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British army logistics and contractors on thebattlefieldDavid M Moore a b & Peter D Antill ca Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University,b Academic Leader for the MSc in Defence Logistics Management,c Research Assistant in the Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis,Cranfield University,

Available online: 20 Mar 2008

To cite this article: David M Moore & Peter D Antill (2000): British army logistics and contractors on the battlefield, TheRUSI Journal, 145:5, 46-52

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DEFENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

BRITISH ARMY LOGISTICS AND

CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

BY DAVID M MOORE AND PETER D ANTILL

The threat that was presented to the WesternAlliance by the Soviet Union and the War-saw Pact during the Cold War forced the

UK to concentrate scarce resources on providingcombat systems that delivered the maximum deter-rent value. Unfortunately this tended to be at theexpense of combat service support (CSS), forcingthe British Army to rely on the secure lines ofcommunication through the Low Countries and theprepositioning of stocks both forward and in therear areas. CSS was characterised by a cumber-some acquisition process and the lack of awarenessof the total cost of acquisition, storage, distributionand ultimately, disposal. Even so, such reliance onthe 'shop-window' of combat capability was inmany ways a false economy, particularly when itcame to actually using those forces in the GulfWar:

'At the outset of Granby, what had long beenknown within the confines of the Army becamemore general public knowledge: that many of theChallenger I tanks were not battle-worthy. Chal-lenger I availability in 1990 in BAOR was just23 per cent - at any one time over three quartersof the tanks were under repair or otherwise out ofservice.'1

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and SovietUnion has forced the West to focus on force pro-jection, expeditionary operations and manoeuvrewarfare, given that there is no longer a direct threatto Western Europe. This move from a just-in-caseapproach to nearer a just-in-time one with a greateremphasis on the ability of commanders to moreaccurately predict their requirements will bedependant on total asset visibility and guaranteedlines of communication. It has proven difficult forthe Armed Forces, particularly the Army, to adjustto the new situation:

'The British Army is primarily trained and

equipped to fight in continental Europe . . . . Thearmy's logistic system is also, quite properly,optimised to fight on the North German Plain - abattle in which the opposition has been assumedto be coming at us; a battle in which we would

•fight in prepared positions over well-knownground, using supply routes which have beenreconnoitred and rehearsed hundreds of times.'2

In working to reduce the risks still inherent intrying to provide such operational logistic support,the military should remain aware of the potentialcontribution that industry can provide. Traditional-ly, the military has had a less than enthusiastic atti-tude about the potential benefits to be gained fromindustry. Contracts were often characterised by aconfrontational attitude but are now moving to afar more positive stance and a cooperative relation-ship where both risks and benefits can be shared.There is a continued importance in gaining valuefor money but contracts should be of a longer-termnature with an in-built flexibility to allow the con-tract between the military and service provider tomature and evolve. The best contracts are built ontrust and cooperation and an understanding of thedifficulties faced by both parties.

Adapting to the international post-Cold War situation is still ongoing inthe British Army. In this articleDavid Moore and Peter Antill,analyse British military procurementat the beginning of the newmillennium.

David Moore (above) is a SeniorLecturer in the Department of DefenceManagement and Security Analysis atCran field University and AcademicLeader for the MSc in DefenceLogistics Management. Peter Antill(left) is a Research Assistant in theDepartment of Defence Managementand Security Analysis at CranfieldUniversity.

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The Strategic Defence Review (SDR), pub-lished in July 1998, aimed to 'remodel Britain'sdefence policy and Armed Forces to meet the chal-lenges of the next century. The government's aim[was to create] strong, modern and cost-effectivedefence, now and for the longer term.'3 It is verylikely that there will be a continuing, if notincreased contribution to international peacekeep-ing and humanitarian intervention operations (asBosnia and Kosovo have shown), some of whichmay be of considerable duration and logisticallyvery challenging. The size and scope may alsovary from a battalion-sized battlegroup to a fulldivision (as per the Gulf War), although the reviewoutlined the requirement that the Armed Forcesshould be able to carry out two medium-sized con-tingency operations at the

same time. It also highlightedthat the Armed Forces willneed to go to the operationrather than have the operationcome to them, that would havebeen in the case of a WarsawPact invasion of Germany. Theareas that they, may have todeploy to are unlikely to havethe same level of infrastructureas those of Western Europeand the deploying forces may'have to sustain non-warfight-ing operations for indefiniteperiods whilst retaining theability to respond to other con- . .tingencies. This calls for rather p a c t HlVaSlOIl 0 1different force projectioncapabilities than we haveneeded in the past.'4

