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8/21/2019 British Agents in Afghanistan (1879) by Sir Owen Tudor Burne
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/british-agents-in-afghanistan-1879-by-sir-owen-tudor-burne 1/51
Afghanistan: The Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection
at the University of Nebraska-Omaha
Digitized Afghanistan Materials in English
from the Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection
University of Nebraska - Lincoln Year
British agents in Afghanistan (1879)Owen Tudor Burne Sir
This paper is p osted at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/afghanenglish/249
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TOTrivate circul tion oltly.
B R I T I S H
A G E N T S
N lette r addressed t o the Times, on the 23rd of
Novem ber lasi;, th e D uke of Argyll made the following
statement
:-
General assurances mere given to Shere
X
in
1869)
that from time to time we should give
him
such a s s i~~ taa ce
nd
support as the circumstances
of
the case might seem,
in
our judgment, to justlfy
and
require.
t may well
be
asked if this
w s
enough to satisfy
th e Ameey as a sub stitu te for all th e demands he
had
made-for t h e tr ea ty offensive and defensive, for the
g r~ a ra n te e ga inst domestic enemies, fo r the assurance
of
is
succession, f o r th e annual subsidy? No. There
was one more concession which Lord Mayo made, and
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cThc
R T ~ C S S1 -hidlas ]:lid
1111(3?1this
at
t h e
r m
Ijnlln
confrn)lice;+,
a n d
t he
h i e l l
c
i
to
i t
a m o n g the
cngagt?lncnts
t o ~i-11ich hey lcll, arc a
suffi.
cicnt i ~ i d i c r ~ t i o ~ l
f
the
v n l t ~ c
~ f - l l i d inttncbecl
t o
it
in
the
feelings
and
tLc
opiuiotls of thc i m e e r . .
n he
otlc
side
he
Iiacl t h e Inctian Gove~lnmcA~.rlt
dem:mding t
llc s u t r e u ~ l e r
of
an i ~ um~mi~ f
roll1 the
intcrftbrcnct.
of
British
ofEct rs,
on
~ d i i c h
re
set
highest wluc and
n-I ich
11:td 1 cen solellinlr gnn~antced
to
h im by t h e pranline of
n S-ilbcroy ~~I1011 i l i c
ilt1 loyqd
axld tr\lstt+cI. 11Elc other sitic he
liad tlw
Kussi:lns,
11-lmae interfprence
hc n l u s t
dislike
qu i t e
ns mucll.
Tllc
D u k ~ f
Argyll rcl icnts this g ~ i l e i n l
tn tcn l~~ l t
n-it11
~ h : t ~ : t ~ t ~ r i s t i c
t l~i l i ty ill
:I
1j k
etltitlc'd
T11~
Enstern Qurntion,
p ~ t l ? l i s l ~ e dn
1,ondon 1st \vr.t ~li.
1x1 this
book
llc
throws
c l o u l ~ t
npon cciwtain c ~ i d c n c r
g i ~ c nby ~~i r sc l f ,lnjor
Grey, and
others, t o tllc
cffcct that
the
Anlccbr
Shurc
Ali
KZlnn
\\-:IS, in ISci9,S
willing r o
consi i l r~*
llc subject of 13ritisll
Apenciei
I
f i i t
lnil
llc
recei~*cd
nco~imgcment
o
cnt c r oflici:illy into
tlic
sul~ject
and
1 ~ d
is ex-
p ~ ~ t n t i o n sf being
gr:n~tcd
;I I i e x
t rea ty
been re-
spo t~ t l ed
o.
Tvhilst
:~ssnming,
~owcvcr,
hat Shere
Ali
obt nilled
frorn Lorfl I I a p :I solelmt
pltidgc
that
no
European
officers
sllould
bc pl:lced
as
Eosideuts
in
his
cities,
The E:tstcm
Question,
from thc Treaty of
Paris,
1856,
t
the Treaty
of
Berlin,
ld ' i8,
31ld tc b thtl st (wni1
-4fghan
TTTzr.
3:
the
Duke
of
X1-gyIl.
Stn~hankC o.,
1871).
f
Colonel
Burnc's Note 24 April
1877,
p. 174, Afghanistan
No 1.
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th e D uk e of
Argyll
bears testimony* to the fact tha t ,
in t h e
en~ ly
art of 1869, on first assuming the '\'ice-
i-oyaltly, L o rd Mayo, on his pa rt , recogniseilL
the
.r tilif / of having a11 Enropean official at Cabol, hu t
considered t1hat he B ritish Government conld, v it h -
oat. sending, t
pi-esoil f ,
ally Eu rope an official to ('nhul,
exercise sufficient influence o r e r him (Shcre Mi)
t o
keep him on th e most anlicable
t enns wit11 us. + His
Grace also s h o ~ s , orrectly enough, that Lord 31a-j-o
was at that t ime opposed to our taking
any
ilii-ect
pa r t
in
th e i n t e r u d affairs of Afghanistan;
and
that
he did not
thei ,
want a n y Residen t a t Cablll, or
political
influence
in
his
(Shere Ali ' s ) k i~~gdom,
although lle fully i lpp~ecinted he mloe of obtaining
accurate infon-mation
as
t o
tho
events that occur in
Central
Asin.
In deducing from
these
fac ts t h a t
Lord
B ~ J - oecog-
nised that
one
of t h e g ~ c n t cl1-antagcs to bc derired
fro111 t5e
approaching
confere~lce oold
be
the oypor-
tumity it x-onld afford him of sntisfj-ing
the
i tm l
t ha t
Ltve
did not
want
to press any Residents
ripoli
him,
the
D uk e of A rgy ll falls int o error. Eqoally
so
xhen
h e states, ~ i t h mplmsis, that tlicrc
was
on e more concession ~ ~ l l i c l l ord 31nj-o made,
aiid
made
~~yillingly-he pro ~l iised o
t he
Aineer
'
ha t
no European officers shoolcl
be
placed ns Residr~l ts
in his cities.'
* t
The
Eastern Question,
rol . ii.
p.
253.
t
Ibid.
ol.
ii. pp.
356, 257.
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There is some fo~inrlnrion, I readily arlmit, for the
Intrcr
inference
in
the
t e r m s
of
Lord
Jlnyo's pri'int~
lpt ter
to
tlie Duke, datctl 3 r d June 1869,
quoted
His Gmcc,
as
fallon-a :- The only pledges (to th
hmcer ) girerl vere
that lye
would not interfcre
in
ilia nE;lirs
; th n t ui-e u ~ o u ld suppor t his iudr-
pcndence ; tlint we n-onld n o t force European officer;
or Resiclcuts upon h im o g t i ~ i s t is ic*isk. * I
:rln
prepared to slum-,
l lowerer, thn t
thc Viceroy
could no:
llnrc
in tcnded
to
g i ~ e
o the
u\~orda thus
( uor~.tl
rile
flill mcnning at tached t o them
by
t h e Duke of
drcvll,
-,
o r llave supposecl t h a t aIiy slicli pledge, if
given, co:ild
he
binding
on
:dl
f
u t
lure
G o r e r ~ ~ m c n
s
fo r
all
r
ilnc
undcr a11 c i r cun l s t ~ nccs .
To mlcIc~18nt:md he quest ion fully, it
is
necessary
for n inorrit.nt t o go
back
to the tmilsoctious
of
18.57,
r iz . tllc negotintioris lc n d i~ ig ip to th e :igrce-
ment
of
tha t
rear betuvr.cn
Yhere
dl i ' s fa ther :ind
Lord
C :i ~ i~ li ~ i g 's ovcrntlletit, riegoti:itions
whlcil
were cnrcf~i l ly tudied y Shcre Ali, a l o ~ i pwith
those
of : in ea~l ierdate,
before
reaching British teri*itory
t o a t t e n d t l ~ cU~ubnl ln d u r b n r . This a g r c c m r ~ l t ,
colicl~ided on
the
ooi1 real; of tlio Anglo-Porsinll iv:lr
't~~tuvctbn he G o~ er~ ho r-G en ert t l
f Incli:~ ~ ~ i c l l~'I
Jhhorned ,
rn:ide
prorisiori f o r lnrge montlily
subsid,r
t o
t he
hrlieer dur ing t h e continuance of the
n-nr,
:lud
for the
temporary location of British o E c e r s with
snitnble cstnblishm ents at Cabul, Candnhnr, and BnlB1~
These
officers were to
keep
their our-n Gorernrnent
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informed of all a'ffairs, and to watch the disbursement
of the subsidy; they mere not to interfere in any may
n the internal administration of the country.
I n the various conferences between the Punjab and
Afghan
authorities,
in
connection with this agree-
ment, it became apparent that the presence of British
officers 1n afghanistan
was
not so unpalatable to the
Afghans as had been anticipated, although an infiuential
party, including Dost Mahomed himself, had so strong
an objection to their location at the capital
its lf
that
the clause of t,he agreement, so
f r
as
it
affected
Cabul, remained
a
dead letter.
The
following passages from some portions of the
correspondence of that period
ivill
sl~om he general
feeling of the
Afghans
of 185'7 on this subject.
On the 7th of January, 185'7, Mr. Lawrence ad-
dressed Lord Canning's Government as follows :-
Hafizjeet on this asked wl~et~her
t
vas our purpose
to send British officers to Afghanistan.
I t mas stated
that, provided Government consented to assist. the
Ameer, it mould
be a
condition that such officers
should be deputed, and receive the countenance and
support of His Highness. But that they mould
exercise no authority nor any command. Their duty
would be to at tend the Ameer, or any of his sons
NO.
23A.
7
January
1847,
p
68.
Epitome
of
Cabul Corre-
spondence, published in Lahore Government Press.
1863.
f-
Hafizjee, son
of
the Mir Wstiz,
one
of the most influential
men
in the kingdom, vhose sanctity
is so
great and popular (from
uniting the
ayyad and Sunni
in
one)
that
it
is supposed his dis-
ciples in Cabul and the Kohistan could give away the throne.
(Colonel
Edwardes,
p. 53,
ibid.
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whom he might entrust with the charge of a distinct
portion of the afghan force,
and
to give advice when
required, and to obtain all the information which our
Governlnent might require, for which the Ameer would
be bound to afford
every
facility.
t
was distinctly
explained that
they
would neither interfere in the
administration, nor instruct nor pay the troops. To
this
the Ameer
and
Sirdars expressed their assent,
and,
indeed,
appea'red
as
if they perceived the reasonable-
ness of the arrangement.
t
was
a point on which
sol~lc ifficulty had been anticipated but the readiness
n it11
which i t
mas
agreed to was remarkable.
He again mot e on the 15th of January, 1857 :-
It
may be expedient here to observe that so far
from the
Afghan
Chiefs raising objection, or in any
s a y indic.ating
an
unwillingness to see
B~itish
fficers
in Cabuil, they had actually shown by their remarks
tha t they were prepazed to allow our officers to inter-
fere in
a manner much more decided than was
con-
templated. Thus, while the Chief Commissioner was
explaining to the Chiefs the particular duties which
Government required of our officers, Hafizjee inter-
rupted his remarks by saying, ' they
'
(the office~*~)
can give the Ameer advice, they can instruct and
drill troops.' There can be no doubt, therefore,
that
the Ameer
and
his Sirdars were quite prepared
for
the
presence
of
our officers,
ill
the event of
any
subsidy
being allowed;
at
the same time,
it
is
now
\
equally
clear
that such an arrangement is distasteful
NO A. 15 January
1857
. 75 i j i d
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t o the Afghans.
