoafueltankwhichmightbecontaminatedwithwater,andinordertoavoidpossiblyhavingtostopsuddenlyandtherebythrowanextrastrainon the cables, HMS Resolution stopped engines for the night and HMS Barhamreducedtorevolutionsfor8knots.15. By the morning of 27th September fires in the Hammock compartment andNumber20Storewereoutand‘A’BoilerRoomBulkheadswerelesshot.TheBoilerRoomwasenteredintheafternoonandthefirewasfoundtobeout;thewaterlevel(andoil)washalfwayuptheairlockonthestarboardside.16.At0815on28thSeptemberHMSResolutionwentaheadonthetwoinnershaftsandthetwoshipsworkedupuntilHMSBarhamwasdoingrevolutionsfor10knotsandHMSResolutionrevolutionsfor6knotsontheinnershafts;speedmadegood7knots.At 1120HMSResolution stopped andHMSBarham reduced to 8 knots; at1450 HMS Barham reduced speed and at 1554 tow was slipped. Thenceforwardspeedwasmaintainedatabout4to5knotsonallshaftsasrequisiteformakingCapeSierraLeoneLightandforenteringharbouronthefirstoftheebb.17. The tugHudson, which had met the ship the previous evening and had beenstandingbyallnight,tooktheshipintowat0530on29thSeptemberofftheFiarwayBuoy, theshippassed thegateat0615andanchoredoffKissyat0753,handy toashelvingbeachshouldthisbenecessary.Thelistwas5°andmaximumdraught38’6”.

Resolutionlimpinghomelistingheavilytoportafterbeinghitbyatorpedoin1940.

Resolutionlistedenoughforheraircrafton‘X’turrettobeindangeroffallingoff,anditwasdecidedtoflythemachineoffthecatapult.

Resolutionsitsinthewaterwhilstbattledamageproceduresarecarriedout.

Ramillies,8August1939.ComparethisviewwiththatofResolutiononsamedateandnotethedifferencesatthisstage.Shehad400tonsofdeckarmouraddedinMarchofthisyear.

18. By Sunday 13th October all compartments before 87 and abaft 108 had beencleared of water except Watertight Compartments 75 to 87. (Water ProtectionCompartment74to87.+P.3.outerfueltank.)Diversreportedthat87bulkheadhadtorn away from the inner bottom at the side and in the absence of any means ofpumpingoutthecompartmentthiswasleftflooded.19.Thefollowingrecommendationsarosefromexperienceafterthetorpedoing:

(i)Easilytransportablepumpswereinvaluable.Thebestwaytodealwithafireistocatchitearly;muchthesameappliestoaflood.SeveralCompartmentssuchastheStoker Petty Officers’ Mess (74 to 87 Bulkhead) and P.1 and P.2 electrical leadpassages were flooded and considerable damage done which could have been

avoidedifsmalleasilytransportablepumpshadbeenavailable.Therateoffloodingintheseandsimilarcompartmentswassuchthat‘snorers’orWorthingtonSimplex’scouldeasilyhavestemmedthefloodwhilethedamagewasbeingrepaired.(ii)Large compartmentswithonly self-containedpumping arrangements shouldbecapableofbeingpumpedfromundamagedadjacentcompartments.(iii)Access trunks to compartments such asDynamoRooms, etc., should be largeenoughforapumpandmentopasseasilythrough.IfthetwotrunkstotheDynamoandHydraulic Rooms (both of which Roomswere flooded and always will floodtogetheruntil somemeans is foundofmakingwatertight thesecuringofHydraulicpumps)therewouldhavebeenenoughroom.(iv) All electrical fittings which were watertight and which were within reach offloodingfromfueltanks,shouldbemadeoiltightbyuseofsomesubstanceotherthanrubber.(v) More oxy-acetylene cutting and welding equipment should be supplied to theship.(vi)Anelectricweldingplantshouldbeinstalled.(vii) Doors such as those to oil fuel working spaces should be open against anyfloodingfromoutboard.(viii) It would have been an advantage to have facilities and necessary tools foroperatingpneumaticdrillsandcuttingmachinesthroughouttheship.(ix)Finally,theoldstory,greatercarewasnecessarytoensurethatallelectricalneeds(andgearing)throughbulkheadsweremadeproperlytight.

Theshipwasoutofactionforelevenmonths.

RamilliesTorpedoed30May1942At2025on30thMay1942,whileRamillieswasatanchorintwelvefathomsofftheinnerharbouratAntsiranoinDiegoSuarezBay,anexplosionontheportsideforwardshooktheship, putting out all lights for a few minutes. She had been hit by a torpedo from aJapanesemidgetsubmarine.

The centre of the explosionwas at about 39 station Port. The explosion holed thebulge and bottom plating and the protective plating over an area approximatelytwentyfeetindiameter,extendingbetween33and43stationsfromtheLowerDeckto the bottom of theHold Flat. Extensive floodingwas caused in the vicinity; themaindamageeffectbeingfeltbytheupperandlower4inmagazinesPort.DraughtandHeeloftheshipbeforeandaftertheExplosion:Beforetheexplosion

thedraughtwas34ft11inforwardand32ft3inaftandtheshipwasonanevenkeel.Afterthehitthetrimincreasedrapidlytoabout13ftandtheshiplistedoverto4½°

Port. The Damage Control Officer then flooded s.4 Inner Bulge 177–208S tocounteractandheelwasreducedto3°port.Atdawnon31stMaydraughtwas42ft6inforwardand30ftaft.Heelwasreducedto1°on31stMaybytransferofoil-fuelandwaskeptbetween1°and2°thereafter.

On 1st June 640 tons of oil fuel were transferred to destroyers and from 31st MayonwardscablewasfleetedafttothestarboardsideoftheQuarterdeckandthegearintheforwardBoatswain’sStoretransferredtotheafterendoftheStarboardBattery.

Thesheetanchorand‘B’shellandcorditeweretakenoutand6inshellremovedtotheafterendofthebatteries.Whentheshipsailed3rdJunethedraughtwas39ft6inforwardand30ft7inaftandonarrivalatDurbanon9thJune38ftforward29ft9inaft.

VariouscompartmentswereemptiedbeforeleavingandduringpassageandatDurban,andfinallyairpressurewasappliedtotheGunsightstore,42–588Middle,‘B’pumpspaceand27–44PMiddleandthewaterwasblownout.

TheremainingcableandthetwoanchorswereplacedontheQuarterdeckand6inshellandcordite,Pom-Pomammunitionand‘X’and‘Y’corditewerelanded.

Six compartments aftwere flooded, and all bulges and forwardW.P.C.5 pumped outwherepossible,andthedraughtondockingon15thJunewas36ft2½inforward,30ft8inaft.

TemporaryrepairstoenabletheshiptoproceedtotheUnitedStateswerecarriedout;andtheshipundockedonWednesday29thJuly,draughtbeing29ftlinforward,31ft8inaft,heel2° toPort.Aftercompletingwithfuel,ammunition(except‘A’andPort4)andstoresRamilliessailedonThursday,6thAugust,withadraughtof33ft5inforward,33ft11inaft.

Speedofship:

Theshipwasatanchor.SpeedonpassagetoDurban11to13knots.

Bulge

TheholeextendedfromthetopstrakeofthebulgeplatingdowntoCstrakebetween32and 47 stations with a tear continuing down to A strake at 38 station (1 & 4). Theextremities of the holewere blown in on all sides, carrying the outer bottomplating inwake.Bulgeplating,whichwas20lb and30lbplate, between24½and53 stationswascorrugatedtoavaryingdegreeandframingbetweentheselimitswhichwasof9in×3½in×23lbbulbangle,waswreckedordistorted.The9in×3½in×3½in×23lbchannelbarformingthetopofthebulgewaspulledawayforabout12ftandthebuttstrapat37stationin the topstrakewasparted, therivetsshearing, leaving theendsof theplatinghangingfree.Thelooseendoftheaftersidewasturnedoverexposingdistortedframing(2and3).

The intercostal stringer15inwideof20lbplatewith3½in×3½in×10lbangleswasdestroyedordistortedwithin thesame limits.Thebulgebulkheadsof20lbplateat39½and41½stationsweredestroyed.Boundaryanglestothesebulkheadswere3½in×3½in×10lb.The longitudinalbulkheadseparating the innerandouterbulgecompartmentswasdestroyedorbadlydistortedto50station.Itwasof20lbplate.Theboundaryanglealongtheloweredgeofthebulgeof6in×6in×37lbwasverydistorted.

In theouter bottomplating theholewasboundedby33 and45 stationsbetween theLowerdeckand‘D’strake,being20ft×16ftinextent.Distortionofplatingandframingoccurred between 28–49 stations and the distorted plating was blown against theLongitudinal Protective Bulkhead in the vicinity of the hole. Distortion of plating andframingbehindthearmourextendedtotheupperdeckandtearsintheplatingoccurredinthewakeofcertainarmourbolts,at33stationfromtheLowerDeckextendingupwardsfor2ftandat3ftabovethemaindeckat43station.Thelowerboundaryanglebehindthearmourwasof6in×6in×28½lb.TherivetsconnectingthisangletotheLowerdeckwere

sheared between 28 and 44 stations and the side plating and armour were blown in amaximumof11in.The15lbplateframesinwakewerebuckled.Acrossthebottomoftheholeaslopingshelfofdamagedplatingwasformedbyblast.

Outerbottomplatinginthewakeofdamagewas20,25and30lbwith25lbH.T.behindarmourand theframingwas6in×3½in×3in×14lbZbarbetween31and41stationsfrom the 4th longitudinal to the Lower deck. Below the 4th longitudinal 20lb bracketframeswith5in×4in×15lbanglesexisted.Theseweredistortedbetweenthe1stand4thlongitudinals.

The14lbinnerplatingwasdistortedinwakeofthe4thlongitudinalbetween34and42stations.Thedistortedboundaryanglebetweenthosestationswas4in×4in×15lb.Abaft42stationtheinnerbottomplating,whichcontinueduptheLowerdeck,wasblastedandtornto47stationwithseveredistortionto50station.Thelightenedplateframesof20lbplatewerewreckedordistorted,between42and50stations.

Bulkheads

The Port Longitudinal Protective Wing Bulkhead, constructed of two thicknesses ofplating,40lboutboardand20lb,wasdestroyedorverybadlydistortedbetween27and50stationsand theraggededgeswereblowninwards(4,5).The topboundaryangle6in×6in×28½lbwas tornaway from thedeckhead (Lowerdeck)with thebulkheadwhichwasblowntowithin8ftofthemiddlelinecorrugatingandcompressingthePlatformdeckin its wake. Rivets to edge and butt straps were sheared. A jagged hole of about 4ftdiameterwasblowninthebulkheadinthevicinityoftheoldtorpedotube.Apieceofthe60lbblankingplatetothetorpedotubeaccessmeasuring18in×10inapproximatelywasblownfromthissectionofthebulkhead.Itpassedthroughthemiddlelinebulkhead,2ftbelowthelowerdeckat38stationanddamagedgearrodsbehind.Theholemadeinthisbulkheadwasbulgedbyblastamaximum5in.Thestiffeningtothemiddlelinebulkheadwasbyverticalchannelbarsof6in×3in×3in×12lb.

TorpedodamagetoRamilliesin1942.Notethattheouterbulgeandinnerhullhavebeenblownawayandthe1½in-thickprotectivebulkheadhasheldfast;6inarmouredplateshavebeendislodged,buttheshipneversufferedanyrealseriousinternalflooding.(Seereportanddrawing.)

Otherbulkheadsintheareaweredamagedalso.

Decks

The hold of 4inmagazine flat of 14lb chequered plate supported on 15lb brackets and2½in×5inbulbangleswasslightlydistortedinwakeofprotectivebulkheadbetween34and42stations.

Platformdeckof14lbplate supportedby9in×3½in×3½in×26lbchannelbarwaswreckedtowithin12ftofthemiddlelineanddistortedafurther3ftthroughouttheupper4inmagazine.Therewasdistortionbeyond42bulkheadfor6ftoutboardofthemagazinebulkhead.Thisflatwasof10lbplatesupportedby7in×3in×16lbbulbangle.

Thelowerdeckoftwothicknessesof20lbplatewasdistortedalongthestringerplatesbetween28and48stationsandthesupportingbulbanglebeams9in×3½in×23lbweredistortedinwakeofdamagedplating.Thedeckwaslightlybulgedinthesparearmatureroomalongtheedgesofthestrongerplateandfasteningsofbracketstotheslopingdeckwereloose.

Between29and45stations,four240lbarmourplatesweredisplacedamaximumof4inoutboardatthetopand11ininboardattheloweredgewhichrestedonthelowerdeck.

Extentofflooding

As a result of the explosion all compartments below the main deck between 27–58bulkheadswerefloodedexcept7–58StarboardMiddleand42–58PortMiddleoutsidetheslopingprotectivedeck.

Forward of 27 bulkhead the FreshWater tank 24–27 Lower was flooded through afracturedfilledpipeandNo.3ProvisionRoom22–27Middleupto2ftofwaterthroughminorleakswhichwereplugged.InNo.2CO2RoomthebrinepipeleadingtoNo.3CO2Roomwasfracturedandroomwaspartiallyfloodedbutcontrolledby‘A’50Tonpump.

Aftof58bulkheadanumberof small leaks throughcableglands,aventilationvalvefromtheairpurifierto‘A’spacethatwasnotcompletelyshut,hydraulicpipeglandsandthedoorsbetween‘A’and‘B’shellroomscausedsomefloodingatalldeckswhichwascontrolledby‘D’pumpaidedbytheportablepumps.Thiswasworstin‘B’spacewherethedrainsonStarboardsideledto‘A’draintank–whenthesewereshutthestudswerefound tohave sheared and thesevalveshad tobeboxed in cementbefore the leakwasstopped.Asaresult,withthelist toPortsome3ft–4ftofwateraccumulatedonthePortsideandcauseddamagetoL.P.generatorsandthe15inT.S.

The main deck was flooded to about 2ft between 27–42 stations by water leakingthroughaholeinthePortsideintheaftcornerwherethearmourhadbeendisplacedandanarmourbolthadbeentornawayandalsothroughthecasingof‘D4’fansupplyingthedeckbelow.Thesewerebothpluggedwithcementandwaterpumpedout.

Engineering

Mainmachinerywasnotaffected.

Gunnery

Thefloodingof‘A’and‘B’spaceshadconsiderableeffectonthefightingefficiencyoftheship.Withtheconsequentlossoflowpower,thearmamentswerereducedtothefollowingdegreesofreadiness:

15in.ThreeturretsinquartersfiringcontrolledbymeansofaVickersrangeclockandaDumaresq in the G.C.T. with communication through the emergency telephone in theG.C.T.

6in.Allgunsinquartersfiring,firingbypercussion.ControlledfromtheTops,orders,rangesanddeflectionsbeingpassedbyvoicepipetothecabinetsandthencetotheguns.

4in. Forward H.A.C.S. in action with either Port or Starboard guns, power beingobtainedbyemergency leads run fromthe lowpowerbatteries to the fuzepanels in theforwardH.A.T.S.

AirDefence:Airdefencetelephonesbeingallsoundpoweredwerenotaffected.

RAMILLIESTorpedoDamage,30May1942

Effectonfightingefficiencyoftheship.Electrical:damagetoringmainalsooccurredwith communication and switchboards put out of order by flooding or shock.Armour:fourarmourplatesbetween29and45stationsweredisplaced toamaximumof4inbutwerenotdistorted.Asmallnumberofarmourboltsweresheared.

Shipwasoutofactionfortwelvemonths.

History:RoyalSovereignATLANTICFLEET(1stBS)April1919toJanuary1921.

1stBSdetachedtoMediterraneanJanuary1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.

Tookpart in operations againstTurkishNationalists atConstantinople and in theBlack

SeaMarchtoJuly1920.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.

CollisionwithTigeratPortlandautumn1920.Considerablydamaged.

ReducedtoreserveatPortsmouthJanuary1921forrefit.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)January1921toSeptember1922.

ExtensiverefitPortsmouthMay1921toSeptember1922.

RecommissionedatPortsmouth3October1922for1stBSAtlanticFleet.

ATLANTICFLEETOctober1922toDecember1926(1stBStoNovember1924,2ndBSlater).

Again detached to Mediterranean with Ramillies, Resolution and Revenge, September1922toreinforceMediterraneanFleetduringfurthertroubleintheNearEast.

StationedatConstantinopleandtheSeaofMarmara.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetSeptember1923,beingthelastoftheAtlanticFleetshipstoreturnhome.

Underreorganization1November1924,became2ndBSAtlanticFleet(seeRamillies).

TransferredtoMediterraneanDecember1926.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)December1926toApril1935(2ndflag1stBSApriltoAugust1927).

Stationed at Port Said June 1927 during unrest in Egypt. Extensive refit PortsmouthOctober1927toJune1928and

JanuarytoNovember1932.

StationedinGreekwatersduringrebellionearly1935.

Transferred toHomeFleet1935,exchangingstationswithBarham and replacingherasflag2ndBS(seeRamillies).

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)April1935toOctober1939(flag2ndBStoJubileeReview,Spithead16July1935).

Attached to Portsmouth Training Service January 1936 as Seagoing Training Ship forboysandRNROfficers(seeRamillies).

RefitDevonportJune1937toFebruary1938.

Recommissioned18February1938andrelievedResolutionasBoys’TrainingShip.

TransferredtoNorthAtlanticEscortForce(Halifax)October1939.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(flagRAHalifax)October1939toMay1940(3rdBSfromNovember1939.SeeRamillies).

RefitDevonportDecember1939.

TransferredtoMediterraneanFleetMay1940becauseofthreatofwarwithItaly.

RoyalSovereign,CapeTown,20October1940,showingearlycamouflage(two-tonegreyandreminiscentoftheGreatWardazzleschemes).

Noslackingeveninperiodsoff-duty.PhysicaltrainingwasaregularfeatureintheNavy–especiallyonabattleship.RoyalSovereign’squarterdeckc.1936/7.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)MaytoAugust1940.

Unit of squadron (Warspite flag,Malaya, Royal Sovereign) in actionwith Italian battlesquadron off Calabria 9 July 1940, while covering Malta to Alexandria convoy,althoughonlyWarspitegotwithinrangeoftheItalianships.

LeftMediterranean August 1940 to rejoin North Atlantic Escort Force, proceeding viaSuezCanal,Aden,Durban,CapetownandGibraltar.

RefitDurhamSeptembertoOctober1940.

ArrivedHalifaxDecember1940.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(flagRA3rdBSHalifax)December1940toAugust1941.

EscortedCanadiantroopconvoytoEnglandFebruary1941.

RefitNorfolk,VirginiaMaytoJune1941.

SelectedinAugustforEasternFleet(seeRamillies).

RefitGlasgowAugusttoOctober1941.

TransferredtoEasternFleetOctober1941.

EASTERNFLEET(3rdBS)October1941toNovember1943(ColombotoApril1942Kilindinilater).

EasternFleetbasedatColombotoApril1942.

TransferredtoKilindiniApril1942.ReturnedtoCeylon(Trincomalee)January1944.

EmployedmainlyonIndianOceanconvoyduty.DetachedSeptember1942forrefitintheUSAandproceededviaCapeandFreetown.

RefitPhiladelphia1942toOctober1943.

WithdrawnfromEasternFleetoncompletionofrefitandreturnedhome.

PaidofftoCare&MaintenanceReserveatRosyth5November1943toMay1944.

LenttoRussia30May1944andrenamedArkongelsk.

This transfercarriedoutunderanagreementconcluded in lieuof thehandingoverofaproportionofthesurrenderedItalianFleetwhichhadbeenclaimedbyRussia.

Other ships transferred on loan were: US cruiser Milwaukee, nine ex-US destroyers(previouslytransferredtoBritainunderLendLease)andfourBritishsubmarines(onesunkinerroronpassage).

LeftScapaforMurmansk17August1944.

OfficiallyhandedbacktoRoyalNavyatRosyth9February1949andplacedonDisposalList.

SoldtoBritishIron&SteelCorporation5April1949andallocatedtoT.W.Ward&Co.Ltd.forscrapping.

ArrivedInverkeithing18May1949.

RoyalSovereignLoantoRussia,1944HMSRoyalSovereign,theUScruiserMilwaukee,nineBritishdestroyersandfourBritishsubmarineswerelenttoRussiain1944inlieuofaproportionofthesurrenderedItalianfleet.

ThetransferofItalianshipstoRussianportswouldhavebeeninconvenientatthattimebecause of impending Allied operations, and would have prevented the useful role theItalians subsequently played during the period of co-belligerency. A spirit of non-

cooperation in the Italian Navy at this time might have had an adverse effect onOperations‘Overlord’and‘Anvil’.

RoyalSovereignhavingjustbeenplacedintoReserveonherreturnfromarefitintheUSAwasmore than ready for suchamove.After theceremonyofhandingherover inMurmansk the British crew left the ship as quickly as possible. Little is known of herserviceduringherstaywiththeRussianfleet.SheremainedinRussianhandsuntil1949,theRussians having frequently intimated that theywould like to keep her permanently,and in fact, anythingelse in thewayof foreignwarships.On23 January1948WinstonChurchillaskedthePrimeMinisterwhetherornottheshipwasinfact tobereturnedtothis country.Thequestionwas raisedduring adebateonForeignAffairs, and the replywasasmightbeexpectedgiventhepublicinterestconcerningtheloanedvesselsandtheseveremistrustoftheRussiansduringtheimmediatepost-waryears.

ThePrimeMinistersaid:‘Icanseenoreasonwhywe,inreturnforsuchhelptoRussiaandItaly,shouldleaveourshipsinRussianhands.Weareentitledtogetthoseshipsback;andthescrapwouldbeextremelyusefultousatthepresentmoment.’

TheAdmiraltyconsideredthattheships,especiallyRoyalSovereign,wouldhavesoonbecomeineffectualthroughlackofsuitablereplacementequipment;duringtheperiodoffouryearsthatshehadbeeninRussianhandsshehadneverreceivedthemajorrefitthatwouldbeneededifsheweretoserveoninanyfleet.ButtheprestigeoftheRoyalNavywasatstakeandthematterofherrecoverywaspursued.Aftermuchhassleanddiscontenton thepartof theSovietNavy,RoyalSovereignwashandedback to theRoyalNavyatRosython9February1949.ShewasimmediatelyplacedonthedisposallistandfinallysoldtoBritishIronandSteelIndustriesandallocatedtoT.W.WardandCo.ShearrivedatInverkeithing on 18 May 1949, being the last unit of her class not already under thecutters’torch.

History:RevengeATLANTICFLEET.

April1919toJanuary1928(Flag1stBSand2ndfleetflagtoMay1921.2ndflag1stBSMay1921toNovember1924.FleetflagNovember1924toOctober1927.2ndBSfromOctober1927).

1stBattleSquadrondetachedtoMediterraneanJanuary1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.TookpartinoperationsagainstTurkishNationalistsatConstantinopleandinBlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.

OnreorganizationMay1921,Revengebecame2ndflag1stBS(seeRamillies).

Again detached to Mediterranean, with Ramillies, Resolution and Royal SovereignSeptember 1922, to reinforceMediterranean Fleet during further trouble in theNearEast.StationedmainlyatConstantinopleandintheDardanelles.

RoyalSovereignleavingPhiladelphiaNavyYard,USA,on14September1943afterrefit.TheAdmiraltywantedmorerefitsinAmerica,butUSshipyardsweresobusywiththeirownwareffortthattherewaslittletimetoconsidertheshipsofGreatBritain.

RoyalSovereignshortlyafterbeinghandedbackbytheRussianFleetinwhichshehadservedsince1944.Notemodificationsandpaintwork(hulldarkgreyandupperworkslightershadeofgrey).February1949.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetMarch1923.

BecameFleetFlagAtlanticFleet 1November 1924on transfer of theQueenElizabethclasstotheMediterranean(seeRamillies).

RelievedasflagbyNelsonOctober1927andbecameprivateshipinthe2ndBS.

PaidoffatDevonport11January1928forrefituntilJanuary1929.

RecommissionedDevonport2January1929forMediterraneanFleet.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)January1929toFebruary1936(flag1stBSand2ndfleetflagfromJune1929).

JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

Revenge,8August1939.Thissuperbfull-lengthviewofRevengefirstappearedinJane’sFightingShipsfor1939.Itshowsallthemodificationsmadeduringherrecentrefit.

StationedatAlexandrialatterpartof1935duringItalo-Abyssiniancrisis.

Paid off at Portsmouth 6 February 1936 for extensive refit until March 1937.RecommissionedatPortsmouth1June1937for2ndBSHomeFleet.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)June1937toAugust1939.

Employed as Seagoing Training Ship for Boys and RNR officers, with specialcomplement,forsomemonthsduring1937(seeRamillies).PresentatPortlandReviewofReserveFleetbyHMtheKing9August1939.

AssignedtoChannelForce(Portland)underWarOrganizationAugust1939.

CHANNELFORCE(HomeFleetCommandPortland)AugusttoOctober1939.

OrderedtojoinSouthAtlanticCommand(Freetown)1October1939followingsinkingofSSClement byGrafSpee.Orders cancelled 5October and ship transferred toNorthAtlanticEscortForce(Halifax),withResolution,forconvoyduty.

LeftEngland5October,carryingbulliontoCanada.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCEOctober1939toAugust1940(3rdBSforNovember1939)(seeRamillies).

UnitofescortforfirstandsecondCanadiantroopconvoystoEnglandDecember1939.

TransferredtoPlymouthCommandAugust1940becauseofanticipatedGermaninvasion.

PLYMOUTHCOMMAND(BaseShipDevonport)AugusttoNovember1940.

BombardedCherbourgfrom15,700yards,October1940.

RejoinedNorthAtlanticEscortForceNovember1940.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(3rdBSHalifax)November1940toAugust1941.

Tookpart in search forBismarck 23 to27May1941 (leftHalifax for thisoperation23May).

SelectedfornewEasternFleetAugust1941(seeRamillies).

ProceededtoColomboviaFreetownandCape(atFreetown31August).

EASTERNFLEET(3rdBS)August1941(ColombotoApril1942.Kilindinilater).

Eastern Fleet based at Colombo to April 1942. Transferred to Kilindini April 1942.ReturnedtoCeylon(Trincomalee)January1944.

EmployedmainlyonconvoydutyinIndianOcean.

Unit of escort for large convoy carrying Australian division from Suez to AustraliaFebruary1943.

ReturnedhomeSeptember1943.

ArrivedClydeSeptemberandreducedtoreserveforSubsidiaryService.

RESERVE

September 1943 toMarch (Clyde to January 1944, Southampton January to December1944,Devonportlater).

EmployedasStokers’TrainingShipthroughoutalthough,inamemototheFirstLordinNovember1943,WinstonChurchillcommentedthattheshipshouldbeputtoahigheruse.

DetachedNovember 1943 to takeChurchill toMalta, en route to theCairo andTehranConferences.

LeftClyde14November.ArrivedMalta17th.

TransferredtoPortsmouthCommandatSouthamptonJanuary1944.

Main armament removedMay 1944 to provide spare guns forWarspite, Ramillies andmonitorsofthe

NormandyBombardmentForce.

AttachedtoImperieuseTrainingEstablishment,Devonport17December1944.

PlacedonDisposalList8March1948.

Sold to British Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. July 1948 and allocated to T. W. Ward & Co.Inverkeithingforscrapping.

ArrivedInverkeithing5September1948.

History:ResolutionATLANTICFLEETApril1919toMarch1926(2ndflag1stBStoApril1921and

SeptembertoNovember1924.Flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflagfromNovember1924).

DetachedtoMediterraneanwithrestofclass(1stBS)January1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.

Tookpart in operations againstTurkishNationalists atConstantinople and in theBlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.

1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons, Atlantic Fleet merged into one, 1st BS,May 1921 (seeRamillies).

Again detached to Mediterranean (with Ramillies, Revenge and Royal Sovereign)September 1922 to reinforceMediterranean Fleet during farther trouble in the NearEast.

EmployedmainlyintheDardanellesandSeaofMarmara.

FlagofBritishsquadronsenttoSmyrnaFebruary1923todemonstratefollowingTurkishdemandforevacuationofthatportbyAlliedwarships.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetAugust1923.

Becameflag2ndBSand2ndfleetflagNovember1924(seeRamillies).

TransferredtoMediterraneanFleet(withRoyalOak)March1926toreplacethefourIronDukeclass,transferredtotheAtlanticFleet.

Became2ndflag1stBSonjoiningMediterraneanFleet.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)March1926toDecember1935(2ndflag1stBSMarchtoNovember1926.FleetflagNovember1932toMarch1933andJulytoSeptember1935).

StationedatAlexandriaduringEgyptianpoliticalcrisisJune1926.

RefitPortsmouthDecember1926toDecember1927.

Recommissioned30December1927.

WithdestroyersKeith,BasiliskandBulldog,carriedoutreliefworkfollowingearthquakeinMacedoniaandThessalySeptember1932.

Temporary fleet flag November 1932 to March 1933 whileQueen Elizabeth refitting.JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

AgaintemporaryfleetflagJuly(afterReview)toSeptember1935whileQueenElizabethrefitting.

StationedatAlexandrialatterpart1935duringItalo-Abyssiniancrisis.

PaidoffatPortsmouth10December1935forrefittoSeptember1936.RecommissionedatPortsmouth 15 September for Home Fleet (ex Atlantic Fleet, renamed Home FleetMarch1932).

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)September1936toAugust1939(flag2ndBSAugusttoOctober1937).

Temporarily replacedRoyalOak as flag 2nd BS and 2nd fleet flag August to October1937.

EmployedasSeagoingTrainingShipforBoysandRNRofficers1937toFebruary1938(seeRamillies).

RefitDevonportMarchtoJuly1938.

Recommissioned22July1938.

AssignedtoChannelForce(Portland)underWarOrganization,August1939.

CHANNELFORCE(HomeFleetCommandPortland)AugusttoOctober1939.

OrderedtojoinSouthAtlanticCommand(Freetown)1October1939followingsinkingofSSClement byGrafSpee.Orders cancelled 5October and ship transferred toNorthAtlanticEscortForce(Halifax)withRevenge.

RevengeindrydockinMaltac.1933/34.Drydockingwhentheshipswereservinginwarmwaterswasessentialtokeeptheconstantbuild-upofplanktonatbay.Thiscouldnotonlyslowtheshipdownbutcouldalsofoulthepropellersifleftunchecked.

ResolutioninPhiladelphiaafterrepairstotorpedodamage;thephotographwastakenon11September1941.

LeftEngland5October,carryingbulliontoCanada.

NORTHATLANTICESCORTFORCE(Halifax)October1939toApril1940(3rdBSfromNovember1939)(seeRamillies).

Unitofescort for firstandsecondCanadian troopconvoys toEnglandDecember1939.RejoinedHomeFleetApril1940forNorwegiancampaign.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBSApriltoJune1940).

Norwegianoperations.TookpartincaptureofBjerkvik12MayduringoperationsagainstNarvik. Carried tanks andmotor landing craft for this attack.Damaged by bomb atTjeldsundetlaterinthemonth.Twokilledand27wounded.

TransferredtoMediterraneanJune1940.

LeftScapaforGibraltar4Juneand joinedForceH(Gibraltar)on its formation28June1940.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoSeptember1940.

Tookpart(withValiant,Hood,ArkRoyal,Arethusa,Enterpriseanddestroyers) inattackonFrenchFleetatMers-el-Kebir(Oran)3July.

Unit of Force M (Resolution, Barham, Ark Royal, Devonshire flag, Cornwall,Cumberland,Australia,tendestroyersandminorcraft).

BombardedDakar23to25September.

EngagedbyRichelieuandshorebatterieson24th,hitfourtimes.

TorpedoedbyFrenchsubmarineBévézierson25thandconsiderablydamaged.

TowedtoFreetownbyBarham,arrivedthere29th.

TemporaryrepairscarriedoutatFreetownandGibraltarSeptember1940toMarch1941,shipbeingtransferredtoSouthAtlanticCommandwhileatFreetown.

LeftGibraltarforPortsmouthMarch1941.

Attackedbyaircraftenroutebutnothit.

LeftPortsmouthforUSAApril1941tocompleterefit.

RefittedatPhiladelphiaNavyYardApriltoSeptember1941.

SelectedfornewEasternFleetAugust1941,whileunderrefit(seeRamillies).

Completedrefit6September,worked-upatBermudaandleftforDevonport(viaClyde)27September.

TemporarilyattachedtoHomeFleetonreturn.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)OctobertoDecember1941.

Hoistedflag(VA)3rdBSEasternFleetDecember1941.

LeftColomboviaCape,January1942.ArrivedColombo26March1942,beinglastshipoftheclasstojoin.

EASTERNFLEET(flag3rdBSand2ndfleetflag)December1941toSeptember1943(seeRamillies).

UnitofescortforlargeconvoycarryingAustraliandivisionfrom

SueztoAustraliaFebruary1943.

ReturnedhomeSeptember1943.

RefitRosythSeptembertoOctober1943.

ReducedtoreserveforSubsidiaryServiceoncompletionofrefit.

ReserveOctober1943toFebruary1948(SouthamptontoJune1944,attachedImperieuseEstablishmentDevonportfromJune1944).

Employed as Stokers’ Training Ship throughout. In a memo to the First Sea Lord inNovember1943thePrimeMinistercommentedthattheshipshouldbeputtoahigherusethanthis.

PortsmouthCommand,SouthamptontoJune1944.

Main armament removed May 1944 to provide 15in guns for ships of the Normandybombardmentforce.

TransferredtoDevonport30June1944andattachedtotheImperieuseEstablishment.

PaidofftoDisposalList2February1948.

Sold toBritish Iron&SteelCorporation 5May1948 and allocated toMetal IndustriesLtd.,Faslane,forscrapping.ArrivedFaslane13May1948.

History:RoyalOakATLANTICFLEET(1stBS)April1919toMarch1926.

1stBSdetachedtotheMediterraneaninJanuary1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.

TookpartinoperationsagainstTurkishnationalistsatConstantinopleandintheBlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetJuly1920.

ExtensiverefitatPortsmouthSeptember1922untilApril1924,thefirstshehadreceivedsincecompletionin1916.

TransferredtoMediterraneanFleetMarch1926untilMay1934.

RefitatDevonportMarchtoJune1927.

ReturnedtoMediterraneanFleet.

Paidoff again inMay1934and transferred toDevonport for extensive refit, June1934untilAugust1936.

HomeFleetAugust1936untillostinOctober1939.

Commissioned for Mediterranean Fleet 7 July 1939 but never joined, remaining withHomeFleetonWarOrganizationinAugust1939.

TorpedoedandsunkbyU47whileatanchorinScapaFlowon14October1939,thefirstBritishcapitalshiptobelostintheSecondWorldWar.

History:RamilliesATLANTICFLEETApril1919toAugust1927(1stBStoNovember1924,2ndBSlater).

FirstBSdetachedtoMediterraneanJanuary1920becauseofNearEastcrisis.

Tookpart in operations againstTurkishNationalists atConstantinople and in theBlackSeaMarchtoJuly1920.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetAugust1920.

InMay19211stand2ndBSmergedintoone,1stBS,theRoyalSovereignsformingthe1stDivisionandtheQueenElizabethsthe2nd.

QueenElizabethremainedasfleetflag,Barhambecameflag1stBSandRevenge2ndflag.

Ramillies again detached to Mediterranean, with Resolution, Revenge and RoyalSovereign,September1922 to reinforceMediterraneanFleetduringfurther trouble intheNearEast.

EmployedmainlyintheDardanellesandSeaofMarmara.

RejoinedAtlanticFleetNovember1922.

RefitRosythJunetoSeptember1924.

On1November1924 theQueenElizabeth class transferred to theMediterraneanas1stBSwithQueen Elizabeth fleet flag, theRoyal Sovereigns remaining in the AtlanticFleetasanew2ndBSwithRevengeasfleetflagandResolutionflag2ndBSand2ndfleetflag.Thisdistributionofthetwoclassesremainedunchangeduntil1926.

UnderwentextensiverefitatDevonportSeptember1926toMarch1927.

Recommissioned1March1927.

TransferredtoMediterraneanFleet(1stBS)August1927toJune1932.

WithBarhamcarriedoutspecialflag-showingcruisealongwestcoastofAfricaDecember1927toFebruary1928.

StationedatJaffaOctober1929duringtroubleinPalestine.

PaidofftoreserveatDevonportforrefitJune1932toAugust1934.

Extensive refit February 1933, completed 31 August 1934 and recommissioned forMediterranean17SeptembertoJuly1935.

Earlyin1935itwasdecidedtoreverttothedistributionoftheRoyalSovereignandQueenElizabeth classes which had been adopted in 1924 and to station all the RoyalSovereigns in the Home Fleet and the Queen Elizabeths in the Mediterranean, asopportunity occurred. Royal Sovereign and Ramillies exchanged with Barham andValiant April to August 1935; Resolution and Revenge withMalaya andWarspiteSeptember1936toJune1937.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)July1935toFebruary1939.

JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

CollisionwithGermansteamerEisenach ingaleoffDover31August1935;damage tobows.

Duringperiod January1936 toSeptember1939, all theRoyalSovereign class,with theexception ofRoyalOak, employed at various times as Seagoing Training Ships forBoysandRNRofficers,withspecialcomplements,althoughremainingwithinthe2ndBSorganizationwhileservingassuch.

RamilliesemployedthusFebruary1936toDecember1937.

CoronationReview,Spithead19May1937.

RefitDevonportJuly1938toFebruary1939.

RecommissionedatDevonport22February1939forMediterraneanFleet(1stBS)toJuly1939.

TransferredtoHomeFleet(2ndBS)July1939toOctober1939.

EmployedasSeagoingTrainingShipforBoysandRNRofficersJulytoAugust.

PresentatPortlandReviewofReserveFleetbyHMtheKing9August.

LeftClydeforAlexandria,viaGibraltar,5September1939asSeniorOfficerofthefirsttroopconvoyofthewar.

StationedatGibraltarSeptembertoOctober.

Ordered to joinNorthAtlanticEscortForce (Halifax)5Octoberbut recalledon the6thandjoined1stBSMediterraneanFleet,replacingMalayadetachedtoIndianOceantotakepartinsearchforGrafSpee.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)OctobertoNovember1939.

TransferredtoEastIndiesCommand(3rdBSAden)forconvoydutyNovember1939.InNovember 1939 a 3rd Battle Squadron was formed, comprising the four Royal

Sovereignclassbattleshipsengagedinescortdutiesoutside theHomeFleet (2ndBS)andMediterraneanFleet(1stBS)Commands.

MalayaalsodetachedforashorttimewhileintheNorthAtlanticEscortForceDecember1939toMay1940.

This squadron organized for administrative rather than for tactical purposes, the shipsbeingindependentlyemployed,whererequired.In1942the3rdBSwasallocatedtotheEasternFleetandinNovember1944totheEastIndies(exEastern)Fleet.

VisitorsaboardtheRoyalOak.ThepublicwerealwayskeentoinspectHMShipsandespeciallyabattleshipwhentheygotthechance.Notethattheanchorcableshavebeenpaintedwhite,whichwouldhavebeenaverytedioustaskforthecrewinvolved.

ArelaxedatmosphereaboardRamilliesduringherAtlanticFleetperiodc.1920.

RamilliesanchoredoffRosythin1941,anexcellentaerialshotshowingearlywartimeguise.Notethedisruptivecamouflage,funnelcapandarmourplatingonthebridgeroof.SheisalsosportingTypes273,279,284and285RDFinstallations.

OnthequarterbackofRamilliesin1936duringherperiodasBoysTrainingShip.Heretheladsarequeuinguponpayday.Placingtheircapsonthetabletoreceivethememorywasanold-fashionedformofsalutefortheoccasion.

EASTINDIES(3rdBSAden)November1939toMay1940.

AttachedtoForceJ(MalayaandGlorious)inIndianOceanNovember1939duringsearchforGrafSpee.

Later escortedAustralian andNew Zealand troop convoys to AdenDecember 1939 toApril1940.

Transferred toMediterranean FleetMay 1940 via SuezCanal because of threat ofwarwithItaly.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(1stBS)MaytoNovember1940.

WithMalaya,WarspiteandKentbombardedBardia15August1940.Unitofsupportingforce for attackon enemy ships atTaranto by aircraft from Illustrious 11November1940.TransferredtoNorthAtlanticEscortForceNovember1940followingreductioninItalianbattleshipstrengthasaresultof theTarantoraidwhichpermittedRamilliesandMalayatobewithdrawnfromtheMediterranean.

AttachedtoForceH27NovemberwhileonpassagethroughMediterraneantoGibraltarand was with this force during convoy action with Italian squadron off CapeSpartiventoonsamedatealthoughnotactuallyengaged.

RefitDevonportDecember1940 to January1941prior to joiningNorthAtlanticEscortForceatHalifax.

LeftDevonport12JanuaryforHalifax,viaClyde,toescortMiddleEastconvoyoninitialstage.

ArrivedHalifaxlateJanuary1941.

NorthAtlanticescortforce(FlagRA3rdBSHalifax)JanuarytoAugust1941.EmployedonBermuda-Halifax-UnitedKingdomconvoyduty.

SightedbyScharnhorst andGneisenau 8February1941when those ships attempted toattackconvoy;presenceofRamilliescausingthemtoabandontheattack.

Detached from a convoy 23 May 1941 to take part in operations against Bismarck.BecauseofthethreatofwarwithJapan,itwasproposedinAugust1941thatallfourRoyalSovereignsshouldbesenttotheIndianOceanbytheendoftheyearastheinitialinstalmentofanew,EasternFleetforthedefenceofthatarea.

This force was to be based in the first instance at Colombo and would later move toSingapore after it had been brought to full strengthwhich could not be done beforeMarch1942. Itwasproposed to reinforce themwithNelson,Rodney andRenown inDecember1941orJanuary1942,butthiswasnevercarriedout.

InOctober 1941, as a concession to the views of the PrimeMinister,Prince ofWales,RepulseandIndomitablewereselectedasafaststrikingforceoftheEasternFleet,tobebasedatSingaporeforoffensiveoperationsagainsttheJapaneseintheeventofwar.

Prince ofWales andRepulse arrived there on 2 December but were sunk by Japaneseaircrafton the10th, twodaysafter theoutbreakofwar.Indomitableneverjoinedtheforce.

Following the loss of these ships, the Royal Sovereigns, which arrived at Colombobetween October 1941 and March 1942, remained in the Indian Ocean until the

summerof1943,constitutingthe3rdBSEasternFleet,withWarspiteasfleetflagfromMarch1942toMarch1943.

Fleet based atColombountilApril 1942,Kilindini (EastAfrica)April 1942 to January1944,TrincomaleefromJanuary1944.

RamilliesrefittedatLiverpoolAugusttoNovember1921.

Hoistedflag(RA)3rdBSEasternFleetinClyde2December1941andleftforColombo.

EASTERNFLEET(3rdBS)December1941toDecember1943(2ndflag3rdBStoApril1942).

AttachedtoForceFApril1942foroccupationofMadagascar.ArrivedDurban22April,replacingMalayaasflag(VA)ForceF.Tookpart inbombardmentandoccupationofDiegoSuarez(Madagascar)7May1942andremainedtherefollowingthesurrender.

‘Standclear’astheforetopofRevengeistoppledfromthesuperstructureassheiscuttopieces,1949.

TorpedoedandconsiderablydamagedbyJapanesemidgetsubmarineatDiegoSuarez30May.MidgetwasoneoftwolaunchedfromtheparentsubmarinesI16andI20.

LeftDiegoSuarezforDurbanforrepairs3June.ArrivedDurban9th.

Temporarily repaired at Durban June to August 1942. Completed refit at DevonportSeptember1942toJune1943.

RejoinedEasternFleetatKilindini(EastAfrica)July1943,beingthentheonlybattleshipremainingonthestation.

LeftColombo28December1943forhometotransfertoHomeFleet.

JoinedHomeFleetJanuary1944.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)January1944toJanuary1945.

UnitofbombardmentforceforNormandyinvasionJune1944.

BombardedbatteriesatVillerville,BenervilleandHoulgateuntil7June.

AgainattackedHoulgatebatteryon17June,puttingitoutofaction.

Unit of bombardment force for invasion of southern France August 1944. BombardedbatteriesatentrancetoToulon25to28August.

ReducedtoreserveatPortsmouth31January1945toDecember1947.

AttachedtoVernonEstablishment15May1945asAccommodationShip(withMalaya)andknownasVernonIII.

Placed on Disposal List December 1947. Sold to British Iron & Steel Corporation 20February1948andallocatedtoArnottYoungLtd.forscrapping.

ArrivedCairnryan23April1948.

RenownandRepulseDesignOriginallyproposedasbattleships,RenownandRepulsewere laiddownunder the1914estimatesasslightlyimprovedvesselsoftheRoyalSovereignclass.

On 19 December 1914, however, the DNC had the first intimation that a newbattlecruiserandnotabattleshipwasrequired;theshiptohaveaspeedofabout32knotsandbearmedwithatleastsix15ingunsfittedinpairs.

Thebasic concept of the designwas conceived as a direct result of theBattle of theFalklandIslandsinDecember1914andanearlierbattleatHeligolandBight(inAugust)whichshowedtheimmensevalueofhighspeedcoupledwithlong-rangepowerfulgunfireand a large radiusof action; factorswhich enabled a ship to rundownany enemy shipunder almost any circumstances, and accept or decline action atwill. These features ofcourse could only be obtained at the expense of good armour protection, andwith thebattlecruiser type in mind no improvement was demanded beyond that given to theoriginalbattlecruisersbuiltin1906(Invincible).Althoughthiswasseenbymanytobeadangerous policy, especially as the latest battlecruisers completing were sporting a 9inarmouredbelt,themovetogettheshipsapprovedwasgivenpriority.

By21December1914 thedimensionsof thenew ships hadbeendetermined andbyChristmasEveamodelhadbeenmadeand inspectedbyAdmiral JohnFisherwhowasmaking every effort to see that the shipswouldmaterialize.On28December theDNCwas notified that the model had been approved and that construction should startimmediately.Itbeingessentialthattheshipsbecompletedattheearliestpossibledate,theDNCsuggested that thebattlecruiserTiger’smachinery installationberepeated toavoidanydelaystothefinallayout.

Atthistime,RenownandRepulsewerestillonthestocksasbattleships,andwereintheearlystagesattheyardsofPalmerandFairfield.BecauseofthegreaterlengthofthenewbattlecruisersPalmer’scouldnotundertaketheworkandaftercompensationformaterialsused,RepulsewaspassedovertoJohnBrown’sShipyardonClydebank.

The rapidity of the design and construction was indeed remarkable as the followingtableshows:

19December1914:Firstintimationgiventhatbattlecruiserwasrequired.

21December:Dimensionsestablishedforgunsandspeed.

24December:LordFisherinspectsmodelofproposedshipinDNC’sroomandaskedforcertainmodificationsbeforeshowingittotheBoard.

26December:Modelcompleted.

28December:DNCinformedthatmodelagreedonandorderedtoproceedwithdesign.

29December:ContractorsinterviewedbyFisherhimselfandordersplacedwiththeclausethat the shipswere tobebuilt in fifteenmonths.Action takenbyDNC’sdepartmentregarding theorderingofmaterial andwhat stock couldbeused fromPalmer’s yard

thathadbeenputintoplacefortheimprovedRoyalSovereign-typebattleship.Materialwasre-directedtoJohnBrown’salmostimmediately.Modificationofkeelplatesfrombattleshiptobattlecruiserpresentednoproblems.

17January1915:FairfieldandJohnBrown’sweresuppliedwithcompleteinformationtoenablethemtobuildmidshipsportionofshipoutoftheturnofbilgeandordermuchmaterial.

25January:Keelslaiddown.

LEGEND:ASORIGINALLYDESIGNEDASBATTLESHIPS,1914Displacement:27,750tons.

Length:580ft

Beam:88ft9in

Draught:28ft6in

Freeboard:16ftforward,18ftaft.

Fuel:900/3,000tonscoal.

Armament:8×15in;16×6in;4×3inAA;4×21inTT.

Armour:mainbelt13in,ends6in,barbettes10in,turrets11in,CT11in,3–1in.

Weights (tons): Hull 8,400; armour 8,600; armament 4,550; machinery 2,550; generalequipment700;BM50.

DESIGNSPROPOSEDAFTERTHEORIGINALLEGENDABOVE(‘C’AND‘D’ACTUALLYWORKEDONWHENABATTLECRUISERWASGIVENPRIORITY). ‘A’ ‘B’ ‘C’ ‘D’Length(ft) 720 760 760 780Beam(ft) 90.6 100 90 100Draught 25 26 24 25Displacement(tons) 28,500 28,000 27,000 31,500Speed(knots) 29 25/26 30 28SHP 90,000 70,000 90,000 90,000Armament 8×15in 8×15in 6×15in 8×15in 12×5.5in 12×5.5in 12×5.5in 12×5.5in TT:2×21in TT:2×21in TT:2×21in TT:2×21inArmour 12–5in 12–5in 12–5in 12–5in

31 January: Both firms supplied with sufficient data for preparing all main structuraldrawings:Hullspecification;Midshipssection;Partprofileanddeckflats;sectionsofprotectivedeck;Sketchofarmouredplating.

15February:250feetofthekeelonblocks,4,000tonsofmaterialordered.

28February:Drawingsalmostcomplete.

15March:375tonsonblocks,3,000tonsofsteelonpremises.

30March:Hullspecificationcompleted,800tonsonblocks.

12April:Alldrawingscompleted,1,200tonsonblocks.

8January1916:Launch.

15August:Preliminaryseatrials.

Thanks to Lord Fisher’s drive and a high degree of co-operation between theConstructor’sDepartment and the contractors, both vesselswere completed in 19 to 20months which at that time constituted a world record for ships of this size and noveldesign.

ONEOFTHEPROPOSEDDESIGNSAFTERROYALSOVEREIGNCLASSDesign‘C2’and‘C’,January1916

Theshipswere the largestandamong themostnoteworthy laiddownandcompletedduring the Great War and can be regarded as the last representatives of the originalbattlecruisertypebuiltfortheRoyalNavy.

InthesucceedingHood,asredesignedafterJutland,thecharacteristicsofthebattleshipand battlecruiserweremerged into one ‘fast battleship’ type by substantially increasingdisplacement to allow for additional protection.Both ships turned out remarkablywell,within the limitsof thedesign, and it is reported that theAmericanswere so impressedthat theirConstellation class were redesigned along similar lines. But war experienceemphasized that, although useful for purely cruiserwork againstweaker ships, such asperformed by Invincible at the Falklands, their weak protection rendered them quiteunsuitable for employment against other capital ships. In the light of Jutland and thebattlecruiserlosses,thisdeficiencywassubjectedtoseverecriticismwhentheshipsjoinedthe fleet late in 1916, and at Admiral Jellicoe’s instigation they were sent back to theshipyard where another 504 tons of protection was worked into the decks around themagazinearea(carriedoutatRosythbythebuilders).

Ascompletedtheyhadanaveragedraughtof25ft9½in,about3½indeepofthedesign

figureandanextradeepof29ft8inwith4,243tonsoil.Afteralterations(October1916)the normal draught had increased to 26ft 2in and deep to 30ft 0½in. The commandingofficerofRepulsereportedthattheshipbehavedverywellinaconsiderableAtlanticseaandhadanevenmotion.Withregardtotheflareatthebows(whichcausedconsiderablecommentatfirst)whichexceedthatofpreviousships,hewasoftheopinionthatRepulsewouldmakemoreprogressagainstaheavyseathanashipofsimilarfreeboardwithouttheflare.

Inservice theshipsprovedverypopulareven though theywerepoorlyarmouredandwhile on a cruise after thewar the correspondent LionelHalsey sent this report to theDNCon29June1920:

MyDeard’Eyncourt,IknowyouareinterestedinRenown.Theship isaperfectmarvel tome.Shesteamsbeautifullyand isextraordinarily

economical.Sheonlyburntalittleover1tonofoilperknotat20knotsandsheisperfectlywonderfulinheavyweather–infact,Ineverknewanyshipcouldbehaveasshedoesandsheisnotabnormallywet,infact, inheadseas,sheiswonderfullydry,buthersteadinessisextraordinary.Wehadarealgaleandheavyseasandshemadegoodweatherofit.

ArmamentAlthough it is well known thatRenown andRepulse had six 15in guns in twin turretsbecauseof their availability andadirective tocomplete the ships in fifteenmonths, thefact is that thenumberofgunswasacompromiseandnotatallpopular inmanynavalcircles.ButLordFisherhadbeendirectlyresponsiblefortheshipsandtheirconstruction,andashewasaveryimportantandpowerfulmanwhocouldmovemountainstogetwhathewanted,nobodywasgoingtobefoolhardyenoughtocriticizehim.

Sixgunsinpairsmadefordifficultywithfirecontrolandsalvoshooting,andthesingleturretafttookupalotofspaceinternallywhereasforafewfeetmoreanotherturretcouldhavebeenworkedintogivefourgunsintwoturrets.Butonlysixgunsforeachshipwereimmediately available so this layout was given the go-ahead and the dimensions wereworked around it. Before the layout had been decided itwas suggested that eight 15ingunscouldbecarriedonahullof780ft(pp)×92ft×27½ft,displacing27,100tonsandhavingaspeedof31knots.Sixgunsintwinmountsreducedthefiguresof750ft×90ft×26ft,displacing25,750tonsonaspeedof32knots.TherewasmuchcorrespondenceonthesubjectwiththeDNC(D’Eyncourt),butalthougheightgunsweremostdesirabletheincreased dimensions also had some sway in the matter and it was easy for Fisher topersuadetheBoardintovotingfornodelay.

Renown,showingdetailsofthebridgeandfunnelsinearly1920,whenshewasusedtoconveyroyaltyontripsaroundtheworld.Notethehousingbetweenfunnelsandtheboxonthecharthouseroofforroyalviewing.

Repulseopensfirewithherforward15ingunsduringbattlepracticec.1928.

The secondary armament was also a compromise, the 4in gun having long beendiscredited as being too small effectively to stop some of the larger destroyers in theGermanNavy.Fisherdidnotlikeheavygunsasasecondaryarmament,however,andsawthe4inas themaximumsize thatcouldpossiblybe incorporated into thenewships.Tomakeupforthisthegunswerefittedintriplemountssoasatleasttogivesaturationfire,butinpracticethegunsprovedawkwardtoworkbecauseofthe‘bunching’ofbreechesattherearoftheopenturret.Andtheturretswerenotpopularbecausetheyofferedlittleornoprotectiontothecrewsservingthem.

Duringthedesignstageithadbeentheintentiontofittheshipswithmines(July1915,

25VickersAutomaticSubmergedminesNo.20),butwhentheconstructionstaffstudiedthe requirements it was found that it would prove difficult in working them from thequarterdeckbecauseofthesternanchorandthefactthattheminerailswouldreachbackacrossthequarterdeckbeneaththe15inmuzzlesandwouldalmostcertainlybedamagedbytheblastfromtheguns.Tofit theminternallywouldhavecausedimmenseproblemswithcompartmentationandalterationoftheprotectiveplatingattherearoftheship,andhavingmines inside theshipsonear to theconventionalgunmagazineswaspotentiallydangerous.AlthoughtheFirstSeaLordfavouredtheidea,itprovedacaseof‘toomanyeggsinonebasket’andthematterwasdropped.

ArmourAstheprotectionforsuchlargeshipswassopoor,theactualthicknessofthearmour(6in)waskeptsecret foras longaspossible– ‘HushHush’ships theywereformorereasonsthanthesobriquetsuggested.

RENOWNAsre-armoured,1923–6

REPULSEArmouredLayout,1919

Asshipsarmedwith15inguns itwasobvious that in time theywouldprobably faceenemyshipswithasimilararmament,aprospect thatcausedshuddersat theAdmiralty.Althoughtheepitomeofthebattlecruisertype,JutlandinMay1916hadprovedthattheseshipshadnoplaceinthebattlelineatanydistanceandthetypequicklybecameobsoleteafterthebattle.Morearmourwasaskedfor,butitwasnoeasymattertore-armourashipinpracticallyallareaswithoutextensivealterationsandaseriouseffectonstability.

During their lifespan the scaleofprotectionwas improved to someextent (see tablesand drawings), but throughout their existence they remained the weakest of all Britishcapital ships.Butuntil 1940 theycouldoutrunanythingpowerful enough to sink them,andoutshootanything thatwas fast enough tocatch themwhichwasexactlywhat theyhadbeendesignedtodo.

STEAMTRIALS

Repulse23August1916 Repulse6March1936FirthofClyde.ArranCourse. MeasuredMile.Displacement:28,200tons. TollandCourse.Draught:26ft2inforward,27ft7inaft. Wind:4–5Diameterofpropellers:13ft6in:Pitch:13ft6in. MeanSHP:112,400Expandedsurface:100sqft. Meanspeed:28.36knots.Meanrevolutions:273.5MeanSHP:116,992Speed:31.31knots.

Renown:10,11,24and25July1939

TollandCourse.

Displacement:31,424tons

Draught:26ft11⅝inforward,27ft6¾inaft.

Diameterofpropellers:(3-bladed)13ft6in;Pitch:12ft11in.1,250tonsballastonboardpluslowerbulgesflooded.Designedrpm275for30.1knotsbutnotactuallyreached.Best

speedwith120,951shpwas29.926knots.

9knots 15knots 18knots FP:32,252tons 32,262tons 32,272tons 32,790tons27ft8⅝in 27ft8¾in 27ft11⅞in 28ft2⅜inSea:3 Sea:3 Sea:3 Sea:287½rpm 137rpm 162rpm 278rpm3,742shp 13,061shp 22,128shp 120,951shp9.877knots 15:633knots 18.530knots 29.926knots

The following compares their thin scale of armour with various ships (1917), allbattlecruisers:

Inflexible: 2,020tonsarmour,1,200tonsplating(decks,etc).PrincessRoyal: 3,900tonsarmour,2,300tonsplating.Tiger: 4,750tonsarmour,2,300tonsplating.Repulse: 2,440tonsarmour,3,300tonsplating.Hood: 6,750tonsarmour,7,500tonsplating.Seydlitz: 5,200tonsarmour,2,400tonsplating.

MachineryBecauseof the speedatwhich the shipswereconstructed therewasnoquestionofanyalterationfrom‘standardAdmiraltypractice’ regardingmachinery,whichhadbeenuseduptoandinthebattlecruiserTiger(1911).

TheTigerlayoutwasvirtuallyrepeated,butwithoil-firedboilersinsteadofcoalandtheadditionofthreeboilerstoattaintherequiredhighspeed.

Designedasbattlecruisers, theywerenaturallyfastshipsbutbeinglightlyconstructedonsuchafinehullthereweresomeproblemswithvibrationduringfull-powersteaming.Thefault,however,wasrectifiedduringtheearlyrefitsasshowninRenownduring1932when fittedwithHACS I and foremast strengthened between the 15in spotting top and15indefenceposition:

Onthedayoftrialtheseawassmoothtoslightandobservationsofthevibrationofthe15inspottingtopand4incontrolplatformweremade.Thestructureatthetopofthemastvibratedatafrequencyofapproximately2/3rds

ofasecond.Thevibrationwastransversenotlongitudinal,nooscillationofthemastwasobserved.Itwasconstantforallspeedsoftheship.Thevibrationonastraightcoursewasveryslight.Whenhelmwasputover,however,thewholetopvibratedmuchmore.Inorder totest thesightinginstrumentsI tookaseat intheH.A.C.S.andtrained

andelevated the instruments– landmarkson theIsleofWightandasmallsteamer

providedsuitabletargets.Itwasfoundthatitwasreasonablyeasytokeepthesightson target even when vibration was noticeable. The ship’s gunnery officers weresatisfiedwithconditionsonthetop.

BridgeworkHaving been completed with open bridgework in much the same way as the QueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses,thepersonnelservingthosepositionsweresubjecttoallweathers.Levelswereaddedandplatformscoveredintovaryingdegreesthroughouttheyearsfrom1916totheearly1930sduringtheirrefits,butseverityofbackdraughtandfoulweather alwaysposedproblemsandoccasionally causeddifficulties in conning theship.Afterreconstructionin1936Repulsehadbeengivenanew,remodelledbridgeandcompassplatform,amoreclosed infittingwithflatsides inanendeavour todeflect thewindawayfromstaff.Twoviewswereexpressedabouttheship’supperworksduringhertrialsafterrefit:

31January1936.1hourfullpowertrials.

Athighspeeds,headtowindtherewasconsiderabledownandbackdraughtoverthebridge,especiallyattheafterend.Attheforeend,thewinddeflectorshadsomeeffectbuttheyonlyextendedfor12inorsoabovethetopofthebridgeplating.TheWatch Officer standing at the Gyro repeater experienced the full force of relativewindinhisface.Thereistroublesomeeddyingatthepositionoftherevolvingcharttable.Theeffectsareduepartlytothelargeplatformoverthebridge.The4indirectorplatformappearstothrowdownthewindontotheafterendofthebridge.Fullpowertrials6March1936.The covered in bridge appeared to be quite comfortable but crowded. Front

windowswerekeptopenwhiledoorsatbackofbridgewerekeptclosed.Theplottinghousebeingusedasanairlock.Withthisarrangementtherewasverylittledraughtonthecompassplatform.Theheightoftheroofcouldbelowered.4incontrolplatform–theconditionsherewereuncomfortabledueto lowscreen

andheavydowndraughtcausedbystructureoverheadandabaft.15indirectorplatform–noinstrumentsarefittedexceptinsidedirectortower.15in spotting top – conditions quite comfortable – abaft the H.A.C.S. tower,

however, conditions were not so good owing to air stream being deflecteddownwardsbyH.A.C.S.H.A.C.S.aftcomplainedofvibrationbutnoneforward.

After her complete reconstruction Renown sported a brand-new smooth-faced semi-circularbridgewhichdrewthefollowingcommentson25July1939:

Theopen compassplatformwasgenerally satisfactory.With awindof 65 feet persecond,10degreesonstarboardbowthewindstreampassedoverheadataheightofabout8–9ft.TheH.D.O.andSLsightsabaftthecompassplatformweredraughtyduetowindstrikingthe15inDCTandbeingdeflecteddown.OnturningtheDCTonbeam,conditionswerebetter.Thefairingontheforeside

would be better removed. It was found that low bulkheads about 2ft high acrosscompass platformat forward edge of chart table prevented draughts along floor invicinityofpelorus.Throughoutthetrialsnotendencyforfunnelsmoketobedrawndowninthevicinityof theflying-offspaceorquarterdeckwasobserved.Theextra

heightoffunnelsafterexperiencewithWarspiteappearstohavebeenmosteffective.

ForefunnelandbridgeofRepulseduringtheWorldCruiseandshownhereinAustraliawithdozensofboyscoutsgettingtheirfirstchancetoseeaBritishbattlecruiser,1924.

Research with a view to achieving the optimum design in bridgework for capitalshipscontinuedattheNationalPhysicalLaboratorythroughoutthewar.Satisfactoryreports had been received from several ships fitted with semicircular bridges, butwind tunnel testsonmockbridgework todifferentscalesshowed thesuperiorityofsquare-facedbridges.Thesquare,openbridgehadaseriousdisadvantage,however,inthatthedegreeofefficiencyofitsprotectionwasvariable;abridgethatwasgoodinheadwindssometimessufferedfromobliquedraughtsatanglesbetween15and35degrees. The determining factor appeared to be the height of the massivesuperstructure. The semi-circular form of bridge while not as satisfactory as thesquarecouldbemademoreeffectivebyroofingitinorfittingsuitablewindbafflesashadpreviouslybeenfittedinmanyof theolderbattleships.Itwasnotedthat thetwin 15in turretswere an obstruction to the smooth flowof air up and around thebridgework.

RENOWNANDREPULSE:PARTICULARS,1919Construction

Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedRenown: Fairfield 25.1.1915 4.3.1916 Sept1916.Repulse: JohnBrown 25.1.1915 8.1.1916 Aug1916.

Displacement(tons)

31,592/32,220(average),32,500(load)ascompleted.Repulseafterrefit36,780(ordinarydeep),37,780(extradeep).

Length:750ft(pp),787ft9in(w2),794ft1½in(oa).

Beam:90ftascompleted,Repulseafterrefit102ft8in.

Draught:Renown26/30ft(mean);Repulse27ft11in(load),31ft1in(deep).

GM:ascompleted3.5ft(load),6.2ft(deep);Repulseafterrefit4.95ft(load),6.5ft(deep).

Armament

6×15in42calMk1120rpg

17×4in44calMkIX200rpg

2×3inQFHA

1×12pdr

4×3pdr

5Maxims

10Lewis

8×21inabovewaten2×21insubmergedTT.

Armour(seeRepulserefitforheralterations)

Main belt 6in, ends 6–3in;Bulkheads 4–3in;Barbettes 7–4in;Turrets 11–9–7–4¼in;CT10–6in;Decks:forecastle1⅛–¾in;main1in;slopes(overmagazinesonly)2in;lower2–1¼in;funneluptakes1½–1in.

Machinery:

BrownCurtisImpulseturbinesdriving4propellers.

42Babcock&Wilcoxboilers,275psi.

DesignedSHP:112,000for31.5knots.

Fuel:1,000/4,200tonsoil(average).

Radiusofaction:4,700nmat12knots,2,700nmat25knots.

Searchlights:8×36in,2×24insignalling.

Complement:Repulse1,057;Renown1,223.

Aircraft

Flying-offplatformson‘Band‘Y’turrets.Inpost-warperiodaircraftnotnormallycarriedon turrets, but embarkedwhen required for exercises. Kite balloon equipment fitted inRepulse.

Enlargedbridgeworksincecompletion.Otherwisenotmuchchangeinbasicappearance.

Rig: Renown short topmast to fore and main (stump only to fore); Repulse shortforetopmast.Nomaintopmast.

Individualdifferencessincecompletion:

RenownRangeclockstofaceofcontroltop.Shorttopmasttoeachmast.

RepulseRangeclockondirectorplatformbelowcontroltop.Nomaintopmast.

Renown,legendparticularsafterrefit,1923–6

Displacement(tons):37,210(deep),32,520(asinclined).

Beam:102ft4in.

Draught:31ft3in(deep),27ft9in(asinclined).

Freeboard:29ft9inforward,21ff3inamidships,16ft9inaft.

Fuel:1,000tons/4,289tonsoil.

Armament

Maingunsunaltered

15×4in(200rpg)

4×4inHAAA(150rpg)

4×3pdr(64rpg)

5Maxims

10Lewis

Armour

Main belt 9in (over 460ft), 7ft 3in abovewater; 4ft below at normal draught, 2in stripbelow this; 4in armour forward, 3in aft; bulkheads 4–4–3in; turrets 9–7in; verticalbulkheads2in;maindeck4–3inflat(overmagazines),slope4in,lowerdeck4in.

RenownalongsideatPortsmouthwaitingforthePrinceofWalestocomeaboardforhistourtoIndiaandJapan.Theshipisfreshlypaintedandfullydressedforthetour,whichtookplacefrom26October1921to20Junethefollowingyear

Renown’sbridgewas,asalreadymentioned,anewstructure, thathadbeendevelopedasaresultofmanyteststhroughoutthe1930s.Itstood56feetabovetheforecastledeckandprojectedslightlyforwardofthemainverticallineofthesuperstructure.Itwastwelve

feetindiameteratthetopandthirteenfeetatthefloorlevel.Baffleswerefittedduringtheendofher reconstructionand thesewere found togivesufficientwindprotection to thebridgepersonnel.Thebaffleshad3ft6incompartmentsandwerefittedaroundthemouthof the bridge and in fact made conditions over the all-important pelorus positionmostsatisfactory;itwasstatedthattherewasnodefinitedeteriorationinconditionsthroughoutthe whole area, and only slight draughts were felt at the rear of the bridgework whencatchingthewindatobliqueanglesorwhenthrownupfromtheturretsbelow.

RENOWNANDREPULSE:PARTICULARS,1934Displacement (tons): Renown 34,540 (load), 37,630 (deep) (after 1926 refit 32,520(load),37,210(deep));Repulse34,880(load),38,100(deep).

Length:unchanged;Beam;both102ft8in.

Draught:26ft8in/31ft9inmean(average).

Armament

Originalmainarmament

Secondary12–15×4in

Single4inmountingsinbothships.

4×4inAA

8×2pdr

OriginalTTinRenown;8×21inabovewaterinRepulse.

Searchlights:6×36in,2×24insignalling.

Aircraft

Renown:FaireyIIIFreconnaissanceseaplane(withcatapult);Repulse:Stillcarriedflying-offplatforms.

Armour:seeAlterationsfordetails.

Machinery:unchanged.

Speed:slightreductionowingtoadditions.

Bothfittedasflagships.

Rig:Noforetopmast;topmastandtopgallanttomain.

Averagecomplement:1,181/1,200.

Appearance:asin1918butwithmodifications.

Renown: Original line of unbroken main deck scuttles. Large aircraft catapult abaftsecondfunnel.

Prominent HA director on control top. Large deckhouse on port side of shelterdeckamidships. Bulges carried up to main deck level. Smooth face to bridgework. Twocompasstablestobridgeface.

Repulse: Side armour higher in position. (6in upper belt). No upper row of scuttles(between ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets).No catapult. SmallRFon control top.Bulges not visibleabovewaterline.Complicatedandmessybridgeworkwithcommunicationpipesrunningdownfromcompassplatform.

AppearanceChanges,RefitsandModificationsAscompletedtheywereexceptionallyfine-lookingshipswithamostgracefulhull.Withtheirequalheightfunnelsintheearlymonthstheywereadesigner’sdelight,andeventheraisingoftheforwardfunneldidnotdetractfromtheirgoodlooks.Thesuperstructurewassimple,butratherpiled-upinappearanceandthesearchlightarrangementonthefunnelswas rather unique.Another distinctive featurewas the double rowof scuttles along thehull–indicatingthelackofarmourofcourse–whichwereveryeye-catching.

Principlecharacteristicsoftheclasswere:

1.Marked upward sheer forward and aftwith strongly curved stem and deep bowflare.2.Longdoublerowofscuttlesalongmainandupperdecksides.3.Unusuallyhighsuperstructureforwardwithwingscarriedafttoabeamforefunnel.4.Short,equal-heightflat-sidedfunnels(forefunnelraisedbeforeenteringservice).5.Small,stronglyprojectingsearchlightplatformsonfunnels.6.Two15inturretsforwardandoneaft.7. Prominent triple 4inmountings abeam fore funnel and on centreline before andabaftmainmast.8.Tripodmastswithshorttopmastoneach.

Asuperbfull-lengthviewofRepulseassheleavesPortsmouthafterherpartialreconstructionandatacostof£1,377,348,April1936.

DuringtheGreatWartheybothreceivedtheusualmodifications thatothercapitalshipsweregiven (seeBritishBattleshipsofWorldWarOne), but thisdidnotdrastically altertheir appearance. The superstructure was built up slightly and searchlight towers wereaddedaroundthesecondfunnel.Bothshipswereusedforexperimentswithcamouflagepaint.

Repulsewas thefirstof the twotobeconsideredforrefitafter thewar,plansfor this

havingbeenmadewellinadvanceofthecessationofhostilities.

RepulseRefit,December1918toOctober1920

1.High-tensileplatingworkedintomaindeck,adding1intotheflatand2inontheslopes.Thelowerdeckreceived1inplatingoverthemagazines.2.Themain6inarmouredbeltwasremovedfromitsoriginalpositionandplacedonedeckhigher.Anew9instrakewasfittedintheoldposition.3.New,wideranti-torpedobulgeswerefitted,ratherlikethosefittedtoRamilliesandwerefilledwithcrushingtubes.Therewere6ft4inwiderthantheoriginalfittings.4.2½inplateswereaddedaroundtorpedoports.5.Submergedtorpedotubeswereremoved,havingbeenfoundunsatisfactoryathighspeeds.6. Eight 21in above-water torpedo tubes were added in four twinmountings, twoP&Sinportsonupperdeck;forwardpaircloseabaftsecondfunnel,afterpairabaftmainmast.7.Large-baserangefinderaddedovercontrolpositionsonconningtowerandatrearof‘A’and‘Y’15inturrets.8.Singlerangeclocksfittedovercontroltopandatrearofaftercontrolpositiononmaintripodlegs.9.Maintopmastreplacedwithtopgallant.10.Searchlightswereremovedfromafterpairoftowersbuttowerswereretained.

Armourprotectionincreasedby4,300tonsinweight.

ThiswasthelastrefitforRepulseuntilhermajorrefitof1936,butminorchangesweremade: 1924–5 single 4in anti-torpedo guns on shelter deck abeam conning towerwerereplacedby4inAA.Original3inAAwasreplacedby4inincreasingAAarmamenttofour4in.Navigatingplatformenclosed.

1925 deckhouse accommodating squash court for royal tour by the Prince ofWalesadded on starboard side of shelter deck between funnels. 1926 New type control top.Signaldistributionofficeaddedatrearofupperbridge.Foretopmastremovedandsignalstrutsadded.

RenownRefit,July1923toSeptember1926

Followingalongthe linesof the1918–20refit thathersisterhadreceived,hermain6inbeltwasremovedandreplacedbya9instrake.Theoriginal6inbelt,however,wasnotre-installedbutthenew9inbeltwasplacedslightlyhigherthaninRepulse.Thiswasbecauseof the deepening that Renown had already suffered as a consequence of additionaltopweight since completion in 1916 (see drawing). Protective high-tensile plating wasadded to themaindeckso that the total thicknesswas2½inamidshipsand4inover themagazines(againstlinand1–3ininRepulse).Platingwasalsoaddedtothelowerdeckasprotectionagainstend-onfire.

RenownenteringthePanamaCanalon8November1921duringtheRoyalTour;onherwaytoTrinidad.Notethecrestontheroyalviewingplatform.

Anew typeofunderwateranti-torpedobulgewas fitted,beingmuch lighter,andwassimilartothatfittedinWarspite.Thecrushingtubeswereomittedalongmostofthebulgebut were retained in wake of the magazines. A small 2in strip of armour was fittedunderneaththemain9inarmourplatestoassistindeflectingdivingshells.Anewtypeofsquare-shaped control top was fitted; it was considerably deeper than the original one.Singlerangeclockswerefittedover‘Y’turret.Theaftertriple4inmountingwasreplaced.The single 4in anti-torpedo guns were removed. AA guns as in Repulse. Flying-offplatformreplacedon‘B’turret.Searchlightsremovedfromafterpairoftowersbuttowersretained.Upperbridgeenlargedandmodified.Signaldistributionofficeaddedatrearofbridge. Foretopmast removed. Short signal struts added below control top. Topgallantfittedtomain.

Theconsequenceofthesealterationswasanetsinkageofabout3incomparedwith12inforRepulse.Thiswasattainedattheexpenseofthecrushingtubesinthebulgesandthecompleteremovaloftheoriginal6inarmour.ItwasagreedthatalthoughRepulsewasthebetter armoured ship of the two, the new position of the 9in belt in Renown had itsadvantages.Weights:896tonsremoved(6inoldmainbelt);1,050tonsaddedforbulges;1,020tonsaddedinarmourplating;1,430tonsaddedinnew9inbelt.

Thealterationsgreatlyimprovedtheship’sprotectionagainstfireatlongrangesandincertaincircumstancesatshortranges.Thedeck,whichalwaysformedthegreaterpartofthetarget,wasstatedtobeproofagainst15inshellsbecauseofitsabilitytodeflectthemat15,000yardsandunder.Althoughthenew9inbeltwasnotconsideredquiteequaltothatofa4inarmoureddeckitwasstatedthatitshouldeitherbreakupa15inshellduringitspathofflightoratleastexplodetheshellatamoderatedistanceinsidethearmouredbeltsothatitwouldnotreachtheship’svitals.

Someoftheex-Eagle’sarmouredplateswereusedinthisrefitastheywereinthatofRepulseduringher1918–20refit.

Estimate of costs Renown refit, 1923–6: labour £404,000, materials £114,000, total£518,000.

January1927.Shortflagpolefittedabaftcontroltopandtomaintopmastforroyaltour(January to June 1927). Deckhouse replaced on port side of shelter deck amidshipsautumn1927(afterreturnoftour).

1929.Fittedasflagship.

1930–1.Rangeclockover‘Y’turretremoved.

September 1931 to June 1932. Refit: midships triple 4in removed to accommodateaircraft catapult (fitted later).Multiple 2pdr AA (8 barrels) added on starboard side ofsuperstructureabeamforefunnel.HARFoncontroltopreplacedbyHAdirector.Flying-offplatformremovedfrom‘B’turret.AfterpairofSLtowersabeamfunnelremoved.

1932–3.Aircraftcatapult(McTaggartTrainingtype)fittedabaftsecondfunnelinplaceofmidships4intripleguns.OneFaireyIIIDseaplanecarried.Nospecialcraneprovided,aircraftbeinghandledbyboatderrick.

