Britain, Konfrontasi and the End of Empire, John Subritzky

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Britain, Konfrontasi, andthe end of empire in

Southeast Asia, 196165John Subritzky

Published online: 01 Jul 2008.

To cite this article:John Subritzky (2000) Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of

empire in Southeast Asia, 196165, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth

History, 28:3, 209-227, DOI: 10.1080/03086530008583106

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Britain,Konfrontasi,and the End of Em pire

in Southeast Asia, 1961-65

JOHN SUBRITZKY

In early 1965 Britain had over 60,000 servicemen deployed in the Far East,

together with a surface fleet of over eighty warships.

1

The main reason for

this extraordinary level of deployment was Indonesia's Confrontation of

Malaysia. Started in January 1963, Konfrontasi had become, by 1965,

Britain's gravest colonial crisis of the 1960s. This essay places Britain's

Confrontation policy in its international context. No nation's foreign policy

is formulated in a vacuum. For British officials, both the creation and the

subsequent defence of Malaysia were inextricably linked to Britain's

relationship with the United States and, to a lesser degree, Australia and

New Zealand. It is contended in this essay that Britain's primary motivation

for establishing Malaysia was to preserve its influence in the region in an

era where formal empire was no longer tenable. A continued British

political and military presence in Southeast Asia, based in Singapore, was

regarded in London as a vital element in securing strategic partnership with

the Americans, and in maintaining Commonwealth solidarity with the

Australians and New Zealanders.

But Konfrontasi turned British plans on their head. The asking price to

be paid for remaining a Far Eastern power proved too high. Although

history records that Malaysia did eventually survive, albeit without

Singapore and B rune i, the same cou ld not be said for British influence in the

region. Faced with enormous costs associated with protecting this influence

east of Suez, the Wilson government initiated plans for disengagement in

late 1965. For Britain,Konfrontasi was a pyrrhic victory. Insofar as British

withdrawal and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, not the destruction of

Malaysia per se, was his ultimate objective, the Indonesian president,

Sukarno, had succeeded beyond expectation.

I

The genesis of Konfrontasi lay in Britain's plans to divest itself of formal

empire in Southeast Asia. Although independence had been conceded to

Malaya in 1957, Britain retained significant colonies elsewhere in the

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21 0 INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

AND

COLONIAL RETREAT

region.The most importantof thesewas undoubtedly Singapore. Britain's

largest overseas military baseand avaluable en trepotfortradeand finance,

Singaporewas asubstantial assetfor acoun try wh ich still regarded itselfas

a major world power.

In the

colony

itself,

however,

the

large Chinese

population

was

becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their colonial status.

Respondingtothis agitationforgreater independen ce, Britain prom ulgated

a

new

constitution

in 1958. The

colony reverted

to the

status

of a self-

governing territory, with Britain's sovereign powers restricted to defence

and foreign affairs.The first elections underthe newconstitution were held

in

May 1959

with

Lee

Kuan Y ew's Peop le's Action Party

PAP)

winning

on

a platformofcomplete indepen dence.

Onceinpow er Le e's outlook quickly changed. M indfulof theeconomic

value

of

both

the

military base

and

trading connections with Britain

and the

Commonwealth, Lee moderated his demands for full independence. This

antagonized

the

left wing

of his own

party, causing

a

split

in 1961,

when

a

significant number of Lee's colleagues formed the Barisan Socialis, or

Socialist Front. This communist-led party demanded formal independence

from Britain

and the

adoption

of a

socialist constitution

for a new

Republic

of Singapore. By July 1961, due to a by-election victory, the Barisan

Socialis trailed the PAP byonlyoneseatin the Legislative Assembly, with

Lee relying

on the

Speaker's vote

to

retain power.

Not

surprisingly, these

developments wereof grave concernto the British Prime Minister, Harold

Macmillan. Only one year after his famous 'wind of change' speech in

South Africa, Macmillan

was

well aware

of the

need

to

accommodate

the

rising force of nationalism in Asia-Africa if Britain's influence was to

survive in the post-colonial world. Searching for possible solutions to

growing nationalist assertiveness in Singapore, British policy-makers

returned

to a

familiar objective:

a

federation

of

former British possessions

in Southeast Asia.

2

The name given tosucha future groupingwasGreater

Malaysia.

The British viewed federation as asolutionto twoseparate p roblem s:it

would provide

a

viable po litical entity

for the

Borneo colonies, considered

too small andunsophisticated to surviveby themselvesas an independent

state;and it would allow thetransferto theMalayansofrespo nsibility for

internal security

in

Singapore, thereby relieving Britain

of an

onerous,

costly,

and

politically demanding task.

3

The

Malayan government

was no

longer so opposed to the idea of a federation which included Singapore,

particularly as concern mounted that the Barisan Socialis might obtain

powerandcreateacom mu nist stateonMalaya's borders.

4

TheBritish were

also providinganincentiveforunionbyincludingtheBo rneo colonies. This

would ensure thattheChinese wouldnot outnumber other racial groupsin

the

new

state.

On 27 May 1961 the

Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul

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THE END OF EMPIRE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-65 21 1

Rahman, announced his support for a 'closer understanding' at some future

date between Malaya, Singapore, British Borneo and the Sultanate of

Brunei. American State Department records indicate that, although British

officials had in fact made the initial suggestion, Londo n w illingly conced ed

authorship to the Malayans in the hope that this would enhance the

credibility of Greater Malaysia with both the inhabitants concerned and

world opinion in general.

5

Historians have differed as to the Macmillan government's overall

objectives in pursuing decolonization through Greater Malaysia. One view

is that federation was designed to facilitate British disengagement from the

region.

6

With the Belgian Congo a recent tragic example, the British were

clearly averse to sudden withdrawal. Such rapid decolonization risked

leaving a political vacuum in which chaos reigned and communism

flourished. Federation was the means by which the British attempted to

exert greater control over the process and avoid political anarchy after their

departure. An alternative interpretation is that the British were responding

to a changed political environment in which formal rule from London was

no longer tenable. In its place, influence w ould be retained by mo re indirect

m eans, namely self-government within the British Com mo nw ealth. By this

route, British elites hoped that still extensive bilateral financial and trade

ties,

together with defence collaboration, would continue to bind Malaysia

to Britain, thus preserving British influence well after formal independence

had been conceded. Such an arrangement has been described by historians

as 'informal empire'. More recently, A. J. Stockwell has challenged the

contention that Malaysia was a neo-colonial creation, suggesting

inter alia

that the British nev er had sufficient control over the process to realize their

objective - if indeed they had one - of perpetuating empire.