The
t r u t h probably is, that
t ho
dmecr ,
though
u q
aware
t h a t
the
presence
of
Erg-
lish officers would compromise him with the
bigoted
party
of
his countrymen, considered
t h e sacrifice
worth malting t o obtain
the
inrge pecuui:ury aid
in
his
hour of
need.
From
these
ctiscussiozls it. n i\s
o l ~ v i o ~ i s
t h a t
the Sirdara
were
not
at
all
unnilling and perhaps
well pleased
t o
have
British
o&cers
at
Cand:illai*,
Lot
not t o s thenr a t Cabu1.j'
A f ew
dnxs
later
he again rvrote,
confirming
this
stntenleiit.
He said :-
After expressing the dmeer s
general nppro~n l
f
the
articles they
(the
Sirdors)
said
the Anleer
held
the
same
opinions
that t hey
themselres
had offered
yesterday,
as t o
th
proprietg
of stationing
such
British officers, as
limy
be deputed, at C:lndnllnr and
not
at Cablll.
H i s Highness
believed tlmt
mllcll
good
mould accrue
f r o m theil-
presence
or1
the I1:~ndnhar
frontier
hat
the
Afghan generals woulc get good
advice
fl-m
them
h a t t he
Persians n-onld
see
tha t
th e Engl ish were
hea rti ly with
t l i e Afghn~is ;and that
these
adrantages
would be readily
unders ocd
and
appreciated by t h e lifglians the~nselves. But
that at
C:tbul no
such
palpable
advantnge 15oulrl accrue,
and
the common people TI-ould hiiik \$-hen t h q s n r Euro-
peaus: at
the
capital
that the old days
of
Shell SLujs
mere
come
again.
To
th is
the
Cliief
Conlxnissior~er
replied that there x a s mncli
force
in wh a t the Smwr
and
his Sirdam said and
it
was Tery probable that
Mo.
50
A.
6 Jasuary 1857 p 79
ibid
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Gowrnmerit might
c t
on their advice, nnrl htlgin hr
atbnding their otficels: t o Cund:ill:ir only btlr it n i~
ncccl;anlmyo p r o ~ i d cn t l ~grecluerlt ful l diicretirin ru
senti
British oflificers to : k n j point
nilere
their 19'.P,2t. L.e
might be required fo r in ~ t:tn ce , l ic w:tr uligllt t t k i ~
tlic directioal of
BaBkh,
n~nd tht:n Guvernrlritnt i~ouIki
send oilicvrs to
that
fro11 ier.
Wit
11
these
t.splnll:il iol1;;
the
point
\\.:is c l ro l~pe~ l ,rld t h e
f o u r t h article
lcft
:is
originnUy ilr;lt'tot-l; EI:rfizjcc finally r e nm r k i nc
tti:it
r
was
~vc l l o
~ ~ r o c e e d
mdu:111~-,11111
:iftcr lit
k~n.i.ilc,
~vken
htb ptwple h:rd got
nccustomect to
IJritisil
u l l i c ~ +
at
Cn~lclnh:ir,
others might colue to t he
c:~lli131.
IIc
addud
that
the
t lmecr
~voulcl
probnblj-
go
liinlself
t i
Contl:ihnr,
so thelac. would i ~ e b c less nccessitv :it
prrserlt
f u r British utficclas clscrr-hrrc.
W i t h
referc~lcu
o t lw
~ I ~ c i t l e ~ I~ i s l ~ e s
f the Cq:nF ;:E
Govcrrlnlc.nt,
nbol-e
espresstd,
:tntl
t h e : ippnr~:i t
rcascan;iblt.ncss
of thumn tlit Chitif C'onlrrlissiornep rc-
conl~uunt l s
ll:rt
for
t
llc
present
our
Europeou
o%ct.rs
be dcputetl t o Caridahas alone
n
C1:iuse 7 W:IS then
inserted,
t the
request
nf
tllc
drncer, that tllc 'Vnliet.1 to he
left
at
C'abol
per-
~ n n n e n t l y , iftw the
witl~clmxalof flle
British
oficcrs
now
deputed, was not
t o
be a European.
And
agniu
:-
Previous
to
the articles
being
signed, t21cy
were
read
o u t
ill presence of the whole d ~ i r b n r ; fter
x~-hich
tile
Clticf Comlnissioncr
recapitulated
those points of
the ar rangement which appeared most important, or
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vhich, for the present, would not be fully carried out.
These
mere, that
t h e e
British officers ~ o u l dtart, as
soon s
110ssil1le, fo r
Candahnr
by the Kuram,
Peiaar, and Loghnr route. Tnnt no British officers
for
the present ~ o u l d
o
to Cabul
;
but that a native
yent lcman, probably Ss~ ab Fau dnr Khan, mould be
ge l i t there
bj- an early date ;
and that tohe Ameer
should also
at
oilce
appoint
a
Pakeel, on
his
o m part,
t o
reside
at Pthsharv~~r.
I make these iluotntions as bearing, in some degree,
s I Imve shown,
on
the trausactions of 1869, at
Cra~balln.
Rvtlen
t he d m e e r came
to Urnballs in that year
t o
lnctt
Lord
Xayo,
he llnd t ~
l~ject~s
t
heart.*
cite
these
oljjects from the records in my possession
of
the
only t w o conrersations vhich took place
between t he Viceroy and
Shere Ali
:
(1.)
The
recognition by the British Government
of
his
t l ~ n n s t r ,
nd
R
guarantee of
hmsel f
and
his family against
all comers whilst
in
actual
possession of the throne.
(2.) Such present assistance in nioney and arms as
could be
giren.
To
gain
the first of these objects, there was nothing
he ~ o u l d
ot do
in
order to evince his gratitude and
t o comply ~ 4 t hhe rrishes of the Indian Government
in
any part ioular.
Firfit con~ersation
etween
d m e e r and Lord Mayo, 9
rch
1869
The
Amwr and Lord
31a~0, f course,
met
on other public
wc;tsions, but not
fo r
discussion of official questions.
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hese
records bear testimony, of themselves, to
the
general accuracy of the following Note* recorded
b y
-
myself in 1877
:-
can fully corroborate all that Captain Grey
and
Dr. Bellen say as to the willingness of the Ameer
t
Umballa to consider the subject of British Agencies in
Afghanistan had
he received encouragement to enter
officially
nto
the subject, and had
his
expectations of
being granted
a new
treaty been responded to. The
same evidence which certified to Shere Mi's desire for
treaty
certified to
his
willingness to receive British
Agents.
If the one
was
imaginary, SO was the other.
Being
at that time
in
Lord Mayo's full confidence,
can
testify to the fact that both he himself and those
associated with him accepted the evidence of the
Arneer's wishes
in
both cases as genuine. The time
had
howe~er,not arrived for the consideration
of
either question
;
and the orders of Her Majesty's
i Government, added to Lord Mayo's own personal
views as
to
the requirement of the moment,
and
the
danger of suddenly deviating from the policy of the
Viceroy who had just left India, induced him to
dis-
courage the oacial mention of either matter at the
conferences. Moreover, His Highness made no formal
proposition on the subject, hoping, as
we
were led t o
believe, that
it
might
come first from the Viceroy, and
thereby
ensure
im
better terms.
But although, as Private Secretary to the Viceroy
in
1869 was in Lord Mayo's ull confidence,
Colonel Burne's
Note; p 1741 afghanistan, No. 1
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do not desire to place my own recollections or
m em oranda in too gr ea t prominence. am con-
te n t to substantiate m y statement above quoted by
means of documents which were received and recorded,
a t
th
time, in the official archives of the Indian
Foreig n Office, copies of which do cum en ts have been,
since th e U mballa durbar, in my possession.
I beg, in th e first instance, to refer t o a record of a
Council held by the Ameer at Lahore on the 16th
March, 1869 whilst n ~ozl teo Um balla.
This record was furnished by X. Y., a faithful ser-
vant who possessed, and still possesses, the confidence
of th e G overnm ent of India, and whose accuracy in
similar cases has bo rne th e te st of years and has not
been found wanting.
At th is
C
ouucil the
f
0110 wing conversations be-
tween Shere Ali an d his confidential advisers took
place
:-
The
Ameer then said,--' Should th e British autho-
rities propose that
a
European Agent be stationed a t
Cabul itself, although I am myself agreeable to such
arra ng em en t, bu t th e people of Cabul are turbulent
and mischievous-should such Euro pean Agent be in-
jured in any way, which God forb id, would be dis-
graced. T h e late Ameer,
my
father,
on
these very
considerations, refused to
have
a European Agent at
his cap ital. B ut if an Agent be located in the interior,
at places like Candahar, or Balkh, or Herat, there
They
have also been
published, in whole o r in
part
in recent
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( 2
would be no objection.
Such an a r rangement would
be advantageous to both Governm ents o r in sta nc e,
at the present time the people of th e Lo w er S e is ta n
have commenced encroachments on the C a n d a h a r
boundaries. Lower Seistan was for m erly alw ays at-
tached to Afghanistan, and has been occupied by
Persia only since a short time.
W e a r e n o t a w a r e
mkat agreement exists between the B ritish a n d
Fer-
sian Governments regarding LoweT Se istan . I f t h e r e
should be a European Agent on the bo rder, he w o u ld
be possessed of the necessary inform ation, and w o u l d
be a t hand to consult regard ing affairs re la tin g to
territories beyond the borders .'
U
the members approved of what th e Am eer h a d
said.
I
beg, in the second place, to refer to a N o t e
written, at the time, by the Under Secretary
in
the
Foreign Department of th e Governm ent of In dia . This
Note is dated 26th March,
1869,
and was rece ived a n d
officiauy recorded as a genuine document. t
ran
as
follows
:-
Th e Viceroy may possibly desire to ha ve w i th o u t
delay the following details which I have l ea rn t f rom
Punjab officials in the course of conversation ye s te rd a y
and to-day. The Am eer
is
prepared, if aske d, to allow
European Agents at Candahar, Herat, and Balkh,
but
he
would raise difficulties, though probably
not
insuperable ones, about such an officer a t Cabul.
I
beg, in the third place, to refer to a con versa6ion
between Major Grey and Sh ere Ali, in
which
a l lus ion
was
made
y the Ameer to the same subject.
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The record of this conversation was equally received
and recorded
t
th
time
as genuine. Before quoting
it, however, it may be expedient to describe the exact
position held by Major Grey at the Umballa confe-
rence, and the opinion which Lord Mayo held of that
officer.
feel bound, in justice to Captain Grey, to
take this course, as some unmerited doubts have been
cast on his position a t Umballa, and the accuracy of
his statements made then and since.
Major 'Grey
is
an officer of recognised experience
and ability.
For his general intelligence and complete
knowledge of Persian, Lord Mayo selected him as
special interpreter at Umballa between His Excellency
and Shere Ali.