RepulseenteringValettaHarbour,Malta,inMarch1937.NotetheSpanishCivilWarstripeson‘B’turret.

RENOWNANDREPULSEBridgework

RENOWN1921and1933

Bothshipswerereconstructedtovariousdegreesduringtheperiod1934to1939withaviewofbringingthemmorenearlyinlinewithmodernrequirements.ThemodificationsinRepulsewere in factquite limited,beingconfinedmainly to increasedAAarmament

and provision of hangar accommodation for aircraft with improved type of catapult.Againstthis, theadditionaltopweight,forwhichnocompensationwasmade,resultedinincreased draught and displacement with some loss of speed, stability, dryness andfreeboard.ReconstructionofRenownwas considerablymoredrastic, theprimaryobjectbeing to secure the maximum possible advance in offensive and defensive qualitieswithoutadditionaldisplacementoranyappreciablelossofspeed.

It proved impracticable to bring the level of vertical armouring up to modernrequirements so such modernization as did take place was mainly in the interests ofretaininghighspeedcombinedwithstrongAAdefenceandabilitytowithstandaerialandunderwaterattack.Therewasstillnoquestionofhereverfacingshipsarmedwithlargercalibregunsifitcouldbeavoidedbecauseofherweak(9in)sidearmour.

In addition to the modifications in AA armament and aircraft accommodation andequipmentcarriedoutinRepulse,elevationandrangeofmainarmamentwas increased,anentirelynew,dual-purpose(HA/LA)secondaryarmamentwasmounted,lightAAgunswerefurtherimproved,horizontalandunderwaterprotectionwasstrengthened,speedwasmaintainedandradiusslightlyextended.Bridgework,layout,superstructureandrigwereallmateriallyaltered.

RepulseRefit,April1933toMay1936

Midships4intriplemountingtakenouttoaccommodateaircraftcatapult.

AAarmamentincreasedtoeight4in,sixteen2pdrsandeight0.5inMG(the4ingunswereintwotwinandfoursinglemountings).

Theforwardsuperstructureand15ingunsofRepulse(noteEtnastrippingondeck),duringapublicopendayc.1928.

Renownc.1931during4inAAgunnerypractice.The4ingunasoriginallyfittedwasconsideredatroublesomemounting,whichrequiredtoolargeacrewtoserveeachtriplemount.

Repulse,lookingdownfromthe30ftrangefinderovertheforecastleduringapublicopendayc.1928..

RenownentersGrandHarbour,MaltaduringherthirdRoyalTourwithH.R.H.ThePrinceofWales(26October1921to20June1922).

Renownon6January1927asdetachedfortheRoyalTourNotethemodificationsafterherlargerefit.ShecarriedtheDukeandDuchessofYorkonyetanotherRoyalTourtoAustraliaandNewZealand,returningtoPortsmouthon27June.

Repulse,1928,lookingaftoverthesecondfunnelandmainmast.

REPULSE1922and1933

REPULSEAsReconstructed,July1936

ThetwinmountingswereaprototypeturretusedlaterinthereconstructedbattleshipsoftheQueenElizabethclassandRenown(prototypeturretalsocarriedinResolution).HAdirectorsaddedoncontroltopandonhighpedestalabaftmainmast.FormerHA/RFoncontroltopwasremoved.MF/DFequipmentfitted.

DFcabinetfittedonmainmast.

Searchlights redistributed;24insignalling lampsretained.Twoaircrafthangarsprovided(P&S)insuperstructureabaftsecondfunnel,withopeningatrear.

Straightarmelectriccranefittedontopofeachhangar.

Fixed athwartships catapult fitted on upper deck abaft hangars, shelter deck being cutawaytoaccommodatethis.

Accommodationforfouraircraft:twoinhangars,oneondeckoutsideandoneoncatapult.

Highsuperstructurecontaininghangarsbuiltuparoundandabaftsecondfunnel.

Heavyboatsstowedontopofhangars,allhandledbyaircraftcranes.

SeaboatscarriedindavitsP&Samidshipsasbefore.

Except for longer signal struts at base of control top, her basic appearance had notchangedsince1933.TheBridgefacewasslightlyremodelled,givingsmoother-lookingfinish.

REPULSE:PARTICULARS,1937Lengthandbeamasoriginal.

Displacement(tons):34,600(load),38,311(deep).

Armament

Originalmain

Secondary12×4in

6×4inMkXVAA

16×2pdr

16×0.5inAA

8×21inTT

Aircraft

Twohangarswithfixedathwartshipscatapultsamidships.Capacityfor4SwordfishTSRorWalrusamphibians.

Radar:MF/DF.

Armour:seeAppearancenotes.

Machinery:asoriginal,butcompletelyoverhauled.

Speed:slightreductionfromoriginal.

Searchlights:6×36in,2×24insignalling.

General

Boatstowagerearrangedtoaccommodatehangarandcatapult.Majorityofboatsstowedontopofhangars.Accommodation,ventilationandequipmentmodernized.

Rig:Asin1932exceptshortermaintopmastandtopgallant.DFaerialsonmaintopmastandatheadofmaintopgallant.

Appearance:

Generallymorepiledupandheavier-looking.

Smooth face to bridgework. Height of superstructure accentuated by cutting away ofshelterdeckabaftit.LighttwinturretP&Sabeammainmast.

LargemultipleAAmountingsP&Sonsuperstructureamidships.

Prominent director over control top and high pedestal abaft mainmast. Prominent DFaerialandcabinetonmainmast.

Other than rig alterations during early years of wan Repulse changed very little inappearanceupuntil the timeofher sinking in1941.According to16mmofficialmoviefilm,hercontrastcamouflagewaspaintedoutbeforeshewassunkinDecember1941.

Trialsafterrefit,1936–7:

1hourFullPower31.1.1936.

Windof15–20mphandshortsteepsea,longestwavesestimatedat120×15ft

Goingaheadwasverywet forwardofbreakwaterGunneryofficer stated thatwaterhadpenetratedbetweenturretsandbarbettearmourat‘A’positionandreacheddowntoshellrooms.

Nospeedrecorded.Fullpower:June1936.

Wind4–5

TollandMile.

Meanfigures:112,400shpfor28.36knots.

Repulse was fitted to take 15in supercharged shells 5/10CRH andmagazines and shellroomsweremodifiedtoaccommodatethese.(20rpg).Date:25.6.1941.

RenownRefit(majorreconstruction),September1936toAugust1939

Superstructurerazedtoupperdecklevel.

15inturretsremoved.

4insecondaryarmamentremoved.

Funnelsrazedtoupperdecklevel.

Foremast(tripod)andmainmasttakenout.

Originalbridgeworkandconning towerwas replacedby largesplinter-proofandgas-proof control tower, similar with variations in detail to that fitted in Warspite asreconstructedin1937,andrepresentingafurtherdevelopmentofthetypefirstintroducedintheNelsonclass.

Platformssitedwithinthetowerwere:1.Accommodationandrecreationspaces.2.Seacabins for Admiral and certain senior officers. 3. Armoured lower navigating position,signal, direction-finding and cipher offices. Navigating platform, main and secondarydirectorswere fitted on top of this tower. Searchlight, signalling and lookout platformswerefittedinthesides.

New streamline funnels fitted, slightly thicker and flatter than original pair, and setclosertogether.

36in searchlights replaced by 44in lamps. Four 24in signalling (2×P&S) on lowerplatform on control tower. Horizontal armouring was improved over magazines andmachinery,but itwasacomplicatedeffortwithexistingplatingbeing removed in somecases and a mixture of high-tensile and non-cemented armour being used to make upcertainthicknesses.Acertainamountof‘D’typesteelwasusedfortheprotectionofthe

secondaryarmament.Basicallyitamountedtofitting4inarmouroverthemagazinesand2½inelsewhere.Forbestresultsinapplicationseedrawingasreconstructed.

Original 4in secondary armament replaced by twenty 4.5in dual-purpose guns in tenturrets(fiveperside):forwardgroupofturretsoneachsideabeamforefunnel;aftergroupoftwoabeammainmast.

LightAAincreasedfromsixteentotwenty-four2pdrsinthree8-barrelmountings.

Re-enginedandreboileredwithParsonsall-gearedturbinesandeightAdmiralty3-drumboilers.NewmachinerybyCammellLaird.SHPincreasedto120,000fornominalspeedof 29 knots. Fuel capacity slightly increased using outer wing bunkers, and radius ofactionincreasedasaconsequenceofgreatereconomyofnewequipmentinstalled.

Otheritemsasfitted(orremoved)were:

1.Type71W/Tremoved.2.Type511buzzeroutfitinstalled.3.CombinedHA/LAcontrol and calculatingposition, eachgroup consistedof oneHACSMkIV,HA/LAdirector,AFCclockandoneHACScalculatingtablewithpewswitchinstallation.4.Newpom-pomdirectorMkIIandwindspeedanddirectionequipment.5.NewFirecontroltablesfittedwhererequired.6.UnderwaterTTremovedandflatsubdividedtoaccommodatecoolingmachinery.7.Newabove-water21intorpedotubesfitted.8.Improvedpumpingarrangementsandsevennew350-tondischargepumps.9.Wirelessofficesredistributed.10.NewandimprovedW/Tfitted:Types36c;49c;52c(2sets);75c;and7dtogetherwithrack-mountedreceivinggear.11.Newventingarrangementstomainarmamenthandingrooms.12.Newanemometer,magslipindicatorandothermeteorologicalequipmentfitted.13.Newairdefencepositionsfitted.

Aclose-upofRepulseasreconstructed,1936.

RenownseenhereleavingPortsmouthaftercompletereconstruction(September1936toJune1939)whichcostapproximately£3,008,008.Shehasyettoreceiveafreshcoatofpaint.

RENOWN1939AsFitted

14.Newwirephonesfitted.15.Existingfiresystemswereupdatedandrenewedincertainareas.16.Provision for electrical power formotor-driven auxiliarymachinery fitted, alsomodernlightingequipmentinmanyareas.17.NewmodernD/F(FTWa/TType405)equipmentandback-upsystemfitted.18.Oldtorpedocontrolpositionsremoved.19.Bulgescoatedwithbitumasticsolutionandenamel.20.Modernizationoffeedwatersystems.21.Oldsteamcapstanremovedandnewmotor-drivenmachineryfittedforanchors.22.New ringmain, newcables, release switches, dynamos andnewmains controlboardfitted.23.Distributionboxesrenewed,andregroupingofexistingboxes.24.Removalof200tonsofsteambilgeejectors.25.Redistributionofoilfuel.26.Rudderindicatorandsupplyrenewed.27.Signaldeckcompletelyrefittedandmodernized.28.Accommodationforcrewimproved.29.Six44inpower-controlledsearchlightsfitted.30.15inturretscutawaytogivegreaterelevation(increasedfrom20°to30°).

RENOWNArmourLayoutasReconstructed,1939

31.Newrigmodifiedtolighttripodforemast,steppedthroughrearofcontroltower,butwell clear abaft upper part. Short polemainmast.No control tops. Topmast toforemastwithDFaerialpoleathead.Nomaintopmast.DFaerial(starfish type)atheadofmainmast.Costofreconstruction:£3,088,008.

RepulseRefit,September1938toJanuary1939

Twin 4in turrets replaced by single 4in in openmountings. Eight 0.5in AA (4 barrels)

added on director platform on main tripod legs. Special accommodation providedinternallyforroyaltourtoCanadabytheKingandQueen,butitwaslaterdecidedtouseCPSEmpressofAustraliawithRepulseasescort.

Renown,1939–45

1941Radarcontrolfittedformainandsecondaryarmament,Types284formainand285for4.5insecondary.Multiple2pdr(4barrels)addedon‘B’15inturrettop.Radarcontrol(Type282)fittedforlightAAguns(2pdrs);directorslocatedP&Sontopofcontroltowerandabeamforefunnel.

ASWradaradded;AWType281withaerialateachmastheadSWType271withaerialin lantern(forprotection)onforetop.Original271set transferred tocorvetteVerbenaatRosythinSeptember1941,replacedbynewsetlater.ImprovedD/Fequipmentfitted,withaerialonfaceofcontroltower.TripodlegsandtopmastfittedtomainmastforType281RDF.Elaboratecamouflagepaintworkschemeevident.

Renown,July1942–August1943modifications

Seventy-two 20mmAA in 23 twin and 26 singlemountings, located on ‘B’ turret (twotwins), on platforms at sides of control tower (four twins), on superstructure forward,midshipsandaftandincatapultspaceamidships(twotwinandtwosingleoneachside).

Decksponsonedoutabreastcatapultspacetoaccommodatetheseguns.AdditionallightAAdirectors(282RDF)fittedonsuperstructureamidshipsandaft.

February–June 1943Refit:Catapult removed but craneswere retained.Hangar spaceconvertedforuseasoffices,etc.Aircraftno longercarried.Boatstowagerearrangedoncatapultdeck.

Renown,1944–5

20mmAAremovedfrom‘B’turret(byMarch1945).

PreviouscamouflagereplacedbyAdmiraltyStandardtype(Pacificcolours).

RENOWN:PARTICULARS,1939Hullanddimensionsunaltered.Displacement(tons):(averagesince1916)

191732,220,192637,150,193638,105,193933,725(averageaction),36,080(deepload).

Armament:Original15inunchanged(turretscutawayforgreaterelevation)

Secondary:20×4.5indual-purposeintwinturrets400rpg

24×2pdrMkVIII(3mounts,8barrels)l,800rpg

TT:8×21inMkIVandIV0

Depth-charges:24TypeDMkVII

4×0.5inMGAA2,000rpg

6×6pdr100rpg

2VickersMG5,000rpg

12×Lewis2,000rpg

Searchlights:4×44in,4×24insignalling.

Armour:seeAppearance,Refitnotesanddrawing.

Machinery

Parsonsgearedturbines.4propellers

Boilers:8Admiralty3-drumtype,300psi

SHP:120,000for29/30knots.

Fuel(tons):1,000/4,860oil.

Radiusofaction:6,580nmat18knots.

Alterationssincecompletion:(average)

1916: 32.58knots. 27,900tons.1919: 29.85knots. 31,820tons.1939: 29.93knots. 32,800tons.

GM:5.07ftaverageactionload,5.76ftdeepcondition.

Stabilityvanishesat:averageaction700,deepcondition760.

General

LargetowerstructurereplacingformerbridgeworkandCT.BoatstowageandhandlingasinRepulse.

Accommodation,ventilationandgeneralequipmentallmodernized.

Rig:Lighttripodforemastwithtopmast.Nocontroltop.Shortpolemainmast.D/Faerialsateachmasthead.Nomainderrick.

Boats:2×50ftsteampinnaces;1×42ftsailinglaunch;1×36ftpinnace;2×32ftcutters;2×30ftgigs:2×27ftwhalers;1×16ftand1×13ftbalsarafts.

RENOWN:PARTICULARS,1944Displacement(tons)35,240(averageload),37,600(deep)

Draught:29ft11½inforward,29ft9inaft(average).

Hullanddimensionsasin1939.

Armament

Mainandsecondaryunchanged

28×2pdr

68×20mmAA.AlllightAAlandedbyJuly1945

Forwardgroupof4.5ingunsremovedbyMay1945.

TT:asin1939.

Allgunsexceptsingle20mmAAradarcontrolled.

Radar:Types284formainguns,285for4.5in,282or283forlightAA,AWType281,SWType271.

Searchlights:asin1939.

Armour:asin1939.

Machineryasin1939.

Speed:slightreductionduetoadditions.

AfterthelossofHoodin1941RenownwasthefastestcapitalshipintheRoyalNavy.

Aircraft:Approvaltoremovecatapultgiven19January1943.

InRenown thiscamouflagealsofeatured15in turretspaintedblueandgunsgreyon topandwhiteandbluebeneath.Bluestripofcamouflageonhullwasrepainteddark-greybeforereturninghomefromPacificinApril1945.

ArmamentreducedinJuly1945aftershippassedintoReserve.

Forwardgroupoftwelve4.5ingunswereremoved.

AlllightAAlanded,mountingsretained.

Repulse,1939–41,additionsandalterations.

Radar control (Type284) fitted formaingunsAugust1941 (proposedNovember1940,approvedFebruary1941).

4intriplemountingonsuperstructureabaftmainmastremoved.

Single4inAAP&Son forecastledeckamidships remountedon topofhangar (byMay1941).

Multiple 2pdr AA (8 barrels) mounted on after superstructure in place of 4in triple(approvedFebruary1941,fittedbyJuly1941).

Single20mmAAaddedP&Son‘Y’15inturret.

Unusualcamouflagepaintedup(contrastpainting,seecamouflage).

ThefollowingwereproposedforRepulsebutitisnotcertainiftheywerealldonebeforeherlossinDecember1941.

May1940:DGcablesfollowingthelineoftheforecastledeckfromthebowtoone-thirdof the lengthfromthebow,andfollowingthe linesof theupperandforecastledecksfromthesterntoone-thirdofthelengthfromthestem.InternalDGcablesalsofitted.

September1940:RDFTypes279or281proposed.GaffforAdmiral’sflag.

Foretopmasttobefittedwhenaerial(radar)wasshipped.November1940:ProposedRDFequipment.Type284formainguns(completedin1941);twosetsType282forward,onesetType285forward,twosetsType285aft,onesetType282aft.

December1940.Reportonperformanceatsea:

‘In a headwind suction of the funnel gases into the after part of the bridge where thetorpedo,SLandstarshellcontrolpositionsaresituatedisclearlynoticeable.Iconsiderthat the question of fitting a cowl on the foremost funnel or lengthening itmust bethoroughly investigated before further extensions are made to the bridge work.’[Captain]

January1941. Itwas reported thatwith lightwindon thebow theoppositewingof thebridgewas distinctly affected by funnel fumes.Addition of 3-foot extension to forefunnelwassuggested.

February1941.AlterationsandadditionsapprovedbytheAdmiralty:

All4inmountingstoberemoved.Proposedtofitseven4intwinmountingswithfourteen4inMkXVI⋆guns.LightAAtocompriseofthree2pdr(8barrels)withdirectorsandfour0.5inMG.RadaroutfitforRepulsefinallyamended:OneType281set;threeType282sets;oneType284set; twoType285sets.August1941:Type284set fittedandoperational.

March1941:Conning towerdeckwasarranged to accommodateHA rearmament.Type281officewasbuiltintothisdeckandtwoofficesforTypes282and285wereplacedontheflagdeck.

May 1941: Zarebas of protective plating to be fitted around 4in mountings. Protectivescreenproposed,1fthigh,for0.5inAAMG.

June1941:Cowlforfunnelagainsuggested.

July1941:MaintopmastredesignedforType281RDF.DFoutfitTypeFM2tobefitted.Cowlforfunnelfinallyapproved.

September 1941: Armament refit in the USA proposed: Three-cornered control of HAguns.TwoHA towers aft, andone forward.HalfTTarmament tobe removed.Type271tobefittedbeforerefit.

36inSLtoberepositionedonmainmastwhenafterHAtowersfitted.

Convertgunstofireextremelylong(67in)6CRFshells(termedMkIIIB)whichjustfittedinhoistcage.

History:RepulseAlternatedwithRenownasflag(RA)1stBCS1917–18.

From September 1917 to March 1918, flag 1st BCS, also served as flag Grand Fleetcarriers(seeRenown).

TookpartinHeligolandBightoperation17November1917.

On thisoccasion,1stBCS&1stBSsupportedsweepbyCourageousandGlorious,1stand 6th LCS and destroyers to attack enemy minesweepers working in HeligolandBight under battleship protection although, apart from Repulse, none of the Britishbattlecruisersof1stBSactuallymadecontactwithenemy forces.Detached from1stBCStocovertheretirementofthe1stLCSafterappearanceoftheGermanbattleshipsKaiserandKaiserin andbecameengagedwith these ships and light cruisers.Scored

onehitonKönisbergwhichpassedthroughthreefunnelsandupperdeckandburstincoalbunkerstartingbadfire.

WasthelastBritishshipinactionwithGermancapitalshipsduringtheGreatWar.

PaidoffatPortsmouthforextensiverefit,2December1918.

Recommissioned at Portsmouth 1 January 1921 forBCSAtlantic Fleet (seeRenown repost-warreorganization).

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)January1921toNovember1923.

Detached,withHood,August 1922 to representRoyalNavy atBrazilian IndependenceCentenaryCelebrations inRio de Janeiro and subsequently carried out flag-showingcruiseintheWestIndies.LeftDevonport14August;returned23November1922.

WithHoodandSnapdragonvisitedNorwayandDenmarkJunetoJuly1923.

Again detachedNovember 1923 as unit of Special Service Squadron comprisingHood(flag),Repulseand1stLCSDelhi,Danae,DaundessandDragonforEmpireandworldcruise.

SPECIALSERVICESQUADRON(WorldCruise)November1923toSeptember1924.

Squadron left fromrendezvousoffPlymouthon27November,proceedingoutwardsviaCapeandIndianOceanandreturningacrossthePacific.Itineraryofthebattlecruisersand light cruisers varied in some instances and finally separated after leaving SanFranciscoon11July1924,onreturnleg,theformerpassingthroughthePanamaCanalwhile the latter proceeded around South America. Squadron reformed again off theLizardon28September1924, theshipsarrivingbackathomeportson the28thand29th.

PortbroadsideofRepulseatfullspeed(takenfromHood)asthetwoshipssteambetweenLasPalmasandGibraltarinNovember1922.

Hood and Repulse visited Sierra Leone, Capetown, Zanzibar, Trincomalee, PortSwettenham,Singapore,Fremantle,Albany,Adelaide,Melbourne,Hobart,JervisBay,Sydney, Wellington, Auckland, Fiji, Honolulu, Vancouver, Victoria, San Francisco,Panama, Colon, Kingston (Jamaica), Halifax, Quebec, St. John’s (Newfoundland).RepulsearrivedPortsmouth29September1924andrejoinedAtlanticFleet.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1924toMarch1925.

With Hood represented the British Navy at Vasco da Gama celebrations at LisbonFebruary1925.

DetachedMarch 1925 for Prince ofWales’s tour toWest and South Africa and SouthAmerica. Left Portsmouth 25 March, visiting Bathurst (Gambia), Sierra Leone,Takoradi andLagos.ArrivedCapetown1MaywherePrince disembarked for inlandtour,rejoiningshipon29July.ProceededtoSt.Helena,Montevideo,BuenosAiresandWestIndies.ReturnedPortsmouth16October1925.

Repulsefullydressed,May1937.

Repulsefromanoddangle,showingtherearofthesecondfunnelandboatdeck,c.1938.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)October1925toMarch1932(flagBCSApril1929toJuly1931).

RefitPortsmouthNovember1925toJuly1926andJulytoSeptember1927.

RelievedHoodasflagBCSApril1929(Hoodtorefit).

FlagrevertedtoHood11July1931.

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)MarchtoJune1932.

PaidofftoreservePortsmouthJune1932priortoextensiverefit.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)June1932toApril1933.

PaidofftoDockyardcontrolatPortsmouthforrefit1April1933.

ExtensiverefitPortsmouthApril1933toApril1936.

Commissionedfortrials14January1936.

Completed full crew Portsmouth April 1936 for BCS Mediterranean fleet under 1935FleetReorganizationplan(Renown).

LeftPortsmouthforMediterranean8June1936.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(BCS)April1936toSeptember1938.

Protected British interests in westernMediterranean during Spanish CivilWar 1936–8.EmbarkedfivehundredrefugeesatPalma,Majorca,forMarseilleslate1936.

CoronationReview,Spithead,20May1937.

SenttoHaifaJuly1938becauseofArab-Jewishdisturbances.

Relieved byMalaya August 1938. Selected to conveyKing andQueen to Canada andUSA inMay1939andwithdrawn fromMediterraneanFleetSeptember1938 to refitpriortothis.

RefitPortsmouthOctober1938toMarch1939.

RecommissionedatPortsmouthMarch1939forHomeFleet,BCShavingrevertedtothisinFebruary1939.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)MarchtoOctober1939.

Becauseof theuncertainpolitical situation,originalplans for theRoyalvisit toCanadaandtheUSAwerelatermodified,theRoyalpartytravellingintheCPSlinerEmpressof Australia, Repulse acting as escort for first half of the Atlantic crossing. LeftPortsmouth5May1939.

With Nelson, Rodney and Ark Royal, carried out patrol off Norwegian coast 7–12SeptembertointerceptenemyshippingandenforceBritishblockade.

Tookpart,withHood,Sheffield,Auroraandfourdestroyers insearchoffStadlandet forGneisenau,Kölnanddestroyers8–10Octoberfollowingsortiebytheenemyforce.Nocontactestablished.

Detached,withFurious,toAmericaandWestIndiesCommand21October1939tocoverHalifax-UK convoy and later to patrol area south-east of Newfoundland followingreportsofenemyheavyshipsintheNorthAtlantic.ArrivedHalifax3November.

AMERICAANDWESTINDIESCOMMAND(Halifax)OctobertoDecember1939.

Left Halifax 23 November to take part in search for Scharnhorst after sinking ofRawalpindi,butdamagedbyheavyseasandforcedtoreturn.

With Resolution and Furious, escorted first Canadian troop convoy to UK December1939.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)December1939toOctober1941.

NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940.

ReinforcedRenownonpatroloffVestfiord9ApriltointerceptenemyshipsattemptingtoreachNarvik.

Escorted cruiserSuffolk fromStavanger toScapa 18April,Suffolk having been heavilydamagedbyaircraftbombingattackwhenretiringfrombombardmentofStavangeron17th.

Sent toFaroes–Icelandarea,withRenown, 5 June to investigate reportof enemyheavyshipsbeing sightedoff theFaroes,possibly intending raidon Iceland.Reportprovederroneousandon the10thRepulse joinedcovering force for troopconvoys returningfromHarstadonevacuationofBritishforcesfromNorway.

With Renown, 1st Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, endeavoured to interceptGneisenau, reporteden route fromTrondheim toGermany27 July1940.Nocontactmade.

WithHood, three ships of 1st CS and six destroyers, covered approaches to Brest andLorientduringsearchforScheeraftersinkingofJervisBay5November1940.

Unit of covering force for raid on Jan Mayen Islands November 1940 when GermanscientificmissioncapturedandWTstationdestroyed.

With Nigeria, patrolled Atlantic convoy routes following attack on troop ship offFinisterrebyHipperon25December1940.

Tookpart in search forScharnhorstandGneisenau inNorthAtlantic January toMarch1941.

Diverted from sailing with Gibraltar convoy from Clyde 22May 1941 to take part insearchforBismarckandPrinzEugen.

CoveredHalifaxconvoysinNewfoundlandareaJune1941afterBismarckoperation.

RefittedonClydeJunetoAugust1941.

Detached fromHomeFleet on completionof refit to escortMiddleEastTroopConvoyandleftClydewithconvoy30August1941,viaCape.

Repulsepreparingforwar,1939.

ArrivedDurban3OctoberandtransferredtoEastIndiesCommand.

Repulseshowingcontrastpaintwork,5July1941,onlyfivemonthsbeforeshewaslost.During1942/3thereweremanyunsubstantiatedreportsthattheJapanesehadsucceededinraisingRepulseandputtingherinaserviceablecondition.ThesourceofthismisconceptionappearstohavebeenofChineseorigin.

EASTINDIESCOMMANDOctobertoNovember1941.

VisitedEastAfricanportsduringOctoberandNovember.

TransferredtoSpecialStrikingForceofnewEasternFleet11November1941.

BecauseofthethreatofwarwithJapan,considerationhadbeengiven,inAugust1941,tothereinforcementofBritishNavalForcesintheIndianOceanandEastIndiesandtheeventualformationofapowerfulEasternFleet.TheChiefsofStaffrecommendedthat,bymid-September 1941, one battleship from theMediterranean, eitherBarham orValiant,shouldbesenttotheFarEastandthatthefourRoyalSovereignsshouldfollowbytheendof the year. One aircraft carrier, probably Eagle, was also proposed, but it was notconsideredthatanyadditionalcruisersorfleetdestroyerscouldbesparedimmediately.

ThisforcewastobeinitiallybasedatCeylontoprotecttheIndianOceantraderoutes,forwhich purpose itwas regarded as adequate, for the time being at least, andwas toconstitute the first instalment of an Eastern Fleet, comprising seven capital ships, onecarrier,tencruisersandabout24destroyers,whichitwasplannedtobuildupintheIndianOceanbythespringof1942whenitwouldbetransferredtoSingapore.

The First Sea Lord had proposed sending theRoyal Sovereigns to the Indian Oceanimmediately, reinforcing themwithNelson, Rodney andRenown in December 1941 orJanuary1942.

The Prime Minister (Winston Churchill) did not approve either proposal but urgedinsteadthatasmall,powerfulgroupoffastmodernbattleshipsshouldbesenttoSingaporeattheoutset;theirpresence,hesuggested,wouldprobablydeterJapaneseaggression.Thisplanwas strongly opposed by theFirst SeaLord on the grounds that none of theKingGeorgeVclassbattleshipscouldbesparedfromhomewaters.

The basic difference in the two points of view lay in the fact that the force theAdmiraltyhad inmindwouldbedefensive incharacter,butwellplacedstrategically, inthecentreoftheimportantSimonstown–Aden–Singaporetriangle,whilethatproposedbythe Prime Minister was potentially offensive, based far forward in an area which thepotentialenemywasthreateningtodominate.Itwasfoundimpossibletoreconciletheseopinionsandthematterwasdroppedforthetimebeing,although,thegradualtransferoftheRoyalSovereignsonlytotheIndianOceanwasbegunwithRoyalSovereignherselfatthe end of August, and in September Repulse was sent to Durban. In mid-October,however, the further deterioration in the political situation vis-à-vis Japan led to thequestionbeingconsideredbytheDefenceCommitteeattherequestoftheForeignOffice.TheCommittee,supportedby theForeignOffice,endorsed thePrimeMinister’splan inprinciple and suggested to the Admiralty that one modern battleship (King George Vclass),togetherwithRepulse(thenintheIndianOcean)andoneaircraftcarrierbesenttoSingaporeasafaststrikingforceforoffensiveoperationsintheeventofwarwithJapan.

TheFirstSeaLordwasstillopposed,butagreedtosendPrinceofWalestoCapetowntoawaitafinaldecisionwhilethenewcarriedIndomitablewasearmarkedtofollowwhenready.Asaconsequenceofgroundingwhileworking-upintheWestIndies,Indomitablewasdelayedandneverjoinedtheforce.On25October1941PrinceofWales, flying theflag of Admiral Phillips (CinC of the proposed Striking Force) left the Clyde forCapetown accompanied by the destroyers Electra and Express. On 11 November theAdmiraltyfinallyacceptedtheDefenceCommittee’srecommendationandPrinceofWales(stillenroutetoCapetown)andRepulsewereorderedtorendezvousatColombopriortogoingontoSingapore.PrinceofWalesreachedCapetownon16NovemberandColomboonthe28th.RepulsealsoreachedColomboonthe28thandtheforcewasgiventhecode-

nameForceZ.

Arrived Singapore 2 December 1941 and obviously intending a landing on the eastcoastofMalaya,whichitaccomplishedonthenightof7/8th.

EASTERNFLEET(ForceZSingapore)NovembertoDecember1941.

RepulseleftSingaporeon5DecemberwithtwodestroyersforashortvisittoDarwin,butwasrecalledthefollowingdaywhenaJapaneseconvoywassightedsouthofIndo-China,steeringwest,

On the 8th, Force Z, comprising Prince of Wales (flag), Repulse, Electra, Express,Vampire andTenedos left Singapore to attack the supply lines of the Japanese invadingforces.Theremainingtwodestroyers,JupiterandEncounter,wererefittingatSingaporeanddidnottakepartintheoperation.

CaptainTennant’sofficialReportonthesinkingofRepulse,10December1941.WespentOctoberandNovemberonwhatreallyamountedtoayachtingtrip in theSouthIndianOceanandduringthistimehadtwoshortvisitstoDurbanwhenIthinkthe ship’s company enjoyed themselves more than at any other port they visited.TowardtheendofNovemberwefoundourselvesrushedofftoCeylon.RepulsewaslyingatTrincomaleeandIgotasignalfromtheCinCEasternFleet(whohadthenarrivedatColomboinPrinceofWales)tellingmethathehadtoflyontoSingaporeto attend a conference there and that I had to take the Eastern Fleet there. ThisconsistedofPrinceofWales,Repulse,fourdestroyersElectra,Express,JupiterandEncounter.Wearrivedby1stDecember.Therewasagreatflourishoftrumpetsandmuchpublicitybythepressaboutourarrivalandhowwehadcommandoftheseasinthesewaters.BeforeIgoanyfurthermanyofusarehesitanttoattributeblameforthe loss of the two capital ships but I would like to tell the inner history of thispolitical move. Japan was getting more troublesome and both the British and USForeignOfficesandalso the localgovernmenton thespotdeclared that ifweonlyshowed force and sent some capital ships to theFarEast Japanwould pipe down.TherewasnotimetocollectabalancedFleetofaircraftcarriers,cruisers,destroyers,etc.,andsotoalargeextentwewerebluffingandinthiscaseourbluffwascalled.ThePrimeMinisterpracticallyadmittedthisintheHouseofCommonssodonotbetemptedtoattributeblamehastilytotheAirMinistryortheAirForcesonthespotforthis would be, I think, unfair. A week after arrival of the Eastern Fleet war wasdeclared and the Japanese started bombing our aerodromes on the north coast ofMalayaandalso carriedout landings there.Thequestionweall asked in the shipslyingthereattheNavalBasewas,whatarewegoingtodoaboutit?HowcouldweremainsittinginSingaporeHarbourwiththeenemylandingonourshores?SotheCinC(AdmiralPhillips)afteraskingforsuchairprotectionascouldbeprovideddidtheonlypossiblething.HewenttoseaandtriedtocuttheircommunicationsbetweenIndo-Chinaandthe

NorthEastCoastofMalayaalongwhichrouteconvoysoftroopswererunning.Justbefore dark onMonday 8thDecemberPrince ofWales, Repulse, Electra, Express,Vampire and Tenedos sailed from the Naval Base with the intention I have justmentioned.Itwasabout30hours’runtoreachourobjectiveofftheNorthEastCoast

ofMalayawhereitwasintendedtoarriveneardawn.Theconvoysandanyshippingwewouldfindandthensweepingdownthecoastat26knotsandsohome.Thenextday at sea, except that it was warm, was verymuchNSweather, low clouds andheavy rainstorms, visibility sometimes down to half a mile. This was a greatadvantage tousaswedidnotwish tobe locatedbyJapaneseaircraft.However,atabout16.45hours theskyclearedconsiderablyand theForcewasverysoonbeingshadowedby at least three aircraft.Wewere then steaming to the northwhich theAdmiralcontinuedtodountildarkwherehemadealargealterationofcoursetothewestincreasingspeedto26knotswiththeintentionofshakingoffourshadowers.Atabout8o’clockIgotasignalfromhimsayingthataswewerebeingshadowedhehaddecidedtocanceltheoperationforifwenowpersistedandwentintotheenemylandings the nextmorningwe should probably find our ships heavily attacked bysubmarines,aircraftandpossiblydestroyersandsowestartedtoreturnhome.AfewhoursafterwehadturnedbackareportwasreceivedsayingthatalandingwastakingplaceatKuanton.NowKuanton isonly150milesfromSingaporewhereasSingariandKateBahru,wherewe had intended to be at dawn, are some 400miles fromSingapore.TheAdmiral decided to investigate this landing atKuantononhiswaybackandtoarriveoffthatplaceatdawn.Thiswedidandfoundnothingbutatabout6.30hoursRepulsesightedareconnaissanceaircraftwhichIreportedbyflagstothePrinceofWales.ThisIthinkwastheaircraftwhoputthetorpedo-bombersontousfor they arrived some four hours laterwhichwould allow for them to come fromsouthIndo-China.Atabout10.45wewenttofirstdegreeHAreadiness.Repulse’sRDFshortlyafter

picked up formations of enemy aircraft. The first aircraft we sighted about 11.00hours.IwillnowdescribethevariousphasesofaircraftattackwhichfinallycausedthedestructionoftheRepulseandPrinceofWales.Theyaredividedinfiveseparateattackswithvaryingperiodsbetweenthem.Theintervalsbetweentheseperiodswerebetween10 and20minutes but theperiodbetween the fourth and fifth attackwasveryshort.Thefirstattackdevelopedshortlyafter11.00hourswhen9aircraftinclosesingle

lineabreastformationwereseenapproachingRepulsefromjustaboutGreen50andofaheightofabout10,000ft.Firewasatonceopenedonthemwiththelong-rangeHAbyPrinceofWalesandRepulse.ItwasverysoonobviousthattheattackwastobeentirelyconcentratedonRepulse.The formationwasverywell kept andbombsweredroppedwithgreataccuracy.Onenearmisson thestarboardsideabreast ‘B’turretandonehitontheporthangarsburstonthearmourbelowthemarines’messdeckandcausedminordamage.Theremainderofthesalvo,itwasthought7bombswere dropped altogether, it fell very close to the port side and this concluded thisattack. Therewas now a short lull of about 20minutes duringwhich the damagecontrolpartiescarriedouttheirdutiesinamostefficientmannerandfireswhichhadbeenstartedbythisbombhadallbeengotundercontrolbeforethenextattackandthebombhavingburstonthearmour,nodamagewassufferedbelowintheengineorboilerrooms.Itisthoughtthatthebombsdroppedwereabout250lb.ThesecondattackwassharedbyPrinceofWalesandRepulseandwasmadeby

torpedo-bomberaircraft.TheyappearedtobethesametypeofmachinebelievedtobeMitsubishi86or88.Iamnotpreparedtosayhowmanymachinestookpartinthis

attackbutonitsconclusionIhadtheimpressionthatwehadsucceededincombingthe tracks of a large number of torpedoes – possibly as many as 12. We weresteamingat25knotsatthetime.Imadeasteadycourseuntiltheaircraftappearedtobe committed to the attack when the wheel was put over and the attacksprovidentially combed. I would like to record here the valuable work done by allbridge personnel at this time in calmly pointing out approaching torpedo-bomberswhichlargelycontributedtoourgoodfortuneindodgingallthesetorpedoes.PrinceofWaleswashiton theport side rightaftduring thisattackanda largecolumnofwaterappearedtobethrownup,largerthansubsequentcolumnsofwaterwhichwerethrownupwhenRepulsewashitlateron.Thethirdattackwasahigh-levelbombingattackagainconcentratedonRepulse.

Possiblytheenemywereaware,andparticularlyiftheywereusing250lbbombs,thatthese bombs would have little chance of penetratingPrince of Wales’s horizontalarmour. Iwasmanoeuvring at high speed at the time andwewere actually underhelmwhen thebombs fell.Nohitswere received.Therewasonenearmisson thestarboardsideandtheremainderfellclearoftheportside.Theattackwascarriedoutin the same determined manner as was the first. At this time Prince of Walesappearedtobeintroubleandhad[notundercontrol]ballshoisted.ImadeasignaltotheCinCaboutherdamagebutgotnoreplyandat that timemadeanemergencyreporttoSingaporethattheenemyaircraftwerebombing,followedimmediatelybyanamplifyingreportwhichwasjustabouttobetransmittedatthetimetheshipsank.Thefourthattacknowstartedtodevelopandabout8aircraftwereseenlowonthe

horizon on the starboard bow. Being low down it signified another torpedo attackimpending.Whenabout3milesawaytheysplitintotwoformationsandIestimatedthatthoseontherighthandwouldlaunchtheirtorpedoesfirstandIstartedtoswingtheshiptostarboard.Thetorpedoesweredroppedatadistanceof2,500yardsanditseemedobviousthatweshouldbeoncemoresuccessfulincombingtheirtracks.Theleft-handformationappearedtobemakingstraightforPrinceofWaleswhowasatthetimeabaftmyportbeam.Whentheseaircraftwerealittlebeforemyportbeamata distance of approximately 2,000 yards they turned straight atme and fired theirtorpedoes. It now became obvious that if these torpedoes were aimed straight atRepulsetheywouldalmostcertainlyhitasanyotheralterationtocoursewouldhavecausedmetobehitbythetracksofthosetorpedoesIwasinprocessofcombing.Onetorpedo fired from my port side was obviously going to hit the ship and it waspossibletowatchitstracksforabout1½minutesbeforetheacttookplace.Theshipwas hit amidships port side. The ship stood this torpedo well and continued tomanoeuvre and steam at about 25 knots. Therewas now only a very short respitebeforethefinalandlastattack.Torpedo-bombersappearedfromalldirectionsandasecondtorpedohittheshipin

thevicinityofthegunroomandapparentlyjammedtherudderandalthoughtheshipwas still steamingat over20knots shewasnotunder control.Shortly after this atleastthreetorpedoeshittheship,twoontheportsideandoneonthestarboardside–I knew she couldnot survive and at oncegave the order for everyone to comeondeck and cast off loose Carley floats. When these final two or three torpedoesdetonatedtheshiprapidlytookalisttoport.Menwerenowpouringontothedeck.They had all beenwarned 24 hours before to carry orwear their life-saving gear.

Whentheshiphada30degreelistIlookedoverthestarboardsideofthebridgeandsawtheCommanderand200to300mencollectonthestarboardside.Ineversawtheslightestsignofpanic.Itoldthemfromthebridgehowwelltheyhadfoughttheshipandwishedthemgoodluck.Theshiphungforatleast1½to2minuteswithalistofabout60to70degreestoportandthenrolledover.DestroyersVampireandElectraclosedtopickupsurvivors.WhenIwasinthewaterIfirstsawourfightersappear.Mysignal,enemyaircraft

bombing,wasinthehandsoftheAirViceMarshalinabout25minutesand6minuteslaterthefightersleftthegroundandtheycoveredthe150milestoreachourpointinanother 40minutes.About 900 survivorswerepickedup fromRepulsewhichwaswonderfulconsidering thespeedatwhich theoldshipwentdownat theend–shewas26yearsold.About400menandofficerswerelost.In conclusion, looking back at the action I think that if 50 or 60 well trained

torpedo-bombers canbe launched to attack capital shipswho arewithout adequateaircraft protection andwith very few destroyers, capital shipswill be seriously upagainstit.Ifounddodgingthetorpedoesquiteinterestingandentertaininguntilintheendtheystartedtocomeinfromalldirectionsandtheyweretoomuchforme.PrinceofWalesandRepulse had both beenwithout serious anti-aircraft practice for somemonths and I am afraid the shootingwas not good – torpedoesweremostly firedoutsidepom-pomrangeatabout2,500yards.Iamconvincedthatwehaveallgottorealizethatburstsbehindthetargetofshort-

rangeAAfirewhichweremissingasternisjustawasteoftimeandmightaswellbethrownovertheside.Ibelievethat90%ofshortrangestuffthatisbeingfiredatanyaircraftgoesbehindthem.

History:RenownATLANTICFLEET(BCS)ApriltoJuly1919.

RefittedatPortsmouthJuly1919.

DetachedJuly1919forPrinceofWales’soverseastoursuntilOctober1920.

FirsttourNewfoundland,CanadaandUSAAugusttoDecember1919.

LeftPortsmouth5August1919,escortedbyDauntlessandDragon.ArrivedConcepcionBay,Newfoundland11August.HRHtransferred toDragon forpassage toSt.John’s(Newfoundland)andHalifax.

Renown arrived Halifax 13 August where HRH re-embarked for passage to Quebec.ArrivedQuebec21AugustwhereHRHleftshipforrailtourofCanadaandtheUSAAugusttoNovember.DuringthisperiodRenownvisitedWestIndies,SouthAmericanports andNewYork.HRH rejoined atNewYork inNovember for return home, leftHalifax25November,arrivedPortsmouth1December.

RenownspeciallyrefittedatPortsmouthJanuarytoMarch1920as‘yacht’forlatertours.

SecondtourNewZealandandAustraliaMarchtoOctober1920.

LeftPortsmouth16March1920proceedingviaBarbados,PanamaCanal,HonoluluandFijiIslands.

VisitedAuckland,NewZealand,variousAustralianports,andHobart,Tasmania.

ReturnedviaPanamaCanal,West IndiesandBermuda.ArrivedPortsmouth11October1920.

PaidofftoReserve(CareandMaintenance)atPortsmouth5November1920.

RESERVE(Portsmouth)November1920toSeptember1921.

Refit1921.

Recommissioned Portsmouth 15 September 1921 for Prince ofWales’s third tour. LeftPortsmouth26October1921,proceedingtoBombayviaMalta,SuezCanalandAden.ArrivedBombay17November1921.HRHleftshipatBombayforfourmonths’tourofIndia.Duringthisperiod,RenownvisitedPersianGulfports,Colombo,BombayandKarachi. HRH re-embarked at Karachi on 17 March 1922. Proceeded to Japan viaColombo,PortSwettenham,SingaporeandHongKong.HRH left shipatYokohamaduringthisperiod.

Returned home via Manila, Labuan, Penang, Trincomalee, Suez Canal, Malta andGibraltar.

ArrivedPortsmouth20June1922.

PaidofftoreserveatPortsmouth28July1922toSeptember1926.

ExtensiverefitPortsmouthJulytoSeptember1926.

BeganrefittrialsJuly1926.

Recommissioned3September1926forBCS,AtlanticFleet.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1926toJanuary1927.

DetachedJanuary1927forDukeofYork’s tour toAustralia.LeftPortsmouth6January1927, proceeding to Australia via Panama Canal. Returned via Suez Canal. ArrivedPortsmouth17July1927.

Refit,PortsmouthJulytoSeptemberandrejoinedAtlanticFleetoncompletion.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1927toSeptember1931(flagJuly1929toJuly1931).

RelievedHoodasflag(RA)BCSJuly1929(Hoodtorefit).

FlagrevertedtoHood11July1931oncompletionofrefit.

PaidoffatPortsmouthforrefit11September1931.

RefitPortsmouth1931toJune1932.

Recommissioned at Portsmouth 2 June 1932 for BCS Home Fleet (ex Atlantic Fleet,renamedHomeFleetMarch1932).

From1932,BCScomprisedHood,RenownandRepulseonly.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)June1932toJanuary1936.

CollisionwithHood duringexercisesoffSpanishcoast23 January1935, struckHood’s

starboard quarter. Stem casting fractured with structural damage above and belowwaterline.TemporaryrepairscarriedoutatGibraltarJanuarytoFebruaryandshipleftforPortsmouth18February.

CompletedrepairsatPortsmouthFebruarytoMay(completed18May).

In March 1935 it was decided for the sake of homogeneity, gradually to separate theQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses,stationingtheformerintheMediterraneanandthe latter in theHomeFleet.Becauseof theheavyreconstructionprogrammein theQueenElizabethclass, theMediterraneanFleetwould loseonebattleshipby thechangeand theBattlecruiserSquadronwas tobe transferred to theMediterranean tooffset this.Squadron initially divided betweenHome andMediterraneanFleetsApril toSeptember1936,andnotfinallytransferredtoMediterraneanuntilSeptember1936.

RenownpresentatJubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

BecauseoftheItalo-Abyssiniancrisis, theBattlecruiserSquadron,comprisingHoodandRenown(Repulse reconstructing)wassent toGibraltar toreinforcetheMediterraneanFleetalthoughremainingasaHomeFleetunit.

HoodremainedatGibraltaruntilJune1936whenshereturnedhome.

Renown transferred to Alexandria in January 1936 and was attached to 1st BattleSquadron,MediterraneanFleetuntilMay1936.

ReturnedhomeMay1936andrejoinedBCSHomeFleet.ReplacedinMediterraneanbyRepulseJune1936.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)JunetoSeptember1936.

PaidoffatPortsmouth2September1936forreconstructionthereuntilAugust1939.

Recommissioned at Portsmouth 28 August 1939 for Home Fleet, the BattlecruiserSquadronhavingrevertedtothisinFebruary1939.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)AugusttoOctober1939.

WithHood, twocruisersandfourdestroyers,carriedoutpatrolbetweenIcelandand theFaroes7–12SeptembertointerceptenemymerchantshippingandenforcetheBritishblockade.

Detached2OctoberasunitofForceK(RenownandArkRoyal)totakepartinsearchforGrafSpee.

FORCEK(SouthAtlanticCommandFreetown)October1939toMarch1940.

ForceoperatedintheFreetown-PernambucoareaOctobertoNovember1939.

Diverted to Cape area to join Force H (Eagle, Cornwall and Dorsetshire) followinglocationofGrafSpeeinIndianOcean.

Renown,April1928,onFleetmanoeuvreswiththeBattlecruiserSquadronoffPortland,watchedbyKingAmanullahofAfghanistanandcarriedoutinhonourofhispresence.

Renown’ssuperstructureasseenonapublicopendayc.1932.ComparethisphotographwiththatofRepulsein1928;RenownhadtwocharthousetablesasagainstoneinRepulse.

Patrolled area south of Cape of Good Hope 28 November to 2 December in order tointercepttheGermanshipifshebrokebackintotheAtlanticalthoughshedidnotdoso.

SankGermanSSWatussioffCape2December1939afterthelatterhadbeeninterceptedbySussex,setonfireandabandonedbycrew.

Force ordered back to Pernambuco–Freetown area on same day, afterGraf Spee againlocated in SouthAtlantic, andwas off PernambucowhenSpee brought to action byExeter,AchillesandAjaxofftheRiverPlateon13December.

RejoinedHomeFleet4March1940.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)MarchtoAugust1940(flagBCSand2ndfleetflagfromlateMarch).

DetachedFebruary1940,withArkRoyal,Galateaanddestroyers,toassistFrenchforcesininterceptingsixGermanmerchantvesselsexpectedtobreakoutfromVigo.Allbuttwoof thesecapturedor scuttled,onewreckedoffNorwegiancoastandone reachedGermany.

BecameflagVABCSand2ndfleetflaglateMarch,relievingHoodforrefit.

NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940;coveredminelayingoperationsbydestroyersinNorwegianwaters5–8April.

Briefly in action with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in the Narvik area 9 April in badweather.ScoredthreehitsonGneisenauat18,000yards,disablingforeturretandmainarmamentfirecontrol.Hittwicebyenemyfirewithoutanymaterialdamage.

Enemy ships brokeoff action after about tenminutes and contact lost in thickweather.Duringthisengagement,Renownreached29knotsinheavyseas.FlagVAWhitworthtemporarilytransferredtoWarspite10AprilforsecondattackonenemydestroyersatNarvikbythatshipandadestroyergroup.RefitRosyth(repairstoactiondamage)20April to 18 May. Sent to Faroes–Iceland area, with Repulse, 5 June to investigatereports (subsequently found incorrect) of enemy heavy ships being sighted off theFaroes,possiblyintendingraidonIceland.

UnitofcoveringforceforNorwegianevacuationconvoysJune1940.

WithRepulse,1stCruiserSquadronanddestroyers,endeavouredtointerceptGneisenau,reportedenroutefromTrondheimtoGermany27July1940butnocontactmade.

Transferred to Force H (Gibraltar) August 1940, relieving Hood as flag. Flag VAtransferredatScapa10August.RenownjoinedatGibraltar20August.

FORCEH(Gibraltar,flag)August1940toAugust1941.

Ordered to intercept French cruisersGeorges Leygues,Gloire andMontcalm after theyhadpassedthroughStraitsofGibraltar11September1940enroutetoDakar,butnotdespatchedintimetodoso.

Temporarilydetached6NovembertoreinforceHomeFleetforoperationsagainstScheerintheAtlantic.RejoinedForceHbythe15th.

From 15 to 19 November Force H covered Argus carrying the first fighter aircraftreinforcements(Hurricanes)forMalta,thesebeingflown-offfromapositionsouthofSardinia.

As a consequence of inadequate training of pilots, only four of twelve aircraft reachedMalta,theothersrunningoutoffuelandbeinglostatsea.

On 27 November 1940 Force H, comprising Renown (flag), Ark Royal, Sheffield,Despatch and nine destroyers, reinforced by Ramillies, Berwick, Manchester,Newcastle,Southampton,Coventryandfourdestroyers fromtheMediterraneanFleet,foughtanindecisiveactionoffCapeSpartivento(Sardinia)againstanItaliansquadroncomprisingtwobattleships,fivecruisersandsixteendestroyers.

RenowninOctober1936,starboardquarterview(notecatapultamidships).

RenowninOctober1936,showingherfinalappearanceintheoldguisebeforetotalreconstruction.Close-upofbridgeworkandfunnels.

The enemy retired following a short engagement between the cruisers, being laterunsuccessfullyattackedbyaircraft fromArkRoyal.Renownbrieflyengagedwith theItaliancruisersatlongrangebeforetheactionwasbrokenoff.ConvoyreachedMaltaintact.

Maltaconvoy7–9January1941.

WithMalaya andSheffield bombardedGenoa 9 February 1941while aircraft fromArkRoyalcarriedoutsearchforScharnhorstandGneisenauinAtlantic8–28March1941aftertheenemyshipshadbeensightedbyaircraftfromMalayawhilelatterescortingFreetown to UK convoy. Renown and Ark Royal joined convoy on the 10th andremainedwithituntilthe19th.Searchoperationsbrokeoffon28thafterScharnhorstandGneisenaulocatedatBrest.

ForceHescortedimportantconvoycarryingtanksandsuppliestoarmyinEgyptforfirstleg of passage fromGibraltar toAlexandria 5–9May 1941 (convoy handed over toMediterraneanFleetescortsouthofMalta).

With Ark Royal and Sheffield took part in search for Bismarck 24–27 May 1941.Intercepted German supply shipGonzenheim in Atlantic 4 June 1941.Gonzenheim,whichhadbeenintendedtoworkwithBismarckandPrinzEugen,scuttledandfinallysunkbyNeptune.

Maltaconvoy21–23July1941.

ReturnedhomeforrefitAugust1941,speedbeingrestrictedto20knotsbytornplatinginstarboard bulge; left Gibraltar 8 August, arrived Rosyth on 14th. Flag Force HtransferredtoNelson.

RefitRosythAugusttoNovember1941.

Proposed,inAugust1941,asunitofnewEasternFleetbutnotsentout(seeRepulse).

Transferred to Home Fleet on completion of refit and rejoined at Scapa 22 November1941.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1941toOctober1942(flagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflag,December1941toApril1942).

ReplacedDukeofYorkasflagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflag9December1941whenlatterdetachedtotakethePrimeMinistertotheUSA.

SecondflagofHomeFleetcomprisingKingGeorgeV(flag),Renown(flagVA),DukeofYork,Victorious,Berwick and twelve destroyers providing special cover for outwardandhomewardRussiaconvoyfrom6to10March1942duringsortiebyTirpitz.

ContactwithTirpitz established by aircraft fromVictorious off theLofoten Islands, buttorpedoattackbythesefailedandTirpitzabletoreturntobasewithoutbeingbroughttoaction.Convoysnotattacked.

FlagrevertedtoDukeofYork3April1942.

Left Clyde 14 April as Commodore in Command Force W, comprising Renown,Charybdis,Cairo, fourBritishand twoUSdestroyers, escorting theUScarrierWaspwithfighterreinforcements(Spitfires)forMalta.Fifty-sevenaircraftflown-offsouthofSardinia on 20 April and all but one reachedMalta. Force back at Scapa by 27th.Similar operation carried out by same force on 9May 1942when aircraft flown-offfromEagleandWasp.

ForcerejoinedHomeFleet15May.

Renownnowfullyreconstructed,shownhereinGibraltarNovember1940,asflagshipofForceH.Earlieron4April1940shewasinactionwiththeGermanbattlecruiserScharnhorstatextremerange(18,000yards)andactuallyhittheGermanship.Theenemytookadvantageofasnowstormtobreakofftheaction.

RENOWNBridgeWindTests,1943

AnaerialviewofRenownon25June1942,showingintermediatedisruptivecamouflage.

Based at Hvalfiord (Iceland)May to June 1942 as cover for Atlantic convoys againstpossibleattackbyenemyheavyships.

ReturnedtoForceHOctober1942forNorthAfricainvasion.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)October1942toFebruary1943.

TookpartinNorthAfricainvasionoperations1942.

ForceHemployedincoveringinitialBritishinvasionforceandfollow-upconvoysagainstattack by Italian or Vichy French forces. Returned home February 1943. ArrivedRosyth7FebruaryforrefituntilJune1943.TransferredtoHomeFleetoncompletion.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JunetoDecember1943.

DetachedtoHalifaxAugust1943tobringPrimeMinisterandChiefsofStaffhomefromQuebecConference.LeftScapa24August,arrivedClyde19September.

AgaindetachedNovember1943totakePrimeMinister,AdmiralA.B.CunninghamandUSAmbassadortoAlexandriaforCairoConference.

LeftPlymouth12NovemberviaGibraltar,AlgiersandMalta.

Weatherlyqualitiesathighspeedinheavyweather inBayofBiscay,enroute,notedbyAdmiralCunningham.RejoinedHomeFleetatRosyth2December1943.

TransferredtoEasternFleetDecember1943asflagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflag.Hoistedflag atRosyth 18December, left Scapa 23Decemberwith convoy for FastEast viaMediterraneanandSuezCanal.ArrivedColombo27January1944.

EASTERNFLEET(FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflag)December1943toNovember1944.

UnitofforcesupportingcarrierattacksonSabang(Sumatra)byaircraft fromIllustriousandUSSSaratoga19April1944.

TookpartinbombardmentofCarNicobarandPortBlairinAndamanIslands30Apriland1May1944.

UnitofforcesupportingcarrierattacksondockyardandoilrefineryatSourabaya(Java)byaircraftfromthesametwocarriers17May1944andsubsequentairattackonPortBlairon21June.

Unit of force supporting carrier attack on Sabang by aircraft from Illustrious andVictorious25July1944,andwithQueenElizabeth,Valiant,FrenchbattleshipRichelieuanddestroyers,carriedoutbombardmentfollowingthis.

Renown’sbridgeworkinMay1943.Notetheroundnessofthebridgeface,designedespeciallytowardoffbackdraught.

Renownin1942.WithArkRoyalandthecruiserSheffield,sheledthebombardmentofGenoaon9February1941,causingconsiderabledamagetotheharbourworks.

Tookpart in several air strikes andbombardment of theNicobar Islands from17 to 19October1944.

On 22 November 1944, ships selected to remain in the South East Asia area afterformationofaPacificFleet,whichwascommencedonthatdate,weredesignatedtheEastIndiesFleet,theBattleSquadronforthiscomprisingQueenElizabeth,ValiantandRenown,andbecomingthe3rdBS,the1stBSbeingallocatedtothePacificFleet.

Onthesamedate,flagVAtransferredfromRenowntoQueenElizabethasflag3rdBSandfleetflag,Renownbecomingaprivateship.

Ahistoricmeeting,ontheforecastleofRenownasshelayoffPlymouthSoundon2August1945,betweenHMKingGeorgeVIandPresidentTruman.

RenownleavesPlymouthforthescrapyardinMarch1949.

Renown’slastdaysasherremainsarefinallycuttopieces,6July1949.

EASTINDIESFLEET(3rdBS)November1944toMarch1945.

RefitDurbanDecember1944toFebruary1945.

RejoinedfleetatTrincomalee7March1945.

RecalledhomeMarch1945toreinforcethedepletedHomeFleetagainstthepossibilityofafinalsortieintotheAtlanticbytheremainingGermanheavyships,eitherthroughtheChannelor

theNorthernpassages,althoughitlaterbecameknownthattheenemyfleetwastheninnoconditiontoattemptthiseveniforderedtodoso.

LeftColombo30MarchviaSuezCanal,arrivingatScapaon14AprilandRosythonthe15th,havingsteamed7,642nauticalmilesin306hoursatanaveragespeedof20knots.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)ApriltoMay1945.RefitRosythApriltoMay.

Intended to relieve Rodney as flag Home Fleet but this cancelled following end ofhostilitiesinEuropeon8May.

ConferenceheldonboardatRosython11May,GermanNavaldelegatesbringingdetailsoftheirminefields,buoysandsweptchannels.

ReducedtoreserveatPortsmouth15May1945.

RESERVEMay1945toJune1948(PortsmouthtoJuly1945,Devonportlater,CCategoryfromOctober1946).

Partially disarmed at Portsmouth July 1945; six 4.5in turrets removed and all lightAAlanded.

TransferredtoDevonportJuly1945.

Meeting betweenHM theKing and President Truman held on board at Plymouth on 3August1945whenTrumanenroutehomefromPotsdamConferenceintheUScruiserAugusta.

ReducedtoCCategoryReserveOctober1946.

Decisionfordisposalannounced21January1948.

PlacedonDisposalListatDevonport1June1948.

SoldtoMetalIndustriesLtd.,Faslane,August1948.

LeftDevonportintowforFaslaneforscrapping3August1948.

Renownin1941,asuperbaerialviewshowingoverallchangesasaresultofherreconstruction.Duringtheearlymonthsof1941shesearchedtheAtlanticinvainforanothercrackatScharnhorstorGneisenau

TheGenesisandDevelopmentoftheAircraftCarrier

The use of aircraft concomitant withwarships pre-dates theGreatWar, theUSNavyhavingbegun experiments in flying-off aircraft fromwarships as far back as 1910, andachieved success in USS Birmingham while anchored in Hampton Roads. A flightplatformhadbeenfittedover theforecastleof thecruiserandthepilot,EugeneEly,canclaimthefirstsuccessfulflightfromthedeckofawarship.

A land aircraftwas used throughoutmost of these tests and arrester gear for landingcomprised of wires stretched between sandbags which engaged with hooks on theaircraft’sundercarriage.AsuccessfullandingwasmadeonthecruiserPennsylvaniainthefollowing year (landing deck fitted over the quarterdeck). This demonstrated thepracticabilityofsuchflightsatsea,buttheUSNavythendroppedallexperimentsforthetimebeingandfurtherdevelopmentwaslefttotheRoyalNavy.

ARKROYALLaterPegasus

ARKROYALLaid down by Blyth Shipbuilding Co.7.11.1913; purchased by the Admiralty in May1914;launched:5.9.1914;completed:10.12.1914.

Displacement(tons):6,900(load),7,450(deep).

Dimensions:Length352ft6in(pp),366ft(oa).Beam:50ft4in.Draught:17ft6inmean.

Mercantilehullconsiderablylengthenedinconversion.

Armament:4×12pdrinsingleopenmountings,2p&sbeforebridge,2p&srightaft.2×MG.

Aircraft:

8 seaplanes in 1915. Later many types were in use including Sopwith 2-seaters andSopwith‘Tabloids’.

Machinery:

Onesetofverticaltripleexpansionenginesdrivingasinglepropeller.

Cylindricalboilers.Speed:11knotson3,000shp.Fuel:500tonsoil.

Complement:180RNandRFCascompleted.Laterreducedto139asdepotship.

Costofconversion:£80,000(unofficial).RenamedPegasusinDecember1934toreleasenamefornewcarrierUsedasCatapultandRepairShipfrom1939to1945.FinallysoldtoBelgianyard forpossible conversion to commercial service and renamedAnitaI.WorkcommencedatCardiffbutlatertowedtoAntwerpforcompletion.NothingdoneandlatersoldtoDutchscrappers(June1949).ResoldtoT.W.WardandarrivedinGraysEssexforscrappingon15April1950.

InJanuary1912LieutenantSamsonmadeasuccessfulflightfromtheforecastleofthebattleshipAfricaatanchor inSheerness (seePre-dreadnoughtbook)and then inMayofthe sameyearmade the first successful flight from the battleshipHiberniawhile underway at about 12 knots (using gear from Africa). This was the first occasion when anaircrafttookofffromamovingwarshipandaseaplanewasusedthroughoutthetests.Thecrafthadwheeledtrolleysfittedtothefloatswhichfittedintoapairofelevatedrailsfittedover the forecastle and fore turret. No arrangements for landings were made and theaircraftcamedowninthewaterandwashoistedaboardbyderrick.Thisequipmentwasthen transferred to HMS London in May 1912 for further tests. None of thesearrangements (US or British) was considered practicable for regular use because thelaunchinggearprecludedanyuseoftheforwardorafterturretswhenerectedoverthetop.Theequipmentwasdismantledinallshipsaftercompletionofthetests.

InMay1913theoldcruiserHermeswascommissionedforserviceasanexperimentalseaplanecarrier.Canvashangarswerefittedforwardandaftandaflying-offrailwasfittedforwardovertheforecastle.Noprovisionwasmadeforlandings,theaircraftbeingliftedfromtheseabycrane.SuccessfulexperimentswereconductedinHermesandshejoinedthe fleet as a seaplane carrier at the start of the war; she was torpedoed and sunk inOctober1914.Manyindependentshipbuilderswerekeepingabreastofdevelopmentsanda proposal was put forward by Beardmore for the construction of a genuine seaplanecarrier, but no decisions were taken pending the results of the trials in Hermes;furthermoreconstructionworkwas limited to finishingoff anycapital shipconstructionthenunderway.

Thefirstpracticalandfar-sightedspecificationforanaircraftcarrierwasmadebyDrP.W.LauchesterandappearedinEngineeringon20November1914.Hisproposalswereforashiptocarryabout50or60aircraft,andgunspowerfulenoughtorepelanyshipuptolightcruiserstatus.Displacementwas to run toabout20,000 tons,speed tobe20knotsand,withaviewtosmokeproblems,dieseloilwassuggested.

Ontheoutbreakofwar,therewassuddenlyanurgentdemandforseaplanecarriersand

thequickanswer to theproblemwasconversion.TheAdmiraltypurchaseda tankerandconvertedher into a seaplanecarrier and renamedherArkRoyal.Shewas fittedwith ahangarandworkshops,etc.,andwasgivenderricksforhandlingaircraft.Shealsohada160ft flush forecastle from which aircraft could be flown-off by the trolley and railmethod.ShewascompletedinDecember1914andsenttotheDardanelleswhereshewasalsousedasarecoveryandworkshopshipforcrashedaircraft.

ShewasthefirstgenuineaircraftcarriertobebuiltfortheRoyalNavy(orinfactanyothernavy).Givenherslowspeed,itwasnotintendedthatshemanoeuvrewiththefleet,but be based in an area adjacent to the fleet. Shewas the first ship to have permanenthangaraccommodationbuilt inandthefirstfromwhichaircraftcouldbeflown-off.Shehadthe160ftflightdeckforward,butthereseemstobenorecordofanyflightbeingmadefromthisdeck;theseaplaneswerealwayshoistedoutontheirownfloatstotake-offfromthe water. The hangar was located amidships below the bridge and the aircraft weremanhandledthroughanopeningbeneaththis.Therewereeightseaplanesaboardin1915whenshewent to theDardanelles.Shewasnotemployedasanoperationalcarrierafter1920,andfrom1928onwardsshewasusedfortrialswithcatapultsandsealandingmats.

The Admiralty was quick to commandeer mercantile ships then completing forconversion to seaplane carriers; they included the small, fast steam packets Empress,Engadine,Riviera,Ben-My-Chree,Vindex,Manxman,Nairana,Campania andPegasus.Thefirst threewerecharteredbytheAdmiralty,but therestwerepurchasedoutright. In1914littlewasknownaboutthetechniquesofusingaircraftfromwarshipsandwhenthewarstarted it seemed that theadaptationof thesesteampacketswouldprovide the fleetwithanairborneback-up.Theequipmentinthefirstthreeconverted(Empress,EngadineandRiviera)merely comprised of some light removable canvas shelters for the aircraftforwardandaft,andtheshipitselfremainedlittlechanged.Followingthesuccessfulraidon Cuxhaven on 25 December 1914 the aircraft accommodation in these three wasimprovedandtwomoreshipsweretakenup(Ben-My-ChreeandVindex).Becauseofthelimitationsofseaplanes,however,Vindexwasgivenashortflying-offdeckforwardfromwhichsmall fighteraircraftcould takeoff.The last threeships (Manxman,NairanaandPegasus)weresimilarlyfittedbutwithsomeadditionalaircrafthandlingequipment.Theaircraft capacity in these threewas increased to nine as against the four or five in theearlier ships.Because of their lack of size, carrying capacity, speed and general radius,none of the converted packets ever proved very successful as aircraft carriers and theywere, on thewhole, unfit forworkwith theGrandFleet.Oncompletion, the first threewere attached to the Harwich Force, and did not operate as a unit of the Grand Fleetalthoughtheydidcarryoutvaluablereconnaissanceworkduringtheearlymonthsofthewar. Themajority of naval air raids on enemy bases and airship stations from 1914 to1916werecarriedoutfromEmpressandEngadine.RivieraandVindexwerealsousedattimes,butrepeatedfailuresledtotheirbeingabandonedpendingthecompletionoflargeraircraftcarriers.

EMPRESSAsCompleted

The main reasons for the lack of success were: 1. Low performance of seaplanes,difficultyinhoistingtheminandoutandtheirinabilitytotake-offinaverageNorthSeaweather;2.Lowspeedofthecarrierswhichmadeitdangeroustokeepthemstanding-byin the vicinity of an enemy coast to pick up the aircraft after a raid. Ben-My-Chreeperformed some useful service at the Dardanelles in 1915 and Engadine was actuallyattachedtotheGrandFleetandpresentatJutlandin1916,butlater,aftertestshadbeencarriedoutintheconvertedFurious,thesevesselswereusedlessandless.Theywerelaterrefittedandreturnedtotheiroriginalowners.

Duringthespringof1917thelargecruiserFuriouswascompletedasapartialaircraftcarrierwithhangarsandaflying-offplatformforwardinplaceofaforwardturret.Aircraftwere successfully flown-off from the platform in the summer of 1917, but attempts atlandingprovedextremelyhazardous.Shewasmodifiedasaproperaircraftcarrier fromNovember1917toMarch1918andfittedwithasecondhangarandlandingdeckaft.Shehadacapacityfortwentyaircraft.Asmodified,however,sheretainedtheoriginaltripodforemast,bridgeworkandfunnelon thecentreline,andaireddiescausedby thesemadelanding on the after deck extremely difficult. It is reported that only three successfullandings were ever made on Furious in this condition, so she was not regarded as asatisfactoryaircraftcarrieratthattimeandwasusedmainlyfortrainingpurposesduringthelatterpartof1918.AnotherconversionwasthecruiserVindictive,asmallershipoftheHawkinsclass.Themodificationtookplacewhileshewasunderconstructionandshewascompleted in September 1918 as a cruiser-carrier with a hangar and short flying-offplatformforwardandlandingdeckaft.Hercapacitywassixaircraft.Sheretainedfourofher seven guns from the original and continued to be rated officially as a cruiser (seedrawings).Shewasnotverysuccessfulintheroleandduring1925shewasreconvertedtoapropercruiseroncemore.

VINDICTIVEShowingDazzleCamouflage

CONVERTEDPACKETSTEAMERSEmpress,Engadine,Riviera,Ben-My-Chree,Vindex,Manxman,NairanaandPegasus

Empress: CharteredbyAdmiralty11.8.1914. Commissioned25.8.1914forHarwichForce.

Engadine: CharteredbyAdmiralty11.8.1914. Commissioned13.8.1914forHarwichForce.

Riviera: CharteredbyAdmiralty11.8.1914. Commissioned13.8.1914forHarwichForce.

Ben-My-Chree: CharteredbyAdmiraltyearly1915. CommissionedMay1915for

EasternMediterranean.

Vindex: TakenoverbyAdmiraltyMarch1915. Commissioned26.3.1915forHarwichForce.

Manxman: TakenoverbyAdmiralty1917. Commissionedin1917forHarwichForce.

Nairana: TakenoverbyAdmiralty1917. CommissionedSeptember1917forGrandFleet.

Pegasus: LaiddownbyJohnBrownandpurchasedbyAdmiraltyonstocks.

Commissioned14.8.1917forFlyingSquadron,GrandFleet.

Campania: TakenoverbyAdmiraltyNovember1914.CommissionedApril1915forGrandFleet.

Dimensions:

Empress:311ft(pp)×40ft1in×15ft6inmean.2,540tons.

Engadine:316ft(pp)×41ftIin×15ft6inmean.1,670tons.

Riviera:316ft(pp)×41ft1in×15ft6inmean.1,670tons.

Ben-My-Chree:375ft(pp)×46ft×18ft6inmean.2,550tons.

Vindex:350ft(pp)×42ft×16ftmean.2,900tons

Manxman:330ft(pp)×43ft×18ftmean.2,030tons.

Nairana:315ft(pp)×45ft6in×13ft3inmean.3,070tons.

Pegasus:330ft(pp)×43ft×13ft6inmean.3,070tons.

Campania:601ft(oa)×65ft×27ftmean.18,000tons.

Armament:

The armament was very variable and difficult to trace especially in the earlierexperimentalships,butwasusuallyacombinationof12pdrLA/HAand/or3pdrs.

Empress:2×12pdrplus2×3pdr

Engadine:1×12pdrLAplus2×12pdrHA.2×3inHAaddedlater

Riviera:AsEmpress(12pdrswerelaterremoved).

Ben-My-Chree:2×12pdrLAplus2×12pdrHAand2×3pdr.

Vindex:AsBen-My-Chree.

Manxman:2×12pdrLAand2×12pdrHA.

Nairana:2×12pdrLAand2×12pdrHA.

Pegasus:AsNairana:

Campania:7×4.7in.

Aircraft:Firsteightshipscarriedvarioustypesofaircraftbutusuallynevermorethansix(allseaplanes).

Campania: carried various types including Sopwith ‘Baby’ and Sopwith ‘Schneider’.Capacityfor13machines.

Machinery:

Amixofboilersandturbinesinall.

Speed(knots):Empress,Engadine,Riviera,Vindex22.5.

Manxman20.5.Nairana19.Ben-My-Chree24.5.Campania22.

Fates:Allreturnedtoownersandreconverted.(Pegasuskept inaircraftroleandfinallyscrapped in 1931. Campania collided with Royal Oak and Glorious and sank on 5November1918.

AIRCRAFTEQUIPMENTINBRITISHWARSHIPS

(Conversioncompleted1914) 1.1.15 1Short(CantonUnne),2Wight,3Sopwith2-seaters,2Sopwith‘Tabloid’

2.15 1Short2-seatseaplane(200CantonUnne),WightandSopwithseaplanes

Ben-My-Chree(Converted1915) 11.5.15. 1Sopwith‘Schneider’

21.5.15 2ShortS184torpedoreconnaissanceseaplanes 12.6.15 2Short 17.9.16 ShortCantonUnne,Sopwith‘Baby’ 1917 Sopwithseaplanes

Minerva 12–20.4.15 1Sopwith‘Tabloid’

Doris 25–30.4.15 1Sopwith2-seater

4.15 1Sopwith‘Schneider’Roberts 9.15 1ShortS184

Raglan 10.15 1ShortS184Arethusa 2.6.15 1Sopwith‘Schneider’Engadine(Takenover8/14) 1914 3Shortseaplanes(160hp) 4.7.15 1ShortS184,3Sopwith‘Schneider’ 4.5.16 Sopwith‘Baby’ 31.5.16 2ShortS184,2Sopwith‘Baby’Riviera(Takenover8/14) 1914 3Shortseaplanes(160hp) 4.7.15 4ShortS184

Vindex(Takenover1915) 3.11.15 2BristolLandplane1-D‘Bullet’,3ShortS184,2Sopwith‘Baby’seaplanes 4.5.16 4Sopwith‘Baby’only 24.6.16 Allremoved 2.8.16 1BristolI-D‘Bullet’Landplane 22.10.16 2ShortS184Campania(Completedconversion1916)

30.5.16 3ShortS184,3Sopwith‘Baby’,4Sopwith‘Schneider’ 1917 Fairey‘Campania’Killingholme 3.16 Sopwith‘Schneider’Brocklesby 3.16 Sopwith‘Schneider’Manxman(Enteredservice1916) 12.16 4Sopwith‘Baby’ 29.4.17 4Sopwith‘Pup’

Furious(Converted1917) 7.17 3Short225,5Sopwith‘Pup’orcouldcarry10seaplanes,hoistedinandout

3.18 14SopwithI½-Strutter,2Sopwith‘Pup’ 7.18 7Sopwith‘Camel’Slinger 6.18 1Fairey3CAurora 5.11.15 1DeperdussinE22 4.16 1Sopwith‘Schneider’.Yarmouth(Modificationstocarryaircraftcompleted6.17) 6.17 1Sopwith‘Pup’

Repulse 10.17 1Sopwith‘Pup’ 3.18 1SopwithI½-Strutter

Argus 1918 Sopwith‘Pups’,Sopwith1½-Strutters(49a/ctotal)

19.10.18 1SqdnShortSeaplanes(310hpengines)

1918 Sopwith‘Cuckoo’,Blackburn‘Blackbird’

Hermes 1913 CaudronbiplaneseaplanesAfrica 1912 Shortbiplanelandplane

The first really successful carrier was Argus, completed in September 1918 with acapacityfor15to20aircraft.ShewasoriginallytheItalianlinerConteRosso,buildinginthe UK on the outbreak of war and later purchased by the Admiralty with a view toconvertinghertoacarrierwhentheopportunityarose.Shehadacompletelyunobstructedflightdeckwhichwasachievedbysiting thenavigatingbridgeetc. forwardbeneath thedeck, the charthousebeing raised and loweredbyhydraulic power.Furnace smokewasexpelled by fans through large horizontal ducts in the side of the hangar, right aft oralternatively at the after extremity of the flight deck, and light collapsible masts werefittedateachsidefortheWT.

