Bringing Order to Chaos - AHMP Conf Sept12

7/30/2019 Bringing Order to Chaos - AHMP Conf Sept12

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BRINGING ORDER TO CHAOS:HARNESSING AND DISTRIBUTING INFORMATION

AT ALL LEVELS OF LARGE-SCALE RESPONSES

Emerging Best Practices and Decision-Making in Crisis Emergencies

Gail Kulisch, CAPT, USCG (ret)EricTelfer, CDR, USCG

Alliance of Hazardous Materials Professionals

13 September 2012


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Bringing Order to ChaosThree Key Elements

Understand the Unique

Characteristics of Large-Scale

Response

Design for Complex and

Layered Decision-Making

Generate Meaningful

Information and UnderstandStakeholder Needs


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Response



Generate Meaningful



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The Unique CharacteristicsTwo Types of Emergencies

Mode C : Crisis Emergency

Significant Novelty Relatively Low Understanding

of the Situation

Requires Creativity toImprovise New Approaches Situation Goes Beyond

Existing Plans

Cognitively Driven Routines Collaborative adaptive C2

Style

Limited Expertise in Key Areasof the Response

No Comprehensive Script Variably Flattened Structure

(Ref: Howitt, Arnold and Herman B. Leonard; Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale

Emergencies, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2009.)

Mode R : Routine Emergency

Key Elements Known Situation has Familiar Aspects Methods Exist to Adapt

Response to SpecificCircumstance

Necessary Skills Have BeenTrained to

Authority Based C2 StructureSuited to Directing Execution

Implement Well-Developed andPracticed Routines

Familiar Script or ElementsRequiring Only Moderate

Adjustments or Scaling Hierarchical Structure with Well-

Defined General Routines


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The Majority of Responses

Routine Emergencies

All emergencies start as operations

Most incidents resolved before ever

leaving the stem and entering planning

cycle

For complex or extended response

Move to the Spiral: Get Planning

ahead of Operations.

Responses can start as routine but

become crisis emergencies.

chaos


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Response



Generate Meaningful



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Design for Layered, Complex Decision-Making

Recognize Key Attributes of Large-Scale Response - Novelty, Complexity,Distributed Consequences, Insufficient Quantities of Specialized Equipment.

Get A System in Place (GASP) Quickly.

National Incident Management System (NIMS) Necessary - But Not Sufficientneed:

Need additional structural elements to coordinate political entities.

Local engagement strategy.

Adaptive leader skilled in collaboration while developing solutions, hierarchical in execution.

Adjusted organizational structure: flattened for solution development, hierarchical for execution.

Implementing National Incident Commander framework - leadership and experience matter to more rapidly orient.

Flatten the Organization and Distribute Decision-Making.

Harness the Information. Recognize corresponding complexity of information needs .

Sustainably Staff and Equip.

Shift and Communicate National, International, and Corporate Level Allocation andResources - Scale Up Rapidly, Plan for Long Duration.

Establish Priorities and Decision-Making for Allocation of Limited Critical Resources.


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The Game-ChangersCrisis Emergencies

11 SEPTEMBER 2001: Commercial Aircraft as Weapon to Destroy Iconic Infrastructure.

A war on US soil. Entire US federal agency structure revisited through the lens of US defense and domestic security - DHS

created.

ANTHRAX ATTACKS: U.S. Mail System as a Delivery System for a Biological Weapon.

Distributed terror attack and unique vulnerability of every citizen to new weapons. 15 Threats Vectors established with corresponding substantial investments in critical infrastructure protection,

early warning systems.

HURRICANE KATRINA: The Known But Unthinkable - Levee Failures (5 locations).

Hurricane Pam Laid Out the Unlikely Scenario. National Response Framework established.

FEMA paradigm and culture substantively changed.

DEEPWATER HORIZON: Uncontrolled Release of Oil at Virtually Inaccessible Depths.

Started as a routine emergency (platform fire). Exceptionally complex decision-making in unique political environment (5 States, x county equivalents). National Contingency Plans adequacy tested; response mechanisms adjusted and added Private sector owned the financial capacity and technical means. Exposed significant limitations of the National Contingency Plan.


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Emergency Response Starts With

NIMS ICS

Forms the Backbone of Routine and Crisis Response.

ICS developed by Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organizedfor Potential Emergencies (Firescope).

Chartered by Congress 1972; developed and Implemented in 1982. Early adoption by some municipal fire departments and National Strike

Force.

Post-Katrina FEMA adopted it and integrated it into a whole of responsesolution (tailored from FIRESCOPE ICS to NIMS ICS).