7

As an

interpretation of the result Stockwell is undoubtedly correct. British

influence did not long survive after Malaysia was established. Nevertheless,

the docum entary eviden ce clearly suggests that British intentions at the time

in creating Malaysia were to maintain rather than end Britain's historic

interests in the region. The extent to which they proved incapable of doing

so is a separate issue.

Given L ee's continued precarious position in Singap ore, the Tunku was

eager to conclude arrangements as quickly as possible. Although the British

welcomed Malayan support, one substantial point of difference remained

between London and Kuala Lumpur. On 26 June the Tunku informed

Macmillan that, although Britain could retain its military bases in

Singapore, it would not be allowed to use them in support of the Southeast

Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) once Malaysia was established.

8

Such a

restriction, if implemented, could create major complications for British

defence policy in the region. The Chiefs of Staff were adamant that, to

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21 2 INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLONIAL RETREAT

maintain a credible military posture in the region, Britain must be able to

employ its bases for SEATO-related operations.

9

Similar concerns were

raised by Britain's principal regional allies, the United States, Australia and

New Zealand.

10

They would not support Greater Malaysia if it meant the

loss of Singapore to SEATO. But not all British policy-makers regarded

such loss with alarm. Noting the considerable gap between commitments

and resources, the British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, Lord

Selkirk, suggested to Macmillan that the time might be right for Britain to

avail itself of Greater Malaysia as means of swiftly cutting back its

commitments in the region.

Selkirk's prescription was too radical for policy-makers in London, the

majority of whom favoured as little disruption of the status quo as possible.

The Chiefs of Staff were particularly reluctant supporters of Greater

Malaysia. Accepting that political realities in Singapore rendered British

sovereignty untenable, they saw federation as offering the greatest chance

of stability but emphasized nonetheless that British military deployment in

the region - in support of either SEATO or Com mo nw ealth operations -

would be compromised without the unrestricted use of the Singapore

bases.

12

Crucial to the attitudes of British ministers was their belief that

Britain was, and should remain, a global power. 'The fact remains'* argued

Julian Amery, Secretary of State for Air, 'that if we want to maintain our

influence with Australia and N ew Zealand on the one hand, and the Un ited

States on the other, we mu st have the effective use of Singap ore. Without it,

our influence in the area could sink to the level of France.

3

The Prime

Minister himself shared this outlook. Macmillan was no revolutionary in

foreign affairs, still essentially believing in British global influence,

although he recognized that this pow er had to be projected d ifferently in the

post-colonial era.

14

As one former Foreign Office official put it later, 'the

Tories were always committed to imperial responsibilities and the world

role ... their instinct was to hang on and not give up until they were

convinced it was the only option'. '

5

On 20 November 1961 the British received a Malayan delegation for

discussions on Greater Malaysia. During the talks the Tunku reversed his

earlier stance, accepting B ritain's requirem ent for unfettered use of its bases

in Singapore. With this hurdle overcom e, agreement was quickly reached in

favour of federation. Both parties agreed to work towards establishing the

new state by 31 August 1963. In the meantime, Britain made preparations

for transferring the troublesome problem of security in Singapore into

Malayan hands. As part of this process, substantial cuts were made in late

1961 to the level of British ground forces in Singapore. Macmillan's

administration pursued its vision of informal empire, hoping that influence

could be retained by less direct means, and with the employment of fewer

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THE END OF EMPIRE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961 -65 21 3

resources. Some advisers feared these objectives were irreconcilable. 'We

seem to be pursuing two separate policies', warned Lord Selkirk. 'First, to

maintain freedom of military action in the area generally and in Singapore

in particular, and secondly substantially to reduce our forces in this area.

These two policies cannot be reconciled and we will have to decide which

we consider to be mo st impo rtant. In practic e', he concluded, 'I have little

doubt that reasons of economy will compel us to accept the latter.

6

During

1962 the British proceeded with preparations for rapid decolonization,

despite the concern of some, especially Colonial Office officials, that many

of the Borneo peoples were content with the status quo.

17

II

A major concern of British planners was how Greater Malaysia would be

received by its neighbours, particularly Indonesia. There was considerable

relief when, during preliminary talks with the Indonesians, no objections

were raised.

18

In retrospect, it seems that this silence from Jakarta was

largely due to their preoccupation with the campaign against Dutch rule in

West New Guinea. Acquiring sovereignty over this last territory of the

former Dutch East Indies had clear priority for President Sukarno. Once this

was settled in late 1962, he was then in a position to turn his attention to

British plans regarding Malaysia.

Indonesian foreign policy was dominated by Sukarno and his particular

view of the world.

19

He trumpeted a philosophy in which emerging forces,

represented by new countries like Indonesia, were locked in a struggle with

the reactionary established forces, represented by former imperial powers

like Britain. A co mm on method by w hich the old established states retained

their influence was through 'neo-colonialism'; in Sukarno's mind, the

granting of political independence was offset cunningly by the maintenance

of European control over extensive economic and other interests. Malaysia

appeared a classic example of the type of neo-colonialism about which

Sukarno had warned his country. Un der the arrangem ents for indep ende nce,

Britain was to preserve significant military interests, including the

unrestricted use of its bases in Singapore. British finance and trade would

also play a crucial part in Malaysia's economy. The British were clearly

eager to retain a significant role for themselves in the region after Malaysia

had been established. Sukarno understood this, regarded it as a direct

challenge to Indonesia's political philosophy, and reacted accordingly.

On 20 January 1963 the Indonesian Foreign M inister, Dr R. Sub andrio,

announce d a policy of Con frontation against the proposed state of Malaysia.