Thedecisiontoabandonallmasts,funnelsandsuperstructureabovetheflightdeckwasa consequence of practical experiencewithFurious (1917–18) and special experimentscarriedoutonshore,bothofwhichemphasizeddifficultyinlandingsafelyinthefaceofserious air disturbances causedbyhot furnacegases andeddies fromupperworks.Theproposals to fit horizontal ducts instead of funnels originated from Captain Onyon, anengineerontheDNC’stechnicalstaff.TheAdmiraltyhadlittleconfidenceinthissystemandanormalsetofuptakesandfunnelswereconstructedforArgusincaseitfailed.Thearrangementasbuiltprovedsatisfactoryontrials,butthevariousinherentdisadvantages(internalcomplications,extracost,andexcessiveheatdeveloped in theafterhangarandcurtailment in width of this with corresponding reduction in aircraft capacity) led toexperimentsbeingcarriedoutinlate1918withadummyislandsuperstructureerectedonthe extreme starboard sideof the flight deck to ascertain thepossibility of ‘landingon’withthesepresent.Thetrials,whichresultedintheadoptionofasimilarplaninEagleandHermes, then under construction, showed that a narrow superstructure and funnels, setwelloutonthestarboardbeam,wouldleaveampleflightdeckspaceandthataireddiesfromthiswouldnotcauseinterferenceashadbeenthecasewiththecentrelinestructureinFurious.Argus’sflightdeckwas550feetlongby62feetwideandabout60feetabovethewaterlineatnormalload.Windbreakingpalisades(14feethigh)werefittedatthesides,toprotecttheaircraftondeck,andthesewereloweredflushwiththedeckwhennotinuse.Alandingnet(about200feetlong)waslaidovertheflightdeckand‘dogleash’grabswerefittedtotheundercarriagestogripthenetonlanding,checkspeedandpreventtheaircraftfrombeingblownoverthesideafterlosingflyingspeed.Anexperimentalsetofretardinggear originally fitted proved unsuccessful in roughweather landing trials carried out in1920,butwiththemodifiedequipment80percentof500subsequenttriallandingswereentirely satisfactory. Although the clear flight deck was ideal for operating aircraft thearrangement of the uptakes absorbed a great deal of internal space and also causedconsiderableheatinginthehangarspaces,whileabsenceofclearall-roundviewfromthenavigatingpositionmadehandlingoftheshipadifficultmatterattimes.

STEAMPACKETSCONVERTEDTOSEAPLANECARRIERS

CAMPANIAShowingDazzleCamouflage

ARGUSConvertedCarrierDazzleCamouflage,Sept.1918

ARGUSLaiddownbyBeardmore,workstoppedonoutbreakofwar

PurchasedbyAdmiraltyin1916.

Commissionedforservice14.9.1918.

Displacement(tons):14,450(normal),16,400(fullload).

Dimensions:Length560ft(wl),565ft(oa).Beam75ft9in.Draught21ftmean.

Armament:2×4in50calMkV,2×4inAA,4×3pdr,4×MG.

Aircraft:

FirstBritishcarrierwithflush,entirelyunobstructedflightdeck,15to20aircraftcarried.(CarriedSopwith‘Cuckoo’torpedoaircraftascompleted.)

Machinery:

Parsonsturbinesdriving4propellers.

12cylindricalboilerswithforceddraught.

22,000shp20.5knots.

Fuel:2,000tonsoil.

Complement:370(490RNandRAFascompleted).

Costofconversion:£1,307,615

Fate:Soldforscrapin1946.

It is perhapsuseful at this point to refer briefly tomeans adoptedduring thewar foroperatingaircraftfromshipsotherthancarriers.Inthesummerof1915somelightcruisersoftheHarwichForcehadlargeplatformsforlaunchingseaplanesfittedovertheforecastlealongthelinesofthe1912tests.Thesewereverycumbersomeandcompletelymaskedtheforecastlegunsandtheywereremovedafterashorttime.During1917–18themajorityofcapitalshipsintheGrandFleetwerefittedwithsmallplatformsoveroneormoreturretswith runways extending out over the guns. A Bristol Fighter was carried on theseplatformsandbysteamingtheshipfastheadtowinditwasabletotakeoffwiththelengthofrunprovided.Itcouldnotofcourselandonboardagainanditwasfrequentlynecessaryforthepilottocrash-landintheseaclosealongsidewherehecouldbepickedupandtheengine possibly salved as well. In some cases the importance of the mission wasconsideredsufficienttocompensateforthelossoftheaircraft.

Theplatformsandrunwaysformedanintegralpartoftheturretconcernedanddidnotinterfere with the guns. Various arrangements for carrying single aircraft were alsoadoptedincertainlightcruisersandincludedforecastleplatformsraisedwellclearofbowguns,hangarbelowbridgefromwhichaircraftcouldtake-off,standingby,steamingshipfastheadtowindandrevolvingplatformamidships.

Some importantoperationswere carriedoutbyBritishcarriersduring theGreatWar,including: thefamousraidonCuxhavenon25December1914by threepacketcarriers,threeaircraftwererecoveredofthenineflownoff; theraidonHoyerinMarch1916byVindex, two of five aircraft recovered; the raid on Tondern, May 1916 by two packetcarriers, one of the two aircraft recovered. The Short seaplane from Ben-My-Chreetorpedoedand sankaTurkishminesweeper in theDardanelles inAugust1915, the firstship to be sunk by aerial torpedo. Engadine, attached to the battlecruiser fleet, GrandFleet,made reconnaissance flights during the early stageof theBattle of Jutlandon31May1916butaccomplishednothingbecauseofpoorvisibility.TheraidontheZeppelinshedsatTondernbyaircraftfromFuriousinJuly1918wasthemostsuccessfulairraidofthe war. Losses comprised: Ben-My-Chree sunk by Turkish batteries, January 1917;CampaniasunkincollisionwiththebattleshipRoyalOakatScapa,November1918.

Attheendof1918Britishcarrierstrengthtotalledtenshipsofwhichonlyone,Argus,couldberegardedasfullysatisfactoryforall-roundaircraftoperations,butherspeed(20knots)was too slow for fleetwork.Of theothersArkRoyalwas actually nothingmorethanaseaplanetender,thesevenpacketcarriershadverylimitedrangeandcapacityandwereunabletolandtheiraircraft.Furious,however,possessedexcellentspeedandrangeandhadadequateaircraft-carryingcapacity,but theaircraftcouldonly landonherwithgreat difficulty so shewas unsuitable for general carrier service. The cruiserVindictivesufferedfromasimilardisabilityandwasinfactnotofficiallyratedasacarrier.Itshouldbenotedthatalltheseshipswereconvertedtypes,notdesignedasacarrierfromthekeelup. During 1919 all the packet carriers with the exception of Pegasus reverted tomercantileservice.

Arguswasconvertedfromamerchantshipandassuchstillshowedlongrowsofscuttles.Hardlyagood-lookingship,sheprovedquitefunctionalinservice.Thisphotographshowsherafterthefittingofbulges,etc.,in1927.

LookingdownontheconvertedAlmiranteCochrane–HMSEagle–intheMediterraneanduring1930.Notethelayoutoftheflight-deckandoftheaircraftlifts

EAGLE1924ConvertedBattleship

HermeswasthefirstcarrierproperbuiltfortheRoyalNavy.SheisshownhereatPlymouthinSeptember1933.Featurepointsarethegiganticsuperstructureandincrediblylowanchorports.

Prior to 1920 aircraft carrier construction was confined almost entirely to the RoyalNavy.TheGermansreliedontheZeppelinairshipsforbothmilitaryandnavalworkandtheotherpowersappear tohaveadopted thepolicyof ‘waitandsee’.But therewasnodoubtbythistimethattheaircraftcarrierrepresentedaperfectlypracticable,usefultypewhichhadcometostay,andin1920carrierconstructionbeganintheUSAandJapan.

InApril1920 the firstBritishpost-warcarrier,Eagle,began trials.Shehadbeen laiddown in February 1913 by Armstrong-Whitworth as the Chilean battleship AlmiranteCochrane.AllworkceasedontheoutbreakofwarinAugust1914andtheshiplayontheslipuntilFebruary1918whenshewaspurchasedbytheAdmiraltyforconversiontoanaircraftcarrier.TheconversionbeganimmediatelyandwascompletedinSeptember1923.As a result of the trials that had been carried out inArgus, Eagle was given an island

superstructure,withtripodmastandtwofunnelsontheextremestarboardsideoftheflightdeck, an arrangement which proved quite satisfactory and has since been generallyadoptedinpreferencetotheArgusplan.Withadisplacementof22,600tons,Eaglewasoncompletion the largest carrier extant although her capacity (21 aircraft) was relativelysmallandherspeed(25to26knots)wasinsufficientforfleetwork.Herflightdeckwas667feetlongby100feetwideandextendedthefulllengthofhullandwaswiderthananypreviousBritishaircraftcarrier.

On her first trials run during the summer of 1920, in a very incomplete condition,without armament or fore funnel, tripod or masts, the ship turned out only a qualifiedsuccessand,asacarrier,inferiortoArgus.AsaconsequencemodificationswereeffectedfromMarch1921toSeptember1923andtheseconsiderablyenhancedherall-roundvalueand asmodified she proved very satisfactory although her speedwas still too slow formodernrequirementsandheraircraftcapacitywassmallinrelationtodisplacement.

One of the most important innovations and improvements in the design was thedownwardcurveatthetailoftheflightdeckwhichgreatlyfacilitatedsafelanding.

Eaglewasfollowedin1924byHermes,thefirstaircraftcarriertobedesignedandbuiltas such.With a displacement of only 10,850 tons, speed of 25 knots and capacity forfifteenaircraft,thisshipembodiedthemoderatedimensionstheoryasappliedtocarriersand,withinthelimitsofthedesign,turnedoutverywellalthoughagainherspeedwastoolow for fleetwork undermodern conditions, and experience indicated that all essentialcarrierrequirementscouldnotbefulfilledonthisdisplacement.Fulladvantagewastakenof the experience gained with Furious and Argus in 1918, and improvements wereeffectedafterHermeswaslaiddownwhichresultedinconsiderabledelayincompletion.Specialfeaturesofthedesignincluded:1.Exceptionallyhighforecastlewithheavy‘flare’continuousoverthewholelengthandlowercounterstern.2.Noveltypeofsquare-leggedtripodmast (the exact purpose of this is not clear). 3.Boat stowage inboardwith fixedoverheadderricksinsteadofdavits.Inservicetheshipprovedverysatisfactorywithinthelimitsof thedesign,butwasfoundtobe toosmallforefficienthandlingofaircraft;shewasasplendidseaboatandremarkablysteady;infact,sheprovedabetterseaboatthanalltheotherBritishcarrierspriortoArkRoyalin1939.

In1925Furiousemergedfromherthirdandfinalmodificationswithaclearend-to-endflight deck and arrangements similar toArgus, being the lastBritish carrier to have theunobstructedflightdeck.

EAGLELaiddownFebruary1917;launched8.6.1918;commissionedascarrier26.2.1924.

Displacement(tons):22,600(load),26,500(deep).

Dimensions: Length 667ft (oa). Beam 92ft 9in waterline, 100ft flight deck. Draught:25/27ftmean.

9×6in50cal,5×4inAA,4×MG.

Aircraft:

Capacity21.Flightscarried:1927–8.TwoSOneF/FOneTB.OneSR(FaireyIII).One

FF(Flycatchers)

1937–9:TwoT/B(18Swordfish).

Machinery:

BrownCurtisallgearedturbinesdriving2propellers.Boilers:32small-tubeYarrow.

SHP:50,000for24knots.

Armour:

9inmain beltwas removed on conversion.Belt 4½in, bulkheads 4in, 1½in flight deck.Bulgedin1921.

Complement:450RNascompleted.

Cost:£4,617,636by1927.

Fate:OnMaltaconvoyswhenshewastorpedoedon11August1942byU73andhitfourtimes(portside).Sankineightminutestakingwithher260ofthecrew(900survivors).

HERMESLaiddownbyArmstrong15.1.1918;launched11.9.1919;commission19.2.1924.

Displacement(tons):10,850(load),12,900(deep).

Dimensions:length548ft(pp),598ft(oa).Beam90ft(flightdeck).

Armament:6×5.5in,3×4inAA.

Aircraft:Twenty(carriedFlycatchers,FaireyIlls,OspreyandSwordfishduringthelate1920sand30s).

Armour:sides2–1½inabreastmagazinesandmachinery,Iinoverflightdeckinareasofmagazinesandmachinery,Iingunshields.Machinery:

Parsonsallgearedturbinesdriving2propellers.

Boilers:Yarrowsmall-tube.

SHP:40,000for25knots.

Fuel(tons):1,000minimum,2,100max.

Complement:664.

Fate:SunkbyJapaneseaircraftoffCeylon9April1942;268men,19officerslost.

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSConvertedBattlecruisers

The last of theBritish conversionswere the large cruisersCourageous andGlorious,half-sisterstoFurious,whichweretakeninhandforconversiontocarriersin1923–4andcompleted in 1928 and 1930 respectively. Both these ships embodied the islandsuperstructurearrangementasopposed to theclear flightdeck inFurious. Incontrast tothe early carriers the armament comprised nothing heavier than 4.7in (large DP) andmarkedthefinalabandonmentbytheAdmiraltyofanyideathatcarriersmightbecapableofengagingsurfacevesselslargerthantorpedo-boatdestroyers,andtheacceptanceofthetheorythattheyshouldrelymainlyontheirownaircraftandescortingshipsforprotectionagainstsurfaceattackbycruisersorcapitalships.Priortothistherehadbeenconsiderableconfusionofthoughtbothathomeandabroadonthisquestion,andcalibresupto8inhadbeenmountedinUSandJapanesecarriersalthoughtheAdmiraltyhadnevergoneabove6in.

Duringtheimmediatepost-warperiodvariousproposalswereputforwardforbattleshipand cruiser carrier types inwhich the functions of the respective typeswere combinedusuallybymountinga50percentnormalgunarmamentforwardanddevotingtheafterpartof theship toaircraft (seedesignnotes).Theobviousdisadvantagesofsucha typesoon became apparent, however, and none ever materialized with the exception of thesmallSwedish cruiser carrierGotland, completed in 1927– theonlyvessel of the typeactuallydesignedandbuiltassuch,sheprovedalimitedsuccess.

FollowingthecompletionofCourageousandGlorious,Britishcarrierconstructionwassuspendeduntil1935whenArkRoyalwaslaiddownandcompletedin1938.Thedesignofthisship,thefirstlargepurpose-builtBritishfleetcarrierembodiedexperiencegainedwiththeprecedingconvertedshipsandformedthebasisfordevelopmentofanewseriesoffleetcarriersoftheIllustriousandIndomitableclasses.

Thefinaldesignwasapprovedon21June1934andwaspreparedinclosecollaborationwith the Air Ministry. Alterative plans considered ranged from 12,000 to 24,000 tonswhichshowedthatasmallshipwouldberelativelyveryexpensivebecauseofthelimitedaircraftcapacity,andthatallmajorrequirementscouldbesatisfiedonadisplacementof22,000tonswhichwasaccordinglyapproved.TheWashingtonTreatyrestrictionsstillinforce limited standard carrier displacement to 27,000 tons and total carrier tonnage to135,000 tons, conditionswhichmade it desirable that each individual shiphave a large

aircraft capacity. For some time prior to the expiration of the Washington Treaty theAdmiraltyhadadvocatedareductionintheindividualdisplacementlimitto22,000tons,ArkRoyal’sdesignbeinginfluencedtosomeextentbyanticipationthatthiswouldbethemaximumagreeduponiftheTreatywererenewed.TheLondonTreatyof1936,however,which replaced theWashingtonTreaty, fixed amaximumat 23,000 tons andArkRoyalwascorrespondinglybelowthepermittedlimit.

HERMES1925

FURIOUSAppearanceChanges

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSFlightdeckandFunnelArrangements(Furiousdimensionsalsoshown)

ARKROYAL,1937AsCompleted–noteshortfunnel

Theprincipalfeaturesofthedesignincluded:

1.Incorporationofflightdeckinhullstructureandshortwater-linelength,withverylong overhang of flight deck aft, combining an easilymanoeuvred hullwith greatlengthofdeckforflyingoperations.2.Exceptionally roomyhangarswithabout20percentgreatercapacity than in theCourageous class, and especially elaborate fire-fighting equipment. Provision ofthree fast-running double platform lifts ensuring rapid delivery of aircraft fromhangarstoflightdeckwithtwocatapultsforlaunchingaircraftifshipwerenotunderway.3.Locationofentirearmamenthighup,atflightdecklevel,givingwideskyarcsandmaximumfightingefficiencyinroughweather.4.Three-shaftmachineryarrangementprovidingeconomy inweightandspaceandmateriallyassistingmanoeuvrability.

Theflightdeckwasapproximately62feetabove thewaterline,800feet long×95feet,andextendedfromthestemto40feetbeyondthestern.Theforwardandafterextremitieswere rounded down to improve air flow over the deck and assist flying on and off.Arresterwireswerefittedattheafterendwiththeusuallongitudinalandtransversewind-screens (hinged down flush with deck when not in use) forward to protect aircraftpreparing for flight. The funnel was specially designed and stiffened to obviate anynecessity forguyswhichwould impede flying space.On trials the smokewas found tocomedown lowover the deck andobscure the landing area, but thiswasovercomebyraisingthefunnelbyeightfeet.

ARKROYALLaid downbyCammellLaird 16.9.1935, launched 13.4.1937, commissionedDecember1938.

Displacement(tons):22,000(load),27,500(deep).

Dimensions:Length721ft6in(wl),800ft(flightdeck).Beam94ft9in97ft(flightdeck).Draught23ft(normal),27ft6in(deep).

Armament:16×4.5indual-purposeHA/LA,32×2pdr(ascompleted),32×0.5inMG.

Aircraft:

Capacity72(6Squadronscarried)(4T/S/R).

Armour:

Mainbelt4½in,deck2½–3½in3½–2¼in,bulkheads2½in.

Machinery:

Parsonsgearedturbinesdriving3propellers.

Boilers:6Admiralty3-druminthreecompartments.

SHP:102,000for30¼knots.

Fuel:4,620tonsoil

Complement:860RN,770FAA.

Fate:Torpedoedabout30milesfromGibraltarbyU81.

Hitbelowbridgebutonlyoneratingkilled.

Startedtosinkslowlyfrom15.40hoursonI3November1941,butaftergettingallhercrewoff(1,540savedbydestroyerLegion)didnotfinallysinkuntil06.13hourson14November

ThenewestcarrierintheRoyalNavyattheoutbreakofwarin1939,thedesignofArkRoyalwastheculminationofmanyyearsofexperimentsonFurious,CourageousandGlorious.ThisrareshotshowsherinGibraltarNovember1940.

Victorious(Illustriousclass),atspeed.

ILLUSTRIOUSCLASS(3SHIPS)Construction: Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedIllustrious: Vickers 27.4.1937 5.4.1939 16.4.1940.Victorious: Vickers 4.5.1937 14.9.1939 March1941.Formidable: Harland&Wolff 17.6.1937 17.8.1939 Oct.1940.

Displacement (tons): 23,100 (as designed) Illustrious 27,950 (on trials), 28,210 (deep),31,190(deep)by1946.

Dimensions:

Length673ft(pp),740–743ft(oa).

Beam:95ft

Draught:24ftload,27ft6indeep.

Armament:

16×4.5inDP

48×2pdr

8×20mmAA

Aircraft:

Capacity for 36 as designed, later increased to 54, ranging fromSwordfish,Albacores,FulmarstoCorsairs,

HellcatsandFireflysthroughouttheircareers.(Manyothertypescarried.)

Armour:

Main belt 4½in;Hangar sides 4½in; Flight deck 3½in;Outside hangarwas 3–1 in ‘D’qualitysteel;

Partialbulkheadatends2½inNC;3inoversteeringgear

Machinery:

Parsonsgearedturbinesdriving3propellers.

Boilers:6Admiralty3-drum,400psi.

SHP:110,000for31knots

Fuel:4,800tonsoil.

Cost:originalestimate(official)£4,050,000.

ThefollowingIllustrious classwerea slightlyenlargedversionofArkRoyal,butnotnecessarily an improved version because of the fact that Ark Royal was still underconstructionwhen theplans for Illustriouswerebeingprepared and any failingson thepartoftheformerwerenotyetmanifest.IntheolderaircraftcarriersincludingArkRoyaltosomeextent,thehangarsandflightdeckwereessentiallysuperstructureinthatthehullwas structurally a complete unit and the restwas simply added above it. In Illustrious,however, the armoured flight deck together with the armoured hangar sides formed anintegral part of the strength of the hull – forming as it were a gigantic girder runninglongitudinallythroughtheship.

DesignedbySirArthurW.Johnsandpreparedinthespringof1936,thesketchplanswere approved by the Board extremely quickly, in fact, in only three months. Theprovision of an armoured flight deck had not previously been contemplated, but wasadoptedattheinsistenceoftheController,AdmiralSirReginaldHenderson,whowasalsomainly responsible for the rapid preparation and approval of the design. The reduced

aircraft capacity in the design (36) and provision of single instead of upper and lowerhangarsasinArkRoyalwastheresultoftheincreasedtopweightofthearmouredflightdeckalthoughtherewasamaximumcapacityof54aircraftwhentheflightdeckwasfullyloaded.

Illustrious and her sistersFormidable andVictorious proved very successful carriersandstoodupexceptionallywellunderextremelyhardandconstantwarservice.FromtheconvertedsteampacketsoftheGreatWarthroughtotheSecondWorldWar’sIllustriousclass,theFleetAirArmhadcomealongwayandhadprovednotonlythatitwasaforcetobereckonedwith,butthatinfactthecarrierhadcompletelytakenovertheroleofthecapitalship.

FuriousDesignandConversionFurious was the first battlecruiser type to be considered for conversion to an aircraftcarrierandsosheisdealtwithbeforeGloriousandCourageous.HeroriginaldesignwasdevelopedtosuitLordFisher’srequirementsforaslightlymodifiedGlorioustoenhancehis projected Baltic operations. Furious differed only slightly from Glorious andCourageous in the way of main armament and was at first fitted with two 18in gunsinstead of four 15in. The secondary armament was also different with eleven 5.5in asagainst eighteen 4in in the earlier two.Furious was laid down to this design and waspractically ready for trials in the springof1917.Herunsuitability in the role, however,made her the obvious choice for conversion to a much-needed aircraft carrier anddiscussions to work this out took place. It became all too obvious that the lightunprotectedframeworkandbiggunsdidnotmakehersuitableforbattlefleetworkandahangarandforwardflightdeckwereapprovedaftertheremovaloftheforward18ingunand subsequent equipment. She completed in this guise. The conversion wasrecommendedbyaspecialBoardappointedbyAdmiralDavidBeattyandtheGrandFleetAircraftCommittee in January1917 todetermine fleetpolicy,andwasapprovedby theAdmiralty in March 1917. The conversion although accepted was at first opposed byBeattyunlesstheshipcouldretainhertwo18inguns,butthiswasoverruledbytheBoard.

Asacruiserhervaluewasatbestproblematical.Asacarriershehadthesizerequired,andthefastspeedneededformanoeuvreswiththeGrandFleet.HerdesignwasotherwiseunchangedandsheenteredserviceinJuly1917.Herforwardflying-offdeckwasapproximately228feet×50feetwithahangarbeneathittoaccommodateaircraftandalthoughtheaircrafttookoffsuccessfullytheycamedownontheseaandwerepickedupbytheconvertedpacketsNairanaandManxman.

On3August1917SquadronCommanderE.H.DunningflyingaSopwithPuppoweredbyan80hpleRhoneengine,achievedthefirstsuccessfuldecklandingevermadeonashipatseabyside-slippingontotheforwardlandingdeck.Astheaircraftpassedoverthedeckofficersgrabbedtheundercarriageinabidtohaulitdownintherightdirection.Atthesecondattempt,however,atyreburstandtheaircraftwentoverthesideandDunningwasdrowned.Thismishap,coupledwiththefactthataircraftaccommodationwasinsufficient,ledtotheremovaloftheremaining18ingunandthefittingofanafterflightdeck.Gangwayswerefittedoneachsideofthefunnelandsuperstructuretoconnectthelandingandflying-offdecksandtheaircraftcomplementwasmorethandoubled,theconversionbeingcompletedinMarch1918.Arrestergearwasfittedontheafterlandingdeckcomprisinglongitudinalsteelhawsersstretchedtightandendingatarampattheforwardendofthedeck.TheSopwithPupswerefittedwithskidsinplaceofwheelswithhooksatthesidestocatchinthewiresandpreventtheaircraftfromgoingovertheside.Thehawserswereraisedaboutonefootabovethedecktoenabletheaircrafthookstopassbelowandengageifthemachineroseagainafterlandingascouldhappeninagustofwind.Alargenetwasplacedattherearendofthefunneltopreventaircraftflyingintoit,butthiswaslaterreplacedbyverticalropes.Becausethefunnelsandsuperstructurewereretained,however,thelandingsprovedveryhazardousasaconsequenceofseriouseddies

setupbythesefittings,andthehotgasesfromthefunnel.Inthisguisetherewereafewsuccessfulifhazardouslandings,butsomeaircraftbrokeuponlandingorcrashedforwardandslippedovertheside;thepilotshadthechoiceofattemptingtolandondeckorcomedownonthewatertobepickeduplaterbycrane.Notsurprisinglymanypilotschosethelatter.Furiouscontinuedtoserveasaflying-offcarrierfortherestofthewarandsuccessfullydeliveredthefirstattackfromacarrieronaland-basedtarget,theZeppelinshedsatTondern.SevenSopwithCamelsattackedanddestroyedtwolargeshedsandthreeZeppelinsinJuly1918.Shewaslaidupafterthewarwithherfutureindoubt,butgiventhegreatneedofaircraftcarriersintheRoyalNavyitwasproposedthatshebefullyconvertedtoacarrierproperinMarch1921.

Furious1918.Convertedtoaircraftcarrierin1918butstilllimitedinpracticebecauseoftheretentionofthefunnelandsuperstructureamidships.Notethesmallliftdoors.

The job problem fell to the DNC (Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt) who assured theBoardthatasuitableshipwouldevolvefromtheconversion.InamemototheBoardhepointedoutthesalientfeatures:

23rdMarch1921.The scheme provides for clearing the vessel down to the floor of the present

hangarandbuildingadouble-deckedhangar,withthefunnelsledforeandaftatthesidesofthesehangars,eventuallydischargingatthestern,somewhatasinArgus.The upper hangar can take 33 Sopwith Torpedo Carriers folded, and the lower

hangar28,total61,oralterativesasshownonsheet2.Two lifts are provided to serve these hangars, and in additionmachines can be

takenoutveryquicklythroughtheforwardendoftheupperhangarandflown-offatthatlevel,sothatmachinesmaygetawayfromthreepositionsatthesametime.The Navigating Arrangements will be very much better than in Argus. A

Wheelhousewillbeprovidedoneachsideoftheship,withaplatformoutsidegivingaview right aft.The twohouseswill be connectedby aBridgeorGangway fromwhichitwillalsobepossibletolookaftovertheflyingdeck.The armament will comprise ten 5.5in and six 4in H.A. guns, with control

positionsoneachsideoftheship.

Verymuchheavieranchorsandcableswillbesupplied,butnoalterationwillbemadeinthepowerofthemachineryorthefuelcapacity.Thepresentfullspeedof31knotswillbemaintained.AccommodationwillbearrangedasaFlagship.Theflying-ondeckwiththetwohangarswillonlybeabout3feethigherfromthe

waterthaninArgus.

GeneralReconstructionasanAircraftCarrierItwasagreedthatarrangementsforlandingaircraftwouldembodytheresultsofthelatestexperience and reports fromArgus, and suchmechanical improvements to the arrestinggear as emerged during the course of development. The length of the arresting wireswouldbeapproximately350feet.

1.Thenavigatingarrangementswouldbefittedattheforeendoftheupperhangar,somewhat as in Argus, duplicated on each side of the vessel with a gangwayconnection between them; these had a much better all-round view than could beobtainedfromacentralposition.2. The siting of the standard magnetic compass was a matter of great difficulty,becauseof theinfluenceof theship’smagneticfield,andnecessitatedexperimentalworkbeforeadecisionwasreached.3.Theprincipalarmamentproposedwasten5.5inguns,fiveoneachbroadside,andsix4inHAguns,fourforwardandtwoaft.4.Notorpedotubesweretobefitted.5. The gunnery control positionswere to be situated abreast the upper hangar justabaft the navigating positions. The port and starboard control were to be quiteseparatealthoughtherangefinderineachpositioncouldbeelevatedforuseoneithersideoftheship.6. The proposed searchlight equipment consisted of four 36in searchlights withEvershedControlandrodcontrolupto90°,four24insignallingsearchlightsandanumberof10insearchlights.7.Theconsiderableriseinfreeboard,offeringamuchgreaterexposedwindsurface,necessitated,as inArgus,muchheavier anchors andcables thanwouldbe requiredforthevessel’sdisplacementandthisnecessitatedconsiderablealterationsforward.

FuriousinJune1925.BeingtowedoutofthedockyardinhernewguiseasafullyfittedaircraftcarrierFuriousshowstheworldhersleeklines.Notethepalisades.

Furiousc.1926.Auniqueviewofherrearend,showingcranesandthehangardoorwhichisjustclosing.Notetherowsofventsunderneaththeflightdeckandthelargeholesinthesidejustbeforethecranes–allfortheextractionoffunnelexhaust.

8.Themachineryandboilerroominstallationsremainedbelowwaterasbefore,butin addition to the new horizontal funnel arrangements for discharging gases aft,considerablemodificationswere required to thearrangementof trunksandfans forsupplyingairtothesespaces,andforengineroomexhaust.9.Thematterofboatscausedconsiderabledifficulties. Itwasnotpossible tocarrythecomplementofboatsusuallyassignedtoavesselofthissizeanditwasnecessarytosupplyalargerproportionofrafts.

Bulkstowagewasprovidedintwoseparatecompartments(oneforwardandoneaft)for24,000gallonsofpetroland4,000gallonsoflubricatingoil.Steampumpsdeliveredthepetroltothehangarsandtopositionsontheflightdeck.Aspecialroomwasprovidedinwhichtoapplydopetoaircraftfabric.

Twolargehangarswereprovided,oneabovetheother.Thelowerhangarwasirregularinshapeandcontainedstorerooms,workshopsandoffices,etc.Itsinternalwidthvariedfrom35 feet to50 feetand itwasapproximately550 feet long.Thewidthof theupperhangarwas50feetanditwasapproximately520feetlong.Theminimumclearheightineachhangarwas15 feet.Thehangarswere sub-divided for firepurposesbysteel rollerblindsorcurtains.Attheforwardendoftheupperhangarlargehingeddoorswerefittedtoenablemachinesofup to50ftwingspan toflystraightout.Thisposition, togetherwiththe two positions on the flight deck in the vicinity of the lifts, gave three flying-offpositions.Two lifts, serving both upper and lower hangars,were installed, each able totakea46ft-longaircraftof47ftwingspan(35ft,wingsfolded).

The lengthofdeckavailable for fittingarrestinggearwasabout340feet.Safetynetswere provided on each side, and although palisadingwas not indicated on the originaldesign,itwasplannedforalaterdate.Craneswereprovidedattheafterendoftheshipfortheworkingofseaplanesandamphibians.

Thegunneryandsearchlightcontrolwerecentralizedandduplicatedoneachsideofthevessel. The navigating arrangements were duplicated on each side with a branch

communicationtoaprotectedlowerconningtowerfromwhichtheshipwouldbesteered.The chart-house, signal offices, sea cabin, etc., were all arranged in the vicinity of thebridgeandadjacenttoacross-gangwayconnectingthetwonavigatingpositions.Thenoseoftheupperflightdeckwasroundedoff,afterexperimentsattheNPLshowedthattherewasatendencyforsteadieraerodynamicconditionstoprevail(withsuchaformforsmallanglesofyawofthewind).Endurancewiththeexistingfuelwas4,300nauticalmilesat16 knots, but it was hoped that this could be increased. Ample accommodation wasprovided for the aircraft personnel.The entire reconstruction took fromJune1921untilSeptember 1925 and she emerged from the dockyard in a very different form indeed.ThroughoutthenexttenyearsshewasinconstantuseforexperimentsandtestsandmuchexperiencewasgainedtowardsimprovingtheRoyalNavy’swingsatsea.

FURIOUS:LEGENDDisplacement:(legendcondition)22,130tons.

Length:735ft(pp),768ft6in(oa).

Beam:88ft(waterline),170ftatnavigatingbridge.

Draught:22ft9inforward,25ft3inaft.

Widthofflightdeck:92ft;lengthofflightdeck:576ft:lengthofupperflying-offdeck;150ft; lengthof lowerflying-offdeck:200ft;areaof lowerhangar:23,500sqft:areaofupperhangar:25,400sqft.

Armament:10×5.5in,6×4in,4×2pdr

Searchlights:4×36in,4×24in,4×10in.

W/T:Type36,Type34,Type9,DFtype.

Endurance:4,300nmat16knots.

Complement: 893RNofficers andmen;with24 aircraft, 251RAFpersonnel;with36aircraft,325RAFpersonnel.

FURIOUS:GMANDSTABILITY,ASINCLINEDLightcondition: 1925ascarrier 21,830tons. GM:3ftDeepcondition: 1925. 26,800tons. GM:3.60ftLightcondition: 1932. 22,400tons. GM:2.30ftDeepcondition: 1932. 27,125tons. GM:2.91ft Stabilityrange Vanishesat

1925: Light 520 Deep 650 1932: Light 500 Deep 620

AlterationsinAircraftEquipmentToreachthestageofbeingacarrierproperwasalengthyprocessasfarasFuriouswasconcerned,andthefollowingnoteswillshowthat thetechniquesofusingaircraftatseawereamatteroftrialanderror.

Furiouscompletedin1917asacarrier-cruiserwithahangarfittedforwardofthebridgeanda flying-offdeckover this.The flying-offdeckwasabout220feet longandslopeddownwards, tapering to a point at the stem.Collapsible palisadeswere fitted along thesidesandacrossthedecktoprotecttheaircraftwhiletheywerebeingpreparedforflight.Twoderricks (portandstarboard)were fitted tohandle theaircraftandasingle liftwasfittedattheafterendofthehangar.AscompletedinthisroleFuriouscarriedthreeShortseaplanes and five Sopwith Pups (folded wings) which could be brought up from thehangarandflownoffinaboutthreeminutesapiece.

The seaplaneswere easily flown-off by the ‘trolley and rail’method inwhich floatsmountedasatrolleyrunningalongaslottedtubeinthedeckwerecaughtattheendoftherun by a device which prevented it going overboard. Flying-off operations provedsuccessfulduringtheautumnof1917butlandingbackprovedtobedisastrous.Thefirstsuccessful landing on the ship was made on 3 August 1917, but it highlighted theunsuitabilityoflandingaircraftontheforwardpartoftheship.Furtherconversionmadethe ship into a carrier proper when a landing-on deck was fitted over the quarterdeck(November 1917 toMarch 1918). The forward flying-off deck remained the same, butanother hangarwas fitted aft of the funnelwhich gave her a capacity for about twentyaircraft.Aliftwassetslightlytostarboardattheafterendofthehangar.Thelandingdeckwasconnectedtotheflying-offplatformbyanarrowcurvedrunwayoneachsideofthefunnel.Theseaplanesweretransferredfromonedecktotheotherbymeansofatrolleyonrails.

Thefirstaircraftshippedafterthesemodificationshadinplaceofwheelsskidswhichslidalongtroughslaidovertheflyingdeck.Primitive‘arresterwires’werelaidoverthelandingdeckanda‘stoppingnet’wasfittedacrossthedeckimmediatelyabaftthefunneltostopanyaircraftthatoverranthedeckonlanding.

Air eddies set up by the superstructure and funnel, however, still tended to makelandingdifficultwhentheshipwasunderwaysothecarrierwasseenasonlyaqualifiedsuccess in this respect. Itwas reported thatonly a few landingswere evermade in thisguiseand theoldermethodofcomingdownon thewaterandbeinghoistedaboardwasrevertedtoinmanycases.WiththecompletionofthecarrierArgusnomorelandingswerecarriedoutonFurious.

Auniquebow-onviewofFuriousshowingjusthowmuchtheaircraft-carrieradditionssatonheroriginalcruiserhull.

Furiousathighspeedin1928.Havingafairturnofspeed,Furiousprovedsuccessfulinhernewroleandcouldoperatewithallthecapitalshipsorcruisers.

Theproblemswithaireddieshadbeenlookedintoasfarbackas1917whenaproposalfor securing a clear flight deck by use of telescoping funnels and an elevator for thecharthouse had been submitted byArmstrongs, but theAdmiraltywas not interested inthisandnoneoftheusualexperimentswereapproved.

Furious was finally taken in hand for conversion into a full carrier (June 1921 toSeptember1925)when the funnel, superstructureandmastswere removedandshewasgiven a clear flight deck throughout three-quarters the length of the hull. The forwardsection sloped slightly upwards to slow down the aircraft,which had no brakes at thattime. Arrester wires were abandoned. The flight deck was almost as high from thewaterlineastheoriginalfunnelhadbeen,andsome30feethigherthantheoriginalflying-offdeckas fitted in1918.Manysteelbarricades (knownaspalisades)werefittedalongthe sides of the flight deck to prevent aircraft from going over the side. The originalflying-offplatformforward(considerablybelowthemainflying-offdeck)wasretainedasa‘take-off’platformandwasintendedtoflyoffsmallfightersfromtheforeend.Aircraftcouldbeflown-offfrombothdecklevels,thosefromthelowerdeckturningtostarboardandthosefromthemainupperdeckgoingovertoport.Attheforwardendoftheflight

deckwasfittedatelescopingcharthousewhichcouldbelowereduntil thetopwasflushwiththedecklevel.Collapsiblepalisadeswerefittedaroundthedeckoverhalfitslengthand they folded down into recesses when not in use. Two 15ft-high hangars wereprovided:upper520ft×50ft, lower550ft×35–50ft,whichwere sectionedoffby largesteelrollershutters(electricallyoperatedandfireproof).

Thefunneluptakesfromtheboilerswerecarriedwelloutoneachbeam,buttheytookupmuchvaluablespacewhichcouldhaveotherwisebeenusedforaircraftfacilitiessotheaircraftcapacitywasnotasgreatashadbeenenvisaged.

Ascanbeseenfromtheofficialrecords(originallegend,etc.)provisionwasmadeforabout60aircraftbutascompletedFuriousneverseemstohavecarriedmorethan36.

Duringreconstructiontherehadbeenplanstogiveheralargefunnelatonesideoftheflying-off deck, like the USS Lexington and Saratoga, but as Furious was too faradvanced at the time of submitting the proposal, it was not done; Glorious andCourageouswerelatermodifiedtohavethisformoffumeextraction.

Althoughshewasre-ratedasanescortcarrierin1942,Furiouscontinuedtoserveuntilaslateas1947,provingthatherconversionhadmorethanjustifiedthecontentionthatshewas‘valueformoney’.

ArmourPracticallynoprotectionbeyondthatgiventoalarge,lightcruiserexceptflightdeck(⅝in)andunderwaterbulgessimilartothoseasfittedtothebattleshipRoyalOak(ratherlarge,full-belliedbulges).

Mainbelt:2inHTplus1inMS.Bulkheads:3in–2in.

Protectivedeck:1in–¼in.

Flightdeck:⅝in.

Funneluptakes:1inatopening,thenmildsteelcasing.

Longitudinalscreensoutsidebulkheadsabreastengineandboilerrooms:1in.

ArmamentOriginallydesignedtocarrytwosingle18inguns,oneforward,oneaft,butprovisionwasmadetochangeovertotwotwin15inineachturretifrequired.Thesingle18ingun,stillfittedaftatthistime,wasnotatallsuccessfulbecause,beingonlylightlyframed,thehullof the shipwas liable to be badly shaken.Moreover, a single gunwas not suitable formodernrequirementsnorwastherateoffireuptomuch.

ARMAMENTASCOMPLETED,19171×18in40calMkI

1I×5.5in

2×3inAA(singles)

2×3pdr

2×21 inTT(onpart-conversion1918,16×21 inabove-water tubesadded, (twoeachsideonupperdeck)

1925:

10×5.5in

6×4in

4×3pdr

4xMG

10×Lewis

1939:

12×4inHA/LAMkXVI(400rpg)MkXIXmountings

4pom-pomsMarkM.MkVIImountings

2×0.5inMGmountings(4barrels)

4×3pdrsaluting

4xMG

From 1939 onwards the armament remained virtually unaltered except the addition ofapproximately22×20mm

FURIOUS1927AsConvertedtoAircraftCarrier

JustpriortohertrialsitwasdecidedtostiffenthebowsoftheshipbecauseofweaknessfoundinGloriousandCourageous.Whileundergoingthisrefititwasdecidedtoconverthertoa‘cruiser-carrier’type.Theforwardturretandbarbettewereremovedandaflightdeckwasfittedforward.

Her secondary armament of eleven5.5inwas a new size for theRoyalNavy, havingfirst appeared in the cruisersChester andBirkenhead which had been taken over fromGreecein1914.SparegunsfromthesetwoshipswereutilizedforFuriousandlaterthebattlecruiserHood.Afterconversionhersecondaryarmamentstillconsistedof the5.5inguns,butvariousAAgunswereaddedandremovedoveraperiodoftime(seeappearancechanges).

During theearly thirties itwasdecided thatguns thatcouldnot fireatboth low-andhigh-level targets had no place at sea (secondary armament) and it was decided to fitFurious with a more suitable AA defence. A meeting was held in the Director ofOrdnance’s roomon8 June1936 todiscuss this issue. Ithad longbeenagreed that thenewgunshouldbethelatest4inHA/LApieceintwinmounts,buttheproblemwaswheretoputthemsoastogivethemsuitablearcsoffireagainstbothairandsurfacetargets.Amethodwas suggestedwherebymostof theguns simply replaced theold5.5in,but theDNO pointed out that this would not be suitable since: 1. The forward guns wouldseverely blast the 2pdr pom-poms and their crews. 2. The midships gun (in place ofnumber 25.5in)would have very poor arcs of fire in elevation. 3.The after gunon thequarterdeckwouldbefrequentlyuntenablebecauseofsmoke.

Morediscussionsfollowedanditwasagreedtomountthreegunsonthelowerflying-off deck: one amidships right forward and two P&S just forward of the present gunpositions.

Tomountoneonthequarterdeckwheresuitable.

To adopt one of the following pom-pom positions: 1.Mount two pom-poms on thestarboard side of the flight deck with a small control platform carrying the directorbetweenthem.2.Tomounttwopom-pomsontheflightdeck,oneeachside,eachwithitsdirector in the position it already occupied. 3. To mount four pom-poms with theirdirectorsontheflightdeck,twoeachside.

Itwasrealizedthattoaccepttheabovewouldvirtuallycreateanislandonthesideoftheflightdeck,andflying-offfromthelowerplatformwouldhavetobeabandoned.Greatconsiderationwasalsogiven toammunitionsupplyandaftermoredebate the followingwasfinallyagreed:1.Threetwinmountingsfittedonthelowerflying-offdeckandoneonthequarterdeck.2.Two2pdrMpom-poms,withtheirdirectors,tobefittedonanislandon the starboard side of the flight deck. 3.Two2pdrMpom-poms fitted at station 32,P&S.Thedirectorsforthesetobetheexistingonesoutsidethewingnavigatingpositions.4.OneHACSIfittedontheislandonthestarboardsideoftheflightdeckandoneonthelowerflying-offdeck.5.Chainhoistsfittedfromthemagazines.6.Stowageprovidedasfollows:4inguns,240rpg(inbottlerackstowage);2pdrs,2,780rpginthemagazineand400rpbarrelinready-usestowage.

Thefollowingequipmentwasremoved:

1. Three single 4in HA guns (two from lower flying-off deck and one from thequarterdeck);2.Two2pdrfromlowerflying-offdeck;3.5.5ingunsandtheirammunitionfrom No 1 position; 4. Hangar doors from forward end of upper hangar (plated inafterwards); 5. Sponsons to existing single 4in mountings. 6. Wind screens on lowerflying-offdeckandoperatinggear.

MachineryBeingcompletedaslarge, lightcruiserstheywerenaturallyfittedtogiveagoodturnofspeed. Itwas stipulated very early in their design that theirmain functionwould be tooutrunalmostanythingthatfloated,largeorsmall,andthiswastomakethemthatmuchmoresuitablewhenconsideringtheirreconstructionasfullyfledgedaircraftcarriers.They

were fitted with small-tube boilers and were the first large warships to have gearedturbines(Furious,GloriousandCourageous).

As completed Furious never underwent a full set of sea trials because of warrestrictionsandunfortunately therearenofullsetsoffiguresavailable toshowhowsheperformedinherearlycruisercarrierrole.

Onreconstructionin1925,althoughtrialswerecarriedout,veryfewspeedfigureswererecorded, the performance of the engines apparently being much more important.Although the ship’s cover does not show a speed for full power runs, official dataelsewherestatesthatshemade30.06knotswith90,600shpon321revolutionsperminute.Afterhermachinery/boilerinstallationswererefurbishedin1931furthersteamtrialswerecarriedoutin1932(seetable).

Oncompletionasacarrierin1925shewasreportedtobe‘ratherlight’andpronetorollmorethansheshould(asaconsequenceofweightremovalduringrefit).Herconditiondidimproveshortlyafterwards,butitisunclearwhethershewasgivensomesortofballastornot.

SeaTrialsasAircraftCarrier,1925Herreconstructionasanaircraftcarriercompleted,shenaturallyunderwenta fullsetofseatrials:

Monday31August:Inspectionat10.00hoursAdmiralSuperintendent.

Tuesday1September:Commissionedforsea.

Thursday3September:Finishfuelling.

Monday7September:MovevesselintoNorthDockfrombasin.

Wednesday 9 September:LeaveSound and carry out 8-hour full power trials.Gunnerytrials and paravane trials also to take place while at sea. Anchor in Sound oncompletionoftrials.

On7Septemberthe10-knottrialswerecarriedout:

Run Speed(knots) SHP1: 10.105 3,0732: 9.527 2,7313: 10.404 3,2434: 9.288 2,855

During the trials smoke was ejected through the side openings and the effect on thequarterdeckandhangarswasverybad.Topreventsmokegettingintothehangarstheafterfirecurtainhadtobeclosed.Observationsofdeflectionofbulkheadsandtemperatureinhangars were taken during the trial, also tests with draughts through the hangars andvarious arrangementswith the fire curtains and lifts, etc. (see table).During full powertrialssmokegotupthroughtheflightdeckbuthadverylittleeffectonthequarterdeckorhangar. Trials of the hangar doorswere successful, and the doors could be opened and

closedinabouttenseconds.Fullpowertrialstookmorethantwohourstodevelopandthemean SHP reached was 91,485 on a displacement of 23,900 tons but no speeds werelogged(30.03knotsbybearings).

FULLPOWERSTEAMTRIALSAFTERCOMPLETERENEWALOFMACHINERYPARTSANDBOILERSRE-TUBEDDURING1932(seelistforworkdone).

Trial:EnglishChannel.I6February1932(4hour).

Draught:26ft4½inforward,26ftIinaft.

Displacement:24,970tons.

Bottomofship:slightlyfoul.

Wind:20kts.

Sea:4to5slightswell.

Fuel:ConsumptionperHPperhour:1.15lb;pressure(oil):124psi.

Propellers:3-bladed.

11ft6indiameterlift6inpitch.

Totalexpandedareaofeachprop:78ft6in.

Surface:bright.

Immersion of upper edge at commencement of trials: inner: 13ft 4⅞in, outer: 13ft0⅛in.

Revolutions: inner shaft: port 314.1, starboard 318.4; outer shaft: port 315.2, starboard319.1.Meanofall

shafts:316.7.

ShaftHorsePower:innershaft:port22,841,starboard:22,813;outershaftport22,213,starboard:21,887.

TotalSHP:45,054port,44,700starboard;89,754shp.

Speed(takenbybearings,notlog):28.8knots.

Effectofdraughtthroughhangars:

1.Liftsatflightdeck.Hangardoorsfullyopen.Allfirecurtainsclear.Wind-screensoutsidehangardoorsup.

Slightdraughtthroughhangarsofabout2–3mph.Sulphurfumesinhangar.Quarterdeckclearofsmoke.

2.Asaboveexceptwind-screendown.Windthroughupperhangar15mph(afterend).Nofumesinhangar.Temperaturefellconsiderably.

3.Forwardliftatflightdeckandafter

liftatupperhangardeck.Allfirecurtainsclearedexceptat75upperhangar,whichwasclosed.Wind-screensup.

Windspeedatafterendoflowerhangar.Slightdraughtabout3mph.Lowerhangarandquarterdeckquiteclear;upperhangarnofumesordraught.Temperaturerising.

4.Asabove(3)exceptwind-screendown.

Windspeedinlowerhangar16mph.Bothhangarsanddecksquiteclearoffumes.Temperaturesrisinginupperhangar.Nodraughtinupperhangar.

Itwasseenfromthesetrialsthatsolongastherewasaslightdraughtthroughthehangarsthe fumeswerekept clear of the ship, butwhen therewas nodraught at all, the fumesfound theirwayup through the liftwell into theupper hangar.When the curtainswereclosedinsomecasesthetemperatureinthehangarroseveryrapidly.

EngineandBoilerRoomRefitPropellingmachinery:

Allturbinerotorslifted,HPscompletelyrebladed,LPsaheadandasternpartiallyrebladed.

Carbonpackingrenewed,manoeuvringvalvesfitted.

Gearwheelsandpinionsexaminedandteethtrimmed.

Propellershaftingalignedandsterntubesre-wooded.

Mainthrustblocksopenedoutandpadpiecesrefitted.

Underwaterfittingsexaminedandrenewedifnecessary.

Maincondensersexaminedandnewdoorsfitted.

Newglands,sectionalvalves,etc.,renewed.

Allauxiliarymachinerycheckedandrenewedwherenecessary.

Boilers:

Boilers,18innumber,werere-tubedandnewcircularwaterpocketsfitted.Boilercasingsmodified to suit new water pockets. Brickwork renewed. Uptakes repaired wherenecessary.New feedvalves fitted.Oil fuel heaters re-tubed.New feedheaters fitted.Modificationtoboilerfrontsandnewtypeofoilfuelsprayersfitted.

Durabilityofboilers:steamreservoirs,5years;waterreservoirs,10years;boilertubes,7years.

Flying-offTrialsSpithead,6April1925.Furious

TheDirectorofTechnicalDevelopment’sdecklandingandlaunchingtrialsofnewtypesofaircraftwerebeguninApril1925andcontinueduntiltheendofOctober.Thefollowingaircraftweretested:

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithlongV-bottomedwoodenfloats.

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithlongflat-bottomedwoodenfloats.

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithshortflat-bottomedduralfloats.

FlycatcherSeaplanewithlongflat-bottomedduralfloats.

FlycatcherAmphibianwithV-bottomedfloatsandsolidtyres.

Flycatcheraeroplanewithskids.

BlackburnSeaplanewithwoodenfloats.

FerretAmphibianwithV-bottomedfloatsandsolidtyres.

FerretAeroplane(Jaguar).

FerretAeroplane(Jupiter).

HendonAeroplane.

DartAeroplanewithoverheadrailandaxleguides.

Trialswerealsomadewithcertaintypesoftrolliesformovingseaplanesaboutthedeckhangars.

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithlongV-bottomedwoodenfloats

Thismachinewaspickeduponthespecialhandlingtrolliesprovided.Fourtrollieswereused,twotoeachfloat.Eachtrolleyhadfourwheelswhichcouldbeadjustedtomoveinanydirection.The trollieshaddropaxleswhichcouldbe raisedbya ratchetactionandthuslift theseaplane.Thetrolliesprovideddidnotfit theparticularseaplaneandtookalongtimetoadjust.Thesmallwheelsofthetrolliesledtodifficultiesinpassingoverthewindscreens,becauseofholesinthescreensandvariousprojections.

Theseaplanewasflown-offfrominfrontofthewind-screenontheupperhangardeckusingaquickrelease, thedeck to thebowbeingcoveredwithgrease.Forparticularsofrunsforlaunchingandlandingseetable.

In flying-off the machine took the whole available length of run, and the pilotapparentlydidnotpullheroff thedeckalthoughhestatedthatheattemptedtodoso.Itwasthoughtthatthedistanceofthestepwhichwassomeway(about12inches)aftofthecentreofgravitymightmakeitdifficulttotilttheaircrafttoobtaintherequiredangleofattack,butanotherpilotintheFaireyIIIDflat-bottomedfloatexperiencednodifficultyinpullingthemachineoff.

Inmaking landings the arresting gearwas not used.The length of runwhen landingprovedtobegreaterthanhadbeenanticipatedfromthetrialsoftheFlycatcherSeaplanewithflat-bottomedfloatscarriedoutinHermesthepreviousyear,andwasactuallygreaterthan with wheels. This was possibly because of high speed of approach, and possiblybecauseoftheattitudeofthemachine,thelongtailportionofthefloatpreventingthetailcomingdownandthuslimitingtheangleofattackofthewings.Otherfactorsthatcouldhaveinfluencedthelengthofrunwhenlandingwerethegreaseonthebottomofthefloatsadheringafter flying-off, andapprobable reduction in airvelocityunder the lowerwingcausedbytheriseintheflightdeckattheforwardend.Thewoodenfloatswereprotectedwith steel runners on the forward portion, but were unprotected on the tail portion.

Surprisinglylittledamagewasdonetothefloatsdespitepassingovermanyprojectionsonthedecks.Theunprotectedtailportionreceivedmostofthedamage.

After the first launching a second type of trolley, primarily intended as a launchingtrolley,was tried formoving the seaplane about.This trolleywas in onepiece andhadfoursmallwheels,twoforeachfloat.Itwasfoundtobequickertousethantheprevioustrolley, but needed several minutes to fit it, and experienced difficulty in passing overobstaclesandthewind-screen.Nolaunchingsweremadewith this trolleyAfter thefirsttwodays,thetrollieswerenolongerusedanditwasfoundpossibletopushtheseaplanesaboutonthebaredecksufficientlyquicklywithoutthem.

FaireyIIIDwithlongflat-bottomedwoodenfloats

This machine was flown off the upper hangar deck, using a greased deck and quick-releaseslip.Forthefirstflighttheentireavailablelengthwasused,butontherestofthelaunchingsthepilotpulledthemachineoffbeforetheendofthedeck.Thethirdlandingwasabadone,themachinecominginwithdrift.Theafterendoftheportfloattouchedthe round down of the flight deck right aft and detached the brass tail-piece, and themachineslewedtoport.Bothfloatstouchedthedeckbeforecrossingthestepinthedeck,wellontheportsideofthedeckandmakinganangleofabout10°totheforeandaftline.Iftheaircrafthadbeenanaeroplane(i.e.,withawheeledundercarriage)itwouldprobablyhavegoneovertheside.Beforereachingthedeckedgethemachinesuddenlyswervedtostarboardandstopped.Thearrestinggearwasnotused,andthiswasthecase,withafewexceptions, throughout the whole series of trials. The floats were more extensivelydamagedthaninthepreviousmachine.Thestepofthefloatwasdamagedinpushingthemachineoveroneof thestanchionsroundthe liftopening.Oneof thefloatrunnerswasdetachedbyalugonthedeckusedforbowsingdownthearrestinggearwires.

Furious’sportbowinDevonport,January1932.Notetheoriginalcruiserbowhighlightedinthisview.

TheboilerroomofFurious.Likeallwarshipswithlargemachineryinstallations,aclosewatchwasnecessaryathighspeedsincaseofmechanicalfailure–itwasnoeasytasktokeepthislotingoodorderasanyoldstokerwilltellyou.

FaireyIIIDSeaplanewithshortflat-bottomedduralfloats

This machine was flown-off the after end of the forward lift, without using a quick-release,ina38½-knotrelativewind.Themachineliftedbeforereachingthewind-screen;approximate run 54 feet. No greasewas used. The landingswere good, and very littledamagewasdonetothefloats.

FlycatcherSeaplanewithlongflat-bottomedduralfloats

Thismachinemadeverygoodlandings,andtheduralfloatsstoodupextraordinarilywelltotheroughtreatmentinpassingoverobstaclesonthedeck.Themachinewasflown-offboth with and without using grease and no trouble was experienced in pulling off thegreaseddeck.

FLYINGOFFTRIALS,1925

Weight(lbs)

Relativewindspeed(knots)

Lengthofrun(ft)

Remarks

MachineFaireyIII.D 4,874 40 70 FlownoffU.H.D.usinggreaseand

Q.R.Seaplane,

SwervedtostarboardandhitlongV-bottom stanchionstayeyebolt.

woodfloats 4,862 38 95 Ranstraight.FaireyIII.D. 4,898 35 90 FlownoffU.H.D.usinggreaseand

Q.R.Seaplane, Didnotpulloffdeck.longflat-bottom

woodfloats 4,860 36 70 Hangardoorshut.Didnotpulloffdeck. 4,837 37 60 H.D.open.Pulledoffdeck. 4,638 35 50 H.Dshut.Pulledoffdeck.FaireyIII.D 38½ 54 Fromflightdeck,nogrease,noQ.R.

Seaplane,shortdural

flat-bottomfloats

Flycatcher 3,277 34 39 Pulledofffromgreaseddeck.Seaplane,long Pulledofffromgreaseddeck.

flat-bottom 3,253 31 30 Pulledofffromgreaseddeck.duralfloats 3,232 39 27 Pulledofffromungreaseddeck.Flycatcher 3,454 34 48 UsingQ.R.

Amphibian, 3,447 35 60OtherlauncheswerewithoutQ.R.frompositioninwhichmachinestopped.

WithV-bottomfloats

&solidtyre.

Flycatcher 2,732 31 30 UsingQ.R.(Jaguar) Otherlaunchesweremadewithout

Aeroplane manhandlingfrompositionmachinelandedin.

withskids. Blackburn 6,232 37 98 Tookofftopofwindscreen.Seaplane withwood floats. 6,302 32½ 77

Ferret 4,772 38 75 UsingQ.R.Amphibian 4,761 36 84 Tookoffwindscreen.(Jaguar) 4,754 31 78 4,744 34 78 4,735 34 78 Ferret 4,228 28 84 Aeroplane 4,221 28½ 64 (Jupiter) 4,214 29 84 4,207 32 55 4,198 35 55 4,186 32 65 Hendon 6,866 32 92 Withtorpedo.Torpedo 6,847 38 80 Withtorpedo.aircraft 6,837 32½ 68 Withtorpedo.Dart 25 109 Ran21ftbetweenguides.Torpedo 27 65 Ran27ftbetweenguides.aircraft 24½ 85 Ran27ftbetweenguides.

FlycatcherAmphibianwithV-bottomedfloatsandsolidtyres

Thismachinemade a number of good landingswithout the arresting gear, themachinecamepracticallytorestandthepilotthenopenedupthethrottleandflewoffagainwithoutthe aircraft beingman-handled.Thenew feature of thismachinewas the new shape ofwoodenVfloatsandthesolidtyres.Thedecklandingqualitieswerequitesatisfactorybutthemilitaryloadappearstohavebeenreducedtopracticallynothing.

FlycatcherAeroplanewithskids

This machine fitted with skids in lieu of wheels behaved perfectly satisfactorily. Theintentionwastoaddfloatswhichcouldbeshedduringflightifnecessary.Thedesignofafloat-cum-skidmachinewasinvestigatedbyMessrs.Fairey.Theplanewasflown-offaftereachlandingexceptthefirstwithoutbeingman-handled.

BlackburnSeaplanewithwoodenfloats

Thismachinemadesuccessfullandings.Thestepandheelofthefloatsweredamagedbyobstaclesonthedeck.Itisunderstoodthatthisseaplanewasunsatisfactoryingettingoffthewater.

FerrettAmphibian(Jaguar)

Thismachinemadeanumberofverygoodlandingswithoutthearrestinggear.Theviewfrompilot’sseatwassatisfactory.Itisunderstoodthatthemachinewasunsatisfactoryintakingofffromthewater.

FerretAeroplane

Thismachine behaved satisfactorily, bothwith the Jaguar and the Jupiter engines. The

flexibility of the undercarriage, which in the previous Argus trials in September waspronounced,wasnotsoprominentonthisoccasion,butstillobservable.

Hendon2-seaterTorpedoAircraft

SometrialswiththismachineweremadeinArgus,butwerediscontinuedasthepilotwasnotgettingthebestoutof themachine.ThelandingsinFuriousweremoresatisfactory.Owingtothehigh-liftslottedwingsthelandingsareapttobeabitbouncy.

DartTorpedoAircraft

Thismachinewaslaunchedfromtheupperhangardeckusinganoverheadrailtosupportthetailandaxleguidesonthedeck.Thetrialswereforthepurposeoftestingtheprincipleofflying-offmachinesinthismanner,sothatifsuccessfulanumberofmachinescouldbeflown-off in rapid succession. The tail support was necessary to prevent the propellerstrikingthehangarroof.Thetaildroppedafterleavingtheoverheadrail.Thetrialsweresuccessful, and it was considered sufficient to justify altering the hangar head roomclearancetoenableothertypesofmachinestobeflown-offinthismanner.

Conclusions

1.Thetrialsshowedthatanytypeofaircrafthavingalowlandingvelocityandgoodcontrol at low speed could be landed on and flown-off Furious. Seaplanes,Amphibians andAeroplaneswithwheels or skids appeared equally satisfactory inthisconnection.2. Throughout the trials the arresting gear was hardly used and it appeared to beestablishedthattheimprovedairflowoverthedeckofFurioustogetherwiththehighspeedofwindrenderedtheuseofarrestinggearunnecessary,exceptpossiblyinveryhighnaturalwindsorwithrollingandpitchingmotionontheship.Since,however,the arresting gear undoubtedly gave confidence to pilots, it was considered thatarrestinggear shouldnot beomitteduntil somealternative such as power-operatedpalisadesatthedeckedgeswerefittedinlieu.3.IfseaplanesweretobeoperatedfromCarriersitwasessentialthatthedeckshouldbemadeflush,andallobstructionssuchasstanchions,eyebolts,fittingsatheeloffirecurtains etc. removed from the flying deck and hangars. It was for considerationwhetherseaplanesshouldbeusedaslongasthearrestinggearwasretained,althoughthe trials rather suggested that the damage done in passing over the arresting gearhurdleswasnotverygreat.

FlightdeckofFuriousc.1928/30.Notethewindbreakersflatondeckandtheopenliftdoor:

FURIOUS:MASTDIMENSIONS,APRIL1925Length:

Signalmast:27ft6in

Signalyards:9ft

Steaminglight:20ft6in

W/Tmasts:38ft6in

OutriggersforW/T:8ft

Aircraftsignalbooms:17ft

Jackstaff:19ft10in

Ensignstaff:24ft

Guestwarpbooms:50ft

Soundingbooms:30ft

Sternboom:6ft

Seaplanebooms:50ft

Highestpartofsignalmastswhenextended:84ft4in

HighestpartofW/Tmasts:forward90ft1in,amidships92ft,aft92ft.

FlightsCarried1927–29:OneFleetFighter; twoSpotter;oneSpotterReconnaissance; twoTorpedo. (In

1928(October)alsoreportedascarryingSixFlights.Single-seatDarttorpedoaircraftandsingle-seatFlycatcherfighters.3or4-seatBlackburnorBisonforspottingand3-seatFaireyIIIFreconnaissance.)

FURIOUS:CRUISERANDAIRCRAFTCARRIER,DATAASCOMPLETEDAscruiser:

Construction: Armstrong-Whitworth; laid down 8.6.1915; launched 18.8.1916;completed26.6.1917.

Displacement(tons):19,513(load);22,890(deep).

Length:735ft2¼in(pp),786ft9inoa.

Beam:88ft0⅝inatwaterline.

Draught:24ftmean.

Armour:

Main belt 2inHT plus 1 inMS.Bulkheads 3–2in,Barbettes 7–6–3in, Turrets 11–9–7–4¼in,Decks:forecastleIin,upperIin,mainI¾–1in,lower3–1in,CT10inface6–3inelsewhere,FunneluptakesI½–1in.

Machinery:

BrownCurtisgearedturbinesdriving4propellers.

DesignedSHP:90,000for31.5knots.Boilers:18Yarrow

Fuel:750/3,160tonsoil

Radiusofaction:6,000nmat20knots(design).

Complement:737ascompleted;890in1925(RNandRAF).

Costs:£1,050,000forhull.

Asaircraftcarrier:

Displacement (tons): 22,500 (normal); 26,500 (deep); 28,430 by 1939. Lengthunchanged.

Beam:107ftoverflightdeck.

Draught:27ft3inmean.

Armour:seenotes.

Machinery: unaltered except for renewal of many items (see notes on 1931machinery/boilerrefit)Radius:4,300milesat16knots.

Armament:seearmamentnotes.

Aircraft: see aircraft list (carried Barracuda aircraft at end of Second World War).Complement:738RNplus468RAF.(1932)

IncreasedlaterandduringthewartoaccommodateextraAAgunsandaircraftasrequired.

Nofullfigureavailable.

Costs:about£6,000,000spentonshipupto1939.

Furious–arareviewoftheloweraircrafthangarwiththeliftabouttoconveyanaircraftuptotheflightdeck.Notethegreatheightbetweendecklevels.

Furiousin1939withhernewisland.Shewasnotanewcarrierbutherrolewasmostimportantduringtheopeningmonthsofthewarpendingthearrivalofthenewcarriers.

1930–32:TwoF/F(Flycatchers);threeS/R(twoFaireyIIIF,oneBlackburn);twoTorpedo(oneDart,oneRiponII).

1933: One F/F (nine Nimrod or Flycatcher); one S/R (twelve Fairey IIIF); One T/B(twelveRipon);twoTorpedo(oneDart,oneRiponII).

1934:Asin1933lesstwoTorpedo.

1935:OneF/F(sixNimrods);oneF/R(threeOsprey);oneT/3(twelveBaffin);oneS/R(twelveFaireyIIIF).

1936:OneF/F(nineOsprey);oneT/B(twelveSwordfish);oneT/S/R(twelveSwordfish).

1937to1939:Alltypescarriedfortrainingpurposes.

1939onwards:EighteenSwordfish.

AppearanceChanges

In her battlecruiser role Furious’s appearance was less than pleasing. Her flight deckforward, largefunnelamidships(withsuperstructure)andsingle18ingunaftgaveherarather unsym-metrical profile. As reconstructed to an aircraft carrier proper, althoughchangingdrasticallyherappearanceremainedratherodd.Thesuperstructure,tripodmastandfunnelwere removedandahighclear flyingdeckwas fittedovermostof theship.The abrupt terminationof the flyingdeck in a dome-shapedoverhangwell short of thestem,withslopingflying-offplatformlowerdownforwardofthis,presentedaparticularlyawkwardappearancewhenseenbowson.Ascompletedfor trials thehangarsides frommidshipstoaftoverthesmokeductswereplatedinwithfourrowsofscuttlesforventing,but the plating was removed after trials and before the ship entered service. A smallcharthouseontheforwardendoftheflightdeckwastelescopicandloweredflushwiththedeckwhenoperatingaircraft.Lowerdeckscuttlesforwardandaftwereextendedfurthermidships. Rig: Short, light pole port and starboard on flight deck right forward. ThreecollapsiblelatticeW/Tpoleseachsideflightdeckspacedwellapart.EasilydistinguishedfromArgusbyamuchlongerhull,curvedstem,flightdecknotcarriedrighttostemandstern,andgunsinshieldsalongforecastledeckside.

1926–39period,asrefittedSeptember1930toFebruary1932:

OverheadviewofFuriousatwarandcamouflagedallovendeckincluded,10July1942.

AA armament increased to three 4in, sixteen 2pdrs (8 barrels). 4in in single openmountingsonafterdeckofflying–offplatformandonerightaftonquarterdeck.Structurebelowflying–offplatformwasmoreenclosed.

1937–8:Forwardendofflying–offplatformraisednearlyhorizontal.

As refitted January to May 1939: 5.5in guns replaced by twelve 4in dual-purpose(HA/LA)withenlargedtwinshields.

Generaldetails1939:Hullasin1925;HAdirectoronflying–offplatformonisland.Gunsincreased to thirty-two 2pdrs. Aircraft equipment: As in 1925 except that flying–offplatform forward no longer used for this purpose. Machinery and boilers as original.Appearancegenerallyasin1925exceptfortheshortislandsuperstructurewithRDFaerial

poleandHAdirectoronstarboardsideofflying–offdeckamidships.ProminentAAgunsand HA director on flying-off platform forward. Quarterdeck raised to forecastle decklevel.Rearofshipabaftsmokeductspaintedblack.

1939–45:asrefittedinUSASeptember1942toApril1943.20mmAAaddedportandstarboard on forecastle in sponsons at sides of flight deck aft. Type 275 RDF to HAdirectors. 1943–4: Some multiple 2pdrs removed. Type 281 RDF fitted by November1943.

History:FuriousOriginally intended as a large, light cruiser she was laid down at the Armstrong–WhitworthYard at Newcastle–on–Tyne butwas never actually completed as such. Sheenteredserviceasahybridtype,beinghalfcruiserofaverypowerfultype(18ingun),theforwardpartoftheshipservingasanaircrafttake-offplatform.

ShewassubjectedtomanyexperimentsthroughouttheGreatWarandwasfittedwithan after landing–on deck in 1918. Finally completely reconstructed as a carrier properwhensheenteredtheRoyalDockyardatDevonportinJune1921.TherefitwascompletedinAugust1925andsherejoinedtheAtlanticFleettorelieveArgus.

UnderrefitagainatDevonportfromSeptember1930untilFebruary1932afterwhichshejoinedtheHomeFleet(exAtlanticFleet).

HomeFleet:March1932untilMay1934.

ShewastemporarilyattachedtotheMediterraneanFleetfromMaytoOctoberin1934.

RejoinedHomeFleetinOctober1934untilNovember1942.

EmployedasTrainingCarrier1937toMay1939.

RefitatDevonportDecember1937toMay1938.

AttheoutbreakofwarshewasbasedatRosyth.

HalifaxConvoy dutiesOctober 1939 and escortedCanada convoy toUK inDecember1939(arrivinginClydeon17th).

NorwegianCampaignApril–June1940.Heraircraftattackedatorpedo–boatdestroyeron11April and it is thought that this was the first time that carrier-borne aircraft hadattackedasurfacewarshipatsea.

Underwentturbinerepairsduringthisperiod.

At the endof June1940 she crossed theAtlantic carrying£18,000,000ofgoldbullion.SheleftHalifaxon1JulyandarrivedatLiverpoolonthe7thwith49Americanaircraftandsparesonboard.

Furious,1941/42.

FuriousinroughweatherAfterthelossofGloriousandCourageousin1939/40,FuriouswastheoldestcarrierservingwiththeRoyalNavy.

DuringSeptember1940shetookpartinanti-shippingstrikesatTromsoandTrondheim,Norway,losingsixaircraftandsufferingcasualtiesduringthiscampaign.

FerriedaircrafttoWestAfricaduringNovember1940.

ReturnedtoLiverpoolon15December.

InJanuary1941sheagaintookaircrafttoTakoradi,WestAfrica.

Bombedby enemyaircraftwhile refitting inBelfast on4Maybut sustainedno seriousdamage.

Left for Gibraltar, arriving on 12May and continued to ferry aircraft to Gibraltar andMalta until September of 1941. At the end of July her aircraft attacked Petsamo,Finland, but found the base empty of shipping. Instead they attacked the quays, oil

tanksandshipyarditself;threeaircraftlost.

Anti–shippingoperationsinAugust1941andinOctoberarrivedatPhiladelphia,USA,forrefit.

ReturnedtoUKinApril1942.

Took part in North Africa landings in November aftermanymore trips toMalta fromAugusttoOctober.

InNovember 1942becamepart ofForceH and continuedoperations onNorthAfricancoast.

ForceHNovember1942untilFebruary1943.

HomeFleetFebruary1943untilSeptember1944.

July1943engagedincampaignsoffthecoastofNorway.

RefitinLiverpoolAugust1943andspenttherestoftheyearworking–up.

During1944Furiouscarriedoutvariousanti-shippingattacksincludingtwomajorattacksontheGermanbattleshipTirpitzintheNorwegianfiords.

InSeptembertookpartinminingoperationsoffNorway.

ReturnedtoUKinSeptemberandpaidoffintoReserve.

ReserveFleetSeptember1944toApril1945.

PaidoffApril1945.

BerthedatLochStrivenduringthisperiodandusedfortargetpractice.

FinallysoldtoBritishIronandSteelCo.forscrapping.

TowedtoCairngorminJune1948(ArnottYoung).

HulltowedtoTroonforfinaldemolitionwhichtookuntil1954.

GloriousandCourageousDesignandConversionDuring1921andthroughouttheWashingtonTreatymonthsthewholequestionofaircraftcarrierswassubject toconsiderabledebate. Itwaspointedout thatat that time theonlyfleet aircraft carrier was Argus – 14,500 tons, 19 knots – which was attached to theAtlanticFleet.Pegasus,3,000tons,20knots,wasintheMediterraneanandcarriedonlyafewseaplaneswhichhadtobehoistedaboardatthestern.ArkRoyal,7,080tons,11knots,was classed as a Floating Aircraft Depot Ship with a good workshop arrangement, aflying-off deck and a hangar. Three aircraft carrierswere under construction and beingcompleted for service as quickly as possible:Hermes was in hand at Devonport, theconvertedEagleatPortsmouthandFuriousatRosyth.

ItwasbroughttotheattentionoftheDNCthatexceptforHermesall theotherswereconversions and thepresent valueof their tonnagedidnot reflect their value as aircraftcarriers. If proper new aircraft carrier designswere allocated to these ships a saving of4,000tonsforFuriousand8,000forEaglecouldbeachieved.Furious–30knots,22,000tons,anewdesign–18,000tons;Eagle24knots–23,000tons,newdesign–15,000tons.ItwasalsobeingdebatedwhetherornotArkRoyalandPegasuscouldreallybeclassedasaircraftcarriers,andbeincludedintheaggregatetonnageforaircraftcarriersintheRoyalNavy. At that time there was a Board policy thatGlorious andCourageous should beconvertedtoaircraftcarriers,which,whencompleted,wouldgiveGreatBritainthefinestfleetofaircraftcarriersintheworld.Itwasconsideredthatifthelattertwoshipswerenotconverted the Royal Navy would find itself saddled with distinctly inferior carriers asregardsspeedandnumbersofaircraftthatcouldbecarried,apartfromFurious.

ItwasunderstoodthatassoonasFuriouswascompletedthedatafromhertrialswouldinfluence any decision fully to convertGlorious andCourageous. Facedwith the ever-growingneedoffastcarriers,andthefactthattheUSNavywasconvertingthelarge,fastSaratoga and Lexington to fully fledged carriers, the Admiralty issued the followingstatement on 27 July 1921: ‘Their Lordships have decided thatHMSGlorious is to betakeninhandforreconstructionasanaircraftcarrierduringthefinancialyearof1922–3.’

Although thegross tonnage foraircraftcarriers in theRoyalNavywas80,580 tons–somewhat in excess of the limit for aircraft carriers as reported to be laid downby theWashingtonConference– itwas pointedout that allwere conversions (exceptHermes)and therefore inefficient for their displacement and thiswas accepted.Eager to convertGloriousandCourageousbecauseofthegreatsavinginexpenditure(about£3million–to build a new carrier £6million), the DNCwas ordered to prepare suitable sketches.Following the lines of Furious, the original sketches show superstructure and a funnel(completedassuch)onthestarboardsideof theflightdeckinsteadof the internalductsfor smoke.Thiswasacceptedbecauseof the fact thatFurioushad tobecompletely re-routed internally all for the sakeof the funnel trunking.Theplacingof up-takeson theupperflightdeckallowedthehangarstobeincreasedinsizetocarryextraaircraftandthiswas considered a vast improvement over Furious. (See notes on funnel discharge forArgus.)