NIMS ICS and FEMA Joint Operations Center/Emergency Management

Functions harmonization evolving. Regardless of complexity, NIMS allows you to orient.

Formally adopted by DHS Whole of government sanctioned and supported.

Element of the National Response Framework.


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Novelty: Anthrax Capitol Hill 2001

Distributed Attack Entire US mail system potential

source of increasedcontamination

Unique Weapon Weaponized biological agent

Created Adjusted Structures US Congress Oversees

Response Maintains Continuityof Government.

Executive Branch Supports.

Supreme Court FacilitiesImpacted.


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Novelty: No Prior Anthrax Playbook When There Is No Playbook - Create One:

Build on What You Do Have/Know. Tannery Field Decontamination Protocols.

Medical Community/USAMRID MicrobiologicalSampling Experience.

Repurposed Existing Methods forDecon (ChlorineDioxide and Ethylene Oxide for Medicalapplications).

Apply Fundamentals of Hazmat Response. Slow it down.

Isolate and Control Entry.

Deliberate Assessment.

Organizational Discipline (Rigor of the ICS PlanningCycle).

Life Safety Priorities.

Actively Manage The Differences Legislative Branch Culture.

Continuity of Government Requirements.

Large Area Assessments of Commercial andGovernment Buildings.

Standardization Provides a Baseline Adaptation Makes It Work


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Distributed Consequences: National Mail System

As An Attack Vector

Extent and Location of Contamination Unknown - Emerged Over Time. Established a system of reporting from Public Health System and First Responders.

Postal Service Established a Unified Command. Collaboration with Public Health agencies. Tracked and engaged on every report.

Aggressively traced each report back to finite number of letters. Localized decontamination efforts were situation dependent. Ultimately pieces of the puzzle became known. Applied and shared guidance and protocols evolved as incident evolved.

EPA Retained National Federal On Scene Coordinator Role. Legal authorities and fund access. Created a body of adapted knowledge and techniques.

Developed and applied tailored techniques learned from one site to another. Created technical and response protocol continuity.

Every Hazmat Unit in the US a Potential Responder. Required extensive distributed decision-making and professional collaboration. Adapted existing and evolving response protocols while preserving a common framework; applied

the basic principles of hazmat response.

Commercial sector adapted equipment to expedite detection.


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Unprecedented Consequences:

World Trade Center Ground Zero

No Script.Requires Critical Leadership Adaptations.

POTUS Channeled the Emotions:

Struck the right chord at the right moment

In two sentences framed a common purpose.

Harnessed the emotion and gave it a direction.

Visual display of solidarity across fed, state, and local elements.

Mayor Guillianni harnessed the culture of New Yorkers.

Engaged leadership.

Resilient and independent.

Invincible culture despite the obstacles.

Addressed emotional overlay of an entire nation.


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Katrina: Insufficient Resources, Inadequate

Response System Design

The Known But Too Hard to AddressScenario Levee Failures.

Disproportionate Impact to the Poor andInfirmed.

Extraordinary Property Damage.

Complexity Exceeded Designed Roles andCapabilities of the Federal DisasterResponse System.

FEMA Redesigned. Creation of the NIC and Whole of

Government Mechanisms. Federal Role in Disasters Reevaluated.

Decision-Makers Operated in anInformation Vacuum.


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Hurricane Pam: Too Hard to Even Plan

2004 SE Louisiana/Gulf Coast Catastrophic HurricaneExercise.

12 parishes represented, State Agencies and 15 federal agencies

for an 8 day workshop.

Slow moving Cat 3 Hurricane (120 mph) with 20 inches of rain

Resulted in the SE Louisiana catastrophic hurricane

functional plan with some highly detailed, some sketchy,and some TBD sections.

Last "Hurricane Pam" training exercise was completedAugust 24, 2005, less than a week before Hurricane Katrinastruck the Gulf Coast.


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Katrina: What Went Right

6,000 Coast Guard personnel rescued 33,000 people alongthe Gulf Coast largest helicopter rescue op in history.

Private citizens heroic personal contributions.

Military contributions to support and logistics.

Private sector role including Wal-Marts now reknown empty

the shelves philosophy.

States and individual federal agencies created uniquesolutions to tackle extraordinary issues.


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Post-Katrina: Government and Organizational

Insufficiencies Exposed and Addressed. Chapter Six Transforming Preparedness.

Define and Implement A Comprehensive National

Preparedness System.

Foster a New, Robust Culture of Preparedness. Align Federal Response Structures to NIMS with ICS

as field command structure.

Create New Principal Federal Official Authorities.

Substantial Revisions to the National Response Plan.