The term was deliberately vague. Realizing that an open engagement with

superior British forces would be futile, Sukarno hoped to wear them down

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in a guerrilla insurgency in the Borneo jungle. In early 1963 Indonesian

army regulars, posing as insurgents, began crossing the border. Far from

easing Malaysia quietly onto the international stage, Britain now faced the

con siderab le task of establishing it against the direct opposition of its closest

neighbour.

British policy-makers were agreed that the Indonesian challenge had to

be resisted.

20

Britain w as comm itted to creating a Federation of M alaysia on

31 August 1963, the Prime Minister advised the Foreign Secretary, Lord

Home, 'and there can, of course, be no question of not honouring that

undertaking'.

21

Moreover, in doing so, the British recognized that they had

undertaken a potentially formidable commitment. A guerrilla war launched

from inside Indonesia's borders could be sustained by Sukarno for many

years. The human and military resources Britain might have to expend in

responding dramatical ly undermined London's basic object ives in

establishing a greater Malaysian state. As Philip de Zulueta, Macmillan's

Principal Private Secretary, recalled, the Prime Minister's civil and military

advisers had hoped that Malaysia would enable Britain to reduce its visible

presence in Southeast Asia, particularly in the form of garrisoned troops,

while nevertheless retaining significant political influence by more indirect

means. Sukarno's violent opposition made this impossible.

22

This fact also

had important ramifications for the British government 's economic

objectives. The Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, emphasized to Macmillan

that, 'so long as we are committed to defend Malaysia against attack, we

shall be unable - even if the attack is limited to infiltration - to make any

significant reduction in our forces in Southeast Asia. Little by little, the

defence eco no m ies wh ich the Ch equers me eting undertook to ensure, are

being shown to be impossible as a result of our overseas political

obligations. '

23

M acm illan was well aware of the difficulties. 'I doub t

whether this is a situation,' he admitted to Home, 'if it really got out of

control, we could deal with single-handed .'

24

British h opes that Indon esia m ight eventually be reconciled to M alaysia

were finally dashed on 16 September 1963, the date when the Federation

was formally established. An angry mob in Jakarta responded by attacking

and then looting the British embassy. Both Britain and Indonesia had

invested considerable international prestige in Malaysia, one for its

survival, the other for its destruction. Neither could easily back down for

fear of losing face. With Indonesian opposition seemingly entrenched,

British military ad visers warned of the difficulties involved in protecting the

new state from its hostile neighbour. 'We are seriously concerned,' warned

Chief of the Defence

Staff,

Lord Louis M ountbatten, 'about the implications

which a long drawn out com m itment, of the nature which w e now env isage,

will have on our ability to meet other emergen cies. At w orst, ' he con cluded,

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'costs might well compare with those involved in the Malayan

emergency.'

25

Despite these rapidly increasing costs Britain continued to

honour its commitments to Malaysia.

The importance of Southeast Asia to British national interests was not

immediately apparent. Both trade and investment between Britain and the

region had declined over the previous decad e. 'Eco nom ic argum ents alone ,'

wrote Macm illan to Selkirk, 'wou ld not justify, and have not for many yea rs

justified, our very heavy expenditure on the maintenance of defence forces

in the Far East. Wider political and military interests are at stake.'

26

What

were these wider political interests? Fundamental was the prevalent

Whitehall assumption that Britain was, and should remain, a global power.

It naturally followed from this world view, largely etched in historical

experience, that Britain should continue to contribute to the security of

Commonwealth allies. 'So long as Commonwealth defence has any

meaning at all, ' ad vised Fred Warner, head of the Foreign Office's

Southeast Asia departme nt, 'our obligations to Australia, New Z ealand and

Malaysia, and more remotely India and Pakistan, command our continued

presence.'

27

Th e reference to India exem plifies the difficulty faced by so me

British policy-makers in disengaging themselves from traditional strategic

considerations and assumptions that had already become outdated.

Of decisive importance to Britain's global power pretensions was the

complex relationship with the United States. Macmillan's analogy of

Britain's Greece to America's Rome neatly summarized the hopes of the

British elite of influencing, albeit modestly, the foreign po licy of the w orld 's

greatest power. A significant British military presence in Southeast Asia

was o ne m eans of consolidating this idea of partnership with the A m ericans.

By contributing to the containment of communism in the region, Britain

was able to present its

bona fides

to the United States as a dep endable senior

ally in the Western alliance. In return, the British hoped that, through this

influence, American power could be harnessed on occasion for the

furtherance of specifically British objectives.

28

A stable Malaysia, with a

continued British military presence in Singapore, was therefore vital if

Britain was to retain these important linkages with not only the United

States, but also key Commonwealth allies, namely Australia and New

Zealand.

29

This was a world with which Tory politicians, in particular, were

entirely comfortable. Indonesian Confrontation represented a major threat

to that world.

By the end of 1963 a stalemate had ensued in Borneo. Indonesian forces

had been unable to prevent Malaysia being established. On the other hand,

British forces could not prevent the easy flow of insurgents crossing from

Indonesian Kalimantan into M alaysian Bo rneo. The possibility of being tied

down in a long guerrilla campaign caused mounting concern in London.

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2 1 6 INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLON IAL RETREAT

'Although we can certainly carry on for some time', wrote the Minister of

Defence , Peter Thorney croft, 'it will not be possible for the present state of

affairs to continue indefinitely. The Indonesians can readily increase their

pressure, and we should then have no ch oice but to step up our own military

action and make further calls upon our strained military resources.'

30

The

British made it clear, as prospects for a quick end to Confrontation

disappeared, that strong support from key allies was vital for eventual

success. The response from the United States, Au stralia, and New Zealand ,

however, merely contributed further to the gloomy outlook.

The Kennedy administration had warned London early in the crisis that

American military intervention was highly unlikely. The President and his

advisers, noting the strategic importance of Indonesia, and the fragile

dom estic political balance there between the Army and com m unists, did not

want to risk an open breach with Jakarta. They feared that escalation might

only result in a communist takeover in Indonesia, much to the detriment of

Western interests in the region. 'The real danger in the Far East', warned

Averell H arrim an, Und er-Secretary of State for political affairs, 'is

communist China and it is therefore essential to save Indonesia from

communist influence. If Indonesia did go Red there was no hope for other

countries in Southeast Asia.'