InOctober1923theControllergaveverbalinstructionstogoaheadwiththecompletereconstructionofGloriousandCourageous.Outlinesketcheswereforwardedshowingtheamountof cutting awayof themain structure and armour required, and thesewouldbeeasytofollowifFuriouswereanythingtogoby.SketchesandgeneraldescriptionsweresenttothedockyardsatDevonportandRosyth,buttherewasmuchdiscussionoftheissuein an endeavour to ensure that the work that was about to be undertaken was fullyunderstood.

AsFurious neared completion shewas transferred toDevonport for completing.Theportions of the structure and fittings thatwere altered and cut away to rebuild the twovesselswere:

1.Structureaboveforecastledeckremovedgenerallyincluding:allbulkheads;shelterdeck;conning tower;director towers;masts;mainderrick;bridges; funnel,uptakesandboilerroomventsdowntothemaindeck;allgunsandboats.

Courageousin1923,shortlybeforebeingearmarkedforconversion.Notehowmuchupperworkandarmamentneededtoberemovedfortheconversion.

COURAGEOUSGeneralArrangementsasconverted1928

2.ForecastleDeck:breakwater (39–44½stations)portandstarboardandPUhouse(37–39 stations); coalingwinches; communication tubes forward and aft. Sketcheswerepreparedandsubmittedforapprovalshowingthefilling–inplatinginwayoftheboilerroomventsandthefunnelhatchesintheforecastledeck,thisplatingbeingofthesamescantlingsastheforecastledeckinthisarea.3.UpperDeck:longitudinalfunnelcasingbulkhead11feetfromthemiddleline,81–109stationsportandstarboard;bulkheadat15feetfromthemiddlelinetoremain;

abovewatertorpedotubes,ship’ssidepocketsandstructureinconnectionwiththesetorpedotubes;screenbulkhead129½–142stationsportandstarboard;bollardsat135stationsportandstarboardandfairleadsat142stationportandstarboard(thesewerefitted again in other positions); 40lb doubling plates 134–156½ stations and 20lbdoublingplates156½to162½stations.4.Sectionsofarmourwereremoved:allholesinthevariousdecksinwayof‘A’and‘Y’turretswerefilledinwithplatingofthesamethicknessasthedecksinthearea;‘A’turretbarbetteandguns,ringbulkhead,etc.,removed;ringofarmourfromupperdeck upwards and the horseshoe armour between the main and upper deck wereremoved;the240lbarmourmaintoupperdeckremoved;60bulkheadontheupperdeckwascompletedtoformaprotectivebulkheadofthesamethicknessasthepartsnowoutsidetheringandthebulkhead;‘Y’turret:thebulkheadat154stationonthelower deck remained; the ring armour on the lower deck was taken out and thelongitudinalprotectivebulkheadswereextendedaftto154station;onthemaindeckthe ringwas removed and 150 station bulkheads filled in; the barbette, guns, ringbulkhead,etc.,andtheringarmourontheupperdeckswereremoved.5.Workbelowtheupperdeck:15inshellroomsandmagazineswereclearedofallbins,dunnage,etc.;4inshell roomsandmagazines, small-armsblankandgunners’storesweredismantledandasavingwasmadeherebyusingexistingfittings;capstanengine, anchor and cablegear andhawsepipes forwardwere takenout– the stempipes remained; submerged torpedo room was dismantled and the compartmentcleared; 15in transmitting station was dismantled; lower conning tower wasdismantled; the armoured communication tube to the lower conning tower wasremovedbutwasutilizedinthereconstruction;aftercapstangearwasremovedandre-positioned;boathoistingwinchesandgearwereremoved;kiteballoonwinchesonmaindeckabaft139stationwereremoved.

General:Beforedismantlingtheshipsthedraughtswerecarefullynotedandallremovedweightswererecorded.

Duringthesummerof1922therewassomediscussionastowhatsuitablearmamentcouldbegiven toCourageous. Ithadalreadybeendecided togiveGlorious ten5.5in,six4inandfourpompomswhichcorrespondedwith thearmament inFuriousandHermes.Therequisitenumberof5.5ingunsandmountingswerereadilyavailableforCourageous,butitwasarguedthatastronger,6inbatterymightbeabetterprospect.Therewasaglutof6ingunsreturning tostoragefromscrappedcruisers,but itwasseen thatmanyof thesewerewornout(thosefromRoyalisthadfiredmorethan1,300roundsandfromCarolinemorethan900rounds).Theywouldrequireconsiderableservicingandinsomecasesre–liningbeforere-issue,andinviewofthisthe5.5ingunsseemedtobethemostsuitable,andasimilarcalibretothatofFuriousseemedadvantageous.

LimitationsimposedbytheWashingtonTreatywere:

1.Aircraftcarrierswerenotallowedtocarryagunlargerthan8in.2.Notmorethantengunsabove6incalibrewereallowed.3.Anynumberofgunsof6inorlesscalibrecouldbecarried.4.Anynumberofhigh-anglegunscouldbecarried.

TheNavalAirSectionpointedoutthataircraftcarrierswouldbespecialtargetsandtherewere two forms of attack towhich theywould be subjected: 1. air attack; 2. attack bycruisers.

AirAttackItwas necessary to be prepared for air attacks to begin long before themainfleetswereincontact,i.e.,whiletheywerestill70,80oreven100milesapart.Being the first tomaterialize these attacks are perhaps themost important. Ingeneral it could be said that the carriers require considerable sea room toexercise their functions which means that they would be in a comparativelyisolatedpositionandwouldbeforcedtorelylargelyonthemselvesfordefenceagainst attacks from hostile aircraft. Assuming that the high-angle armamentwouldengagetheaircraftitisverydesirablethatthemainarmamentshouldbeable to assist in breaking up themore persistent formations. A high-angle ofelevation for the main armament is therefore considered a matter of extremeimportance.AttackbylightcruisersItisthoughtquitepossiblethatanenemylightcruisermightbreakthroughthedefence and attack the carriers. Also during an action the carriersmight losetheirposition(duetoflying-offandflying-on)tosuchanextentthattheywouldbe liable to attack from single enemy light cruisers without being supportedquicklybytheirownsupportships.Underthesecircumstancesitseemsessentialthat a carrier should be able to render a good account of herself against acontemporarylightcruiserwhileworking-upherspeedtorejoinherownforces.Alternatively,anyCommander-in-Chiefwouldbe forced todetachadefensiveescortforthecarrierstothedetrimentofhisoffensivepowers.Considerationoftheseformsofattackpointstothedesirabilityofan8inarmamentforGloriousandCourageous.

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSAsAircraftCarriers:GunLayoutscomparedtoFurious

Thepossibilityofacarrierbeingabletodefendherselfagainstalightcruiserbymeansofher own aircraftwas thoroughly investigated during February andMarch 1922 and theconclusionsreachedbytheCinC,AtlanticFleet,were:

InthreecasesoutoffouritisprobablethattheAircraftCarrierwouldhavebeensunk by the Light Cruiser though in two the Light Cruisers would also havebeen damaged or sunk by the torpedo planes. Thus the conclusion is thatAircraftCarrierscannotrelyonprotectingthemselvesatpresentfromtheattackofevenasingleLightCruiserbymeansoftorpedoplanesandneedeitheraveryhighspeedtoescapeattackoranadequateescort.

From thegunnerypointofview itwasconsidered that the idealmainarmament for thetwocarriersshouldconsistof8ingunscapableofhighanglesofelevation.Itwasrealizedthattheproposalwouldbemorecostlythanthealternatives,butitwassubmittedthattheextremeimportanceofthesevesselsjustifieditsconsideration.

A strong body of opinion, however, considered that the carriers should never beexposedintheordinarycourseoftacticalmanoeuvringtoattackbylightcruiserssincetherelativeimportanceofrecoveringaircraftintactwouldbeinsufficienttojustifysucharisk.If the carrierwerebrought to action, even if her armamentwere superior to that of theenemyshipengaged, itwasprobable that thedeck,hangar lifts, etc.,would suffer suchdamage that shewould be unable to continue towork her aircraft.Only in exceptional

circumstances of coursewould carriers be compelled to accept action and therefore theheavierarmamentwasdesirable.

Whengenerally consideringboth air and surface attack itwas appreciated that undernormalconditionsitwasbettertoincreasetheelevationofthesecondaryarmamentratherthan increase the calibre because this would enable the main armament to engageapproachingaircraft.Itwasalsopointedoutthatthedutiesofacarrierweretofly–offheraircraftandavoidgettingwithinrangeofenemysurfaceships.Withoutenteringintoanyargumentsthemostimportantitemseenatthattimewasspeed,whichwasconsideredtobethemainessentialofanaircraftcarrier;itwasalsoconsideredthatifactioncouldnotbeavoidedbyspeedalone,thenoutrangingtheenemywasofthegreatestimportance.Toachieve thisanycarrierwouldhave tobeprovidedwith the longest-rangegunspossibleprovided that her speedwere not impaired.Great difficulty had alreadybeenwitnessedwith armament inHermes and Eagle, especially high-angle guns. Tests forwarded byExcellentshowedthat interferencebyblastfromthe4ingunsin theseshipsreducedtheeffective armament virtually to twoguns inHermes and four inEagle.As can be seenfromtheaboveitwasfoundtobeextremelydifficulttoconvertthesetwoshipsandgivethemalltheessentialqualitiesofanaircraftcarrier:1.Suitablearmament;2.Highspeed;3. A good aircraft-carrying capacity. The conclusion of these long-winded debateswasthatneither8innor6ingunswithhighelevationcouldbefittedwithout interferingwiththefunctionsoftheshipasanaircraftcarrier.

FacedwiththeseproblemstheDNCinvestigatedseveralalternativesingreatdetail.Oftheninealternativessubmitted(seedrawings),‘Hand‘J’layoutswerethemostfavoured.The arrangements in ‘H’ and ‘J’ were modifications of design ‘C’, that is, they weregenerallysimilarto‘C’asfollows:

Design‘H’Thesix4inhigh-anglegunsin‘C’werereplacedbysix4.7inhigh-angleguns.Inadditionfour4.7inwerearrangedonthelowerhangardeck, twoontheportsideandtwoonthestarboardside.Thesegunsonthelowerdeckhadamaximumelevationofabout63°.Inordertomountthetwoadditional4.7ingunstheywererelativelycloselyspacedandthisimposedsomerestrictionintheangleoftraining.

The four after 6in gunsweremoved aft relative to the ‘C’ designwhich caused thelowerhangarinwayoftheafterpairofgunstoberestrictedascomparedwith‘C’.

Inviewofthedifficultyofmaintainingadirectsupplyofammunitiontothe4.7ingunsonthelowerhangardeckwithoutinterferingwiththeworkingofthe6inguns,ready-usemagazineswereindicatedwhichwouldtakeupacertainamountofhangarspace.

Design‘J’Thearmamentinthisarrangementcomprised4.7ingunsentirely,eighteenofthembeingindicated on the upper hangar deck forward, twelve on the lower deck and two on theupper deck aft. The twelve guns on the lower hangar deck showed high angles ofelevation.Asindesign‘H’thesebroadsidegunsweresponsonedouttwofeet.

The following table gives the approximate hangar stowage of Designs ‘H’ and ‘J’comparedwith‘C’.

Design No.oflarge No.of aircraft Flycatchers‘C’ 51 67‘H’ 51 63‘J’ 52 65

TheprosandconsofDesigns ‘H’and‘J’weresetout ina lettersent to theDNCbyJ.C.W.Henley,DNO,pointingoutthesalientfeatures:

Design‘J’(a) A uniform armament; (b) A greatly superior anti-aircraft fire; (c) QFcartridgesalonerequired,vesselsovulnerableandfrompetrol,aircraft,etc.The4.7ingunsonthebroadsidewillhaveamaximumelevationupto60°on

a good arc of training, and the maximum range of the gun as a low-angleweapon on these bearings will be 17,000 yards. On the other hand a 4.7inbroadsideisconsideredlittleuseoutsideabout12,000yardsinstoppingTBDs,asthedifficultiesofspottingthesesmallshipsatgreaterrangeareinsuperable.Against thismustbeplacedthefact thatenemyaircraftatseaor inharbour

willundoubtedlybetheprincipalfactoragainstwhichacarriermustbecapableofdefendingherself.Whatevergunsshemaycarry, todefendherselfagainst surfaceattack, they

will not deter a determined enemymaking an effective attack against such aprize. No consideration of gunfire deterred our destroyers in pressing homeattacksontheHighSeasFleetatJutland.Thecomplete4.7inarmament inDesign ‘J’has a further advantage in that,

withcontrolarrangementsfittedateachcorneroftheflyingdeckbothforwardand aft, attacks on 4 separate bearings by aircraft could be dealt withsimultaneously.Design‘H’Theproposalfortwo4.7ingunsonthebroadsideisnotliked,asitmixesthe6inand 4.7in armament. The alternative of five 6in guns on the broadside is animprovementonDesign‘C’andprovidesafairTBDarmamentwith4.7ingunsasHAarmament.

SKETCHDESIGNSShowingdifferentarrangementsforfunnel,islandandgunpositions

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUS:PARTICULARS,ONCOMPLETIONASBATTLECRUISERSConstruction Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedGlorious: arland&Wolff 20.4.1915 20.4.1916 14.10.1916.Courageous: Armstrong 26.3.1915 5.2.1916 28.10.1916.Displacement(tons):Glorious19,180(load),22,360(deep);Courageous19,180(load),22,560(deep).Dimensions:Length:735ft1½in(pp),786ft9in(oa).Beam:81ft(deck).Draught:22ft8in–25ft10in.Armament:4×15in42cal18×4inMkIX2×3pdr2×21insubmergedTTArmour:Mainbelt3in(2inplus1in);Bulkheads3–2in;barbettes7–6–3in;turrets11–9–7–4¼in;Decks:forecastle1in;upper1in;main1¾–1in;lower3–1in;CT10–6–3in;Funneluptakes1½in.MachineryParsonsgearedturbinesdriving4propellers.DesignedSHP:90,000for32knots.Boilers:18Yarrowsmalltubed,235psi.Fuel:750/3,160tonsoil.

Radiusofaction:6,000nmat20knots(designed).Costs:Glorious£1,967,223;Courageous£2,038,225.

GloriousinJanuary1930,thefirstappearanceofthenewlyfittedaircraftcarrieratDevonportWithallheralterationsandtopweightshestillmade29.466knotsontrials.

Anangleoffireof1degreeacrossthesternishopedforfortheafter6inguns.

For the reasons givenunderDesign ‘J’ and those inACNS’sminute of 13.2.24, it isconsideredthat‘J’isdecidedlypreferableandisrecommendedforapproval.

[Signed]J.C.W.Henley

AscompletedtheshipswerethelastBritishfleetcarriersnotoriginallydesignedandbuiltas such, and were more or less similar to Furious with the exception of the funneldischarge arrangements. Courageous was the first to be completed (May 1928) withGloriouscommissioninginFebruary1939.

TheyprovedverysuccessfulintheirredesignedroleandmorethanfulfilledtheNavy’sdemandforaircraftatseaat that time.AswithFurious,manyexperimentswerecarriedout in themand the resultsallwent towards thesuccessfuldesignsofArkRoyal (1937)andthelaterIllustriousclass(1940).

ArmourWith only 2in high-tensile steel coveredwith 1inmild steel,Glorious andCourageouswerepoorlyprotectedindeed.Infact,thescaleofprotectionwasbarelyproofagainsteventhesmallestshell.Aslargelightcruiserswhencompletedtheywereaterriblerisk,butascarrierstheprotectiondidnotseemtomattersomuchbecausetheywouldnotbecalledupon to faceotherships in the lineofbattle.As reconstructed intoaircraftcarriers theywerenotgivenanyadditionalprotectionovertheirvitalsexceptanextra⅝inontheflightdeckovertheentirelength.Itwasarguedthat,aswiththeirsidearmour,thisthicknessofflight deck protectionwas totally inadequate against even small bombs – in fact itwaslittlemorethanbullet-proof.Buttherewasnoquestionoftheirbeingclassedasarmouredshipsandtheywerethoughtveryhighlyofintheirnewroleasfloatingairfields.

Mainbelt:2inHTplus1inMS.

Bulkheads:3–2inHT.

Protectivedeckwasretained:1–¾inHT.

Uptakes:1½–1inMS.

4.7inguns:½inMS.

MachineryAsinFurious.

SeaTrialsofGlorious,27January1930Theshipputtoseaon27Januarywiththeintentionofcarryingouther4–hourfull–powertrials, but becauseof troublewith the air condenser pumps this couldnot bedone.ShereturnedtoPlymouthforrepairsanddidnotattempttrialsagainuntil30January,althoughnoactualtrialswerecarriedout(orcertainlyrecorded)until1February.The4–hourfull-power trials were successful although the weather was foul and she was recorded asrollingto15degreesmaximumwithapitchof2degreeseachway.

SummaryoftrialcomparedwithCourageous(sametrial)

Meandisplacement Glorious Courageous(tons) 24,750 23,460Meanrevolutions 316 318.5ofallshaftsAverageSHP 92,270 92,065

On the measured mile Courageous made 30.507 knots with 90,618shp and 317.75revolutions.

On3February1930GloriouscarriedoutherturningtrialsoffPlymouth.

Comparison:Fullspeed: Advancetactical Glorious Courageous diameter(yds) 1,200 1,07014knots tacticaldiameter 1,080 1,090 (yds)Aircraftlifts:trialscarriedoutandweremostsuccessful.Hangardoors: Windspeed,40knots.

Openbypower,22seconds.Byhand;(close)18menontackle,38seconds.

Wind-screens: upin8seconds(downinsametime).Wirelessmasts: upin32seconds,downin28seconds.

StowageofFAAFlightsinGloriousIn November 1931 it was suggested by the CinC thatGlorious could not operate 52aircraftwithanyefficiencyItwasremarkedthatmaintenancewastheall-importantfeatureandthattoflymoreaircraftthancouldbemaintainedproperlywasoutofthequestion.Anofficer inGlorious pointed out that the stowage was for 48 aircraft, but that 52 was

definitely not out of the question. The 52 aircraft could be operated (somewhatinefficiently perhaps if nine includes sixteen Flycatchers with small endurance) morefreelyiffighters(NimrodsandOspreys)wereused.Itwasnotedthatsincecompletionasa carrier she had never carried more than 46 aircraft whereas Courageous had (andoperatedefficiently)52aircraftforsometimesincehercompletionin1928.Atotalof52aircraftwasundesirablefromthetrainingpointofview,butwhennecessarytocarryfullcomplementofmachinesitwasthoughtthatthiscouldbeaccomplished.TheCaptainofGlorioussentalettertotheCinC,MediterraneanStation,dated8November1931:

1.Theproblemofoperatingaircraftfromacarrierinvolvesnotonlytherangingup,flying-off,landing-onandsoon,butalsotheefficientupkeepoftheaircraftinthehangars.Itisevenpossibletoflymoreaircraftthancanbemaintainedinefficientconditionsonboard.2.Thelimitingcondition,therefore,ishowmanyaircraftofdifferenttypescanbestowedsothattheworknecessaryforpropermaintenancecanbecarriedoutonthem?3.Theattachedlisthasbeenworkedoutandthevariouscombinationsactuallytried.ThemostsuitableforordinarypeacetimecruisingworkseemstobeNo.1.This allows of all aircraft belonging to the ship being carried, except onecompleteflightofFlycatchers.4.Fromseatraininginpeacepointofviewthesingleseaterfighterscanbestbesparedasthebulkoftheirtrainingandexercisecanwellbecarriedoutashore.

Alternative stowages ofGlorious which should make it possible to operate themefficiently.

1.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18IIIF – upperhangar6T/B – upperhangar12T/B – lowerhangar4oldSSFTotal46 – lowerhangar2.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18T/B – upperhangar10oldSSF – onesideoflowerhangar8IIIF – onesideoflowerhangarTotal42

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUS:PARTICULARS,ONCOMPLETIONASAIRCRAFTCARRIERSDisplacement(tons):Glorious (July1935)24,970 (load), 27,419 (deep), 27,95 I (extradeep); Courageous 23,550 (legend), 24,210 (as inclined 13 July 1928), 26,990 (deep),27,400(extradeep).Length:unchanged.

Beam:90ft6inwaterlineoverbulges,104ftflightdeckatbridgesection.

Armour:(seenotes).

Machinery:unchanged(3,800tonsmax.oil).Armament:

16×4.7indual-purposeHA/LA,fittedinsingleopenmountings;eightoneachbeam,twoatendofafter

flying-offplatformforward,twelvespacedalongthesidesofupperdeckamidships,tworightafton

quarterdeck.

4×3pdr(saluting)

24×2pdr(3×8barrels)addedinGlorious(1935),12×2pdraddedinCourageous(1936)(3x4barrelsex-battleshipRoyalSovereign).

Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedtoboth.

Searchlights: 5 × 36in: I over bridge, 3 in sponsons on port side of flight deck, I insponsononstarboardsideofflightdeckrightaft.Aircraft:seelists.

Complement:Glorious(193I)793plus490FAA;Courageous(1938)814plus531FAA,(1939)807plus403FAA.Boats(1936):

2×36ftmotorpinnaces

2×35ftmotorboats

1×35ftbarge(Courageousonly)

2×35ftcrashboats(IinCourageous)

1×32ftmotorcutter

2×32ftpullingcutters

1×30ftcutter

2×30ftgigs

2×27ftwhalers2×16skiffdinghies

GLORIOUS:STEAMTRIALSASAIRCRAFTCARRIER,20MARCH1930Displacement(tons) Revs: SHP Speed(knots)24,165 104 3,466 10.14424,540 152 9,508 14.68524,160 208 25,637 19.91524,435 270 52,948 25.5624,360 296 72,572 28.10424,260 318 91,063 29.466

AerialviewofCourageousabout1932/3whileservingtheAtlanticFleet.AsCourageouswascompletedtwoyearsbeforeGlorious(1928)herfirecontrolandrelatedequipmentwasnotasgoodasthatoftheGlorious.

GloriousanchoringinGrandHarbour,Malta,June1930.Notetheextraordinaryheightoftheflightdeckfromtheoriginalhull,whichgivesanimpressionoftop-heaviness.

3.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18IIIF – ‘F’upperhangar6oldSSF – ‘A’upperhangar

12T/B – ‘F’lowerhangar4oldSSF – lowerhangarTotal464.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar18IIIF – ‘F’upperhangar6T/B – ‘A’upperhangar10oldSSF – ‘F’lowerhangar8T/B – ‘A’lowerhangarTotal425.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar6oldSSF – onesideofupperhangar6T/B – onesideofupperhangar6T/B – ‘A’hangar(upper)4oldSSF – ‘F’lowerhangar12IIIF – ‘A’lowerhangarTotal406.6newSSF – ‘A’hangar12IIIF – ‘A’lowerhangar18T/B – upperhangar6oldSSF – ‘F’lowerhangarTotal42[SignedCaptain]GloriousatMalta,8November1931

FLIGHTSCARRIED1928:CourageousIF/F.2S/R.2T/B.

1930:Courageous3F/F.4S/R.2TIB.Glorious3F/F(Flycatchers).2S/R(FaireyIIIF).2T/B(Ripon).

1931;Bothships.2F/F(Flycatchers).2S/R(FaireyIIIF).2T(Dart).

1932:2F/F(FlycatchersorNimrods).3S/R(FaireyIIIF).2T(DartorRipon).

1933–4:CourageousIF/F(NimrodorOsprey).IS/R(9FaireyIIIF).IT/B(Ripon).

GloriousIF/F(NimrodorOsprey).IS/R(FaireyIIIF).IT/B(Ripon).

1935;Courageous IF/F&F/R (9Nimrodand3Osprey). ISIR (12Seal). IT/S/R (12Shark).

1T/B(12Baffin).

1936:Bothships.IF/F(9Nimrodand3Osprey).2T/S/R(24Shark).IT/B.1937:Bothships:36T/S/R.12F.D.B.

April1940:GloriouscarriedISquadronT/B(Skuas)andISquadronF/F(Gladiators).

AppearanceChanges1928–30

Appearance (as in Furious) particularly unattractive because of abrupt termination offlight deck well short of bows, with separate flying-off platform lower down forward.Leadingedgeofflightdeckroundedsteeplydownindome-shapedcurve,theeffectbeingespeciallydistinctiveseenbowson.Superstructureveryshortandhigh.Funnel:flat-sided,very large, occupying about two-thirds the length of superstructure. Bulges: veryprominent abovewaterline amidships.Lightpolemast stepped throughbridge.Short inCourageous as completed (1928), taller inGlorious as completed (1930). Collapsiblelatticepoles(3portandstarboard)forW/Talongsidesofflightdeck.Note that inbothshipsthemastactuallycomprisedtwopolessetveryclosetogetherabreastinCourageousandforeandaftinGlorious.InCourageousseenfromabeamandGloriousseenendon,themastappearedasasinglepole.Theshipswereeasilyidentifiedbyasingleverylargefunnel, lightpolemast, flightdecknotcontinuous tosternanda low,sloping flying-offplatform over the forecastle. The superstructure and funnel separate from Furious towhichtheywouldotherwisehavebeenverysimilar.

GLORIOUSANDCOURAGEOUSasconvertedtoaircraftcarriers(portandstarboard)

Individualdifferences

Courageous:Shortmastwithnoforwardstrut.Inconspicuousdirectors(pre-August1930only). Rounded extremity to flying-off platform. Signalling searchlights on port sidebeforefunnel.Lowerdown,smallsearchlightstarboardaftercornersuperstructure.Shortsearchlight platform before funnel.Glorious: Tallermastwith prominent forward strut.Conspicuous directors. Pointed extremity to flying-off platform. Signalling searchlightplatform.Sidebeforefunnelcarriedhigher,tallersearchlightplatformbeforefunnel.

1928–39

LightAAadded.Aircraftcatapultsinstalledandflightdeckmodified.

1930

CourageousasrefittedJune–August1930.

LAdirectorsfor4.7inreplacedbyHA/LA(asGlorious).

Arrangements of directors and searchlight sponsons at after end of flying deck werereversed, i.e., SL sponsons relocated before instead of abaft directors. Tail of flyingdecklengthenedandslightlymodified.Extraplatingaddedbeforeflyingdeckforward.

Rig modified as in Glorious, i.e., higher mast with wider yard and prominent strutsprotrudingfromthis.

Glorious

Extraplatingaddedbelowflyingdeckforward(aftertrials).

1933

Courageous

Highcharthouseaddedonbridgeand36insearchlightsremoved(May1933).

DIMENSIONSCOMPAREDWITHFURIOUSANDEAGLE

CourageousGlorious Furious Eagle

Lengthofarrestinggearforflying-on(ft):Spaceforflying-off(ftapprox.) 300 300 320

(i)afterendofflightdeck: 300 300 280(ii)forwardendofflightdeck: 165 160 185(iii)forwardendofupperhangardeck: 156 156 Cleardistancebetweenlifts(ft): 342 344 326Totalbreadthflightdeck(ft): 100 91 100Clearbreadthinsideisland(ft): 84½ 78Lengthofisland(ft): 73½ 163

COURAGEOUS:GMANDSTABILITY,ASINCLINED28FEBRUARY1928

‘A’condition(load) Draught GM MaxStability(1,000tonsoil) 25ft10in 3.3ft 300‘B’condition 28ft 4.4ft 31°(3,665tonsoil)Stabilityvanishesintheaboveconditionsat:‘A’:49°,‘B’:55°.

1933–4

Courageous

TwincatapultsfittedinforwardflyingdecktrainedforeandaftbeforeMarch1934).

1935

Glorious

AsrefittedMay1934toAugust1935.

Threemultiple2pdr(8barrels)added.Oneportandstarboardonflyingdeckforwardandoneonsuperstructureabaftfunnel.Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedinsponsonportsideflyingdeckrightaft.

CatapultsfittedasinCourageous.

Tailofflightdeckextendedaftindownwardcurve.

Midships36insearchlightsonflyingdeckremoved.

Quarterdecktoforecastledecklevel.

1936

CourageousasrefittedOctober1935toJune1936.

LAAaddedasinGloriousexceptthatmultiple0.5inwereonthestarboardsideinsteadofportside.2pdrsadded(4insteadof8barrels).

Polemastreplacedbylighttripodwithaircrafthomingbeaconaerialatthehead.

1939: Apart from tripodmast inCourageous and raised quarterdeck inGlorious, theiroriginal appearance as completed aircraft carriers remained generally unchanged(Glorioushad‘GL’painteduponflightdeckinMay1937,Courageousmayhavebeensimilar).

GLORIOUSProposedconversionto‘single’hangarship,15November1938

Individualdifferences

Courageous:Tripodmastwithextraplatformandaircrafthomingbeaconaerialhead.Tallcharthouseonbridgeandlargedeckhouseabaftfunnel.Lowquarterdeck.Shorttailtoflyingdeck,roundedextremitytoflying-offplatformforward.

Glorious:Polemast.Nocharthouse.Nodeckhouseabaft funnel,highquarterdeck, longtailtoflyingdeckandpointedextremitytoflying-offplatformforward.

1939–40:Nooutwardappearancechanges.

ExtensiontoFlightDeckAftinGlorious,1936Afterherafterportionof flightdeckhadbeen lengthened in1936, itwas found tobeagreatimprovementwhenlandingtheaircraft.TestsweremadeonpassagetoSudaBayinOctober1936andthefollowingreportensued:

Extension to flying deck is a great improvement. Themore gradual and extendedslopehasproducedasurfacewhichgivesanuninterruptedairflowenablingpilotstolandfurtheraftwithouthavingtoflythroughtheturbulencesetupbythesteeperandshorter round-down ofCourageous type. There is no question of any downwhencomingintoland.

AerialviewofCourageousabout1932/3whileservingtheAtlanticFleet.

AIRCRAFTCARRIERANDBATTLECRUISERDATACOMPARED Carrier BattlecruiserArmour 3–2inmainbelt 3–2inProtectivedeck 1inand¾in 1inand¾inFlightdeckprotection(‘D1’quality)Weights(tons) ⅝in Generalequipment 870 650Armament 760 2,250Machinery 3,130 2,350Armourandprotectiveplating 16,680 8,500BoardMargin 100 100Totaldisplacement 23,250 17,400

It was noticeable that whenwewere in companywithCourageous, aircraft toucheddown further forward than uswhich indicated a higher approach taken by the pilots inorder to avoid the eddies caused by the abrupt round-down. Although total extensionamountsto41ft,only3ft6inofthisisleveldecksothatverylittlerangingareaisgained.

Mostaircrafttouchdownwiththeirhookontheforwardendoftheafterliftandwheelsa little ahead.Maximumnumber of our striking force is 24, i.e., 18 ranged on deck, 1behindeachacceleratorand2readyeachsidetotakeontotrolley.

Althoughsuchasuccess,andplannedforCourageousduringhernextrefit,itwasneverimplemented,eveninherrefitof1939.

ProposedConversiontoSingle-HangarShips,1938Towardstheendof1938thequestionwasraisedastowhethertoconvertbothGloriousandCourageoustosingle-hangarships.

Theapparentadvantages–itwouldbeeasiertohandletheaircraft,protectthemwitharmourplatingandperhapsincreasecapacity–seemedattractiveatthetime.Thereweretwo essentials for single-hangar ships: the hangar had to be at least 62ft wide so thataircraftcouldbestowedthreeabreast;heighthadtobesufficienttoallowofthreegallerydecksofreasonablewidthforaccommodation.Toachievethesedimensionsbeamwould

have to be increased by about 14 feet. To support such an extension of the entire hull,however,would requireagreatdealof reconstructionwhichwouldput the shipsoutofservice for a considerable time (see drawing). As newer aircraft carriers were underconstruction (Ark Royal) and the cost of conversion would be high, the project wasshelvedandthendiscarded.

History:GloriousCommissionedfortrialsasabattlecruiseron14October1916,shejoinedthe2ndLCSin

Octoberofthatyear.

ReducedtoReserveatRosython1February1919andbecametendertoHMSHercules.

TurretDrillShipatDevonport,attachedtoVividTrainingEstablishment,December1920.

1921–22:FlagshipofRear-AdmiralCommandertheReserveFleetatDevonport.

September1923:ParentShipinPortsmouthReserve.

14February1924:PaidofftoprepareforcompletereconstructiontoanaircraftcarrieratRosyth.ConversionbeganatRosythbutlatertransferredtoDevonporttocomplete.

BegantrialsasacarrierJanuary1930.

Commissioned atDevonport 24February1930 to relieveCourageous inMediterraneanFleet, but actually attached to Atlantic Fleet for three months,March 1930 to June1930.

MediterraneanFleet:June1930toOctober1939.

IncollisionwithFrenchlinerFloridanearMalaga1April1931(seereport).RepairedatGibraltarandMaltauntilSeptember1931.

ExtensiverefitDevonport,July1934toJuly1935.

PresentattheCoronationFleetReviewMay1937.

BecameunitofForceJ(GloriousandMalaya)organizedinOctober1939foroperationsagainsttheGermanpocketbattleshipGrafSpeeintheIndianOcean.

LeftAden14October1939.

ForceJ:OctobertoDecember1939.

Force Jbrokenup6December1939,Malaya toHalifax escort duties,Glorious sent toColombo.

MediterraneanFleet:December1939toApril1940.

Transferred toHomeFleetApril1940 forNorwegianCampaign, arrivedoffNorwegiancoast,flew-offsquadronofGladiatorsforlanduse24April1940.

HomeFleet:ApriltoJune1940.

Employedinprovidingaircoverforconvoysandtroops,landingplaces,etc.,andtoattackairfieldsinNorway.

GLORIOUS1932

Flew-offRAFfighters(GladiatorsandHurricanes)foroperationsagainstNarvik,26May1940.

AttackedandsunkbyGermanbattlecruisersScharnhorstandGneisenau8June1940(seereport). When she was attacked she was largely ineffective because her own aircraftcomplementhadbeenreducedtomakewayfortheRAFfightersthathadbeenflownoffatNarvik.Shewasalso lowon fuel,havingexpendedmuchof itduring theoperationsfromwhich shewas just returning,whichmeant that shewas unable to reach the highspeedsrequiredforflying-offaircraft.

History:CourageousCommissionedfortrialsasabattlecruiseron28October1916andjoinedthe2ndLCSin

October1917.

June1919.TendertoHMSHerculesinReserve.

March 1920. Flagship of Rear-Admiral Commanding Reserves and attached toPortsmouthGunnerySchool.

TwoviewsdepictingGloriousaftercollisionwithSSFloridaonIApril1931:thesmashedbowhead-onand(bottom)

thebowfromtheportside.

GloriousentersMaltaaftertemporaryrepairstothebow.CompleterepairstookuntilSeptember1931.

August 1923. Hoisted the Flag of Rear-Admiral Commanding Reserve Fleet atPortsmouth.

27June1924.TakeninhandatDevonportforcompletereconstructiontoaircraftcarrier.

Conversion commenced atDevonportDY June 1924 and commissioned as a carrier 21February1928.

CommissionedforservicewithMediterraneanFleetMay1928toJune1930.

RelievedbyGloriousJune1930.

RefitJunetoAugust1930.

Recommissioned12August1930forAtlanticFleet,replacingArgus.

AtlanticFleet:August1930toMarch1932.

HomeFleet:March1932toDecember1938.

PaidoffatPortsmouthforrefit1October1935.

PresentatCoronationFleetReviewMay1937.

TemporarilyattachedtoMediterraneanFleet1936.

Relieved by Ark Royal December 1938 and reduced to Reserve as training carrierDecember1938toAugust1939.RelievedasdecktrainingcarrierbyFuriousatRosythMay1939.

PresentatPortlandFleetReviewbyHMKingGeorgeVI9August1939.

ChannelForce(DevonportandPortland)August1939.

SunkbyU2917September1939(seereport).

CollisionofGloriousandSSFloridaExtract from letter written by Mr. Newnham (Assistant Constructor) to DNC, 5 April1931:

At1630on1/4/31Gloriouswassteamingatabout16knotsinafog.ShecameintocollisionwithSSFlorida,thebowsofGloriousstrikingSSFloridanearlynormallybetweennos.1and2holdsandpenetratingtojustbeyondthecentrelineof theship.Theresultingholewas36ftwideandapparentlyextendedforthewholedepthofSSFlorida.Damage toGloriouswas found tobe as follows: (This is apartof a report

sentintototheCaptainbeforewearrivedatGibraltar.Theunderwaterdamagebeingunknown.)ThelowerFlying-OffDeckisbuckledforabout60ftfromtheforeend.The

CableDeckiscompletelysmashedto10station,the2BowerHawsepipesbeingwrenchedupwiththestructurebeingcompletelyentangledinthewreckage.Theportbowerpipeiscrackedbeyondrepair.Thesheethawsepiperemainsinplace,butallitsholdingdownrivetshavesheared,andtheweightofalonglengthofcablewouldprobably tear it from thestructure.Thesheetanchorhas lostonefluke and the starboard bower anchor shank is bent. The fashion plate andadjoining plating has been torn away and bent round to port. Between CableDeck and Upper Deck everything is smashed as far as and including 10bulkhead. Seamen’s urinals are damaged. BelowUpperDeck no examinationhas beenmadeon the fore sideof 10bulkhead asmanholewas coveredwithdebris. An examination of the after side showed the following state of 10Bulkhead:Upper–MainDeck–Buckledwithsomeplatingtorn.Main–LowerDeck –Bulkhead intact. Lower – Platform –A fewweeping rivets. PlatformKeel – Intact. The bulkhead was shored up and on arriving at Gibraltarconditionswerethesame.

Gloriousc.1930/32.MatelotsandMarinesgatheredontheflightdeck.Notetheheightoffunnelandthecamberinthedeck.Duringtheearlyyears,GloriousandCourageouswerepracticallyidentical.

PlentyofroomforSundayservice.

CourageousinJuly1934whileservingwiththeHomeFleet.

TheCommandersuggeststhatthiswouldbeagoodopportunityforgivingGloriousanarrowerlowerFlying-OffDeckfrombeforetheforemostgunstotheforeend.Aircraftflyingoffdonotrequiresowideaplatformasformedbytheafterpartofthisdeck.Therewouldbelesslikelihoodofitsbeingliftedbyheavyseas.Cableworkshouldbefacilitated;andincidentallyweightshouldbesaved.

CourageousunderrefitatPortsmouthin1936,duringwhichshereceivedatripodforemast.

CourageousinJuly1937.Notetheshortextensiontotheflightdeckaft,unlikethatofGloriousduringthisperiod.

CourageousinMay1937,showingmodifications.Notethebridgeworkandnewtripod.

CourageousinJuly1937.Agoodbowview,thisshowstheextraordinaryheightoftheflightdeck,bridgeandfunnelsfromthewaterline.Thephotographalsohighlightsthemassiveanti-torpedobulges.

GloriousattheCoronationFleetReview,18May1937.

GloriousinMay1937,showingtheextensiontotheflightdeckaft.Thisrefit,whichtookfromJuly1934toJuly1935,wasnevercarriedoutinCourageous.

BattleDamageSinkingofCourageousbyU29On16September 1939Courageous sailed fromPlymouth for theAtlantic to carry outoffensive air operations against enemy submarines off the south-west coast of Irelandescorted by four destroyers. On 17 September Courageous had been steaming to thewestward at high speed. This course and speedwere assumed in order to decrease thedistanceforthehomingofastrikingforceoffouraircraftwhichhadleftat1615hoursforan attack on a submarine which was shelling SSKafiristan. At the same time as thestrikingforceleft,thedestroyersInglefieldandIntrepidweredetachedtofollowthemupforhuntingthesubmarine.Atabout1920hoursCourageousturnedtothesouth-eastwardinto thewindandreducedspeed tofly-on thestrikingforceagain.At that timetheshipwas screenedby thedestroyer Ivanhoe on the port bow and Impulsive on the starboardbow.

Shiphitbytorpedo

Atabout1955thereweretwoheavyexplosionsinrapidsuccession.Allthelightsinthe

shipwentoutatonceandtheshipalmostimmediatelytookaheavylisttoport.Theshiphadalreadybeendarkenedalthoughthesunhadnotyetquitesetwhenthiswasdoneandalldead-lightsandmostof thescreendoorswere thereforeclosed.Itwasestimatedthatthe ship finally sankabout2015only twentyminutesafterbeinghit.No torpedo trackshadbeenseennorhadthepresenceofasubmarinebeendetectedbythescreenwhichwasregainingstationafterstartingaturnbyRedPendant.

PositionofTorpedoHits

FromstatementsmadebyofficerandratingsurvivorsitwouldappearthatonetorpedohittheportsideapproximatelyabreastthePettyOfficers’Flat.Thesecondhitappearstohavebeenatabouttheafterendof‘B’boilerroom.Officersandratingswhowereonthebridgecouldgivelittleinformationinthisrespectasthebridgebeingonthestarboardside,anyviewtoportismuchrestrictedbytheflightdeck.AllelectricpowerwentoffatonceafterthetorpedoeshitandtheTyfonsirenstartedandcouldnotbestopped.ImmediatelyaftertheexplosionstheQuartermasterreportedthattheshipwouldnotsteer.TheCaptainthenorderedtheship’spositiontobegiventotheW/TOffice.Meanwhilethesignalbookshadbeencollectedonthesignalbridgeandtheunweightedonesplacedinaweightedcanvasbag.Theywerethentakendowntothecompassplatformreadyfordestruction.Abouttenminutes after beinghit somebulkheadswereheard to collapse and the list increased toabout35°.At thesametimetheCaptainordered the internationalcodesignal ‘Standbyme’tobehoisted.Thiswasdone.Hethensaidthatanyonewhowishedtoleavetheshipwasatlibertytodoso.

Lieutenant E. Shenton was on watch in the forward centre engine room andimmediatelyafterthedoubleexplosionalllightsintheengineroomwentout.

The ship took a heavy list to port immediately and Lieutenant Shenton ordered thestarboardenginestobestopped.Hethenorderedtheengineroomtobeevacuated.Inthemeantimethesteampressurewasfallingrapidlyandtherewasaconsiderablesteamleakon the port side. Lieutenant Shenton therefore operated the emergency bulkhead valveclosinglever,andrangthesprayertelegraphstozero.Ashewasleavingtheengineroomthe revolution telegraph from the bridgewas rung down.A stoker coming up from theboilerroomwithhisoverallsonfirecouldgivenoinformation.Othermencameupfromtheboilerroomslaterbutnostatementsweretakenfromthem.

Actionbetweendecks

Thisamountedtoverylittle.All the importantwatertightdoorswerealreadyclosedanddue to the heavy list of the ship and the fact that there were no lights or broadcasterworkingtheremaindercouldnotbeclosed.

Shortly after the explosion the Captain had given the order to flood the starboardbulges.Althoughtheorderdidnotgetthrough,LieutenantE.SedgwickandastokerPettyOfficerfromthedouble-bottomparty,withthehelpofaSub-Lieutenantcarryingatorch,hadproceededto‘Z’seacockinordertoattempttofloodthestarboardbulge.Thecotterpinwas removed but in spite of awheel spanner the valve could not be turned. Itwasassumedthattherodgearingwasdistortedandjammedbytheexplosion.

Actiontakenonupperdeck

Allboatsexceptseaboatswereturnedinandsecured.Owingtotheheavylistwhichtheshiptooktoportatonceandwhichfinallyreachedabout35°to40°itwasnotpossibletoloweranyboatsexceptthestarboardseaboat(cutter).Thisboatapparentlysufferedsomedamageonbeingloweredandsubsequentlybecamecompletelywaterlogged.Thefourthmotorboaton theportsiderightaftwas,however, traversedoutandsomeratingswereabletounhookthefallsassoonasshebecamewaterborneowingtothelistoftheship.ItwasonlyfoundpossibletocastlooseaboutthreeoftheCarleyfloatsonthestarboardside,andthesewerelowered.Gratingsandloosewoodworkwerealsothrownoverthesidetohelpmeninthewater.

Hangars

Bothhangarswereevacuatedbythefewofficersandratingswhowerethereatthetimeofthe torpedoes’ hit. Personnel in the lower hangar appear to have had somedifficulty inforcingawaythroughthefirecurtainswhichwerejammeddownaftertheexplosions.

Immediatelyafterthetorpedoeshit,HMSIvanhoeontheportbowturnedandattackedthe submarine. It is understood that two patterns of depth-chargeswere dropped.HMSImpulsiveonthestarboardbowdroppedasternandcommencedpickingupsurvivorswhohadabandonedship.

SeveralofficersaftontheQuarterDecksaidthattheysawasubmarineperiscopefineon theportquartershowingupagainst thereflectedglowin thewater fromthewesternsky.SomeoftheofficersloadedS.8–4.7ingunbutowingtothelistoftheshipitcouldnot be trained. They stated that HMS Ivanhoe then arrived at the position where theperiscope was seen and dropped depth-charges. Several officers and ratings statedafterwards that they saw the stern of the submarine come up out of thewater after thedepth-charge attack. It is considered that this was quite probably the position of thesubmarineafterherattack,asHMSCourageouswasstillcarryingagooddealofwayforsomeminutesafterthetorpedoesstruck.

CaptainW.T.Makeig-Jonesand518ofhercrewwerelost.Thedestroyerspickedupthesurvivors andU29wasvigorously hunteduntilmidnight.Further attempts to locate thesubmarinecontinuedfortwodaysafterwardsbuttheU-boatescapedandreturnedsafelytohomebase.

TheLossofGloriousOn themorning of 8 June 1940Glorious, escorted by the destroyersHMSAcasta andHMS Ardent, left the Narvik area bound for Scapa Flow, after participating in theevacuationofBritish forces fromNorway; the carrier hadonboard someRAF fightersanda fewSwordfish.At1600on the sameday,whileoffNarvik, twoenemywarshipsweresightedtothenorth-westward.ArdentwasorderedtoinvestigatethecontactswhichprovedtobetheGermanbattlecruisersScharnhorstandGneisenau,whileGloriousturnedto the southward, unsuccessfully attempting to fly off her Swordfish aircraft. At 1631Scharnhorstopenedfireatarangeof27,800yards,closelyfollowedbyGneisenau.BothBritishdestroyersmadefortheenemyathighspeed,layingasmokescreen,whichprovedmosteffective, silencing thebattlecruisers’guns fora time.Theoutcome,however,wasalready a foregone conclusion. Glorious was completely out-ranged, her 4.7in gunsprovingof littleuse,andshortlyafter theactionbeganshereceivedahit in theforward

upperhangarwhichstartedafire,destroyingtheRAFHurricanefightersstoredthere,aswellaspreventingaccesstotheaircrafttorpedoeswhichwerealsokeptthere.At1700asalvohitthebridgeandat1715shereceivedaheavyshellhitaft.Fiveminuteslatertheorder was given to abandon ship and she sank at 1740, leaving only 43 survivors.MeanwhileArdenthadbeensunkat1728afterfiringalleighttorpedoes,withoutsuccess.Acasta steered to the south-east, concealed by smoke, and then fired a salvo of fourtorpedoes,ofwhichonehitScharnhorstabreast theafter11ingunturret,causingseveredamageandreducingherspeed.At1808afinalsalvodevastatedAcastaandtheorderwasgiventoabandon,theshipsinkingsoonafterwards.Casualtiesfromthethreeshipswereheavy:atotalof1,515NavalandRAFpersonnellosttheirlives.

AmostinterestingaccountoftheincidentisgiveninthereportwrittenbyGermanstaff.

Areporton theaction foughtby theScharnhorstandGneisenauwithHMSGloriousand her destroyer escort on June 8th, 1940, written by Konte-admiral Schubert frommemoryon19thJuly,1945,andsubmittedtotheFlagOfficersSchleswig-Holstein.

IwasExecutiveOfficerof thebattleshipScharnhorst,which togetherwith thebattleshipGneisenausanktheAircraftCarrierGloriousandthetwodestroyersArdent andAcasta in the North Sea on June 8th, 1940.My action station asExecutiveOfficerwas in the ship’s control room.But Iwas on the bridge atvarious times toget apictureofhow thebattle situationwasdeveloping.Thefollowingstatementsare thereforebasedonnotonlymyownobservation,buton reports which I received during the course of the battle, or which weresubsequently given to me by other officers of the ship. I no longer possesswrittendocumentsforthisreport.Itiswrittendownfrommemory.After a brief action off Narvik, involving the two battleships and the light

naval forcesattached to theunit, thebattleship sailednorthwardsonJune8th,1940withoutanyescortingvessels,becauseofnews,asfarasIcanremember,ofthepresenceofanAircraftCarrierformationintheareaofJan-Mayen.Intheafternoon, at about1700, a cloudof smokeat adistanceof about25miles tostarboard was sighted from the foretop of the Scharnhorst through the goodlensesofthetargetindicator.TheforceoftwobattleshipsunderthecommandoftheCinCaboardtheGneisenau,proceededathighspeedtowardsthiscloudofsmoke. The Scharnhorst was at this time on the starboard quarter of theGneisenau.On drawing closer, first of all a trellismastwas recognized, latertwo further masts. At first the impression was gained that there were onebattleshipand twocruisers.Finally,however, theaircraft carrierGloriouswasrecognizedincompanywithtwodestroyers.One of the two destroyers detached itself from the force, and firing

recognition signals, approached the two battleships. The recognition signalswerenotanswered.Thebattleshipsopenedfirewiththeirfor’ardheavygunsonthe aircraft carrier from a distance of about 13 miles. Thereupon one of theescortingdestroyers tookup a positionon the port side of the battleships andfrom there carried out a torpedo attack, while the second escorting destroyerremainedwith thecarrier. It couldbeobserved that in theaircraft carrier theyhadimmediatelybeguntobringtheaircraftondeck.

Thebattleships’firstorsecondsalvohadalreadyscoredahitontheaircraftcarrier.At that timeshewasproceedingata speedof30knots.Theescortingdestroyerinthecompanyoftheaircraftcarrierlaidasmoke-screenbetweentheretreating carrier and thebattleships, and thus effectivelywithdrew the carrierout of sight of the battleships. In carrying out this manoeuvre the destroyersteamedathighspeedthroughtheheavyfireofthetwobattleships.Afterlayingthesmoke-screenshetookuppositionontheleftedgeofthesmoke-screen(asseen from the battleships), and from there opened fire on the two battleships.Thesalvosfellveryshort,as therangewasmuchtoogreatfor thedestroyer’sguns.Thesalvosfromthecarrieralsofellveryshort.The destroyer on the port side of the battleship force again attacked with

torpedoes, and endeavoured in an extremely skillful manner to escape theeffective defensive fire of the medium guns of the battleships by constantalterationsofcourse.Finally thisdestroyeralsoopenedfireon thebattleships.She fought with a dash which was outstanding in a hopeless situation. Thedestroyerreceivednumeroushitsandfinallywentdown,steamingathighspeedwithherenginesapparentlyundamagedandfiringherfor’ardguns(bowchaser)tothelast.Thelastfightingrangewasabout5miles.Afterthebattleshipforcehad penetrated the smoke-screen, the Glorious was again sighted at a greatdistance. The heavy guns opened fire from the bows and very quickly theaircraft carrier received further hits.The fighting range quickly narrowed, butstill remainedcomparativelygreat.Thecarriersustaineda list toportandwasonfireuntilitfinallycapsized.Thedestroyerwith thecarrierclosed toattack thebattleship force, andat a

verycloserangefiredtorpedoesatthebattleshipswhichtookevasiveaction.Atthis stage of the battle, at about the time of the carrier capsizingScharnhorstreceivedatorpedohitonthestarboardsidebytheheavyfor’ardturret.Aswasrevealed later the hole torn in the ship’s sidewas of considerable extent. Themagazines of the heavy turret were directly penetrated and caught fire. Thestarboard enginewas put out of action, and the starboard shaftwith the shaftmountingswas torn away from the hull.A large amount ofwater entered theship; the ship’s situationwas becoming difficult, and in particular themiddleengineroomwasgraduallyfilledwithwater.Theshipstillcontinuedtheactionwiththedestroyerwhichwasnotveryheavilydamaged.Thedestroyer,withhergreatlyinferiorarmament,foughtahopelessfightagainstthebattleships.Asfaras Ican remember, shescoredaminorhitwithhergunson themiddleof thesecondheavyturret.Thecarrierhadmeanwhilecapsizedandsunkfarasternoftheship.Whenthe

destroyerwithhergunsoutofactionceasedfire, thebattleshipsdid thesame.ThesituationcausedbytheseveredamagetotheScharnhorstmadeitnecessaryaboveallforthedamagedshiptoreturntothenearestNorwegianharbourandforthisthenecessarystepshadtobetakenatonce.TheNarvikareawasstillinBritish hands, and the nearest harbour was Trondheim. As far as I canremember,theactiontookplaceatabout70degreesnorth.Thetwobattleships,leavingthedestroyerwhichwasdamagedbutstillafloat,proceededsouthwardsatagreatlyreducedspeed.

It was not clear as to whether the torpedo hit on Scharnhorst was reallyscored by the destroyer in her advanced position or whether it was hit by asubmarine. At first the latter seemedmore probable. To remain longer at thesceneoftheactionwas,therefore,notjustified.Not only the tactical handling, but the audacity andpluckof thedestroyers

were outstanding. Every officer taking part in the action was of the sameopinion.Thedestroyersputtheirutmostintothetask,althoughintheirhopelesspositionsuccesswasimpossiblefromthestart.

HoodDesignThebasicconceptofHood’sdesignbeganon8November1915whentheDNCwasaskedtoprepareanewbattleshipdesignalongthelinesofanimprovedQueenElizabeth.TothisendTennysond’Eyncourtforwardedthefollowingdata:

Length:760ft.

Beam:104ft.

Draught:23/25ft.

Displacement:31,000tons.

ShaftHorsePower:75,000.

Speed:26/27½knots.

Fuel:1,000tonsofoil,3,500tonsmax.

Armament:8×15in,12×5in,2×3in,4TT.

Armour:mainbelt10in,upperandlower6½–3inends5–3½in,barbettes10in,turrets11–9in,CT11in,uptakes1½in,upperdeck1in,maindeck1½in,middledeck2–1in,lower3–2½in.

General equipment: 750 tons, armament: 4,750 tons, armour and backing: 9,150 tons,machinery:3,550tons,hull:11,650tons,BM:150tons.

Theinitialdesign,asusual,wasmodifiedslightlytogivedifferentversionsonthesametheme, but at this time the primary idea was still to build a superior battleship. ThemodifiedfiguresofJanuary1916show:

750ft×90ft×25ft3in.

Displacement29,500tons

ShaftHorsePower60,000

Speed25kts.Otherwisesameasbefore.

DESIGN‘3’:LEGEND,27MARCH1916Displacement(tons):36,250–36,300

Length:810ft(pp),860ft(oa).

Beam:104ft.

Draught:26/29½ft

Armament

8×15in

12×5.5in.

Armour

8–5–3inamidships.5–4inforward,4inaft,bulkhead4–3in,barbettes

9in,turrets11–10in,CT10in,DirectorTube6in,funneluptakes1½in,

forecastledeck1½in,upper1in,main1½,lower2–1in.

Weights(tons)

Hull,etc.14,070

Armour10,100

Machinery5,200

Generalequipment4,750

Fuel1,200

BM180

Aftersomediscussiontwomoremodifiedversionswereadoptedwhenitwashopedthatthe best of both worlds would be highly advantageous in perhaps having a very fastbattleshipratherthanaslowbattleshipandafastbattlecruiser.By24January1916therewerenowfourdesignstodiscuss,‘A’and‘B’,asalreadymentioned,theothertwobeingdesignated ‘C’ and ‘C2’. ‘C’ 660ft × 104ft × 23–24ft.Displacement 27,600 tons. ShaftHorsePower40,000.Speed22knots.‘C’2610ft×100ft×24/25ft.Displacement26,250tons.ShaftHorsePower40,000.Speed22knots.Otherwiseallspecificationsthesame.

Aconferencewasheldon26 January1916 todiscuss layouts.TheSecondSeaLordpointedoutthat,‘…wearenotbuildingbattlecruisersintheabsenceofinformationonthenewGerman construction andwemust act on the assumption that they are keeping uptheirapprovedprogramme’.

GreatattentionwaspaidtoaseriesoflettersfromtheCommander–in–Chief,AdmiralJellicoe,whohadtheadvantageofthelatestwarexperience.Hisguidelinesassetoutinaletterdated8February1916reflectedthefollowing:

1.Wedonotrequiretobuildbattleshipsatthemoment.2.Oursuperiority isverygreatandgivesnocause foruneasiness in regard tothistypeofship.3. Weakness in future will lie in the battlecruiser type especially thosepossessing high speed. Germany is building at least three very fastbattlecruisers,theHindenburg,VictoriaLouiseandFreyainadditiontoLützowand almost certain to approach 30kts, which will be in excess of ourbattlecruisers.4.Almostcertainthatthelastthreewillhave15.2inguns.5.Any armoured vesselwhichwe are building should be of the battlecruisertypeandtheneedisgreat.6.Glorious is unable to competewith theGerman ships owing to inadequateprotectionandthesameappliestotheRepulse.7.Insomebattleshipdesignsforwardedthespeedvariesfrom25to27kts.This

intermediate speed is to my mind of little use. Either they should bebattlecruisersof30ktsorbattleshipsof22kts.8. I am attempting to use theQueen Elizabeth class as a fast wing but theirexcessinspeedisofverylittleuseanditisquestionablewhethertheycangettoheadofthelineofdeploymentwithoutblanketingthebattleline.9.Requirementsarebattlecruisersat30kts.Notlessthan8guns.10.None of our armoured decks in battlecruisers are sufficient. Lower decksshould be not less than 2½in thick and the funnel casing requires betterprotection.

FurnishedwithsuchadvicetheFirstSeaLordaskedtheDNCtopreparenewdesignsforamuchlargertypeofbattlecruiser.

TheBoardgenerallyfavoureddesignNo.3andwithsomemodificationitwasworkedoutindetail.Thelegendappearedon27March1916showingthesamespeedasNo.3forlessSHP(144,000)butanarmouredbeltofonly8inchesmaximum.InApril theBoardapprovedthedesignandorderedfourofthetypewhichweretobeknownasthe‘Admiral’class.

WorkonHoodcommencedinMay1916,butasaresultofexperienceatJutlanditwasdecidedtomodifythedesigntosecureincreasedprotection,ithavingbeenfoundpossiblesubstantiallytoimprovethisbyacceptingdeeperdraughtandslightlyreducedspeedbutwithout any radical alteration in the design as a whole. Improvements in gunnery andtorpedoequipment,bridgeandconningtowerdesign,etc.,wereincorporatedatthesametime, the details being worked out in collaboration with the CinC Grand Fleet. ThemodifiedprotectionplanwascompletebySeptember1916andfourshipswerelaiddownintheautumnof1916althoughtherevisedplanswerenotfinallycompletedandapprovedinalldetailsuntil1917(seefinallegend).

Principalmodificationsontheoriginaldesignwere:

1.Nominaldraughtanddisplacementincreasedby3feetand4,900tonsrespectively.2. Elevation of 15in guns increased from 20 to 30 degrees with correspondingincreaseinrange.3.Firecontrolandrange-findingequipmentformainandsecondarygunsimproved.4.Fourabove-watertorpedotubesaddedwithimprovedtorpedocontrolequipment.5.Armouronbelt,decks(overmagazines)andbarbettesincreased.6. Hull sides sloped inboard to waterline, offering abnormal angle of impact toprojectilesandincreasingeffectivearmourthickness.7.Specialanti-flashprotectionfittedtomagazinesandammunitionhoists.8.Estimatedspeedreducedby1knotalthoughontrialstheoriginaldesignspeedwasexceededbyafractionofaknot.

9.Conningtowerandbridgedesignimproved.

The revised design, which represented a merging of battleship and battlecruisercharacteristics, constituted what was then a unique combination of offensive power,protectionandspeedandamountedtoabattlecruisereditionoftheQueenElizabethclass,themarkedriseindisplacement(13,700tons)resultingmainlyfromthematerialincreaseinhorsepower(69,000)requiredtoraisespeedfrom25to31knots.

It alsomarked the finalabandonment in theBritishNavyof theoriginalbattlecruiserconcept,embodiedtovaryingdegreesinalltheprecedingclasses,inwhichprotectionwassacrificed to an extent which rendered them unfit to engage other capital ships andresulted in the lossof three shipsat Jutland.Althoughbenefitingconsiderably from thelessons learnedat Jutland, thedesigndidnot fully embodyall 1914–18war experienceandwasneverofficiallyrecognizedasrepresentingtheidealpost-Jutlandtype.Principalpointsopentocriticismwere:1.Lowratioofoffensivepowertodisplacementwithonlyeightgunson41,200tons.2.Retentionofrelativelylightarmouronuppersidesinsteadofconcentrating protection on belt, deck and gun positions, and absence of any armouredprotectiontosecondaryguns.

Early in 1917 the Germans ceased worked on the three Graf Spee class, andconstructiononAnson,Howe andRodney was suspended inMarch 1917, the contractsbeingfinallycancelledinOctober1918after£860,000hadbeenspentonthem.Thehullsweredismantledtocleartheslipsafterthearmistice.

Withaviewtobringingherdefensivequalitiesasfaraspossibleintolinewithmodernrequirements,Hoodwasearmarkedearly in1939formajor reconstructionalongsimilarlines toRenown, although the outbreak ofwar in September 1939 prevented this frombeing carried out and the ship was never modernized to any sufficient extent.Modificationsweretohaveincluded:

FINALLEGEND,20AUGUST1917Displacement:41,200tons.

Length:810ft(pp),860ft(oa).

Beam:104ft.

Draught:28/29ft.

Freeboard:29ftforward,21ft11inamidships,18ft9inaft.

Armament

8×15in80rpg

12×5.5in150rpg

4×4in200rpg

2×21insubmergedTT,8×21inabovewater(changedto4atalaterdate).

SHP:144,000for31knots.

Fuel:1,200–4,000tonsoil.

Armour

21ft6inabovewaterlineatnormalload,3ft3inbelow.

Main belt 12–7–5in, 6–5in forward, 5–4in aft, bulkheads 5–4in aft, 5–4in fore and aft,barbettes 12in max, turrets 15–12–11in, TCT 9–7in, Funnel uptakes 2–1½in, Decks:Forecastle2–1½in,Upper2–l–¾in,Main3–2–1½–1in,Lower1½–1inforward,3–1½–1inaft.

Weight(tons)

Hull,etc.14,950

Armour13,550

Machinery5,300

Armament5,200

Generalequipment800

BM145

LAUNCH,22AUGUST1918Length:810ft5in(pp)Beam:104ft2in.Beam:103ft11Min(asmoulded).Depthofkeelfromforecastle:50ft6in.

Breakage:Longitudinallyinadistanceof610ft=2 thsinhog.

Transverseinadistanceof88ft= thshog.

Displacement:21,720tons.

Armament:74tons.

Machinery:1,620tons.

Armament:1,184tons.

Menandequipmentonboard,etc:310tons.

3,188tonstotal.

1.Newdual-purpose(HA/LA)secondaryarmament.2.Removaloftorpedoarmament.3.Additionofaircrafthangarsandcatapult.4.Increasedprotection,especiallyhorizontal.5.Newmachineryandnewhigh-pressureboilers(seenotesonreconstruction).

Hoodin1922.Shewasoneofthemostinterestingwarshipsduringtheinter-waryearsinthefactthatshewasahybrid.Shewasafast,well-protectedshipbutwitharelativelyweakdeckby1921standards.SheisseenhererunningtrialsfortheNavy.

HoodservedintheHomeFleet1939–40;ForceH(Gibraltar)1940–1;HomeFleet1941,lostMay1941.

HullTheoriginaldesign,towhichworkcommencedon27March1916,calledforanominalload displacement of 36,300 tons with the same length and beam but with 3 feet lessdraught.Additionalprotectionworked into thedesignas revisedon thebasisof Jutlandexperienceincreasednominaldraughtanddisplacementby3feet.Thereviseddesignwasnominally 12,700 tons heavier than Tiger, previously the heaviest (although not thelongest)shipbuilt for theRoyalNavy,withanincreaseof156feet length(oa)and14ft9in beam, butwith the samedesignedmeandraught.Comparedwith theRenown classdisplacementincreasedby14,700tonswithanincreaseof66½ftinlength(oa),15ft4inbeam and 3ft draught. This substantial rise in displacement over earlier ships wasnecessitatedinordertocombineallrequirementsofarmament,protectionandspeed,andfor more than twenty yearsHood retained the distinction of being the largest warshipafloat. The hull lines were perfectly proportioned and exceptionally graceful, carefulattentionbeinggiventoherunderwaterformsoastoavoidanysacrificeinspeedbecauseoftheprovisionofanti-torpedobulges.Heroutstandingfeatureswere:

1. Strong upward sheer forward and aft, off-setting to some extent the reducedfreeboardofthereviseddesign,althoughthequarterdeckwasstillverylowandliabletobefloodedinaseaway.2.Continuousflarefromstemtostern,introducedinthereviseddesign,andintendedtoaugmentprotectionbyofferingabnormalanglesofimpacttoprojectiles.Thiswasconsidered especially effective against plunging fire. In transverse section the hullsidesslopedinwardsfromweatherdecklevelsrighttothekeel,wheretheymetthelower edgeof the bulge, the flare being such that the outer edge of the bulgewasperpendiculartothetopsideofthehull.Thelongforecastlecarriedrightthroughto‘X’turret.ClipperstemwithoutthestrongreversecurveoftheRenowns.Bowflarewasconsiderablebutlessmarkedthaninthoseships.

Thefittingofadditionalarmourinthereviseddesignposedspeciallongitudinalstrengthproblems as a consequence of the very considerable bending moment induced by theincreasedweightofeachpairofbarbettes,whichwerelocatedveryfarapart.Constructionwas especially stiffened tomeet this demand andwas exceptionally strong, large areasbeing covered by thick plating, and heavy framing being an outstanding feature. Shellplating behind all armour was especially heavy, ranging from 2in HT over the greaterportion to 1½in and lin elsewhere. This materially increased the strength of the entirestructureandservedasadditionalarmouredprotection.Thedouble-bottomwasnotcarriedabovetheturnofthebilge.Sheprovedherselfagoodseaboatandasteadygunplatform.Atfullspeedorinaseaway,however,thedeepflareandupwardsheerforwardkepttheforecastle dry although freeboard aft was insufficient to prevent the quarterdeck frombeingfloodedundertheseconditions.

ArmamentTheeight15in42calMk1gunswereinfourtwinturretsallonthecentreline,twoontheforecastleandtwoonthequarterdeck,secondandthird turretssuperfiringoverfirstandfourth. Twelve 5.5in 50cal Mk 1 guns for the secondary armament were in singlemountings behind open shields, ten (5 P&S) well spaced along the forecastle deckamidships, two (P&S) on shelter deck abeam fore funnel; four 4in anti-aircraft guns insingleopenmountingsatafterendofforecastledeck,twooncentrelineabaftmainmast,two (P&S) abeam this. The 15in guns were the same model as those in the QueenElizabeth,RoyalSovereignandRenownclasses.Directorcontrolwasfitted:directortowerwith15ft rangefinderover thecontrol top,30ft rangefinder in revolvingarmouredhoodover the conning tower and in rear of each turret. The armoured cases for the turretrangefinderswereslightlywiderthantherangefinderitselftoallowthesetobetraversedfor fine adjustment. Range clocks on foremast, below control top, and at rear of aftercontrolplatform.

AnaerialviewofHoodduringtheWorldCruise1923,showingheroveralllayoutandappearanceasFlagshipoftheSpecialServicesSquadron.

OnthequarterdeckofHoodduringtheWorldCruiseandshownhereanchoredinGovernmentDock,Victoria.BC.Repulseisinthebackground.June1924.

Themain armamentwas equal to that of the latest contemporary battleships, but theratio of offensive power to displacement was relatively low as a result of the urgentdemands for protection and speed, this factor being one of the few points subjected tocriticisminthedesignasawhole.Theoriginaldesignprovided20°elevationforthe15ingunsas inQueenElizabeth. In the revisedplan, however, thiswas raised to 30°whichincreasedrangebyabout7,900yards.Improvedloadinggearincreasedrateoffirefromoneroundintwominutestooneroundinabout1minute35seconds.Theturretswereanewdesign(weighingabout900tonsapiece)withflatcrownsandsmallsquaresightingportscutlowintheturretfaceforlayingoveropensights.Thisprovisionofsightingportsin the turret face insteadof inhoodson thecrown,as inall theearlierclasses, alloweddirectend-onfirebythesuperfiringturretsforthefirsttimeintheRoyalNavy.Thishadpreviously been impracticable because of blast effects on personnel at the hoods in thelowerturrets.Firecontrolandrangefindingequipment,whichreceivedspecialattentioninthereviseddesign,wasunusuallyelaborate,detailsbeingworkedoutincollaborationwiththeCinCGrand Fleet. The 30ft rangefinders over the conning tower and in the turretswere the largestafloat to thatdate.Shewas the lastBritishcapital shipcompletedwithmastlocationforcontroland/ordirectorpositions.Inthelatershipsthesewerecarriedona large tower structure which replaced the normal bridgework. Gastight arrangementswere fitted in the control positions, but the transmitting station was found to becomeintolerablyhotwhensealedagainsttheoutsideair.

The 5.5in secondary armament was a new calibre introduced in the light cruisersBirkenhead andChesterwhichwere building inEngland forGreece in 1914 and takenoveraftertheoutbreakofwar,thesparegunsandmountingsfortheseshipsbeingutilizedforHood.Theshelterdeckandfirsttwopairsofforecastledeckgunsboredirectlyaheadtowellabafttheirbeam.Othershadwidearcsontheirownbowandquarter.Theyhadnodirect astern fire.Originally it hadbeen intended to carry four additional guns (makingsixteeninall)mountedattheafterendoftheforecastledeckandbearingdirectlyastern,buttheseweresuppressedwhilebuildingasbeingunnecessaryandentailingextraweightandpersonnel.Directorcontrolwasfitted,withdirectortowers(P&S)onthelowerbridge.

Therewerecontrolpositionseachsideofthemaincontroltop.Officialplansshowa9ftrangefinder on each position, but these do not seem to have been fitted until 1924–5(according to photographs). Battery sighting hoods (P&S) were situated on the shelterdeckbetweenthesecondandthirdgunsandabaftthefifth.

Thedistributionofsecondarygunswaswellplannedandtheirhighcommandenabledthemtobefoughtinheavyweatheralthoughtheabsenceofanyformofprotectionotherthantheopensplintershieldsleftthecrewsveryexposed.ShewasthelastBritishcapitalshiptohaveanopensecondarybattery.Thefirecontrolandrangefindingequipmentinthereviseddesignreceivedsimilarattentiontothatgiventothemainarmament.Atorpedo-spotting position was fitted below the main control top. Antiaircraft armament ascompleted was double that previously carried in any British capital ship. The designprovidedfora6in‘travelling’HARFmountedonathwartshipsrailsontheaftercontrolposition, but this was not actually fitted until after 1926–7. Special arrangements fortorpedocontrolwereprovidedinthereviseddesign,these,asinthecaseofthegunnerycontrol, beingworked out in conjunctionwith theCinCGrand Fleet. Therewere threetorpedocontroltowerswitha15ftrangefinderinarevolvinghoodoneach(afterhoodwasarmoured): two(P&S)abeamtheamidshipscontroltowerbeforethesecondfunnel,oneonthecentrelineabafttheaftercontrolposition.Directionalwirelesswasfitted,theaerialslungbetweenmastswellbelowthemainWTaerials,DFofficeinthemidshipscontroltowerbefore the second funnel.Shewas the firstBritishwarship to completewithD/Fequipment.

ArmourThearmouringintheoriginaldesignwasverysimilartothatofTigerwith8inbeltand9inbarbettes,butasaresultofthelossofInvincible,IndefatigableandQueenMaryatJutlandbecause of inadequate armouring, it was decided immediately after this engagement tomodify the design to secure increased protection, it having been found possiblesubstantially to improve this by accepting deeper draught and slightly reduced nominalspeed,butwithoutanyradicalalterationinthedesignasawhole.TherevisedprotectionplanwascompletedbySeptember1916,theprincipalmodificationsinvolvingabout5,000tonsadditionalarmourcomprising:

1.Increaseinmaximumthicknessofbeltarmourfrom8into12in.2.Materially increasedarmouringondecksovermagazines(extraarmouraddedtocrownsof‘X’and‘Y’magazinesfrom40lbto80lb).Deckprotectionincreasedtoatotalof6½inoverforwardmagazinesand7inoveraftermagazines.3.Increaseinmaximumthicknessofbarbettearmourfrom9into12in.4.Provisionofspecialanti-flashprotectiontomagazinesandammunitionhoistsandimprovedarrangementsforisolationandfloodingofmagazines.

Thebeltandsidearmourwasbackedbyspecial2in–1½in–1inHTshellplatingoverthegreatestportion,whichineffectincreasedthemaximumthicknessofbelt,loweranduppersideto13½in–9in–7inrespectively.One-inchHTplatingwascarriedcompetetothestembeyond the ends of the 6in belt armour and over the same height as this. Effectivethicknessofbeltandsidearmourwasfurtherincreasedbyastronginboardslopeof thehull side to the waterline, introduced in the revised design, continuous over the whole

lengthoftheshipandofferingabnormalanglesofimpacttoprojectiles.Thisfeaturewasofspecialvalueagainstplungingfire.Theturretswereanewimproveddesignwithflatcrownstendingtodeflectshellsfallingatasteepangleandsmallsquaresightingportscutlowintheface.Roofplatesinthereviseddesignwereconsiderablythickerthaninanyofthe preceding classes.The absence of anything better than open splinter shields for thesecondary guns was a weak point and the entire battery was liable to simultaneousdisablementbyasinglehit.

HoodatanchorinToulonin1923.Noteher30ftrangefinderontopofthemassiveconningtowerrangeclocks,improvedshapeof15inturrets,bridgelayoutandhulllines.

Theconningtower, towhichparticularattentionwasgivenin thereviseddesign,waslocated unusually far ahead of the bridge, affording an unprecedentedly wide range ofvision andwas the largest, best devised,most elaborate and heaviest ever fitted in anywarshiptothatdate.Thebasecarrieddowntothemaindeck.Theupperstagescomprisedtwoshells,11inouterand9ininner,withanarrowpassagebetweenthem.Inthemiddleandlowerstagestheinnershell(3in)wasfittedontheforesideonly.Theconningtowerarmourweighedmorethan600tons,thewholestructureweighingalmost900tons.

Provisionwasmade for sealing off the 15in gun turrets, control positions andbridgeagainstgasattack,butduringexercisesin1923conditionsinthetransmittingstationwerefoundtobecomeintolerablewhenentirelyshutofffromtheoutsideair.

Theanti-torpedobulgeswereofanimprovedtypedevelopedbySirEustaceTennysond’Eyncourt(DNC)andProfessorB.Hopkinson,fromtheearlypatternfittedinmonitorsand old cruisers of the Edgar class in 1915 as a result of experiments carried out inobsoletebattleships shortlybefore thewar (seeRoyalSovereignclass,notesonbulges).Thestructurecomprisedanoutersectionofwatertightcompartmentsseparatedbya½inHTbulkheadfromtheinnerbuoyancyspace,alsosub-dividedandboundedbya1½inHTlongitudinalanti-torpedobulkhead,slopinginwardstothekeelandformingacontinuationofthetopsideplatingandinnerboundaryofthebulgeproper.Theinternalsectionoftheanti-torpedospacebehindthisbulkhead,insteadofcomprisingpartofthebulgeasintheRenown class,was part of the hull proper andwas composed of oil fuel compartmentswhichwere separated fromworking spaces by an air space and an inner¾inHT anti-

torpedobulkheadabout16ft inboardat thewaterline risingvertically fromkeel tomaindeck.Within the bulge were five rows of crushing tubes over the whole length of thecitadel. The width of the bulge forHood had been determined by the weight of theexplosive charge carried in torpedoes at that date. The outer edge of the bulge in theperpendiculartotopsideofhull,themarkedflareofthehullsideallowingwiderbulgesthan in theRenowns. The bulges ran from ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes only, hull sides beingmouldedtoflushwiththese,causingnolossofspeed.Completeendtoendprotectionwasconsideredunnecessarybecausetheeffectoffloodingattheextremitieswasregardedasbeingnegligible.

Hoodin1924duringtheWorldCruise.EveryonewantedtoseetheHood,andtheladieswerenoexception.Notethefashion.

Hoodundergoingtrialsofspeedandturningcapabilitiesetc.Notethetremendouswashoverthebows.1926.

AscompleteditwasestimatedthatHoodwascapableofwithstandingtheexplosionoffour or five torpedoes (1915–18model) without anymaterial loss of speed or fightingefficiency. Internally she hadmore than 500watertight compartments.The independentventilation in all main transverse compartments eliminated the risk of water passingbetween them in the event of damage, and there were very elaborate pumping andfloodingarrangements.Thepumpingequipmentwascapableofdischargingabout20,000tonsofwaterperhour.