Of
Lord Mayo's personal opinion of
him need only quote the following statement* from
many others of a similar kind :-
Captain Grey, who knows them (the Afghans)
all thoroughly, and is steady and wise, and entirely in
our confidence (as he was interpreter at Umballa)
keeps up a purely unofficial correspondence with Nur
Mahomed, the Minister.
This is useful.
No one in 1869 ventured to call in question this
officer's veracity; and in that year the following
statement, signed and verified
by
the Foreign Secre-
tary, was handed
n
to the Viceroy, was accepted as
genuine, and was recorded in the archives of the
Foreign Office.
t
is dated 31st March 1869, and
runs as follows :-
The Ameer is prepared to act on what he
may
see
Lord
Mayo 17 October
1869
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is the nature of the friendship the British pr3pose to
afford him. If, as hitherto, merely acknowledging the
ruler of Cabul
de
fncto well and good, but if prepared
to acknowledge and support him and the heir he
may
point out (the contrary having produced the present
troubles), tlhere is nothing
he
mill not accede to.
He is open to any proposition for securing his
northern border. While doubtful of any Russian power
for aggression for some years to come, still
he
thinks
precautions should he taken he mould collstruct forts
on his own part, o r under our superintendence, and
admit European garrisons if ever desired; he would
gladly see
an
Agent or engineer superintendent in
Balkh, Herat, or anymhere but actually in Cabul,
which might lead tc tjhe supposition of s being a
puppet
.
But there is yet another officer's evidence in favour
of this view-an officer who was attached to the
Ameer's personal staff as his int'erpreter an officer
who mas a personal friend of Shere Ali's, who was
on the most intimate terms with him who had a
thorough knowledge of the Pushtoo language, and
could hardly retain a wrong impression of his many
conversations with His Highness. his officer, Dr.
Bellevr, mtting in 1875 ays that the impression left
on
his
mind
at Umballa was that Shere Ali wonld
gladly
see
Agents at Herat and Candahar. *
ha.ve, however, no
wish
t o rely solely on
the
evidenoe
thus given therefore may be permitted t o
gee p 273 Afghanistan, No: 1
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quote Lord Mayo's own words, when he wrote* to
Sir
Henry Rawliuson after the Umballa durbar,
treating the question of an Agency at Herat as a
n e w
one which did not take a prominent place at the Um-
balla confe&nce estifying, at the same time, to Shere
I
Ali's willingness, although evincing, in his opinion,
no positive anxiety, to receive British Agencies a t
Herat, Candahar, or Balkh, if desired.
Lord Mayo writes
:
t
was repeatedly explained to him (Shere
Ali)
that we should never send a British soldier to assist
him against his rebellious subjects.
. . own
am very sceptical as to the prop14iet-y of placing a
British Resident at Herat, but mill reserve my
opinion until
hear the reasons
As a r~ile,
am
l
a
totally opposed to sending Emopean Politicals
to
any
I
Asiatic town if it can be avoided hey are a dangerous
class, and many a misfortune can be traced to their
i
honest but misplaced activity.
do not believe, from
what the Ameer said at Umballa, that he would
offer
any oppos i t ion
to an English Agent being placed a t
j
Candahar, Herat, or Balkh, though he mo111d strongly
object to the appearance of one at
CaBul
But I do
I
not
t h i nk
he wished for
it
allywhere, fearing the effect
f
I
it might have on his own subjects.
When, in
1875
the question of an Agency a t Herat
1
unexpectedly caused a difference of opinion between
;
t
Her Majesty's Home Government and that
of
India,
Ldrd Northbrook's Government endeavoured to shake
~
Lord Mayo t o
Sir Henry Rawfinson
1
June
1869
.-
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the evidence given and accepted as genuine in 1869.
But it failed to do so to any material extent. Major
Grey's evidence, indeed, became more emphatic than
that given in 1869 or he says,* he Ameer did freely
consent to the appointment of British officers in Balkh,
Herat, or anywhere but actually at Cabul and the
Government of India could not but acknowledge that
Captain Grey's evidence was not to be ignored. For,
in addressing the Secretary of State for Indiat in
that year, they said :-
On the whole, however, we think that either
the Ameer himself or his Minister, Noor Mahorned
Shah, did, in confidential communication with Captain
Grey, express a readiness to accept a t some future
time, not far distant, the presence of British Agents
in Afghanistan, excepting Cabul itself.
Passing from this correspondence, we come to evi-
dence of a more recent dat-e, on which the Duke of
Argyll places much reliance-that of Mr. Seton Karr,
who, in 1869, filled the position of Foreign Secretary to
the Government of India. Mr. Seton Karr's evidence
is culled from his private memorandum book. That
evidence is not on official record, either in India or a t
the India Office and
I
give prominence to this fact
as showing the secondary importance to be attached
to it. It is an axiom of Indian administration to
record every word, every h e , every expression of im-
portance, which passes between a Viceroy and an Asiatic
ee
p 144 Bfghanistan,
No. 1
t To Secretary of State, 7
June
1875, p. 129
Afghanistan, No. 1
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potentate, or a Foreign Secretary and an Asiatic
minister. This is a point on which most scrupulou~
care is taken.
It is necessary to existing, and vital
to future, interests; and, such being the case, no
responsible Government can justifiably accept extracts
i from private memoranda given ten yeam after an
event, unless fully su13ported by the official records
of the date to which those memoranda may refer.
Mr. Seton Ear r is a distinguished Indian servant,
whose veracity, honour, and ability, are not to be im-
peached.
But to what, after all, does his testimony
amount
Why, merely-to substantiate that of Captain
Grey, vie that the Ameer did not want a Resident
a t
Cahul
and to
a
complete negation of the solemn
guarantee on which the ake
of Argyll relies.
give his own words.
I
. Mr. Seton Earr s letter to Lord Lawrence,
dated 18th November, 1878.
This is what he says to Lord Lawrence
:
As instructed by Lord Mayo,
I
did broach (to the
Ameer) the subject of an English Resident at
Chbul.
Both he and his Minister clearly intimated that they
could not accede to this step.
t would be viewed
with suspicion, they said, by a strong party at
Cabul.
t would excite prejudice and hostility; if anything
happened to the Resident, the Ameer would be blamed
;
and many similar arguments. He certainly did add
that, perso~~ally ,e might have no strong objectio~zs
o
a
Resident, but urged that his chiefs and nobles would
resent the presencq of an Englishman, and that he
could not consent. considered then, as do now,
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t
down his refusal. Indeed, from the Ameer's manner, as
well as from that of his Minister, judged that he dis-
t
1
I
liked this idea as much as anyone, and had no wish for
;
any English political officer.
The subject wa s not a gain
i
p~ressed and Lord Mayo never, think, apprehended
that the proposal would find acceptance. My commu-
nications with the Ameer and with Nur Mahommed
I
were long and frequent. noted down these results
at the time.
have frequently thought over the
matter since, and am quite certain of my facts.
2.)
Mr. Seton Kayr's letter to the Under Secretary
of State for India, dated 10th December, 18 78-
<
repeat that was distinctly empowered by Lord
Mayo to ask the Ameer whether he would consent to
an English Resident (at Cabul), and his reply was that
though
personally he m ig h t no t object
it
'
would do
him harm in the eyes of his people,' and he and
kcis
Ministers used other arguments to the safme effect.
This was by me reported to Lord Mayo in the presence
I n a letter addressed to me on the 4th of April 1869, Mr.
Seton Karr, referring to his conversations with Nur Mahomed,
wrote-
"
could not find an opportunity last night to tell His Excel-
lency that the Ameer, through his Minister, clearly understands
the wishes of the Government about trade and the passes, &c.
In a Note of the same date, enclosed to me for Lord Mayo's
information, Captain Grey made a further report of his private
conversations with the b e e r on matters which Lord Mayo
desired him (Captain Grey) to discuss with His Highness, in the
course of which Shere Ali expressed his readiness to meet the
British Government half -way in every matter that interested
them.
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19 )
of Lord Sandhurst, and the subject was at once dropped
by the Viceroy's express desire.
The Duke of Argyll, in
a
letter to
Mr.
Seton Karr,
dated the 14th December (published in the Daily
News of the 18th idem), congratulates him on having
spoken the truth; believing, apparently, tliat his
evidence had disproved the statement that the Ameer
was not unwilling in 1869 to receive European Agents
in his country (except at Cabul), and that Mr. Seton
Karr had given
a
denial to this assertion.
But all Mr. Seton Ram apparently adduces from
his private memoranda, is the fact stated by Major
Grey and others
in
1869, that the Ameer would
aise difficulties, although probably not insuper-
able ones, to the location of a Resident at
Cabul
Mr. Seton Karr-no doubt inadvertently-omitted
to state that the evidence tendered and accepted
as genuine at Umballa showed that Shere Ali was not
unwilling to have considered the question of the
location of British officers elsewhere than at the
capital, had he been asked, or had the matter been
looked upon as of sufficient importance (which it was
not) to have been urged upon him by the Viceroy.
That Lord Mayo did not really desire, in 1869, to
send British officers to Cabul, or to any othey part of
Afghanistan, as permanent Agents, or, in other words,
to exercise, in
th
state
of
things then existing, inter-
ference in the internal affairs of the country, is
evident from his published despatches and from his
letters quoted by the Duke of Argyll. But before
each of his conferences with Shere Ali, he went over
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with Major Grey, in my presence, the ground whicb
he intended to take up in the event of the Amees
bringing the subject forward and his whole object
was,
whilst making up his mind to refuse to allofl
officers to go th n to Afghanistan, yet to leave his
hands entirely free as to sending them at any
futur
time.
I
am sure Major Grey will bear me out in this
statement; it may also be in his recollection that the
Ameer took a sudden whim into his head
as
to taking
his friend Colonel Cha-rles Chamberlain back with
im
to
Cabul-a step to which Lord Mayo declined to accede.
Whilst the Ameer was not unwilling, the Viceroy
was not willing, to see British officers in Afghanistan.
Lord Mayo only wished to establish what he called an
intermediate policy. He had no wish to interfere,
nor was there at that time any object in doing so, with
the internal politics of the country or with the family
quarrels of the Barakzaies; consequently at his per-
sonal conferences with Shere Bli, he gave him no
encouragement to bring forward the question of
Agents, or other measures involving responsibility in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
Lord Mayo's own views in this respect are contained
in
his private correspondence with the Duke of Argyll
and others.
Thus, he wrote, on the 2nd March 1869,-
I m
entirely opposed to any attempt to take any
direct part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
On the 3rd of June 1869 he wrote,-
As the invasion by a foreign European Power of
his territory was never alluded to by the Ameer
o r me,
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our course of action, in the event of such an occur-
rence taking place,
is
not affected by anything that
took place at Umballa.
Re again wrote, on the 10th June 1869,-
t was repeatedly explained to
im
(Shere Ali)
that we should never send a British soldier to assist
him against his rebellious subjects.
And again, on the 2nd July 1871,-
Then
(if Afghanistan were threatened from with-
out) it might be indispensable to the safety of India
that we should support the Ruler of Cabul with men,
money, and arms but the Ameer was told at Umballa
that no British officer or soldier would ever cross his
frontier to he im
to
put
down a rebellion.
Afghans
do not fight when they can murder or bribe.