31

To avert such a catastrophe was the

paramount objective of the Kennedy administration. 'To me,' argued

presidential adviser Robert Komer, ' i t 's worth every resource of

preventative diplomacy to forestall the kind of blow-up over Malaysia in

which our very success in blocking Sukarno may lose us Indonesia. '

32

Australian and Ne w Z ealand p oliticians agreed with these sentiments.

33

In its relations with these three allies, Britain faced a dilemma between

its interest in establishing Malaysia, and the Cold War imperative,

underlined continuously by the allies, that Indonesia must remain non-

communist. Crucial American support would be forthcoming only when

London's interest in Malaysia could be reconciled to Washington's wider

regional objectives, focusing on Indonesia. Until then, Britain would be

largely alone in bearing the full force of Sukarno's Confrontation. The

difficulty in balancing imperial against Cold War requirements was

recognized by Macmillan's successor as Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-

Home. 'We must defend Malaysia of course; but it will help neither

Malaysia nor ourselves, nor the Western cause in general, if in the course of

defending Malaysia we drive Indonesia into the arms of communist Russia

or China . It is prob ably conside rations of this sort that mak e our friends and

allies less than wh olehearted in our support.'

34

R. A . Butler, the new Foreign

Secretary, did not disagree, but pointed out that Britain's available options

were limited. He saw little alternative but to retain a strong defensive

posture in Borneo until more favourable circumstances developed.

35

The

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stalemate therefore continued. Confrontation had become a war of attrition.

Not surprisingly, the likelihood that Confrontation would continue for

the foreseeable future deeply distressed British policy-makers and led to

them questioning whether a traditional military presence in Singapore was

the best means of promoting British interests in Southeast Asia. In

particular, the cost of maintaining defence establishments east of Suez

would not appear to be offset by the financial and trade returns from the

region. Furthermore, officials were becoming uneasy with aspects of

American-led Western strategy in Asia generally, suggesting that alliance

structures such as SEATO, and military bases like Singapore, might be

assisting, not hindering, communist infiltration.

Ill

During mid-1964 the Foreign Office conducted a review of British policy in

Southeast Asia. As a starting point, officials analysed the extent of B ritain's

trade and economic interests in the region. These were found to have

steadily declined in importance over the previous 25 years. No longer was

Britain in particular need of primary products from the region, such as

rubber and tin. No longer was Malaysia a net contributor of American

dollars to the sterling a rea, but rather w as in deficit and likely to remain so.

Put simply, the level of Britain's eco nom ic interest in the region had b eco m e

m ore neg ative than positive. Even so, there w ere still vital political interests

at stake. Critical am ong st these was Brita in's role, as a senior mem ber of the

Western alliance, to ensure the region remained free from communist

domination. The salience of this objective went well beyond Southeast

Asia. Communist success in Asia could weaken American resolve

elsewhere. Britain's still substantial presence in the region was essentially

justified by officials as a crucial con tribution 'to the global An glo-American

partnership', which in turn maintained a degree of British influence over the

shaping of United States foreign po licy. So long as this influence con tinued,

officials calculated that Britain's military presence east of Suez was 'worth

retaining for this reason alone'. A secondary consideration was the interests

of Australia and New Zealand. On grounds of race and sentiment, together

with the im portance still attached to the Com monw ealth, Britain felt ob liged

to contribute to Australasian defence through a forward position in

Southeast Asia.

36

The formal basis for Western intervention in the region was the SEATO

alliance. Und er various contingency plans sponsored by SEA TO, the United

States, Britain and their allies allocated specific forces for deployment in the

event that communist states committed aggression. These forces were

usually permanently stationed in the region itself. During Confrontation

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British policy-makers increasingly questioned the validity of the

assumptions supporting this strategy. Although not as pronounced as in the

Middle East, local nationalist resentment at the continuing and seemingly

permanent Western military presence in the region did exist. 'Military

alliances with Western cou ntries ', com mented the Foreign O ffice, 'are

suspect to radical Asian sentimen t in the same way as W estern military bases

and for the same reasons. Their ultimate effect, like that of any other form of

overt Asian d ependence on the W est, is to drive nationalism into partnership

with com munism . Since nationalism is still the dominant political emotion in

Southeast Asia, such a partnership is bound to be damaging to the non-

communist cause.'

31

The British feared that such a partnership would

eventually undermine their own position in the region. Looking ahead, even

the Chiefs of Staff considered the retention of permanent military bases

untenable. 'However long we may wish to stay in Singapore', argued naval

chief Sir David Luce, 'the Malaysians are bound to ask us to go ... We

should accept this as an inevitable historical developm ent for which we m ust

plan, and not wait for others to set the pace.'

38

Given these expectations, the British were not sanguine about the West's

long-term chances of containing communist infiltration. 'If the Western

objective is to keep communism out', noted the Foreign Office, 'and if, as

our treaty obligations imply, we are prepared in certain circumstances to

fight for this objective, we m ust take it for g ranted that the com m unists may

also be prepared to go to extreme lengths to keep the West out.'

39

In other

words, a potentially bloody stalemate could ensue. The British concluded

that regional stability depended upon some form of understanding, either

implicit or explicit, with the major communist powers, especially China.

The nature of such an arrangement would be a neutralized Southeast Asia,

in which neither the West nor the communists had a permanent military

presence. If adopted, such a strategy would have major ramifications for

Cold War policy in the region.

The creation of a neutralized Southeast Asia would involve the

abandonment of SEATO. The British also clearly envisaged the end of their

own military bases in Singapore. Indeed, gradual withdrawal leading to

eventual closure was foreseen, at an appropriate time, as the means by

which to engineer a political settlement between Malaysia and Indonesia.

40

Such a settlement, however, should be negotiated only from a position of

strength. The Foreign Office was mindful that any precipitate British

departure could lead to political instability, and even grea ter interference by

outside powers. Confrontation would have to be brought to an end before

any renegotiation of the West's strategy and deployment could take place.

Nonetheless, the ideas expressed in the Foreign Office's review betrayed

clear unease over Britain's current predicaments in Southeast Asia.