Thegeneral schemeofprotection in the reviseddesignwasmost comprehensive andsimilar to that of the latest German battlecruisers, the large areas covered by heavyarmour, strong framing and plating, etc., being an outstanding feature. Horizontal andunderwater protection was especially strong and on completion (1920) Hood wasgenerallyconceded tobeamong thebestprotectedwarshipsafloat, all-roundarmouringbeing rather superior to that of the Queen Elizabeth class and underwater protectiondistinctly stronger than in those ships as completed. Percentage of armour weight todisplacement33.5percentagainst31percent in theQueenElizabeths.Totalweightofprotection 13,550 tons,which excluded especially heavyHT shell plating.At the sametime protection to the main armament, magazines and machinery fell short of thestandardsaffordedbythe‘allornothing’planadoptedbytheUSNavyintheOklahomaclassof1916,butnotacceptedbytheBritishAdmiraltyuntilafterthewarwhenitbecameuniversally adopted.As a result light armourwas retainedover the upper side inHoodwhen itwouldhavebeenmoreusefullyapplied to further strengthening thebelt,decks,turretsandbarbettes.

Duringthelate1920sand1930sitwasmorethanapparentthatHood’sprotectionwasvulnerabletomodernheavycalibreprojectiles,especiallyatlongrangewhenthesewouldfall at steep angles, although the ship would become progressively less liable to vital

damage as the range approached 12,000 yards and trajectories flattened. Protection ascompletedwas:

Mainbelt:12inamidships,562ftlong×9ft6inwide,extendingalmosttotheouterfacesof ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes. The upper edge at main deck level was 5½ft above thewaterline, the lower edge along the lower deckwas 4ft below thewaterline; 6in-5inforwardextendingtowithin75feetofthestemoverthesameheightasthemidshipssection,6infor50feetbeyond‘A’barbette,5inoutsidethis;6inaftextendingtowithin80feetofthesternoverthesameheightasthemidshipssection,3inlowerstripfittedbelow12insection.

Middleside:7in–5inextendingfromforwardextremityof6inbeltarmour,50feetbefore‘A’barbettetoabeamcentre‘Y’barbettebetweenmainandupperdecks;7inbetweenouterfacesof‘A’and‘Y’barbettes,5inforwardof‘A’.

Upperside:5infromouterfaceof‘A’barbetteto65feetshortof‘X’betweenforecastleandupperdecks.

Bulkheads: 5in closing forward extremities of 5inbelt armourbetween lower andmaindecks.Closingforwardextremitiesof12inbeltarmourwith‘A’barbettebetweenlowerandmaindecks.Closingforwardextremitiesofmiddlesidearmourbetweenmainandupperdecks.Closingafterextremitiesof12inbelt armourwith ‘Y’barbettebetweenlower andmain decks. Oblique, closing after extremities of 7inmiddle side armourwith‘Y’barbettebetweenmainand‘Y’–12in–9in–6in–5in–2in.Outerface12inaboveupperdeck,12inand9inuppertomain,5inmaintolower.Innerface12inaboveupperdeck,6inuppertomain,2inmaintolower.

Turrets:15infaces,12in–11insides,11inrearsand5incrowns.

Secondarygunshields:lin.

Ammunition(5.5inhoists):¾in.

Ammunitionpassages:l½in–linportandstarboardbetweenupperandmaindecksoutsideengineroomcasingbelow5.5inbattery.

Conningtower:11in–9in–7in–6in–3insides.Outershell11inupperstages,7inmiddle,6inand3inlower(forecastletoupperdeck).Innershell9inupperstages,3inmiddleandlower(onforesideonly),5inroof,2in–¾infloor;2inbelowuppersection,¾inatbaseonupperdeck.

Sightinghood:10inface,6inrearoverconningtower,5incrown.

Revolvinghood:6insides,3incrownoversightinghood,2infloor.

Torpedocontroltower:4infaceandsides,1½inrear,3inroof,2infloor.

Revolvinghood:4insides,3inroofovertorpedocontroltower.

Uptakes:1¼in(ship’scoverstates1½in–2½inbutsomeplateswere removed in revisedplan)betweenshelterandupperdecks.

Anti-torpedobulkheads:1½inouter,¾in inner.Longitudinalport and starboardover allmagazine,machineryandboilerspacesfromkeeltomaindeck.Outerbulkheadsslopedinboardtokeelconformingtoangleofhullside.Innerbulkheadsvertical.Forwardand

afterextremitiesclosedby1½intransversebulkheads.

Anti-torpedobulges:About7½feetwideextendingovermagazine,machineryandboilerspaces.

MachineryBrown Curtis geared turbines driving four screws. Four separate sets of turbines eachcomprising: 1. Compound ahead turbines. 2. Cruising turbines in separate casing.ConnectedwithmainHPshaftasrequiredandoperatedinserieswithHPandLPturbinesat cruising speed. 3. Astern turbine fitted in LP casing and rotating in vacuum whensteamingahead.Eachsetwascomplete in itselfwith itsowncondensersandauxiliariesand could be operated independently. 210 revolutions per minutes at full speed. Theturbineswerearranged in threecompartments: twosets in forwardcompartmentdrivingwing shafts; one set inmidships compartment driving port inner shaft; one set in aftercompartment driving starboard inner shaft.Reduction in shaft revolutions, as comparedwithpreviousshipswithdirectdriveturbines,permittedtheadoptionofhigherefficiencypropellers.

The designed horsepower of 36,000 on each shaft was the highest power ever putthroughgearingto thatdate,andthe totalhorsepowerwashigher thaninanyothershipextant:twenty-fourYarrowsmall-tubeboilersarrangedinfourcompartments(sixineach)with an averageworkingpressure of 210psi.Excepting theCourageous group as beinglargecruisers,Hoodwas thefirstBritishcapitalship tohavegeared turbinesandsmall-tubeboilers.Adoptionofsmall-tubeboilers,whichhadlongbeenadvocatedbytheDNC(d’Eyncourt) andwhich afforded 30 per cent greater power than the large tubewithoutcorrespondingincreaseinweightandspace,materiallyinfluencedthedesignasawhole.Ona reductionof approximately185 tons inweightofmachineryandboilers, a30percentincreaseinhorsepowerwasobtainedovertheRenownclass,andmorethandoubledtheLions’ horsepower on approximately the sameweight; the gain, in this case, beingobtained on the same total floor space although substitution of oil fuel for coalwas animportant contributory factor in this respect. Eight widely separated dynamos providedelectricpower:twodrivenbyturbines,fourbyreciprocatingenginesandtwobydiesel.

Hood,Melbourne,Australia,March1924.Oneofherfirstmajortaskswasto‘showtheflag’.WithRepulse,cruisersanddestroyers,theSquadronwentonaWorldTourfromNovember1923toSeptember1924andcausedmayhemwherevertheywentbecauseofthepublic’swantingtoviewthelargestwarshipintheworld.

HOODAsFitted,1924.AsseenonWorldCruise

HOODBRIDGEWORK

The original design provided for 32 knots at the normal load, rather similar to theRenown class.Nominalhorsepowerwasunchanged in the reviseddesign, the estimatedspeedbeingreducedby1knotasaresultoftheincreaseddraughtanddisplacement.Ascompleted,however,sheprovedcapableofexceedingtheoriginaldesignednormal loadfigure.

Carefulattentiontothehullformmeantthatthespeedwasnotaffectedbythebulges,andoncompletionshewasoneofthethreefastestcapitalshipsintheworld(theothertwobeingRenownandRepulse).

BridgeworkAlthoughtheformofHood’sbridgerepresentedthefinaldevelopmentoftheolderstylesuperstructure,whichhadbeeninusesince1912,itwasnottoeveryone’sliking,adversecriticismsbeing:

1.Standardcompassplatformtoosmall.2.Impossibletolookaftfromthisposition.3.Necessarycommunicationsfromthispositionnon-existent.

Duringpreliminarytrialsthebridgewasfoundratheropenanddraughtyandthefollowingalterationsweredemanded:

1.Wingsfittedatthesideofthebridge.2.Canopyextendedtopelorusplatform.3.Canopygivenaliparoundtheopeningtodeflectaircurrentfromopeningnearthestandardcompassasfaraspossiblewithoutobstructingviewoftheinstruments.

Evenwith thesemodificationsandotheralterations that tookplaceduring thefollowingyears,furthermildcriticismwasvoicedin1936.

PortbowofHoodmooredalongsideandflyingtheflagofRearAdmiralSirRogerKeyesc.1920/21.

ReportofCaptain’sBridge:

There isnoall-roundview.Theaftviewcanonlybeobtainedbygoingout through thedoorstoplatformsonthewings.WhencomingalongsidetheCaptainwouldbeononeofthesewingplatformswhicharecutofffromessentialcontrols,etc.Ifbridgeiswinddownanddoorsatthebackofcompassplatformareshutconditionsarenotbad.Whendoorsatthebackareopenconditionsatthecompassaredifficult.

Admiral’sBridge:

FromenclosedpositioninfrontofcharthousetheAdmiralcannotseeaheadastheviewiscompletelyblankedbythearmouredhoodandrangefinderovertheconningtower.Frompositionsinthebridgefromwhichhecouldseeaheadandoneside,hisviewoftheother

side isblanked.Togetagoodviewafthehas touse the5.5indirectorplatformononesideandagainiscutofffromtheotherside.

These and other criticisms from officers aboard His Majesty’s capital ships led to acompletelynewtypeofenclosedstructurebeingdevelopedandthisfeaturedforthefirsttimeintheNelsonpairof1925.

GeneralNotesThebridgestructure,whichwasadevelopmentofthetypeintroducedintheKingGeorgeV class battleships andLion class battle-cruisers, comprised a heavy square cut centraltowerwithtwowingsateachside.Thenavigatingplatformwascompletelyenclosedandnotprojectedforwardasintheearlierclasses.Thebridgewassetwellabafttheconningtower.

Fourseparatesteeringpositionswerefitted:(a)inconningtower;(b)inlowerconningtower; (c) in after engine room; (d) in steering compartment (auxiliary only).No handsteeringgearwasprovided,experiencehavingfailed to justify retentionof this in large,high-speedships.

Heavyboatswerestowedontheshelterdeckbetweensecondfunnelandmainmastandhandledbymainderrickslungfrommainmast.Seaboatswerecarriedintwopairsoffixeddavits (portandstarboard)onshelterdeckbetweenfunnels.Anextrapairofdavitswasaddedfurtheraft,1926–7.

Accommodation, which embodied recommendations of the special committeeappointedshortlybefore thewar,wasmaterially improved insomerespectsover that intheearlierships.Berthingandsanitaryarrangementswerereportedasbeingnotinferiortothose in contemporary US ships. Officers’ accommodation was reported as beingexcellent, but crew’s quarters, located over boiler rooms, not altogether satisfactory.Messes hadgoodheadroombutwhereotherwise cramped and inferior to the precedingclasses.Oil-fired cooking appliances,marking a considerable advance over all previousarrangements,were adopted for the first time in theRoyalNavy. Special attentionwaspaid toventilation.Supply and exhaust fansprovided fresh air,warmed if necessary, atlowvelocity to all living spaces,with full natural supply to engine andboiler rooms, aseparatesupplybeingprovidedtoeachmaintransversecompartmenttoavoidopeningsinbulkheads.Theshipwasfittedasaflagshipbutwithnosternwalk.

ConveyedbytenspecialtrainsfromCoventry7,000schoolchildreninvadedPortsmouthon2September1933tovisittheFleet.ThephotoshowsapartyofschoolchildrenwaitingtoboardHood.

RigTripod fore and mainmasts. Stump topmast to fore and short topmast to main. Topgallantmast tomain in early period, when required to increaseW/T range, but usuallycarriedhouseddownabafttopmast;carriedthroughoutworldcruise1923–4butremovedaltogether after this. Wide signal struts, raked strongly aft, from lower starfish onforemast.CombinedsignalandW/Tyardatheadforetopmast.Mainderrickonmainmast.Lightderricksportandstarboardabeamsecondfunnelandateachsidemidshipscontroltowerbeforethis.Accordingtophotographsoftheofficialmodel,theshipwasoriginallydesignedwithoutmaintopmast,afterendsofW/Taerialsbeingcarriedtoupward-rakingstrutsatmainstarfish,andwouldprobablyhavebeenriggedthusifcompletedpriortotheendofthewar.

AppearanceChangesandRefitsShewasmuchlongerandless‘piledup’thantheRenownsandwasgenerallyconcededtohavebeenoneofthefinest-lookingwarshipseverbuilt.

No previous ship had presented such an embodiment of power and speed combinedwithbeautyandproportion,andhersizewasnotapparentunlessshewasseenincompanywith other ships. Principal characteristics: (a) Clipper stem, (b) Marked upward sheerforwardandaftandinboardslopeofhullsidetowaterline,continuousoverwholelength,(c)Exceptionallylargeconningtower,wellclearaheadofbridge,withprominentRFoverthis, (d) Solid, square-cut bridgework. (e) Large control top on foremast with heavydirector toweron roof, (f)LargeSLandcontrol towerbefore second funnel, (g)Large,flat-sidedfunnels,(h)Secondarygunsinshieldsalongforecastledeckamidships.

STEAMTRIALS:HELDONTHECLYDE(Preliminarytrialsforacceptance)18March1920.

Displacement(tons) Revolutions SHP Speed(knots)42,090 inner66.5 inner655 11.84 outer93 outer3,901 41,700 inner61 inner– 15.17 outer112 outer7,480 41,600 inner125 inner7,232 20.37 outer123 outer7,307 42,190 inner173 inner21,229 27.46 outer174 outer22,071 42,200 inner203 inner35,246 31.58 outer203½ outer37,543 44,600 inner204.7 inner40,000 31.88 outer204.3 outer40,900 Maximumspeedattainedonthisdaywas32knotswith151,600shp.ThefollowingdayHood’scalculationswere:5,000milesat18knotsand4,500milesat20knotsbasedonconsumptionduringtrials.SteamTrials:MeasuredMile,April1920Displacement(tons) Speed(knots) SHP RPM42,090 13.53 9,110 8041,700 15.60 14,630 9341,700 17.20 20,050 10341,600 20.37 29,080 12441,850 25.24 58,020 15442,100 27.77 89,010 17642,150 27.71 116,151 19142,200 32.07 151,280 20745,000 13.17 8,735 8145,000 15.78 14,020 9645,000 19.11 24,720 11644,600 22.00 40,780 13644,600 25.73 69,010 16144,600 28.37 112,480 18544,600 31.89 150,220 204

METACENTRICHEIGHTANDSTABILITY(Asinclined,21February1920)

Displacement(tons):41,125(light).Draught:28ft3in.GM:4.2ft.

42,670(legend).Draught:29ft3in.GM:3.25ft.

46,680(deep).Draught:32ft.GM:3.2ft.

Asinclined,14March1931

Displacement:41,125tons(light).Draught:28ft3⅜inforward,28ft5⅛inamidships,29ft5¼inaft.

Asinclined,15July1932

Displacement:45,450tons(legend).Draught:30ft4inforward,32ftaft

1920–39

1921:Rangeclocksremovedfromsidesofaftercontrolposition;onerelocatedatrearofthis,othersuppressed.

1922–3: Lower pair of SL removed frommidships control tower. Small tower on lightlatticesupporttemporarilymountedoveraftercontrolposition(removedJuly1923).

1924–5:Rangeclockbelow forecontrol top removed.Secondary armamentRF (9ft) inshieldfittedateachsideofmaincontroltop.TheseRFincludedinoriginaldesign(videofficialplans)butnotfittedascompleted.ModificationseffectedbyMay1925.

HOOD:PARTICULARS,ASCOMPLETEDConstruction

JohnBrown;laiddown1.9.1916;launched22.8.1918;completed7.1.1920(commissionedfortrials).

Displacement(tons):41,125(light),42,670(load),46,680(deep).

Dimensions

Length:810ft5in(pp),860ft(oa).

Beam:104ft2in(105ft3inmax.).

Draught:28ft3inlight,29ft3inload,32ftdeep.

Armament

8×15in42calMk1

12×5.5in50calMk1

4×4inAA

4×3pdr(saluting)

5MG

10Lewis

6×21inTT(4abovewaten2submerged).

Armour:(seealsoarmournotes)

Mainbelt12inamidships,6–5inforward,6inaft,3inlowerstrip;Middlesidebelt7–5in,Upperside5in,

Bulkheads:5in,Decks:Forecastle

2–1½–1¼–¾–½in,Upper2–1–¾in,Main3–2–1½in,Lower2–1½–1inforward,3–2–1½–1inaft;Barbettes12–10–9–6–5–2½in,Turrets15–12=11–5in,Secondarygunshields1in,Ammunitionhoists(5.5in)¾in,CT11–9–6–3in,TCT4–1½in,Anti-torpedobulkhead1½/¾in.

Directorcontrol:fittedintoweraloftandalsoin‘B’and‘X’turrets.

Machinery

BrownCurtisgearedturbinesdriving4propellers.

Boilers:24Yarrowsmall-tubein4compartments.

Workingpressure:210psi.

Designedshp:144,000for31knots.

Fuel(tons):1,200oilnormal,4,000max.

Radiusofaction:6,400nmat12knots.

Searchlights: 8× 36in: 2 on platform lowon fore tripod, 4 onmidships control towerbetweenfunnels;4

x24insignalling:2onaftercontrolpositionabaftmainmast.

Rangefinders

Five30ft:1ineach15inturretand1indirectorcontroltowerforward.

Ship’sboats(see1939).

Anchors:3×192cwtstockless1×61cwtstern.

Wireless:Types1–16,Types1–34,Type31(2officesascompleted).

Complement:1,475(average).

Cost:publishedfigure:£6,025,000.

HoodsleavesPortsmouthc.1926flyingtheflagofRearAdmiralCyrilT.M.Fuller.Notetheaircrafton‘B’turretandrunwayfullywooded;alsothesmallrangefinderatrearofthespottingtop.

1925–6:After control position enlarged.SLon after control position remounted abreastwithremotecontrolpositionbeloweach.

1926–7: 6ft traversing HARFmounted on athwartships rails on after control position.Thiswasincludedinoriginaldesign(seeofficialplan)butnotfittedascompleted.

1931:AsrefittedMay1929toMarch1931:Multiple2pdrAA(8barrels)addedportandstarboard on shelter deck amidships. HA RF on after control position replaced by RAdirector.Onepair24insignallingSLremountedonsuperstructurebelowbridge.Aircraftcatapult(McTaggarttrainingtype)fittedonquarterdeckrightaftwithcraneforhandlingaircraft abaft it. One Fairey IIIF reconnaissance seaplane carried. Flying-off platformremovedfrom‘X’turret.Shortwingsfittedtoupperbridge.Forwardpairseaboatdavitsremovedtoaccommodatemultiple2pdrs.

1932:Rangeclockremovedfromaftercontrolposition.SecondaryarmamentRFateachsideofcontroltopremoved.Aircraftspottingpositionadded(portandstarboard)onafterpointsofstarfishbelowcontroltop.Catapultandcraneremoved(locationreportedtohavebeenfoundinconvenient).ModificationseffectedMay1932.

Portquarterandfull-lengthviewsofHoodasshepreparesfortheCoronationFleetReviewinSpitheadRoads,May1937.Repulseisbehind.

SternofHoodduringtheWorldCruise1924andcoveredwithvisitorswhohavearrivedonsmallboats.Notethefreshairventsprotrudingfromtheportholes.

1933–4:Multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedportandstarboardonsuperstructureabeamconning tower. Flying-off platform removed from ‘B’ turret.Modifications effected byJuly1934.

1934–5:SecondaryarmamentRFremountedportandstarboardonforwardsuperstructureabeambridge.AAspottingpositionsonstarfishbelowcontroltopenlargedandbroughtinagainstrearoftop.ModificationseffectedbyJuly1935.

1936:AsrefittedJunetoSeptember1936:Aftercontrolpositionrebuiltandenlarged.AAspotting positions on foremast removed. SL and platform removed from foremast.Remaining 36in SL replaced by 44in. Upper bridge built up. Middle bridge wingsextendedaftaroundtripodlegs.

1937–8: Red, white and blue identifications bands painted up on ‘B’ turret inMediterraneanduringSpanishCivilWar.

Refit,FebruarytoJune1939:Shelterdeckpairof5.5inremoved.Fourtwin4inAAinlargeshieldsadded,2P&Sonshelterdeckabaftsecondfunnel,closetomainmast.Afterpair of 4inAA remounted in place of shelter deck 5.5in.Multiple 2pdrAA (8 barrels)added on large platform on centreline abaft control position (replacing torpedo controltower). HA directors added (P&S) on forward superstructure abaft bridge. Submergedtorpedo tube room utilized for other purposes (TT in this position removed in 1937).Additional DF equipment added. Two 44in lamps added on platform P&S close abaftsecondfunnelandsetwelloutfromthis.Bridgefaceslightlymodified.

HOOD:PARTICULARS,1939Displacement(tons):42,672(load),48,650(deep)(48,360afterremovalof5.5inguns).

Dimensions:unchanged.

Draughtgreatlyincreasedowingtoadditions:33ft2inforward,34ft0¼inaft.

Armament

Maingunsasoriginal

Secondarygunsasoriginal

8×4in(twins)

24×2pdrAA(3×8barrels)

8×0.5in(2×quads)

Originalfieldandsalutingguns

4×21inTT(abovewater).

Radar:ImprovedMF/DF(1939).

Searchlights:6×44in.

Aircraft:nil.

Protection:asoriginal.

Machineryandboilers:unchanged.

Speed:Reportedashavingdroppedconsiderably,28–29knotsmaximum.

Rig:OriginalplusDFaerialatheadofmaintopmast.D/Fcabinetonmainstarfish.

Complement:1,341–1,418.

Appearance

Original appearance not materially altered by 1920/39 modifications. Bridgework onlyslightlymodified.

Largecontroltowerbeforesecondfunnelwasreplacedbysmalldeckhousewellclearoffunnel.

Twin 4in AA amidships and prominent 2pdr gun mountings. After control positionconsiderablyenlarged.

Refitextension, June toAugust1939:All single4inAAremoved.Shelterdeck5.5inreplaced.Control towerbefore second funnel removed;originalDFposition in thiswasrelocated in small deckhouse farther away from funnel. Extension to admiral’s bridge.HACSimproved.

Refit,MarchtoJune1940:Shelterdeck5.5inremoved.All5.5inequipmentremoved.Three twin 4in AA (HA/LAMk XIX) added in large shields. Forward 5.5in openingsplatedup.Lowshieldsfittedaround2pdrguns.FiveUPmountingsfitted,oneon‘B’15inturret,fouronshelterdeckamidships.Degaussingcablefittedoutsidehull.5.5inspottingtopsconvertedto4incontrolpositions.

Refit, January toMarch 1941 (lastmodifications received):Type284 radar fitted formaingunnery.Type279AWradarfitted.HF/DFofficeremovedfrommainmast.Torpedo

lookoutsremovedfromforemast.Foretopmastremoved.

History:HoodOrdered April 1916 under EmergencyWar Programme from John Brown&Co., Ltd.,

Clydebank.

Workcommenced31May1916butsuspendedafterBattleofJutlandformodificationindesign (seeGeneralSummaryofDesign).Laiddown to reviseddesign1September1916.Launched22August1918.CommissionedatClydebankfor trials7January toMarch1920.

AchanceforsomeofthecrewtorelaxasHoodpassesthroughthePanamaCanalon23July1924duringtheWorldCruise.

Lookingovertheforecastlefromtheconningtowerin1926.

Completed full crew at Rosyth 29 March 1920 to relieve Tiger as flag BattlecruiserSquadron,AtlanticFleet.

CarriedoutfurthertrialsfromDevonportMarchtoMay1920.

Officiallycompleted15May1920.

JoinedBCSatPortlandMay1920.FlagtransferredfromTiger17May.

ATLANTICFLEET(flagBCS)May1920toNovember1923.

OrderedtoRevalMay1920,withTigerandninedestroyers,toreinforcetheBritishBalticSquadron for proposed summer operations against the Bolsheviks. Squadron leftPortland30MayandproceededviaSwedenandDenmark.

Recalled fromCopenhagen in Juneowing to change inpolicy towards theRed regime,andvisitedOsloenroutehome.

ArrivedScapa3July.

ReceivedsurrenderofGermanbattleshipsHelgolandandWestfalenandtwelvedestroyersinForth4August1920.

DetachedAugust1922,withRepulse,torepresentRoyalNavyatBrazilianIndependenceCentenaryCelebrations at Rio de Janeiro and subsequently carried out flag-showingcruiseintheWestIndies.

MASTS:AUGUST1931Foremast: length(ft) diameter(in)Lowermast steel 87 36Struts steel 100 33Flagpole wood 19 6–1Topmast wood 30ft5in 14–6Signalyards wood 30ft6in 8½–5Outriggers wood 9–10 Mainmast: Lowermast steel 92 36Struts steel 72ft9in Topmast wood 59 Flagpole wood 26ft10in Gaff wood 32ft10in Topgallantyard forW/T 30 Derrick steel 65 Jackstaff wood 50 Ensignstaff wood 21ft6in

PROPOSEDMODERNIZATION:12DECEMBER19381.Newmachinery.2.8×5.25ingunsinpairs.3.ShortrangeHAAAincreasedto6MkVIpom-poms,0.5ingunsremoved.4.FittingD111HCatapultandaircrafthangarasinKGVclass.5.Removalofallabove-waterTT6.Removalofconningtowerandreconstructionofbridgework.7.Modificationofunderwaterprotection,removalofcrushingtubesandreplacementwithoilfuelcompartments.8.Increasedeckprotection(5inovermagazines,4inovermachinery).9.Removalofupperbelts(7inand5in)andreplacewith12inplates.

Estimatedcosts: Machinery £1,625,000Armourprotection 750,000Underwaterprotection 300,000Re-armament 1,000,000CTandbridgework 150,000Extensionofforecastle 30,000Includingothersmalladditiorandalterations,thetotalestimatedcostwas£4,035,000.Afterthisrefittheshipwasestimatedtobegoodforanotherfifteenyears.

HOODJuly1931PlusModifications

Port-sideamidshipssuperstructure.

LeftDevonport14August1922,returned3December.

WithRepulseandSnapdragon,visitedNorwayandDenmarkJunetoJuly1923.HoistedflagKingofNorwayasHonoraryAdmiralinRoyalNavyduringthiscruise.

DetachedNovember1923asflagSpecialServiceSquadroncomprisingHood(flagVA),Repulseand1stLCSDelhi(flag),Danae,DauntlessandDragon,forEmpireandworldcruise.

FLAGSPECIALSERVICESQUADRON(WorldCruise)November1923toSeptember1924.

SquadronleftfromrendezvousoffPlymouth27November,proceedingoutwardsviaCapeand Indian Ocean and returning across the Pacific. Itinerary of battlecruisers and lightcruisersvariedinsomeinstancesandfinallyseparatedonleavingSanFrancisco11July1924 on the return leg, the former passing through the Panama Canal while the latterproceededaroundSouthAmerica.SquadronreformedagainofftheLizard28September,shipsarrivingbackattheirhomeportson28thand29th.HoodandRepulsevisited:SierraLeone, Capetown, Zanzibar, Trincomalee, Port Swettenham, Singapore, Fremantle,Albany, Adelaide, Melbourne, Hobart, Jervis Bay, Sydney,Wellington, Auckland, Fiji,Honolulu, Vancouver, Victoria, San Francisco, Panama, Colon, Kingston (Jamaica),Halifax,QuebecandSt.John’s(Newfoundland).

HoodarrivedDevonport29SeptemberandrejoinedAtlanticFleet.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)September1924toMay1929(flagtoApril1929).

RefitRosythandDevonportSeptember1924toJanuary1925.

WithRepulse,representedRoyalNavyatVascodaGamacelebrationsatLisbonFebruary

1925.

Flag transferred to Repulse April 1929 and Hood paid off to Dockyard Control atPortsmouth17May1929forextensiverefit,May1929toMarch1931.

RecommissionedPortsmouthforBCS17May1931.

ATLANTICFLEET(BCS)May1931toMarch1932(flagfromJuly1931).

FlagtransferredfromRepulse11July1931.

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(flagBCS)March1932toSeptember1936.

RefitPortsmouthMarchtoMay1932.

Collision with Renown during exercises off Spanish coast 23 January 1935. Hoodrammed byRenown on starboard quarter, damage to stern and propellers. TemporarilyrepairedatGibraltar.RepairscompletedatPortsmouthFebruarytoMay1935.

InMarch1935,itwasdecided,intheinterestsofhomogeneity,graduallytoseparatetheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses,stationingtheformerintheMediterraneanandthe latter in theHomeFleet.Becauseof theheavyreconstructionprogrammein theQueenElizabethclass,theMediterraneanwouldloseonebattleshipbythechange,andtheBattlecruiser Squadron was to be transferred to the Mediterranean Fleet to offset this.Squadron initially divided between the Home and Mediterranean Fleets April toSeptember 1936.Not finally transferred toMediterranean until 1936,Repulse inApril,HoodinSeptember.Renownreconstructing1936–9.

HoodpresentatJubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

Because of the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, Battlecruiser Squadron, comprising Hood andRenown (Repulse reconstructing), sent Gibraltar September 1935 to reinforce theMediterraneanFleetalthoughremainingasaHomeFleetunit.

Renown transferred toAlexandria in January 1936 and attached to 1stBS untilMay1936whensherejoinedBCSathome.

HoodreturnedhomeatPortsmouthuntilSeptember1936.

RecommissionedatPortsmouth8September1936forBCSMediterraneanFleetunderthe1935FleetReorganizationplan.JoinedatMalta20October1936.

MEDITERRANEANFLEET(BCS)September1936toFebruary1939(flagVABCSand2ndfleetflagfromNovember1936).

FlagVAand2ndfleetflaghoistedatMalta30November1936.

Flag1stBS(Barham)previously2ndfleetflag.

Employed 1937–8 mainly in protecting British interests (anti-piracy patrols) duringSpanishCivilWar.

In April 1937 stood by, with Shropshire, off Bilbao following interception of Britishsteamer Thorpehall by Franco cruiser Almirante Cervera outside territorial waters.Thorpehall subsequently released following arrival of three British destroyers. Later

samemonthescortedBritishsteamersHamsterly,MacGregorandStanbrookcarryingrelief food supplies from St-Jean de Luz to Bilbao and prevented interference bySpanishwarships.

PresentatCoronationReview,Spithead20May1937.

Stationed in western Mediterranean January to November 1938 (Marseilles-Barcelona-Palmaarea),Vice-AdmiralBCSbeingappointedSeniorOfficer.

Western Basin Mediterranean from January 1938 in connection with Spanish Waroperations.

BattlecruiserSquadronrevertedtoHomeFleetFebruary1939.

HOMEFLEET(BCS)February1939toMay1940(flagBCStoMarch1940and2ndfleetflagfromJune1939).

RefitPortsmouthFebruarytoJune1939.

Foremastandfunnel;notethe5.5ingun.

RecommissionedatPortsmouth1June1939,flagVABCSbecoming2ndfleetflagfromthatdate.

WithRenown,twocruisersandfourdestroyers,carriedoutpatrolbetweenIcelandandtheFaroes7–12September1939tointerceptenemymerchantshippingandenforceBritishblockade.AttackedbyenemyaircraftinNorthSea26September1939whilecoveringrescueoperationsforsubmarineSpearfish,damagedoffHornsReefon25thandunabletodive.Hitglancingblowonquarterbyheavybomb.Nodamage.

With Repulse, Aurora, Sheffield and four destroyers, searched for German forcecomprisingGneisenau, Köln and four destroyers off Stadlandet 8–10 October 1939followingsortiebythisgroup.Nocontactestablished.

WithNelson,Rodney and four destroyers, covered iron ore convoy fromNarvik toUK22–31October1939.

CommencedrefitatDevonportNovember1939formachinerydefectswhichhadreducedspeedto25knots.RefitinterruptedtosearchforScharnhorstandGneisenaufollowingsinkingofRawalpindi23November.

Left Devonport 25 November and joined French battleship Dunkerque and cruiserGeorgesLeyguesandMontcalm,withBritishandFrenchdestroyerscreen,forsearchinareasouthofIceland.ThiswasthefirstAnglo-FrenchnavaloperationofthewarandwasundertheoverallcommandoftheFrenchadmiralinDunkerquewhowasseniortothevice-admiralinHood.

WithBarhamandWarspite,coveredthefirstCanadiantroopconvoytoUKinDecember1939.LeftClydeforthisoperation12December.

Resumed refit at Devonport March 1940, flag BCS being transferred to Renown. LeftDevonport 26May for Liverpool to complete refit, completed 12 June.While shipunderrefit,250crew,mainlyMarines,joinedAlliedExpeditionaryForcetoNorway.

EscortedfirstNewZealandtroopconvoyfromFinisterreareatoClydeimmediatelyaftercompletionofrefit.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)onitsformationJune1940.

LeftClydeforGibraltar18June,arrived23rd.

TooffsetthelossoftheFrenchFleetintheMediterranean,followingthefallofFranceinJune1940, itwasdecided tobaseapowerful force,designatedForceH,atGibraltar,independentof the existingGibraltar command, towork in theWesternBasinof theMediterraneanandcovertheconvoyroutesfromSierraLeoneandGibraltar.

As organized at Gibraltar on 28 June 1940, Force H comprised Hood (flag VA),Resolution, Valiant, Ark Royal, Arethusa, Enterprise and four destroyers. FlagVice-AdmiralSomervillehoistedinHoodon30June.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)JunetoAugust1940(flag).

TookpartinattackbyForceH(plussevendestroyersfromtheGibraltarcommand)ontheFrench fleet at Oran 3 July 1940. Slightly damaged by shell splinters from fire ofDunkerque.W/Taerialscarriedaway.Oneofficerandoneratingwounded.

ForceattackedbyItalianhigh-levelbombersincentralMediterranean8June1940whileenroutetocarryoutairattackonCagliariasadiversionaryoperationtocoincidewithpassage of convoy fromMalta toAlexandria.Operation later abandoned because ofriskoffurtherheavyairattack.

On 31 July 1940, Force H left Gibraltar escorting Argus with the first fighter aircraftreinforcements for Malta, these being flown-off from a position south of Sardinia.Beforereturning,aircraftfromArkRoyalcarriedoutattackonCagliariairfield.ForcelaterattackedbyItalianhigh-levelbombersbutnodamagesustained.

HoodrejoinedHomeFleetinAugust1940,relievingRenownasflagBCS.FlagForceHtransferredtoRenownatScapa10August1940.

HOMEFLEET(flagVABCSand2ndfleetflag)August1940toMay1941.

WithRepulse, threeshipsof1stCSandsixdestroyers,coveredapproachestoBrestandLorientduringsearchforScheerfollowingsinkingofJervisBay5November1940.

RefitRosythFebruarytoMarch1941.

TookpartinsearchforScharnhorstandGneisenauinNorthAtlanticMarch1941.

Based on Hvalfiord (Iceland) with four destroyers early May 1941 to cover convoyspassingsouthofIcelandagainstpossibleattackbyenemyheavyships.

Left Scapa 22 May 1941, with Prince of Wales and destroyers Icarus, Echo, Electra,Achates,AntelopeandAnthony,tocoverareasouthwestofIcelandandsupportNorfolkandSuffolkinDenmarkStraitfollowingreportofsortiebyBismarckandPrinzEugen.

Theforwardsuperstructureasseenfromtheforecastlec.1931/32.

Hood,WeymouthBay,July1935.Oneofthemostgraceful-lookingwarshipseverbuilt,the‘Mighty‘Ood’showsherfinelines.

German ships sighted early on 24May off thewestern end of theDenmark Strait andactionopenedat0552atabout25,000yardsrange.EnemyfireinitiallyconcentratedonHoodalthough,throughtoanerrorinidentification,sheatfirstengagedPrinzEugeninsteadofBismarck.

LossofHoodBismarckhadopenedfireataboutthesametimeasPrinceofWales.Atabout0555HoodandPrinceofWales executeda turn togetherof20° toport inorder tobring their afterguns intoplayasonly the forward turretswouldbearat theangleofearlyengagement.ThethirdsalvofromBismarckhadhitHood’sboatdecknearthemainmastandstartedafiercefireinthearea.ThemassesofevidenceshowthatHoodwashitagainbythefifthsalvo fromBismarck and that one or two shells fell in the area of the boat deck andpossiblynearorbelow thewaterline.Thiswasat the same timeasHoodandPrinceofWaleswereputtingoveranother20°(rangeabout16,300yards).Thismove,however,wasneverexecutedbecauseat0600hoursHoodexplodedinamassofflamesandsmoke,andsankinapproximatelythreeminutes.

ThereissomeevidencethatHood’safter15ingunsactuallyfiredasalvojustbeforesheexplodedoratleastsimultaneouslywiththehit.Asmightbeexpectedinconnectionwithsuch a sudden, unexpected and stupendous happening, and the lapse of time from theoccurrencetorecallingtheincident,theactualevidencewasconfusedandcontradictory.

ABoardofEnquirywassetupbutitwasacceptedthatnowitnesstothescenecouldbe100 per cent certain ofwhat really happened. The only certain factwas that themajorexplosionwasintheareaofthemainmast.Totry–asmanyhave–todetermineexactlyhow and whyHood exploded as she did is fruitless; unless and until her remains areinspected,⋆ which might throw some light on the matter, any conclusion is merespeculation.Nevertheless,wecanbesureaboutmuch thathappenedon that fatefuldayand,followingofficialdocumentsclosely,theevidenceofobserversispresentedbelow.Inthevicinity,HMSSuffolk(cruiser),28milesfromHood:

HoodatInvergordon,11August1940.UpuntilherlossinMay1941,thegreatshipwaskeptextremelybusyandcertainlyhadnotimeforanyimprovementsduringhertwoyearsbeforedestruction.

Theplot(ExhibitA)showsthatthisshipwas28to30milesfromHoodduringtheactionand it is obvious that little could be seen, although amirage effectwas noticeable (seeCaptainR.M.Ellis’sevidence(SeriesA.26)).WeconsiderthatCommanderL.E.Porter’sdescription(A.15)givesanaccurateideaofthemostthatwasvisiblefromSuffolk.BrieflyallhesawwasgunflashesfromHoodandthenaverythinparallel-sidedpillaroforangeflamewhichwenttoabout800to1,000feet.Thiswasfollowedbyacloudofverydarksmokewhichdevelopedfromthebottomoftheflame.

Norfolk’sevidence:

The plot gives Norfolk’s distance from Hood as 15 miles. A mirage effect was alsonoticeablefromherbutitisnotconsideredlikelythatmorethanageneraleffectcouldbeobserved.Rear-AdmiralWake-Walker’sevidence(A.l)isconfidentandclear.

Thegeneralimpressionfromthesetwoshipswasasfollows:

Afireintheafterpartoftheshipburntwithaclear,reddishflame,anditappearedtodiedownandthenincrease.Thiswasfollowedshortlybyabigexplosionwhichtooktheformof a high sheet of flame shaped like a fan or inverted cone. Clouds of dark smokesurmounted this flame, and the ship disappeared.One or twowitnesses, however, e.g.,CaptainPhillips(D.6.)andMids.Summers(C.39)andBuckley(C.40)mentionedaballorballsoffireshowingclearlyintheflameoftheexplosion.

Twowitnesses stated they had seen (through glasses) a completemainmast, and twootherswhatmighthavebeenmastorderrick.Althoughdebriscouldprobablybeseen,toomuchreliancecannotbeplacedontheevidenceastoitsnature.

DESTRUCTIONOFHOOD,24MAY1941Eye-witnesses’sketches

PrinceofWoles’sevidence:

TheverycloseproximityofPrinceofWalesandthefactthatshewasinactionatthetimepreventedmanyoftheobserversfromgettingaclear-cutimpressionoftheoccurrenceanditwasfairlycertainthatnooneobservercouldrecordeverydetailofwhathappened.

ItwasclearthatafirehadstartedontheportsideoftheboatdeckofHoodbythethirdor fourth salvo fromBismarck, but the opinionwas divided as towhether it originatedbefore or abaft themainmast (evidence shows that itwas abaft) but it evidently spreadwithverygreatrapiditycoveringaconsiderablesectionoftheboatdeck.ThisfactandtheinclinationofHood fromPrinceofWaleswould account for the difference of positionsgiven.Themostreliableevidenceshowsthatthecolourofthefirewasareddish,orangecolourwithverylittlesmoke–thelatterbeingabrownorblackcolourbutcoloursfrombrightyellowtodullredandevenblueareshownintheevidence.Severalwitnesseswhoalready had experience of cordite fires definitely specified the fire on the boat deck assuch and Lieutenant Commander Rowell described it as being similar to a petrol fire.Evidence about the explosion shows that it was divided between before and abaft themainmastandtherewassomedivergenceofopiniononthispoint.Otherwitnessesonlyrecorded a flash of the explosion but others, who showed a keener appreciation of therapidevents,said that theflameof theexplosionhaddefiniteduration.Oneof themostreliablewitnessesofcoursewasCaptainLeachwhowasimpressedbytheeffectwhichhedescribed as like avast blowlampwhileChiefPettyOfficerFrench stated that theboatdeckappearedtoraiseinthemiddlebeforethemainmast.Ascanbeexpectedthecolourof the explosion under those conditions was difficult to record but it was probably a

reddish-orange colour. The smoke ranged from dense white through to having anappearanceofrisingsteam.Otherwitnessestalkedofyellow,brown,white,light-greyandblack smoke. Sub-Lieutenant Womersley, who was a chemist in private life, had theimpressionthatthecolossalvolumeofbrownsmokehadaredglowallthewayalongthebaseofit.TheSecondGunneryOfficersaidthatitwasthickdarkyellowsmokewhichheassociated with cordite. The paradox of the whole ordeal was that very few witnessesheardanynoisefromtheexplosion,onlyarumblingandafewmufflednoises–perhapsadullthudoraroarbutnottheusualnoiseassociatedwithsuchahugeexplosion.

Part of the mainmast or main derrick was stated to have been observed by a fewwitnesses.Onewitnesswaspositivethathesawacomplete15inturretwithtwogunsandasinglegunintheairandfiveotherwitnessesclaimtohaveeitherseensingle15ingunsorpartofthegunhouseofaturret.

TheshipwasobviouslysoenvelopedinsmokeanddisappearedsoquicklythatitseemsthatnoonewitnessgotacompletelyclearpictureofHoodaftertheexplosion.Lieutenant-Commander Rowell stated that he saw her fore-top falling backwards and the sternslippingforwards.HesaidthatasPrinceofWalesdrewabreastofHoodallthatcouldbeseenwaswhatappearedtobethreelargesectionsofthehullwhichwereunrecognizableandsinkingfast.Otherwitnesseswerecertainthattheysawtheforepartoftheshipwhichwasnotdamagedandseveralofthemsawherforepartstickingoutofthewaterataverysteepangle slippingbackwardsunderwater and turningover as it did so.AbleSeamanPatonsaidthathesawherturntoport,rolloverandthattwofunnelswerevisiblelyingonthewater,hecouldalsoseeajaggedpartofthestern.Allevidenceagreedthatshesankinaboutthreeminutes.

TheevidencegenerallyindicatedthatthefirstsalvofromBismarckfellaheadofHoodandthesecondsalvoastern.Itwasthethirdthathit,thefourthwascloseandthefifthhitheragain.Therewerealsothe8insalvosfromPrinzEugenwhichmadeitdifficultwhenrecording the fall of shot in the area. To compound the confusion was the fact thatwitnesses state thatHood had just fired ‘A’, ‘B’ and possibly ‘X’ and ‘Y’ 15in turretswhichalsocausedfierceflameandheavysmoke.

HoodduringtheFleetReview,July1935.AnaerialviewonthedaybeforetheKing’sinspection.

Therewereonlythreesurvivorsandtheirevidencewasall-important.MidshipmanW.J.Dundaswasnotavailable for interrogationat theBoardofEnquiry,buthehadgivenevidenceshortlyafterthetimeofhisrescue.HehadbeenemployedasMidshipmanoftheWatchontheupperbridgeduringtheaction.Theupperbridgewasclosedinandhehadnoviewaft.Hispositionwasamidshipsat thechart tableandhesawverylittle,buthisevidence suggests that the first salvo fromBismarck fell onHood’s starboard bow, thesecond on the port bow. After the third salvo the Torpedo Officer, who was at thestarboardafterendofthebridge,reportedacorditefireonthestarboardsideoftheboatdeck.Hoodfiredatleastonesalvoafterthisreportandwasstillsteamingfast.OnaboutthefourthorfifthsalvofromBismarckeveryoneonHood’sbridgewas thrownoff theirfeet,wreckage started to come down and on getting to his feetDundas saw amass ofbrownsmokedriftingtoleeward(theportside),theshipwaslistingheavilytoportandhe

hadanuphillscrambletoreachoneofthewindows.HenoticedtheOfficeroftheWatchclimbing through anotherwindow.WhenDundaswas halfway through thewindow thewatercameupbeneathhimandthenextthingheknewhewasswimming.HesawHood’sbowsatanangleofabout45°withtheforefoot,justclearofthewater,slidingbackwardson an even keel. He was quite sure that the ship received no hits forward and hisrecollectionwasthattherewascompletesilenceeverywhereaftertheshockandthattheshiphadstoppedandwasheelingquicklytoport.Therewasnoblastbiggerthanthatoftheship’sowngunsfiring.

HoodduringtheFleetReview,July1935.FullydressedandmannedonthedayoftheKing’sinspection,depictingthefinesttraditionsoftheRoyalNavy.

ThesecondsurvivorwasR.E.Tilburn,AB.He impressed theBoardasbeingaveryintelligentmanalthoughinexperienced,andatthetimeoftheBoardofEnquirywasstillobviouslyshakenbyhisordeal.Hiswastheonlyfirsthandevidenceofwhathappenedon

boardfromanobserverwhocouldseeaft,butformostofthetimehewaslyingdownontheboatdeckbeforetheportforwardUPmountingsohisviewwaspartiallyrestricted.Hestated thatHoodwashitnear theportmidshipUPmountingwhichcauseda fierce fire.The fire did not seem to spread, but he thought that the RU ammunitionwas affectedbecauseheheardnoiseslike‘explosionsofabigChinesecracker’.Hethoughtitwastoofar forward forapetrol fire–his evidenceas regards thepetrol stowagewas,however,rather shaky.He stated that the4in ammunitionhatchon theboatdeck (port side)withwhich he was familiar was definitely closed during the action. With regard to theexplosion,hestatedthattremendousvibrationresultedfromanotherhit,buthedidnotseemuchexcepta lotofgreysmoke.Therewasanoiseas if thegunshadfired, thendeadsilence. One flash of flame came between the control tower and ‘B’ turret above theforecastledeckjustashewasgoingintothewater.Alotofdebrisandbodiesfelloverthedecks,butapartfromthefactthatsomeofthosebodieswerethoseofofficers,hecouldidentify nothing.One particularly interesting point he statedwas that he saw long steeltubes,approximately15feetlongand1footindiameter,floatinginthewater,andthesewerethoughttobethecrushingtubesfromthebulgeswhichconfirmedthemagnitudeofthedamagedonetotheship.Infactherbackhadbeenbroken.

ThethirdsurvivorwasA.E.Briggs,OrdinarySignalman,whomtheBoardalsosawasanotherquiteintelligentwitness.Hewasonthecompassplatform,however,andagaindidnot see much, but he was in a position to overhear the conversation of some officers.Importantpointswere:

1.TheSGOsaid,‘…shehasbeenhitontheboatdeckandthereisafireintheRUlockers’.2.TheVice-Admiralsaid‘…leaveit‘tiltheammunitionhasgone’.3. Immediately after the explosion theOOWstated, ‘the compass has gone’ – thiswouldbethegyrorepeateronthecompassplatform.4.Briggsstatedthattherewasnotaterrificexplosionatallasregardsnoise,andhesawnodebriscomingdown.5.HetestifiedtothegreatrapidityofHood’ssinking.

Becauseofthemish-mashofevidencecominginduringtheBoardofEnquiry,thecauseof Hood’s destruction could nor be determined, so to clarify certain issues someoutstanding pointers in the evidence were emphasized by technical witnesses. It wasobvious that she had been sunk byBismarck’s 15in shells which had struck her in oraround the areaof themainmast, butwhat itwas that caused the tremendousexplosionwasuncertain.Whether the15inshellpiercedherupperarmourbelt,orenteredthroughthedecks,andinwhatareait landedarequestionsthatmayneverbefullyanswered.Inthe after area of the ship there were not only 15in and 4in magazines, but torpedowarheads which could have exploded, starting a chain reaction in other ammunitioncompartments. Technical evidence, however ruled out the torpedo warhead detonationtheory,theirevidencebeingasfollows:

1.Awarheadwouldnotbedetonatedbyashellunlessitburstinsidethemantlet.2.Onewarhead detonating inHoodwould detonate the next one in the horizontalplane.Warheadsinoneplanewouldnotdetonateothersintheplanehigherorlower

owingtothehorizontalmantlet.Warheadsononesideoftheshipwouldnotdetonatewarheads on the other side. To sumup, one shellwould not causemore than twowarheadstodetonate.

Hoodrollsatsea,exposingherunderwaterbulge,February1937.

3.Ifthewarheadsdetonatedtheywouldnotexplodethe4inor15inmagazines.4. The effect of fire round a warhead would possibly lead to an explosion, but itwouldhavetobeafireoffiercenessanddurationandtheresultwouldprobablybecomparativelymild.5.Ifanyoftheafter4inmagazines,excepttheforwardupperone,explodeditwouldexplodetheafter15inmagazines.6.Theauralandvisualeffectofwarheadsgoingoffwouldbeanoiseofasharploudcrack and a bright flash, whichwould be instantaneous, and likely to be dull-red,dark-red,reddish-brownorbright-yellow(lighterthancordite).7.Therewasnounanimityofopinionabout theeffecton theship if twowarheadsdetonated. DTM, DNO and CSRD’s representatives considered that although thestructure in the immediatevicinitywouldbeshatteredandsomeof the5inand7inbelt blown away, it would not cause a serious rent in the ship’s side below thewaterline, and theywereconvinced that theeffectwouldnotbedisastrous.DNC’srepresentativeontheotherhandconsideredthatthestrengthdeckwouldbedestroyedfor a considerablewidth and themain deck ruptured. Therewould be a sufficientrupturebelowthewaterlinetocausethewatertobescoopedinandbreakdowntheafterbulkheadsas faras259andpossibly280whichwouldcause the ship to sinkveryrapidly.

HoodentersMalta,February1938.NotetheMediterraneanlight-greypaintworkandSpanishCivilWarrecognitionbandson‘B’turret(red,whiteandblue).

AlovelyaerialviewofHoodenrouteforMalta,February1937

8.Theauralandvisualeffectsofa15inmagazineblowingupwouldbearumblingnoise(unlessitdetonated,inwhichcaseitwouldbeasharpexplosion)accompaniedby a spurt of bright-yellow flame of some duration (as opposed to a flash andsmoke).The smoke was described variously by the experts as: (a) dark and somewhite likesteam;(b)denseanddirty; (c)black,perhapsgreyand; (d) reddish.Thefirstkickoftheexplosionwouldtaketheeasiestpath,buttheremightbeothereffectsinotherplaces.9.The ‘balls of fire’ seen in the explosion could not be explained, but theymighthavebeenpartlyignitedcorditechargestakingfireintheair,orignitionofprojectedoilfuel.10.Therewasgeneralagreementthat:(a)ThedescriptionsoftheexplosiongivenbyAdmiral Wake-Walker (A.1), Captain Leach (B.1) and Sub-Lieutenant Wormsley

(B.8)pointedtoalargecorditeexplosion.Corditeontheupperdeckwouldnotcausethe main effect seen, (b) The fire on the boat deck had nothing to do with theexplosion,butwasprobablycausedby4inready-useorUPammunition.Ignitionofeitherofthesewouldnotproducedisastrouseffects,(c)Itwouldbeimpossibleforanuntrainedwitnesstodifferentiatebetweena4inandaUPammunitionfire.11.Bismarck’s shellsprobablyhadamuzzlevelocitybetween2,721 fps and3,150fps.12.Ifaslowas2,721,althoughitcouldnotpenetratethe12inbelt,therewasastripontheship’ssideabouteighteeninchesdeepand42feetlongwheretheshellcouldenterandpassoverthetopofthe12inbeltandyetgetinundertheflatportionoftheprotectivemaindeck.Withafuzedelayofabout55feet itcouldexplodeinavitalpart.13.Therewasazoneafewfeetwidethelengthofthemagazinegroupwhereashellcouldfallshortoftheshipandentertheshipbelowthearmouredbelt.Assumingafuzedelayofabout75feet,thisshellcouldgettoa15inmagazineandwithadelayof55feetgettoa4inmagazine.Abouthalfthetravelwouldbeunderwater.14.Germanshellsprobablyhavelongerfuzedelaysthanoursandexperienceshowsthattheirfuzesarefairlyerratic.IntheactionoftheRiverPlatetwoGermanshellsburstat65and70feetrespectively.15.Littleisknownofunderwatertrajectorybutthegeneralopinionwasthatifashellhitbelowthewaterlineitwouldbeslowedupsomuchthatafuzedelayof75feetunderthesecircumstanceswouldbeunlikely.

CauseoftheShip’sDestructionThe very sudden and total disappearance of the ship clearly showed that the explosionwhichsankherwasofgreatmagnitudeand,asnotedbefore,muchof theevidencewascontradictoryandinconclusive,andmanypointsinconnectionwiththelossoftheHoodcanneverbeproveddefinitely.Thefirstvisibleevidenceofdamagewhichmightpossiblyhaveledtothedestructionoftheshipwasafireontheboatdeck.TherecanbenobetterconclusionthantheBoardofEnquiry’swrittenreport:

1.Itisestablishedthatthisfollowedimmediatelyonahitontheboatdeck,probablyfromBismarck’sthirdsalvo.2.PositionandExtent.Theexactpositionofthehitand/orthestartofthefireisindoubt,butthebulkoftheevidenceshowsthatthefirefirstappearedontheportsideandabaftthemainmast.Itiscertainthatitspreadveryrapidlyuntilitcoveredalargepartoftheportsideoftheboatdeck.Itisnotcertainwhetheritwasconfinedtotheboatdeck,butthereisverylittleevidencethatitextendedbelow.TherewasnosignofHood’sspeeddecreasingbeforetheexplosionanditmightbeinferredthatthefirehadnot,therefore,affectedtheenginerooms.3. Appearance. Evidence as to colour of flames, smoke and other phenomenaobserved in this fire differs very considerably, but analysis of the most reliableevidenceindicatesthatitburnedwithareddish-orangeflameandcomparativelylittlesmoke.Distantobserversemphasizethered.4.Cause.1.Thereare threepossiblecausesofsuchan immediateandrapidlyspreadingfire:

(a)Petrol,(b)ReadyUseammunition,(c)UPammunition.2.Theexactamountofpetrolwhichwasonboardat the timecannotbedefinitelystated,but if theordersknowntobeinforceinHoodashort timepreviouslywerecarriedout–and there isno reason tosupposeotherwise– it isunlikely that therewas more than 2 gallons. This would have been on the boat deck abreast themainmast.There is reasontobelieve that thepetrolstowageinHoodwascarefullysupervisedandnotwithstandingtheopinionformedbyBismarck’sofficerswhichwasbasedonafalseassumptiontheBoardconsideritunlikelythatpetrolwasthecauseoratanyratethesolecauseofthisfire.3.Eightyroundspergunof4inRUammunitionwerestowedinlighttypelockersontheboatdeck.UPammunitionwasstowedinlockersontheboatdeckandforecastledeck.Itisquitepossiblethateither4inorUPorbothcouldbeignitedastheresultofashellburstingintheirvicinityandthereisdefiniteevidencefromthesurvivorsthatammunitionwas in factexploding in the fire.Onesurvivor (Briggs)gaveevidencethat theSGO reported a fire in theRU lockers andMid.Dundas is stated to haveinformedthepreviousBoardthattheTorpedoOfficerhadreportedacorditefireonthestarboardsideoftheboatdeck.ThenoiseslikebigChinesecrackersheardbyABTilburnmayhavebeenUPammunitionexploding.Evidence as to orders which were known to be in force inHood a short time

previous to thedate inquestion, regarding the supplyof4in ammunition,makes itpractically certain that all the hatches in the train of supply would be definitelyclosed.Theevidenceofexpertwitnessesalsoshowsthattheresultsofafireamongstthe

4inRUandUPammunitionshouldnotbefataltotheship.5.Conclusion.Wehavemadeacarefulstudyoftheplansshowingthestowageof4inandUPammunition;theevidenceclearlyshowsthatsomeofthiscaughtfire.Afterconsideration of all the evidence and bearing inmind thatHood was certainly hitagainafterthefirehadstarted,andalmostimmediatelybeforetheexplosion,wehavecome to theconclusion that the firewasnot in itself thecauseof,andwasdistinctfrom,theexplosionwhichdestroyedtheship.6.Somecauseotherthanthefiremustthereforebesoughtfortheexplosions,andthethree potential dangers are obviously as follows: (1) Torpedo Warheads, (2) 4inMagazines,(3)15inMagazines.7.AsregardstheTorpedoWarheadsweputourselvesthefollowingquestions:(a)Couldoneormorehavebeencausedtoexplodeduringtheaction?(b)Doestheevidenceofeyewitnessescorrespondtowhatonemightexpecttoseeorhearifoneormorewarheadshaddetonatedorexploded?(c)Wouldtheexplosionordetonationofoneormorewarheadshavecausedtheshiptosinksorapidly?Toobtainanswers to thesequestionsweconsulted theexpertwitnessesavailable

anddrawthefollowingconclusions:8.Withreferenceto(a).Evidenceofeye-witnesses,Repulseandanofficerwhohadrecently served inHood leaves little room for doubt that the mantlet doors wereclosed.Awarheadcouldstill,however,havebeendetonatedorexplodedbyadirecthitfromBismarck’sshell.Thereisnodirectevidencethatsuchahitoccurred,butit

mayhavedonesooneithersideof theship. Ifasinglewarheadhadgoneoff,oneother,butprobablynotmorethanone,warheadwouldalsohavegoneoff.Withreferenceto(b).Expertopinionsuggestedthattheexplosionoftwowarheads

wouldproduceanall-roundalmostinstantaneousflash.Itwouldnothaveproducedtheveryhighcolumnofflameofappreciableduration,whichwasseenbysomanywitnesses.Norwasthenoise,reportedasbeingheard,compatiblewiththatofTNTdetonationorexplosion.Theconsensusofexpertopinionwasdefinitelyagainst thecharacteristicsof theexplosionasgiven inevidencebyeye-witnessesbeing thatofTNTWithreferenceto(c).Mr.Offord,ouradviserinconstruction,wasoftheopinion

that this could be the case. Other witnesses, experts in explosions but not inconstruction,wereof theoppositeviewand theBoard isnotconvinced thatsuchaveryrapidsinkingcouldfollowfromthedamagewhichMr.Offordconsideredwouldresultfromtheexplosionoftwowarheads.Further,thereisstrongevidencethatthewidespreadandimmediatedamageactuallycausedto theafterpartof theshipwasconsiderably greater than thatwhichMr.Offord consideredwould result from twowarheadsexploding.We have therefore come to the conclusion that, although the explosion or

detonationoftwowarheadscannotbeentirelyexcluded,thiswasnotthedirectcauseofthesinkingoftheship.Asregardsthe4inand15inMagazinesthefollowingquestionsarise:

(1)Isitlikelythatenemygunfireduringthisactionwould‘blowup’anyorallofthemagazines?(2) Would the blowing up of magazines produce the effects seen and heard bywitnesses?(3)Wouldtheblowingupofanyorallofthemagazinescausetherapiddestructionoftheship?

Hereagainexpertadviserswereconsulted,andleadustothefollowingconclusion:

OneofthelastphotographsofHood,takenon23May1941.

As regards (1). Expert evidence shows that this is quite possible if the muzzlevelocityofBismarck’sshellwasbetween2,721and3,050fps(actually2,790fps).Asregards(2).Weconsiderthatwhatwasseenandheardwasinaccordancewith

whatmightbeexpectediftheaftergroupof4inand/or15inmagazinesofHoodhad

blownup.There isone importantpointwhichneededcareful consideration andwhichwas

remarkedonbyDNCinhisminuteonN.L.9821/41 (ReportofpreviousBoardofEnquiry) and by CinC, Home Fleet, namely that the position of the explosion asobservedbysomecompetentwitnesseswasmuchfurtherforwardthanwould,atfirstthought,havebeenexpectedhadthe4inor15inmagazinesblownup.Thisiswherewereachedtheconclusionthatnotonlywasa tremendouspillarofflameobservedjust before the mainmast, but that in addition a very heavy explosion was seenpracticallysimultaneouslyfurtheraft.CommanderMatonandCommanderKnightagreedthatifthe4inmagazineswent

offfirst,followedalmostinstantaneouslybythe15in,thefirstvisiblesignmightwellbealargesheetofflamedirectlyaboveorjustbeforethe4inmagazines.Finally it must be remembered that our peacetime knowledge and practical

experienceoftheresultsofcorditeexplosionshasbeenbasedonexperimentswithamaximumofabouthalfatonofcordite.Hood’saftermagazinescontainedabout112tons–overtwohundredtimesasmuch.Thecourseoftheexplosionfollowingontheterrificpressureslikelytobeproducedinthiscasemustbedifficulttopredict.Fromthe last war there are three examples of the effects on battlecruisers of corditeexplosions–explosionswhichbothinappearanceandeffectgiveverysimilarresultstothoseexperiencedinthelossofHood.Asregards(3).Thereislittleroomfordoubtthattheimmediatedestructionofthe

afterendoftheshipfollowedbytherapidsinkingoftheremainderwouldresultfromtheblowingupofthe4inor15inmagazines–inthecaseoftheformerbecausetheirexplosionwouldcausethe15inalsotoblowup.Conclusions–10October1941:(1) That the sinking ofHood was due to a hit from Bismarck’s 15in shell in oradjacenttoHood’s4inor15inmagazines,causingthemalltoexplodeandwrecktheafterpartoftheship.Theprobabilityisthatthe4inmagazinesexplodedfirst.(2)There isnoconclusiveevidence thatoneor twotorpedowarheadsdetonatedorexplodedsimultaneouslywiththemagazines,oratanyothertime,butthepossibilitycannotbeentirelyexcluded.Weconsiderthatiftheyhaddonesotheireffectwouldnothavebeensodisastrousastocausetheimmediatedestructionoftheship,andonthewholeweareoftheopinionthattheydidnot.(3)ThatthefirewhichwasseenonHood’sboatdeck,andinwhichUPand/or4inammunitionwascertainlyinvolved,wasnotthecauseofherloss.

ThedisasterwasbroadcastontheBBCat9p.m.on24May1941:

British naval forces intercepted early thismorning off the coast ofGreenlandGerman naval forces including the battleship Bismarck. The enemy wereattacked andduring the ensuing actionHMSHood,wearing the flag ofVice-AdmiralL.E.Holland,C.B.,receivedanunlikelyhitinthemagazineandblewup.TheBismarckhasreceiveddamageandthepursuitoftheenemycontinues.ItisfearedtherewillbefewsurvivorsfromHMSHood.

A further official statementwas drawn up, but it was thought that the public were notreadytobetoldtherawtruthofthematter.TheDNC(S.V.Goodall)said:

Thisstatementgivesthebaldfacts.Ifpresentedtothepublicasitstandsitwillbe perturbing and although some peoplemay then realize the load of anxietywhich has rested upon successive Boards of Admiralty owing to our capitalshipsbeingoutofdate, it appears sucha statementwoulddepressour friendsandhearten theenemy,giving the latter informationwhich it ishoped theydonot at present possess, e.g., we have been bluffing them with the RoyalSovereigns for nearly two years. It is for consideration to what extent thisstatement should be modified on grounds of policy if some publication isessential.

HoodpayingoffatPortsmouthon16January1936,returningfromtheMediterraneanaftertheItalo-AbyssinianwarNotethegreatheightbetweendecks.⋆ Thewreck ofHood was located and inspected in 2001 but did not provide concrete evidence as to exactlywhereBismarck’s15inshellspiercedthearmour.ForfurtherinformationseeHMSHoodAssociationwebsite.

NelsonandRodney

Thursday17December1925dawnedcoldanddamp,oneofthosegreymorningswheneven the most robust and sturdy shipyard worker seemed dejected and miserable. Butthere was a good reason for high spirits because it was a very special day for theBirkenhead shipyard and a huge crowd had wrapped themselves up in their warmestclothingandgatheredinandaroundtheyardtoawaitthearrivalofHRHPrincessMaryandherhusbandViscountLascellestoperformthenamingceremonyofoneofthemostpowerful battleships ever constructed in aBritishyard. Indeed, thepeople ofLiverpooland the little town of Birkenhead, and Messrs Cammell Laird Shipbuilding andEngineeringWorkswere justlyproudof theoccasion.Notonlyhad theybroughtanewconcept in warship design to the launching stage, but they were witnessing theconstruction of one of the fewBritish battleships to be laid down during the inter-waryears. The very existence of such a vessel during the depression was something of amiracle;shewasbeingbuiltundertheshadowofseverenavalrestrictionswhichgoverneddisplacements and gun sizes. The general public saw the ship as something of acompromise andhardlyknewwhat to expectbecauseof the continuous agitation in thePress during the last few years since the Washington Naval Treaty of 1921, wherebyBritainhadagreedtoreducethesizeofherfleet,abandoningthe‘twopowerstandard’andaligning herself numerically with the USA. In 1921 Britain had laid down four giant48,000-ton battlecruisers of which this ship should have been one, but lengthynegotiationshadreducedtheirsizebymorethan15,000tons,andonlytwoinsteadiffourwereallowedtocompensateforthelatestbattleshipsbuildinginJapanandtheUSAatthattime.

Atapproximately10.15a.m.on thatDecembermorningHRHPrincessMaryandherhusband entered the shipyard to be met by The Right Hon Earl of Derby, KG, GCB,GCVO, and a very vociferous crowd. The Royal party were introduced to Mr W. L.Hichens(Chairman)andMrR.S.Johnson(ManagingDirector)beforemakingtheirwaytothefirm’smainoffices.

Atprecisely10.40a.m.HerRoyalHighness left theofficesandmadeherway to thelaunchingplatformwherethereligiousceremonywasthenheld.Atexactly11.15a.m.,inamomentofhush,aquietvoicecalled,‘InamethisshipRodney,andGodblessallwhosailinher’,andtheleverwaspulledtoreleasethechristeningfluidoverthebowsofthegreat ship. Thus themightyRodney slid calmly andmajestically down the slipway foraboutfiftyfeetbeforeenteringthecoldwateroftheRiverMersey.

In the coming months, she and her sister (Nelson, which had been launched a fewmonthsearlierinSeptember)wouldbefittingoutandtakingshape,andthemediawouldgettheirfirstlookatwhathadbeenoneofthemostcontroversialdesignsoftheinter-waryears. Indeed, theywere to wonder whether the two ships would beworth £7,000,000each,when the latest,and larger,Hoodhadonlyset thembacka littleover£6,000,000.Withhindsight,however, itcanbesaid thatNelsonandRodneyproved tobe twoof themostpowerful16in-gunnedbattleshipseverbuilt,andthesterlingworktheywereabouttododuringthecomingwar(1939–45)wouldmorethanjustifytheirbuilding;infact,atthe

outbreakofwar,theywerethelatestbattleshipsthattheRoyalNavypossessed.

RodneyislaunchedatLiverpool,17December1925.Thecrowdlookonandwonderwhathercompletedappearancewillbe.Notethatpartofthetowerisalreadyinplace.

DesignDuringtheperiod1919to1921,aconsiderablenumberofalternativecapitalshipdesigns,embodying 1914–18 experience, especially the lessons of Jutland and therecommendationsofthePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,werepreparedandconsideredbytheAdmiralty, and in 1921,when the large programme in hand in theUSA and Japannecessitated a resumption of British capital ship construction, a battlecruiser type of47,540tonswaschosen.ThelatestshiptocomplementtheRoyalNavy’sfleetatthattime(1920)was the largebattlecruiserHood, andalthoughshehadbeenconstructedwithoutregardtothemanylessonslearntatJutland,hergeneraldesignandlayoutwasnaturallyfollowed(‘K’,‘K2’and‘K3’).

Followingthesesketchdesigns,therewasaseriousinvestigationintotheconstructionof one of the largest andmost powerful battleships built to date (‘13’), but although itreachedsketchstageandgainedsomeBoardapproval,theConstructor’sdepartmentsawit as far too large and radical at that time. In 1920, however, the NID informed theirLordshipsthatbothJapanandtheUSAwouldprobablyconstructvesselsofabout48,000tonsarmedwith18ingunsinthenearfuture,anditwasreluctantlyagreedthattheRoyalNavywouldhavetofollowsuittomeetanythreat.Itwasrealized,however,thatshipsofsuch a size would introduce severe problems not only for designers, but in dockingaccommodationaswell.

During the next fewmonths various designs were prepared (see page 337) for bothbattleships and battlecruisers, but unfortunatelymost of the information (ship’s covers)

concerningthebattleshipshasbeenmislaid,onlythebattlecruiserlayoutsbeingavailable(variations of ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’ and ‘N’ Designs were shown). In December 1920 it wasdecidedthatthesketches‘G3’and‘H3’(battlecruisers)shouldbeinvestigatedfurther,butwithmodificationson‘G3’soastoincludeextraarmourprotectiontothedeckarea.Afterviewingthemodified‘G3’layout,theBoardaccepteditinprincipleandinFebruary1921askedforconfirmationandfurtherpreparationonfourshipsofsuchacalibre.TheDNC(d’Eyncourt)particularlyapprovedofthemodifiedG3andwrotetotheFirstSeaLordon23March1921pointingoutthesalientfeatures:

Themainarmamentconsistsofnine16ingunsinthreeturretswith40degreeselevation. Two pairs forward and one amidships. The latter cannot fire rightastern.Warexperience,andourrecentlyacquiredknowledgeofGermanandUnited

States turrets have been carefully considered in connection with the mainarmament;theprotectionandflashtightnessisverycomplete.Secondaryarmamentconsistsofsixteen6inineightturrets,arrangedsothat

supply from magazines and shell rooms is very direct, but is provided withbreaksandothersafeguardstopreventflashpassingdownintomagazines.AAconsists of six 4.7in high-angle guns, andmountings embody the latest high-angleideasasrecommencedbyNavalHighAngleGunneryCommittee.Armament controls are a special feature. An erection forward supports the

main director control tower, two secondary directors and the high-angledirectors, and calculating positions are free from any smoke interference.Aeroplanehangarsmaybeconsideredasapermanentfeaturebutadecisionispending.Mainarmamenthasbeenconcentratedinthecentreoftheshipinorderthat

the heavy horizontal and vertical armour required to protect it may be aminimum,andalsothatthemagazinesmaybeplacedinthewidestpartoftheship,and theunderwaterprotectionbe thebest thatcanbeafforded.Over thiscentralcitadela14inbeltisarranged,andrestingonthebeltisadeckof8inontheflatand9inontheslopes.Thesethicknessesandangleshavebeencarefullycalculated after consideration to oblique attack results with the latest type ofshell.Abaftthecentralcitadelasloping12inbeltand4indeckareprovidedovermachineryspaces.Thebeltextendsovertheaft6inmagazine,andherethedeckisincreasedto

7in.Abaftthecitadelathickdeckof5inisprovidedoverthesteeringgear.Barbettesare14inandturretsand17inonthefacewith8inroofs.Underwater experience is based on Chatham Float tests and embodies the

principleof thebulgeas fitted to theHood.Thesideunderwaterprotection isdesignedtowithstandachargeof750lbofexplosive.

SOUTHDAKOTAANDLEXINGTON,1921Battleshipandbattlecruiser

Protectionagainstminesisaffordedbyadouble-bottomof7ftdeep.Byslopingthemainbeltoutwards,notonlyisthevirtualthicknessincreased,

butprotection isprovidedagainstattackbydistant-controlledboatscontaininglargeexplosives. Inorder that the stabilityof thevesselmaybeadequate, thetriangular space between side and armour will be filled with light tubes.Calculationsshowthatthewholeofthisstructurewouldhavetobecompletelyblownawaybeforetheshipwouldlosestability.

Although never wanting ships with such mastodon proportions, on accepting the ‘G3’designandthebattleshipversion‘N3’,theRoyalNavyhadaccomplishedwhatitsetouttodo,and thatwascompletely tooutclassany foreignopposition forat least fiveyearsahead.ThedesignwasfaraheadofitstimeandshowedfeatureswhichevenmatchedtheJapanesegiantsoftheYamatoclassconstructedin1941.Indeed,itmaybethatthe‘G3’plans were carefully considered by the Japanese when their two ships were underconstruction because they certainly reflected many qualities of the early 1921 Britishdesign.

Withallmajormaritimepowersbuildingalongthesamelinesitwasonlytooobviousthat itwould be but amatter of time before the designwas overshadowed by a vesselgrosslyoutofproportiontorequirements,witheveryoneelsebeingforcedtofollow.Thepolitical implicationswere too complex to be discussed here, but the result ended in aNaval treatycalled forby theUSAand itwould includeGreatBritain, Japan, ItalyandFrance.Anagreementwas reachedwhereby therewouldbeabattleshipholiday for thenexttenyears.Newshipscouldonlybeconstructedafterexistingshipshadreachedtheageof20years,andnewconstructionwaslimitedto35,000tonsandcalibresreducedto16ingunsrather than the18inbeingpreparedat that time.Dozensofolder (inBritain’scasenotsoold)battleshipswenttothescrapyard.

ContractsfortheBritish‘G3’class(four)hadbeenunderwayforsometimeandwheninFebruary1922lettershadtobesentouttothefouryardsinvolved,statingthattheshipswere cancelled, it came as a bitter blow to an already flagging industry during thedepression.

ARMOURPROTECTIONCOMPARISONS

TooffsettheretentionoftheWestVirginiaandNagatoclassesbytheUnitedStatesandJapan respectively,which had been too far advanced to scrap,Great Britain authorizedunder the Treaty two new designs to complywith the severe limitations that had beenimposedonconstruction.

AsearlyasNovember1921,whenitbecameprobablethatthefour‘G3’groupvesselswere to be scrapped, the Constructor’s Department was asked to prepare fresh layoutswithin the limits of the treaty, butwas asked to include anyof theG3’s featureswherepossible.The first three sketches (‘F1’, ‘F2’, ‘F3’) featured 15in guns because thedepartment thought that no suitable 16in-gunned design could be acquired on such alimited displacement, but it would appear that the designs received little considerationbecauseboththeUSAandJapannowhad16in-gunnedbattleships(seetables).InJanuary1922furtherproposalswereforwardedshowingareducededitionofthe‘G3’butretainingmanyofitsqualities(‘O3’,‘P3’and‘Q3’)withaspeedof23knots.

NELSONCLASSEarly‘G3’Battlecruiser,17December1920

⋆18ingunswereproposedfortheseandsomeoftheotherdesignsbutwerereferredtointheShips’Coversandvariousofficialdocumentsas16ingunsforsecuritypurposes.

TheController asked for the designs to be fullyworked out, and itwas proposed toConstructorE.L.Attwoodthatdimensionsbe710ftby102ft(waterline)by30ft,andthatSHPsufficienttoreach23/24knotswouldbeneeded.Themainarmamentwouldbethesameasinthe‘G3’s(16in),butarmourplatingwouldbeseverelythinneddownfromthatdesign.Inorderthatthelegendweight,asdefinedbytheWashingtonTreaty,shouldcomewithinthe35,000tonslimit,theutmosteconomywascalledfor,andnoBoardmarginwaspossible foranyweightsaddedduringconstruction. InSeptember1922 the finaldesignwasaccepted(modified‘03’)anditembodiedalltheessentialfeaturesdemanded:

1.Highfreeboardandgoodseakeepingqualities,thesebeingregardedasessential.2.Armamentasinthecancelledbattlecruisers(‘G3’).3.Armouring generally similar to that of the battlecruisers, and concentrated overmagazines,machineryandgunpositionsonthe‘allornothing’principle.4.Speedequaltoorhigherthancontemporaryforeignbattleships.

Although having the same main armament and turret arrangement as the cancelledbattlecruisers (whosegunsandmountswereutilized toacertainextent)and resemblingthem in certain outward characteristics,Nelson andRodney were in no sensemerely a

reduced edition of those ships, but constituted an entirely distinct ‘battleship’ type,representingthenearestapproachthatcouldbeobtained,withinthelimits,tothe48,000-ton plan previously proposed. The battlecruiser designwas stated to have constituted areplytoNavalStaffRequirementsforan‘idealbattlecruiser’;NelsonandRodney,ontheother hand, represented the best that could be done, within treaty limitations, towardsmeetingthedemandforan‘idealbattleship’.