As
our
officers do not indulge in the latter business, they
would probably, if employed
in
Afghanistan, be
dis
posed of by assassination, in which case, I think, the.
British lion would naturally seek revenge. think
we should wait a long time before we encouraged civil
war in Afghanistan by giving either ofi ers r money
to
assist any BaraTcsai
in
conquering another.
Again, in regard to the general line of policy to be
pursued in future contingencies towards Afghanistan
and other neigh bouring States, he wrote
:-
have never met a sensible politician who held
the opinion that our true policy is to await an inva-
sion of India within our frontiers.
have frequently
laid down what believe t o be the cardinal points of
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Anglo-Indian policy.
They may be summed up in
few
words. We should establish with our frontier
States of Khelat, Afghanistan, Yarkund, Nepal, and
Burmah, intimate relations of friendship we should
make them feel that, though we are all-powerful, we
desire to support their nationality; that when necessity
arises we might assist them with money, arms, and
even, perhaps, in certain eventualities, with men.
e
could thus create in them outworks of our Empire; and
assuring them that the days of annexation are pa,ssed,
make them know that they have everything to gain
and nothing to lose by endeavouring to deserve o u r
favour and support. Further, we should strenuously
oppose any attempt to neutralise &those erritories
n
the European sense, or to sanction or invite the inter-
ference of any European Power in their affairs. t
may take years to develope this policy. I t is cont rary
to what has been hitherto our course in India but
if
it is once established, recognised, and appreciated, o u r
Empire mill be comparatively secure.
These were the general views held consistently by
Lord Mayo during his Indian administration. He had
no wish in 869 to send British Agents to Afghanistan,
knowing that to do so at that moment was to court
r sk
for no corresponding benefit. They could t he n
only have gone to interfere with domestic politics, o r
to support the b e e r ' s dynasty. Afghanistan was
not threatened from without. Although Russia h a d
made rapid conquests in Central Asia, she had no t
approached inconveniently near t o the afghan border
and Persia showed no symptom of aggression on
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Herat. Consequently the disoussions at Umballa
between Lord Mayo and Rhere
Bli
dealt rather
with Afgbaiiista11 recovering from domestic brawls,
than
with afghanis tan fearilig the aggressions of
a foreign power.
This state of things gave a very
distinct colour to
the
Umballa proceedings, and made
all that mas then said and done essentially different
from transactions of
a
more recent date.
Lord Mayo was not, however, satisfied with the
mode in which we were represented in Afghanistan,
and he, therefore, authorised the Foreign Secretary to
confer tentatively with Nur Mahomed on the subject.
give
the question
put,
and the answer given,
in
the
two conferences held on this subject on the 1st and
3rd of April, 1869
: 1st
April. Question Would
the Ameer sanction
ative
Agents in Afghanistan,
either as visitors or as permanent residents, sup-
posing the British Oavernment wished it ?
Reply.
The Minister remarked that
he
did not wish
to commit himself, and asked rather anxiously
whether European Agents were intended, observing,
at the same time, that
it
was no use to send any but
Mahommedans Hindoos were of no good at all.
He
begged that his reply might not be put on paper.
e
said that he first distinctly wished to ascertain the
Ameer's sentiments.
He
added, he was
looking far forward, and the day might come when
the
'
Russ would arrive, and the Ameer would be
glad not only of British officers as Agents, but of
arms
and
troops to back them.
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reserved in the
conversation of April lst, 1869, the
Minister said that there was no occasion to include
Ghazni as a place of residence for a British Agent, as
Ghazni mas included in Cabul. The Ameer was ready
to have a writer to accompany h im wherever he moved,
and to allow of men in
Turkestan and Balkh, when
the country mas more settled.
At the close of the interview the Foreign Secretary
took the Minister apart and clearly explained to him
His Excellency's instructions that , under no circum-
stances, mas the Ameer to
expect
that British troops
would cross the border to put down civil mar or
domestic contention. This intimation was repeated to
the Minister
by
the Foreign Secretary at a subsequent
interview, and the Minister's reply on both occasions
was clear and satisfactory as to the Ameer's full
ulzderst ndizg on this point.
I n alluding to the coilversations, Lord Mayo*
said :
Two interviews have taken place between the con-
fidential adviser of His Highness Syud Noor Mahomed
Shah and our Foreign Secretary. At these interviews
various matters of importance mere fully discussed,
and the means whereby trade with Afghanistan could
be encouraged, and additional measures for securing
the peace of the frontier could be promoted, were
carefully considered.
An opportunity was also taken,
at the same time, to inform the Minister, in the
I
I
Government
of
India to Secretary of State, April
1869,
p 89,
Afghanistan,
No
1
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clearest and most explicit terms, that the British
Government would always abstain filom any direct
interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,
and
t h a t under no circumstances could Gtish troops
or
r i t i s h oficelfis b e employed across the frontier in
quelling civil contentions or domes ic strife.
Lord Mayo's object at Umballa mas to keep his
Government f r from engagements and pledges
of
a n y kind except those contained in the letter addressed
t o Shere Ali, dated 31st March
1869,
which intimated
t o him that whilst the British Government did not
desire to interfere in the nternal affairs of Afghan-
istan, yet that it would view with severe displeasure
any attempts on the part of his rivals to disturb
his
position as Ruler of Cabul and rekindle civil war
and that it would further endeavour, from time to
time, by such means as circumstances
may
require,
t o strengthen the Government of His Highness.
Finding, however, that the Home Government
did not view these pledges with favour, he justified
them in some detail in a subsequent despatch,? de-
scribing his general policy at Umballa in the following
words :-
The policy that we had endeavoured t o establish
may be termed an intermediate one hat is to say, that
while we distilictly intimated to the Ameer that, under
no circumsta~lces, should
a
British soldier ever cross
his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebelLious
subjects; that no European officers would be placed
See p. 90,
Afghanistan, No.
1
t Government of hdia , 1 uly 1869 p. 94 Afghanistan,
No.
1
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as Residents in his cities; that no fixed subsidy or
money allowance would be given for any named period;
that no promise of assistance in other ways would be
made hat no treaty would be entered into, obliging
us under every circumstance to recognise him and his
descendants rulers of Afghanistan, yet that we were
prepared by the most open and absolute present
recognition, and
by
every public evidence of friendly
disposition, of respect for his character and interest in
his fortunes, to give him all the moral support in our
power, and that in addition we were willing to assist
h im with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers,
and in other ways, whenever we deemed it possible or
desirable to do so.
admit that the phrase in this letter touching the
European officers may be construed to bear, to
some extent, the interpretation placed upon it by the
Duke of h g y l l , in the light of Lord Mayo's private
letter of the 3rd of June
1869.
But affirm with confidence, on the evidence of
Lord Mayo's other letters and the official records of
1869 that no pledge
of
the nature suggested was
given to the Ameer at Umballa.
t
was Shere Ali
who, on first arrival at Umballal, expressed his
c
willingness to receive British Agents at his out-
posts, and his absolute wish to receive them if
Russia ever approached nearer to him. I t was Lord
Mayo who knew that such
a
measure,
if
adopted
by him, would draw from the Ameer further pres-
sure for a treaty on the lines of the agreement of
1857, and commit him to support the Ameer's dynasty.
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The sub je~ t ome, therefore, into the category
of
what
the Ameer
W S
not to have.
much regret, by any testimony of my own, to
cast a of doubt on any expressions used y
Lord Mayo
in
his private letters. But these expres-
sions must be read, as said before, in the light of
the official records of
1869,
and of the spirit of that
great and good Viceroy's whole policy. feel sure
that no one more than Lord Mayo himself, were he
now alive, would regret the meaning attached to
words which he intended merely to apply t o the
fact that he had no desire to force a Resident
at Cabul on the Ameer, or to send officers across
the frontier to countenance
Shere Ali's family quar-
rels, and commit the British Government to support
his dynasty in the state
of
thngs existing at that
p
er io d.
Is
it possible that Lord Mayo, whose sole object at
Umballa was to establish an intermediate policy capable
of future development, and to keep his hands free in
regard to future contingencies, would tie to all time
his own action, and the action of his successors, y
a pledge in the sense understood y the Duke of
Axgyll? Could he have done so without specifio
instructions from the Home Government? Had so
solemn a pledge been given, would it not have been as
solemnly placed on official record Would it not have
been given personally by the Viceroy to Shere Ali?
Would no t Shere Ali have mentioned
it
in subsequent
transactions Would not ur Mahomed have brought
it forward as an unanswerable argument to Lord North-
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brook in 1873,* when his Foreign Secretary pressed on
that wily Asiatic the advantages of a permanent British
representative at Cabul Would he not equally have
given to such a pledge a prominent place in his argu-
ments at the Peshawur Conference of 1877, and have
thereby effectually stopped all further discussion
Nur Mahomed certainly did constantly refer, both
in
1873 and 1877, to Lord Mayo's pledges to the
Ameer, but only in the sense that those pledges meant
an unconditional guarantee of protection without
return of any kind from Shere Ali-an argument
successfully disproved both by Lord Northbrook and
Lord Lytton.
I t stands to reason that if the b e e r was not un-
willing in 1869 to
receive British Agents into his
country (except at Cabul), he would hardly have
devoted all his energies to obtain a concession, a
solemn pledge, to the contrary from Lord Mayo.
If
the evidence, in regard to this willingness, of the
Viceroy's confidential interpreter, Major Grey; of the
See
Government of h d i a lett.er, para. 13, 10 May 1877, p. 162,
Af ghanistan, No.
1
It is remarkable that
in
none of the arguments
used by ur Mahomed at any time was mention made of any pledge
given to the b e e r by Lord Mayo on the subject of Agents.
It
is
equally remarkable, as showing the slow rate of progression of
the Afghan nation, that
ur
Mahomed repeated the same excuses
for delay,
in
regard to the question of British Agents
in
Afghan-
istan, as urged twenty years previously by Hafiz-ji.
No wonder
the b e e r exclaimed at Peshawur,
ll
people are advancing in
the arts of peace and civilization.
It
is only we dfghans who
remain
the ignorant asses we have always been.
(Commissioner
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Ameer's friend and confidential interprete', Dr Bellew;
of the Viceroy's Private Secretary; and of Lord Mayo
himself; are collectively to be treated as inaccurate
and valueless, then
I have nothing more to say.
But
I
venture to think that no after attempts to shake
our evidence, or to throw doubts on records
accepted
fid
ofici lly
re orded
in
1869, should be allowed
to weigh with any reasonable mind as against facts
established in that year, accepted by the Covern-
ment of that day as genuine, and not doubted or
attempt,ed to be shaken until many years afterwards.
If, on the other hand, our evidence is trustworthy,
then the argument now put forward that British
officers in Afghanistan were in 1869 the one dread
and abhorrence of Shere Ali. falls to the ground.
It is of course possible that Lord Mayo, when he
instructed Mr .
Seton Karr to let the subject of a Resi-
dent
at
Calsul drop, may have given him some
general authority to assure Nur Mahomed that he had
no wish to send an officer to Cabul against the Ameer's
wish. Admitting this, for the sake of argument, let
us examine for a few moments how the fact affects
the policy adopted since 1875-76, by Her Majesty's
present Government and the Viceroy.