Joint Rapid ReactionForces have now been set up,5 building on the JointRapid Deployment Force created in 1996. This hasbeen organised as a pool, from which a task-organ-ised joint force can mount'short notice mediumsize operations. As such, sustainability, which canbe defined as 'the ability of a force to maintain thenecessary level of combat power for the durationrequired to achieve its objectives,'6 has grown inimportance and necessity now that the Cold War isover. The difficulties involved in achieving theright level of sustainability should not be underes-timated as 'setting appropriate levels of logisticsustainability is a difficult task in an environmentwhere there is no apparent adversary, and wherethe new risks are less clearly defined than before.'7

With the 'peace dividend' bringing a reduc-tion of the defence budget by some 23 per cent inreal terms and the British Armed Forces being cutback by a third, new operational imperatives haveplaced increasing strain on the Armed Forces, par-ticularly in their ability to sustain overseas opera-tions.8 This is particularly so with the creation ofthe Defence Diplomacy mission. A strong elementof this would include the traditional 'showing theflag' visits by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines.9

This article will examine British Army logistics,the nature of future conflict and whether theincreased use of contractors will be of benefit tothe British Army, how they could help with theproblems of a shrinking budget and overstretch,and what issues still need to be addressed.

...the Armed Forceswill [now] need togo on operationrather than have theoperation come tothem, that wouldhave been in thecase of a Warsaw

Germany.

BRITISH ARMY LOGISTICS

Throughout the history of war-fare, it has always been themore competent commanders.that have recognised the impor-tance of logistics to an opera-tion. For logistics is not merelythe amassing and storage ofmaterials and equipment, butalso the timely and balancedarrival of those resources to thevery forces that require them.An army's logistic system is itslink with the home industrialbase and has been described as'the bridge connecting anation's economy to itswarfighting forces.'10 Howev-er, it has been the grand

armoured thrust, the daring commando raid and themassed strategic air offensive that has always cap-tured the public's imagination. The harrowing trekof a convoy of supply trucks, the desperate strate-gic airlift of food and medical supplies or the longawaited arrival of the roll-on/roll-off cargo shipwith ammunition and fuel rarely do. 'Finally, Ihave no reason to believe that logistics will everhave much military sex-appeal, except to serioussoldiers, but this book is written in the hope that Iam wrong.'11

During the Cold War the main threat toNATO and the UK was from the Soviet Union andthe Warsaw Pact. NATO adopted the strategy of apositional defence in Germany combined with

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'flexible response'12 and the forces in the CentralRegion were configured what has been called a'layer cake'.13 As a result, 1st British Corps wasstationed on the North German Plain close to itspredetermined deployment positions (between the1st German and 1st Belgium Corps), and haddeveloped a plan to counter a Soviet attack, whosecapabilities, doctrine and routes would be relative-ly well known, and which had been practised andrefined over the decades.14 In essence, the plancalled for NATO forces to inflict maximum casual-ties and delay the advancing Warsaw Pact forces(known as 'Forward Defence'15) in order to allowreinforcements from the UK and the US (such asthe Reforger units) to be transported to Germany.