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THE END OF EMPIRE IN SOUTHEA ST ASIA, 1961 -65 2 1 9

Beyond strategic considerations, Whitehall specialists were also

concerned at the rising financial cost, exacerbated by Confrontation, of

maintaining Britain's traditional military presence in the region. By late

1964 Britain was experiencing significant problems with its balance of

payments. This constraint challenged the arguments of those in favour of

the 'world role'. An interdepartmental long term study group warned that,

by continung obligations which imposed a serious strain on British

resources, a point might be reached 'at which the advantages of influence

are outweighed by the weakening of our economy. To maintain the

commitments beyond that point would be disastrous to our whole

position.'

41

Nevertheless, the value and prestige Britain obtained from its

historic commitments could not be so easily ignored or dismissed. 'A

balance w ould have to be struck ', observed the Defence and Oversea Policy

com m ittee, 'between the pressing need to restore our own econo my and the

value to us, as a trading nation, of being able to continue to exert through

our overseas com m itmen ts an influence in world affairs out of proportion to

our actual resources. '

42

The task of doing so would fall to a new government. It is of course

unclear whether the Conservatives would have carried out a significant

reform of British policy east of Suez. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, in particular,

was a strong supporter of 'the world role' and Britain's continuing status as

a global power.

43

As Foreign Secretary he had strongly resisted the

Treasury's efforts to prune defence spending the previous year,

44

but his

short tenure at Downing Street ended on 15 October 1964 when Harold

Wilson emerged victorious at the general election. It would be left to the

first Labour government in thirteen years to address the problem of an ever-

widening gap between Britain's comm itm ents and the resources available to

meet them.

IV

Many traditional Labour supporters hoped that the Wilson government

would be a truly reforming one, modernizing the elitist state they believed

Britain still to be. Certainly Wilson promoted a number of prominent left-

wing MPs to the Cabinet: Tony Benn, Frank Cousins, Barbara Castle and

Richard Crossman. However, the key positions of state were held by those

on the right of the party: Patrick Gordon Walker at the Foreign Office,

George Brown at Trade and Industry, and James Callaghan at the Treasury.

Wilson himself was no revolutionary, believing essentially in Britain's

continued status as a global rather than a regional power. The dominant

historical interpretation is of a Prime Minister who abandoned the

opportunity to implement radical change. 'When one surveys the entire field

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2 2 0 INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLON IAL RETREAT

of foreign affairs', wrote Robert Rhodes James in 1972, 'it is difficult

indeed to detect any real differences of substance between the performance

of Labour and its predecessor.'

45

Recent commentaries provide a similar

interpretation, emphasizing Wilson's support for Britain's 'world role' and

maintaining its historic commitments east of Suez.

46

The documentary

evidence relating to Confrontation suggests, however, that while Wilson

may not have been a revolutionary, he was m ore willing to accep t a radical

reappraisal of Britain's position east of Suez than has previously been

recognized by most historians.

It was not long after assuming office that the new government's resolve

in Southeast Asia was strongly tested. In late December Sukarno ordered an

intensification of Confrontation, despatching more Indonesian army

regulars across the border into Malaysian Borneo. The Labour government

immediately heeded the call for assistance from the Malaysians, sending

further reinforcem ents to the region during January 1965. W ilson's vigorou s

response would appear to support the contention of his critics that he

favoured the status quo and was not prepared fundamentally to challenge

the basic principles of British foreign policy he had inherited from the

Conservatives. Nevertheless, rising defence expenditure, at a time when

Britain was facing a serious balance of payments crisis, did provoke

renewed calls from senior ministers and officials for a rapid reduction of

Britain's overseas obligations.

Military expenditure allocated for east of Suez commitments was a

favourite target of criticism. This was partly because it involved overseas

expen diture, thereby draining B ritain's precious foreign exchang e, and also

because it was still rising as a result of Confrontation.

47

'We are bound to

state our opinio n', ou tline da Treasury briefing to ministers, 'that we cann ot

see a satisfactory solution for the economic problems of this country in the

next decade unless an immediate halt is called to the increases in the

defence budget, and a steady reduction takes place in the proportion of the

nation's resources devoted to defence.'

43

In light of these concerns

Callaghan made it clear to Gordon Walker that, while he supported the

objective of neutralization in Southeast Asia, it had to happen sooner rather

than later. In his view B ritain simply did no t have the luxury of waiting until

Confrontation was satisfactorily concluded before negotiating a withdrawal

from the area. 'The basis of our policy should be to lessen our commitments

as quickly as we can', he warned, adding that if this was not implemented

Britain was in serious risk of bankruptingitself.

49

These economic concerns

undoubtedly lent considerable weight to those who believed Britain had

already outstayed its welcome in Southeast Asia. In reporting progress of

the 'neutralization' paper to overseas posts, the Commonwealth Relations

Office warned that 'the validity of its main theme has received fresh

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em phasis from our present econo m ic difficulties: we do not want to retain a

substantial military presence in Southeast Asia longer than we can help.'

50

Arising from these concerns London initiated a major review of all

aspects of defence spending. Although it was not completed until late 1965,

some key decisions had been made by June. Most importantly, ministers

agreed that defence expenditure must be reduced to 2,000 million (at 1964

prices) by 1969-70. To do so was not realistically possible without a

substantial reduction in commitments. The most viable strategic region

where cuts might be made was east of Suez.

51

There Britain had neither

valuable industrial resources to protect, as was the case in the Middle East,

nor overriding political objectives to meet, like stability in Europe.

Ministers also recognized, albeit reluctantly, that only by forsaking its

capacity for independent intervention could Britain seriously reduce its

defence expenditure.

52

'One of the most significant conclusions which

appears to have emerged from the work done so far', the Cabinet Secretary,

Burke T rend, warned the Prime M inister, 'is that we shall probably h ave to

plan in future on the basis that we shall not try to retain, as at present, the

capability of mounting any operations single-handed in the face of

opposition.'

53

Important factors militated against a swift reduction of Britain's east of

Suez commitments . To at tempt this while Confrontat ion remained

unresolved would effectively give final victory in the conflict to Sukarno.

Although the consequences of this could not be gauged accurately, political

instability, eradication of any vestiges of British influence, and the

dismemberment of Malaysia were all reasonable assumptions. In addition,

the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, strong supporters of a

British military presence in the region, would react harshly to any pull out.