Significant Review of All Federal Agency Support

Rules in Response.


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DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and Unprecedented

Technical Challenges

Largest National Contingency Plan GovernedResponse In History.

Whole of Government Engagement The NIC Role.

Novelty Elements Delayed Critical Flattening ofOrganization.

Critically Dependent on Common Operating Picture.Unique Legal, Fiduciary Obligations of Responsible

Party (BP) Challenged Decision-Making. Capping at Depth; Limited National Boom Inventory.


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DWH: Novelty, Complexity, and Unprecedented

Technical Challenges

The Responsible Party and the National ContingencyPlan.

NIC Communication Skills Essential.

Extraordinary Legal Claims. New legislation required to allow funding for

government costs in advance of reimbursements from

BP.

Limited Technical Solutions and Specialized Equipment.


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DWH: NIC Role Proved Critical

Identified Air Space Safety As Critical Need FacilitatedNational Command Authority Action to Control the Air

Space.

Mobilized Senior Interagency Partners, Cabinet LevelOfficials - Mechanism for Higher Level Engagement and

Decision-Making.

Filled Critical Cross-Government Facilitation Role.

Effective Communicator: Ability to Simplify ComplexInformation.

Supported Flattened Organization and BroadenedEngagement of the Locals in Decision-Making.

Drove Development of a Common Operating Picture.


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DEEPWATER HORIZON

Single greatest challenge was lack of a common operatingpicture (adm allen)

DWH Example:

Authorities:

Incident Command authority to prescribe the PersistentDemand for accurate, real time info

RRI underfunded and unsupported for years- incomplete andinaccurate inventory of response equipment.

Information requirements and authorities Air Tasking Order essential to manage all flights operating

above and around the spill site

Before ADM Allen implemented it, there were 8 near air-to-air


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Flatten the Organization: Engaging the

Locals

Establish pre-existing relationships with community basedorganizations who can take leadership roles.

Establish strong engagement with business community

(large-scale capabilities, logistics mechanisms)

Collaborative decision-making

Capture and incorporate info requirements of allstakeholders.

Staff and sustain surge versus dribble. Common Operating Picture can they see what you see.

The articulate communicator.

Elevate quickly to NRF/NIC structure - can always back off.


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Engaging the Locals: A Checkered History

Ground Zero Solidarity of Purpose (citizenrysupported responders)

Cosco BusanResponders became the enemy.

Deepwater Horizon Scale and complexity across 5states exceeded routine collaborative methods.

Ultimately created additional and incident command elementswith distributed authority and power, collaborative decision-

making within discrete geographic areas.

Incident leadership distributed to personally engage locals.


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Flatten the Organization: Engage the

Private SectorThe Restorative Function of Business

Pre-Crisis Alignment and Partnerships Business Leaders Emergency Operations Center

Coca Cola partnership with the Red Cross

Target partnership with FEMA

Citi partnership with World Food Programme

Bring Unique Expertise, Logistics, Innovation andSpeed

Director Craig Fugate

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Role of Business in Disaster Response

US Chamber of Commerce Report


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Response



Generate Meaningful



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Harness The Information

EstablishIncidentManagementStructure

DefineInformationRequirements

Collect andDistributeInformation

ProactivelyEngage at All

Levels

Mature theFeedback LoopsAdjust theResponse


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Harnessing Information:

Facilitated By Technical Tools

Common Orientation.

Consistency.

Effective/Efficient Resource Allocation.

Accelerate Assessment and Decision-Making.

Safety. People do not need to physically be in the danger zone to have

information.

Operate moving resources in concentrated areas (air, marine,ground) without physical danger.


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Managed As A System

Requires:

Authorities.- Air Space Management.

- Collection Means Authorized.- Decision-Makers Engaged.

Processes. Requirements Identified and Validated. Standard Requirements Developed in Plans.

Tools. Common Operating Picture. Real-Time Video. Accessible Network.


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Structured By Defined Requirements.

Learn From Other Disciplines:

The Intelligence Community. Requirements Developed, Validated, Sourced.

Collected Information Distributed.

Intelligence Cycle Repeatable.

Plan, Collect, Analyze, Produce, Disseminate.

The Coast Guards SDCIP Operational Planning Model.

Surveil. Detect.

Classify.

Identify.

Prosecute.


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SDCIP Tactics and Fusion Model


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Harnessing Information: Collect and

Distribute.

Defined By: Pre-scripted Priority Incident Requirements. Event Specific Requirements.

Collected by: Real-Time Systems In A Repeatable Cycle.

Displayed In: A Common Operating Picture.