The logistic implications of a clash betweenthese two giants would havebeen enormous. Despite its'economic weakness and com-'mercial and industrial ineffi-ciency, the Soviet Unionpossessed mighty and highlycompetent armed forces. A r m y l o g i s t i c sIndeed, they were probably oneof the few efficient parts of theSoviet Union.'16 Also, despite , . . , •.

its high ideals, NATO had a dist inctly centred

The foundations ofthe current British

doctrine is

O nnumber of drawbacks, the mostserious of which was its lack ofsustainability. In a major shoot-ing war, so long as the Sovietsperformed reasonably well,NATO would probably havelost due to the fact it wouldhave run out of things withwhich to fight. In a static war,logistics is somewhat simpler in the modem age, asammunition can be stocked and fuel expenditure islimited (thus allowing one to stock that as well). Ina highly mobile war, the main consumable usedwill be fuel rather than ammunition, but in a highlyattritional conflict, the reverse will apply. Ammu-nition will be used to a larger extent than fuel.17

The foundations of the current British Armylogistics doctrine is distinctly centred on the previ-ous planning for the NATOAVarsaw Pact con-frontation. Resupply is still conducted by ahierarchical multi-layered system of stock holding,which has inventory management at each level,and provisioning in the previous level. Material isin essence pushed forward, thus refilling the fol-lowing level of stockholding to a pre-plannedlevel.18 Such a system, involving a 'back-to-front'

g f5 A

Pact confrontation.

process invariably, has costs associated with stor-age, the amount of stock held, transportation ontothe next level and double handling.19

The current system is thus a traditional linearor echelon one, consisting of lines of support,which are known as the first, second, third andfourth line. The first, second and third lines areprovided by logistic units, which have deployed onthe operation being carried out, and are eitherorganic to the combat units themselves or attachedto higher headquarters. For example, the first linewould be the battlegroups themselves (battalion),second line would be the parent formation (brigadeor division), and third line would be at the theatreheadquarters (Joint Force Headquarters or CombatService Support Group). Finally, the fourth line isthe UK Home Base (Logistic Support Base Area)

and typically involves theMoD, non-deployable storagelocations, defence agenciesand the defence industrial base.The Home Base is responsiblefor the construction of fightingpower, the sustainment of thatfighting power, as well as itsfinal rehabilitation after use.20

Material that arrives in the the-atre of operations at the Pointof Entry (POE) will be held inthe inventory of the Rear Sup-port Group (RSG) and thenmoved forward as require-ments dictate, by third and sec-ond line transport. Such atechnique utilises both pushand pull elements in that stockis initially 'pushed' forward

with regard to the out-load plan being used, andthen distributed as required. It is however, firmlybased on the just-in-case philosophy in order tominimise risk given the lack of accurate informa-tion about expenditure rates that can be passeddown the line. While many elements of the BritishArmy's logistic system have been rationalised, itsoverall structure is still a product of the Cold War,and is still echeloned in nature. "The requirementfor a review of logistics practices has been givenadded impetus by the change in emphasis awayfrom massed armoured warfare towards interven-tion operations by rapid deployment forces.'21

CONTRACTOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

With the end of the Cold War the British Armymoved away from static defence and is increasing-

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ly looking at expeditionary warfare. Thus thedeterrent value of a weapon system is no longer themost important factor, it is whether that weaponsystem can actually be deployed, used and support-ed adequately. Logistic support must now beresponsive to the needs of the combat forces, andany ineffective or obsolete parts of the logisticssystem must be dealt with as they ultimatelyreduce the warfighting capability of the Britisharmy.22 The use of contractors per se is not a newone, indeed 'throughout modern history there hasbeen a greater or lesser use of contractors with var-ious degrees of success.'23 But why indeed shouldwe increase the use of contractors in our opera-tions? SDR noted that there

were 'weaknesses in our abil-ity to sustain forces overseas,particularly where local facil-ities are limited' and statedthe intention to 'where appro-priate, we will consider theuse of contractors to assistwith logistic support.'24

There are several additionalreasons :25

• Overstretch. This is acontinuing problem forour armed services, andwith the Kosovo peace-keeping operation, . theBritish Army has facedsome of the highest levelsof operational deploymentsince the Second WorldWar. In many instances,logistics and supporttroops may well becomethe limiting factor on anyoperation, and contracted support could wellease the burden. Such a contracting out of ser-vices would offer flexibility, help with surgecapacity and also release 'those assets, in rouel-ment, that are still army owned to be availablefor additional operations that may come alongin the mean time.••Financial. With declining budgets, the MoDhas to try and gain as much value for money inlogistics as possible, and concentrate scarceresources on procuring expensive and limitedcombat systems, along with the troops to manand maintain them.• Lifecycle Equipment Costs. Contractors arenow under pressure to be involved in the com-