It was simply not in Britain's power alone to implement a policy of rapid

withdrawal. 'It is essential that there should be no premature disclosure of

the way in which our minds are working', Trend emphasized to Wilson, 'if

only because, once it is thought that we are on the run, we have lost our

main negotiating card, and a process which ought to be a phased and

controlled contraction of commitments will degenerate into a disorderly and

ignominious retreat'.

54

The government was faced with a contradiction

between its long-term goal of negotiated withdrawal, and its short-term

requirement to conclude Confrontation in a manner which recognized the

territorial integrity of Malaysia. Britain's predicament was well explained

by M ichael Stewart, the new Foreign Secretary, in his me m oirs.

Adaptation to our position in the second rank was not easy, as Britain

still had post-imperial commitments all over the world. We were like

a juggler who has a dozen plates circling in the air, and knows he

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22 2 INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLON IAL RETREAT

cannot keep them going; but to fold his hands and let them crash

would be irresponsible. We had the grim story of the Belgian Congo

to warn us against precipitate abandonment of imperial rule. The

juggler must extract from the circle one plate after another and put it

safely on a table until his job has become manageable. The Cabinet

had already decided that we must divest ourselves of responsibilities

east of Suez, though we knew that this would be the work of several

years.

55

By mid-1965 British policy-makers were searching, or perhaps more

accurately hoping, for a change in political circumstances that would allow

the proce ss of diseng agem ent to beg in. Fortuitously, this occurred suddenly

in early August. Rising tension between Singapore and Malaysia, and the

two respective Prime Ministers, finally resulted in the Tunku expelling

Singapore from the Federation. This provided the Wilson government with

a convenient excuse to reassess Britain's defence com m itments to M alaysia.

'Even if the lawyers are no longer confident that our Defence Agreement

has lost its juridical basis', the Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, told

Wilson, 'no one would consider it politically or morally binding. It is for us

to decide whether, and on wha t cond itions, we retain a defence com m itment

to Malaysia.' Healey himself was in no doubt that Britain had to disentangle

itself from an increasingly untenable position, which was costing the British

taxpayer countless millions. 'Our basic objective should be to obtain the

early consent of the United States, Australia and New Zealand to a policy

aimed at negotiating the end of Confrontation and the withdrawal of British

forces from Borneo.'

56

A number of his ministerial colleagues agreed.

Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations, advised

Wilson that Britain's position regarding both Confrontation and tenure of

the Singapore b ases had been drastically underm ined by the Tu nk u's a ction.

'It is therefore all the mo re desirable and in our interests that Confrontation

should be brought to an end.'

57

George Brown chimed in, noting his

agreement 'with the conclusion that some means must be found to bring

Confrontation with Indonesia to an end quickly'.

58

With these objectives in mind, and using Singapore's expulsion as an

excu se for formal talks, British officials met with Am erican, A ustralian and

New Zealand representatives in London in early September to discuss

possible options. The British delegation outlined its concerns regarding

tenure of the Singapore bases, and the need to end Confrontation in the near

future. This marked a blunt admission to the allies that Britain's ability to

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carry the weight of its comm itm ents east of Suez was being rapidly eroded.

'By whatever means it may be contrived', outlined the British paper

released at the talks, 'we need an early end to Confrontation.'

59

As a result,

the only option was to negotiate a settlement directly with Sukarno, even if

this damaged British prestige. Minimum requirements for Britain in any

such deal were that no part of the original Federation should be placed in a

position of complete helplessness in the face of future Indonesian

aggression, and that there should be an orderly withdrawal from Singapo re.

The react ion of B ri tain's a l l ies , . especial ly the Am ericans and

Australians, was scathing.

60

United States officials took issue even with

Britain's basic premise: that tenure of the Singapore bases was now

uncertain and unlikely to remain beyond the medium term. They also felt

that any attempt to negotiate a settlement with Sukarno would fail.

61

Once

the Indonesian leader received clear evidence of weakening British resolve

he would no doubt wait until virtually all Indonesian demands were met.

The result could potentially be disastrous for the Western position in

Southeast Asia.

62

Over the previous twelve months Sukarno had

increasingly edged Indonesia towards communism, taking the country out

of the United Nations and into a de facto alliance with China. In contrast to

the first years of the crisis, the Western allies now wanted Britain to

ma intain a strong military de ploym ent in the region, principally as a means

of keeping Sukarno's ambitions in check. An abandonment of that role was

considered unacceptable in Washington, Canberra and Wellington. Britain

was in no position to ignore the representations of its allies. Australia and

New Zealand now had troops on the ground in Borneo. American

diplomatic support was vital to putting further pressure on Jakarta.

The W ilson gove rnme nt had little choice but to heed these concerns and

maintain existing force deployments in Malaysia. 'It is clear,' Burke Trend

told Wilson, 'that we could not insist on making an early move to end

Confrontation without causing grave offence to our allies and prejudicing

the prospect of their future collaboration.'

63

In his m essages to Menzies and

Holyoake reporting on the talks, Wilson assured them that there would be

no precipitate withdrawal and that further consultation would take place.

But he concluded by warning that 'our assessment of the situation is that

time is not on our side, either as regards our tenure in Singapore or the

continuation of Confrontation'.

64

Less than a week after these messages were sent political violence

erupted in Indon esia. On 1 October 1965 a group of army officers, led by

Colonel Untung, attempted to seize power in Jakarta. The coup ended in a

dismal failure, the fledging rebellion being ruthlessly crushed by troops

loyal to Major-General Suharto, commander of the strategic reserve. This

event heralded a major transformation in Indonesian politics. Increasingly,

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22 4 INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND COLON IAL RETREAT

Sukarno became a paper President, with real power being exercised by

Suharto and the army establishment. These generals, concerned with

restoring economic stability and suppressing the local communist party,

were now eager quietly to abandon Sukarno's radical agenda, including the

Confrontation. Although the crisis did not officially end until the signature

of the peace treaty in Bangkok on 11 August 1966, in reality it all but died

during the months immediately following Untung's intervention.

Britain w as saved by these even ts from a potentially serious h um iliation.

