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In this book, we document the main presentations of an international conference of liberal politicians and scholars held in Cairo in May 2013 as a point of reference also for future dialogues and debates. In the sessions, differences and differentiations concerning the central issue of the role of religion in society became apparent. However, little separated Arabs and Europeans in regards to the basic liberal principles of the freedom of the individual, the equality of chances for all men and women and the rule of law.
Citation preview
Bridging the Gap
An Arab-European Dialogue
on the Basics of Liberalism
Editor
Dr. Ronald Meinardus
Bridging the Gap 2
Title of the Book
Bridging the Gap
An Arab-European Dialogue on the Basics of Liberalism
Editor
Dr. Ronald Meinardus
Editorial Assistant
Dirk Kunze
Publisher
Al-Mahrosa for Publishing, Press Services, and Information
Block 7399, Street 28 branching from Street 9, Mukkattam
Cairo, Egypt
Tel/Fax: 02-25075917
E-mail:[email protected]
Chairman: Farid Zahran
Serial Number:
ISBN:
This book was published by the European Liberal Forum asbl with
the support of Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and Forum
for Greece. Funded by the European Parliament. The European
Parliament is not responsible for the content of the publication. The
views expressed in this publication are those of the authors alone. They
do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Liberal Forum
asbl, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty or Forum for Greece.
Bridging the Gap 3
European Liberal Forum (ELF) Founded in the fall of 2007, the European Liberal Forum is the non-profit European political foundation of the liberal family. ELF brings together liberal think tanks, political foundations and institutes from around Europe to observe, analyse and contribute to the debate on European public policy issues and the process of European integration, through education, training, research and the promotion of active citizenship within the EU.
Forum for Greece The “Forum for Greece” is a non-profit organization with liberal, democratic and reformist ideas, wishing to contribute to open and democratic developments in the European Union. The “Forum for Greece” has been registered under the Greek Law as a non for profit organization with headquarters in Athens and a branch in Thessaloniki, at North Greece. The “Forum for Greece” is aiming to work in the liberal-thinking sector in Greece helping to form a critical mass of citizens aiming at a liberal reform of Greek society.
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) Established in 1958 by the first president of the Federal Republic of Germany, Theodor Heuss, and a group of committed Liberals – is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization that is committed to promoting liberal policy and politics in Germany, Europe and worldwide. Based in Potsdam, Germany, the Foundation has seven offices in Germany and more than 40 projects worldwide through which it promotes its core concepts such as the protection of human rights, civil society, market economy, free trade and rule of law. Over the last 51 years the activities of the Foundation have expanded beyond their original civic educational task in the young Federal Republic of Germany. A scholarship program, a think tank (the Liberal Institute), a press and media department was established and the engagement in international politics became an important part of the Foundation’s assignments.
Bridging the Gap 4
Bridging the Gap 5
Table of Content Page
Ronald Meinardus Introduction 7
Giulio Ercolessi Preface: The Basics of Liberalism 11
Hala Mostafa Freedom, human rights and the individual in
Arab and Western experiences
15
Aristides N. Hatzis Rule of law, individual rights and the free
market in the liberal tradition: The case of
Greece
27
Asteris Huliaras Liberalism and conspiracy theories: Greece
and Egypt
45
Yusuf Mansur Arab renaissance and economic freedom 57
Andrzej Kondratowicz Economic freedom and institutional change:
European experiences and Arab realities
75
Mohammed Tamaldou The role of religion in Arab politics and
society
93
Sven Speer The role of religion in society and politics in
Europe, or: three myths of secularity in
Europe
109
Alexandra Thein Blueprints for the future of liberalism in the
Arab world
121
Mounir Rached A liberal program for the future: Guidelines
for Arab and European countries
135
Bridging the Gap 6
Bridging the Gap 7
Introduction
Dr. Ronald Meinardus
Arabs and Europeans are neighbors — they always have been
and always will be. In terms of geography, Arabs and Europeans
are very close. In terms of politics and culture, however, the
distance at times seems vast.
In Europe and the European Union there exists a consensus
that good neighborly relations are of existential importance. In
exemplary fashion, the EU has redefined its relations with the
Eastern neighborhood after the successful peoples’ revolutions in
that part of the world. Now, after the historic changes in the Arab
world, it is high time for Europe to redefine in earnest its
relationship with the Southern neighborhood.
For two days in May 2013, Cairo became the center of liberal
debate and attention, as politicians and academics from Algeria,
Belgium, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, the Netherlands, Palestine, Poland, Tunisia and
Syria assembled for the first Arab-European dialogue forum on
the basics of liberalism. We assumed there would be major
ideological and programmatic divergence between the delegates
and we therefore gave the conference the title, “Bridging the
Gap.”