[Overstretch]...is acontinuing problem .for our armedservices, and with theKosovo peacekeepingoperation, the BritishArmy has faced someof the highest levels ofoperationaldeployment since theSecond World War

plete lifecycle of their equipment, especially inthe very high-tech areas. It would be advanta-geous for the MoD to involve contractors in thecomplete lifecycle of a piece of equipment sothat they could build a greater level of reliabili-ty into systems in order to reduce the mainte-nance burden. By reducing the amount ofmaintenance needed, it logically follows thatthe amount of spare parts that have to be movedthrough the supply chain can thus be reduced.Correspondingly, the number of faulty partsmoving back up the chain is reduced as well. Asan example, during the Gulf War, the Chal-lenger 1 main battle tank was found initially to

have a poor Mean Time

- Before Failure rate, around723 kilometres, instead of theplanning figure of 1235 kilo-metres.26 Thus, as the Chal-lenger was substantially lessreliable than anticipated, farmore spares had to be moveddown the supply chain, moreman hours of work had to be•put in to fix the problems andmore faulty parts had to moveback up the supply chain. Inreducing the amount ofinventory held in the combatarea, reducing the throughputin the supply chain, and hav-ing a greater visibility in thesupply chain, it would bepossible to reduce the logis-tics infrastructure. Lessinventory requires less peopleto maintain it and less spaceto store it, as well as fewer

troops to guard it in the theatre of operations.Fewer consumables will mean less personneland transport assets will be needed to movethese items (which in turn will mean fewer con-sumables will be required to keep those assetsrunning).• Host Nation Support. During the Cold War theprovision of Host Nation Support (HNS) wasvirtually guaranteed (by the Federal Republic ofGermany) in the event of a Warsaw Pact inva-sion. As shown in recent operations and whatwill be true for future ones is that it is unlikelythat the British Army will deploy into an areathat has the same level of infrastructure, have aHost Nation that is willing to provide the same

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level of HNS, or even have a Host Nation (as inKosovo). There are some gaps in the army'scapability just at the moment which are prob-lematic (such as port operations and water sup-ply) and must be addressed one way or another.• Changes in Warfare. Many operations, partic-ularly peacekeeping ones, which involveextended duty in static locations (such asBosnia and Cyprus) thus create a need foraccommodation and services that are up to areasonable level if the troops are to stay therefor a long time. This can also be influenced bythe possible interventionof news cameras - the'CNN factor' - that has There are some gapsah effect on the public's _ , .perception on how our 111 Liie A r m y Ssoldiers are treated.

moment which areIf overall, we canassume that the role of con-tractors will increase, if only p r o b l e m a t i c ...gradually, then what are the r

factors that are required forsuccess, and what policyissues still remain to beanswered? Firstly, while a lotof policy work is beginning

provided within agreed preparedness times byindustry, such stock should only be bought fordeployable forces and non-deployable assetsshould be used to support those elements that aredeployed. Another difficulty is that what exactlyshould the army keep as a strategic asset? Whatassets should be army owned and operated, con-tractor owned and army operated, army owned andcontractor operated and finally contractor ownedand operated? Obviously as you work down thelist, risks increase in that industry may fail to meetits obligation, although this may not happen in

reality.The deployment of con-

tractors to a theatre of opera-tions is a more difficult task,as it will be incumbent on the

-• - i . • . -I operational commander toCapabi l i t ies JUSt at t h e evaluate when the time is

appropriate to start handingtasks over to them. It isassumed that the environmentin the theatre of operationsshould be relatively benignwhen contractors start toreplace military assets, butwhat exactly does 'relativelybenign' mean and how can

must be addressedone way or another.