Although Sukarno did not succeed in 'crushing' Malaysia, as he once

claimed that he would, there is little doubt that his policy of Confrontation

helped to bring to an end British aspirations of remaining a Far Eastern

power. The asking price to be paid, as Confrontation cruelly showed, was

simply too high. By late 1965 the Labour government appeared to have

accepted this. The following February, Defence Minister Healey visited

Canberra to explain to Au stralian and New Zealand officials B ritain's future

plans for deployments east of Suez. It was not an easy meeting. Healey

made it clear that Britain 'would never again be prepared to act alone

against an oppon ent like Indonesia, 10,000 miles away, nor undertake large -

scale counter-insurgency operations'.

65

The British also 'envisaged' leaving

Singapore by 1970. Although North Australia was flagged as a possible

substitute base, both Canberra and Wellington regarded it as a non-starter.

The New Zealanders were under no illusions that the British were in fact

preparing to leave. 'The whole process of British withdrawal is likely to be

a hesitant and gradual on e,' cited the Department of Ex ternal Affairs, 'and

will be modified in accordance with political developments. '

66

Although

such a process would make adjustment slightly easier, it could not

camouflage the fact that the preparations were already being made.

Greater Malaysia had originally been described as the 'grand d esign ' by

M acm illan and his colleagues. Britain certainly had am bitious, and p erhaps

in retrospect naive, hopes for the Federation. Recognizing direct imperial

rule from Lon don as untenable, the British hoped that indepen dence within

the Commonwealth would produce a new nation content to retain historic

trade, financial and defence ties with the former colonial power. By these

means Macmillan wanted to retain some measure of British influence and

power east of Suez. By declaring Confrontation, however, Sukarno denied

Britain the option of an easy transformation from formal to informal em pire.

The cost of remaining a Far Eastern pow er, not to mention 'the world ro le',

was to be far greater than anticipated. In addition, addressing the Indonesian

threat proved to be a mostly lonely vigil for Britain. The United States,

especially under President Kennedy, placed a higher priority on securing a

non-communist Indonesia than on protecting Malaysia from external

aggression. Even Australia and New Zealand did not deploy forces in

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THE END OF EMPIRE IN SOUTHEA ST ASIA, 1961 -65 22 5

Borneo until April 1965, over two years after the crisis had begun. Early

that year, as Wilson recollected in his memoirs, the trooping the colour

ceremony was in risk of being cancelled if there had been one further

deployment of troops overseas.

67

British military and financial resources had

been stretched to the limit. Although Sukarno failed in his task to 'crush'

Malaysia, it should also be recognized that the British failed in theirs. Any

ambitions of being a global power of substance, and retaining a significant

role for itself east of Suez, had vanished by December 1965. The Wilson

government had resigned itself to disengagement. Although implementation

took several yea rs, there is little doubt that Confrontation hastened the end

of empire in Southeast Asia.

N O T E S

1.

John Darwin,

Britain and Decolonisation

(London, 1988), 290.

2.

The British had argued for many years that the most logical form of decolonization was a

union of Britain's territories in the region, starting with Malaya and Singapore. This had been

strongly opposed, however, by Malayan leaders; see A. J. Stockwell, 'Insurgency and

Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency', Journal of Commonwealth and

Comparative Politics, 15 (1987),

71-81 .

3.

Memo, by Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Cabinet, 7 April 1961, DO

169/25; see also David Easter, 'British Defence Policy in South East Asia and the

Confrontation, 19 60 -66 ', unpublished Ph.D . thesis, University of London, 1998, 40 0- 03 ,

who emphasizes British concern about the future of the military bases, given the rise in

popularity of the Barisan Socialis and the inevitability of formal independence for S ingapore.

4.

Memo., Kuala Lumpur to State Department, 8 June 1961, 790.00/6-861, Decimal Files,

1960-63,

RG 59, National Archives and Record Administration, Washington.

5.

M emo., Singapore to State Department, 16 June 1961, 790.00/6 -1661, ibid.

6. Chin Kin Wah, The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security

System, 1957-1971

(Cambridge, 1983), 179.

7. A. J. Stockwell, 'Malaysia: The Making of a Neo-Colony?', Journal of Imperial and

Comm onwealth History, 26 (1998), 138-56.

8. The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed in Manila on 8 Sept. 1954 by

representatives of Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the

Philippines and Pakistan. The crucial operative clause w as Article IV: 'Each Party recognises

that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties (or

against Cambodia, Laos or the territory under the jurisdiction of the free Vietnamese

governm ent) would e ndanger its own pe ace and safety and agrees that it will in that event act

to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.'

9. Minute of Chiefs of Staff mee ting, 3 A ug. 1961, DE FE 4/13 7.

10.

State Departm ent to Londo n, 12 Oct. 1 961 , John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, 'M alaya and

Singapore - general', National Security File, box 140; Australian Prime Minister R. G.

Menzies to Lieutenant-General Sir William Oliver, British High Commissioner to Australia,

28 Aug. 1961, PREM 11/3418; New Zealand Prime M inister K. J. Holyoake to M acmillan,

20 Oct. 1961, PREM 11/3422.

11.

Selkirk to M acmillan, 30 Dec. 1961, PREM 11/3866.

12.

M inute of Chiefs of Staff mee ting, 3 Aug . 196 1, DE FE 4/137 .

13.

Note by Amery, 4 Oct. 1961, D(61)66, CAB 131/2.

14. The literature on Macmillan's continued belief in Britain's status as a world power is

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INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

A N D

COLONIAL RETREAT

considerable:see inparticular John Turner, acmillanLondon, 1994),272;Peter Clarke,A

Question of Leadership: Gladstone to Thatcher (London, 1991), 229-31.

15 .

Sir James Cable, counsellor in the FO, 1961-63, head of Southeast Asia department

1963-66, interview with author, Cambridge, 16 Sept. 1994.

16.

Selkirk to Macm illan, 30 Dec. 19 61, PREM 11/3866.

17.

John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand

Diplom acy in the Ma laysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-19 65 (London, 2000), 37 -8.

18 .

Leslie Fry, British embassy, Djakarta, to Fred Warner, head of Southeast Asia Department,

FO, 11 Aug. 1961, DO 169/28.