The instructions? sent by Lord Salisbury to the
Governor-General of India on the 22nd January 18'75,
made the establishment of a British Agency
at erat
(not a t Cabul) dependent on the assent of the
+
'(The Eastern Question, Vol
ii.
p 271
afghanistan, No
I.
p. 128
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Ameer, His illstructions of the 19th November
1875 pointed equally to the necessity of obtaining
the ccconcurrence of the Ameer even in receiving
a tempor ry mission in his capital to confer on Ceiitral
Asian affairs. The instructions of the 28th February
1876, given to Lord Lytton, pointed equally to
a temporary mission to Cabul to overcome the
Ameer's apparent reluctance, as reported by Lord
Northbrook, to the establishment of Agencies in
Afghanistan ; and to the offer of great and permanent
benefits, the only return for which benefits was to be
His Highness's consent to the placing of British
Agents in those parts of his dominions whence they
might best match the ourse of events outside his
dominions.
There is certainly no sign in these papers
of any attempt to break solemn pledges, even had
they been given, or any desire to force Agents on
Shere M i against his wish.
From my position as Private Secretary to Lord
Lytton, I am able to say from personal experience that
nothing could exceed, from the first moment he landed
in India, the patience with which that nobleman dealt
with Shere Ali, and the pains he took in carrying out
the instructions of the Home Government.
/
On arrival at Calcutta he arranged, with the
unanimous concurrence of his Council, to send
his own aide-de-camp, Ressaldar Khanan Khan, to
the Ameer, charged with a letter and verbal mes-
sages to Shere Ali, informing him of his intention
t o
depute Sir Lewis Pelly temporarily to Cabul, or
to any other place convenient to His Highness,
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to confer
on
matters o common interest to the two
Governments. No question of Agents mas men-
tioned, but the verbal communications which the Res-
saldar was empowered
t~
make were of a most friendly
and ass ~~ r in gature.
S
Shere Ali declined t o re eive Lord ~ f i t o n Y snvoy;
and this within a month after the Viceroy's arrival in
India', long before Lord Lyttolz committed the offences
of which the Duke of Argyll so emphatically accuses
him.
Yes, the Ameer, who had two Russian Native
Agents at his Court, who wa s in full correspo~dencemith
General Kauffman, and who was, according to intelli-
gence afterwards received reliable sources, making
preparations fo r exciting
a
jehad at Cabul against the
British Government, declined to receive the British
Envoy. The matters t o be laid before the Ameer
were of too great importance to be sent in writing
f o r
the criticism of General Eauffman the Ameer could
not come at that moment to India; and the Viceroy
did not feel justified
n
submitting his proposals to
any one but the
Ameer
himself; he desired, hom-
ever, to be patient;
and '
although much disappointed
at the Ameer's refusal, h e took no hurried action he
again consulted his Council, and, with the concurrence
of the majority of his advisers, deemed it right, under
the special circumstances of the moment, not to ac-
quiesce i n that refusal, but t~ reply to Shere
letter in firmer lallgu
age
than under ordinary circum-
stances he would have used, warning him not to hastib
reject the hand of friendship held out to him Lord
Lytton
h d reasons, justified by the v nts
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o
the moment, for wording his communication in
this language, -urging the Ameer to reconsider his
position and the chances he was throwing away of a
irm
alliance with the British Government. That
communicat,ion went to the Ameer, after careful and
lengthened consideration at Simla, on the 8th of July
1876.
After a delay of nearly two months, the Ameer
replied, still refusing to receive
Sir
Lewis Felly, b u t
pyoposing that the British Vakeel a t Cabul should b e
summoned to Simla to expound the whole state of
affairs, and to hear what the Byitish Government
had
to say to the Ameer. So reluctant was Lord Lytton
to treat the Ameer harshly or hastily, that he p u t
aside all his own wishes on the subject, and con-
sented to this course. By the hand of this Vakeel
he entrusted, for communication to Shere Ali,
an
Aide Memoi~e,dated 13th Oct. 1876.
This Aide Meemo~oil e nformed Shere Mi, clearly and
succinctly, of the great and liberal coiicessions t h e
British Government was prepared to grant him,
and
of the reasonable return required by it for tliose
concessions.
. offering the Ameer these terms, viz. a treaty of
alliance, a dynastic and territorial guarantee, a n d
prospective financial and military aid, Lord Lytt80u
distinctly indicated, in conciliatory language, that
he
had no desire to press Agents on the Ameer against
his wish. But it was clearly impossible to undertake
the weighty obligations, above noted, on behalf of
the
b e e r unless His Highness, on
his
part, consented
t
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accept the conditions offered to him; and this was all
that yas intimated to Shere Ali. He was asked to
discuss the matter frankly, and he knew perfectly
that the discussion would be a fair and reasonable one
on the part of the Indian authorities.
In this Aide Memoi~eLord Lytton said, in effect,
I am prepared to give you a treaty, guarantee your
dynasty, a large annual subsidy, aiid defence from
outward aggression, some of which benefits you desired
in 1869, some in 1873; if you desire them now, all I
ask
in
return is permission to establish a British
Agent at Herat or elsewhere on your frontier to watch
affairs beyond it. These officers are not to inter-
fere with you. If they do, I will at once recall them.
In short, to be accurate, I give his own words.*
He
said :-
I
authorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that I am
glad to find
it
in my power to relieve his mind from
many apprehensions as to
my
intentions, which appear
to have been caused by circumstances previous to
my assumption of the Government of India. I
autliorise the Agent to tell the Ameer that, if His
Highness wishes to make me his friend,
I
mill
be
a
warm and true,
a
fast and
firm
friend to
him,
doing
all that is practically in
my
power to stand by
him
in his difficulties, to cordially support him, to
strengthen his throne, to establish his dynasty, and to
confirm the succession in the person of his son Sirdar
Abdullah
an,
etc.
i
am,
theref ore, willing to give im
treaty of
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anns men and money for the defence of his terri-
tory against unprovoked foreign invasion. am
f urtller willing to give him immediate pecuniary
assistance and to give to his son Abdullah Jan the
public recognition and support of the British Govern-
merit .
But I cannot do any one of these things unless
tlie Ameer is on his part equally willing to afford me
tile practical means of assisting His Highness in the
potection of his frontier by the residelice of a British
Agent
st
Herat and at such other parts of that fTontier
most exposed to danger from without as may be
hereafter agreed upon.
I do not even wish to embarrass the Ameer whose
present difficulties
I
fully sympathise with by carrying
out this arrangement until after the signature of
a
Treaty of Alliance between us on terms which ought
to satisfy His Highness of the perfect loyalty of our
friendship nor unt.il after the Ameer shall have had
tlie means of making known to his people that the
presence of
a
British Agent in Afghanistan signifies
tliat lie is tliere without interfering in internal State
matters a s the firm supporter of the Ameer and of
the heir-apparent to aid them with all the influence
and power of the British Government in defending
their country against foreign aggression and to dis-
courage
attempt,^
on the part of the disaffected to
disturb its internal tranquillity or weaken the throne
of
His Highness.
t
will be the duty of any such British Agents to
watch the external affairs of the frontier furnishing
timely and trustworthy intelligence thereof to the
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I
Ameer, as well as to the British Government.
Should
the Ameer at any time have good cause to complain
that any British Agent has interfered in the internal
affairs of the country, the Agent will at once be
re-called.
I have no wish to disturb the existing Native
I
Agency at Cabul, or to urge upon the Ameer the
I
reception
of
a permanent British Envoy at his Court,
if
His Highness thinks that the presence of such an
Envoy would be a source of embarrassment to him.
But, in that case, I should, of course, expect that
n o
obstacle be placed in the way of confidential commu-
nications between myself and His Highiiess,
by
means
of
special Envoys, whenever the interests
of
the two
Governments may require them.
In short, it is my object and desire that t h e treaty
of friendship and alliance, as well as the presence of
British Agents on the Afghan frontier, should be
a
i
great strength and support to the Ameer, both at
home as well as abroad, and not
a
source of weakness
or embarrassment to him.
In his personal conference with the British Vakeel
(who was individually opposed to anything like his
own supersession in Afghanistan by temporary o r per-
manent European Agents, and was not therefore a very
cordial co-operator) Lord Lytton used firm language.
It w s
necessary to show this official that whilst the
British Government did not desire to b'e unfriendly to
Shere Ali, it was not a Government to be trifled with.
The Ameer, d t e r all,
was
only asked to consider the
proposals laid before him; they were not being forced
upon him against his will. The Vakeel expressed,
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or
any rate pretended to express, his hope that
Shere Ali would consent to consider the pToposals so
beneficial to his interests. ut the hostile feeling
at
Cabul against the British Government remained un-
changed.
On
the return of the Vakeel, the Ameer,
under pretence of sickness, declined to receive h im
for some weeks and when a t last he did so it was
not
in
any very friendly spirit. fact, there w a s
treachery at work, and a further delay of th ree
months during which the Viceroy vainly waited for a
reply to, or even a recognition of, his friendly
ide
Memoire.
At length, on the 28th January, 1877, the P r im e
Minister, apparently as a reply to the
Aide Memoiq e,
appeared a t Peshawus. The Viceroy accepted
t he
deputation of this functionary as a token of Shere Ali s
acquiescence in the discussion of the important mat te rs
impending between them, on the bases of that docu-
ment. But he was deceived. Nur Mahomed was ted
meetings which lasted from the 30th of January
to
the 19th February, 1877,
n
mere recriminations
as
to
past
policy.
He
professed to have no authority
t o
discuss the bases of the
Aide Memoire
nd all this
time
Shere
i
continued his activity at Cabul in jeh d
matters; and now openly, as he had hitherto
d o n e
secretly, issued to the whole of the tribes down
the
frontier, sunnuds obtained from the Akhoond of Swat ,
authorising a religious war against the British Govern-
ment, a war which might have broken out at
n y
moment. Shere
li
was in nightly conference
with
Russian Agents ; affairs in Europe were critical, a n d
Lord Lytton was only too glad to take advantage
of
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the death of Nur Mahomed to avoid further pitfalls.
He now found
it
impossible to pledge the British
Government to a treaty with a ruler who so clearly
showed the cloven hoof, and he put an end, on justi-
fiable grounds, to conference which codd in these
circumstances only end in mischief. Lord Lytton took
this step not only with the full concurrence of his
confidential advisers, but with the approval of the
Home Government.
Such is the history of the commencement and
termination of the Peshawur conference.
Whilst the
Indian Viceroy was endeavouring to maintain satis-
factory relations with the Ameer by offering ll
he was ever supposed to desire, in return for a con-
cession to which he had not in former years indicated
insuperable objections, Shere A was nourishing
against the British Government an inveterate ani-
mosity an animosity rendered specially dangerous by
the past intimacy of his relations with General Kauf-
mann.
This intimacy we were powerless to preventl
or counteract on account of our continued and accepted
exclusion from afghanistan.
I n the then existing state of things in Europe
it
became necessary for the Government of India to
remain passive, so long as it could do so with dignity,
and so long as the b e e r did not commit
any
further
overt act of hostility.
But all further efforts to strengthen our relations
with him and to place them on a proper footing, were
useless and close intercourse between the two Go-
vernments practically ceased. Events
had,
in fact,
proved the correctness of Lord Mayo s view of Shere
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Ai, as expressed in 869 He is a wilful, impulsive
man, leaving much to fate, and possessing few of
the generous qualities which characterised his father.