Augmented By: Push Tools Such as

Emergency Incident Alerts

Notifications

Updates


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Strengthened By The Power of Social Media.Emergency Situation Awareness - Twitter for Crisis Management(Cameron et al) Emergency Situation AwarenessAutomated WebText Mining (ESA-AWTM) system. .

Detect unexpected or unusual incidents.

Condense and summarize messages maintaining awareness of aggregatedcontent.

Classify and review high-value messages during an incident - understand theimpact of an incident on people and infrastructure.

Identify, track, manage issues within an incident.

Pro-actively identify and manage issues that may last for hours, days or weeks.

Perform forensic analysis of incidents by analyzing social media content frombefore, during, and after an incident.


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The Common Operating Picture

DWH - Initial lack of a GIS-based Common Operating Picture. Hampered sharing and decision-making. No tool to effectively manage airspace safety.

Single biggest impediment to response decision making andcommunications: lack of common operating picture (ADM Thad

Allen)

The emergence of ERMA - Emergency Response ManagementApplication. GIS base/on-line mapping tool.

Integrates both static and real-time data Maps

Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps

Ship Locations

Weather/Ocean Currents

Impacted Areas

Industrial Data


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Deepwater Horizon ERMA


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Arctic ERMA


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Caribbean ERMA


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ERMA Architecture


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Real-Time Situational Awareness

From the Civil War: President Lincoln and T-Mail

(Wheeler, Tom; Mr. Lincolns T-Mails: How AbrahamLincoln Used the Telegraph to Win the Civil War;

Harper Collins Publishers, NY, NY, 2006)

Personally Coordinated with

Generals in the Field

To the War on Terror:

The Raid on Bin Laden

Real-Time Camera feedfrom an Isolated Location

in Pakistan.


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Tactics and Tools At The Speed of Light

New environment demands new tools to meet those needs.

Data and information must be contextualized.

Rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mappingtools; e.g. HSIN:

Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness andanalysis;

Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographicalvisualization,;

24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Web

conferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP)provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussionboards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs),calendars

Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds

Online training materials

ERMA


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Virtual On-line Sharing Tools (VOST)

Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional

Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble


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Reference: Bledsoe, Cheryl; VOST The Basics, Clark Regional

Emergency Services, Twitter@CRESA@cherylble


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Value of a Video

911 - the repeated image of the towers falling created anenormous emotional impact.

Katrina - primary info in first 3 days was provided by CGHelicopter clips of rescues.


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Katrina Clips


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Repeated Video Impact

Al Qaeda techniques: IED explosion from multiple angles over mass comms medium

viewer perceives a single attack as multiple attacks.

Repeated viewing of same attack exponential emotional

impact. Increases emotional impact of the terror.


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Power of the Private SectorResilient communities have: A greater percentage of small businesses with disaster

plans;

85% of business is small business (confrim)

Yet:

71% of small businesses have no disaster plans 43% with no plan never reopen

If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years laterTheRole of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamber ofCommerce

(Ref: The Role of Business in Disaster Response, US Chamberof Commerce, Business Civic Leadership Center, 2012


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The Human Element

In times of crisis, and on a daily basis, Allen said members of the public are

going to base their perceptions of government on personal transactions, as

they did after oil spill. Alluding to the dissatisfaction among Gulf Coast

residents with contractors staffed in the region, the retired commandant said,

"You cannot outsource core values -- empathy and compassion -- to a third

party."Admiral Thad Allen, National Incident Commander

Hurricane Katrina and Deepwater Horizon


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The power of a pictureand the value of a video

Airsta Rescue Katrina piece from


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Commercial Tools

Rapidly expanding

Pre-incident warning


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Backup Slides


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Deep Dive into Information Management:DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR

Erich Telfer, USCG

Information Management Broader Context


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Social Media Explosion

Data, data everywhereMonitoring Social MediaDuring a Crisis


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Evolving Capabilities of the Private Sector

People Finder (Google)

Satellite Based emergency networks for responders Private Sector capabilities rapidly expanding


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Its not the size that matters complexity as a differentiator

When there is no script the unthinkable aand the newnormal

US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the

super-NIC NIMS is necessary but not sufficient

Situational Awareness on Steroids

Tools and schools

Brokering limited resources Whole of Effort global private sector players as experts in

Scalewho understand large problemsand can opportunity to

Scale


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In large-scale, a number of issues rise to thislevel.how best to maximize that opportunity

Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into theNIMS/IC Area Command process as possible; the better the

workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chanceissues not addressable at AC level or IC level must

Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC

Meta-Leader

Knows what moves into the brokered sphere

Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessaryengagement of senior leaders

Communications mastery complex concepts made simple

Visible

No personal agenda/affiliationagnostic direct report to CIC


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Information versus data

How do you educate at the same time you inform?