‘G3’:FINALLEGEND,12AUGUST1921Displacement(tons):48,000.

Length:820ft(pp),856ft(oa).

Beam:106ft.

Draught:32ftforward,33ftaft.

Freeboard:28ftforward,21ftamidships,25ftaft.

SHP:160,000=31/32knots.

Fuel:1,200tonsoilmin,5,000tonsmax.

Complement:1,716.

Armament

9×16inMk1(80rpg)

16×6in(150rpg)

6×4.7in(200rpg)

40×2pdr

2×24.5inTT

Armour

14in at 72° incline (overmagazines), 12in at 72° incline (overmachinery and boilers).Bulkheadsforward12-5in,aft10–4in,barbettes14inmax.,turrets17–13–8in,CT12–6in,tube8in,DT5–3in,funnelprotection12–9-5in,decks:forecastle1in,upper8in,4inovermachinery,lowerdeckforward8–7in,aft5–3in.

Weights(tons) Hull 17,860Armour 14,700Armament 7,030Machinery 6,000Generalequipment 1,000BM 200

The influenceof theTreaty restrictionson thenew shipswas considerable, as itwasnecessary,forthefirsttime,toworktoanabsolutedisplacementlimitwhichcouldnotbe

exceeded, but which had to be approached as closely as possible in order to securemaximumvalue.Thehistoryofthesetwoships,then,isacomplexone,butwhenlaidoutintabularformitseemsstraightforward:

1.Attheconclusionofthe1914–18war,investigationswereconductedintocapitalshipdesigntoincorporatethelessonslearntatJutlandinparticular.2.Battlecruiserdesignwithlegenddisplacementof48,000tonswasapprovedbytheBoardofAdmiraltyon12August1921.

‘F2’AND‘F3’:PARTICULARS,30NOVEMBER1921‘F2’

Displacement(tons):35,000.

Length:720ft(pp),760ft(oa).

Beam:106ft.

Draught:28ft6in(mean).

SHP:112,000.

Speed:30knots.

Armament:6×15in,12×6in.

Armour:13inovermagazines,etc.,12inovermachineryandboilers,turrets16–12–9in,barbettes13in,CT12–6in,7inupperdeck,3¼inovermachinery,5–3inaft.

‘F3’

Displacement(tons):35,000.

Length:700ft(pp),740ft(oa).

Beam:106ft.

Draught:28ft6inmean.

SHP:96,000.

Speed:28½knots.

Armament:9×15in,8×6in.

Armour:mainbelt12in,barbettes12in,CT9–5in,otherwisesameas‘F2’.

3. Orders were placed for four ships on 26 October 1921, but cancelled on 13February1922underWashingtonNavalTreaty’sdirectivenottoexceed35,000tons.4. Investigations into designs for a 35,000-ton battleship resulted in sketch ‘03’(modified)beingacceptedbytheBoard,andbecameNelsonandRodney.5. TheWashington Treaty’s 35,000-ton limit led to development of better qualitysteel.

PARTICULARSOF‘P3’AND‘Q3’

‘P3’,

Displacement(tons):48,000.

Length:717ft(oa).

Beam:104ft

Draught:30ftmean.

Armour:11inupperbelt,amidships14in,decks8–7½in,5–3½inovermachinery.

Armament:9×15in(newtype),16×6in,6×4.7in,2aircraft.

‘Q3’ same as above except for twomain triple turrets forward of bridge instead of allforwardofbridge(seedrawings).

6.No further capital ships to be built from12November 1921 exceptNelsonandRodney.7.Generalarmourandprotectionaffected(reductionfrom‘G3’)tosaveweight.8.Thearmourcitadelwas384ftby14inabreast16inmagazines,slopedat70°andwas so arranged inside the hull that the slope produced downwards did not meetprotection bulkheads. Each belt of armour was keyed, and individual plates weremade as large as possible with heavy bars fitted behind the butts. Chock castingshousing the lower edge of armour also directed fragments of bursting shells awayfromthebelt.9:No new construction to be commenced until:United States 1931;GreatBritain1931;France1927;Japan1931;Italy1927.

ConstructionTheoutstandingfeatures,whichinrespectofthearrangementofarmament,werepeculiarinbeingapparentlygovernedmorebyconstructionalthantacticalprinciples,included:

NELSONCLASSDesigns‘O3’,‘P3’and‘Q3’withvariants

1.Exceptionallyhighfreeboardwithaflushdeckhull.2.Concentrationofentiremainarmamentforward,allowingmaximumprotectiontogunpositionsandmagazines,andgroupingofanti-torpedoarmamentintwinturretswell aft on each quarter for similar considerations, and also to minimize blastinterferencefromthe16inguns.3.Excellentprotectionfromallformsofattackwithmainstrengthformedoverthemagazines,machinery,boilersandmainarmament.4.Designedspeedabout2knotsaboveexistingbattleshipaverage.5.Innovatoryhighstructurereplacingnormalbridgeworkandtripod.

Bothshipswerebuiltingreatsecrecyanditwasnotuntilofficialnotificationwasgiventhat thegeneralpublicknewanythingabouttheRoyalNavy’slatestacquisition.DespiteitssomewhatexperimentalnatureandthehamperingTreatyrestrictions,thedesignprovedgenerallysatisfactorysofarastheBoardofAdmiraltyandConstructor’sDepartmentwereconcerned.Theshipswere,however,subjecttosomecriticism:

1.Absenceofanydirectasternfirefromthemainarmament.2.Insufficientdepthofarmourbeltbelowthewaterline.

The Washington Treaty’s dictates meant that economy was more important than everbefore, and the general design was so disposed as to give maximum effectiveness toarmamentandprotectionwithinthesmallestpossibledimensions,whilespecialmeasureswere taken to eliminate all non-essential items and to utilize the lightest practicablematerialsandmethodsofconstruction.Theseincluded:

1. The use of special ‘D’ steel in place of normal high-tensile steel, the superiorqualityofthisenablinghigherstressestobeacceptedwithaconsequentsubstantialreductioninweightofscantlings.2.Specialinvestigationsweremadeintothestrengthoftheplatingandframingofthedouble-bottom so as to reduce weight to a minimum (7ft double-bottom of ‘G3’reducedto5ftinthisclass).3.Modified form of construction for the principal decks, comprising a system oflongitudinal girders with widely spaced beams in conjunctionwith web frames toutilize the maximum amount of material for longitudinal stresses and so reducethickness of deck plating required for strength purposes, which afforded aconsiderablesavinginweight.4. The use of Douglas fir instead of the customary teak for the upper deck, thereduction in wearing qualities and appearance being accepted in favour of thereducedweight.5. Extensive use of aluminium alloys forminor interior fittings (kit lockers, storecupboards, mess racks, etc.) with some plywood for the dwarf and divisionalbulkheadsthatdidnotrequirestructuralstrength.

The hull constructionwas very strong throughout, the unusually concentrated and veryheavyweights of armaments necessitating a special provision for adequate longitudinalstrengthwhendocking,includingthenewformofdeckconstruction.

Rig

Therewasathickrectangularstumpforemastforwardattherearofthebridgetowerwithan open, diamond-shaped platform carrying the high-angle rangefinder at the head.Notopmast and no yards or signal struts. Forward ends of theW/T aerialswere carried toprominent struts on rangefinder platform and bridge tower. They were given a tripodmainmastwithatalltopmastandtopgallant.Themainyardwaswellbelowthestarfish,withanothersmalleroneabovetheheadofthetopmast.TherewasaverywideW/Tyardattheheadofthetopgallantmast.

LEGEND:(FINAL)‘03’FINALLEGEND,SEPTEMBER1922(NELSONANDRODNEY)Displacement(tons):35,000.

Length:660ft(pp),710ft(oa).

Beam:106ft.

30ftmeandraught.

Freeboard:29ftforward,25ft6inamidships,27ftaft.

SHP:45,000–23knots

Fuel:4,000tonsoilmaximum.

Armament

9×16inMk1

12×6in

6×4.7in

4pom-poms.

TT:2×24.5inTT(10torpedoes).

Armour

14ininclinedat72°10feetabovelowerwaterline,

13inovermachineryspaces.

Bulkhead forward 12–8in, aft 10–4in, barbettes 15in max., turrets 16–11–9in, CT 14–6½in,DCT2–1in,NConbridge1in,boileruptakes9in,deck6¾inovermagazines,4¾inaft.

Weights(tons) Hull 14,250Armour/protectiveplating 10,250Armament 6,900Machinery 1,924Generalequipment 1,050NoBM.

LAUNCHFIGURESNelson,3September1925

Length:660ft0⅞in(pp),709ft9⅞in(oa).

Beam:106ft.

Depthfromkeeltoupperdeck:55ft6in.

Draughtatlaunch:8ft5⅜inforward(10ftabaftpp),24ft10¾inaft(42ftabaftAP).

Breakage:

Longitudinallyinadistanceof512ft3in=⅛inhog.

Transverseinadistanceof99ft9½in–0.

Displacementatlaunch:19,454tons.

Equipmentonboardattimeoflaunch:

94.3tonsarmament

1,511.5tonsmachinery

6,081.9tonsarmour

773.5tonsballast,men,gear,etc.

8,461.2tons

Recordedweightofhull:11,102tons.

Rodney,17December1925

Length:660ft0⅛in(pp),710ft2½in(oa).

Beam:106ft in.

Depthofkeelfromupperdeckamidships:55ft in.

Draughtatlaunch:9ft7¾inforward(8ft10inabaftFP),25ft2¼inaft(42ft2inforwardofAP).

Breakage:

Longitudinalinadistanceof438ft=¼inhog.

Transverseinadistanceof85ft=0.

Displacementatlaunch:20,200tons.

Equipmentonboardatlaunch:

157tonsarmament

1,483tonsmachinery

6,107tonsarmour

636tonsmen,ballast,gear;etc.

Recordedweightofhullatlaunch:11,905tons.

NelsonfittingoutattheArmstrongconstructionyardduringJuly1926.

ArmamentWith theexceptionof the16.25ingunmounted in theBenbow andSansPareil classes,completed1888and1891respectively,NelsonandRodneywerethefirstandonlyBritishbattleships to have 16inBL guns in triple-mounted turrets,whichmade them themostpowerfully armed battleships afloat. An experimental mounting had been produced byMessrsArmstrongandCo.andfittedandsatisfactorilytestedinthemonitorLordCliveinFebruary1921inanticipationoftheirbeingfittedinthe‘G3’group.Whenthe‘G3’swerecancelledsome£500,000hadbeenspentonthemanditwasonlynaturalthatthemoneyandresultsofthetestsshouldbeusedinthenewshipsoftheNelsonclass.Concentrationoftheentiremainarmamentforwardwasuniqueatthetimeoftheirbuilding,andallowedaminimum length of armoured citadel withmaximum protection to gun positions andmagazines, while the close grouping of the turrets incidentally facilitated fire control.Theseadvantageswereconsideredtooutweighthelossoftacticalefficiencycausedbytheabsenceofdirectasternfirewhichatfirstwasamuchcriticizedfeature;thedesign,inthisrespect, subordinating tactical principles to severe pressures in constructionalrequirementsandweightsaving.ThearrangementwasnotrepeatedaftertheNelsonpair,althoughitwaslateradoptedbytheFrenchNavyintheDunkerqueandRichelieuclasses(laid down 1932–7 respectively). Although no direct astern fire was provided, thesuperstructurewascutawayandsoarrangedas toallow‘A’and ‘B’ turrets rather largenominalarcsoffire,bearingrespectivelytowithin31°and15°oftheaxiallineastern.

The 16in gun was a high-velocity/lighter shell weapon, but tests after completionshowed that it was much inferior to the low-velocity/heavy shell 15in gun which hadproveditselfanexcellentpieceduringtheGreatWar.Nevertheless,theheavierweightofbroadsidedidhaveitscompensations(6,790lbheavierthaninQueenElizabeth)andwasnot equalled until 1941 when the US North Carolina entered service with a similararmament.

Magazinesandshellroomsweregroupedtogetheraroundtherevolvinghoists,andthe

boilers were located abaft instead of before the engine rooms so that the uptakes andfunnel arrangement could be placed further aft, with a view to minimizing smokeinterference to the control positions on top of the bridge structure. She was animprovementoverpreviousdesigns,but,ascompleted,thefunnelprovedtobetooshort,beingappreciablylowerthanthemassivetoweranditscontrols,especiallysteamingheadtowindwhenthetowerproducedconsiderablebackdraughtandthefunnelgasescausedseverediscomfort.

On trials, and during gunnery tests, it was found that when the guns were fired atconsiderableanglesabaftthebeam,thestructureandpersonnelwereaffectedbyblast.Inparticular, ‘C’ turret, when fired abaft the beam at full elevation was to cause severeproblems, and special measures would be needed when firing at these angles (seeCaptain’sreport,elsewhere).Manyofficersthoughtthattheblastwastoosevere,andthatthedesignwasabadone,butwhentestswerecarriedoutbyHMSExcellentduring theearlyguntrials,therewasadivergenceofopinion.

Gunpressuresonthebridgewindowswererecordedandshowedfiguresof8½psiwhenbearing 120 degrees green or red, and it was suggested that bridge personnel mightpossibly be moved to the conning tower when the guns were firing at these angles.ConstructorH.S.PengellywasaboardRodneyon16September1927andhadthistosaywhenmakinghisreportfortheirLordships:

Lookingafttowardthemassive16inturretsandbridgeofRodneyc.1929.

Rodneybeingtowed,oncompletion,downtheRiverMersey.Port-bowviewshowingherleavingthefitting-outberth.

Duringthefiringof‘X’and‘B’abaftthebeam,IremainedonthemiddlelineattheafterendoftheAdmiral’splatform.Thefiringfrom‘B’wasnotuncomfortable,buttherewasconsiderable shockwhen ‘X’ fired at 130 degrees or slightly less, but at 40 degrees ofelevation.Theshockwasaggravatedbyonenotknowingwhen toexpect fire,butapartfrom this point, it is understood that the blast recorded at the slots on the Admiral’splatformwereabout9lbpsiandontheCaptain’splatformabout11lbpsi.Itwasnotedthat10 degrees more bearing aft made all the difference to the effect experienced on thebridge.

The bridge structure was, in itself, entirely satisfactory, and I was informed by theofficersoccupying themainDCTforward, that thispositionwasextremely satisfactory,andtheywouldhavebeenready,throughoutthewholeofthefiring,tofireagainin8to10

seconds.

Theonlydamagewasonthesignalplatform–1×18inprojectorattheforeend–glasssmashed,andshutterofanotherbroken.On theCaptain’sbridge, fourwindowsbroken,a fewvoicepipes loose.On

Admiral’s bridge, four windows broken. Number of electric lights put out ofaction.Generaldamagewaslittle,andtheextrastiffeninginboardafterNelson’sguntrialsappeartohavefunctionedwell.

TheywerethefirstBritishbattleshipstocarryanti-torpedogunsinturrets,whichafforded,inadditiontothebetterprotectiveareaforguncrews,substantiallywiderhorizontalandvertical arcs of fire than the battery system of the preceding classes.On the protectionside,however,thesecondaryarmamentfailedmiserablybecauseoftherestrictedweightsallowedintheships,andthewholeofthesecondaryarmament–turretsandbarbettes–werepracticallyunarmoured,withnothingmore than1inhigh-tensilesteelalloverasaformofsplintershield.

Rodneybeingtowed,oncompletion,downtheRiverMersey.GettingupsteamandmakingherwaydownriverSeptember1927.

Nelsonin1931ThesetwosistershipswerethefirstBritishbattleshipstobeconstructedaftertheGreatWarandwerethelastforfourteenyears.Theyweredescribedastheoutcomeofthegunneryofficers’lessonsatJutlandregardingprotection.

Theturretswerearrangedintwocompactgroups,governedbythesameconsiderationsof concentration to allow magazine grouping, as had been the case with the mainarmament.Therewassomecriticismoftheclosegroupingbecauseasinglehitmightputtheentirebatteryoutofactiononanyoneside.Theywerelocatedasfaraftaspracticablesoastominimizeblasteffectfromtheafter16ingunswhenfiringabaftthebeam.Theirhighercommand(about23ftagainst19ft)meantthatthefightingefficiencyofthesegunsinmoderateorroughweatherwasmateriallybetterthanthatoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses,anadvantagethatwasdemonstratedduringfleetmanoeuvresinMarch1934whenunitsofallthreeclassesoperatedtogetherinsomeoftheworstweathereverexperiencedduringpracticalbattletests(thesecondarygunsoftheQEandRSclasseswereseentobecompletelywaterloggedandwereofnousewhatsoever).

The 24.5in torpedo armament was introduced in this class (21in was the largestpreviously carried) even though there was a body of opinion that expressed a wish todiscontinuetorpedotubesincapitalships.Thetubeswerenottrainedabeam,butangledforwardtowithinabout10degreesoftheaxialline.Toeliminateriskofseriousflooding,the torpedo compartmentswere located in a separate flat rather than a single flat as inpreceding classes, which was seen a serious fault in those early classes. The torpedocontrolpositionswerelocatedonthesuperstructureclosebeforethefunnel.

Giventhatthedesignhadbeenrestrictedindisplacement,thearmamentingeneralwasmorethanadequate,butthetriplemountingofthe16ingunswasnotviewedfavourablyintheConstructor’sDepartment,whichpreferredtwinmountingsasinprecedingclasses–awell-tried and proven set of equipment. The trouble seems to have been the extremeweightoftheentiretriplemounting(1,500tonsapprox.)whichboredowntooheavilyonthe flanges of the roller pathwhen the turretwas being trained.As a result of this andothersmallteethingproblemsthegunsorturretsneverachievedthereputationofthetwinmounted15ingunwhich,inhindsight,hasbeenconsideredthebestcombinationthateverwent to sea in a battleship. After new vertical rollers had been fitted, and muchexperimentationonthe16inmountings,thingsdidimprove,buttheywerenevertrouble-freeduringprolongedfiring.

Armour

Thearrangementofarmouringinthe‘G3’sandNelsonandRodneyembodiedthe‘allornothing’ principle, introduced for the first time in theDreadnought era in theUS shipsNevadaandOklahoma(laiddown1912).

Protection was concentrated over gun positions, magazines, machinery and boilerspaces,withtheentirehullbeforeandafterthisbeingcompletelyunarmoured.Toallowminimum length of the citadel, and maximum armour thickness, main armament waslocated forward, the after turret being located exactly amidships. The adoption of thismethod of application was a radical departure from British practice, but had beengrudgingly accepted in order to secure the great freeboard required, good seakeepingqualities, extremely heavy armament and above-average speed on the 35,000-tonWashington Treaty displacement limit while at the same timemeeting strict Admiraltyrequirementsforaverythickbelt(14in)toprotectthemainarmamentforward.

Extremely valuable information about armour protection was gleaned when the ex-GermanbattleshipBadenwas used as a target for heavy shells on 29 September 1921.Rounds 3, 8 and 14were of particular interest as they showedwhatmodernAP shellscoulddo,andthevulnerabilityofturretsprotectedbyonlymediumarmourthickness.The7insidearmourprotectingthesecondaryarmament,andthatforthemainbeltloweredge(6¾in)proved,infact,almostvalueless.TheseroundsalsoshowedwhatAPshellscoulddo againstmedium armour struck at large or oblique angles and proved how relativelyineffectual the armour was. It had long been recognized that armour plate was of thegreatest value when worked in large thickmasses. Distribution ofmedium thicknessesover large areas gave a general impression of protection, but thiswas, in fact, illusory.Thiswas impressively illustrated by rounds 3, 8 and14when fired at the 7in plates ofBaden,whichwereallpiercedby15inshellsofarmour-piercingquality,atavelocityof1,380 fps. Not only was the 7in battery armour pierced, but the 7⅞in armour on thebarbettes below the upper deck level was nearly perforated. This would have beenaccomplishedhadtherangebeengreaterandtheshelldivingatasteeperangle.Thesameshells attacking 14in armour under the same conditions would have broken up afterconsiderabledamagetotheplate,butthatthicknesswouldhavekepttheblastoutside.

Thepolicyofthedaywastoprotectanynewshipwithmaximumconcentrationaroundvitalsandatthemaximumthicknessthatdisplacementwouldallow.Horizontalprotectionrequirementswere indicatedby rounds2,4and10whichwere firedat theunarmouredendsofBadenandresultedinexplosionsbetweenthedecks.Inround10(CPC)theupperdeckwaslifted4ft6inand43feetofitwastornawayfromthesideoftheship.Theshellthenpiercedthemaindeckandproducedahole16ftwideby4ft6inlongandblewthatdeck7ftdownwards.Itwasconsideredthatsuchseveredamageinastrengthdeckwouldjeopardizethelongitudinalstrengthofavessel,especiallyifthevesselreceivedmorethanonehitinthesamearea.

Round 6 was fired to test the tongue-type joints adopted by the Germans for theirbarbettes.Thevelocityandangleofattackwassoarrangedthattheattackingshellwouldjustfailtoperforateandputmaximumpressureonthejoint.Theresultwasthatthestrapbehind the armoured joint gave way and the joint split; this was exacerbated by thenumberofboltholesinthearea.

Tocompletethetestsagainstmodernarmour,furtherfiringwasconductedagainstthe

oldbattleshipSuperb (Bellerophonclass,1907)on2May1922.Plateswere takenfromBadenandpositionedinSuperbtotaketheblast.Anumberof15inshellswerethenfiredat the decks (290lb plates) and side armour (560lb plates) from HMS Terror from adistanceof500yards.Theresultswere:

1.ThearmourqualityoftheplatesfromBadenstooduptothetestsverywell.2.Anyelectricweldingincorporatedinthestructurebrokeaway.3.Heavydeckthicknessesofthisnaturecouldbesupportedifnecessary.4. The angle of the 560lb armour was enough to cause the shell to break up onimpact,but itwas seen that thebeltwouldhave tobe ‘keyed’ inproperly soas toavoid any damage to the hull proper, or displacement of the armour strakes inquestion.

The general scheme of armouring inNelson andRodney also embodied all the lessonslearnedduringtheGreatWar,especiallyatJutland.Newimproved‘D’ typesteelwithatensilestrengthof37to43psiwasusedforthefirsttime,inplaceofnormalhigh-tensilesteel,ondecksandanti-torpedobulkheads.Themainbeltwasfittedinternallyforthefirsttime in a British battleship – to secure maximum support to the armour against beingdriveninbodilybyadirecthit,ashadoccurredinDerfflingerandLionatJutland,anditwasfittedatanangleof72degrees,runningawayfromthewaterlineatitsbottomedgetoincreaseeffectivenessagainstplungingshellfire.Thebeltwasnotdeepenough,however,andcausedgreatconcernamongtheconstructionstaff.Theupperedgeofthemainstrakewassupportedbya thickarmoureddeck,but the loweredgerestedonan inclinedshelfwithindividualplates‘keyedin’andheavybarsplacedbehindthis.Thesechockcastingswhich housed the lower edge would also help to direct fragments of a bursting shellupwardsandtakethemawayfromthelowerpartsoftheship.Thearrangementofinternalarmouringreduced thearmouredwaterplane,butsufficient resourcesofbuoyancywereavailabletoensurethat theshipwouldbesafeevenif theouterhullwereopenedupbygunfire. The horizontal protection against plunging fire and bombing aircraft wasdeveloped toaveryhighdegree,andwasconsideredat the time tobeadequateagainstanythingthatcouldbeusedagainstthenewships.

NELSONArmourLayout

Theslopingarmoureddeckbehindthemainbelt,whichhadbeenafeatureinallBritishbattleshipssince theMajestic class (1893),wasabandoned inNelson in favourof a flatheavydeckacross the topof themainstrakeandcovering themagazines,boiler spacesandmachinery.Anextensionaft,ataslightlylowerlevel,ranacrosstoprotectthesteering

gear. The horizontal armouringwas concentrated entirely in these two levels, and theywerethethickestindividualarmoureddeckseverfittedinabattleshiptothatdate.Theirdesignalsoreceivedspecialattentioninviewofprobabledevelopmentsinaircraftattack.

All openings for ventilationwere reduced to aminimumwhile special hatches,withoperating gear under protection below,were fitted to provide a readymeans of escape.Protection to the main armament and magazines was very thorough, special attentionhaving been given to this in view of the high percentage of hits on and around turretsduringthewar,andtheusuallydisastrouseffectsofthese.Maximumarmourthicknessesonbarbettesandturretswererespectively5inand3inmorethanin theQueenElizabethandRoyal Sovereign classes. The turrets were a new, low design with a flat crown todeflectprojectilesfallingatasteepangle,andreportedly theyaffordedahighdegreeofprotection.Anti-flashprotectiontomagazineswasmateriallyimprovedasaresultofpost-war experiments. They were the first British battleships to carry the anti-torpedoarmament in closed turrets, these providing, in addition to other advantages, morecompleteprotectiontotheguncrewsthanthebatterysystem.TheywerethelastBritishbattleships tohavea separateheavily armouredconning tower, thisbeingabandoned inthesucceedingKingGeorge IV class andVanguard inwhich only a light splinter-proofnavigatingpositionhighupinthefaceofthebridgetowerwasprovided.QueenElizabeth,Valiant and Warspite were similarly modified during their final reconstructions.Underwaterprotectionwasverycompleteparticularlyinthemachineryandboilerspaces,where it reached a degree not previously attained in anyotherBritish capital ship.Theusualexternalbulgeswerereplacedbyanalternativeandveryefficientsystemofinternalsub-divisiondevelopedaftera longseriesofexperimentsandit isreportedthat thiswasdesigned tobecapableofwithstanding thesimultaneousexplosionof four torpedoes.Alongitudinalbulkheadwasfittedthroughoutthemachineryandboilerspaces.

TheDNC(SirWilliamBerry)hadfavouredinwardslopingsideswithexternalbulgesas inHood, but thiswas found to be impracticable because of: 1. Inability of existingdocking accommodation to take the increased beam caused by the considerably widerbulgesrequiredtoresistmoderntorpedoes.2.Necessityformaximumarmouredbeamatwaterlinetoensurestabilityineventofheavyflooding.

Pumping and flooding arrangements were very extensive and were designed to dealrapidlywiththecorrectionofheeland/ortrimresultingfromdamage.Elevenelectricallydriven pumps with individual outputs of 350 tons per hour were provided forcompartmentsoutsidethemachineryandboilerspaces.

Themainarmourprotectionwasasfollows:

MainBelt:was 14in thick amidships and ran for 384 feet.Angled at 72°, itwas fittedinternallyandextendedfromtheouterfaceoftheforward16inbarbette(about100feetfromthebow)totheinnerfaceoftheafter6inbarbette(about70feetfromthestern)andslopedinwardstothewaterline.The14inplatesreducedto13inabreastmachineryandaftermagazines.Bulkheadswere12inand8inforwardclosingforwardextremitiesof belt armour between middle and lower decks, 10in and 4in aft closing afterextremitiesofbelt.

Decks:6¼in armourplatesplus1½inplating laidover the top (6¾in) laid flat over the

lengthof the14inbeltarmouronmiddledecklevel.Lowerdeck4¼inarmourplatesplus½inplatinglaidoverthetop(4¾in)flat,fromafterextremityof14inbelttowithinabout25feetofthestern.

Barbettes:15incarrieddowntomiddledeck(seeplanforvariousthicknesses).

Turrets:16infaces,7¼incrownsandrear.

Secondarybarbettes:1in.

Conningtower:14insides,12infront,10inbackand6½inroof.

Tube:6in.

Conningtowerhood:5in–3in.Funneluptakes:8in–7in.

Anti-torpedobulkheads:1½in,longitudinalportandstarboard,setwellinboard,extendingcompletelybetweenforwardandaftermagazinesfromkeeltomiddledeckandslopinginwardsfromtoptobottom.

On completion they were probably the best armoured battleships afloat although theshallow 14in belt led tomuch criticism after completion. During firing experiments in1931onMarlboroughandEmperorofIndiaoneshell(hitno.4)burstunderthearmouredbelt, apparently justwhere itwas in contactwith skin plating, and caused considerabledamage. This hit emphasized the desirability of a deep belt and it was proposed thatNelsonandRodneybeimprovedinthisrespectwhentheycameinhandforrefitting,buttheextensionofsidearmourwasnevereffectedandtheirarmourprotectionremainedthesamethroughouttheirlives.TheonlyadditionwastoNelson,whichwasfittedwith100lband 120lb NC armour on the lower deck forward between 80 and 84 stations, ‘160lbarmour bulkhead at 80 station fromhold to platformdeck.Rodney was not completelyfittedwithadditionalarmourforward,butitisunderstoodthatshedidreceivesomethingalongtheselinesalthoughtheofficialrecordsarenotclear.Laterproposalstomodernizethearmourprotection(1938)werefinallyabandoned(seenotesonreconstruction).

NELSONANDRODNEY:PARTICULARS,ASCOMPLETED

Construction Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedNelson: Armstrong 28.12.1922 3.9.1925 April1927(begantrials).Rodney: CammellLaird 28.12.1922 17.12.1925 August1927(begantrials).

Displacement (tons):Nelson (as inclined 19.3.1927) 31,800 (light), 33,300 (standard),37,780(deep).Rodney:33,730(standard),37,430(deep).

Dimensions

Length:Nelson660ft(pp),709ft9⅞in(oa);Rodney710ft2½in(oa).

Beam:106ft.

Draught

Nelson:28ft1in(light),30ft4in(meanstandard);

Rodney:30ft2in(standard),31ft8indeep.

Armament

9×16inMk1(100rpg)

12×6inMkXII(150rpg)

6×4.7inHAMkVIII(175rpg)

4×3pdrHotchkiss

8×2pdrSingleQF

9×6pdr

5×MG

18Lewis

2×24.5inTTsubmerged.

Armour

Mainbelt:14in(KC)thinningto13inatmachineryspacesandaftermagazines.

Barbettes:15–12in

Bulkheads:12–8–10–4in

Turrets:16–11–9in

Conningtower:14–12–10–6in

Decks:Protectivedeck:6¼inplus½inplatingoverwholelengthof14inbelt,lowerdeck4¼inplus½inplating.

Secondarybarbettes:1in(special‘D’steel)

Secondaryturrets1½–1in(special‘D’steel).

Machinery

BrownCurtisgearedreductionturbinesdriving2propellers.DesignedSHP:45,000for23knots.

8Admiralty3-drumsmall-tubedboilers,250psi.

Lengthofenginerooms:29ft11⅛inforward,23ft11¾inaft.

Lengthofboilerrooms:41ft11¼inforward,42ftaft.

Fuel:3,800tonsoilmax.

Radiusofaction:14,500rpmat10knots,5,500atfullspeed(seealso1939figures).

Ship’sboats:

2×50ftmotorpinnaces,1×35ftmotorpinnace,2×45ftmotorlaunches,2×32ftsailingcutters,2×27ftwhalers,1×30ftgig,2×16ftskiffdinghies.Forprivateshipadd:1×30ftgig,1×50ftadmiral’sbarge,1×13ft6inbalsaraft.

Searchlights

4×36in:2onplatformeachsideoffunnel,2onplatformonmaintripodlegs,6×24insignallinglamps.

Complement:1,361asflagship,1,314asprivateship.

Costs:Nelson£7,504,055,Rodney:£7,617,799.

MachineryThearrangementofboilers andmachinerywascontrary tonormalpractice, theenginesbeing forward of the boiler rooms. This layout was adopted because: 1. Engine roomrequiredmorewidththantheboilerroomandinreversingtheorderofnormalpracticethiswasobtainedanditwasconsequentlybetterprotected.2.Largeopeningsforuptakesandboilerroomfanswerefurtherfromthemainmagazines.3.Greatspaceformainarmamentandcontrolscouldbeprovidedwithoutsmokeinterferencefromthecloseproximityofthefunnels.

Theywere the firstBritish battleships to have all geared turbines although these hadbeenfittedinthebattlecruiserHood,thelargecruisersoftheCourageousclassandsomesmaller cruisers and destroyers. Sub-division in machinery and boiler spaces wasdevelopedtoahigherdegreethaninanypreviousBritishcapitalship.Arrangementoftheboilers abaft machinery, contrary to normal practice, brought the engine roomsimmediatelybelowthebridgetoweranditwasadoptedtoenablethefunneltobeplacedwellabaftthetowerwithaviewtoreducingsmokeinterferencetothebridgeandcontrolpositions.Thefunnelwaslocatedabout40feetabaftthetower,butinservicethisdistancewasfoundtobestillinsufficient,especiallywhensteamingheadtowind,whenthetowercreated a considerable back-draught to the inconvenience of the bridge and controlpersonnel.Onvariousoccasionsafunnelextensionandcowlwererecommended,butthiswasneverfitted.

TheNelson arrangementwas not repeated, although the practice of disposing engineandboilerroomsalternatelyforgreatersecuritywaslateradoptedintheKingGeorgeVclass and Vanguard and in some cruisers and destroyers, each group of boilers beingplacedbefore the engine room it served.ThemainmachinerywasBrown-Curtis singlereductiongearedturbinesdrivingtwinscrews,oneHPaheadandoneLPaheadandasternturbine on each shaft. Cruising stages were fitted to HP turbines for economy at lowpowers.Themachinerywasinfourcompartmentsforwardoftheboilerrooms,arrangedinpairsabreast,separatedbyacentrelinebulkhead.Theturbineswereinthetwoforwardcompartments,reductiongear,etc.,inthetwoaftercompartments.Therewasacompleteset of machinery for each shaft, entirely isolated from and independent of the other.Auxiliarymachinerywas situated inwing compartments farther aft. Boilerswere eightAdmiralty,3-drum,small-tubeboilerswithsuperheatersandforceddraught,sixboilersof5,600hp and two of 5,100hp.Working pressure was approximately 250psi reducing to200psi at the turbines, and super-heated to 150° Fahrenheit. The boilers were in fourcompartments, two in each, arranged in pairs abreast on each side of the centrelinebulkheadabaftthemachineryspace,withcentralstokeholdspaces.Theportandstarboardboilerroomswerecompletelyisolatedfromandindependentofoneanother.

Theauxiliarymachineryconsistedofdistillingmachinery– fourevaporatorsand twodistillerycondensers–capableof320tonsoutputper24hours,arrangedintwocompletesets,oneineachauxiliarycompartment(locatedportandstarboardabreastboilerroomswiththeturbinesinwell-separatedcompartmentsforwardoftheenginerooms).Thiswidedistributionminimizedtheriskofallelectricpowerbeinglostintheeventofdamageinanyonearea.Anewtypeofelectro-hydraulicsteeringgearwasintroducedintheseships.Rams were operated by oil under pressure from three variable-speed pumps driven byelectric motors. Each pump with its motor was placed in a separate watertightcompartment.Alternativesteam-drivenpumpswereprovidedintheafterengineroomforuseineventofcompleteelectricpowerfailure.Thisgear,whichprovedverysatisfactoryinservice,wascapableofputtingtherudderhardoverfromporttostarboardorviceversainaboutthirtyseconds.Oilfuelwas3,967tonsandwascarriedinwingtanksanddouble-bottomsandincluded162tonsofdieseloil.

NELSON:GMANDSTABILITY,BASEDONINCLININGEXPERIMENTS19MARCH1927‘A’condition:Shipfullyequippedwith1,000tonsoilinbottomtanks,and1,000tonsinwingtanks.Draught:30ft4inmean.GM:9.3ft

‘B’condition:Shipfullyequippedwith95%fueloilonboard(3,900tonsoil).Draught:31ft8inmean.GM:10.2ft

Anglesofstability:‘A’condition:30°max.‘B’condition:40°max.Stabilityvanishesat‘A’condition:73°,‘B’condition:77°

Twosetsoftrialswerecarriedoutineachship,oneatstandarddisplacementandoneatdeepload.Nelson,withoutforcing,exceedednominalspeedatstandarddisplacementanddidverywellatdeepload,theseresultsrepresentingameanofeighthours’trialineachcase(seesteamtrialtables).

Bothshipsprovedtobeexcellentsteamersinserviceandit issaidthatwhilechasingBismarck in May 1941 Rodney attained a speed in excess of what had been thoughtpossibleinviewofpreviousmachineryandboilerbreakdownsandthelongtimethathadelapsed since her last refit. In relation to displacement Nelson and Rodney were, oncompletion,probablythemosteconomicalsteamersintheRoyalNavy

GeneralNotesAcompletebreakawayfromthenormalbridgeworkandheavytripodforemast,whichwasreplacedbyahigh tower structure,wasconsidered tobe theonly satisfactorymeansofobtaining adequate support and clear vision for the extensive modern fire controlequipment, as well as providing the necessary accommodation for the navigating andsignalling positions and extra cabins, etc. The controls for the main and secondaryarmamentwerelocatedatthetopofthetower,andtheAdmiral’sbridge,navigatingandlookout platforms were arranged around the upper sides and face of the tower, withsignalling searchlights in ports inside and lower down.The sea cabins, plotting offices,etc.,werepositionedatthebaseofthetower.Allflagsignallingwascarriedoutfromtheforemast(seeCaptainsreport).

Themassivetowerbridgework,introducedinthisclass,wasretainedinthesucceedingKing George V and Vanguard classes, and (in modified form) in the reconstructedWarspite,Valiant,QueenElizabethandRenown.

The heavy boats were all stowed abaft the funnel, and handled by themain derrickwhichwasworkedfromthemainmastbase.

Accommodation greatly embodied the recommendations of the AccommodationCommittee,whichhadbeenappointedbytheAdmiraltyin1923,andinthesetwoshipsitwasespeciallygoodbothforofficersandratings–thespaceavailablebeingmuchgreaterthanusualasaconsequenceofthehighfreeboardoverthewholelengthoftheship,whichalsoofferedampleheadroombetweenthedecks.Naturallightwasprovidedinmostlivingspaces,andventilationwasgreatlyimprovedoverprecedingclasses.Theshipswerealsoprovidedwithsuchitemsasreadingandrecreationrooms,dryingroomsforwetclothing,bakery,oil-firedgalley,laundryandelectricovensforthefirsttime.

Ventilationreceivedspecialattentionandprovedtobegenerallysatisfactoryinservice.Inthecrew’sgalley,however,exhaustfumeswerestatedtobeintolerableduringthewarwhentheskylightswereoftenclosedtodarkenship.

Thepairwereknownaffectionatelyas‘TheQueen’sMansions’(becauseofthemassivetower)andby1930hadbecomepartoftheBritishconstitution–thegeneralpubliclovedthem and theywere always crowded out on ‘NavyDays’, but amore relevant opinioncamefromCaptainT.H.BinneyofNelsonwhenfinishinghistermofserviceinher:

BeforerelinquishingcommandofHMSNelson,Ihavethehonourtosubmitthefollowingremarksorpointsofinterestrelatingtothisclassofship.IhavebeenfortunateinthatIhavejoinedtheshipatthatmomentwhenshemaybesaidtohavegotoverherinitialtroubles,andmyperiodofcommandhasincludedthelasttwelvemonthsofthefirstcommandwithawell-trainedship’scompany,andthefirstfivemonthsofthesecondcommandwithanewship’scompany.

NELSON:STEAMTRIALS,DISPLACEMENT:33,636/33,913TONS

Date Runs SHP Revs(S) Revs(P) Speed(knots)21.5.1927 1.East 6,318 84.7 85 13.01 2.West 6,224 82 82.25 12.34 3.East 6,329 83.5 85 12.84 4.West 6,393 83 82.75 12.29 1.East 9,463 97.2 96.5 14.89 2.West 9,332 94.4 96 14.13 3.East 9,193 96.4 95.6 14.75 4.West 8,707 91 93.5 13.76 1.East 14,574 112.2 110.3 17.34 2.West 14,594 110.6 110 16.38 3.East 14,633 112.2 111.2 17.211 4.West 14,583 110.2 110.2 16.47

1.East 18,331 117.5 120.25 17.9 2.West 18,777 122.7 121.7 18.85 3.East 18,624 121.2 120.2 17.70 4.West 18,763 122 121.3 18.8523.5.1927 1.West 27,186 136.6 137.3 20.76 2.East 27,531 137 136.3 20.22 3.West 27,612 138 137 20.67 4.East 27,380 136.7 136 20.1124.5.1927 1.East 37,008 150.6 152 22.53 2.West 36,992 150.3 151.3 22.19 3.East 36,936 150.3 151.7 22.67 4.West 36,569 150.3 147 22.0926.5.1927 1.East 45,805 161 161 23.14 2.West 45,878 162 162 23.9 3.East 45,890 161.5 160.3 23.23 4.West 45,174 162 162.6 23.84 5.East 46,212 161.3 161.3 23.32 6.West 46,089 162 162 23.68

NELSON:STEAMTRIALS,DISPLACEMENT:33,636/33,913TONS(DEEPLOAD)

Date Runs SHP Revs(S) Revs(P) Speed(knots)28May1927 1st 6,342 80 79 12.33 2nd 6,046 81.2 82.9 12.30 1st 15,238 113.25 113.75 17.48 2nd 15,218 111.25 111.25 16.42 3rd 15,189 113 113.25 17.66 4th 15,115 111.8 112.27 16.36 1st 19,030 121.7 122 19 2nd 18,790 120 120.6 17.31 3rd 18,636 120 120.7 18.33 4th 18,626 119.5 120 17.11 1st 37,027 150.3 150 22.36 2nd 36,554 149 148.3 21.10 3rd 36,920 150 149.3 22.14 4th 36,312 148.6 148.3 21.25 1st 45,876 161.5 161 23.20 2nd 45,685 160 159.7 22.90 3rd 45,844 160.6 161 23.05

4th 45,840 160 160 23.14 5th 45,795 160 161 23.96 6th 45,771 160 160.3 23.35

RODNEY:STEAMTRIALSCoursethroughoutthetrialswasabout2milesfromshoreatadepthof25fathoms.Sea:Smooth.Displacement:33,785/33,660tons.

Date Runs SHP Revs(S) Revs(P) Speed(knots)30.8.1927 1.East 18,162 122 122 18.672 2.West 18,236 124 123 18.710 3.East 18,307 124 122 18.367 4.West 18,399 124 123 18.828 I.West 14,859 114 114 17.892 2.East 15,022 116 115 16.901 3.West 14,803 114 114 18.072 4.East 14,875 114 115 16.697 1.West 10,237 101 101 16.514 2.East 9,623 98 98 14.331 3.West 9,627 98 97 15,481 4.East 8,919 97 95 14.074 1.West 5,760 86 86 13.897 2.East 6,633 89 89 12.894 3.West 6,752 87 88 13.667 4.East 6,809 87 88 12.8111.8.1927 1.East 27,809 140 140 20.571 2.West 28.069 140 140 21.277 3.East 28,167 141 140 20.809 4.West 27,727 140 139 21.3532.9.1927 1.East 36,442 154 154 22.670 2.West 36,626 154 153 22.670 3.East 37,052 154 153 22.613 4.West 36,651 153 152 22.7857.9.1927 1.West 46,477 164 163 23.08 2.East 45,427 165 163 3.West 45,591 163 162 4.East 45,365 163 163 5.West 46,030 165 161 6.East 46,317 165 163

1.Manoeuvringpowers.

Intheearlystagesoftheship’sfirstcommission,therewasageneralmisconceptioninthe service that the Nelson class were unhandy and difficult to manoeuvre. This wasprobablyduetotheunaccustomedpositionofthebridgeandtheinitialinexperienceofthepersonnelofwhat theshipmightdoundervariousconditions.Bothmypredecessorandmyself,however,verysoondiscovered that thisopinionwasentirelyfallacious. Incalmweather, the ship’smanoeuvring capabilities are in noway inferior, and inmanywayssuperior to thoseofQueenElizabeth orRevenge.The asternpower ismuchbetter thanthatofQueenElizabeth,theysteermuchbetterwiththeenginesstopped,andatresttheyturnveryeasilybyworking theengines.Owing to thehighsuperstructureaft,however,theycarryagooddealofweatherhelm,andforthesamereason,theirturningcirclewhenturningawayfromthewind isgreatly increased,whilewhenturning into thewind, it iscorrespondinglydecreased.

Asanexampleoftheeffectofthewind,ononeoccasionwhengettingunderwaywithawindofabout5–6ktsonthestarboardbeam,theshipswung4pointstostarboardagainstfullstarboardhelm,anditwasnotuntiltheshipwasmovingthroughthewaterat9ktsthatshestartedtoanswerherhelm.

Onanotheroccasion,whenanchoredwiththefleet,withawindofabout5knotsontheportbeam,theship’sheadcouldnotbekeptsteadywithfullporthelm,andswungtoportinspiteofstarboardscrewsbeingreversed.OnenteringaharbourthroughalongnarrowchannelsuchasGibraltarastrongheadwindisthecauseofsomeanxiety;buttheeffectseemstobegreatlyreducedifthewindisafewpointsabaftthebeamoronthebow.

Whenpointingtheshipusingtheengines,thewindhaslittleeffect,excepttostoptheswingatonce.

Generally,thesuperstructurehastheeffectofamizzensailcontinuouslyset,andifthisiskeptinmind,norealdifficultiesshouldbeencounteredinanycircumstances.

Armament

Iholdtheopinionthatthelow-anglegunequipmentasawhole,andparticularlythe16inmainarmament,isaverymarkedadvanceonanypreviouscapitalship,andshouldresultinimprovedrateofhittingatallranges.

Onaccountofvarious improvements (rangefinders,controlapparatus,etc.)aswellastheincreasedsizeofsplashes,long-rangefiringfromNelsonshouldbemoreeffectiveinthe25/28,000ydslong-rangefiringthaninQueenElizabethat21/25,000yds.

Inthecaseofsecondaryarmament,althoughtherateoffireisratherlow,theincreasedrange at which fire can be opened, and the absence of loss of output due to fatigue,combined with excellent ammunition supply arrangements, will be a very prominentfactorinwar.

Inviewof themodemtendencyofconstructionfor ‘allornothing’armourprotectionleaving controls and secondary batteries unprotected, the possibility for using thesecondarybatteryfor‘harassingfire’atthemainarmouredtargetwhentherangehasbeenfound assumes greater importance, and inNelson the secondary armament can do thisefficientlywithoutlossofanti-torpedoboatefficiency.

16inmountings

The16intriplemountinghasbeensubjectedtoconsiderablecriticismfromtimetotime,andthereislittledoubt,thatinsomequarterstheviewisheldthatatriplemountingforheavygunsisnotagoodinvestment.

The great advantage of the triple mounting system from construction point of view(whichisthatthearmamentcanbeconcentratedinamuchsmallerspace,andwillrequirelessareaofarmouredprotection)hasnot,perhapsbeensufficientlyemphasized.

ThemaindisadvantageofNelson’striplemountingislossofoutputonaccountofthefact that the three guns cannot be fired together owing to ballistic difficulties, whereastheymustbeloadedtogether.This,however,isnotinitselfareasonforcondemningthetriplemountingingeneral.

Themountingmaybesaidtohaveproveditself,wheninOctober1929,oneturretcrewwithtwoyears’experience,loadedandfired33roundswithoutmishap.Themaindefectsappeartobetherollerpathsandtherollers.

Firecontrol

Themain armament fire control is very satisfactory, and a marked advance on that ofearlier battleships. The efficiency of the rangefinder installation and theAdmiralty firecontroltableareofahighorder,andithasbeenfoundacomparativelysimplemattertotrainthepersonnelintheiruse.Insecondaryarmamentapparatusnogreatadvancecanberecordedastheinstallationisessentiallythesameasinoldershipsthoughmoreautomaticinaction.Theinstallation,however,fulfilstherequiredconditionofsimplicity.

Rodneyleavingportc.1934.

RODNEYAsFitted,1928

RODNEY1928InboardProfile,UpperDeckPlan,Rig

AmidshipsviewofNelsonin1932.Notethestairwaysattherearofthesuperstructure.

TheCaptains bridge is generally satisfactory and a great improvement over previousclasses. One small difficulty occurs however, as a Flagship, in that the Captain andofficers on the bridge cannot see signals hoisted on the mainmast, and are entirelydependantonthereportingofthembyasignalman.TheAdmiral’sbridgeisinferiortotheCaptain’sbridgeinthattheAdmiralhasnoall-roundviewfromanyonespot,thebridgeitselfisundulycrowdedwithpersonnel.

Ibelievethatwarrequirementswouldverysoonleadtoademandtoimprovethebridgeinthisrespect,andifexpensewerenoobject,itcouldeasilybedonebyextendingtheforeendofthisstructureoverthecompassplatform.

Accommodation

The accommodation for officers and men is excellent, the men’s particularly being inconformitywiththespiritofthetimesandwithoutanykindofpamperingandisagreatimprovementonanythingthathasgonebefore.

Inconclusion,itmaybeworthemphasizingtheobviousfactofthegoodmoraleffectonofficers andmen of serving in such a ship completewith themost up-to-datematerial.Servinginsuchashipinducedasenseofresponsibilityandconsequentthoroughnessinquiteanexceptionaldegree.

Mentakeprideintheirshipbecausesheisuptodate,andtakeprideinshowinghertotheirfriendsbecausetheyfeelthattheyhavesomethingworthshowing.Thisconnectionbetweenmoral andmaterial factors is not of course in itself a reason for building newships,butinthepost-warnavyitisafactofsomeimportancethatshouldnotbeneglected.

BridgeworkAfteralongsuccessionofsingleandtripodforemaststohousethe‘eyesandbrains’ofthebattleship,anentirelynewconceptinbridgeworkarrivedin1925withthemassivefullyenclosedstructurefittedtoNelsonandRodney.Thistypeofstructurehadneverbeenseeninacapitalshipbefore;gonewerethesteppedlevelsofbridgeworkthathadalwaysbeenopentoallweathersandinitsplacewasonelargetowerwithdirectorcontrolequipmentlocated on the top. Within the tower were housed all the essentials to run the ship:Captain’s, Admiral’s and officer’s levels, searchlight platforms, lookout and navigatingbridge.Thestructurewassomethingofagambletofitina£7,000,000battleshipwithoutanyproperpracticaltests,butonethatthankfullypaidoff.

Thetoweritself,whichdominatedtheappearanceoftheship,hadsomedisadvantages,includinglackofall-roundvision,butitsgoodpoints,suchasbeingfullyenclosed,whichofferedsomedegreeofprotectiontoeveryoneservinginthere,andallinstrumentsbeingclosetohand,outweighedthedisadvantages.Amajordisadvantagewasthefactthatthelargeflatsidesofthestructurecaughtthewindatallangles.Testshadshownthatthewindwhenhead-onwouldflowquicklyupoverthefaceofthebridgeandthenquicklymovearound to the back of the structure. When the windows were open in the bridge andnavigatingpositionstherewouldbeaterrificbackdraught,whichinsevereweatherwouldcausediscomfortnotunlikethatexperiencedintheolder,moreopenbridgework.Withalldoorsandwindowsclosed,thebackdraughtpracticallyceased.

Throughout the years the structurewas subject to criticism, especially in 1934whenNelsonranagroundatPortsmouth.(Itwasarguedthatthewindcaughtthestructureandpushed the ship off course. See Nelson aground notes.) The criticism, however, wascertainly less than that levelled at older bridgework. Moreover the design was muchfavoured abroad and became widely copied in new ships and older vessels beingreconstructed. This type of structure continued in the RN in various shapes until thedemise of the battleship with Vanguard in 1946, so it must have been reasonably

successful.

NELSON:MASTS,MARCH1930Forwardsteelspursonfrontofbridge:7ft6inlong,3–3½indiameter.

Jackstaff:22ft6inlong,3–4indiameter.

Ensignstaff:27ft3inlong,3–5indiameter.

Twosoundingbooms:30ftlong,6–4indiameter

Eightgeneral-purposederricks(Oregonpine)40ftlong,11½–14indiameter.

Mainmast(Oregonpine)

length(ft/in) diameter(in) weight(tons)Lowermast 90 34 16.89Struts: 77ft6in 30 16.28(two)Topmast: 60 16–10¼ 1.18Topgallantmast: 49 12¾–5 .77Lowersignalyard 19ft6in 6–4½ .09Topgallantyard: 50 9–4¼ .56Mainboatderrick: 59ft4in 21–16¾ .31(mildsteel) 5.36Highestfixedpoint: 113ft5¼in.Heightoftopgallantmastfromwaterline: 190ft9in.High-anglecontroltower: 116ft7in.High-anglecontrolplatform: 108ft.Mainarmamentcontrol: 82ft7in.Floorofsearchlightplatform: 61ft1in.Pom-pomcontrolplatform: 68ft.

DuringtheSecondWorldWartestswerecarriedout(1943–4)bytheNationalPhysicalLaboratorytoascertainadegreeofhabitabilityforthoseservingintheuppermostlevelsof thebridgework.AmodelwasmadeofNelson’s bridgework at½ full size, includingpartoftheupperdeckand‘X’and‘B’16inturretsandthefunnel.

Variousscreenswerefittedtotheoriginalbridgeandnavigatingpositions,first12ininheightandthen18into24in.Itwasfoundthatwindpressuresandbackdraughtcouldbeeliminatedsufficientlybyfittingscreensandbaffles;thesmallledgethathadbeenfittedinRodneyinthe1930s(belowbridgewindows)hadinfactbeenasuccess.Nelson,however,wasnotgiventhisuntilthetestshadbeencompleted.Itwasprobablyfittedinlate1943orearly 1944 and can be seen as a small ledge with airflow baffles beneath it fitted justbelowthelowerbridgeworkwindows.

NelsonAground,January1934

Bigshipswouldoftenbumpintooneanotherduringdockinganditwasnoeasytasktoensure the safetyofabout35,000 tonsat lowspeeds inconfinedareas.Another regularmishaptoshipswithlargedraughtswasrunningaground,andwhenNelsonranagroundinJanuary1934abigissuewasmadeoftheincidentbecauseithappenedclosetoSouthseabeach and in full view.On 12 January shewas proceeding out of harbour at high tideassistedbythreetugs.AttheSouthRailwayJettytheorderwasgiventoincreasespeedto15½knots and fixingswere taken from the land toattain thecorrect speed.OnpassingMarlboroughPier and approachingHamiltonBank theorderwasgiven to reduce to12knots. The ship turned against the rudder to starboard and after proceeding about 2½lengthsgroundedfastontheHamiltonBankatabearingof10½degreesstarboard.Earlyeffortstorefloattheshipprovedunsuccessfulandsomeofthestoresandequipmenthadtoberemoved.Diversweresentoverthesidetoseewhatdamagehadbeencaused(actuallyverylittle)andaninquirywasorderedalmostatoncetodeterminewhetherthegroundinghadoccurred throughanerrorby theofficers inchargeorhadsimplybeenanaccident.Was it because of the close proximity of the land, or had the rudder been put over toohard?Abnormalsteeringwasalsosuggested.Theshipwasrefloatedonthenexthightide,butbythenthePresshadmorephotographsthantheyneeded.

Amodeloftheshipwasmadeandtestswerecarriedoutusingasimulationofthescenein a test tank.Thepathof themodelwas carefully recorded,wind speeds,weather andofficers’orderswerealltakenintoconsideration.ThefindingsoftheCourtwerevariable,butnoneofthestaffinNelsonwasblamed:

1.Windeffectonsuchalargestructureascarriedbytheclass.2.Rudderdraginsuchshallowwater.3.Tugmismanagement.4.Screwtypesandsizes.5.Correctdisplacementwhenleavingharbour.6.Nelsonclasshandlebadlyatslowspeeds.

Withregardtonumberoneitwasconcludedthatalthoughthestructureforwardcaughtthewindthisdidnotinfacthaveabadeffectonthehandlingoftheshipatsea,butinsomecasesdidaffectthevesselatslowspeeds.

Number two was dismissed because the rudder did not contribute to the grounding.Numberthree.Althoughonetughadpartedthetowduringpreliminarysailing,theothertwoperformedverywellexceptthatatthetimeitwasthoughtthatagreaterspeedfortugswouldhavebeenanadvantage.

Number four was dealt with later by Stanley Goodall (Assistant Constructor) whowrote:

The absence of complaints is the highest reward that the Director of NavalConstruction expects, but in this particular case a reportwas received from acaptainrelinquishingcommand(seereportelsewhereinchapter)inwhichitwasstatedthattheship’smanoeuvringcapabilitiesareinnowayinferiortothoseoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses.Ithinkthisistobeattributedto some extent thatNelson and Rodney have twin screws of large diameter,

whereastheotherclassesmentionedhavefourscrewsofsmallerdiameter.

Numberfivewasprovedtobecorrect;theshipwasnotoverweightforhervoyage.

Number six, stating that Nelson handled badly at slow speeds, did have somefoundation(seeCaptainBinney’sreport),andwhenfirstcompletedtheconstructorsnotedthefollowing:

W.J.Berry,13December1927:InabeamwindofForce6theestimatedwindpressureontheshipamountsto

morethan38tons.Ataspeedof7knotsthethrustfromeachscrewamountstoabout7 tonsand thepressureon the rudderat20degrees isabout8½tons. Itwill thus be seen that at low speeds a strongwind produces the greater forceactingontheshipandcouldaffectherbehaviourrenderingherlessresponsivetotheactionoftherudder.

All thesepossibilitieswereexamined,but theconclusionwas that theship’scoursewastoofareastofthecentreofthechannelthroughwhichshipsleavePortsmouth,probablybecausetheshipwasnothandlingtoowellatalowspeed.

Although itwas often stated that the pair did handlewell at sea,many reports from1945onwardsstatedthattheydidnotperformatallwellatslowspeedsasaresultofthewindcatchingthemassivesuperstructure.

AppearanceChanges,ModificationsandRefitsThe unique appearance of Nelson and Rodney was never equalled in any othercontemporary capital ship–Britishor foreign.Many thought themextremelyugly, andthey received derisory nicknames: ‘Rodol’ and ‘Nelsol’ (after oil tankers); ‘the pair ofboots’–therightandleftbootsoftheSecondBattleSquadron–‘theuglysisters’or‘theCherryTreeclass’(i.e.,cut-downversionsfromWashingtonNavalTreaty).Yettheyweregenerallyconcededtobethemostimpressive-lookingBritishbattleshipsoftheirday,witha menacing appearance of fighting efficiency seldom, if ever, equalled in any otherbattleship.Oneofherofficerssaidofher,‘Ichallengeanyonetostandonherfo’c’s’leandnot feel a definite tingle of pride and fear’ – certainly a general feeling that waspromulgatedbythemedia.

NelsonagroundatHamiltonBankinJanuary1934.Thetugsareattemptingtopullhercleanbuttonoavail.

AnaerialviewofNelsonatthe1935FleetReview.

Theabnormallylongforecastle,withitsmassivebridgestructurelocatedabout60feetabaftamidshipsandstandingapproximately116feetabovesealevel,andtheveryshortquarterdeck made for an extremely unattractive profile and, incidentally, made a trueappreciationoftheirworthsomewhatdifficultfromcertainangles.Itisoftensaidthattheywere seen to their best from the quarter, but the author believes that by far theirmostimpressiveappearancewasbow-on.Theirprincipalcharacteristicswere:

1.Highfreeboard,flushdeckhullwithstraightcutawaysteminsteadoftheusualramorplough-shapedbow.2. Three triple 16in turrets, all forward with the after turret placed approximatelyamidships.3.Threetwin6inturretscloselyspacedoneachquarter.4.Highmassivebridge towerwith rangefindersanddirectorson top, slightlyabaftamidships.5.Rectangularstumpforemastatrearoftower.6.Asinglerathersmallfunnelsetwellabafttower.

Ascompletedtheywereextremelyalike,andfromadistanceitwasalmostimpossibleto

distinguishone from theother. Individualdifferences:Nelson, flagpole tomain.Secondyardonmainmastcarriedlow;Rodney,noflagpole.Secondyardonmaincarriedhigher.Also therewere slight variations in the scuttles near anchors and under 6in armament.Pendantnumbers(neverpaintedup):Rodney29;Nelson28.

1929–30:High-anglerangefinderonforetopreplacedbyhigh-angledirector(byMarch1930inRodney,MaytoJune1930inNelson).Originaldiamond-shapedtopreplacedbycircularpattern.

NELSONCLASSRe-armouring,21May1936

AnaerialviewofNelsonduringthespringcruise,March1937.Notetheidentificationletterson‘C’turretroof.

RODNEYANDNELSONBridgeModifications

1931–2:RodneybyJuly1932,multiple2pdrAA(8barrels)addedinlargesponsonsonstarboard side of superstructure abeam funnel. Original single 2pdr AA removed.StarboardtorpedoRFremoved.

1933–4:Nelson,multiple2pdrAA (8barrels) added, asRodney, andsingle2pdrAAremoved(byMarch1934).MFDFequipmentaddedMaytoJune1934.Aerialatheadofmainmast.Remotecontrolofficefittedatrearofbridgetower.

1934–5:Nelson,multiple0.5inAA(4barrels)addedP&Sonplatformlowdownattherearofbridgetower.Straight-armedcraneforhandlingaircraftfittedonportsideontheupperdeckabeamthetower.OneSeagullamphibianfitted,mainlyforexperimentationinconnectionwiththesubstitutionofamphibiansforseaplanesincapitalshipsandcruisers,and for obtaining information regarding their performance in reconnaissance and roughweather operations. The crane was retained for other purposes after the conclusion oftrials.NootheraircraftequipmenteverfittedinNelson.Rodney,multiple2pdrAAaddedonportsideofsuperstructureabeamfunnel.Multiple0.5inAAaddedasinNelson.PorttorpedoRFremoved.

1935–6:36inSLreplacedby44ininbothships.

1936–7:Nelson,multiple2pdr (8barrels)addedonport sideofsuperstructureabeamthefunnel.Shieldwastemporarilyfittedtoforward4.7inAA(removedbyMarch1938).

1937:Red,whiteandblueidentificationbandspaintedupon‘B’turretinbothshipsinSpanishwatersduringSpanishCivilWar.Aircraftidentificationletterspaintedoncrownof‘C’turretinNelson(NE)(paintedoutbySeptember1939).

1937–8:Nelson as refitted June1937 to January1938.SecondHAdirector addedonforetop close before the other, and raised well clear of this. Foretop was considerablyenlarged. Additional horizontal armour added in forward part of the ship (see armourdrawing). Thicker foremast fitted to support extra weights of second HA director andgenerallyimprovedstablefoundation.Rodney,noextraarmourfitted,butthereweresomeimprovements forward of themain belt internally. Refit September toNovember 1938,multiple2pdraddedonquarterdeck,rightaft.AirwarningradarType79Yaddedoneachmasthead. (First capital ship to have operational radar.) Aircraft catapult (McTaggart)added on crown of ‘C’ turret. Bent-arm crane fitted on port side of conning tower.

TopmastfittedtoforemastforRDF(79Y).Maintopgallantremoved.

1940–1:UPAArocket-projectorsfittedon‘B’and‘C’turrets(1940).AirwarningradarType279fittedinNelson(modified79Y).Type79YreplacedinRodneybyType279.DFaerialremovedfromheadofmainmastinNelson,withamodifiedtypefittedlowonforetopmast. Shields fitted to 4.7in AA guns in Nelson. Foretopmast added, andmaintopgallantremovedinNelson.

1941–2:Radar Type 284 fitted formain armament.Multiple 2pdrs (8 barrels) addedP&S on superstructure and ‘B’ turret, and on quarterdeck, right aft inNelson (Rodneyalready fitted on QD). Seven to nine 20mm AA added in various locations, port andstarboard superstructure around and abaft bridge tower in both ships, on ‘C’ turret inNelsonandon‘B’turretandconningtowerhoodinRodney (removedfrom‘B’turret inRodney later). 0.5inAA removed fromboth ships.Radar fitted for control of 4.7in and2pdrs(Type285for4.7in;283for2pdrs).AAdirectorplatformatheadofforemastwasconsiderablyenlarged.LAAdirectorsfittedonformer0.5inAAplatformsatrearofbridgetower,onupperpairofmaintripodplatforms,andbeforeandabaftafter16indirector.UPAA rocket-projectors removed from ‘B’ and ‘C’ turret in Rodney, but still evident inNelson until September 1941.Allmodifications effected byMay1942.Type 279 radarremoved in Rodney and replaced by Type 281. Aerials on both mastheads. SurfacewarningradarType271addedinbothships(aerialinsidelanternonmainmast).GeneralwarningradarType291fittedinRodney,aerialatheadofforetopmastaboveType281.D/FaerialremovedfromforetopinNelson,andamodifiedtypefittedto thefaceof thebridgetower.MF/DFfittedinRodneywithaerialssameasinNelson.HeavierforetopmastfittedinRodneytoaccommodateadditionalradar.Camouflagepaintedupinbothships.

NELSONWindEffectonBridgework

Nelsonin1937.Lookingupatthemassivesuperstructure,itisobviouswhythisclassweredubbed‘TheQueen’sMansions’.

NELSONANDRODNEY:PROPOSEDRECONSTRUCTION,1938Scheme 1. Remove all 4.7in guns and replace with two twin 5.25in turrets. Add deckarmour over magazines and machinery. Displacement: 39,470 tons deep load; draught:32ft7½in.

Scheme2.Removeall6ingunsandreplacewith4.5inturrets.Amendarmourasabove,plusmodifysidearmourDisplacement:40,830tons

Scheme3. Fit only 3× 5.25in turrets.No splinter protection added butmodify armourbelt.

Costs:

each

6×5.25in: £30,000 (mountings)

Twelveguns: 3,500 eachSightingandcontrolgear: 20,000 Dockyardwork: 60,000 Miscstructuralwork: 30,000 Sidearmour: 400,000 Removalofoldbridgeplusnewonefitted: 13,500 Machineryrenewalormodification: 440,000 Chainhoistsfor5.25inguns: 60,000 Newpom-poms(AA): 13,500 Otherworkrequired:Removalofoldfunneluptakes.Fitaircrafthangarorpositionaircraftbysideof‘C’16inturret(2innumber)(catapulton‘C’turret).Totalcostincludingallworkinvolved: £2,234,500.Alldetailswereagreedinprinciplebeforethewanbutallworkceasedaswarapproachedin1939.

1942–3:13×20mmAAsinglesadded(Nelson),threeP&Sonplatformatrearanglesofbridgetower,replacingformerLAAdirectorplatform.Rodney,35×20mmAAsinglesadded(byAugust1943)‘B’and‘C’ turret,quarterdeck,etc.Type271replacedbyType273. Extra LAA director added on conning tower. Catapult removed but crane wasretained.Shieldsfittedto4.7inAA.Modificationstodirectorcontrolplatform.

1944:Rodney,extra20mmAAadded.Type650anti-missileequipmentfitted.Nelson,28×20mmAAsinglesadded.

1944–5: Nelson, as refitted for Eastern service, July 1944 to January 1945, mainarmamentdirectorpositionoverconning tower removed.LightAAguns increasedby4quadmountings40mmAA,some2pdrdirectorsremovedtomakespaceforextra20mmAA. LAA directors (283 RDF) were above and abaft forward pair of 40mm AAmountings, port and starboard on superstructure abeam and abaft mainmast and onplatformonmain tripod legs.SLremovedfrommain tripod legs tomakewayforLAAdirectors. Internal arrangements modified for tropical service. Standard Admiraltycamouflage scheme painted up inNelson only. Type 650 anti-missile equipment fitted(late1944),aerialonfaceofbridge.

1946: Some 20mmAA removed from both ships. Repainted all grey (Nelson only),Rodneyretainedoriginalcamouflagetothescrapyard.

1947–8:Strippedofallsmallguns,aerialsandgeneralsmallfittings,etc.

BattleDamageNelson,mined4December1939At0755hoursasNelsonwasenteringporton4December1939ataspeedof9–10knots,sheranoveraminewhichexploded in theareaforwardof ‘A’16in turret.Theforward

partoftheshipwaspushedupandwhippedtwoorthreetimesbeforecomingtorest.Menontheupperdeckforwardwerethrowndowninaforwarddirectionandasplashofabout6feetabovetheupperdeckwaswitnessedalongwithbluish-greysmoke.Nelsontookaslightlisttostarboard(about2°)andtrimmedbythebow.Herdraughtwascheckedandread39ft2in, forward,31ft2inaft.The shipwasquicklyput intoportanddiverswentoverthesidetoexaminethedamage.From43to74stationsthesideplatingwasslightlybuckledandshowedanumberofcracks,andtherewasaholejustabaftstation60.Abaftstation60theplatingwasdishedoveralengthofabout14feet.Theholeatstation60wasabout10ft×6ft.Theedgesoftheplatingwerebentinandout.

AwalkaroundNelsonin1937.Lookingaftonthesuperstructureand‘A’and‘B’16inturrets.

Lookingforwardovertheforecastleand16inturrets.

TherearofNelson’sfunnel,showingthesearchlightplatforms.

Nelson,lookingaftfromtherearofthetoweroverfunnelandmainmast.

LookingupatthestaircaseattherearofNelson’stower,showingtheheightoftheDCT.

Flooding

Abaft 80,D.B. tanks under ‘A’ cordite hanging roomwere under pressure and oilwasleaking slowly into the sump under the false floor in the handing room, and thencethroughrivetholesin theboundarybarat thebottomof88transversebulkheadintotheholdspace84–88.Thetransverseoil-fueltank80–84wasunderpressure.

80–86.No.3centralstoreholdwasfloodedatonce.CO2roomSandE.A.roomPwerefloodedslowlytoabout6ftand3ftrespectivelyabovetheplatformdeck.Coldandcoolroomsonplatformdeckmiddle-lineremainedfairlydry,butwatersquirtedintothelobbyfrombuoyancyspace80–84.

60–43 torpedobody roomplatformdeckmiddle-line soon flooded, andwater rose in

theescapetrunktowaterlineoutside.Thecellflatandmusicroomonlowerdeckfloodedslowly.Thefresh-watertank43–50lowerdeckhadsaltwaterinitandhadtobepumpedout.

43–28 torpedo-tube compartment platform deck soon flooded. Compartments aboveremaineddry,exceptforasmallleak.

28–23‘A’pump-roomplatformdeckflooded,andcable-lockerflatfilledslowly.

23–16 inflammable storeplatformdeck flooded toabout3 feet througha loose rivet;thetatterwasstoppedandthecompartmentclearedofwater.Thepetrol-tankbelowwasintact,buttherewasalittlewateratthebottomofthecompartment.

Pumping. There were three 350-ton pumps and two 50-ton pumps forward of thecitadel.The two50-tonpumpswereoutofaction, that in‘A’pump-roombeingfloodedandthatintheCO2roombeingdamaged.

No.1350-tonpumpin‘A’room,workedonthetorpedodraintank,loweredthewaterinthetorpedo-tubecompartmentfromwaterlineleveltoafewfeetbelowthelowerdeck;the pump then gave out (an electric lead was later found to be parted), and thecompartmentfloodedagain.ThestarterofNo.2350-tonpumpwasflooded,andthepumpcouldnotbeused.

No.3350-tonpumpinthelobbyabaftthecoldroomdealtwiththewaterintheCO2room and in the E.A. room, at first by draining the water into the lobby, and later bywanderingsuctions.Twooftheship’s100-tonportablesubmersiblepumpswereusedinclearingwaterfrom‘A’pumproom,etc.Inaddition,theEnglishmanhadbeenalongside,usinga250-tonpump,butthelatterdidnotpumpmorethan100tonsperhour.Waterwascleared from theCO2 room to platform-deck level, theE.A. room to outer bottom, thelobbyofthecoldandcoolrooms,‘A’pumproom,andallspacesabovethelowerdeck.Itwaspossiblewiththepumpsavailabletolowerthewaterinthetorpedobodyroomandinthetorpedo-tubecompartmenttobelowthelowerdeck,butthesecompartmentswerestillfloodedandremainedsountildamagetotheship’ssidewasmadegood.

Internalstructuraldamage

Sofarascouldbeexamined(i.e.,wherenotflooded)internalstructuraldamagewasslightandmuchlessthanwouldbeexpectedaftertheforwardendoftheshiphadwhippedasdescribedbyofficersandmen.Localdamagetofittings,etc.,occurredinvariousplaces;evidencethattheshipwasthoroughlyshakenisgivenbyminordamageasfollows:

(1) Cases in the provision room 60–80 lower deck rose about 2ft and flattened aventilationtrunk.(2)Storerooms,sick-bay,etc.,overtheneighbourhoodoftheexplosionhadstores,fittings,cots,etc.,thrownoutofplace.Thesurroundingbulkheadsofthesick-bayareundamaged,thepaintbeinguncracked.(3)AtablecollapsedintheAdmiral’sdiningcabin.(4)Afewminorbulkheadswerebuckled,butnothingmorethanwouldbeexpectedifthemainarmamentwerefiredoverthedeckatmoderateelevation.(5)Thefire-mainunderupperdeckfracturedatajointjustforwardof43andstopped

supplytotheheads.(6)Thewoodliningtothecoldandcoolroomswaspracticallyundamaged,althoughabovethecentreofthemainexternaldamage.

Inallcasesdamagetostructureappearedtobelocal,andsofarascouldbeseentherewasnosuspicionofstructuralbreakage,eitherlongitudinalortransverse.Theupperdeckwassightedascarefullyaspossible,and,onleaving,theshipwassightedfromabout50yardsforwardof thebowandappearedtobenormal.Theupperdeckplankingwasintactandbuttsandedgesofcaulkingsound.

Machinery

The main machinery suffered no important damage. All bedplates, glands, etc., wereexamined and appeared sound. Starboard auxiliary condenser discharge overboard wasfracturedclosetotheoutboardflange;therewasslightbucklingoftheinnerfunnel.

Auxiliarymachinerysufferedasfollows

(1)Capstanmachinery.Controlshaftingandtiltplateactuatingspindletocentre-linecapstanbentanddistorted.Pressurejointsleakedonallunits.Themachineryneededre-alignment.(2)TheCO2machinerywasunderwaterandcertainCO2bottlescracked.(3)TheE.A.plantwasunderwater.(4)Hydraulicmachinery.One innumbersuctionpipesplit ineachofNos.1and2pumps; the outboard end of the crankshaft of No. 3 pump distorted. Pressure andexhaustmainswereleaking.

Armament

(a)Torpedo.Thiswasallflooded.(b)Gunnery.Thesecondary,H.A.andD.C.T.swereunaffected.Certaindamagewassustainedtothemainarmament,butnotserious.Allturretsweresomewhataffected,butprincipally‘A’.Itemsexaminedwereasfollows:(1) Cordite Handing Room. Oil fuel was leaking from D.B. tanks into the sumpbelowthefalsefloor.Theflooroftherevolvingstructurewasnotconcentricwiththefalsefloorof thefixedstructure,norquitelevelwiththesame.Withtheturretforeandafttherewasagapbetweenthetwofloorsabout1¼inwideat0degrees,andatthispositiontherevolvingpositionwaslinbelowthefixed.Thegapreducedtozeroand the floors are level at 120° R & G; the gap revolves with the turret. Whentraining, theangle-barstiffenerunder theedgeof therevolvingplatformrubbedonbracketssupportingthefalsefloor.

NELSON1934

OnthequarterdeckofNelson(Rodneyfollowing)KingGeorgeVI(seatedatrear)takestimetotalktotheofficers,Weymouth,1938.

Rodney,amidshipsin1937showingtheaircraftcatapulton‘C’turret.

NELSONMineDamage,4December1939

(2)All16inshellhoistswerefullyloadedatthetimeoftheexplosion,buttherewas

nopressureon the turrets.Thehoistsdroppedabout½in, shearing2bolts in smallbrackets connecting the hoists to themain revolving structure. Triangular bracketsconnecting thehoists to theplatformof the trainingenginecompartmentdepressedtheplatformslightly.

Casualties

Therewere74injured,about45seriousorfairlyserious,theremainderminor.Themoreseriouscasescomprisedthreefracturedthighbones,twocompoundfracturesofthelowerlegs,2or3forearmfractures,kneecapfractures,fracturedjaws(onelower),oneshoulder-blade,backinjuries,andcutstoupperinsideleg.Thelast-mentionedinjurieswerecausedbyratingsusingtheheadsfallingbackonbrokenpans;onesuchcasewasserious.Therewerealsoheadinjurieswhereheadsstruckdecks.Alltheinjuredwereintheforepartoftheshipatthetimeoftheexplosion,eitherontheupperdeck,intheheadsorinthecable-lockers.

Conditionofship

Diversattemptedtoclosethevariouscracksintheship’ssidebysoftwoodwedges,etc.,buttheholejustabaft60couldnotbeclosedbeforedockingexceptbymeansofalargeship’ssidepatch.Itwasconsideredthattheshipcouldproceedtoseainsafetywithoutthispatchbeingfitted.

Shewasoutofserviceforatotalofsevenmonths.