We cannot do much but watch
him
as well as
w
can.
confine my observations to facts in regard to
which have personal knowledge and recollection.
do not, therefore, attempt to touch on those later
passages in our relations with Cabul which followed
the b e e r ' s reception, in July last, of a Russian
mission.
-do not write in any controversial spirit,
nor do I desire to do more than fulfil a duty to Lord
Mayo, to Major Grey, and to myself, in establishing
plain facts, and in removing doubts as to the accuracy
of our evidence.
\
I
commend the plain facts set forth in this narrative
to the impartial consideration of fair-minded men,
,
before they accept as conclusive the Duke of Argyll's
al
estimate of the evidence, on particular points, of
witnesses opposed to his own view of the case; and
his criticisms on the action of the present Viceroy of
India and the Government which Lord Ly-tton
has
faithfully served.
OWEN TUDOR BURNE.
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No~~--Since mriting the foregoing observations,
have read letter from Major rey in the Times of
this day's date- As
this
letter strengthens
my
own
evidence bearing on the Umballa conferences, append
an extract from
it
:
was confidentially employed by Lord Mayo on the occasion of
the meeting with Ameer Shere Ali W a n at Umballa. kept full
mmnoranda of everything that occurred, and these, with copies of
official reports, semi-official notes, and other papers that passed
through my hands, are now efore me.
Mr. Seton Karr ~houldbe cognizant of what passed between
myself and the Ameer, or his Wazir, on various occasions during
the Umballa meeting, for embodied the results of my interviews
in official reports, dated the 29th of March, the 3rd of April, and
the 4th of April, 1869.
In
the last of these, which was a summary
of my entire proceedings, gave an abstract of the results of piivate
interviews with the b e e r , or Wazir, on the 26th of March (before
the Viceroy's arrival); the 27th, 29th, 30th, and the 31st of March,
the 1st of April (three interviews), the 2nd of April (several
interviews), and the 3rd of April. In the first of them is the
following passage :
L He (the Ameer) is open to any proposition for securing his
northern border
;
while doubtful of any Russian power for aggres-
sion for some years to come, still thinks precautions should
be
taken; would construct forts on his own part or under our superin-
tendence, and admit European garrisons if ever desired; would
gladly see an agent or engineer superintendent there (in Balkh),
Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul, which might lead to the
supposition of his being a puppet. There would be no danger to
such did they respect the Afghans and themselves.'
My summary of the 4th of April, 1869, before referred to, states
that the Ameer was a party to this conversation, which occurred
previous to the first private interview of the b e e r with the Vice-
roy on the 29th of March. obtained the Ameer's opinions on this
point with a view to matter being broached at that interview, which,
however,or some reason, was not done. The second private interview
between the Viceroy and b e e r occurred on the 3rd of April. y
official summary of the 4th of April, says :
Ofi *day, the 2nd of April, had several interviews with
the
beer
and Wazir regarding points to be settled by the latter
with the Foreign Secretmy next morning (the discussionregarding
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trade routes)
and
hp the Ameer at the next day's private
interview. '
c c 3lY l+,rivate memoranda say on this head :-
In accordance with my representations, therefore, a new le tt er
was addressed to the Ameer, to which I was directed, if possible,
to obtain a reply of complete satisfaction, and also to arrive at
&finite understanding with him on various other points noted
below, which should be held the second private interview,
which shoulcl in a manner sanction and confirm the results of the
The points were : 1)That the b e e r should accede
to our deputation of native Agents whereveer me pleased-to this
the
b e e r agreed and promised to assist them in every may
;
2)
to
whether the Ameer mas agreeable to the deputation
of
~ n v o yt some future date-on this point the Ameer expressed
his willingness to receive
an
Envoy as soon as things had somewhat
down, anywhere save at Cabul, where he thought i t would
affect his power with the people.
.'
I
ct In March, 1875 he Government of Ind ia inquired from me
rnhcther my knowledge of what passed at Umballa led me to
believe that th e Ameer would received British officers at Herat o r
Candahar.
I replied, giving the facts detailed above, and
I
may note that the b e e r was at the time eager to meet our
views, or what he supposed to be such, and his whole atti tude was
that of one anxious to please.' I further explained myself, semi-
officially, as follows
:-
l C
I n saying that he would receive an Envoy when matters had
soniewhat settled down, the Ameer referred, as
I
understood,
merely to hi9 immediate t~ouhles,Afghanistan being then still
much disturbed and a campaign in Turkestan imminent.
I
had
been instructed to ask whether the Ameer would receive an Envoy
a t some future date. ' He had agreed to the deputation of native
Agents
"
wherever we pleased, and his only stipulntion regarding
British Envoys was that they should not reside in cabu1.j
"Your obedient servant,
I
"a.GREY,
Major, Political Agent and Superb-
"
endent, Bahawalpur State.
"
Bahawalpur, Jan. 18.
0 T. B.
4th
Feb
18 79.
I
L O S D O N
PRMTED BY W. H.
ALLEN UTD CO. 13 WATERLOO
PLACE PALL HALL
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Purpose confining my rem ark s up on th e important subject
of
th e proposed rectification of o u r fro ntie r l ine exclusively t o t h e
present mil i ta ry and poli t ical aspects of the quest ion as, eq ~ la l l y
with Sir H. Norman ,
I
should deprecate any reference to
the
policy which ha s preceded th e present w ar in Afghanistan, for I
cannot b ut consider th at th e recent Par l iamentary discussions h av e
been based upon a n ent i re ly fa lse issue, an d tha t t h e quest ion
which th e Na tion real ly req uir ed to b e solved, was no t w het he r
Lords Lawrence an d Northbrooke in act in g upon the t radi t ional
mo tto of th e B ri ti sh Fore ign Office, viz., Sufficient for th e
d ay
i s
the evil thereof, failed to talne t h e necessary steps to establish ou r
influence a t Cabul , a nd , ,h us to frus trat e th e aation of Russia, act ion
wLich, although fully anticipated by al l who had careful ly stu die d
the poli tical s t ra te gy of t h a t great Power , both in E uro pe a r~d
Asia may have been looked upon by t h e noble Lords
and
the i r
advisers as stil l probably very remote, b u t whether, when we found
tlint comtnunications were frequently passing between Gen eral
Kauffmann and Sher Al i and th at , finally, a Russian Mission
had reacl~ ed he capital an d Russ ian influence become al l-powerful
at the Arneey's Co urt , i t was ou r duty, in th e interests of ou r
Ind ian Em pi re a n d for th e main tenance of peace both withi n an d
without our borders, to supine ly continu e to pursue our policy of
masterly inactivity, or to a t once encleavonr to counteract tb e in -
trigues, I will n ot sa y of our enem y, b u t certainly of our political
rival , and to convince both h er a n d the Ameer tha t , ml~ ilst m ost
anxious t o m ain tain friendly relat ions w ith Afghanistan ancl most
unwill ing to interfere in her int ern al affairs, we will brook no such
interference on t h e par t of a Po w er th at ha s already declared th e
Ameer's t err ito rie s to be be yo nd th e sphere of her political action,
and which consequently can only have entered the Afghan King-
don1 with th e view of ma kin g i t either a screen behind which she
might stealtl l i ly mature her plans for clisquieting our frontier and
spreading sedition amongst o u r subjects, or a cat's-paw by which
she migh t effect h e r ends w ithout run nin g t he risk of being called
to account in the event of her machinations proving unsuccessful.
I
mere mi litar y point of view, no one can dispute th e accuracy
of the definition given by S ir H e n r y No rm an of a scientific frontie r,
bu t i t has to be considered
1 W het her our present frontier answers to t he definit ion.
2 W heth er political considerations may not over-balance the
purely military in deciding what
is
to be th e fu ture f ront ier of ou r
India n Empire .
Genera l Norm an r igh tly s t a t es th a t a good frontier
is
o ne t h a t
would dot enta il th e employm ent for i t s defence of an excessive
force of troops,
the
occup ation of which wo uld not in ot he r re-
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spects be very costly th e com mu nication s of which, along th e
whole line, and
w i t h
t h e bases i n rear, are fa i r ly easy an d no t l iable
to interruptiou h a t it should, while in i tself st ro n g bulwark,
have in its front obst 'acles that would be very serious t o a n attack-
ing force, and yet n ot such as to p reclude blows bein g delivered to
the front
by
the defenders.
Let us examine how far our prese nt frontie r accords with this
description.
I t consis ts of a narrow t rac t of coun try about 500
miles i n length, s i tua ted between a ran ge of hi l ls on
th
one side,
and a broad and rapid r iver on th e other, hence t h e force by which
it
is occupied can ne ithe r advance no r re tre at n fact, no t only
does it not hold th e glacis of t h e fortress, b u t it does not even
occupy
the
bastions and ravelins so long as
it
is n eed ed only for
t h e
defence of our territories again st t h e at tac ks of me re predatory
tribes occup_ving h e hills, a t th e base of w hich th e fron tier line
runs, possibly its gr ea t defect is of tr iflin g im po rtan ce, for the
duty of our troops is confined alm ost entire ly t o t h e p ursu it of
raiders, who rarely wait to be attacked, but,
as
soon as they meet
with
serious opposit-ion, hurriedly retire, in t h e hop es of escaping
to theit- fastnesses with the booty the y have captu red-the desire
for plunder being the sole inducement for th ei r incursions; bu t
\voulil this be th e case in t h e even t of I n d i a bei ng seriously
n~enncedwith invasion
by
a larg e an d well-disciplined force, aug-
mented by a horde of irregu lar troops, ius tig ate d by th e hopes of
participating in th e spoils of t h e rich cities in t h e plains, t o become
auxiliaries in the att em pt.
As all
the passes
t o
our fro nt woulcl be closed ag ai ns t u s, wh ilst
our whole line would b e threatened , i t would be o u t of ou r power
either to advance, in order to strike
a
counter-blow, a n d act upo n
the enemy's lines of communication, o r t o conc en trate our troo ps
upoil any
given
pojut, in order to meet
him
on his debouching
into the
plains,
at
% he same t ime with
his
base
extending from
Candahar tc
Cabnl and
sheltered from ob serv atio i~beh ind the
screen of mouutai n s, the invader m igh t quiet, ly collect h is
supplies
and
make his p reparations for a tta ck ing us upon what
might appear our [nos t unguarded point , h i s re al a t tack being
accompanied aud concealed by feiuts directed upon other parts
of
our line,
as
the
weak
columns employed for this purpose when
driven back, woultl simply ret ire upon st ro n g positions in t h e
hills, from which
m e
should have difficulty i n dislodg ing them, a n d
from which the y could always
g in
advance, thus necess i ta t ing
our retaining corps of observation in fron t o each o f the th ree
great passes-corps so far digttant from on e an o th er , as to p rev en t
their affording m ut ua l supp ort in case of at tac k, w hilst, if o n e
should be overpowered, th e safety of
th
other two would become
jeopardised, and
they
could only escape from their critical posi-
tion by retiring across the Indus in
th
face
O a
p u r s u i n g
euemy,
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U nd er t h e above circurnatances so long as we do not command
th e passes i t can hardly thinlt be maintained th at our posit ion
is such as to enable
s
to deliver counter-attacks in case of v a r
o r calculated t o secure our subjects from invasions from Afghan s
o r others wh ether incited to anno y us by Russia or doing so
of
their own mere motion.