The political and cultural environments are very different in
these parts of the world. This has a big effect also on the role of
liberalism in respective societies. In the Arab world, sadly, the
perception prevails with many that liberal principles stand against
local mores and traditions. Some groups, be it out of ignorance or
out of spite, continue to propagate that liberalism and religious
freedom are not compatible. Yes, they hatefully spread the lie that
the great idea of personal freedom is against Islam, thereby
Bridging the Gap 8
willingly pushing all Muslim liberals into the world of the non-
believer.
In this regard, the situation in Europe is very different: here,
liberal principles have become the mainstream and have found
their way into constitutions and legislation. All major political
forces, also socialists, conservatives and democratic religious
parties, have adopted basic liberal values.
In the following pages we gather the main presentations of
the Cairo conference as a reference point for future debates. In
the sessions, differences and differentiations concerning the
central issue of the role of religion in society became apparent.
Little separated the Arabs and Europeans in regards to the basic
liberal principles of the freedom of the individual, equality in
opportunity for all men and women, and the rule of law.
Importantly, these liberal principles have also been the
drivers of the peoples’ uprisings in the Arab world. Some three
years later, much of the enthusiasm has vanished — also among
Arab liberals who find themselves politically marginalized. How
to get out of this marginalization and become a key player is the
most important challenge of the liberal movement in the Arab
world.
It is essential to remember — a point highlighted at the
conference by speakers from both sides — that elections alone
are no guarantee for a democracy that protects the rights of all its
citizens. Recent history is awash with examples of so-called
illiberal democracies. These are political regimes that come to
power in democratic elections and then do little if anything at all
to protect the freedom of all citizens and guarantee equality of
opportunity in the fields of politics, society and economy.
Neither this conference nor the book you are holding in your
hands would have been possible without the generous support of
the European Liberal Forum (ELF), an European institute
dedicated to the promotion of dialogue and cooperation of
liberals in Europe. The Regional Office of the Friedrich Naumann
Bridging the Gap 9
Foundation for Liberty in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) is gratified and thrilled to cooperate with our European
partners in an endeavor to strengthen the understanding between
liberals on both sides of the Mediterranean.
Bridging the Gap 01
Bridging the Gap 00
Preface: The Basics of Liberalism
Giulio Ercolessi
All political speech is not only inherently difficult to translate
but also per se polysemic: it needs elucidation even within similar
political and cultural milieus. What are we talking about when we
discuss “the basics of liberalism”?
There cannot be a prescriptive definition, but here is a possible
proposal. Liberalism is a theory of the ends and a theory of the
means: maximizing individual freedom and self-determination,
mainly through the instrument of the legal limitation of all powers.
If we accept this definition, liberalism is a perpetual work in
progress.
First, because since the beginning it was the outcome of a fight,
ever more comprehensive and ever more consistent, against
authoritarian traditions and beliefs, and because of the natural
inclination of every political, traditional, bureaucratic, social and
economical power to confront and overrun its imposed limits.
Second, because it was by no means a steady triumphal march.
The preconditions for the development of liberalism were first
provided by the birth of the modern idea of the individual in the late
Middle Ages, especially in Central and Northern Italy and in the
Ancient Low Countries, and much later by the hard-won achievement
of a limited freedom of conscience, first in restricted areas of Europe
and in the religious domain alone. Further later, individual freedom
expanded to other domains, through hard and often bloody
confrontations, step by step leading to political freedom, freedom of
the markets, democracy, the system of constitutional checks and
balances, the independence of the judiciary, equal rights and equal
social dignity and protection from discrimination on the basis of
religion, political opinions, gender, race, nationality, ethnic origins,
age, disability, sexual orientation, etc.
Bridging the Gap 02
Not even within what we call today “the Western civilization”
was it a secure process. On the contrary, we learned from our
mistakes: freedom of conscience arose from persecutions and
religious wars; freedom of the markets from limitations to
development during the Ancien Régime and even later.
And European integration and the EU were finally established
as a consequence of two world wars (mostly fought among
Europeans and among Westerners). After two consecutive attempted
suicides, the main commitment of Western Europeans consisted of a
will of change, not of continuity: «Never again, nie wieder, jamais
plus ça, mai più, nunca más».
Third, liberalism was not the common result of an equal
progression of identical historical developments in all the Western
nations. It was a basically Dutch, English, American and French
product, that proved capable of partially or entirely successful
importations, transplants, imitations, adaptations, improvements, to
ever larger parts of the world.
This historical expansion of liberalism beyond its original
boundaries can be seen today as a promising precedent for regions
where new totalitarian or fundamentalist threats seem to be on the
rise.