DamagesustainedbyRodneyduringtheBismarckaction,27May1941During the action Rodney sustained very little damage from return fire – three minorshrapnelholesinthesideandanothersmallholewhichcutthesearchlightcontrolleadsontheconning tower level.Thehigh-angledirector trainer telescopewasdistortedandputoutofaction.Muchmoredamagewascausedbythefiringofherown16ingunsandwasasfollows:

External. Upper deck was depressed to varying degrees in wake of the turrets. Wooddeckingwaslifted,splitandblownoutofplace.Deckfittingsincludingstowagehuts,mushroomheads, skylights,breakwaterandberthing rail stanchionswerebrokenanddistorted.Watertighthatchestothesickbayflatwereblownopen.

Internal. Deck pillars under girders were distorted and shaken, the fore and aft girdersthemselvesbeingfracturedinseveralplaces.Inthetorpedobodyroomthedepressionwastransmittedtothelowerdeckandputthetorpedotransversingtrolleyoutofaction.Partition bulkheads were distorted and split between upper and main decks.Considerablelengthsofventilationtrunkingweresplitopenandinsomecasesblownoutofplace.Allthestanchionssupportingthesickbaycotscameawayfromthedeckfastenings.

Damage by blast.HACS roll corrector glass fractured.The angle support on 16in gunsaround inside of armoured ring bulkhead for supporting leather apronwasdamaged.Brassboltswithintheturretbrokelooseleavingsomehangingoutofplace.Periscopesin‘A’turretwerepulledfromsecuringboltsbyblastfrom‘B’turret.Variousperiscopesinboth16inand6inturretshadhoodssodistortedthattheywererenderedpracticallyuseless.The superstructure stoodupquitewell to theblast of the16inguns, but the

upperdeckandfittingsprovedtobeaproblemandtherewasaneedofextrasupportandadditionalstiffeningwhichwascarriedoutduringrefitasopportunityarose.

Nelson,torpedoed27September1941OperatingwithForceHintheMediterranean,NelsonwasattackedbyItalianaircraftandhit byone torpedoon theport sidewhile underway at about 16knots. Fortunately thetorpedo’s TNTwarhead onlyweighed about 375lb, but the damagewas still extensive.The hit made a hole in the bottom plating approximately 30 feet long × 15 feet deepextendingfromthelowerdeckedgetojustbelowtheplatformdeckbetweenstations50and 65 and caused extensive flooding to compartments in the area.When flooding hadbeenbroughtundercontroltherewasabout3,700tonsofwaterinsideherhull.Beforethehitherdraughtwas35ft3inforwardand34ft6inaft,butaftertheexplosionitincreasedto44ftforwardand38ftaftandtherewasaheelofabout1½°.AcoursewassetforGibraltaratahighspeedof10to17knotsandshearrivedat1045hourson30September.Pumpingoperationswereputintoeffectimmediatelyaftertheexplosionandcontinuedthroughoutthe passage so that on approachingGibraltar the draught had been reduced to 39ft 6inforwardand32ft3inaft.Shewasdockedon2Octoberandafullsurveyofherdamagewascarriedout.

StructuralDamage

OuterBottom.Ontheportside,themainholeextendedfromtheedgeofthelowerdecktohalfway across ‘H’ strake and between 50–65 stations, about 15ft inwidth and 30ft inlength.Long,jagged,fractureshadoccurredupwardsacrossthemainstrakesbetween52and54stations;across‘N’strakebetween58and60stationsandacross‘N’,and12ininto‘P’strakebetween64and66stations.Fracturesoccurreddiagonally forwardacross ‘H’strakebetween50and58stationsandtotheloweredgeof‘C’strakebetween60and62stations.Thejaggededgesofplatingwereturnedinsharplyattheforwardandafterendsalong thebottomof theholeandconsiderabledistortionofplatingaround theholewascausedoveranareaextendingfromthemiddledecktothebottomofthestrakeandfromabout48–70 stations, approximately40ft×40ft.All outer bottomplatingwas20lb ‘D’except‘M’strakeimmediatelybelowthelowerdeck,whichwas20lb‘D’beforeand25lb‘D’abaft61station.Onthestarboardsidetheouterbottomwaspiercedbythreesplintersin‘M’and‘L’strakesbetween56and60stations.

NELSONTorpedoDamage,27September1941

Framing.Themainframes(6in×3in×3in×14lbchannelbar)werecompletelydestroyedinwayoftheholeandwereseverelydistortedandtornfrombeamarmbracketsinwayofthedamagedbottomplating.

MiddleDeck.Ahole,approximately3ft×2ft situatedabout2ft6inbefore60bulkheadand20fttoportofmiddleline,wascausedbyanarmouredmanholecoverblownupfromthe lower deck. The deck plating (12lb ‘D’ with 14lb stringer) was bulged upwards,maximum9inoveranareaextendingfrom48–60stationsinaforeandaftdirection,andfrom theship’s side towithin4 feetof themiddle lineathwartships, i.e., approximately23ftinlengthby21ftinwidth.Abaft60bulkheadthedeckwasbulgedupward,slightlybetween60½–69stationsand from17ft to29ft toportof themiddle line, i.e.,about17feetinlengthby12ftinwidth.Exceptfortheholereferredtoabovetherewerenoholesorfracturesinthisdeck.Slightleaksoccurredalongplateedges,boundaryangleatside,andthroughscrew-holestocorticenestripswhichwerebrokenbythebulgedplating.

LowerDeck. The deck plating (10lb, 14lb stringer, 100–120lbNC armour)was forcedupwards over an area extending from the ship’s side to within 6ft of the middle linebetween50–60 stations and to about20ft from themiddle linebetween60–70 stations.The10lband14lbplatingwas severelydistorted,perforatedby splinters, and torn.The100lb armour plate adjacent to the ship’s side, 48–52 stations, was forced upwards,maximum 4½in along the butt at 52 station. This plate was not distorted. The 120lbarmourplate,52–60,wasforcedupward9inattheforwardbuttand19inattheafterbutt.The plate was distorted but not fractured. The adjacent armour plate (120lb) abaft 60station, and also next toward themiddle line, 52–60,were disturbed upwardmaximum3½in.Nodistortionoccurred.Thedeckbeams(7in×3in×14.6lbbulbangle)ontheportsideinwayoftheexplosionweredestroyedandthedeepgirderat52stations(14lb×24inplate,with9in×3½in×3½in×25lbchannelbar todeckand3½in×3in×8lbdoubleanglestiffenersontheloweredge)wasseverelydistorted.

PlatformDeck.IntheTorpedoBodyRoom,43–60,thedeckplating(14lb)wasdistortedoveranareaextending12infromship’ssideat43stationtowithin6ftofthemiddlelineat60station.Theplatingadjacenttotheship’ssidewasdestroyedbetween57–62stationsand the jaggededgeswere turneddownover thebottomplatingwhichhadbeenblowninwards.Thehatchbetween62–63stationsleadingtotheAirCompressorRoom(under)wasdestroyed.

Hold.TheplatingintheAirCompressorRoomandAirBottleCompartment,52–70,wasslightlydistorted.

Bulkheads.No.43bulkheadwasslightlydistortedneartheship’ssidebetweenLowerandPlatformDecks.No.60Bulkhead.Thescantlingsofthisbulkheadwere–12lb‘D’platingbetweenMain andPlatformDecks, 14lb ‘D’ below thePlatformDeck.Stiffeners 4in×2½in×6.5lb‘D’bulbanglesbetweenMiddleandLowerdecks;6in×3in×3in×14lb‘D’channels(continuous)betweenLowerDeckandInnerBottom.Belowthelowerdeckthebulkheadwasdestroyedfromship’ssidetothelongitudinalbulkheadoftheColdRoom,i.e.,adistanceof9ft6infromtheship’ssideatPlatformDecklevel.Theremainderofthebulkheadwasdistorted towithin4ftof themiddle line.Between theLowerandMiddleDecksthebulkheadwasdistortedoveranareaextendingfromtheship’ssidetotheportlongitudinalbulkheadoftheProvisionRoom,i.e.,about13ftfromtheship’sside.BelowthePlatformDecktoportlongitudinalbulkheadtoCentralStore60–80M.L.wasdistortedbetween60–70stationsandtornfromtheboundaryangleat60transversebulkhead.Thevertical stiffeners 8in × 3½in × 3½in × 20lb channels at 62–65 and 67 stations were

distortedandfracturedacrossthestandingflanges.Thedivisionalwatertightbulkheadat70 station was bulged aft, maximum 12 inches. The door at the middle line of thisbulkhead,hingedon the foreside, remainedwatertight.Slightdistortionoccurred to theinnerbottominthevicinityof60bulkhead.OnthePlatformDeck,theport longitudinalbulkheadoftheTorpedoBodyRoom,43–60wastornfrom60bulkheadandfromitsdeckconnections.Thebulkheadwasholedbysplinters,about20No.maximumsize8in×6inbetween50–60stations.Threeofthesplintersperforatedtheouterbottomonthestarboardsidein‘M’and‘L’strakes,between50–60stations.Asplinterperforatedthecoverofthehatchleadingtothelobbyunder.TheouterlongitudinalbulkheadoftheColdRoom,60–80Portwasseverelydistortedbetween60–72stations;stiffenersandbracketsweretornfromthebulkheadanddecks.Thelowerforwardportionofthebulkheadwascrushedanda hole about 2ft 6in square led directly into the Cold Room. The after bulkhead at 76stationwasdemolishedandblownintothelobbybetween76–80stations.OntheLowerDeck theminorbulkheads toLobbyandPrisons, 50–60 stations, and toCanvasRoom,60–70stations,werebuckledanddistorted.

DamagetoNelsonfromtheItaliantorpedo.WhenlookingatthedamagefromonetorpedoitisnotdifficulttounderstandwhyRoyalOak,Barham,PrinceofWalesandRepulsesuccumbedtothisweapon.

Machinery

Main.Nodamagewascausedtomainmachinery.Thewaterlevelintheboilerswasnotaffected.

Armament

Gunnery: No damage was caused to gun armament. Torpedo: The torpedo room waswrecked.

Flooding

As a result of the explosion all compartments on the Lower Deck between 53–85bulkheads;on thePlatformDeckbetween43–84andbelow thePlatformDeckbetween43–80,wereflooded.TheportTorpedoTubeRoomwasfloodedfromtheTorpedoBodyRoomthroughamultipleelectriccableglandinNo.43bulkhead.ThedrainvalvestotheDrainTankfromtheTubeRoomshadbeenleftopenandresultedintheDrainTankandStarboardTorpedoTubeRoombeingflooded.Thisfloodingmayhavebeenaccentuatedbyleakagepastthereardoorofthestarboardtube,whichwasfoundtohavebeendamaged.Bothtubeswereloaded,withbowandreardoorsclosedanddrainvalvesopen.

TheMiddleDeckwasfloodedtoadepthof2ftbetween43–60bulkheadsthroughtheholecausedbythearmouredmanholecoverblownupfromtheLowerDeckandthroughtheventilationsupplytrunktothePrisonFlatbelow.

The compartments affected were: Lower Deck: Prisons, Lobby and Music Room;Canvas Room; Awning Room; Provision Rooms; Canteen Store; Flour Stores; Lobby.Platform Deck: Torpedo Tube Rooms; W.T. Compartment;Torpedo Body Room; W.T.Compartment;RefrigeratingMachineryRoom;ColdRoomandLobby;E.A.PlantRoom.Hold: ‘A’ Pump Room Drain Tank; Torpedo Tube Drain Tank; Warhead Magazine;Torpedo Gunner’s Store; Warhead Magazine; Air Bottle Compartment; No. 3 CentralStores(Forward);No.3CentralStores(Aft).DoubleBottoms:W.T.Compartments.

Damagecontrol

Shoring: Some time elapsed before the forward boundary of the flooded area wasestablished,duetothefloodingoftheMiddleDeck,butitwasquicklyascertainedthatnofloodinghadoccurredforwardof23bulkhead.Attheafterboundaryofthefloodedarea,the Watchkeeper escaped from the Refrigerating Machinery Room and closed thewatertightdoor,butonlyclippeditonthesidenearestthehinge(thisdooropensintothecompartmentandishingedontheforeside).TheholeintheMiddleDeckwaspluggedbyhammocksshoredfromthedeckover.Shores,closelyspaced,wereerectedbetweenMainandMiddleDecksthroughoutthefloodedarea,theworkbeingcontinuedincessantlyfor48 hours. More than 24 hours after the explosion, when the ship had been lightenedsufficientlytopartiallyemptytheLowerDeckcompartments(43–60)whichwereopentothe sea, the surge ofwater caused theMiddleDeck to bulge upwards about 9in in thevicinityoftheholeandfurthershoringwascarriedoutoverheadbetweenMainandUpperDecks.ShoreswereerectedbetweenMainandMiddleDecksinwayofthebulgedplatingontheMiddleDeck,portside,60–70stations.Smallleakswerepluggedandshoredandleaksintheboundaryanglewerestoppedwithcement.

Nelsonlimpsbacktobase,downbythebowsafterbeingtorpedoedbyItalianaircraftinSeptember1941.

Effect on Fighting Efficiency: Torpedo tubes were out of action and of 12 torpedoescarried 10were destroyed or rendered unfit for service. Speed of shipwas reduced onaccountoftheamountofwaterinthefloodedcompartmentsandtheriskofunduestrainon structure in the immediate vicinity of compartments open to the sea. Except for thepossibilitythatfiringthe16ingunswouldhavedisturbedtheshoringoftheMiddleDeck,thefightingequipmentwasnotaffected.ShewasoutofactionuntilApril1942.

Operation‘Bronte’,BombingTrialsinNefsonNelsonshowedresilientqualitieswhenusedasatargetshipfor1,000and2,000lbbombs.Thetrialswerecarriedout in theFirthofForthnearInchkeithIslandfrom4Juneto23September1948.Thetrialsweredividedintostagesandtheobjectiveswerenotonlytotestherarmoureddecks,buttotesttheefficiencyofthearmour-piercingbombsused.

Onetrialshowedthatalthoughher6inarmourcouldbepiercedbya2,000lbbomb,itwouldhave to be dropped frommore than4,000 feet to obtain this penetration.Nelsonwasmoored fore and aft to buoys laid about position 260° Inchkeith Light 1.14miles,lyingalongaline045°/225°,bowstothenorth-east.

SixBarracudaIIInavalaircraftwereused,andtherewerefourpilots,i.e.,twoaircraftwerealwaysinreserve.TheaircraftwerebasedontheRoyalNavalAirStation,Arbroath,and were controlled when over the target by R/T from Inchkeith Island. Bombs werereleased indivingattacks at 55° to thehorizontal, diving to thepointof release fromaheightof4,000feetat280knots.Attacksweremadeeitheralongthemiddlelineof theshipfromasternorfromthestarboardquarterdiagonallyacrosstheshiptowardstheportbow.Twocamerastorecordthepathofthebombspriortostriking,strikingvelocityandangleofstrike,werepositionedatPettycurBattery,KinghornNess,onthenorthshoreoftheFirthofForthandonInchkeithIsland.

The original order for Stage IV was: ‘Bomb, A.P., 2,000lb, Mk IV, filled inert andexploding charge 23¼lb T.N.T., fitted pistol and detonator delay, dive dropped from8,000ft.’

ThepistolusedwasNo.65MkIX.ThestagecommencedwithdetonatordelayNo.60Mk II (0.07 seconds) and was to have continued with detonators No. 56 Mk 11(0.05

seconds) or No. 50 Mk 11 (0.14 seconds) if the delay proved too long or too shortrespectively.

After 39 bombs had missed from 8,000 feet the dropping height for Stage IV wasamendedto6,500feettogiveareasonablechanceofhitting,sinceonly60ofthespeciallyexplodingbombshadbeensupplied for thewhole trial.HitJ, the first in thestage,wasscored with the 42nd bomb. The stage was then discontinued as the exploding chargeappeared to be too powerful. The system of numbering of hits gives the stage no., theserialno.ofthedropinthatstageandtheletterofthehit.

Results

HitIV/42/JDate:15thSeptember,1948Time:1715.

TypeofBomb:2000lbA.P.explosive,0.07secondsdelaydetonator.

ForceandDirectionofSurfaceWind:NorthWest,5knots.

WeatherandVisibility:3/10thscumulus,extremevisibility.

ConditionsofRelease:

Ordered ActualHeightofRelease 6,500ft 5,900ftTrueAirSpeed 285kts 280ktsStrikingVelocity 807fps 780fpsStrikingAngle 20° 28°(tovertical) TimeofFlight 11.3secsAngleofAttacktoship’shead. Green124°

PARTICULARSOFSHIPS,1944–5Displacement (tons): (1942) Nelson 34,955 (light), 40,628 (average action), 42,740(deep);(1945)Nelson44,054(deep);Rodney43,100(deep).

Draught;(1942)34ftforward,35ft4½in,34ft8¼in(mean);(1945)34ft7inforward,35ft3inaft(Rodney).

Armament:Mainandsecondaryasoriginal.

AAguns:

6×4.7in

48×2pdr

16×40mm(Nelson)

32×20mm(Nelson)13×20mm(Rodney)

Originalsaluting,boatandfieldguns

OriginalTT

Allgunsexcept20mmwereradar-controlled.

Radar:Type284formainguns,Type285for4.7in,Type283forlightAA,AWType279(Nelson),Type281(Rodney),SWType271,GWType291(Rodney),MF/DF.

Searchlights:

Nelson2×44in,Rodney4×44in,6×24insignallinginboth.

Aircraft:none,butaircraftcraneretainedinboth.

Complement:1,631–1,650

Speed:Statedtohavebeenreducedtoabout22knotsowingtoadditionalweightsaddedsince1939.

OPERATION‘BRONTE’BombingTests,1948

Pathofbomb:

The bomb struck the starboard side of ‘B’ Barbette on the armoured ring bulkhead at

station126about6ft6inabove theUpperDeck,andexplodedon impact.Theangleofstrikewas70°tothenormaltothearmouredringatthepointofimpact.Themarksonthearmourindicatedthatthecentreofexplosionwasveryclosetothepointofimpact.Sincethecentreofthebursterchargewassituatedataboutone-fifththelengthofthebombfromthebaseend,itfollowsthatthenoseofthebombhadsliddownthearmourtowardsthedeck,bringingthe tailnearer to thearmour,whentheexplosionoccurred.Therewasnoevidence either way as to whether the explosion had occurred before or after the tailactuallystruckthearmour.

Alargenumberoffragmentswasproducedbytheexplosion,varyinginsizefromafewpoundstomorethan100poundsinweight.Someofthesefragmentswereseentohitthewatersomedistanceaheadoftheship(estimatedat300yardsmaximum).AnIngersoll-Randaircompressor,standingclosetothepointofburst,wasdamagedbeyondrepairbyfragmentsandblast.

‘B’BarbetteArmour:Thicknessofarmour600lb.Theplatewasscoopedat thepointofimpacttoadepthof inonanareaof6in×2in.Theplateasawholewasdished¾inona 4ft datum and loosened slightly at the butts. There were a few small cracks on thecementedface.Therewasnoapparentdamagetotheturretrollerpath.

Upper Deck: There were six main holes in the Upper Deck, the largest of which wasdirectlybeneaththeexplosionandappearedtohavebeencausedmainlybytheairblastoftheexplosion.Thedeckplatingintheareawas30lbS.Q.Themainholeswere:

1.4ftwideby8ftlongfromaboutstation124to127justbesidethebarbettearmour.

NELSONInboardProfile,1945

2.4ft2in longby1ft8inwideat120stationat20ft6in tostarboardof themiddleline.3.12inlongby6inwideat119station,23ft9intostarboardofthemiddleline.4.2ft8inlongby6inwideat121station,25fttostarboardofthemiddleline.5.6in×3inat123station,24fttostarboardofthemiddleline.6. 3ft longby1ftwide from127 to128½stations,20ft to starboardof themiddleline.

No.1holehadalargepetalofplatinghangingdownwardsattheforwardedgeofthehole.Alltheotherholeshadlittleornopetallingandshowedsignsofbrittlefracture.Thedeckgirder,8in×6in×6in×35lbS.Q.Ibar,inwayofholeNo.1wascarriedawaycompletely

from stations 124 to 127. At station 128, this girder was distorted and split where afragmenthadstrucktheupperdeck.HoleNo.6wasjustinboardofthisgirder.

MainDeck.This deckwas perforated in several places both by bomb fragments andpiecesoftheUpperDeckcarriedawaybythesefragmentsorbytheblastoftheexplosion.TheW.T.doorinbulkhead127wasperforatedbyafragmentwhichcarriedonthroughtheMainDeckabaft127station.TheprincipalholesintheMainDeckwereheldbelowNo.1in theUpperDeck.Oneorbothmayhavebeencausedby thenoseof thebombwhichmay have been broken by the explosion.The base-plug of the bombwas found on themaindeck.

MiddleDeck.Thedeckarmour,of250lbwith30lbS.Q.backingplate,wasstruckat122 station, 21ft to starboard of the middle line close to the barbette armour ring,presumablybythenoseofthebomborpartofthenose.Thearmourplatestruckwasonecutdiagonallyattheafterendtofitthecastingsupporting‘B’barbette.Theplatewas15ftlongon the inboard side, 21ft longon the outboard side and6ft 6inwide.The inboardseamwas14fttostarboardofthemiddleline.Theseamsweretonguedandgroovedandthebuttsplainfaced.Thehitoccurredonthepointoftheplatewhereitwascutdiagonallyattheafterbutt.Thispointwassetdown,withsomeremovalofmetalfromthefaceoftheplate,toamaximumof4¾in,thetonguesandgroovesbeingopenedupinway.Therewasa scoop in both the adjacent casting and the next plate outboardwith no depression ineither. Pieces of the nose of the bombwere found scattered on the armour in theMessspacebetweenbulkheads95and127.ThefragmentwhichcausedholeNo.2intheUpperDeck passed through theMain Deck, travelled forward through a vent trunk, struck aladderremovingthebottomrungsandwasdeflectedupwardstostrikeandforceopentheW.T.dooratbulkhead95.Somedistanceforwardofthisdoor,ajaggedfragmentofship’sstructurewasfoundembeddedinthesideofakitlockeratstation82.Thismayhavebeenapieceof themaindeckcarried awayby the fragmentdescribedaboveor itmayevenhavecomefrom theupperdeckandbeen itself the fragmentwhichdamaged the ladderanddoor.Thetotaldistanceofthisfragmentfromthepointofexplosionalongitspathwasabout90ft.

UndersideofMiddleDeck.Thebacking to thedeck armourwas smoothbulged to adepthof5inona4ftdatuminawayoftheimpactofthebombnose.The9in×7in×7in×53lbS.Q.Ibarundertheoutboardseamofthedamagedarmourplatehadits topflangeandupperpartofthewebsplitatthepointofimpact.

Detailsofbomb:

2000lb,A.P.,MkIV.Makers:ThomasFirth&JohnBrownLtd.

BombNo.P.4110.

FilledHES/RD1057.

Pistol:65Mk.IX.

Detonator(delay):60MkII0.07secondsdelay.

Tube:T.N.T.Exploder,23½lbandC.E.Pellet–12oz3drachms.

Tailunit:No.47MkI

Thebombexploded instantaneously, thecentreofburstbeingveryclose to thepointofimpactof thenose. Itbrokeup intoa largenumberof fragmentsvarying insize fromafewpoundstomorethan100poundsinweight.Thenosewasfoundinthreepiecesonthearmour deck and it could not be ascertained whether it had been broken up by theexplosionorbyimpactwiththedeck.Thebase-plugwasfoundonthemaindeckandnoexplanation couldbe found as towhy it hadbeenprojecteddownwards.No conclusiveevidence could be obtained as to whether the delay had been shortened by a blowtransverselyonthetailofthebomborwhetherithadsimplynotfunctionedcorrectly.

Floodingcaused:Nil.

Damage to Machinery, etc.: Firemain supply to main and middle decks, 95–127starboard,fracturedonmaindeck.

DamagetoElectricalLeads:Lightingandpowerleads,bothpermanentandtemporary,wereseveredonmainandmiddledecksbetween95and127starboard,Theseincludedthedegaussingcircuitandtelephoneandfirecontrolcircuitsoftheship’spermanentsystem.

Inthelasttriala2,000lbAPMkIVbombhitthedeckat232station,22ft6intoportofmiddlelinejustabreastthefunnel.Itperforatedalldecksandtransversebulkheaddowntothemiddledeck,where it penetrated and reboundedwholeon topof thedeck.Anothersimilar bomb, dropped in the same fashion, also pierced the armour deck, at 219/220station.The platingwas heavily dished over awide area and some holding-down boltsblewdownandpiercedthelowerdeck.

Theconclusionsdrawnfromthesetestswere:

1.Allbombsneededtobedroppedfromatleast5,000feettobeeffective.

Rodney’sbiggunsopenfire.Whenthemainarmamentfireditcausedhavoconboardbecauseofthetremendousblast;everyonetookcoverandheldontightwhenthefiringbellsounded.

2.Droppedfrom3,000to4,000feet,inpracticethebombsonlypenetrated2.95into4.75in.3.Itwasnoteasytohittheshipfromtheseheightsandcertainlynotfrom5,000feet.

4.Itwasnotedthattheshipwasastationarytarget.5. It had not been an easy task to pierceNelson’s 6in armoured deck, but the factremained that it had been pierced and this proved once and for all that battleshipswereveryvulnerable tothiskindofattack.Infact thetestsprovedthat thedaysofheavilyarmouredshipswereover.

History:Nelson1922 Programme. Laid down by ArmstrongWhitworth & Co., Newcastle on Tyne 28

December1922.Launched3September1925.

BegantrialsApril1927.CompletedtrialsJune1927.

CommissionedatPortsmouth15August1927 to relieveRevenge as flagAtlanticFleet.CarriedoutfurtherextendedtrialsAugusttoOctober1927anddidnothoistflaguntil21October1927.

ATLANTICFLEET(Flag)October1927toMarch1932.

CollisionwithSSWestWalesspring1931.Slightdamage.

EmbarkedKingAmanullahofAfghanistanforexercisesoffPortlandApril1928.AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEETMarch1932toJuly1941(fleetflagtoDecember1939andfromAugust1940toApril1941).

Grounded in Portsmouth harbour January 1934 when leaving for spring cruise. Nodamage.

JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

ExtensiverefitPortsmouth1937toJanuary1938.

WithRodney,paidofficialvisittoLisbonFebruary1938.

Took part in operations against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 23–30 November 1939followingsinkingofRawalpindibyScharnhorston23rd.

ConsiderablydamagedbymagneticmineinLochEwe4December1939.

RefittedatPortsmouthJanuarytoAugust1940.

Temporarily replaced as fleet flag by Warspite pending return of Rodney from refitJanuary1940.

RejoinedfleetAugust1940.

NorwegiancoastoperationsSeptember1940.

TookpartinoperationsagainstScheerfollowingsinkingofJervisBay5November1940.

OperationsagainstScharnhorstandGneisenauJanuarytoMarch1941.

RelievedasfleetflagbyKingGeorgeV1April1941.

DetachedApril1941toescortMiddleEasttroopconvoyviaCape.

RejoinedHomeFleetJune1941.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)July1941forMaltaconvoy;leftClydewithconvoy11July.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)JulytoSeptember1941(flagfrom8August).

Maltaconvoy21–27July1941.

RelievedRenownasflag8August.

Selected(withRodney)inAugust1941fortransfertoEasternFleetinDecember1941orJanuary1942(seeRamillies).Latercancelled.

Maltaconvoy24–30September1941;damagedforwardbyaerialtorpedo27September,duringthisoperation.Shipbrought10ftdownbyhead,reducingspeedto15knotsandlaterto12knots.RefittedatMaltaandRosythSeptember1941toApril1942.

RejoinedHomeFleetoncompletionofrefit.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)ApriltoNovember1941.

TransfertoEasternFleetagainproposedApril1942.

LeftClyde31May1942,with convoy forFreetown, en route to joinEasternFleet, viaCape,butrecalledfromFreetowninJulyforMaltaconvoy.

RejoinedHomeFleetatScapa26July.

Flag(VA)convoyescortforcehoistedatScapa27July.LeftClydewithconvoy4August.

Maltaconvoy10–15August(flagVAEscortForce).

RejoinedHomeFleetlaterinAugust.

TransferredtoForceHOctober1942forNorthAfricainvasion.

LeftScapa30OctoberandjoinedatGibraltar6November.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)November1942toOctober1943(flagfrom15November1942toMay1943andfromJune1943on).

TookpartinNorthAfricainvasionNovember1942.

RelievedDukeofYorkasflag15November.

TemporarilyrelievedasflagbyKingGeorgeVMay1943andcamehometoworkupatScapaforSicilyinvasion.

RejoinedForceHJune1943.LeftScapa17th.ArrivedGibraltar23rd.

TookpartininvasionSicilyJuly1943andItalySeptember1943.

With Rodney, bombarded defences at Reggio 31 August, prior to Italian landings.SupportedlandingsatSalerno9September.

ItalianarmisticesignedonboardatMalta29September1943.

LeftGibraltartorejoinHomeFleet31October.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1943toJune1944.

UnitofbombardmentforceforNormandyinvasionJune1944.

Carried out twenty bombardments of batteries, including Houlgate battery, and troopconcentrations11–18June.

Damagedbymine18June.

LeftPortsmouth22JunetorefitintheUSAforservicewithEasternFleet.

RefitPhiladelphiaNavyYard1944toJanuary1945.

RejoinedHomeFleetJanuary1945forworking-up.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoApril1945.

LefthomeApril1945tojoinEastIndiesFleet(ex-EasternFleet)viaSuezCanal.

Continued work-up in Mediterranean en route and arrived Colombo 9 July, relievingQueenElizabethon12Julyasflag3rdBSandfleetflag.

EASTINDIESFLEETJulytoOctober1945(flag3rdBSandfleetflagtoSeptember1945).

Surrender of Japanese forces in Singapore area negotiated on board at Penang 2September1945.

Present at surrender all Japanese forces in South-EastAsia at Singapore 12 September1945.

RelievedasflagbyHowe20Septemberandleftforhome13October.

ArrivedPortsmouth17November1945.

RecommissionedatPortsmouth24NovembertorelieveRodneyasflag2ndBSandfleetflagHomeFleet.

HOMEFLEETNovember1945toOctober1947(flag2ndBSandfleetflagtoApril1946.SeagoingTrainingShipfromApril1946.FlagHomeFleetTrainingSquadronAugusttoOctober1946).

RelievedasfleetflagbyKingGeorgeV9April1946andbecameSeagoingTrainingShipinHomeFleet.

Hoisted flag (RA) Training Battleships Home Fleet 14 August 1946 on formation ofspecialTrainingSquadron,tocompriseNelson,AnsonandHowe.

RelievedasflagbyAnsonOctober1946andbecameprivateshipinsquadron.

CollisionwithsubmarineSceptreatPortland15April1947.Slightdamage.

ReplacedbyVictoriousandreducedtoreserveatRosyth20October1947.

RESERVE(Rosyth)October1947toMay1948.

PaidofftoDisposalList,Rosyth19May1948.

Usedasbombingtarget1948(seeOperation‘Bronte’).

Sold toBritishIron&SteelCorporation5January1949andallocated toT.W.Ward&Co.forscrapping.

ArrivedInverkeithing15March1949.

HullarrivedTroonforfinaldemolitionDecember1949.

History:Rodney1922 Programme. Laid down by Cammell Laird, Birkenhead 28 December 1922.

LaunchedbyPrincessMary17December1925.

BegantrialsAugust1927.

Commissioned atDevonport 7December1927 for 2ndBattleSquadron,AtlanticFleet.Becauseoffurtherextendedtrials,didnotactuallyjoinfleetuntil28March1928.

ATLANTICFLEET(2ndBS)March1928toMarch1932(temporaryfleetflagApriltoMay1930andJuly1931).

TemporarilyreplacedNelsonasfleetflagApriltoMay1930.

ConveyedBritishParliamentaryDelegationtoIcelandJune1930for1000thAnniversaryCelebrationsofIcelandicParliament.

AgaintemporaryfleetflagJuly1931whileNelsonrefittingaftercollisiondamage.

AtlanticFleetredesignatedHomeFleetMarch1932.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)March1932toSeptember1941(FleetflagJanuary1934.Flag2ndBSand2ndfleetflagJanuarytoMay1936.FleetflagJune1937toFebruary1938andJanuarytoAugust1940).

BecametemporaryfleetflagJanuary1934afterNelsongroundedinPortsmouthharbouratcommencementofspringcruise.

Flagre-transferredduringcruise.

JubileeReview,Spithead16July1935.

AgainfleetflagJune1937toFebruary1938,replacingNelsonforrefit.

WithNelson,paidofficialvisittoLisbonFebruary1938.

RefitPortsmouthSeptembertoNovember1938.

Took part in operations against Scharnhorst and Gneisenau 23–29 November 1939following sinking of Rawalpindi by Scharnhorst 23 November. Developed seriousrudder defects during these and forced to break off search on 29th and return forrepairs.

RefittedatLiverpoolDecember1939(completed31st).

Rejoined fleet 1 January 1940 and became fleet flag, relieving Warspite which hadtemporarilyreplacedNelsonafterlattermined4December.

NorwegianoperationsApriltoJune1940.

HitaftbybomboffBergen9April1940.Nomaterialdamage.Fifteencasualties.

Detached to escort homeward-bound Halifax convoys after sinking of Jervis Bay byScheer5November1940.

Tookpart inoperationsagainstScharnhorstandGneisenau inNorthAtlanticJanuary to

March1941.Brieflysightedthem16Marchbutunabletomaintaincontact.

Detached 24May 1941 from escorting SSBritannic to take part in operations againstBismarck. JoinedKingGeorgeV on26th and assisted in destructionofBismarck on27th.ThirdsalvoscoredfirstregisteredhitontheGermanship.SustainedonlysplinterdamagetooneHAdirectorduringtheaction.

RefitBostonNavyYardtoAugust1941.

Selected(withNelson)inAugust1941fortransfertoEasternFleetinDecember1941orJanuary1942 (seeRamillies).Later cancelled.Worked-up atBermuda after refit andthenjoinedForceH(Gibraltar)lateSeptemberforMaltaconvoy.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)SeptembertoNovember1941(flagfrom30thSeptember).

Maltaconvoy24–30September.

NelsonentersPortsmouthafteramostimpressivewarcareen1945.SheisseenhereafterherservicewiththePacificFleet.NoteAAadditions,camouflageandRDFinstallations.

ReplacedNelsonasflagForceH30Septemberafterlatterdamagedbyaerialtorpedoon27thduringconvoyoperation.

RelievedasflagbyMalayaandrejoinedHomeFleetNovember1941.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)November1941toNovember1942.

BasedatHvalfiord,IcelandNovember1941toFebruary1942tomeetthreatofattackonNorthAtlanticconvoysbyenemyheavyships.

RefitLiverpoolFebruarytoMay1942.

Transfer to Eastern Fleet again proposed April 1942. Left Clyde 31 May 1942, withconvoy for Freetown, en route to join Eastern Fleet, via Cape, but recalled fromFreetowninJulyforMaltaconvoy.

RejoinedHomeFleetatScapa26July.

LeftClyde4AugustwithconvoyforMalta.

Maltaconvoy10–15August.

RejoinedHomeFleetlaterinthemonth.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)October1942forNorthAfricainvasion.

LeftScapaforGibraltar23October.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)October1942toOctober1943.

TookpartinNorthAfricalandingsNovember1942.

InactionwithbatteriesatOran8–10November.

EngagedfortDjbelSantononthe9thuntilitcapitulated.

CamehomeMay1943towork-upatScapaforSicilyinvasion.

RejoinedForceHJune1943.LeftScapa17June.ArrivedGibraltar23rd.

TookpartininvasionofSicilyJuly1943andItalySeptember1943.

With Nelson, bombarded defences at Reggio 31 August prior to Italian landings.SupportedlandingsatSalerno9September.

RejoinedHomeFleetOctober1943.

Rodneyopensfirewithher4.7ingunsduringbattlepractice,1939.

HOMEFLEETOctober1943toNovember1945(2ndBStoSeptember1944.Fleetflaglater).

UnitofbombardmentforceforNormandyinvasionJunetoSeptember1944.Attackedbyshore batteries, bombs and human torpedoes during this period but not damaged.BombardedHoulgateandBenervillebatteriesonD-Day(6June).

On 30 June, heavily hit concentrations of armoured vehicles seventeen miles behind‘Gold’beach.

Bombardedenemytroopconcentrationsatextremerangeon2July.

Bombarded defences at Caen 8 July, prior to assault. Knocked out shore batteries onAlderney(ChannelIslands)12August.

UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoysSeptembertoNovember1944.

RelievedDukeofYorkasflagHomeFleetSeptember1944.

RelievedbyNelsonNovember1945andreducedtoreserveatRosyth.

RESERVE(Rosyth)November1945toMarch1948.

ReducedtoCare&MaintenancestatusAugust1946.

PlacedonDisposalList1948.

SoldtoT.W.Ward&Co.,March1948.

ArrivedInverkeithingforscrapping26March1948.

Rodney’screwloading16inshellsduringtheearlymonthsofthewar(1940).

Rodneyinherwarpaint,1942.

StarboardquarterviewofRodneypreparingforcoastalbombardmentduties,26May1944.

RodneypulledintopositionbytheworkersofThomasWardscrapyard.Shortlyafterthisphotographwastaken,alldrawings(hull,electrical,gunneryandtorpedo)weretakenofftheshipbyRoyalNavalofficersanddestroyedbyfire.March1948.

KingGeorgeVClassDesignAswithNelsonandRodney,theKingGeorgeVdesignwasnotsettledwithoutagreatdealof deliberation, and was carried through against a background of restrictions anddifficulties.TheAdmiraltyhadplanned for the shipsas farbackas1933although theirideaofasuitableshiptoenhancethebattlefleetwasnotpopularwithBritain’salliesorindeed among some departments of theAdmiralty itself. In all essentials the classwasbuilt under the restrictions of the 1921Washington Treaty which was extended by the1930and1935navalagreementsbetweenBritain,USA,FranceandRussiaandseverelylimiteddisplacements,theentirescopeofthedesignsufferingaccordingly.

During the great lull in construction from1925 to 1935 there hadbeen an enormousamount of experimentation regarding the entire infrastructure of British capital shipdesign,andthiswasfastidiouslyexaminedbythePost-WarQuestionsCommittee,whichin turn sent its deliberations to their Lordships. Itwas noted that there had beenmuchactivityinthewayofforeigndevelopment;shipssuchastheGermanDeutschland(1931)andtheFrenchDunkerque(1935)weretwoofthemostformidableto

ORIGINALPROPOSALFORBATTLECRUISER,8AUGUST1935Equipment 1,200 tonsMachinery 3,350 Armament 6,850 Armour 10,550 Hull 13,050

Totaldisplacementofshiptobe35,000tons.

Design‘14P’FinalLegend

Displacement:35,000tons

Length:700ft(pp),740ft(w2).

Beam:103ft.

Draught:28ftmean.

Freeboard:22ft9in.

SHP:110,000for28½–29knots.

Fuel;4,000tonsoil.

Armament

10×14in(80rpg)

16×5.25in(200rpg)

2pom-pomsMkVI(500rpg)

4×0.5inMG

Catapultandaircraft(4aircrafttobecarried).

Armour

Mainbelt15in,15–7inbelowwater

Turrets13–9–7in,deck:6inovermagazines,5inovermachinery.

Weights(tons)

Generalequipment 1,050Machinery 2,635Armament 5,880Armour 12,845Hull 13,040Designs ‘15C’ ‘14H’ ‘14G’ ‘14J’ ‘14K’9×15in 9×14in 12×14in 12×14in 12×14in29½knots 30 27 28 29108,000shp 112,000 80,000 90,000 100,00014inarmour 14in 14in 13in 12½in6¼indeck 6¼in 6¼in 6in 6in740ftlong 750 750 740 75035,000tons 34,545 35,345 35,300 35,200

Theconclusionofmanyyearsofcarefulstudyculminated ina summarydelivered tothe Board showing just what the Royal Navy would require in any fresh battleshipconstruction:

1.DispositionofMainArmament

Notlessthanfourtwinturrets,placedasinQueenElizabethclass.

2.CalibreandDispositionofSecondaryArmament

Twelve6ingunsinbatterymountings,capableof30°elevation.

3.Anti-AircraftArmament

Sixgunseachside,ortwotwinmountingseachsideandoneoncentreline.Designofshiptobesuchthat4.7inor4incanbemounted(decisionastowhichcalibretobegivenlater)inbetween-decktwins.FourMkMpom-pomsandeight0.5inmultiplemachine-gunsifpossible;aminimumoftwopom-pomsandfourmultipleMGifitisnecessarytoreducenumbers.

4.TorpedoArmament

Torpedoestobecarriedinabove-watertubes,quintuplemountings.

5.ArmourProtection

(a) Ifdisplacement isnot reduced,1928proposals tobeaccepted, i.e.,against16inshell and 2,000lb bombs; but protection to be given to machinery spaces against1,000lb‘terminalvelocitydive’bombattack.(b) If displacement is reduced, standard of protection to be against 14in fire; anti-bombprotectionasbefore.

6.UnderwaterProtection

(a)Anti-Torpedo:Against1,000pb.chargeincontactwiththeship’sside,(b)Anti-mine – (‘B’ Bomb, etc.). Best protection possible; Nelson’s standard being aminimum.Closesubdivisionofcompartments.(c) Near-Miss (by a heavy bomb). Areas outside anti-torpedo protection to beconsidered.

7.Speed.

Amaximumof23knots.(Endurancerequiredatvariousspeedsisdetailed.)

8.Endurance

14,000milesat10knots.

OnthisfoundationtheDNCDepartmentwasaskedin1935tosubmitsuitablesketches.This they did, but because of the large number of designs proposed, all still beingrestricted to about 35,000 tons, the concept gave the department an almost impossibletask.MorethantwentydesignswereforwardedfromJuly1935toApril1936andadesignprefixed‘14.0’wasconsideredthebestpossibleall-roundlayout.TheDNCsaid:

Inviewoftheverygreatimportanceofgettingthebestdesignofshipspossible,adesignwhichmustbeabletowithstandthedevelopmentofdesignofthenexttwentyyears,thenavalstaffhavebeenatgreatpainstoexamine‘14.0’designinevery aspect. The staff memo has the appearance of being written by anadvocatusdiabolipointingoutall theweakspotsofanadmittedlyfinedesign.But this is all to the good as it brings out these points which requiremodification. The raising of the armoured deck is of great importance anddefinitely should be adopted.’ With slight modification of armouring andarmamenttheprefixwaschangedtobecomedesign‘14.P’andwasapprovedon28 May 1936.The design can be best understood by referring to the officialAdmiraltyHistoryofDesign,KingGeorgeVclass:

The last capital ships completed for the Royal Navy prior toKing George VwereNelsonandRodneywhichweredesignedtomeet therequirementsof theWashington Treaty.At theGenevaConference in 1927 theBritish contingentwerepreparedtoacceptareducedstandarddisplacementandsmallercalibreofgun for capital ships, hut theUSAwasnot prepared todiscuss sizeof capitalships.At theLondonConference in1930 themajorpowersagreednot toexercise

the right provided in theWashington Treaty to lay down the keels of capitalships replacement tonnage during 1931–6 inclusive.Thus the earliest date forlayingdownkeelsofreplacementtonnagebecame1.1.1937.TheLondonTreaty

of 1936 between the USA, France and Britain was arranged because of theforthcoming expiration of the Washington Treaty (1921) and London Treaty(1930).An important clause affecting capital ship design was to the effect that no

capitalshipshouldcarryagunover14incalibreprovidedhoweverthatifanyofthepartiesofthe1921WashingtonTreatyshouldfailtoenterintoanagreementtoconformtothisprovisionnotlaterthan1stApril1937thenmaximumcalibreshallbe16in.(Japandidnotenterintotheagreement.)KingGeorgeVclassweredesignedtoTreatylimitationsof35,000tonsand

14in guns.GreatBritain decided to lay down two capital ships at the earliestdatepermittedbytheTreaty,namely1stJanuary1937.GreatBritainthenbecamecommittedtothe14ingunalthoughintheeventof

Japanrefusingtoacceptthissizeconsiderationwasgiventodesigningtheshipssothat the14ingunscouldbechangedover to16ingunsata laterdate.This,however, would have involved an appreciable increase in citadel length andarmourweightanddelayanditwasthereforedecidedtodesigntheshipswith14in guns. Many sketch designs were prepared before approval. The earliestsketchdesignincluded12×14ingunsinthreequadrupleturretsand20×4.5inguns in ten twin turrets. The middle deck was the armoured deck. In latersketchesthesecondaryarmamentbecame16×5.25ingunsineighttwinturretsand the armoureddeckwas raised tomaindeck level, increasing thedepthofsidearmourbyabout8feet.Tomeetthisincreaseadheringto35,000tonsitwasfoundnecessarytoreducethemainarmamenttoten14inbymaking‘B’turretatwinmounting.Everyeffortwasmadetoeconomizeinweight.On28thMay1936approvalwasgiventodesign14.P.On 29th July 1936 two ships were ordered (KingGeorge V andPrince of

Wales).The Board drawings were completed, approved and delivered to the ship

builderson30thSeptember1936.

Thedesignascompletedwasprobablythebest35,000-tonlimiteddisplacementbattleshipever produced.True, themain armamentwas not powerful enough, but the 14inwas agoodgun,andinallotheraspectstheywereexcellentships;thearmourprotectionwasinfactsecondtonone.LessonsembodiedinthedesignhadallbeenlearntduringtheGreatWarandaugmentedbytheexperimentswithEmperorofIndiaandMarlboroughin1931.Theyincluded:

1.Magazinesbelowshellrooms.2. Main machinery re-arranged and sub-divided to reduce possibility of completedisablement.

PrinceofWalesfittingoutatCammellLairdsearlyin1941.

ThefirstvieweverpublishedofKingGeorgeVin1941.(Jane’sFightingShips)

3.Sidearmoursubstantiallylengthenedandthickened.4. Thick armour at top end of side armour and splinter protection covering allmagazines.5.Anti-flasharrangementsinallturrets.6.Ventilationarrangementstohandingrooms.7.Importantunderwaterprotection.8.Closewatertightsub-divisionandpumpingfacilityextensions.9. Technical improvements, particularly in propulsive machinery and structuralapplicationofarmour.

Featuresofthedesignwere:

1.TheonlyBritishbattleshipstohave14inguns(apartfromtheex-ChileanCanadatakenoverin1914)andquadrupleturrets.2.Firstdesignsince1877withadual-purposeHA-LAsecondaryarmamentandthefirstcompletedwithoutanytorpedoarmament.

KINGGEORGEV:LAUNCHFIGURES,21JANUARY1939

Length:700ft(pp),700ft0¼inasmeasured,745ft0⅛in(oa).

Beam:103ft in.

Depthofkeeltoupperdeck:51ft in.

Breakage:

Longitudinallyinadistanceof688ft:1inhog.Transverseinadistanceof98ft:nil.

Draught:13ft2⅛inforward,15ft10¼inamidships,18ft6⅞inaft.

Hull:11,790tons.

Displacementatlaunch:18,120tons.

Displacement(tons)atlaunchforothers

PrinceofWales: 18,578.DukeofYork: 18,852.

DUKEOFYORK:GMANDSTABILITY,19AUGUST1941Shipin‘A’condition:Draught:32ft5½in,55tonswaterprotection,2,530tonsoilfuel.GM:7.36ft.

Ship in ‘B’ condition:Draught: 33ft 3in, 55 tonswater protection, 3,270 tons oil fuel.GM:8.14ft.

Stability.

Maximumin‘A’condition:34°

‘B’condition:35°

Stabilityvanishesat:

‘A’condition:67°

‘B’condition:70°

Displacement:38,126tonsloadcondition.

3.Thefirstcompletedwithradar.4.Thefirstdesignedtocarryaircraft.5.Thefirstsince1877completedwithoutaheavilyarmouredconningtower.

Theshipshadaflushdeckhullandaveryslightsheerforward,thishavingbeencurtailedtoanundesirableextenttomeetanAdmiraltyrequirement(inforcepriorto1941)thatallturretsbeabletofireat30depressionovertheirentiresafetyarcs.Thesheerforwardwasinadequate,however,andwasaggravatedbyareductionofaboutthreefeetintheoriginaldesignfreeboardduetotheadditionofextraweightsduringconstruction.Thiscausedtheships to be wet at high speed and inclined to bury in head seas, the class sufferingappreciably from thisdefect.During theactionwithBismarck inMay1941 ‘A’and ‘B’turret rangefinders inPrinceofWaleswereblankedbyheavy spray coming inover thelow forecastle and, as the main armament radar was not functioning, the fighting

efficiencyofthegunswasseriouslyimpaired.

Such was not the case in King George V however. On her preliminary trials (2December1940),ConstructorH.S.Pengellysaidofhergeneralseaworthiness:

Duringfullpowertrialstheshipwasdryexceptforbrokenwateroverthebowwhichwaswell clearedby thebreakwaters.The fairing at the fore endof thesidearmourand thestreamlinedrefusechutewereeffective in reducingspray.Theflying-offspaceandquarterdeckweredry,thelatterevenwhengoingasternat10knots.Themovement of the ship was generally easy, periods measured onmany

occasions being about 7½ seconds’ pitch and 14 seconds’ roll. The ship wasremarkably free of vibration at all speeds and I was informed that therangefinderscouldbeusedwithoutdifficulty.TheCaptainandofficershaveallexpressedthemselvesasbeingpleasedwiththeshipandherperformance.

They were the last British battleships to have the conventional (cruiser) stern, a newsquare-cuttypebeingadoptedinthelaterVanguard.Thetight,almostsquarebilgeofferedgreaterresistancetorolling.Themetacentricheightwas6.1feetintheaverageloadand8.1feetdeep,thisbeinggreaterthaninanypreviousBritisharmouredshipsinceInflexible(1874). Electric welding was extensively used in the construction but was limited tocertainareas.

PARTICULARSOFSHIPS,ASCOMPLETEDConstruction

Dockyard LaidDown Launched CompletedKingGeorgeV: Vickers 1.1.1937 21.2.1939 11.12.1940.PrinceofWales: CammellLaird 1.1.1937 3.5.1939 31.3.1941.DukeofYork: JohnBrown 5.5.1937 28.2.1940 4.11.1941;Anson: Swan,Hunter 22.7.1937 24.2.1940 22.6.1942.Howe: Fairfield 1.6.1937 9.4.1940 29.8.1942.

Displacement(tons):

DukeofYork:37,754(light),41,858(averageaction),42,046(deep);KGV:38,151(load),42,245(deep);Howe:39,138(load),42,630(deep).

Dimensions

Length:

KingGeorgeV 700ft0¼in(pp) 745ft0⅛in(oa)PrinceofWales 700ft1in 745ft1⅝in(oa)DukeofYork 699ft11⅝in 745ft0¼in(oa)Anson 700ft0¼in 745ft0¼in(oa)Howe 699ft11½in 744ft11½in(oa)Beam:

KingGeorgeV 103ft in PrinceofWales 103ft in DukeofYork 103ft1¾in Anson 103ft0¼in Howe 103ft0⅜in

Draught:Rangingfrom28ft6inthroughto33ft7½independingoncondition.

Armament

10×14in45calMkVII(80rpg)

16×5.25in50calMkIHA/LAdual-purpose(200rpg)

32–482pdrAA

1×40mmAA(PrinceofWales)

11–15×20mmAA(AnsonandHowe)

4×3pdrsaluting

3to420-tubeAArocket-projectors(KingGeorgeVandPrinceofWales).

Freeboard:(asdesigned)30ft10inforward,26ft10inaft.

Armour

Mainbelt15–14in

Bulkheads12–I0in

Barbettes14–13–12–11in

Turrets13–9–7in

Secondaryturrets1in–1/½–1in

Splinterprotectiontosecondarymagazines1½in‘D’steel

Underwaterprotection1¾–½in

Deck:6inovermagazines,5inovermachinery

Lowerdeckforwardofcitadel5–2½in,aftofcitadel5–4½in

Conningtower(andbridge)4insides,3inface

Machinery

Parsonssinglereductiongearedturbinesdriving4propellers.

Separatecruisingturbines.

Turbinesarrangedinfourcompartments.

Boilers:8Admiralty3-drumboilersin4compartments.

DesignedSHP:110,000for28.5/29knots

Workingpressure:380/410psi

Steamtemperature:750degrees.

Lengthofenginerooms:‘A’and‘B’43ft11¼in.‘X’‘Y’43ft11¼in.

Lengthofboilerrooms:43ft11⅝in

Fuel:3,770tonsoil(average).

Radiusofaction:KingGeorgeV,PrinceofWales,DukeofYork,15,600nmat10knots;Anson16,700nmat10knots;Howe15,400nmat10knots.

Weights(tons) Generalequipment 1,150Machinery 2,770Armament 6,570Armour 12,460Hull 13,780Costs Hull £2,578,034Armour 1,140,000Machinery 1,116,153Armament 2,243,162Storesandequipment 315,785Storesandequipment 315,785Totalofeachshiponaverage: £7,393,134.

Ship’sboats

3×25ftmotorboats

3×45ftmotorpickets

1×45ftmotorlaunch

2×32ftcutters

2×27whalers

2×14ftdinghies

1×16ftdinghy

1×13ft6inbalsaraft

47lifefloats.

Searchlights

6×44in:2onlowerbridge,2onplatformabaftforefunnel,

2onplatformonsecondfunnel;2×24insignallingonlowerbridge.Upperdecktoforetruck121ft6in.

Topofforefunnelfromupperdeck63ft9in.

Upperdecktoaftertruck103ft.

Upperbridgetoupperdeck59ft6½in.

Complement

KingGeorgeVandPrinceofWales:average1,400(1941);

PoW110officers,1,502men(December1941);

DukeofYorkassquadronflagship84officers,1,530men,

asfleetflagship104officers,1,578men.

ArmamentIn1931staffrequirementscalledforamainarmamentmountedinnotlessthanfourtwinturretsplacedasintheQueenElizabethclass.Aftermanyteststhismethodofdisposingthearmamentwasstronglyadvocated. Itwas thought that if for reasonsconnectedwithadequateprotectionandlimitedtonnageitwasfoundimpossibletomountthearmamentin this way, the method should follow that as fitted in Nelson and Rodney (tripleturrets).The calibre of gun as proposed ranged from 14in to 16in and in all forms ofdisposition.That the 14inwas finally adopted came about as a direct result of the 1936London Naval Conference, which suggested a reduction in maximum permitted guncalibrefrom16into14in,andthedesignoftheKingGeorgeVclasswaspreparedonthisbasis.Theotherpowersconcernedfailedtoratifytheagreement,butasthedelayofoneyearrequiredforthepreparationofnewdesignswasunacceptablethe14inarmamentwasretained.Designsfor15ingunswereavailableatthetime,butthe14inwasconsideredtoofferabetter-balanceddesignonadisplacementlimitof35,000tons.

Numerous alternative plans were consideredwith a view tomounting themaximumnumber of guns, and both twin, triple and quadruple turrets were discussed. Threequadrupleswereeventuallyapprovedalthoughitlaterbecamenecessarytoreducethistotwoquadrupleandonetwintooffsettheweightofextramagazineprotectionwhichtrialswith new projectiles had shown to be desirable. TheNelson-class arrangement for theoriginalthreequadrupleturretswasconsidered,butrejectedbecauseofsevereblasteffectswhentheafterturrettrainedabaftthebeam,andbecauseofdifficultyinaccommodatingthe longermachinery space required in the fine stern section. The arrangement of twoturretsforwardandoneaftwasfinallyadopted,thesecond(super-firing)quadruplebeinglaterreplacedbyatwin.TheyweretheonlyBritishbattleshipstohave14inguns(apartfromtheex-ChileanCanadatakenoverin1914)andquadrupleturrets.Theywerealsothefirsttocompletewithradarcontrol.

Becauseof thecomplexityof thequadruple turrets thecrewshadproblems thatwerenoticeableduringtheactionagainstBismarckin1941,forexample,whenmainarmamentsinPrinceofWalesandKingGeorgeVwereattimesonly20–50percenteffective.PrinceofWaleshadonegun in ‘A’ turretdefective throughout,and ‘Y’was temporarilyoutofactionthroughmechanicalfailure.InKingGeorgeVoneturretwasinoperativefornearlytwentyminutes.TheseproblemswerelaterovercomeandatthesinkingofScharnhorstinDecember1943DukeofYork fired52broadsidesofwhich31straddledandsixteenfellwithin200yardsofthetarget,aremarkableperformanceeveniftheefficiencyoftheradar

controlistakenintoconsideration.

The secondary armament for theKingGeorge V groupwas extremely problematicalalthoughithadbeenunderdevelopmentsince thetimeof theoriginalproposal in1928,which called for twelve 5in gunsmounted six on each side. The contentious issuewaswhethertoincludeagunthatcouldcoverbothLAandHAfire.Thelow-anglegunneededto be powerful enough to stop attacking destroyers and yet have sufficient elevation tocounterdivingaircraft,andtherewasnosuchdual-purposeweaponinproductionatthattime. The questions of armament allocation and weight distribution were hotly arguedthroughout theearly1930s,buton1 January1936 itwas finallydecided to replace the4.5ingunbythenew5.25inwhichwasabouttogointoproduction.AtaDNO’smeetingon1May1936thepositioningofthe5.25ingunswasdebated:

Position‘A’:Eightgunsoneachsidein twogroups.Theentire5.25inbatterybeingfedfromcommongroupsofmagazinesandsituatedjustbeforetheforemostboilerroom.

Position‘B’:Toseparatethegunsoneachsideintotwogroups,theforemostgroupeachside to be fed frommagazines positioned forward, and after group frommagazinespositionedaft.

DisadvantagesofPosition’A’:

1.Thetwoaftermountsrequiredlong-distancetransportationofammunitionbetweendecks.2.Asall5.25inmagazineandshell roomscame togetherseriousdislocationwouldresultfromanunderwaterhit.3.Couldbeputoutofactioncompletelybyshellorbombhit.4.Close-rangeAAdifficulttopositionawayfromblastof5.25inguns.

DisadvantagesofPosition‘B’:

1. Arrangement required two separate funnels and fore funnel would have to beclosertothebridgework.

Advantagesof‘B’:

1.Magazineswidelyseparated.2.Lessvulnerabletoallbeingknockedoutbysingleblow.3.Betterinternalarrangements.4.Betterarcsoffireandnointerferencetobridge.

AlthoughNelsonandRodney’ssecondarygunswerefittedinturrets,therecommendationsofthe1928committeedidnotfavourareturnofthismountingandstronglyadvocatedthebatterysystemoftheQueenElizabethandRoyalSovereignclasses.

AnoverallviewofKingGeorgeVin1941.

DukeofYorkrunningspeedtrialsinNovember1941.

Twoclose-upsofDukeofYork’ssuperstructurewhilefittingoutatJohnBrownshipyardinNovember1941.Notethestrangecamouflage.

Theadvantagesofthebroadsidebatteryasopposedtotheturretsystemwere:

1.Morereliableduetoabsenceofmachineryandprobableeffectofsplinters.2.Crewsfairlywellprotected.3.Abetterchanceofa fairproportionof thearmamentbeingfit forserviceafteraday’saction.4.Localcontrolofwholebatteryeasy.5.Upkeepeasyandcheap.6.Costofmountingtwelvegunsaboutone-thirdthatofmountingthesamenumberinturrets.

Disadvantages:

1.Arcsoffirenotasgoodasthoseofturrets.2.Rateoffirefallsoffaspersonnelbecometired.3.Adequatesupplyarrangementsmoredifficulttoarrange.4.DifficulttoprotectfromweatherunlessmountedhigherthaninQEandRSclasses.

Thefinalrecommendationwasfortwelvegunsinabatteryofhighcommand.

The backupHAarmamentwas to consist of eight 4.7in twinmountings as had beendiscussedinthe1928proposals.Atalaterdate,however,weightrestrictionsimposedonthedesignforcedareductionincalibreto4.5in.Morediscussionsledtothefavouringofadual-purpose battery (both LA and HA) and for this the turret system seemed best,althoughatthesametimeitwasseenasaflawintheprotectionbecausesecondaryturrets

could not be heavily armoured because of displacement restrictions. The finalrecommendationswerefor5.25ingunsseparatedintofourgroupsoffourguns(i.e.,twotwinmountings)situatedinthecornersofthecitadel,themagazinesandshellroomstobedividedintogroupsbeforeandabaftmachineryspaces.

Boththe1928and1931BattleshipCommitteeshadproblemsindecidingwhethertofitany torpedoarmament.The1928Board showeda certaindislike for the idea, but threeyears later favoured the addition. The 1931 proposal was for above-water tubes whichwouldbeadvantageousfornightfighting.Later,however,thewholequestionoftorpedoarmamentwasdroppedbecauseofweightproblems.

Theywere the firstBritishbattleships tobedesignedwith thedual-purpose (LA/HA)secondaryarmament,but in service the5.25ingunwas found tobe tooheavy for rapidfire,particularlysustainedAAfireatcloseranges.

Light AA armament was variable in the earlier and later ships of the class, ascompleted.

The original design had provided for thirty-two 2pdrs in four multiple (8 barrels)mountings,twoP&Sonthesuperstructurebeforeandabeamtheforefunnel.Thefirsttwoships(KGVandPoW)completedthus(1940–1)plusasingle40mminbreastworkrightafton the quarterdeck inPrince ofWales only.KingGeorge V carried four andPrince ofWalesthree20-tuberocketprojectors,oneeachon‘B’and‘Y’turretsinbothships.KingGeorge V also carried an additional rocket launcher on her quarterdeck.Duke of York,Anson andHowe completedwith an extra pair ofmultiple 2pdrmountings, one on ‘B’turretandoneon‘Y’insteadoftherocketlaunchers.Therewerealsosome20mmAAinAnsonandHowemountedontheforecastleandquarterdeckinboth,andontheforwardsuperstructureaswellinAnson.

Rocket-projectors inKingGeorge V andPrince of Wales were replaced by multiple2pdrs (8 barrels) and four 20mm AA added in place of the rocket projector on thequarterdeckinKingGeorgeV.Therewasradarcontrol for thesecondaryarmamentandthe 2pdrs; four directors in King George V, Prince of Wales and Duke of York ascompleted,butsixinthelasttwooftheclass.

These ships were the first British battleships to be completed without any form oftorpedoarmament.

ArmourThe original desired scale of protectionwas that first envisaged during the early 1930swhen proposals were made to protect new battleships against 16in shells at rangesbetween12,000and30,000yards.Inforeignnavies,however,therewereonlyfive16in-gunnedships(1935,USAthree,Japantwo)anditwasthoughthighlyimprobablethatanynewshipwouldhave to faceoneof these.Mostheavygunswere14in,however,and itwasthoughtthatthissizemightwellbecomethe‘standard’soprotectionwouldonlyneedtobeeffectiveagainst thiscalibre,especiallywhendisplacement limitationswouldplaysuchabigpartinconstructionofanynewships.

Amoredauntingaspectwhenconsideringadequateprotectionwastheever-increasingdangerfromaerialbombattack,theefficiencyofwhichwasimprovingsteadily.In1930theweightof thehigh-explosivebombwas limited to2,000pounds,but itcouldnotberuledoutthatbeforelongmorepowerfulbombswouldbeavailable.IthadbeenestimatedthatthefollowingthicknessesofNCsteelcouldbepenetratedbythe1,000lbbomb:

Aircraftspeedatendofdive: Heightofrelease: NCsteel:320mph 1,200ft 3.43in400mph 1,200ft 4.20in

Protectionwouldneedtobe:

Magazines:Againstpenetrationby14inshellsbetween12,000and30,000yards.

Against2,000lbbombsAPdroppedfrom10,000ftandlower.

Engineandboilerrooms:

1. Against 14in plunging shell fire up to 26,000 yards; the side armour not beingpenetrableoutside12,000yardsat70°inclination.2.Against2,000lbbombswhendroppedfrom4,000ftandbelow.3.Against1,000lbbombsof‘terminalvelocitydive’type.Mainarmament:

Ammunition supply arrangements and gun-houses to be protected from 14in shellsbetween12,000and26,000yards.

Sameprotectionagainstbombsasforengineroomsandboilerhouses.

Secondaryarmament:

Against splintersandblastof14in shellsor2,000lbbombsbursting in thevicinityplusweather,blastfromowngunsandmachine-gunfirefromattackingaircraft.

Steeringgear:

Theneedforprotectionagainstallbutdirecthits.

Itwas found practicable to include protection against guns of greater calibre than theirown,thescaleinfactbeingsecondtononecomparedtoanycapitalshipafloat(1937)orindeed any proposed designs of the time (with the exception of the Japanese Yamatoclass).Asbuilt,theywereprotectedagainst16inshellsbetween12,000and30,000yardsandagainst2,000lbbombs from10,000ft (sidearmouranddecks).Themainarmamentwasproofagainst16inshellsatrangesbetween12,000and26,000yards,themachineryspaces against 16in plunging fire up to 26,000 yards, and the side armour wasimpenetrableoutside12,000yardsduringnormalbattleconditions.

Extraconsiderationwasgiven tounderwaterprotectionand itwasconcluded that thefollowingwasneeded:

Anti-torpedo:Toprovideagainst750lbchargeincontactwithship’sside.

Anti-mine:Toprovideatleast5feetbetweenbottomsofinnerandouterhulls.

Anti-torpedo protection was built in and fitted internally for as far forward and aft aspossibleonthegivenweightrestrictions,andduringconstructionconsiderationwasgiventoprotectionagainst1,000lbtorpedochargesratherthan750lbafterreviewingthescaleofprotectioninNelson.

Aswiththebattleshipsthathadbeen‘modernized’duringthe1930s(Warspite,Renownetc.),therewasnoprovisionforaheavilyprotectedconningtowerashadbeennormaltothat date (1933), all control positions being adequately protected beneath the deck, andbulletproofprotectionbeingprovidedforbridges,etc.Inanycaseofficerswerereluctanttouseaconningtowerbecauseofthepoorviewfromthepositionandthefactthatadirecthit would probably put the personnel out of action – and this saw the demise of theconningtowerwithintheRoyalNavy’sdesigns.

TheentirephilosophyunderlyingtheprotectiongiventotheKingGeorgeVclasswasa

direct resultof full-scale testscarriedoutduring the1930sagainststructuresbuilton to‘Job74’whichwere testedagainstheavycontactcharges.The twomost important testsinvolved 1,000lb TNT charges exploded against a heavy two-ply riveted protectivebulkheadof‘D1’material,andshowedthatarivetedbulkheadresistedexplosivechargesmuch better than a welded one. Many experiments were carried out with models andagainst older ships such asEmperorof India,Marlborough,Centurion and themonitorRoberts.Thedrawingsshowsomeofthetests.

ConclusionsoftheExcellenttestswerehighlightedinthereportmadetotheAdmiralty:

1. Both systems of defence were heavily defeated and, had either system beenincorporated in a ship, sea water would have entered two, possibly three, maincompartmentsbehindtheholdingbulkhead.

KINGGEORGEV,1936ARMOURJob74

KINGGEORGEVAsFitted,1940

DUKEOFYORKFebruary1942

2. The principal cause of the extensive damage was brittle failure which wasassociatedwithweldedjoints.3.Steel ranging in thickness from1½in to inwasused in theconstructionof thetargetandthickmetalwasthemostsusceptibletobrittlefracture;infact,examplesofductilebreaksin1½inmetalwererare,whereas,in insteeltheywerenumerous.4. The evidence of the tests and Job 74 trials indicates that riveted joints in thickprotective bulkheads are superior to welded joints for resistance against explosiveloading.5.Valuableinformationwasobtainedontheefficiencyofvariousdesignfeaturesofthedefencesystem.6.Thedamageobtainedwasfarmoreextensiveanddifferentintypewhenfull-scaletrialsratherthan¼-scalemodelswereused.7.Thetrialsemphasizetheimportanceofmetallurgicalresearchonstructuralsteels.8.Thetrialsemphasizetheimportance,inthebuildingoflargewarshipstructures,ofthehighestqualityofworkmanship.

As completed, theKing George V class had an external armoured belt instead of theinternalarrangementadopted in theNelson class and the armourbeltwas carried lowerbeneath the waterline than in any previous battleships, this being demonstrated duringfiringtestsagainsttheGermanbattleshipBaden(1921),Superb(1922),Monarch (1924)andEmperorofIndia(1931).Despitethisincreaseindepthofarmour,however,PrinceofWaleswashitbeneaththearmourbeltduringtheBismarckactioninMay1941.

ThebeltarmourwascarriedonedeckhigherthaninNelsonwithamaximumincreaseof1inoverthatclass.Theflatarmoureddeck,adoptedinNelson,wasretainedbutplacedonedeckhigher.Thicknesswas reducedby¼inovermagazines,but increased2inovermachinery and boiler spaces. The 6in maximum deck thickness was based on theextensivetrialssince1922whichallindicatedthatthisthicknesswasadequateagainstanybombsthenconsideredlikelytobedeveloped.Ontheotherhand,onlytheJapanesehadestimatedthata6inthicknesswasnotenoughtokeepoutreallyheavybombs,andduringtestscarriedoutfrom1934hadconcludedthatatleast7into9inwasneededtoresistAPbombsdroppedfromagreatheight.AsinNelson,theexternalbulgesystemwasnotused

andanewarrangementofbulkheadingwasadoptedwithincreasedpumpingfacilities.

ThelossofPrinceofWales,whichcapsizedafterbeinghitbymanytorpedoes,showedupawholeseriesofminordefects,however,oneofthemostimportantbeingthelackofwatertight integrity in the ventilating system. The ship settled rapidly before capsizing.Thetorpedoescausedmoredamagethantheyshouldhavedone,butitisbelievedthattheshipcouldhavebeensavedhaditnotbeenforabombwhichpiercedthecatapultdeck,burstinthecinemaspacebelowandblewoutthesideofthehull,causingrapidflooding.Thecinemaspaceextendedrightacrosstheshipandthefreefloodingcollectedinthisandwasmainlyresponsibleforhercapsizing.Withtheabandonmentofaircraftinbattleshipsafter1942, thishazardwas reducedby relocating thecinemaandvariousofficeson thecatapult deck in the former hangar space and eliminating the free flooding area below.Additional tanks forwatertight integritywerealso fitted following the lossofPrince ofWales.

Withaview to increasingwaterlineprotection,arrangementsweremade, for the firsttime,forfloodingthefueltanksoutsidetheanti-torpedobulkheadsasoilwasexpendedsothat these would never be empty. Later, however, it was found that this offered noadvantageoveremptyspacesinabsorbingshock.

Themain armoured belt as completed was 15in abreast themagazines, 14in abreastmachineryandboilerspaceswithaloweredgeof5½inand4½inrespectively.Thetotalarmouredsidewas414ftlongby23ft6inwideandextendedtojustbeyondtheouterfacesof‘A’and‘Y’barbettes.Theupperedgeofthebeltwasatmaindecklevelsome14ft9inabovethewaterline(atnormalload), theloweredgebeingapproximately8ft6inbelow.The entire side protection of the citadel reached 40ft before and 36ft abaft. Bulkheadswere12in–11in–10inclosingforwardandafterextremitiesofbeltarmourbetweenmainandlowerdecks.Themaindeckwas6in–5inthickandlaidflatoverthelengthofthebelt;6inovermagazinesand5inovermachineryandboilers(also5in–2½inand5in–4½inonlowerdeckoutsidecitadel).Barbetteswere13in–12inand12in–11inaccordingtoposition(‘A’and‘B’3in–12in–11inand‘Y’13in–12in).Turretshad13infaces,9insides,7inrearsand6incrowns.Secondaryturrets(5.25in)weregivenonly1½–1inbullet-proofplating.Splinter-proof protection for secondary magazines was 1½in ‘D’ steel. Anti-torpedobulkheadswere 1¾in running thewhole length of the armoured belt and finishing in a1½inbulkhead.Theconningposition in thebridgefacewasgiven4inarmourplatesonthesides,3inonthefront.Therewasalsoextraarmourinthewayofcircularbulkheadsunderthebarbettes;2insplinter-proofscreensformainmagazines(‘D’steel)andasmall4inbulkheadontheafterendofthesteeringcompartment.Theshipshadadouble-bottom4feetdeep.

HoweontrialsinAugust1942.Judgingbytheamountofphotographs,thetrialswerewellrecorded,althoughheavilycensored.

MachineryIn 1928 the Post-War Questions Committee examined the requirements for a superiorbattleshipanditsconclusionwas:‘Aslightsuperiorityinbattlefleetspeedoneithersideisoflittleaccount.’Withthisinmindandthefactthatitwouldstillbetosomeadvantagetohaveatleastequalitywithmostoftheforeignbattleshipsatsea,thetermsfortheRoyalNavy’snewshipswerelaiddown.Atfirstthesuggestedspeedwasonly21knotswhichwasmuchslowerthantheNelsonandQueenElizabethclasses.InOctober1928theBoardconsidered the following alternatives: ‘Either design for 21 knots with the purpose ofmaintainingthatspeedthroughoutthelifeoftheship,ordesignfor23knots,whichwouldbeobtainedbyforcingtheboilersandwhichwouldbesubjecttoreductionwithage.’

PRELIMINARYSTEAMTRIALSKingGeorgeV: Displacement41,700tons. 108,290shp = 28.4kts.PrinceofWales: Displacement42,650tons. 111,900shp = 27.5kts.DukeofYork: Displacement42,550tons. 111,30shp = 28.6kts.Anson: Displacement42,600tons. 111,850shp = 27.62kts.Howe: Displacement42,630tons. 112,105shp = 27.5kts.

DUKEOFYORK:TRIALS,INOVEMBER1941Shipcompletewithammunitionplus35tonstrialammunition.

Displacement:42,970tons.

Underway08.30hours.FirthofForth.

Fullpowertrialscommenced12.00hours.

Sea:slight.

Wind:moderate.

MeanSHP:28,720.

RPM:153.

Speed:20.6knots.

MeanSHP:111,200.

RPM:232.

Speed:28.6knots.

ConstructorandDNCaboard.

Theconclusionreachedwasthatthebestpolicywastoaimforaspeedof23knotsinthestandardconditionand thatagreaterforcingof theboilers thanhadpreviouslybeenallowedshouldbecomecommonpractice.Thefigureswerebasedonashipof35,000tonsand carrying 16in guns. In 1929, when the matter of a smaller battleship was beinginvestigated, the question of speed was aired: ‘The staff were unable to recommend apolicyofincreasingspeedattheexpenseofmainbattleshiprequirements’.Atthismeetingthenotionof‘abalance’inspeedfromthetacticalpointofviewwasputforwardanditwaspointedoutthatifbattlefleetspeedsincreased,sotoowouldthespeedsofothernewtypesofvesselswhichwouldhavetokeepupwiththem.TheDNCDepartmentdidnotlike or accept this view and, even at the expense of another 1,000 tons, itwas thoughtnecessarytoraisethespeedofthenewbattleshiptoatleast25knots.Theargumentabouthighspeedswasbasedonthesuppositionthatspeedswouldriseinthefutureinalltypesof ships and that high speeds were essential to deal with the attack of ‘extraneousweapons’.

Theill-fatedPrinceofWalesinfullfightingshapeAugust1941.Notethecamouflage–fivecolours–whichmadeher

oneofthemostcolourfulbattleshipsinthefleet.

Itbecameextremelydifficult toworkout thepropulsivepower that couldbeworkedintothenewships.Moreover,thereweremanyreportsreachingtheAdmiraltyregardingspeedsofthemodernizedJapanesebattlefleet,anditwasknownthattheFrenchfleetandreconstructedItalianshipswereallshowinggreaterspeedsthanbefore.Inthelightofthisit was almost impossible for the Committee and theDNC not to give the new ships aspeedofatleast26knots,andwhenthefinallegendwasdrawnupthespeedhadrisento27knots–whichwasstillconsideredbymanytobetooslow.

As built themachinery consisted of Parsons single-geared reduction turbines drivingfourscrews.Therewereseparatecruisingturbinesandtheywerearrangedinfourseparateengineroomsinfourcompartments.EightAdmiralty3-drumboilersinfourcompartmentswith a working pressure of 380–410psi. Steam temperature was 750°. Machinery andboilers were arranged alternately to reduce the risk of complete disablement. It wasreportedthatthecruisingturbineswereseldomusedduringthewarasthefleetspeedwassetataknotortwoabovetheircapabilityandsotheycouldnotbeemployed.

BridgeworkThe bridgework ofKingGeorge V was basically a development of that inNelson andRodney butwas amore square-shaped constructionwith a less pointed front. Over theyearsitwasfoundthatalthoughNelsonwasmuchbetterbridgewisethanpreviousclassesofbattleshipswith theiropen tripod fittings, therewas still a considerablebackdraughtthroughoutthebridgeandcompassplatform,especiallyifthedoorswereleftopen.