to take shape, the key to any success in using con-tractors on the battlefield is their involvement incontingency planning. 'This is absolutely funda-mental to the success of contracted support. Histor-ically, when contractors have been deployed onoperations, and a lot of us have been involved in it,it has been on a pretty ad hoc and frankly riskybasis.'27 This will hopefully eliminate the risk ofmisunderstanding and misalignment, and hencemistrust, lack of confidence and thus a failure ofsupport. Planning will help each party to under-stand where the other is coming from, what theirneeds are and how each can benefit the other. Sec-ondly, it is probable that ''continued budgetarypressure will force the military to outsource allnon-core business to industry and consider moreimaginative ways of reducing overheads.'28 Thiswill mean the outsourcing of a great deal of what isgenerally described as administrative functions,usually considered in terms of the activities thattake place in the UK Home Base. The real difficul-ty is in the correct assessment of what level ofstock is necessary for future operations. The threecriteria outlined in the SDR was that the armed ser-vices should only keep that stock which cannot be

the military insure itself against contractors beingexposed to sudden and unexpected danger? It maywell take up to thirty days to make such a judge-ment, and so it would make sense to retain suffi-cient military capability to be able to conductoperations (up to whatever scale is necessary) forthe first thirty days. It must be remembered thatour armed forces lack the immediate resilience tocope with the possible consequences of a highlevel of risk - that is, a large number of casualties.Should there be any restrictions on contractors hir-ing local labour and what status should these per-sonnel be afforded? If contractors do increase innumber on the battlefield then the servicemen andwomen involved will be able to make direct com-parisons to their counterparts in industry. Thearmed forces must not underestimate the effect onmorale and discipline if their personnel see con-tractors responding to different codes of conductand enjoying a better quality of life in a theatre ofoperations.

Sponsored Reserves have been created (in the1996 Reserve Forces Act) and it is likely that thearmy will insist that a certain number of contrac-tors' employees must be sponsored reservists in the

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future. Sponsored -Reserves will be similar to theTerritorial Army, enjoying similar training, condi-tions and benefits, but their service will be condi-tional in that it will be similar work to theirday-to-day jobs. The advantage of this is that theywill be able to be mobilised by the Secretary ofState for Defence and become service personnelonce deployed.29 Additionally, the individual's jobwill be guaranteed once they return and it shouldease training requirements in that they shouldalready be qualified at the job they will be doing.The concept has been criticised however, as 'ten-dering for mercenaries,'30 few companies will beable to win the tenders and they will be veiled insecrecy, and if the sponsored reserve makes a mis-take, who takes the blame, the MoD or privatecompany? What status will the sponsored reservisthave as regards the Hague and Geneva conven-tions, and what about those contractor personnelthat are not sponsored reservists? It will be impor-tant for the military to accurately define what thepeacetime training for these reservists will be ifthey to play their role, and possibly fight and sur-vive on a future battlefield. The employment ofthese reservists will be dependent on the graduatedreadiness plan and how they fit into it and whetherthe contractor can respond to these short noticerequirements.

FUTURE CONFLICT

Logistics has finally come of age. Rather thanbeing considered merely a support function it isnow recognised as a force enabler, or even multi-plier. Logistics can be considered 'a key determi-nant in its own right, a crucial element of effectiveplanning and an essential element of combatpower.'31 Future operations are likely to be joint innature and involve a multinational coalition ofsome type. As such, the UK's logistic system willhave to be modified to be as flexible as possible tocope with such situations.

The future battlefield (or battlespace if oneincludes air, sea and space forces) is likely to bemore complex, more dynamic, and non-linear. Thelower force densities (than that of a NATO-WarsawPact confrontation or even the Gulf War) meansthat there is less likely to be a well defined 'front-line' or 'rear area', and will involve manoeuvrewarfare and deep battle. 'The battlespace is chang-ing as we move away from the linear battlefield ofthe Cold War to a non-linear, fragmented battle-space. It is envisaged that high intensity conflict

would take place in three dimensions, day andnight, in all weathers and 24 hours a day.'32 Evenrelatively minor conflicts could have repercussionsfor the rest of the international community withefforts to monitor, prevent or manage conflicts.The spectrum of future conflict is now seen as acontinuum in Figure 1:33