If
on th e contrary th e passes were in ou r possession the n in-
deed ou r positioll would be coroparatively strong .
few well-
selected po sitiol~ s cu ref ul lj stren gth ene d would enable a sn1a11
fo rce to bar th e passage of nu arm y wh ilst reinfol.cements could
wh en necessary be furnishe d by t h e su pp ortin g columns located in
th e plaills and even alt ho ug h th e out-posts might be eventually
colnpelled t o retreat t ime would be gained and a t th e same tiole
the hosti le leader would be cornl~elled
in
sorne measure to shew
hi s hand a n d thu s from th e na ture of th e several athacks our com-
lliander would be able to form some idea as to the strength of tho
enem y a n d liis prokpable plan of op era tic~ ns nd be ide to judge of
th e directio n in which liis main body is moving nud consequently
of t h e p o in t on wl1ic11 hi s decisive blow
is
ii~teild ed o be struck.
I t may be said th at by throwing our outposts too niuch in ad-
vance they would be isolated from th eir suppo rts an d their coln-
mu nications l ikely to be cut off whilst
if
constraiued to retire the y
wou ld hav e to do so thro ug h difficult country
i n
a l ~ i c bhey
would be liable to be harassed by hostile tribes.
Now this obser-
vatio n wou ld apply almost t~xclusively lo th e force stationed
t
t he
fur th er ext remi ty
of
the Rh:-her Pa s s of course presume th a t
some years must i n ll prob ability elapse ere any foreign power
could be in pos ition to place in line sufficiently arg e arm y s to
absolu tely imperil ou r north-w est frontier in th e meanwhile may
we not fairly hope th at in the Indian Army men may arise who
cheered by the success th at a t te i~ d ed he effor ts of the g al lant an d
lam ente d Ou traln with th e Bhcels may devote their energies
t o
brin gin g und er subjection some of th e H ill tribes and by wisc
displa y of firmness temp ered with kindne ss may fiucceed in con-
isroll ing even th e most lawless
a n d
convertiag those who now form
m ere band s of robbers into ga lla nt . and loyal defenders of ou r
rule. Should this happ y result be obtained every mo untain r idge
betweeu Dhalm an d Jumrood would become an im po rtan t posi-
t ion which t he assailants could only carry with great loss; bu t
even supposing th e hope were no t re;~liued an d th e tr ibes con-
tin ue d hostile still th e ret rea t need n ot prove difficult doubt-
less th e road-way betmeeu Dha1;a a n d Al i M usjid will be much
improve d th e distance is b u t twenty-one miles of which th e last
th i r t eeu
on ly w ould offer serious obstacles to th e rapid inovements
of a retir in g column b u t these obstacles would equally retard th e
advance of th e pu rsu ing enemy th e more especially as the heights
would be crowned by th e slrirmishers of t h e force detached from
th
suppor ts t t h e la tte r place to cover th e retreat. Th e defile
naxrows
for
th e las t th ree miles before reaching Ali Musjid an d
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this portion of the Pass vould naturally be sharply contested,
vllilst the wlzole of the main-body stationed in the neigl~bourhood
of Jamrood could be brought into action in order to crush the
enemy whilst still embarrassed
in
the
defile,
and unable to
make
effective use of his artillery.
I n
the Khurum Valley, the advance-post would be
at
the Peiwar
Psas
and the support-s at the Khurum for t
and Thull,
whilst, to
the south, the advanced post would be
in
the neighbourhood of
Quettah, or in the Fishin Valley, and the supports a t Jacobabad
~ h e i a c G b a z iXhan n neither case, apparently, would there
be any difficulty in maintaining the requisite communications. I n
tlle first, the out-post mould
be
connected with the fort by
valley, offering no impediments
t o
a rapid advance and,
in
the
second, although the country through which the supports would
have to pass is rugged, and the distances are great, the popula-
tion is friendly.
At present, even in time of peace, in addition to the troops
stationed
in
the Cis Indus districts of the Punjaub, a large
gar-
rison is needed a t
Pesbawur,
and a special corps, consistiilg
of
(including the guides) six cavalry and twelve infantry regiments,
with sevel-a1 batteries of artillery, is posted along the frontier,
simply for the purpose of protecting our subjects from incursions
from across the border,
and
so long as our relatious with the
Hill tribes remain on their present footing, no reduction can
be
made in the strength of this force.
General Norman acknowledges that the oc~upationof t h e 7111~-
r u m
Valley ~vould ender our fronticr
near
Tllull more secure, but
he
objects to our holding Quettah
and
the Ehyber Pass, princi-
pally upon the grouuds that it wollld be necessary for this pur-
pose to withdraw from the gar~isoa
of
India a force which he
estimates at not less than '7,000 or 8,000
men.
Surely
this
de-
n~ands greatly over-estimated, when
il;
is 1-emembered that, in
1842
a
garrison, entirely isolated, separated from our frontier not
merely p a range of mountains, but by
t h e
entire breadth of the
Punjaub, without any Europeari supports nearer than Kurnaul,
garrison consisting of one regime
lit
of Europeau infantry, one
regi~neut f Native infantry, two squadrons of Native cavalry,
1)att)eryof artillery,
and
some Native sappers and
miners,
nurn-
bering
of all arms, about 1,800 men, not only held tlle position of
Jellitlabad throughout the winter, but eventually iuflicted GI-ush-
i n g
defeat upon their assailants, capturiug all their gulls a nd
camp-equipage, and compelliug them to raise the siege; this, too,
ts
~
time
when
the whole of Afghanistan, elated by the aunihila-
tiou of the Cabul gariison, had risen against us.
Under present circumstances, with a British cantonnlent
t
Peshawur and British posts
at
Ali
Musjid
and Dhaka,
a
force
of
the
salne
strength would,
i n
ordinary tirnes, bc
sufficient
to
gale-
risoli
Jellult~l~tlrl,specially
as
there seems to
bo
no reason to doubt
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the possibili ty of o a r being
llle
to raise f rom L ]~ , .Iill tril,es, for
P1.otectoll of u r l in e o f ~ o m n l u u i c n t i ~ mbrougll tho g h j b e r
P as s, a body of milit in, perfectly faithful so long s tllril. pay r l l : ~ ~
b e re gu lar ly issu ed, a nd capitble, under tlie colltrol of cal*efully
sel ec te d c om n lsnrle r, i ~ h oV O U ~ ~tu dy their feeliugs an d prpjudiees,
of beco tn ing an ex t remely valual,le force , alld the lu rer t l ~ m u ~ l i
which w e m ight ex tend cur influence gener.~l lg th roughoutv l ~ e
border. W ith t-he Kh j-ber P a s s it1 our hands. th e force i ll th e
P e sh a w u r Division m ight, with possibly consi~lernble advan tage
a s regard s the b p d t h of th e Br i ti sh t roops , furnish the necessary
d e t a il t o
fo1 m
the Jel l~ t l i tbad arr ison ; he duty of ho l~l inghe K hu-
r u m Va lley would b e ent4rustecl o th e Purljaub frontier force, whilst
t h e addi t ion of
a
wing of Euro pcnn re gi m el ~t o t l ie forcc
Ly
which Quet tah has recent ly beell occul)ied, mould be sufficient to
re nd er th a t pos t capable of resisting uy unforeseen attack tlint
m ig h t b e made up on it..
T h e Sham i D istric t , wllich is 5,500 feet above the sea, is state~l
t o 11nve
a
del igh tful climate, i n the hottest season of th e year
(between J u n e an d Au gu st) , the highest range of the t liernlolnetcr
b e i n g 80° a n ag ree abl e contrast to th at of Scinde, from which th e
win g m ig ht safely b e withdraw n, whilst th e men would benefit by
the i r removal f rom a district in which, du ring fire months in th e
year, the heat is excessive, often remaining at
100
throughout
t h e n i gh t .
U n d e r th e dispositioli al~T.)vepecified, t h e es ta bl is l~ m eu t f thc:
th re e adv anced po sts would l .)rove no great drain upon our Arrny
a n d , w it h th e exception of the corps of Local Milit in,
of
vhicb t l lc
cost would not be excessive, need not elitail any necessitly for thc
addit ion of
a
single soldier.
A n y sc he m e for occupy ing th e ra ug es of hills stre tch ing fro111
H az ar ah to Sc inde an d c iv ilis ing the inhabi tan ts by maill force,
m ig ht cer tain ly be deemed visionary, an d we must t rust , as Sir
H
N o r n ~ a nruly states, to time nncl such civilizing iiifluences a s
we ca n br in g to b e a r to taliie aitd educate these mild people
b u t i t j s a ques t ion wl ie thcr ~ccupying
h e
advanced positions
no w proposed, we sho uld no t possess grea ter f;sil ities fur exert-
ill ou r inf luence over atllem. This would be wore p a r t i c ~ ~ l s r l j ~
t h e case as regard s t h e t r ibes in t he neighbourhood of the Khyber
P a s s a n d E h u r u m Valley , upon whom the very fac t of our
ho ldi ng posts in th eir rear woulrl have
a
great moral etfect.
T h e taslc of sp rea di ng th e blessings of order i\nd civilin;ltion
a m o n g st tho fierce races to be found in the borderland is, doubt-
less, deserving of serious consideration-it
is
ou
e
involving great
labour
nd
responsibility, an d can only be carried out graduallp
st i l l i t i s not beyond t he po se r of Great Bri ta in, and, i f success-
fully ccomplished, must a d d materinlly
to
the s:rkty alld pros-
per i ty
of our o~ vl1 rovinces. H itlle rtu our efforts towmrds th is pnd
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J
repression no systematic at te m pt ha s
been
mad e t o b ri n g
thenl under our influence
and any such a t t empt would have
been u t ter ly frui t less and indeed ou t of place so lon g as the y w ere
beyond t h e l imits of our jurisdict ion an d ackaowledged nom inal
to another power bu t once b roug ht w i th in our f ron-
t ier l ine means would no t be w ant ing for th e extension of ou r
in tercourse wi th them a n d
w
migh t fai rly an t ic ipa te tha t in
th e cou rse of a few years such intercourse if conducted un de r
wise and stric t supervision ulight lead to hap py results.
n h i s
of the A r t of W ar General Jom ini in referr ing t o
l ines of defence states t h a t al l chains of mo untaius and al l gre at
defiles protected by entr enc hm ents up on the ir accessible points
c a n
be
regarded as defensive l ines a t the same t ime stra teg ic
an d tact ical s ince they serve to s u ~ p e n d ur ing several days th e
march of a n enemy a n d oftLeu oblige hinl t o deviate from his
direct. m arch to seek a passage less difficult in which case th ey
prove a n evident s t ra tegic advantage; bu t i f th e enemy al tacl i s
t .bem i n force to their front th en it i s c lear th at th ey hav e also
a
tact ical advantage since it is always m ore difficult to at tac k a n
enemy in a post s t rong both by natu re
and
a r t t h a n t o a t ta c k
him in a n open pla in n d he points out how th e smal l for t of
Bard
m ig ht have arre sted th e descent of t he Army: of Napoleon
in to the Valley of Aosta an d equally how a few good forts in the
defi les of the Balkans mig ht have frust ra ted th e Russ ian p lan s in
the campaign of 1829 remarking that to concentra te forces in
th e p la ins i s
a
na tura l system but in a co unt ry w ith difficul t
gorges it is t o del iver th e keys of the coun try in to the han ds of
th e en em y; xvhilst he describes a mountainous frontier as a defile
difficult to pass a tem pora ry obstacl e which once
COII
quared presents
an adva ntage ra ther than a danger to the army which has succeeded
in seizing i t .