19.

For leading commentaries on Indonesian policy during Confrontation, see J. A. C. Mackie,

Konfrontasi: the Ma laysia-Indonesia Dispute, 1963-1966

(Kuala Lumpur, 1974); Ide Anak

Agung gde Agung, Twenty Years of Indonesian Foreign Policy, 19451965 (The Hague,

1973), and Michael Leifer,Indonesia s Foreign Policy (London, 1983).

20.

CC(63)6th mtg , 24 Jan. 1963, CA B 128/37; OP(63)4th m tg, 'Th e Future Defence of

M alaysia', 24 April 1963, CAB 134/2371.

21. Macm illan to Hom e, 3 April 1963, PREM 11/4347.

22. Minute by de Zulueta to Macm illan, 3 April 1963, PREM 11/4189.

23. M emo ., Heath to Macm illan, 23 April 1963, PREM 11/4347.

24.

M emo ., Macm illan to Hom e, 3 April 1963, ibid.

25.

Mountbatten to Thorneycroft, 30 Sept. 1963, DE FE 1 3/387.

26.

Minute by W. I. McIndoe, Cabinet Office, to T. J. Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to

Macmillan, 24 Sept. 1963, PREM 11/4183.

27.

Memo, by Warner, 'Four Years in South East Asia 1960-1963', 28 Nov. 1963, FO

371/169688/D

1051/41.

28. Ibid.

29.

Warner to Marshall, 20 Sept. 1963, FO 371/169688/D 1051/37; mem o., Lord Head, British

High Comm issioner to Malaysia, to Sandys, 11 De c. 1963, FO 371/169907/DH 1062/124.

30.

Thorneycroft to Dou glas-Hom e, 7 Jan . 1964, PRE M 11/4905.

31. M emcon, FO, 16 Oct. 1963, FO 371/169909/DH 1071/31/G.

32.

Foreign Relations of the United States,

1961-1963,

vol.23,Southeast Asia

(Washington DC,

1994), 742.

33.

David Ormsby-Gore, British ambassador in Washington, to FO, 12 Feb. 1963, FO

371/169695/D 1071/23.

34.

Minute by Home to R. A. Butler, Foreign Secretary, 19 Dec. 1963, FO 371/169894/DH

1051/102/G.

35.

M em o, by Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, to Ho me , 8 Jan . 1964, PRE M 11/4905.

36. FO memo., 'British Policy Towards South-East Asia', 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7. The

memorandum was approved by the Defence and Oversea (Official) Committee on 14

October, and later by the Cab inet; DO(O )(64)21 st mtg, 14 Oct. 1964, CA B 148/4; me mo .,

Gordon Walker to Cabinet, 19 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/17.

37.

Ibid.

38.

M emo, by Luce to CO S, 30 June 1964, DEFE

4/171.

39.

FO mem o., 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7.

40.

Ibid.

41. Report by long-term study group, 23 Oct. 1964, CA B 148/40.

42.

DO(O)(64)21st mtg, minute of Defence and Oversea (Official) Committee, 14 Oct. 1964,

CAB 148/4.

43.

D. R. Thorpe,Alec D ouglas-Home (London, 1996).

44. M emo, by Douglas-Home, 17 June 1963, CAB 131/28.

45.

R. R. James,Ambitions and Realities: British Politics 1964-1970 (London, 1972), 61 .

46.

Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson (London, 1992), 270; Chris Wrigley, 'Now you see it now

you don't: Harold Wilson and Labour's foreign policy, 1964-1970', in R. Coopey, S.

Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments(London, 1993), 132; Leslie Stone,

'Britain and the W orld', in D. McKie and C . Cook (eds.),The Decade of Disillusion: B ritish

Politics in the Sixties (London, 1972), 126; Philip Ziegler, Harold Wilson: The Authorised

Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx(London, 1993), 21 0-1 9; Clive Ponting,Breach of Prom ise:

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THE END OF EMPIRE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1961-65 227

Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London, 1989), 97-9; Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson(London,

1992),383-6.

47. Easter, Confrontation , 412-3 .

48. Treasury memo., 11 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/40.

49.

Callaghan to Patrick Walker, 1 Jan. 1965, FO 371/180205/D 1051/7.

50. CRO to Kuala Lumpur, 19 Jan. 1965, FO 371/180206/D 1051/25/G.

51.

Trend to Wilson, 11 and 14 June 1965, PREM 13/215.

52. Minute of COS meeting, 11 June 1965, DEFE 4/185.

53.

Memo., Trend to Wilson, 14 June 1965, PREM 13/215.

54. Ibid.

55. Michael Stewart,Life and Labour: An Autobiography (London, 1980), 144.

56. Healey to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1965, PREM 13/431.

57. Hughes to Wilson, 13 Aug. 1965, ibid.

58. Memo., Brown to Wilson, 26 Aug. 1965, ibid.

59.

London to New Zealand Department of External Affairs (NZDEA), 2 Sept. 1965, Ministry

of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Head Office, Multiple-Number Subject Files, ABHS, series

950, accession W 4627,

434/8/1,

pt. 9, box 4670, New Zealand National Archives,

Wellington (hereafter NZNA).

60. Memcon, Stewart with Ball, 8 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431;Canberra to Ministry of Defence,

7 Sept. 1965, FO 371/181529/IM 1193/135/G.

61. FO to Washington, 9 Sept. 1965, PREM 13/431.

62. Djakarta to State Department, 7 Sept. 1965, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin Texas,

Indonesia country file , vol.4, National Security File, box 247.

63. OPD(65)41st mtg, 23 Sept. 1965, CAB 148/18; memo., Trend to Wilson, 21 Sept. 1965,

PREM

13/431.

64. Wilson to Menzies and Holyoake, 25 Sept. 1965, FO 371/181529AM 1193/152/G.

65. Report by NZDEA, 17 Feb. 1966, ABHS, series 950, accession W 4627, 434/8/1,pt. 10, box

4670,NZNA.

66. Report by NZDEA, 10 March 1966, ibid. pt. 11, box 4670, NZNA.

67. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London, 1971),

42.

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Documents

Britain, Konfrontasi and the End of Empire, John Subritzky