Cool

Warm

Hot

Warm

Hot

Very Hot

Figure 1

As such, increasing importance is beingplaced on post and pre-conflict activities in orderto reduce the likelihood of actual conflict breakingout. In order to operate effectively throughout thispossible range of deployments in both national andmultinational operations, the army must be organ-ised and logistically supported effectively and flex-ibly. While contractors are used extensively in theHome Base, this is in a situation that could bedescribed as peacetime. The use of contractors willincrease as the environment in a theatre of opera-tions settles down and the threat is reduced, and sowill correspond to the top half of the circle, espe-cially where there is traditional peacekeeping andpreventative deployment operations. Anothermethod of showing this is shown in Figure 2:34

High

Conf l i c t . . ,. Medium

Intensity

Low

\

\

Warfighting OOTWOperational Intensity

\

Low

Medium

High

Peace

DegreeofContractorInvolvement

Figure 2

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CONCLUSION

Contractors must be up to the challenge of meetingthe customer's needs (in this case the DefenceLogistics Organisation) and enhance their chancesof success by providing logistic support moreeffectively, and allow the Army to concentrate onits core task - that of warfighting. A letter from theDuke of Wellington to the British Foreign Officeillustrates the point:35

'Gentlemen,Whilst marching to Portugal to a position whichcommands the approach to Madrid and the Frenchforces, my officers have been diligendy complyingwith your requests, which have been sent to me bydispatch rider to my headquarters. We have enu-merated our saddles, bridles, tents and tent-polesand all manner of sundry items for which HisMajesty's Government holds me accountable. Ihave dispatched reports on the character, wit andspleen of every officer. Each item and every far-thing has been accounted for with two regrettableexceptions for which I beg your indulgence.Unfortunately the sum of one shilling andninepence remains unaccounted for in one infantrybattalion's petty cash. And there has been hideousconfusion as to the number of jars of raspberry jamissued to one cavalry regiment during a sandstormin western Spain. This reprehensible carelessnessmaybe related to the pressure of circumstancessince we are at war with France. A fact that maycome as a bit of a surprise to you gentlemen inWhitehall.

This brings me to my present purpose, which isto request elucidation on my instructions from HisMajesty's Government so that I may better under-stand why I am dragging an army over these bar-ren plains. I construe that perforce, it must be oneof two alternative duties given below.

One, to train an army of uniformed Britishclerks in Spain for the benefit of the accountantsand copyboys in London. Or perchance, to see to itthat the forces of Napoleon are driven out of Spain.I shall pursue either one with the best of my ability,but I cannot do both.'

The situation as it is in the post-Cold Warworld and after SDR means that the Army (and thearmed forces as a whole) must try and obtain bettervalue for money from their logistic and supportoperations. This will be necessary to maximise theresources available for the purchase of increasinglycomplex and technologically sophisticated equip-ment and to enable the army to keep hold of ade-quate personnel to run and maintain those systems.'But if we are to remain a professional force, capa-ble of intervention and support operations, then wemust retain a rapidly deployable, coherent militarycapability in the logistics and engineering areas,