What parameters guide or determine how porous andrapid the data flow is versus information assessment by

experts does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate)

spur


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Efforts to flow data and information

Can not themselves create more chaos - still need asystem, still need some degree of site control,

accounting for victims and responders, hazard

assessment.

Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units fromMD that they mobilized showed up and operated on the

pentagon site without informing or integrating into the

professionally well-known ICS structure - actedindependently


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A Number of Solutions on the Market


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Words matter careful and deliberate selection of termscan ease tension, minimize misunderstandingpoorly

selected terms can fuel rhetoric and misinform

perception

Cat spirit: Safe anchorage vs harbor of refuge (what is it hiding

from)

Returned to international svc (conveys acceptance of

standards by a legitimate independent body) versusallowed to enter port (implies a personal decision of an

individual cotp without context)

Others?


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KATRINA

Photo clip/Video


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The predicted crisis

Hurricane Pam 2004 full deliberate effort to plan andexercise reponse to a catastrophic hurricane in NOLA

all 12 parishes represented, state agenceis and 15

federal agencies for an 8 day workshop slow moving

cat 3 hurricane w20 inchses of rainSE Loisiana

catastrophic hurricane functional plan resulted with

some highly detailed, some sketchy and some TBDsections assumed there were no levee breaches (yet

believed it to be the worst case)communicating the

unthinkable


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Effective comms and info mgmt and decision makingstructures will depend on whether there is a culture of

self-relience and resilience or a culture of dependence

and vulnerability.in either case, the need for

extraordinary external engagement and support isnecessary, how that becomes interfaced, coordinated,

and implemented depends on which circumstance the

community is grounded in. Individuals can be either, this

is a characterization of the collective behavior not

individual behavior.


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Precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships(w/business, govenrment entities, private sector groups,

the broader response community) increase resilience

Precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)


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Resilient communities have

Greater percentage of small businesses with disasterplans;

- 85% of business is small business (confrim)

71% of small businesses have no disaster plans

43% with no plan never reopen

If they do reopen, only 29% are still open two years later


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RISK COMMUNICATION


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Incredible restorative function of business (DirectorFugate)

ROB rules in disaster resonse.


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The Power of a Picture: Photos and

Videos.


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Study topics

When is too much info bad

How to optimize the theory transparency breeds self-correcting behavior


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References

The Role of Business in Disaster Response, USChamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership

Center, 2012


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Nyc - resilience 911

Greatest example of resilience canal street southcompletely shut down to vehicles cement dust and

debris coated every inch of buildings and streets

16 acre pile gutted center of the financial district


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Wrap

Large-scale have phases that go on for decades stillworking Katrina issues , still individuals in temp

housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are

actively managed -


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Info needs

Need to add the context against the array of distributedinfo that spews from an incident

Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it,refresh it, stay relevant

How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them toa more powerful effect.

Aggregation tools? visual displays

Data and info must be proactively contextualized by

credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersedenvironment


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The Cycle


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Social media and extensive communications channels,including historically novel and significant expectations

on


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Expectations

The president was expecdted (via press qs) to everydayknow how much ice and water were distributed to new orleans

Or in dwh, how much oil had leaked that day info mgmtmeans accurante info on details has to move from

reliable/validated source

Info: how much/how many.

Will always be many answers unless all agree on as of timeand date and from what geographic area a simple

question but unless there is a common understandingof the

parameters, answers will sound uninformed.get through

this by establishing a set time for reporting/freeze the counts,

communicate the agreement of parameters


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The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LBFD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen

peroxide self-venting.the 36 hour perspective watching

6 shift changes.

Whiteboard on a pier each brief, key pieces weredropped perished. Not uncommon continuity of

people balanced against fatigue question


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Info expectations

All responses have phases

Need to be clear about movement from one phase toanother and the info expectatIons between different

phases

Create distinct phases that cause shift in tactics, andcommunicates the progress

cap hill: emergency phase to recovery phase

dwh: katrina: rescue phase to recovery


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References

Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press,Washington DC, 2009.

Renaud, Cynthia

Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-ClassDistrurbances in the United States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs

Committee; 8 march 2006

Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned; February 2006.

Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008.

Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for StrategicIntelligence Research, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011.

Rupert, Richard; Federal on-scene Coordinators Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3;undated.

US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team,Sept 2011.

Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 27AUg2010, After ActionReport/Improvement Plan, 2March2011

Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), FinalReport, Jan 2011

National Level Exercises


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National Level Exercises

The Next Best Thing to Actual Events

NLE11 New Madrid FaultEarthquake (May 2011)

NLE12 Cyber Focus (October 2012) New Paradigm: Distributed Effects

Specifically Test: Impacts to Infrastructure/Physical Effects

Information Exchange/Communications

National Cyber Incident Response Plan

Federal Government Continuity


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Deep Dive into Information Management:DEEPWATER HORIZON Case Study - CDR Erich

Telfer, USCG

Information Management Broader Context

Decision-Making in Large-Scale Crises


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Bring Order to the Chaos

Get A System in Place (GASP) quickly

National Incident Management System (NIMS) Necessary, But Not Necessarily Sufficient

National Response Framework Whole of government effort

Recognize the Key Attributes of a Large-Scale ResponseNovelty, Complexity, Distributed Consequences, InsufficientQuantities of Specialized Equipment

Sustainably Staff and Equip National and Corporate LevelAllocation and Designations


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Tool Time

Volunteer Tracking

COP

ICS Forms Management/Tracking

Notifications and Alerts

Interactive Mediums

Hybrid Emergency Management Software


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Volunteer2.com

VolSoft

www.iamresponding.com


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Katrina (2005)

Worst case scenario levees protecting major citybreached

Required full national engagementBeyond FEMA

Led to comprehensive review of National structure andestablished whole of government mechanisms

NRF published 2008


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Deep Water Horizon

Complexity exceeded previous incidents.

Role of designated private commercial entity (responsibleparty) in a national level response

Uncontrolled release at unprecedented depth

Sufficiency of the National Contingency Plan

challenged.


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Erich


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Define Information Requirements,Systems, and Dissemination

Incident Communications and Structures:


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Incident Communications and Structures:Before, During, and After

BeforeMinimize the Impact: Information pushed to potential victims e.g.warning phase

- Good Robo Calls : one of the first times robo calls used to scale was LA fires in 200x -warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g. evacuate and go tothe Staples Center

- Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of samethis past summers Waldo Canyon fire inColorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered to residents in the pathtwo-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents

New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels:

- People Finder (Haiti) - Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post-Katrina

emphasis)

- Codified NIC structure and instituted multiple Incident Commanders concept creatingmechanisms for direct engagement with impacted populations (Cosco Busan concernedcitizen volunteers), impacted industries (fishermen in GOM), Congressional Members andstaff (Cap Hill Anthrax), and accountable elected leaders (DWH).

Command and control distributed decision-making and engagement of the local elected leaders(DWH)


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Information Management

Proliferation of tools Emergent and initial incident (warning phase)

Incident management (response phase)

Post-crisis (recovery phase)

Define Information Requirements, Systems, and Dissemination


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Its not the size that matters complexity as a differentiator When there is no script the unthinkable and the new

normal

US Government Structural Transition and the Rise of the

super-NIC NIMS is necessary but not sufficient

Situational Awareness on Steroids

Tools and schools

Brokering limited resources

Whole of Effort global private sector players as experts inScale who understand large problemsand can opportunity

to Scale


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Harnessing the Private Sector - People Finder

- Satellite Based emergency networks for responders

Tactics and tools at the speed of light


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Tactics and tools at the speed of light

New environment demands new tools to meet those needsdata and information must be contextualized

- rapid evolution of COP tools, incident notification tools, mappingtools; e.g. HSIN:

Common Operational Picture (COP) provides situational awareness andanalysis;

Integrated Common Analytical Viewer (iCAV) gives geographicalvisualization,;

24/7 availability, document Libraries, instant-messaging tool, Webconferencing, incident reporting, Common Operational Picture (COP)provides situational awareness and analysis, announcements, discussionboards, task lists, requests for Information/or Your Information (RFIs/FYIs),calendars

Really Simple Syndication (RSS) Feeds

Online training materials

ERMA


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Is too much information Bad?

Is the info accurate?

Is it current with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it wasaccurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3mindoes it cause more harm? Who determines accurate?

Is it this data or information? experience accelerates thedetermination of harm vs benefit for info pieces and cycles other ways to rapidly assess harm vs benefit? Who decides one persons harm is anothers benefit.and, on top of that,what is the power and value of transparencydo we

underestimate the power of

Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior ADM ThadAllen, USCG (ret)


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Frameworks and Structures

Evolve over the course of the incident Nims is necessary but not sufficient in large-scale

disasters in addition to accepted and trained-tostructures, LSDs must have systems for addressingcontentious decisions that require not insignificanttrade-offs Role for elected and appointed leaders responsible to the

citizenry.

Facilitated by an agreed upon, codified acknowledged process.