I n
fact th e obstacle once surmounted an d the
wa r t ransferred to the plains th e chain of r~zou ntains may he
considered as a species of base upon which a n inva der ca n alway s
re t i re
and
find an rzvailable refuge.
8
gre at mil itary wri ters agree i n condemning w ha t
is
sty led
an in er t or passive defence and prefer th e defence with retu rns
to th e offensive styled by Jo m ini th e defeizsive offensive which
h e
ass erts combines the dv nt ges of t he two systems. 80 long
s
our frontier is l imited t o the base of th e m ouutnin s instead of
inel udin g th e principal Passes ou r action may restr icte d to
our
own ter rito rie s as natur ally th e first ac t of a11 enem y w ould be
as have already stated t o close the Passes agains t us hence
n
order to enable US to take the offensive we must ill th e fi rst
instance carry t llem by assault a n operat ion likely to be st te od ed
w ith gr ea t loss an d which might not if the y were scieotifically
strel lgth ene d and defeilded
by
a resolute enemy pro ve successful
so t b a t ag a i n s t
our
mill we m igh t be colnpelled to ac t upon th e
purely iiefeusive
i u
th e present war th e oppositiou met witll i l l
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th e Pass es ha s been comparatively feeble , bu t me h a w no r ig h t t o
calculate up on our ob tain ing possession of th em on such easy t e r m s
i n the event of a future campaign.
Tak ing al l these facts into
ons side ratio
th ink i t can hardly
be asserted, as a purely m ilitary question, t h at our pre sen t
border-lin e offerg u s good an d scientific frontier.
W i t h th e Passes i n our possession, th e power of tak ing the
initiative would rest i n our own hands, and , supposing the enemy
t o have fairly established himself in Afghanistan, an d this would
be t h e first ~ t e po be accomplished preparatory to an invasion of
In di a, w hilst our own rig ht flank would be, in
a
great measure,
secured , we could pu sh forward force on Candahar so a s t o
attack the extremity of his long line,
3 5
miles in exten t, of
which th e rig ht would rest upon th a t city, and vhich , with
Brit ish posts a t Jel la labad and the Peiwar Pas s threatel ling his
lef t h e would possibly experience di ac ul ty in re-inforcing, as h e
m u s t eith er detach corps of observation to watch those posts an d
ho ld thei r garrisons i n check, or else ru n th e risk of hav ing his
comm unications w ith th e capital exposed to attack. In st ea d ,
therefore, of hav ing ou r frontier disquieted an d the v ho le of
In d ia agita ted, as would
certainly be the case if we awaited
at ta ck i n o u r own ovinces, we should become th e assailants, a n d
th e contest would be transferred to the valley of th e Tu rnu k. f
success at ten de d ou r arm s it would, i n all probability, prove de-
cisive, whilst even if we were compelled to retreat, we should
re tir e upo n Quettnh, where re-inforcements would await us, an d
enable us t o ar re st th e enemy s progress. Meanwhile, peace an d
quietn ess would prevail throu gho ut our own dominions a n d th e
mu ss of o u r subjects would be in no way affected, a ma tter of th e
greatest political importance.
> T h e oregoing views are, however, based upon the hypothesis
t h a t a hostile Po wer had been permitted to occupy Afghan istan
an d become m aster of it s resources and of its strongholds, b u t with
Po li t icalor Consular Agents a t Cabul, Candaharand Herat , an d th e
Front ie r Passes in o u r possession, there is littl e probability of an y
Fo reig n Po we r ever beiug permitted to take u p such position,
for, n o t only ou gh t o ur political influence to be paramount th rou gh -
ou t th e country, b u t by our being able to anticipate any hostile
movement by an advan ce on Candahar, all hope on the p a rt of
R us sia of c arry ing o u t t o a successful issue any design for ex-
tellding h e r dominions in th at direction must cease whilst, as
she would feel assu red th at, so long as she contented herself with
consolidating and improv ing th e Asiatic Provinces a t present un de r
her rule aud refrained from auy interference, either open or secret,
with a State which she should distinctly be informed is under our
pro tection , an d of which th e limits sho uld be clearly defined, so
fa r from w ishing t o thw ar t her efforts we shonld view with satis-
fact ion
h r
atte m pt to bestow th e advantages of good governmant
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upon th e races now under Ler control th e jealousy which has for
so many years past existed between th e two nation s m igh t gradu-
ally subside an d by degrees t h e relatio ns of am ity which so
long prevailed betveen them he restored.
Although with reference to pui.ely m ilitary consideration s th e
~leighbourhood f Dh aka might in some respect be deemed th e
most suitable locality i n which to establish ou r extrem e frontier
post beyond the Khyber yet
there are polit ical advantanges
atte nd ant upon our holding Jelallabad which upon t h e whole
would make that the more preferable statiiin.
A t Jelallabad from our commanding pcjsition w should enjoy
a n opportunity thro ug h th e adoption of a firm b u t conciliatory
attitu de of bringing un de r our influence th e Ghilzais one of tlie
most powerful of th e Afgh an tribes we sh ou ld be able t o en ter
int o comnlunication with the Siah-posh Kafirs a race which has
believe generally expressed themselves favo urab ly inclined
to pa rd s u s; whilst as suggested by me ten years ago when
poin tin= out th e probab le results of t h e policy t h e n pursued should
in any treaty th at may b e concluded with th e r ule r of Afghanistan
clause be introduced un de r which he would receive fixed libera l
p q r n e u t iu lieu of all dues now levied up on our corn-
merce
nd
in retu rn for gua rantee of protection t o th e lives
an d property of our merchants Jelallabad m igh t become
commercial entrep6t from which t h e ramifications of o ur tr ad e
might be exteuded throug hou t Central Asia measure th a t would
probably be more effectual tov ard s conciliating t h e Afg ha n tribes
an d securing the ir good will th a n an y diplomatic relations we
m igh t enter into with their ruler. Asiatic Prin ces a re proverbially
fickle an d owing to some fancied sligh t which he hopes t o avenge
or to his cupidity being excited by some tempting offer froul
anothe r Power our ally of to-day may become our o pp on ei ~t o-
morrow but comm ercial intercourse once fairly esta blishe d between
two nations th e bonds by which they are un ite d re not easily
broken an d even a Sovereign m ay find himself powerless to
engage his people in war which they may feel to be opposed to
their own interests.
Even in a mere military point of view Jela llab ad has some
advantages as n outpost the garr ison would co ~n m an d he whole
of the valley from th e resources of which u nt il it was dislodged
1
an enemy would there fore be excluded whilst before he could
I
besiege the town or oblige the British force to evacuate
it
by
threa tenin g i ts line of communication he would b e compelled aft er
crossing th e Tezeen Pas s a t an elevation of 8 200 feet to traverse
upwards of 60 miles of m ost inhospitable au d b ar re n coun try by
road passing over long ranges of bleak hills an d th ro ug h nar-
r w nd rugged defiles. f he employed larg e force for t h e
purpose he mould experience considerable difficulty in ca rrying
with
him
th e requisite provisions am m unitio n 6tc. wh ilst if he
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detached
a
small body there would be the risk of i ts being en-
countered nd defeated asi t debouched into the more open country,
in the vicinity of Gundamuk.
Although during the last two or three years of Lord Napier's
tenure of office in India, our political relations with the Ameer
Shere Ali had become somewhat strained, and apparently, Russian
diplonlacy n7as gradually acquiring undue influence
at
Cabul,
and taking possession of the ground which we ought to have
occupied, yet there w s still hope that the Ameer might be in-
duced to recognise the advantages that would accrue both
to
him-
self and to his people from a cordial alliance with the only Power
that could effectually interfere to prevent Afghanistan from be-
coming, in time, a Russian Province, hence no English statesman
or soldier could then have advocated an advance of our frontier,
or annexation of territory, that could only have been accomplished
st the certain risk of alienating the ruler
w e
were most desirous
of
retaining as our ally, but, with the appearance of the Russian
Embassy at Cabul, and the refusal to receive the Mission under
Sir Neville Chamberlain, the aspect of affairs couipletely changed,
and the political question assumed an entirely new phase, it was
clear that we must abandon all expectation of successfully pur-
suing a coilciliatory policy towards the Ameer, and that, in the
event of ally rupture with Russia, his capital would become the
scene of intrigues for inciting the border tr ibes to make forays
into our districts, eve11 if we should not find his regular forces
arrayed against us. Hence, in self-defence, both for political and
military reasons, with reference, first, to the effect that any in-
vasion of our territories might have upon our subjects, amongst
whom the slightest reverse on the Indus would, by clever intriguers,
be magnified into
an
overwhelming disaster., Secondly, to the
necessity
for taking up a position which would admit of our
assuming, if necessary, the offensive, axid also enable us to oppose
every possible obstacle to the advance of an enemy,
w
were com-
pelled to occupy the th ree main Passes, and thus circumstances
having placed in our hands the keys of the gates through which
invading columns must pass in the interests of the great de-
pendency entrusted to our charge, and with the view of securing to
its people a complete immunity from the evils caused
by
con-
tinually recurring rumours of foreign invasion, and preserving for
them the full enjoyment of the blessings of peace, it is to be
hoped that we shall never restore them to any chief upon whose
fidelity we cannot fully depend but for
the
future retain
them in our
ow
hands, and, :'although endeavouring to the
utmost of our power, to cultivate friendly relations and to pro-
mote peaceful intercourse with our neighbours in Afghanistan,
at the same t ime coilvince them that , whilst coveting no extension of
territory and even fully prepared to afford them material aid and
support in preservir~g heir independence, we
sti-e
strong enough
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to hold our own a n d
t
mabta in the in tegr i ty o f our
Indian
Empire against all assailants.
W ith the Passes under our control an d ou r north-west frontier
strengthened so as t o effectually remove a ll al ar m of any success-
ful
invasion from th a t quarter by massing our troops upon
im
portant strategeticsl points instead
of
dispersing them in sm a l l
cantonments a t th e same time re-organizing our Native Army
it might be possible to reduce our military exp end iture w ith ou t
ixnpdring our military power and aft er an almost unbroken era
of fo rty years warfare commencing from th e app eara nce of a
Russian Emissary a t th e Court of D bos t M ahorned the Indian
Government with impro~edfinances would be
at
last free t o
tu rn its undivided attenti011 to th e improvem ent of th e moral and
material condition of the vast populations und er it s rule and
by
securing their welfare
and
happiness prove Gr ea t Britain dese rving
of the tru st reposed in her and of the high position she ow
occupies on th e Roll of Nations.