within an integrated support chain which has a bal-anced civil component.'36

NOTES

1. House of Commons Defence Committee. Implementation of the LessonsLearned from Operation Granby, HC43 / 928, Fifth Report, Session 1993 - 4, 25May 1994, paragraph 39.2. Hayr, Sir Kenneth, 'Losistics in the Gulf War,' RUSI Journal, Autumn 1991,pp. 14-19.3. Ministry of Defence. The Strategic Defence Review, (The Stationary Office,London, July 1998). p. 53.4. Ibid, Supporting Essay 6. p. 4.5. Ibid, pp. 23 - 26. Also: Ministry of Defence, What do you know about...Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. C200, DISN-Pubs 1, 8/98.6. White, M S, 'How Can We Meet the Logistic Requirements of ForcesDeployed at Some Distance from the UK?,' RUSI Journal, October 1996, p. 32.7. Saunders, D J. 'UK Lodstics Planning - The Way Ahead,' RUSI Journal.December 1992, p. 24.8. Op cil., The Strategic Defence Review, p. 6.9. Ibid., pp. 14 - 15. Also: Ministry of Defence, Defence Diplomacy, C400,DISN-Pubs 3, 3/99; Ministry of Defence. What do you know about... DefenceDiplomacy. C200, DISNN-Pubs 1, 2/99.10. Op cit. White, M.S. p. 31.11. Thompson. J. The Lifeblood of War - Logistics in Armed Conflict, (Brassey's(UK) Ltd, London, 1991). p. xvi.12. The key element of NATO strategy, that of 'flexible response', was adoptedin 1967, and took over from 'massive retaliation.' This strategy demanded a bal-ance of conventional and nuclear forces sufficient to deter aggression, andshould deterrence fail, be capable of actual defence.13. Evans, M, 'NATO's Evolving Concept for Armoured Warfare on the CentralFront: Implications for the British Army', British Army Review, August 1991,pp. 22 - 27.14. Edmonds, M, 'British Army 2000 - External Influences on Force Design',SCSI Occasional Paper No. 21. HMSO, 1996, p. 60 - 1.15. Op cit. Evans, M.16. Op cit., Thompson. Julian, p. 289.17. Ibid. pp. 291 -292.18. Headquarters, Quartermaster General, Material Support Strategy II (Version2) Draft Paper, D Mat Sp (A). October 1998, p. 1.19. Headquarters, Quartermaster General, Material Support Strategy Paper.D/DMSD(A)97/101 MSD la, 24 June 1994, p. 3.20. The Royal Logistic Corps. Logistic Support Doctrine, Volume 1, PamphletI, Army Code Number 71570, 1997, pp. 5-3 and 5-4.21. Hammick, Murray. 'Lodstics comes of age', International Defence Review,July 1992, pp. 665 - 673.22. Evans, Brig P A D . 'Contractors on the Battlefield', Royal Logistic CorpsReview. 1999, pp. 1 - 3. Also: Evans, Brig P A D,. 'Contractor Support: A Viewfrom Land Command'. Focused Logistics II Briefing, Royal United ServicesInstitute, 7 & 8 February 2000.23. Smart, Peter. 'Support to the Front Line', RUSI Journal, February 2000, pp.67-70 .24. Cited in Cowan, General Sir Sam, 'Perspectives on Current MoD Policy',RUSI Journal, February 2000, pp. 65 - 66.25. Ibid. Also Op Cit. Evans, Brig P A D., 'Contractors on the Battlefield'.26. Moore, David M.. Bradford, Jeffrey P., Antill, Peter D., 'The Role of Logis-tics in Modem Warfare: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm', RMCSResearch Paper, 1999. p. 14.27. Op cit.. Smart, Peter.28. Op cit., Evans, Brig P A D., 'Contractors on the Battlefield'.29. Ibid. Evans, Brig PA D.. Contractors on the Battlefield'.30. David Luxton, cited in Martin, Daniel, 'Sponsored Soldiers', DefenceReview, Autumn 1999. p. 28.31. United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations, JointWarfare Publication 0-10, Interim Edition, 1998, p. 8-1.32. Lewis, J, Support to the Future Army, Supply Chain Management inDefence and Aerospace Conference, 21 April 1999.33. Developed from Lewis, J, 'Support to the Future Army', Supply Chain Man-agement in Defence and Aerospace Conference, 21 April 1999 and Bellamy, DrC, 'Spiral Through Time: Beyond 'Conflict Intensity", SCSI Occasional PaperNo.35, August 1998. PD - Preventative Deployment: PE - Peace Enforcement;PK - Peace Keeping.34. Op cit, Evans, Brig P A D . 'Contractor Support: A View from Land Com-mand.35. Cited in Smart. Peter. Op cit.36. Cross, Brigadier Tim. 'Logistic Support for UK Expeditionary Operations',RUSI Journal, February 2000, pp. 71 - 75.

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