Realistic acknowledgement of individual tactics , usinginformation means and media, to influence others and positionones priorities above others - goal here is to gain as muchcommon consensus with agreed upon best possibledata/information, visible to each other.


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In large-scale, a number of issues rise to thislevel.how best to maximize that opportunity

Invest in a solid NIMS process to bring as many issues into theNIMS/IC Area Command process as possible; the better the

workings and processes inside NIMS, the better the chance

issues not addressable at AC level or IC level must

Courageous, knowledgable, articulate NIC

Meta-Leader

Knows what moves into the brokered sphere

Knows how to minimize the disconnects creating unnecessary

engagement of senior leaders

Communications mastery complex concepts made simple

Visible

No personal agenda/affiliationagnostic direct report to CIC


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Information versus data

- How do you educate at the same time you inform?

New language, no framework.

- what parameters guide or determine how porous and

rapid the data flow is versus information assessment by

experts does free flow of data (accurate or inaccurate)

spur



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Can not themselves create more chaos - still need a system,still need some degree of site control, accounting for victimsand responders, hazard assessment.

How to share imperfect and evolving information will youalways be wrong? Create deliberate structures of reporting e.g. as of information Match to normal cycles of information requirements Simultaneous picture The CG helicopter rescues during Katrina

Pentagon 911 response, the DC fire dept and units from MDthat they mobilized showed up and operated on thepentagon site without informing or integrating into theprofessionally well-known ICS structure - actedindependently

Th M L d C i


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The Meta Leader as Communicator

Must earn the confidence of highly diverse set of boththe engaged and enraged.

Must see strategic picture.

Be able to speak to detail of most elements.

Communicate at multi-levels.

Make people feel safe when they are unsafe andunsure.

Contextualizes data and information for commonunderstanding.

Lays out the areas for hard-choices DWH not enough boom for everyone.

I f d


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Info needs

Need to add the context against the array of distributedinfo that spews from an incident

Who adds the context, how, how to then distribute it,refresh it, stay relevant

How to embrace the disparate nodes and corral them toa more powerful effect.

Aggregation tools? visual displays

Data and info must be proactively contextualized by

credible source?, by an aggregate in a freely dispersedenvironment


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Do the same principles apply if - event is predicted

- Resources are prestaged- Vulnerabilities and impact area are known

The Averted Crisis LNGC CATALYUNA


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The Averted Crisis LNGC CATALYUNA

SPIRIT Disabled Adrift April 2008

Words matter Be Careful With Terms of Art Careful and deliberate selection of terms can ease tension,

minimize misunderstandingpoorly selected terms with

specialized meaning can fuel rhetoric and misinform perception.

Safe Anchorage versus Harbor of Refuge (what is it hiding from)

Returned to International Service (conveys acceptance of

standards by a legitimate independent body) versus Allowed to

Enter Port which others might interpret as a personal decision of an

individual without context.


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I f t ithi th


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Info mgmt within the zone

- disaster and crisis phase rely on preexisting naturalnodes within the community unique to each

community a church, civic group, or school system

(joplin high school) serve as comms and coordination

nodes

Citizens want to engage economic incentives,environmental sensitivity incentives, desire to

contribute, feeling of having control (COSCO Busan)

The Role of Business


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- effective comms and info mgmt and decision makingstructures will depend on whether there is a culture of

self-relience and resilience or a culture of

dependence and vulnerability.in either case, the

need for extraordinary external engagement andsupport is necessary, how that becomes interfaced,

coordinated, and implemented depends on which

circumstance the community is grounded in. Individuals

can be either, this is a characterization of the collective

behavior not individual behavior.

I fl


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Influencers

- precrisis alignement and pre-existing relationships(w/business, govenrment entities, private sector

groups, the broader response community) increase

resilience

precrisis macro culture (reliance or independence)


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RISK COMMUNICATION


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References


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References

The Role of Business in Disaster Response, USChamber of Commerce/Business Civic Leadership

Center, 2012

The meta leader as communicator


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The meta leader as communicator

Must see strategic picture Know every detail of every element

Communicate at multi-levels

Make people feel safe when they feel unsafe and

unsure

Contextualizes data and information for commonunderstanding

Lays out the areas for hard-choices

- DWH not enough boom for everyone


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The standup 8 hr (really every 6) change of shiftsL - LBFD reponse to 5000 gal baker tank 30% hydrogen

peroxide self-venting.the 36 hou r perspective

watching 6 shift changes.

Whiteboard on a pier each brief, key pieces weredropped perished. Not uncommon continuity ofpeople balanced against fatigue question

Risk was local if they dropped a key piece of info so

didnt illustrate critical need; but you operate for the bigone the way you practice for the little ones.