Inan endeavour to alleviate thisproblema slightly lower andmore square flat-facedsuperstructurewaschosenaftermanytestsofamodifiedNelson-typestructurehadbeencarried out at the National Physical Laboratory from 1934 to 1936. As completed,however,itwasfoundinpracticethatalthoughlessdraughtwasevidentascomparedtoNelson, there were still cross-flows of draught up and over the various levels at kneeheight.

Further testswere carried out from 1940 to 1943 in the interests of future battleshipconstruction, but it seems that the situation was never rectified – even for Vanguard(1944), the last British battleship. Although it had probably the best-designed andconstructed forwardsuperstructure fitted inaBritishship,KGVwasneverdraught-free,justmoretolerablethanmostoftheolderships.Theproblemwasthatthemoreclosed-inand draught-free a bridge structure was, the less vision the staff had. A more openstructure obviously meant strong or severe draughts and the answer had to be acompromisetoattainanacceptablelevel.

Throughout the history of British battleship construction from 1906 to 1944(DreadnoughttoVanguard),manytestswereundertaken(asseeninpreviouschapters),allleadingtothefinalconclusionthatasharp-facedorroundfrontwasfarworseregardingdraughtandup-windsthana lessstreamlined,flat-facedtypeofstructure. Itwasprovedthat thewind hitting the flat facewould disperse around the sides rather than carry onacrossasitdidwithrounded-offedgesorsmooth,streamlinedfittings.

TheopenbridgeworkoftheQueenElizabeth,RoyalSovereign,RenownandHoodtypeswere at best practicable; at worst they proved downright uncomfortable, but it was

claimedthatfromthepointofviewoffightingefficiencytheyweremucheasiertomanandweremorefavouredbythepersonnelthantheclosed-ineffortsthatbecamenormalinallnewbattleshipsandreconstructionsthroughoutthe1930s.

AppearanceChanges,ModificationsandRefitsThe shipswereverydistinctive,with a long, low flushdeckhullwithvery slight sheerforward.Theyhadvery large superstructures thatwere separated amidships by catapultspace. The forward superstructure and bridge tower was especially massive. Largequadruple turret forward and aft with twin turret in superfiring position forward.Secondary turretsportandstarboardamidships in twogroups.Large, flat-sidedstronglyribbed funnels spaced well apart. Searchlight platform on second funnel. Prominentaircraftcraneportandstarboardovercatapultspaceamidships.RocketprojectorsorlightAAgunson‘B’and‘Y’turrets.Verylightrig:lighttripodmasts.Maintripodlegsrakedforward.Shorttopmasttoeachmast,notopgallants.Radaraerialatheadofeachtopmast.Prominentradaraerialscreen(lanterntype)onforetopinAnsonandHowe.

AerialviewsofKingGeorgeVarrivingbackinBritishwatersfromtheUSAfromwhereshehadjustconveyedLordHalifaxasBritishAmbassador.

Individualdifferences:KingGeorgeV:

1. Rocket projectors on ‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets and right aft on quarterdeck (removed1941–2andreplacedonturretsbymultiple2pdrs).2.LanternradarscreenonbridgetowerbetweenHAdirectors(relocatedonforetop1941–2).3.Type279radaraerialateachmasthead.4.Externaldegaussingcable(relocatedinternallylater).

5.Squareportsrightaft.

Others:

1.Multiple 2pdrs on ‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets (Anson,Duke of York andHowe). Rocketprojectors(PrinceofWales)replacedby2pdrs1941.2.Lanternscreenonbridgetower(PrinceofWales),foretop(others).AddedinDukeofYork1941.3.Type279radaraerialsatmastheads(Howe).ReplacedbyType281in1943.4.Internaldegaussingcables.5.Roundportsrightaft.

PrinceofWales:

1.Single40mminbreastworkrightaft(onlyshipthus).

1941–2

1.Radarcontrol (Type285) fitted for5.25inguns inKingGeorgeVandPrince ofWales, as others (by June 1941 in Prince of Wales). Multiple 2pdr mounting (8barrels) addedon ‘B’ and ‘Y’ turrets inKingGeorgeV andPrinceofWales (June1941 inPrinceofWales).Rocketprojectors removed fromboth ships.Nine20mmAA (singles) added in Duke of York (May/June 1942): five on forecastle abaftbreakwater,fouronquarterdeck.Four20mm(singles)addedonquarterdeckinKingGeorgeV,replacingrocketprojector.2.Surfacewarningradar(Type271)addedinDukeofYork.Aerialinlanternscreenonforetop.3. Protection tomagazines andmachinery further improved inKingGeorgeVandPrinceofWalesin1941followinglossofHood.Otherthreeshipssimilarlymodifiedwhilebuilding.4.CamouflagepaintedupinKingGeorgeVandPrinceofWales.

1943Howe:

AirwarningradarType279replacedbyType281(March1943).

1944–5:

1.Type284radaronforward14indirectorreplacedbyType274.Type274fittedtoafterdirectoraswell inallexceptKingGeorgeV (Type285).NewMk6directorswithType275radarfittedforsecondaryarmamentinAnsononly.Quadruple40mmAA mounting added port and starboard on after superstructure abeam mainmast.Eight40mm(singles)addedinHowe(1945):twoportandstarboardonlowerbridge,two in place of SL on second funnel, two port and starboard on forecastle andquarterdeck.Two40mm (singles) added port and starboard on superstructure abaftsecondfunnelinKingGeorgeV.Fourmultiple2pdrAA(8barrels)addedinall.Twoport and starboard on superstructure abaft second funnel and on quarterdeck (notcertain thatHowe andKing George V had after pair). Four multiple 2pdr AA (4barrels)added inAnsonandDukeofYork: twoport and starboardon lowerbridgeandonupperdeckabeamrearof ‘B’ turret.Someorall20mmAAremoved.King

George V carried two in place of the SL abaft forefunnel. Additional light AAdirectors(Type283radar)fittedportandstarboardonsuperstructureabeamandabaftsecondfunnelinall,inplaceofSLabaftforefunnelinAnsonandDukeofYorkandoncentrelineabaftmainmastinDukeofYorkandKingGeorgeV(AnsonandHowecompleted thus).Type282 radarcontrol toLAAdirectorswhere fitted replacedbyType283.

PARTICULARSOFSHIPSIN1945Originallengthandbeam

Displacement (tons):King George V 44,460 tons: Duke of York 44,790 tons; Anson45,360tons;Howe45,400tons.Alldeepload.

Draughthadrisenabout1½ftwithanaverageadditionof1,500tonspershipsince1941.

Averagedraught:35ft10into38ft3indeepload.

Armament

Originalmainandsecondary.LightAAgunswerevariablethroughouttheclass.8×16×40mmAA.Twoquadruplesinallplus8singlesinHoweand2inKingGeorgeV.80–96×2pdr 10× 8 barrels in all plus four quadruples inAnson andDukeof York. Nil to 4 ×20mmAA.Allgunsexceptsingle40mmand20mmwereradarcontrolled.

RDF:Type274formainarmament.275forsecondaryinAnson,285inothers.Type283forlightAA.AirwarningType279inKingGeorgeVand281inothers.SurfacewarningType277.

Air/surfacewarningType277.IFFType242.HF/DFandMF/DF.VHFcommunicationinAnson.

Searchlights:4×44inKingGeorgeV;others2×44in;2×24insignallinginall.

Aircraft:Allremovedincludingmostoftheequipment.

Armour: as original with some minor modifications to the magazines and machineryareas.

Machinery:asoriginal.

Speed:slight reductionowingtoadditionalweightsaddedduring thewarAdmiralVianreportedthatKing

GeorgeVcouldnotmanagemorethan26knotsby1945.

Aircrafthangarsutilizedforofficesandcinemaspace.

Boatsstowedoncatapultdeck.

Rig:Originalexceptforheavierforetopmast.

Appearance:VeryclutteredwithAAguns,radaraerials,etc.,butnomajorchanges.

Individualdifferences(1945)

Anson:Werylargesecondarydirectors(onlyshipthus).Multiple2pdrmountingsP&Son

lowerbridgeand

upperdeckabeam‘B’turret.ProminentDFaerialsonmaintripodlegs.

DukeofYork:SLplatformonsecondtunnelextendedwellforward.Multiple2pdrsasinAnson.

Howe:ForwardsectionofSLplatformaroundsecondfunnelwasenlargedandenclosed.AAgunsinplace

ofSLonthisplatform.

KingGeorgeV:20mmgunsinplaceofSLabaftforefunnel.279RDFaerialatheadofmainmast(281inothers).

Ansonin1942.Ascompleted,AnsonandHowewereextremelydifficulttotellapart.

2.SurfacewarningradarType271replacedbyType277.AirsurfacewarningradarType293added.Aerialatheadoffore-topmastinplaceofforwardType281aerial.Identification(IFF)radarType242fittedhighonforetopmastandatheadofmain-topmast. HF/DF aerial added right aft on quarterdeck in all. VHF radiocommunicationequipmentfittedinAnson,aerialsonmaintripodlegs.3.SearchlightsremovedfrombridgeandabaftforefunnelinAnsonandDukeofYorkand from bridge and second funnel in Howe and from abaft forefunnel in KingGeorgeV.4.Aircraft and catapult removed (1944), cranes retained for boats.KingGeorge VreportedtohavebeenthelastBritishbattleshiptofly-offitsownaircraft.5. Superstructure built up between second funnel andmainmast and boat stowageshiftedtocatapultdeck.6.Heavierforetopmastfittedtocarrytheadditionalradaraerials.7.Pacificcamouflagepaintedup(1945).

AppearancewasveryclutteredwithmanylightAAgunsandnumerousradaraerials,etc.,butnomajorchanges.Anytypeofcamouflagedeletedbylater1945.

Individualdifferences:

Anson1.Verylargesecondarydirectors(onlyshipthus).2.Multiple2pdrmountingportand starboard on lower bridge and upper deck abeam ‘B’ turret. 3. Prominent DFaerialsonmaintripodlegs.

DukeofYork1.SLplatformonsecondfunnelextendedwellforward.2.Multiple2pdrsasAnson.

Howe1.ForwardofSLplatformaroundsecondfunnelenlargedandenclosed.2.AAgunsinplaceofSLonthisplatform.

KingGeorgeV1.20mmgunsinplaceofSLabaftforefunnel.2.Type279radaraerialatheadofmainmast(Type281inothers).

1945

1.DFaerialonquarterdeckremoved.

1946–8

1. All 2pdrs and 20mm AA (with exception of two 20mm in King George V)removed;2pdrmountingsretainedonturretsandsuperstructure.2pdrsremovedfromHoweandKingGeorgeVinearly1946.Quarterdeck2pdrsremovedfromAnsonandDukeofYorkin1946,others1947–8.Quadruple40mmAAretainedinallplusfoursinglesinAnson(onbridgeandsecondfunnelplatform)andtwoinKingGeorgeV(abaftsecondfunnel).2.VHFequipmentremovedfromAnson(1946–7).

Alllaid-upfrom1950–1.

BattleDamagePrinceofWalesBombDamage,31August1940While fitting-out at Cammell Lairds, Prince of Wales was subjected to a low-levelbombing attack duringwhich shewas struck by a 250lb bomb. The raid took place atabout2030andPrinceofWales,whilstlyinginthefitting-outbasin,washitat2040.Thebombactuallyexplodedbetweenthebasinwallandthehulloftheship,causingdamagetothehullplating.Therewasfloodingtotheportlongitudinalprotectivebulkheadandtheshipheeledtoabout8degrees.Waterroseinthelowerdeckcompartments(184–228)toabout18inchesbelowthemiddledeck.Thelowerdeckwasfloodedthroughholeswhichhadrecentlybeenmadefortheinternaldegaussingcable.Theshiphadtobedry-dockedoncemoreandthedamagewasrepairedwithoutanyseriousdelaytohercompletion.

DAMAGETODUKEOFYORKBYSCHARNHORST26December1943

AerialviewofDukeofYorkin1943,showingadditionalAAgunsmountedontheforecastlenearthebreakwater.

DukeofYorkactionagainstScharnhorst,26December1943AlthoughDuke of York’s action against the German battlecruiser Scharnhorst was anoverwhelming success, she received some damage. The battle damage report is givenbelow:

DukeofYorksustainednoseriousstructuraldamagedue toenemyactionwiththeexceptionofonehitfroman11inshellwhichpassedthroughtheportstrutofthemainmastandthemainmastitself.Theshelldidnotexplodebutcarriedawayabouttwo-thirdsofthestructureofbothmastandstrutinthetrackoftheshell.1.ExtremelyhastyrepairswerecarriedoutatKolaInletbyweldingonsteel

strapsandtheship’sstaffperformedwellinmakingstagingforandcarryingouttheserepairsindistinctlydifficultconditions.2. The repairs, although of some help, could certainly not be considered

effectiveand,sincetheshipexperiencedfairlybadweatheronthepassagebacktoScapa,thefactthatthemainmaststoodisregardedasadefinitetributetothetripodsystemofconstruction.3. The damage in Duke of York to weather deck fittings, particularly

mushroomheadsandcovers toventilationopeningsand lengthsofventilationtrunking below the upper deck, was severe and extensive. This damage wasmainlyduetoblastfromthe14inbroadsidesbutwasaccentuatedsomewhatbythe trunking systems fillingwith heavy quantities ofwater due to continuousharddrivinginbadweatherbefore,duringandaftertheactionwithScharnhorst.4. The potential weaknesses of the ventilation system were already well

known,asampleexperiencehadbeengainedinallshipsoftheKingGeorgeVclass. The present action experience, with the ventilation system extensivelydamagedbyblast, stronglyemphasized theurgentneedfor fitting thestrongertype steel or metal weather deck ventilation valves instead of the existingaluminiumtype.Mostofthesestrongervalveswereorderedmonthsagoforallfour ships and every opportunity taken to fit the new type of valve to allventilationopeningsintheweatherdeckincludingthoseopeningsnotyetfittedwithavalve.5. In addition, the trunking below the weather deck developed numerous

gapingcracksthroughwhichwaterpouredintothelivingspaces.Asrenewalbystronger trunking of the round section is hardly practicable in wartime, it isnecessary for the corners of all trunking liable to exposure to gun blast to bereinforcedbyextensivestrapping.6.Weatherdeck leakagealsodeveloped throughbolt fasteningsofOerlikon

screens and ammunition lockers and rivet fasteningsofbreakwaters, skylightsandgirdersundertheupperdeck.Theseleakswerenumerousandmainlyduetothe whip of the forecastle deck under blast from forward arcs of fire; thebreakwaterdefectswereduetoheavyseas.Pillarsundertheupperdecksufferedfromblastanddishedwashersbetweentheheelofthepillarandthemaindeckappeartoassist thetaprivetssecuringtheheelsofthesepillars.It isclearthatthe weather deck fittings should be secured in general by welding instead ofthrough fastenings.Many of the fittings causing leakage had been secured byboltingwhenlittletimeandlabourwereavailableforusingalternativemethods.7. Severe leakageoccurred past ‘A’ barbette on themain deck andweather

shieldsaroundthesebarbettes,particularly‘A’,areanecessityforbadweather.8.Someleakageoccurredintothefirecontrolrooms,14inmagazines,action

machinery rooms and power control room through the ventilation system andthismighteasilyhaveprovedserioussincesomefanswentoutofactionfromthiscause.9.Altogetherthelargeamountofwaterwhichaccumulatedbelowpresenteda

seriousandcontinuousproblemwhichwasdealtwithlater.10.Aninterestingcaseofblastdamageoccurredin‘Y’boilerroomwherethe

divisional plates above the eyes of the boiler room fans were split open at

middledecklevel.

AnexcellentviewofHowein1944,showinghercamouflageandextensiveradaraerials.

11.Aswill be seen from the above the damagewas confined to subsidiaryequipmentwitheffectswhich,althoughhighlyinconvenientandinsomecasestemporarily serious, did not affect the main structure of the ship. It issatisfactorytonotethat,inspiteofthemoreorlesscontinuousharddrivingtowhich the ship was subjected in the course of these operations, no structuralfailureoccurred.12. Radar Type 281, F.V.I, 91 and 251M,W/T Type 75Dwere put out of

actionbywiringbeingsevered.13.Gun armament –No damagewas caused by enemy action to themain

armament. Five Oerlikon shields and the supports on the forecastle wereextensively damaged byweather and blast and had to be scrapped before thehomeward passage. P2 and S2 theGRUwas blown from its supports, all byblast from‘Y’ turret.Repairsweremadeafterarrival inharbour thefollowingday.

History:KingGeorgeVTheshipwouldnormallyhavebeennamedafterthereigningmonarch,KingGeorgeVI,butwas namedKingGeorge V at the special request of theKing to commemorate hisfather.

1936Programme

Laid down by Vickers-Armstrongs, Newcastle-on-Tyne, 1 January 1937. Launched 21February1939.

CommissionedatNewcastle1October1940for2ndBattleSquadron,HomeFleet.JoinedFleetatScapa2December1940.

HOMEFLEETDecember1940toMay1943(2ndBStoApril1941,fleetflaglater).

ConveyedLordHalifax to theUnitedStates asBritishAmbassador, January1941.LeftScapa15JanuaryandarrivedatAnnapolisonthe24th.

Leftforhomeonthe25th,escortingaspecialconvoy,andrejoinedHomeFleetatScapalateFebruary.

UnitofcoveringforceforLofotenIslandsRaid4March1941.

TemporarilyattachedtotheBattlecruiserSquadron,HomeFleet,earlyMarch1941.

Took partMarch toMay 1941 in covering Halifax convoys against possible attack byenemyheavyships,specificallyScharnhorst,Scheer,andHipper.

RelievedNelsonasfleetflag,HomeFleet1April1941.

Took part in operations againstBismarck andPrinz Eugen 22–27May 1941 and withRodney in destruction of Bismarck on 27th, experiencing difficulties with mainarmamentduringthisaction.

Took part in search for Scheer andPrinz Eugen off Norwegian coast 20–23 February1942.

FlagofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoysMarchtoMay1942.

From6to10MarchaforcecomprisingKingGeorgeV(flag),Renown(flagVA),DukeofYork,Victorious,BerwickandtwelvedestroyersprovidedspecialcoverforanoutwardandhomewardconvoyduringasortiebyTirpitz.

ContactwithTirpitzestablishedoff theLofotenIslandsbyaircraftfromVictoriousbutatorpedoattackbythesefailedandtheGermanshipwasabletoreturntobasewithoutbeingbroughttoaction.Convoysnotattacked.

Rammedand sankPunjabi,oneofher screeningdestroyers, in lowvisibilityon1May1942 duringRussian convoy operation. Sustained considerable damage to bows andalsodamagedbyexplosionofPunjabi’sdepthcharges.

Refitted by Cammell Laird, Birkenhead, May to July 1942, flag behind transferred toDukeofYorkon6May.

RejoinedfleetatScapaandrevertedtoflagCinC11July.

UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoyJanuary1943.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)withHowe,May1943forSicilyinvasion.

KingGeorgeVon4February1943.

LeftScapaforGibraltar21May.

FORCEH(Gibraltar)MaytoOctober1943(flagMaytoJune).

TemporaryflagofForceHMaytoJune,relievingNelsonforworking-upatScapa.

FlagrevertedtoNelson23June.

TookpartininvasionofSicilyinJulyandItalyinSeptember.

WithHowe intended to serve as a reserve for ForceH in these operations to carry outdiversionarybombardments,assaultconvoysandreplaceanyotherForceHbattleshipsthatmightbedisabled.

Onnight of 10/11 July both ships carried out bombardment ofMarsala andTrapani onwestcoastofSicilytosimulateanotherintendedlandingandpindownenemytroops.

Stationed atAugusta 7SeptemberwithHowe as reserve force forSalerno landings butdetachedon the8th, following the signingof the Italian armistice, as unit of specialsquadron(undercommandVice-AdmiralMalta)comprisingHowe(flag),KingGeorgeV,fourcruisersofthe12thCSandtheminelayerAbdielsenttoTarantotooccupyandholdtheport.ForceenteredTaranto10September.

With Howe escorted the larger of the surrendered Italian warships from Malta toAlexandria14–16September.

LeftAlexandria1OctobertorejoinHomeFleet.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)October1943toFebruary1944.

Detached December 1943 to bring Prime Minister home from the Cairo Conference.

WithdrawnfromHomeFleetFebruary1944torefitpriortotransfertoEasternFleet.

RefitbyCammellLaird,BirkenheadFebruarytoJuly1944.

Worked-upatScapaandleftforCeylon28October1944.

ProceededviaSuezCanalandbombardedLakidaBatteryonenemy-heldislandofMilosintheAegean15November1944whileenroutethroughtheMediterranean.

Left Alexandria 1 December, arrived Trincomalee 15 December and transferred to thePacificFleetthenbeingformedthere(seeHowe).

ANSONProfile,March1945

AnaerialviewofKingGeorgeVreturningfromtheUSA,1941.

KingGeorgeVleavingSydneywiththeDukeandDuchessofGloucesterforTasmaniaandtheUK,January1946.

PACIFICFLEET2BSDecember1944toJanuary1946(FlagVA1stBSand2ndfleetflagFebruarytoOctober1945).

LeftTrincomaleeforPacificFleetbaseatSydney,Australiaon19January1945togetherwith Indomitable (flag RA carriers), Illustrious, Victorious, Indefatigable, Argonaut,Black Prince, Euryalus and ten destroyers, the force carrying out air attacks on oilrefineriesatPalembang,Sumatra,on24and29Januarywhileenroute.

ArrivedFremantle4FebruarywhereflagVice-AdmiralsecondincommandPacificFleethoistedinKingGeorgeV.ArrivedSydney10February.

At Sydney flag CinC Pacific Fleet transferred ashore fromHowe, the Vice-Admiral inKingGeorgeVassumingseagoingcommand.

FleetleftSydneyforoperationalarea28February1945.

Joined US 5th Fleet and commenced operations against the Japanese 26 March 1945,beingdesignatedTaskForce57.

CarriedoutbombardmentsofJapaneseairfieldsonFormosaandSakashimaGuntoIslandsMarchtoMay1945aspartoftheOkinawacampaign.

On4MaywithHoweandcruisersbombardedairfieldsonMikayoShimaintheSakishimaGuntogroupofislands.

On27MaytheUS5thFleetbecamethe3rdFleet,followingachangeincommand,andtheBritishPacificFleetwasrenumberedTaskForce37.

On 17 and 29 JulyKingGeorge V took part with US fleet ships in bombardments ofindustrialareasonJapanesecoastnorthofTokyo,beingtheonlyBritishbattleshipintheoperationalarea,HowehavingbeenwithdrawnearlierinJulyforrefit.

FlagofBritishForce,comprisingKingGeorgeV, Indefatigable,Gambia,Newfoundlandandtendestroyers,selectedon12August1945toremainwiththeUSFleetoffJapan

following news of the impending Japanese surrender, the remainder of the BritishPacificFleetreturningtoAustralia.

Present at the signing of the Japanese surrender aboardUSSMissouri in TokyoBay 2September1945.

Relieved as flag 1st BS by Anson October 1945 at which time flag VA 1st CarrierSquadronreplacedflagVA1stBattleSquadronas2ndfleetflag.

RefitSydneyOctobertoDecember1945.

ConveyedDukeandDuchessofGloucesterfromSydneyto

Hobart,Tasmania,December1945.

ReturnedhomeMarch1946.ArrivedPortsmouthonthe1st.

RelievedNelsonasflagHomeFleet9April1946.

HOMEFLEETApril1946toSeptember1949(flagtoDecember1946.TrainingSquadronPortlandfromMay1948).

RelievedasflagbyDukeofYorkDecember1946.

RefitDevonportDecember1946toNovember1947.

JoinedHomeFleetTrainingSquadron,Portland,May1948,replacingHowe.

Reduced to reserve, Portsmouth, September 1949 untilApril 1957 (Portsmouth to June1950.C.CategoryClydelater).

LaidupinClydeinextendedreserve(CCategory)June1950.

PlacedonDisposalList30April1957.

SoldtoArnottYoung,Dalmuir,January1958.

ArrivedDalmuirforscrapping20January1958.

HulkarrivedTroonforfinaldemolitionDecember1958.

History:PrinceofWales1937Programme.LaiddownbyCammellLaird1January1937.

Launched3May1939.

Commissioned at Birkenhead 18 January 1941 for 2nd Battle Squadron, Home Fleet.JoinedFleetatScapa25March1941inincompletestatewithcontractors’menstillonboard.TwoturretsnotfinallyhandedovertotheAdmiraltyuntil27April1941.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)JanuarytoSeptember1941(flagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflagfromJuly).

Left Scapa 22 May 1941 with Hood and destroyers Icarus, Echo, Electra, Achates,AntelopeandAnthonytocoverareasouth-westofIcelandandsupportcruisersNorfolkandSuffolkinDenmarkStraitfollowingreportofsortiebyBismarckandPrinzEugen.

Germanshipssightedon24Mayandactionopenedatabout25,000yards.Scoredtwohits

onBismarck, flooding one boiler room, reducing speed, causing oil leak and puttingshiponetotwodegreesdownbyhead.Receivedfivehitsby15inshellsandthreeby8in. One 15in hit on compass platform and killed or wounded nearly all bridgepersonnel although CO unhurt. Broke off action owing to turret failures, seriousdamagetobridgeandfourhundredtonsofwatershipped.

RefittedatRosythMaytoJuly.

RejoinedFleet16JulyasflagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflag.Detached4August1941totakePrimeMinistertoandfromtheAtlanticCharterConferencewiththePresidentoftheUnitedStates,heldonboardatPlacentiaBay,Newfoundland,on10th.

RejoinedFleet at Scapa 18August. Flag temporarily transferred to depot ship at Scapaduringthisperiod.

Temporarily attached to Force H (Gibraltar) September 1941 for Malta convoy butcontinuedtowearflagVA2ndBS.

LeftClydewithconvoy17September.

ForceH(Gibraltar)SeptembertoOctober1941.

Maltaconvoy24–30September.

RejoinedHomeFleetearlyOctober.

ReachedCapeTownon16NovemberandColomboonthe28thwhereRepulsejoinedandtheForcewasgiventhecode-nameForce‘Z’.

ArrivedSingapore2December.

EASTERNFLEET(Force‘Z’Singapore)NovembertoDecember1941.

Force ‘Z’, comprisingPrince ofWales (flag) andRepulse, with the destroyersElectra,Express,VampireandTenedos,leftSingaporeon8December1941toattacksupplylinesfor a Japanese invasion forcewhich had landed on the east coast ofMalaya during thenightof7/8th.

The original plan for the formation of the Eastern Fleet was to concentrateNelson,Rodney, Repulse and fourR Class battleships with appropriate number of cruisers anddestroyersandforthemtoproceedincompanytoSingapore,butitwasnotthoughtthatsuchafleetcouldarriveatSingaporebeforethespringof1942forthefollowingreasons:

1. The necessity for refitting ships before leavingUK, and equipping themwith themostmodernRDFavailable.2.LightcraftcouldnotbemadeavailablewithoutreducingtheHomeFleet,MediterraneanFleetandtheshipsrequiredfortheBattleoftheAtlantic.No modern aircraft carrier was available at that time because: 1. Illustrious andFormidablewerenot ready to leave theUKbeforeFebruary1942.2.Victorious had toremain at home, being the only operational carrierwith theHomeFleet. 3.Therewereurgent demands for twomodern carriers in the easternMediterranean and onemoderncarrierwithForceH.

IthadbeenhopedtosendArkRoyaltotheEasternFleetwhenherrefitinAmericawascompleteinaboutApril1942.

Revenge arrived at Durban on 28 September, Repulse on 3 November and RoyalSovereignon17December.RamillieslefttheUKon8DecemberandResolutionwasduetoleaveon7JanuaryTheplantosendNelsonandRodneyprovedabortivewhenNelsonwas torpedoed and it became necessary to change Rodneys guns. By 21 October thesituation in the Far East had deteriorated and it was decided to sendPrince of WalesinsteadofRodney. She arrived atColombo on 28November and reached Singapore incompany withRepulse on 2 December. To provide the necessary screen forPrince ofWalestwoHomeFleetdestroyersandtwoMediterraneanFleetdestroyers(bothofwhichcouldbeillafforded)plusfourAustraliandestroyers(whichithadbeenplannedwouldbeaddedatalaterdate)weresentalong.InadditiontheUSNavypromisedeightdestroyerstobridgethegapuntilsufficientdestroyerscouldbemadeavailable(fourofthesearrivedatSingaporeshortlyafterAdmiralPhillipshadlefton8December).

The reason for sending Prince of Wales and Repulse to Singapore prior to theconcentrationoftheEasternFleetwasthatitwashopedthattheywouldactasadeterrentto the Japanese threat. If, however, Japan decided to take the plunge itwas hoped thattheseshipsmightpreventthemsendingtheirexpeditionaryforceintotheGulfofSiam.ItwasrealizedthatitwaswithintheabilityoftheJapanesetobringdownamuchsuperiorforce, but it was felt that the strongAmerican Fleet at Hawaii would deter them fromdoingso.

On1December theAdmiralty suggested thatPrinceofWales andRepulse disappearintotheblue,andthattheuncertaintyoftheirwhereaboutswoulddisconcerttheJapanese,but the appearance of Japanese submarines off Saigonmeant that to put to seawithoutadequatebackupforceswouldbeunwise.

In judging the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, one must strike abalance between what is known now and what we think he knew when he took hisdecisiontoputtosea.HehadnodefiniteknowledgethatJapaneseaircraftcarrierswereintheGulfofSiam.Warexperiencehadshownthathigh-speedwarshipswithfullfreedomof manoeuvre would have a good chance of avoiding torpedo aircraft attack, earliertorpedo attackson the enemyhavingborne thisout. Itmust be remembered that itwasonlythethirdattackonBismarckthatdidvitaldamage.NeitherhenortheAdmiraltyhadanyreasontosupposethattheJapanesetorpedoaircraftwereinfactofahigherdegreeofefficiency than theBritish. Theweatherwas such that detection and attacks by aircraftwouldbeverydifficulttoexecute(anortheasternmonsoonwasblowing).Thefactthattheweatherclearednotonlyontheeveningofthe9thbutalsointhemorningof10Decemberwas seen to be unusual.AdmiralPhillipswas operating at such a distance fromenemyshore-based aircraft in Indo-China that the chance of a torpedo attack from them couldwithallfairnessbeconsideredminimal.HeprobablyreckonedthatthedestructionofthelargeJapaneseconvoy(knowntobeintheGulfofSiamon7December)mightwellturnthescaleofmilitaryoperationsintheMalayPeninsuladecisivelyinfavouroftheAllies.Itwould be idle to say that the Admiralty was not anxious about these ships. Theyconsidered that thesubmarineriskwas themostpotentand thatAdmiralPhillipswouldhavetorelyonthehighspeedofhisshipstoavoiddanger.Theairthreatwasappreciated,butwiththeincompleteinformationavailabletotheAdmiraltyatthattimeitwasfeltthatAdmiralPhillipswasinthebestpositiontoassessthethreat.

AdmiralPhillipsrealizedthedangerofsailingintothisareawithoutfighterprotection,hencehisrequestforit.ThefactsthathecouldnothaveitandthattheweatherhadclearedwereprobablythefactorsthatinducedhimtoreturntoSingaporeonthenightofthe9th.

LossofPrinceofWales1.PrinceofWales,RepulseandfourdestroyersleftSingaporeafterdarkon8December.Before sailing the Commander-in-Chief asked for: (a) reconnaissance 100miles to thenorthofforceatdaylighton9December;(b)100milesmidpointSinggora,10milesfromcoast leaving first light on the 19th; (c) fighter protection off Singgora daylight 10December.AftersailingtheCinCwasinformedthat itwashopedtoprovide(a)and(b)butnot(c).

KingGeorgeVreturnstoPortsmouthafterthewaronIMarch1946havingservedwiththePacificFleet.

2.At 1700 on 9December theweather cleared andPrince ofWales was sighted byJapaneseaircraft.PhillipsdecidedtoreturntoSingaporeatfullspeed.

3.Atmidnighton9/10Decemberhewasinformedthata landingwastakingplaceatKuantan and he decided to investigate. At about 1000 shadowing aircraft were againobservedandat1115airattacksonPrinceofWalesandRepulsebegan.

The attackdeveloped in severalwaves (seeRepulse), being carried out by high-levelbombersand torpedo-bombers.PrinceofWaleswashit by six torpedoes andonebomb(nohitinfirstattackwithbombs).Inthesecondattack(torpedo)PrinceofWaleswashitaftbytwotorpedoeswhichcrippledherrudderandbothportpropellers.⋆Oneshaftwastornoff,rippingalargeholeinthehullandcausingtheportturbinestoracetodestruction.Theshiplisted13°outofcontrolandspeedreducedtolessthan15knots.Shewasalsoincapableofmanoeuvring.

ThethirdattackwasdirectedentirelyatRepulse.

The fourth attack saw Prince of Wales being hit by four more torpedoes, forward,midships and aft on the starboard side, and in the final attackone bombpenetrated the

catapultdeckandblewoutthesideoftheship.Followingthistheshipsettledrapidlyandcapsizedtwohoursafterthefirsthit.Electra,ExpressandVampirepickedup90officersand 1,195 ratings.Twenty officers, including theAdmiral andCaptain, and 307 ratingswerelost.OnhearingofthedisasterthePresshadafieldday,levellingseverecriticismatthegovernmentandthoseresponsiblewithintheAdmiraltystaffHeadlinesweredisplayedeverywhere.

1.SundayExpresscriticizedthetraditionbywhichtheAdmiralandCaptainonboardPrinceofWaleswentdownwiththeirship.

2.DailyHerald (1)allegeddelayofCinCEasternFleet inaskingfor fightersupport;(2)allegeddelayintheirarrivalwhenaskedforand(3)askedwhywasthereachangeofcoursetothenorthwardafterbeingsightedbyJapanesereconnaissanceaircraft.

3. Evening Standard asked whether there were enough aircraft in Malaya for bothmilitaryandnavalneeds.

4.DailyExpressandNewsChronicle:Gravityofinitiallossofairfieldsnotappreciated;follyofdividedresponsibilityforairfields’defence.

KingGeorgeVindrydockunderpreparationtobemothballed,1951.

5.DailyHerald:UnpreparednessinFarEastespeciallyinmechanizedequipment.

6. Daily Mirror: The higher Command should be sacked for not appreciating theimportance of air protection for ships at sea. Also quoted a similar demand made bySydneyDailyTelegraph.

7.Daily Mail (Sydney Correspondent): Revelation in Australia by the Minister forExternalAffairsthattheAustralianGovernmenthadsuggestedanagreementwithRussiathat either nation would make war on Japan if Japan attacked the other, but that thesuggestionhadbeenturneddown.

8.NewsChronicle:Navallosseswereduetofailureofinter-serviceco-operation.Navymainlytoblame(noreasongiven,thearticlewentontoshowthatthechiefomissionwasproper defence of the aerodrome at Kota Bharu). The same was said by several otherpapers.

9.LetterfromAdmiralBacontoTheTimes:

Battleshipsshouldnotbeusedtorepelinvasion.ItismostdisquietingtofindtheFirst Lord to be still of the opinion that battleships can be used for inshoreoperations.

As can be seen the loss ofPrinceofWales andRepulse causeddismay andmisgivingsthroughout the country, coming, as it did, within a few days of the Prime Minister’sannouncementoftheopportunearrivalofthesetwofineshipsatSingapore.TothosewhowereawareofthesuperiorityandstrengthoftheJapanesefleetanditsnavalairserviceitwasobviousthatthissmallsquadronwouldnotbeabletooperatefarfromtheprotectionof Singapore and the fighter cover of the RAF. Sir Roger Keyes, writing in theNewsChronicleon18December1941,summeditup:

Until all the facts are known itwouldbe fruitless to speculate.But it is quitecertainthattheAdmiraltyutterlyunderratedthestrengthoftheJapaneseNavalAir Service and that Sir Tom Phillips, his Squadron and some hundreds ofseamenwerethevictimsofthefailureoftheAdmiraltyandtheGovernmenttoprovide thefightingNavywithanefficientNavalAirServiceunder thedirectcontroloftheAdmiral,andmustbearalltheresponsibility.

HMSPrinceofWalesCompassPlatformNarrative:

This record was taken by Paymaster-Lieutenant W. T. Blunt, RN, who had his actionrecorderwithhim,andwroteoutafaircopyassoonaspossibleafterbeingpickedupbyElectra.

1113. Opened fire on eight high-level bombers which attacked Repulse. Repulse wasstraddledbybombsandreportedsomedamageandsmallfirefromtwonearmisses.

1141½Openedfireonninetorpedo-bomberscomingintoattackfromportside.

1144.Torpedohitonportsideaftofthebridge(exactpositionnotknown).

1144½.Oneaircraftshotdown,fallinginseacloseonthestarboardside.

1145.Closemisspastthestarboardquarterbytorpedopassingfromforwardaft.

1149½.Repulseattackedbyoneaircraftwhichdroppedonetorpedo.

1150½.Reported:Oneaircraftcrashedinsea,Green140.Atthisstageaheavylisttoporthaddeveloped.

1157½.Openedfireonsixaircraftonthestarboardside,thoughttobeattackingRepulse.

1158.Ceasefire.

1159.Aircraftseentohaveturnedaway.1205.Manoverboard,portside.1206½.Vampireorderedtopickhimup.

KingGeorgeVhavingrunagroundonherwaytobelaidupintheGairloch,August1955.Theanchorsarebeingremovedtolightentheloadatthebow.

1210.Hoisted‘Notundercontrol’.

1213.outoftouchwith‘X’engineroom.(NotedthatbridgewasoutoftouchwithDamageControlHeadquarterssinceshortlyafterhit.)

1220.Sevenaircraftonstarboardbow.

1221½.Openedfire.

1223.Twohits by torpedoes on starboard side, a few seconds apart.Onevery near thestem, the other in the after part of the ship. 1224½. One hit starboard side undercompassplatform,bytorpedo.

1226½.Repulseshotdowntwoaircraft.

1227.Repulseobservedtobelistingtoport.?hitbytwotorpedoes.

1228.DestroyersorderedtocloseRepulse.

1230.Ninehigh-levelbombersonportbow.1230.‘X’engineroomonlyworking.

1232.Repulsesinking.

1233.Repulsesunk.

1241. Opened fire on eight high-level bombers on port bow. 1244. Hit by one bomb(reportedasbeingstarboardsidecatapultdeck).

1250.AskedSingaporefortugs.

1310(approx).Ordertoinflatelifebelts.

1315(approx).Listtoportbegantoincreaserapidly.

1320(approx).Shipsank,capsizingtoport

ExtractfromreportofFlight-LieutenantT.A.VigorstoC.inC.,FarEasternFleet;datedIIDecember1941,fromRAAFStation,Sembawang:

I had the privilege to be the first aircraft to reach the crews of thePrince ofWalesandtheRepulseaftertheyhadbeensunk.Isaytheprivilegefor,duringthenexthourwhileIflewlowoverthem,IwitnessedashowofthatindomitablespiritforwhichtheRoyalNavyissofamous.IhaveseenshowofspiritinthiswaroverDunkirk,duringthe‘BattleofBritain’,andintheLondonnightraids,butneverbeforehaveIseenanythingcomparablewithwhatIsawyesterday.Ipassedoverthousandswhohadbeenthroughanordealthegreatnessofwhichtheyalonecanunderstand,foritisimpossibletopassone’sfeelingsindisastertoothers.Even to an eye so inexperienced as mine, it was obvious that the three

destroyersweregoingtotakehourstopickupthosehundredsofmenclingingtobitsofwreckageandswimmingroundinthefilthyoilywater.Aboveallthisthethreatofanotherbombingandmachine-gunattackwasimminent.Everyoneofthosemenmusthaverealizedthat.Yet,asIflewround,everymanwavedandputhisthumbupasIflewoverhim.After an hour lack of petrol forcedme to leave, but during that hour I had

seen many men in dire danger waving, cheering and joking as if they wereholiday-makersatBrightonwavingatalow-flyingaircraft.Itshookme,forherewassomethingabovehumannature.Itakeoffmyhattothem,forinthemIsawthespiritwhichwinswars.Iapologisefortakingupyourvaluabletime,butIthoughtyoushouldknow

oftheincredibleconductofyourmen.

History:DukeofYork1937Programme.

LaiddownbyJ.Brown&Co.,Clydebank,5May1937asAnson.

RenamedDukeofYork12July1938inhonourofKingGeorgeVwhohadservedintheRoyalNavyasDukeofYork.

Launched26February1940.

BegantrialsJune1941

CompletionforservicedelayedbyimprovementstoprotectionfollowinglossofHood.

Completed4November1941

HoistedflagVA2ndBSand2ndflagHomeFleetatScapa6November1941,replacingPrinceofWales.

HOMEFLEETNovember1941toOctober1942(FlagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflagNovembertoDecember1941andApriltoMay1942.FleetflagMaytoJuly1942.Privateshipin2ndBSlater).

Flag transferred toRenown9December 1941 and ship left Scapa forClyde to embarkPrimeMinisterandpartyfortheUnitedStates.

LeftClydeforUSADecemberandarrivedatAnnapolisonthe22nd.

Prime Minister returned home by air andDuke of York worked-up at Bermuda 5–17January.

LeftBermudaforhomeon17JanuaryandrejoinedHomeFleetatScapaon30th.

Unitof covering force forRussiaconvoysMarch toMay1942.From6 to10March, aforcecomprisingKingGeorgeV(flag),DukeofYork,Victorious,Berwick,andtwelvedestroyersprovidedspecialcovertoanoutwardandhomewardconvoyduringsortiebyTirpitz.

ContactwithTirpitzestablishedofftheLofotenIslandsbyaircraftfromVictorious,butatorpedoattackbythesefailedandtheGermanshipwasabletoreturntobasewithoutbeingbroughttoaction.Convoysnotattacked.

FlagVA2ndBStransferredfromRenown3April1942.

TemporaryfleetflagMaytoJuly1942,replacingKingGeorgeVforrefitafterrammingPunjabion1May.

FlaghoistedatScapa6May.

On6June1942,KingGeorgeVIvisitedHomeFleetatScapaandwasaccommodatedonboard. Flag of distant covering force (Duke of York, USSWashington, Victorious,Nigeria,Cumberlandandfourteendestroyers)forRussiaconvey(PQ17)from27Juneto8July1942.

Fleet flag reverted toKingGeorgeV atScapa8 July on return from this operation andDukeofYorkbecameprivateship.

UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoySeptember1942.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)asflag(VA)October1942forNorthAfricainvasion.

HoistedflagatScapa30OctoberandleftsamedayforGibraltar.

FORCE‘H’(Gibraltar)OctobertoNovember1942(flag).

TookpartinNorthAfricalandingsNovember1942.

ForceHemployedincoveringboththeinitialBritishtaskforcesandfollow-upconvoysagainstattackbyItalianorVichyFrenchforces.

RelievedbyNelson15NovemberandleftGibraltarforhomeonthe18th.

RejoinedHomeFleetatScapaon26th.

HOMEFLEETNovember1942toSeptember1944(2ndBStoMay1943.FleetflagfromMay1943).

RefitRosythDecember1942toMarch1943.

BecameflagCinCHomeFleetMay1943ontransferofKingGeorgeVtoForceH.Flaghoisted8May.

Flag of covering force for attack on enemy shipping offNorway by aircraft fromUSSRanger4October1943.

FlagofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoyNovembertoDecember1943.

Sank Scharnhorst off North Cape 26 December during this operation, putting up aremarkableshootingperformancewiththirty-onestraddlesoutoffifty-twobroadsidesandplacingsixteenwithin200yardsofthetarget.

Sustainedminor damage to bothmasts thatwere hit by shellswhich failed to explode.This was the last occasion on which battleships were in action with one another.Proceeded right through to Kola Inlet with convoy after the action, being the firstHomeFleetcapitalshiptoenterRussianwatersduringthewar.

ReturnedtoScapa1January1944.

FlagofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoyMarch1944.

Flag of force supporting attacks on Tirpitz in Altenfiord by aircraft from Formidable,Indefatigable andFurious on17 July, 22 and24August 1944 and fromFormidableandIndefatigableon29August1944.

WithdrawnfromHomeFleetSeptember1944torefitforPacificservice.

RefittedforPacificatLiverpoolSeptember1944toMarch1945.

Worked-up at Scapa and left for Pacific Fleet base at Sydney, Australia on 25 April.Proceeded via Mediterranean with further work-up period at Malta, Suez Canal,Colombo,FremantleandAlbany.JoinedfleetatSydneyJuly1945.

PACIFICFLEETJuly1945toJuly1946(fleetflagtoJune1946).

HoistedflagAdmiralSirBruceFraser,CinCPacificFleet,atSydney31July1945.

Arrived too late to take part in offensive operations against the Japanese, which wereterminatedon15August1945,andemployedmainlyonoccupationduties.

HadbeenintendedtobeunitofsecondBritishTaskForce(TF38.5)comprisingAnson,Duke of York, Colossus, Venerable andVengeance (11th Carrier Squadron), to workwiththemainbodyoftheBritishPacificFleet(TaskForce37)intheUSThirdFleetfor the proposed invasion of Kyushu (Operation ‘Olympic’). Following end ofhostilities conveyedAdmiral Fraser to TokyoBay for signing of Japanese surrenderaboardUSSMissourion2September1945.

RelievedAnsonasbaseshipatHongKongDecember1945.

LeftHongKongforhome6June1946.

FlagCinCtransferredtoAdmiralBoydatSingapore11Juneenroute.

ArrivedDevonport11July1946andflagAdmiralFraserstruckonthe12th.

RefitDevonportJulytoNovember1946.

JoinedHomeFleetNovember1946.

HOMEFLEETNovember1946toApril1949(flagfromDecember1946).

RelievedKingGeorgeVasfleetflagDecember1946.

FlagHomeFleetforClydeReview22–23July1947.

RefitPortsmouthDecember1947toFebruary1948.

FlagofdivisionofHomeFleetcomprisingDukeofYork,Cleopatra,Diadem,Siriusandsixdestroyers,visitingWestIndiesandBermudaduringautumncruise,September toNovember1948.

RelievedasflagbyImplacableandreducedtoreserveatPortsmouthApril1949.

RESERVEApril1949toApril1957(PortsmouthtoSeptember1951.FlagReserveFleetfromJuly1949.ClydeCCategoryfromNovember1951).

RefitPortsmouthApriltoJuly1949.

BecameflagReserveFleet,PortsmouthJuly1949.

RelievedbyDido2September1951.

RefitCammellLaird,Birkenhead,SeptembertoNovember1951.

ReducedtoCCategoryReserveandlaidupinClydeoncompletionofthis.

LeftBirkenheadintowforGareloch6November1951.

DukeofYorknearGuaminAugust1945whilstservingwiththePacificFleet.

DukeofYorkafterthewaratPortsmouthin1947.

DukeofYorkinPortsmouthDockyard,1949–HMSVictoryinthebackground.

LookingovertotheDukeofYorkfromunderneaththelong,silentgunsofKingGeorgeVanchoredinGairlochshortlybeforescrappingcommenced,27September1957.

PlacedonDisposalList30April1957.

SoldtoShipbreakingIndustriesLtd.,Faslane,18February1958.

ArrivedFaslaneforscrapping.

History:Howe1937Programme.

LaiddownbyFairfield,Govan,1June1937asBeatty.

RenamedHowe February 1940 on grounds that the nameBeatty commemorated a toorecentAdmiral.

Launched9April1940.

CommissionedatGovan1June1942for2ndBattleSquadron,HomeFleet.

JoinedFleetatScapa29August1942.

HOMEFLEET(2ndBS)August1942toMay1943.

UnitofcoveringforceforRussiaconvoysDecember1942andFebruary1943.

BasedonHvalfiord,Iceland,MarchtoApril1943tocoverNorthAtlanticconvoysagainstpossibleattackbyenemyheavyships.

TransferredtoForceH(Gibraltar)withKingGeorgeV,May1943,Sicily invasion.LeftScapaforGibraltar21May.

FORCEHGibraltarMaytoOctober1943(2ndflagfromSeptember).

TookpartininvasionofSicilyinJuneandItalyinSeptember1943.

WithKingGeorgeV, intended to serve as a reserve forForceH in theseoperations, tocarry out diversionary bombardments, cover assault convoys and replace any otherForceHbattleshipsthatmightbedisabled.

Onnightof10/11 July,both shipscarriedoutbombardmentofMarsala andTrapanionwestcoastofSicilytosimulateanotherintendedlandingandpindownenemytroops.

Stationed at Augusta 7 September, with King George V, as reserve force for Salernolandingsbutdetachedonthe8thfollowingthesigningoftheItalianarmisticeasflagspecial squadron (under command Vice-Admiral Malta), comprising Howe, KingGeorgeFandfourcruisersofthe12thCSandtheminelayerAbdiel,senttoTarantotooccupyandholdtheport.ForceenteredTaranto10September.

Flag RA 2nd in command Force H transferred to Anson from Warspite at Malta 12September.

WithKingGeorgeVescortedthelargerofthesurrenderedItalianwarshipsfromMaltatoAlexandria14–16September.

LeftAlexandria1OctoberforhometorejoinHomeFleet.

HOMEFLEET2ndBSOctober1943toJanuary1944.

WithdrawnfromHomeFleetJanuary1944forrefitpriortotransfertoEasternFleet.RefitDevonportJanuarytoApril1944.

Worked-upatScapaandleftforCeylon1July1944viaMediterraneanandSuezCanal.

JoinedEasternFleetatTrincomalee3August1944.

EASTERNFLEET1stBSAugusttoDecember1944.

On 22 November 1944, formation of a Pacific Fleet to be based on Sydney, AustraliacommencedwiththeappointmentofAdmiralSirBruceFraserasCinCandtheEasternFleetredesignatedEastIndiesFleet.

HowetransferredtoPacificFleetasflag2December,AdmiralFraser’sflagbeinghoistedatTrincomaleeonthatdate.

ByendofDecember1944 following ships allocated to thePacificFleet although somehad not actually joined: Howe (flag), King George V, Formidable, IllustriousIndefatigable, Indomitable, Victorious, Swiftsure, Ceylon, Gambia (NZ),Newfoundland,Achilles(NZ),Argonaut,BlackPrinceand22destroyers.

PacificFleetBattleSquadronbecamethe1stBSandtheEastIndiesFleetSquadronthe3rdBS.

PACIFICFLEETDecember1944toSeptember1945(fleetflagtoFebruary1945.IBSlater).

Arrived Sydney late December 1944 being the first of the Pacific Fleet ships to reachthere.

Conveyed Admiral Fraser to New Zealand January 1945 for conference with the NewZealandgovernment.

Fleet finally assembled at Sydney 10–11 February 1945 at which time Admiral Frasertransferredhisflagashore,Vice-AdmiralRawlingsassumingseagoingcommandwithhisflaginKingGeorgeVwhileHowebecameprivateshipin1stBS.

FleetleftSydneyforoperationalarea28February1945.

Joined United States 5th Fleet and commenced operations 26 March 1945, beingdesignatedTaskForce57.

CarriedoutbombardmentsofJapaneseairfieldsonFormosaandSakashimaGuntoIslandsMarchtoMay1945insupportoftheAmericanoperationsagainstOkinawa.

On4MayHowe,KingGeorgeVandcruisersbombardedairfieldsonMiyakoShima inthe Sakashima Gunto group. Howe narrowly missed by Kamikaze aircraft offSakashima Gunto Islands 9 May. Aircraft heavily hit by AA fire and deflected incourse,passingcloseoverquarterdeckandcrashingintothesea.

On27May1945 theUS5thFleetbecame the3rdFleetaftercommandchangeand theBritishPacificFleetwasrenumberedTaskForce37.

HowewithdrawninJuneforrefit.

RefitDurbanJunetoSeptember1945.

TransferredtoEastIndiesFleetoncompletionandrelievedNelsonasflaglateSeptember.

EASTINDIESFLEETTrincomaleeSeptember1945toJanuary1946(flag).

ReturnedhomeJanuary1946arrivingatPortsmouthonthe9th.

TransferredtoHomeFleetFebruary1946relievingQueenElizabeth.

HOMEFLEET2ndBSFebruary1946toApril1949(Flag2ndBStoAugust1946.TrainingSquadronlater).

AttachedtonewHomeFleetTrainingSquadron,Portland,August1946(seeAnson).

ClydeReviewofHomeFleet22–23July1947.

RefitDevonportMay1948toApril1949.

Transferred toReserve,Devonport (as SeniorOfficer) 21April 1949 on completion ofrefit.

Howe‘makingashow’assheleavesFairfieldsconstructionyardoncompletion,November1942.

RESERVEDevonportApril1949toMay1957(50toJuly1950.CCategoryfromFebruary1950).

ReducedtoCCategoryReserveFebruary1950.

PlacedonDisposalListDevonportApril1957.

SoldtoT.W.Ward&Co.,Inverkeithing2June1958.

ArrivedInverkeithingforscrapping4June1958.

History:Anson1937Programme.

Laid down by Swan HunterWigham Richardson, Newcastle-on-Tyne 20 July 1937 asJellicoe.

Renamed Anson February 1940, prior to launch, on grounds that name JellicoecommemoratedatoorecentAdmiral.

Launched24February1940.

CommissionedatNewcastle22June1942asflagVA2ndBattleSquadronand2ndfleetflag,HomeFleet.

HOMEFLEET(flagVA2ndBSand2ndfleetflagJune1942toJune1944).

UnitofcoveringforceforfollowingoperationsSeptember1942toApril1944:

RussiaconvoysSeptember1942andJanuary1943.

AttackonenemyshippingatBodø,NorwaybyaircraftfromUSSRanger4October1943.

RussiaconvoyNovember1943andMarch1944.

AttackonTirpitzinAltenfiordbyaircraftfromFuriousandVictorious3April1944.

AttackonenemyshippingatBodøandintheleadstothesouthofBodøbyaircraftfromFuriousandVictorious26April1944.

WithdrawnJune1944torefitforPacificservice.

RefitDevonportJune1944toMarch1945.

CommissionedatDevonport7March1945forPacificFleet.

Worked-upatScapaMarchtoAprilandleftforfleetbaseatSydney,Australia,withDukeofYork,25April.

Proceeded via Mediterranean, with further work-up periods at Malta, Suez Canal,Colombo,FremantleandAlbany.

JoinedfleetatSydneyJuly1945.

PACIFICFLEETJuly1945toJuly1946(2ndflagRA1stBSAugusttoOctober1945.FlagRAlaterVAOctober1945toJanuary1946).

Joined too late to take part in offensive operations against the Japanese, which wereterminatedon15August,andemployedmainlyonoccupationduties.

WithDukeofYork,Colossus,VenerableandVengeance(11thCarrierSquadron)intendedtoformasecondBritishTaskForce(TF38.5)toworkwiththemainbodyofBritishPacific Fleet (Task Force 37) in the US Third Fleet for the proposed invasion ofKyushu(Operation‘Olympic’).

Followingtheendofhostilitieson15Augustselectedasflag(RA)SingaporeOccupationForce,comprisingAnson(flag),Vengeanceandfourdestroyers.

Singapore Force later cancelled because of logistic problems and this group added toHongKongForce, comprising Indomitable (flagRAHarcourt),Venerable, Swiftsure,Euryalus,RCNPrinceRobertandtendestroyers.

Entireforce(lessVengeance,detachedtoRabaulenroute)arrivedoffHongKongon29August and on the 30thRear-AdmiralHarcourt transferred his flag toSwiftsure andenteredtheportaccompaniedbyEuryalus,PrinceRobertandthedestroyers,theheavyshipsremainingoutsidebecauseofriskofmines.

Rear-Admiral Harcourt appointed Governor-General immediately afterwards and Rear-AdmiralDanielinAnsonassumedcommandoftheforce.

AnsonsubsequentlyservedasbaseshipatHongKonguntilDecember1945,landing400ratingsand230marinesforgarrisonandpoliceduties,etc.

JapanesesurrenderofHongKongsignedonboard,16September1945.

RelievedKingGeorgeV as flag 1stBS inOctober 1945 and also becameFlagOfficerWesternPacificArea.At thesametime,2ndfleet flag transferredfrom1stBSto1stCarrierSquadron.

Detached to Tokyo as guardship in November and returned to Hong Kong earlyDecember.

RelievedasbaseshipbyDukeofYork inDecemberand leftHongKongforSydneyon26th.

FlagVAtransferredtoBelfast(2ndCS)January1946.

RefitSydneyJanuarytoFebruary1946.

ConveyedDukeandDuchessofGloucester fromHobart,Tasmania toSydneyFebruary1946.

Returned to forward area in March, visiting Yokohama, Kobe and Kure. Later againstationedatHongKong.

FlagRA5thCStemporarilyflownfromMaytoJune1946whileBermudarefitting.

LeftHongKongforhome21June1946fortransfertoHomeFleet.

FlagVAshiftedtoBelfastinJanuary1946,rehoistedatSingaporeforpassagehome.

ArrivedPortsmouth29July1946.

RefitPortsmouthJulytoOctober1946.

SelectedinAugustforHomeFleetTrainingSquadron,formedinthatmonth,comprisingNelson(flag),AnsonandHoweandbasedonPortland.

Joinedsquadron19October1946,relievingNelsonasflag.

HOMEFLEET(FlagRATrainingSquadron,Portland)October1946toNovember1949.

PresentatClydeReviewofHomeFleet22–23July1947.

RefitDevonport1947.

TookpartinNATOnavalexercisesummer1949.

Withdrawn from Training Squadron November 1949 for refit prior to being placed inreserve.

RefitDevonportNovember1949toAugust1950.

Reducedtoextendedreserve(CCategory)August1950andlaidupinClydeAugust1950toApril1957.

PlacedonDisposalList30April1957.

SoldtoShipbreakingIndustriesLtd.,Faslane,17December1957.

ArrivedFaslaneforscrapping.

Ansonshortlyaftercompletionin1942.From1942to1944shewastheflagshipofViceAdmiralSirBruceRFrasenandduringthistimeshewasmainlyoccupiedinshadowingforcesinsupportofRussianconvoys.AsthiswasapressphotographsomeoftheRDFaerialsandcamouflageshapeswereremovedpriortopublication.

⋆Following freshevidence fromacompleteunderwater surveyof thewrecksofPrinceofWalesandRepulse duringMay2007itshowsthatthefirsttorpedohitonPrinceofWalesintheareaoftheportpropellershaftcausedcatastrophicdamagetotheship’swatertightintegrity(tearingthehullopenaroundtheshaft).Inthefinalattackshewashitbythreetorpedoesonthestarboardside(actualholesinthehull)whichsealedherfate.Itseemsthatotherclaimedhitsarenotshowing…

ThehulloftheRepulse(some9milesaway)showsonlytwotorpedoholes(onetoportandonetostarboard)buttheothertwohitstoportasclaimedwerenotfound.However,theareaofhullontheportsidehassunkdeepintotheseabedandcannotbeseen.Somedistortionofthehullisevidentamidshipswheretheclaimedtorpedohitsweresupposedtobe.CaptainTennantclaimedthreehitsontheportside(seehisreport)afterwhichhestartedhis abandon ship procedure andgiven the rapidityofRepulse sinking it ismorethanprobablethatthesetorpedohitsarethereburiedinthesilt.

ForafullreportonthissurveyseePacificwrecks.comExpeditionJob74

Conclusion

Whenhostilitiesbeganin1939noonecouldhaveforeseenthemanychangesthat theRoyalNavywouldbe forced tomakeas thewarprogressed.Thepanic-stricken rush tobuildbig-gunnedshipsduringthe1930s,althoughnotexactlyinvain,hadinallessentialsbeenamistake.EventhoughtheAdmiraltyknewthattheGermanNavyhadonlysevenlargesurfaceships thatconstituteda threat, itwasnotobvious to them that the fightingwas going to be very different from that of the Great War. In fact the Germansconcentrated their efforts on commerce raiding by surface and underwater craft.Nevertheless, at thebeginningbattleshipswere still considered tobeprime factors, andevenmoresoby1941whenJapanenteredthewar.

It would not be fair to say that money spent on battleships would have been betterdirectedtowardsothertypesofvesselsbecausenearlyalltheleadingmaritimepowersstillbelievedthattherewouldstillbetheclassicsurfaceactionduringanyhostilities.Solongasanynationhadthetypewithintheirfleet,theotherswereobligedtoconform.

DuringtheearlyyearsoftheSecondWorldWar,exceptatTaranto,theaircraftcarrierdidnotfulfilitspromiseastheweaponoftomorrow,assooftenforecastduringthe1930s.Most of the existing carriers had no experience of conducting successful airborne tosurfaceattacks–especiallyatsea.WhenPrinceofWalesandRepulseweresunkin1941itwasland-basedaircraftthatdidthejob;theaircraftprovedtheirworth,notthecarrier.

It is truethat theattackonPearlHarborshowedthevalueof thecarrier inconveyingaircraftforanattackonafleetinharbour–anemulationofTarantoin1940,anditwasthen that all the powers became really aware of the carrier’s potential.But this did notmakethebattleshipobsolete;itstillhadanimportantroletoplaywithintheinfrastructureofanysurfaceaction.Itwasstillaverycapableweaponofwar,butitwasclearthatitwasvulnerabletoairattackandneededsupportfromAAshipsanditsownprotectivecarriers,inthesamewayasthoseshipsneededbiggunprotection.

Theroleofthebattleshipfrom1942turnedtowardsprotectionforothershipsandtheirbiggunsalsoplayeda superbpart inbombardingbeaches in supportof landing troops.Therewerelimitationsofcourse,ascanbeseeninthispassageofareportmadebytheCommanding Officer aboard Warspite in November 1944 while bombarding landpositions:

BackfromRussiaatlastasRoyalSovereign(Archangelsk)passesundertheForthBridgeonherwaytoRosythfortheofficialhandovertotheRoyalNavyon4February1949.StillingoodfightingorderatthisdatewhilsthersistershipsRomillies,RevengeandResolutionhadlongbeenunderthecutter’storch,shewouldhavebeenidealshipforpreservationasanhistoricBritishbattleship.

AuniqueviewofRodneyassheentersherfinalberthwhereshewouldfacethescrapper’scuttingtorch,26March1948.

ThelastappearanceofQueenElizabeth,offtheIsleofWight(Motherbank)–‘notwantedanymore’–autumn1946.

ThemajesticNelsonsitsbehindRevengenowinasorrystate.Note‘B’turret’s16ingunshavebeencutoff.Inverkeithing,15March1948.

Thereareboundtobelimitationsas towhat thebombardmentcanandcannoteffectanditisthoughtproperthattheseshouldbesetoutbytheCommandingOfficerverballytotheOfficerplanningand/orconductingtheoperation,orthatparticularpartofit.TheCaptainofaheavydraftbombardingshiphashishandsveryfullwhenhemustmaintainhisshipinastrongtideway,withinaspaceof,perhaps,nomorethantwicethelengthofhisship.Ifheiscontinuouslyassailedbydoubtsastodetailsoftheundertaking,itcanbutreducetheefficiencyofthehammering,whichtheenormoushittingpowerofa15inbattleshipshouldmakepossible AND IS KNOWN TO BE PARTICULARLY DISLIKED BY THEGERMANS.

InmanypreviouspublicationsthecomparativeworthofBritishbattleshipshasbeenmuchdebated.Theanswerisverysimple; theywereasgoodasanybuilt foranyothernationwithin the limitations of displacement and size, and any statements from 1919 to thepresentsuggestingthatBritishbattleshipswerenotonaparwiththoseofforeignpowersarenonsense.

Letuslookatsomeoftheargumentsthathavebeenrepeatedforsolong:

1. TheRoyal Sovereign class were too slow and were weakly protected over thedecks.2.KingGeorgeVclass(1936)wereundergunnedandhadpoorradiusofaction.3.Britishbattlecruiserswerepoorlyprotected.4.Britishunderwaterdefencewaspoor.

In answer itwouldhave tobe said that, yes, of course, theRoyalSovereign classwereslowby1939standards,andshortofbeinggivennewenginesandboilerequipmenthowcould they fail to be anything else – after all theywere nearly 25 years old. The deckarmour,althoughpoorby1939standards,wasall thatcouldbeapplied(seeclassnotes)because of stability problems within their design, but they were still a match for anycontemporaryforeignbattleship,survivingastheydiduntiltheSecondWorldWar.WhentheRswere sent to the IndianOcean in1942,with the likelihoodofhaving to face theJapaneseKongo-classbattlecruisers,itwasseenasadisastrousmove,buttheBritishshipswould in facthavegivena remarkablygoodaccountof themselvesagainst shipsarmedwith14ingunsandprotectedbya relatively thin9inbelt.Had theybeencaughtby theJapaneseaircraftcarriersitwouldhavebeenadifferentstory,butthenitwouldhavebeenthesameforanymodernbattleship.

Aclose-upofRevengeon4September1948,nowaworn-outrelicofthepast.Notetheadditionstothebridgeworkandtheextradecklevelattherearofthefunnel.

The second generation of British battleships, theKing George V class, were under-gunned, etc! Maybe, but the Admiralty knew that before continuing construction. Butunder-gunnedagainstwhat?Theywouldnothave to faceUS16in-gunned ships, and itwashighlyunlikelythattheywouldeverfacetheJapaneseNagatoandMutsu(16in).Thatleft theGermanandItalianshipswiththeir15inguns.Against thesethe14ingunhadalowerratingonpaper,butinpracticeatseathe14ingunproveditselfanexcellentweaponalthoughlackingtheextrapunchoftheheavier15in.

The14ingunmadebigholesintheGermanbattlecruiserScharnhorston26December1943, and she had 14in KC belts. The gun wrecked the so-called superior battleshipBismarckin1941,against12inKCarmouredstrakes.Itseemsthatthe14ingunacquiredits poor reputation early in its life before the minor faults in its mounting had beenrectified, and the troublesome quadruple turret inPrince of Wales andKing George Vduring theBismarck episode lent strength to its critics. But apart from that, when andwheredidthegunandturreteverfailtoperformadmirably?

Poorradius.Well,thiswastrue,butbecauseoftherestrictiontoabout35,000tons,theweightwasdirectedelsewhereinsteadofbeingusedforlargetanksformuch-neededfuelsupplies.ManyBritishbattleshipsfaredbadlyinthisregardwhenservinginthePacific,whereasinhomewatersreplenishmentwasclosetohand.

Britishbattlecruiserswerepoorlyprotected.Again,onemustagree,buttheywerebuiltforspeed.AllthebattlecruisersthatsurvivedtoserveintheSecondWorldWarwereoldshipsby1939.

Theyhadbeendesignedtooutrunratherthanoutfighttheenemy.Eveninmodernizedships thispoorprotectionwasnever rectified.Hood’s armoureddeckwasweakand the

Admiraltyknewitbeforeshewascompletedin1920.Renownremainedtheweakestunitin thebattle fleet,but shewascertainlynoweaker than theJapaneseKongo-class shipsandthereneverseemtobeanyderogatorycommentsmadeaboutthem.

PoorunderwaterprotectioninBritishships?Notexcessively,whencomparedtoshipsof the same age.TheRoyalSovereign andQueen Elizabeth classes had old systems ofunderwaterprotectionwhichcouldnot inallcasescopewithseveredamage.RoyalOakand Barham were most effectively sunk by submarine attack; hit by at least threetorpedoesinquicksuccession, theycouldnotfail tosink.Butwouldnotsimilarforeignbattleshipshavesunkinthesamecircumstances?Ofcoursetheywould,anditwouldbefoolishtodenyit.

Prince of Wales was effectively sunk by torpedoes and bombs, but in view of thedamageshereceiveditisnotsurprising.Herownturbinesopenedupherbottomaftwhenshewashitinthatarea.Noothership,neworold,couldhavesustainedthatpunishmentandlivedtotellthetale(withtheexceptionsperhapsofthegiantYamatoandMusashi).TheunderwatersystemoftheKingGeorgeVclasswasasgoodasanythingfittedtoanyforeign battleship of the 1930s, in fact it outclassed some rivals in that it was amorecompletesystem.

ThesereflectionsonBritishdesignsmayseemverychauvinistic,ofcourse,butthatisexactlywhattheyare.Theydonotseektodenigratetheforeignopposition,norskateoverthefactthatthereweremanyfaults,butwhenalltherelativefactorshavebeencarefullyconsidered,theconclusionisthatBritishbattleshipsstoodwellthetestoftimeanddonotdeservetheadversecriticismthathasbeenlevelledatthem.

‘Let’sgodownandseethe“oldlady”!’wasthecrywhenWarspiteranagroundin1947.Shecheatedthescrapyardbutsadlydidnotescapethescrapper’storchandwascutupwhereshelay.

BibliographyThehundredsofdocumentsconsultedduringthewritingofthisbookaretoonumeroustolistbutbelowaresomeofthemoreimportantones.

NationalMaritimeMuseum:

ShipsCovers:

KingGeorgeV1911

IronDukeClass1912

QueenElizabethClass

RoyalSovereignClass1913

RenownClass1915

GloriousandCourageous1916

Furious1916

Hood1916

NelsonClass1925

KingGeorgeVClass1936

ForeignBattleships(general)

Manuscripts:

SirTennysond’Eyncourt.DNC.

SirWilliamMay.

AdmiralR.E.E.Drax.

AdmiralWilliamTennant.

AdmiralAlfredChatfield.

AdmiralSirCyprianBridge.

AdmiralSirB.E.Domville.

PublicRecordsOffice:

ADMpapers.

NavalPolicy.1936.

Aircraftversusbattleships.1937.

Firingtests.(Job74etc)

Usesforcapitalships.1943.

Bombardmentetc.1943.

De-gaussingexperiments.

Shellandbombdamage.1939/45.

WashingtonNavalTreaty.1921.

LondonNavalTreaty.1930.

Capitalshippolicy.1921.

Bridgeconstructionincapitalships.

Battleshipsdesign.1919,1921,1928,1934.

Battlecruiserdesign.1921.

Aircraftinbattleships.1937.

Armourincapitalships.

Enduranceincapitalships.

Replacement.1933/4.

DesignKingGeorgeV.1936.

ReconstructionofRenown.1923.

ReconstructionofRoyalOak.1924.

ReconstructionofGloriousandCourageous.1923.

Camouflageinwarships.

Radarinstallations.

LossofPrinceofWales.

LossofRoyalOak.

LossofBarham.

LossofHood.

LossofGlorious.

LossofCourageous.

Proceedings:Ramillies,Furious,Revenge,Renown,QueenElizabethandWarspite.

ShipsBooks:KingGeorgeV;Hood;AnsonandHowe.

Ships Logs: Queen Elizabeth; Warspite; Barham; Valiant; Royal Sovereign, Revenge,Royal Oak; Resolution; Repulse; Renown; Glorious; Nelson; Rodney, Hood; KingGeorgeV.

Vulnerabilityofbattleships.1933.

Modelsofcapitalships.1940.

Paintingofships.1939.

Usesforoldbattleships1944.

Gasandchemicalattacks.1923.

Publishedbooksconsulted:

Raven,AlanandJohnRoberts.BritishBattleshipsofWorldWarTwo.ArmsandArmourPressandNavalInstitutePress,1976

Parkes,DrOscar.BritishBattleships.SeeleyService,London,1957.

Roberts,John.Hood.AnatomyoftheShipSeries.ConwayMaritimePress,London1982.

TransactionsoftheInstituteofNavalArchitects.Allvolumesfrom1911to1948

Brassey’sNavalAnnual.1916throughto1950.

Jane’sFightingShipsforrecognitionandphotographidentification(notfordatahowever).1919to1945.

PeriodicalsandNewspapers:

TheSphere.

TheIllustratedLondonNews.

NavyLeague.

Mariner’sMirror.

TheTimes.

TheDailyMail.

TheEveningStandard.

TheDailyGraphic.

TheDailyTelegraph.

Large drawings are based on Admiralty ‘As Fitted’ plans now held in the NationalMaritime Museum; small drawings on official drawings and photographic evidence;isometricdrawingsonphotographicevidence.

Photographsarefromauthor’scollection.

IndexA

Aircraft31–4,250,252,270–4,284

Aircraftcarriers,developmentof250–62

Ajax43,44,69

Anson

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402datatablesandparticulars389,402,405design386–9history423machinery402–3

Argus252–4

aircraftequipment252

ArkRoyal(1914)250,254

aircraftequipment252

ArkRoyal(1937)258–62

Arkangelsk,seeRoyalSovereign

B

Barham

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage108–12datatablesandparticulars75,76,89design71–3history134–5lossof117–20machinery74reconstruction85

Ben-My-Chree251

aircraftequipment252

Benbow20,44,48,61–2,68,69

Bridgework

inHood310–12inKingGeorgeVclass403inNelsonandRodney357inQueenElizabethclass78–80inRepulseandRenown211–14inRoyalSovereignclass151–4

Bulging

inRoyalSovereignclass148–51,173–80

C

Camouflage34–40

Campania251

aircraftequipment252

Centurion30,43,44,48–55

Chemicalwarfare27–9

Courageous

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits284–6,287armament279–82armour282datatablesandparticulars282,283,285,286designandconversion278–82flightscarried284history289–90lossof297–8machinery282

D

Dreadnought,evolutionofthe10–17

DukeofYork

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402battledamage408–9datatablesandparticulars388,389,402,405design386–9history418–21machinery402–3

E

Eagle252,257,278,280,285

EmperorofIndia20,22,30,44,48,58,61

Empress251

Engadine251,254

aircraftequipment252

F

Furious

aircraftcarried273–4appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits274–6armament267–9armour267datatablesandparticulars265,266,270,273designandconversion263–7flying-offtrialsin266,270–3history276–7machinery269–70

G

Glorious

aircraftstowagein283–4appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits284–7armour282datatablesandparticulars282,283,285,286designandconversion278–82flightscarried282history287–9lossof298–9machinery282

H

HandlingandmanoeuvrabilityinRoyalSovereignclass154–6

Hermes(1924)257–8

Hood

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits313–18armament302–4armour304–7datatablesandparticulars300,301,313,318,319design300–2history318–25lossof325–32machinery307rig313

Howe

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402datatablesandparticulars389,402,405design386–9history421–3machinery402–3

I

Illustriousclass262

IronDuke

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits61–9battledamage70datatablesandparticulars57,61,68design57history69–70rig58–61

K

KingGeorgeV(1912)16

KingGeorgeV(1940)

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402datatablesandparticulars388,389,402,405design386–9history409–12machinery402–3

L

Losses

Barham117–20Courageous297–8Glorious298–9Hood325–32PrinceofWales413–18Repulse238–40RoyalOak180–3

M

Malaya

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4

armour74battledamage112–13datatablesandparticulars75,76,89,96,104design71–3history138–42machinery74reconstruction85–8,89–96

Manxman251

aircraftequipment252

Marlborough20,30,44,48,61–8

N

Nairana251

Nelson

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits358–66armament342–5armour345–8battledamage366–74,374–7bombingtrialsin377–81datatablesandparticulars339,348,349,357,366,377design335–9history381–2machinery348–9rig339

P

Pegasus,seeArkRoyal(1914)

PrinceofWales

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits403–6armament389–95armour395–402battledamage406datatablesandparticulars389,402design386–9history412–18inBismarckaction325–30lossof413–18machinery402–3

Q

QueenElizabeth

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107

armament73–4armour74battledamage120–2datatablesandparticulars75,76,85,89,104design71–3history127–32machinery74reconstruction85–8,107

R

Radar40–3

Ramillies

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour147–51battledamage188–91datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history200–6machinery151

Reconstructions

Barham85QueenElizabeth85–8,107Renown228–33Valiant85–8,100–7Warspite85–8,96–100

Renown

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits214–34armament208–9armour209–10datatablesandparticulars207,210,212,214,233,234design207–8history240–8machinery210–11

Repulse

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits214–34armament208–9armour209–10datatablesandparticulars207,210,212,214,228design207–8history234–8

lossof238–40machinery210–11

Resolution

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51battledamage183–8datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history196–200machinery151

Revenge

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history194–6machinery151

Riveria251

aircraftequipment252

Rodney

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits358–66armament342–5armour345–8battledamage374datatablesandparticulars339,348,350,366design335–9history382–3machinery348–9rig339

RoyalOak

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170design143–7history200lossof180–3machinery151

RoyalSovereign

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits156–73armament147armour148–51asArkangelsk193–4datatablesandparticulars156,157,164,170,180design143–7history191–3machinery151

T

Thunderer44,55

Tiger20,44,47,55

V

Valiant

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage113–17,121–2datatablesandparticulars75,76,89,104design71–3history135–8machinery74reconstruction85–8,100–7

Vindictive252,257

W

Warspite

appearancechanges,modificationsandrefits84–107armament73–4armour74battledamage113–17datatablesandparticulars75,76,85,89,97,104design71–3history132–4machinery74reconstruction85–8,96–100