Information Disrupters


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Information Disrupters

Phase Change

Significant New Variable

References


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References

Howitt, Arnold and Herman Leonard, Managing Crises: Responses to Large-Scale Emergencies; CQ Press, Washington DC, 2009.

Leonard, Herman and Arnold M. Howitt, Katrina as Prelude: Preparing for and Respnding to Future Katrina-Class Distrurbances in theUnited States; Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homealnd Security and Governmental Affairs Committee; 8 march 2006

Townsend, Francis, et al; The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned; February 2006.

Kulisch, Gail P. et al; LNGC CATALUNYA SPIRIT Adrift Incident After Action Report; une 2008.

Telfer, Erich; Unlimited Impossibilities: Intelligence Support to the Deepwater Horizon Response; Center for Strategic IntelligenceResearch, National Defense Intelligence University, DIA (Unpublished) Dec 2011.

Rupert, Richard;; Federal on-scene Coordinators Report for the Capitol Hill Site, Washington, D.C.; USEPA Region 3; undated.

US Coast Guard, On-Scene Coordinator Report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Submitted to National Response Team, Sept 2011.

Floriida Division of Emergency Management, Deepwater Horizon Response 30Apr2010 27AUg2010, After Action Report/ImprovementPlan, 2March2011

Papp, Rober t, COMDT USCG, BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR), Final Report, Jan 2011

Spare Slides


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Spare Slides


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http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex

tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104

Migratory bird map - baseline
http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104


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http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&ex

tent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104

Migratory bird map - baseline

Wrap
http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=84af65e379fb42dfbbb94e8bf0d78f5d&extent=-80.8474,36.1439,-69.9709,40.3104


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Wrap

Large-scale have phases that go on for decades stillworking Katrina issues , still individuals in temp

housing; still an active series of recovery issues that are

actively managed -


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Uncomfortable to responders National Security Concerns

Decision-Making Ahead of Decision-Makers


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http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&e

xtent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685

Wetlands map baseline

http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685http://www.geoplatform.gov/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=ecfd899b55e944a1977f00c06a111013&extent=-95.4268,29.5805,-94.747,29.8685


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Evolve over the course of the incident

HARNESSING THE INFORMATION


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HARNESSING THE INFORMATION

Chaos phase Initial response

NIMS ICS NRF Build-out

EstablishIncident

Management

Structure

Define Information

Requirements

Collect and Distribute

Information

Proactively

Engage/Deliberat

ely Distribute

Mode R: Refine Structure

and Processes

Mode C: Escalate - Shift

Leadership and Structure

Mature

Feedback Loops

and Adjust

Response

Incident Communications and Structures:


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Highly Engaged Communities and Opportunities

BeforeMinimize the Impact: Information pushed to potential victims e.g. warning phase

Good Robo Calls : one of the first times robo calls used to scale was LA firesin 200x - warned individuals in remote area and communicated instructions e.g.evacuate and go to the Staples Center

Downside: Non-receipt and tracking of samethis past summers WaldoCanyon fire in Colorado - more then 20,000 evacuation calls never delivered toresidents in the path two-thirds of the 32,000 impacted residents

Now - New tools to account, distribute, and engage all levels:

People Finder (Haiti) Real-Time Logistics Tracking/Inventory and Distribution Technology (post-

Katrina emphasis)

Command and control distributed decision-making and engagement of the localelected leaders (DWH)



132/135


Proliferation of tools.

Emergent and initial incident (warning phase)

Incident management (response phase)

Post-crisis (recovery phase)

New Methods and Innovation


133/135

Novelty Requires Technical and Organizational Improvand Adaptation.

Anthrax

Decontamination techniques.

DWH

Capping Technologies

Manually Controlling a Well at Unprecedented Depth

The Power of the Private Sector.



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Is the info accurate?

Is it current with respect to the receive-act timeframe? If it wasaccurate 1 minute ago and you now receive it at time +3mindoes it cause more harm? Who determines accurate?

Is it this data or information? experience accelerates thedetermination of harm vs benefit for info pieces and cycles other ways to rapidly assess harm vs benefit? Who decides one persons harm is anothers benefit.and, on top of that,what is the power and value of transparencydo weunderestimate the power of

Transparency breeds self-correcting behavior ADM ThadAllen, USCG (ret)



135/135


- disaster and crisis phase rely on preexisting naturalnodes within the community unique to each community a church, civic group, or school system (joplin high

school) serve as comms and coordination nodes

Documents

Bringing Order to Chaos - AHMP Conf Sept12