Past successes easily led to the idea that the values and
principles of what we now call “Western civilization” are — and
must be — universally valid.
Dilemmas are obvious. In some countries, former colonial
powers appear to “impose” their values and principles on the rest of
the world. This was not the concern of the eminent scholars and
representatives of liberal and democratic Arab organizations that
took part in the Cairo conference whose proceedings are gathered in
this volume. We are no longer able to impose anything on anybody.
But it is our duty to bring to others what we think are the most
successful parts of our political civilization, as tools in “bridging the
gap.” The precious and passionate work of the Friedrich Naumann
Stiftung in Cairo should be an example for all of us.
Bridging the Gap 03
We must be conscious that history carries a weight, but does not
inflict on us an inescapable and inexorable destiny, resulting in
ascribed identities of peoples or civilizations that are given once and
for all.
And when we discuss the anthropological individualism of the
West, we have to remind ourselves that it is not the Arab world, nor
the Muslim world, nor Asia, that represent exceptions: the exception
is the West itself, and this was not given from the beginning; it was
the product of history, and history is also made of opportunities,
possibilities, choices.
Religious beliefs do have the capacity to influence and
condition popular behaviour and mentalities more than rationalistic
or philosophical thinking. Yet one must remember that Christianity,
and, most of all, Catholicism, with its hierarchical and authoritarian
structure, had been the strongest enemy of freedom of conscience in
the West, until it was forced to come to terms with pluralism,
liberalism, with the Enlightenment, and the modern scientific
thinking — with new exegetic tools provided by modern linguistics
and the social sciences, that were initially embraced only by
enlightened minorities.
Traditional views were indeed strongly challenged also from
within Christianity, but in principle freedom of conscience was
anathema to the official teaching of the Catholic Church well into
the second half of the 20th century, actually until the Second
Vatican Council.
Elsewhere, a solid “wall of separation” (Thomas Jefferson,
1802) between political power and religious faith had already
proved to be the best recipe to grant at the same time full religious
freedom to believers and freedom from impositions to religious
minorities and non-believers.
We liberals always held that all powers, even the democratic
power of the majority, must be limited whenever they try to coerce
individual conscience, individual freedom and self-determination.
Bridging the Gap 04
At the very dawn of Western liberalism, John Locke set a
principle: “Every man has a property in his own person” (Second
Treatise of Government, 1690).
Today, this sentence could seem related to the most advanced
present frontier of the ethical and political dilemmas of individual
self-determination.
Locke obviously could not think of that in 1690. He provided a
consistent framework to explain the historical developments arising
from almost a century of English political turmoil. But the principles
set at that time produced the basic political guidelines that we think
proved most fruitful in the three following centuries - and beyond.
Bridging the Gap 05
Freedom, human rights and the
individual in Arab and Western
experiences
Hala Mostafa
Human rights are defined as the package of rights and freedoms
to which everyone is inherently entitled, simply because she or he is
a human being. They encompass and address fundamental needs,
demands and rights that must be indiscriminately provided to all
human beings, because they touch the very nature of the individual,
such as the right of life, freedom, or equality, or any other right
essential to human nature. In other words, there exist a number of
natural rights enjoyed by man, and they are inherent to human
nature. Such rights exist even if they have not been recognized, or
moreover, even if they have been infringed upon by religious or
political authority. The United Nations has defined human rights as
legal and universal guarantees to protect both the individual and the
group from the actions of governments that may jeopardize
fundamental freedoms and human dignity. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations, binds
governments with certain obligations, while banning practices that
infringe upon human rights. That is, the international organization
views human rights as inherent to the nature of mankind.
On the other hand, human rights are understood as an
expression of the accumulation of philosophical schools, doctrines,
and religions throughout history. Human rights represent universal
human values that are extended to the human being wherever he or
she may exist. Laws and legislation in most countries protect human
rights, and yet prevailing regimes — more often than not — fail to
comply with the principles such laws embody because they are
incapable of providing guarantees of them, or because, at the outset,
they are against them for cultural or political reasons.
Bridging the Gap 06
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948
addresses four fundamental dimensions of human rights: first, the
individual and personal rights; second, the relation between the
individual and society or the state; third, public freedoms and
fundamental rights; and fourth, social and economic rights.
The Universal Declaration has been signed by most states and,
moreover, has inspired in many national constitutions provisions
governing citizens’ rights. However, the degree of compliance
varies among states and its legal mandate is still subject of debate,
particularly in non-Western states and non-democratic states.
Liberalism and human rights
Principles of human rights have evolved — historically and
ideologically — in the light of liberal philosophy, which fosters the
values of freedom and individualism simultaneously, since
individualism implies the protection of one’s physical and abstract
rights and freedoms, and embraces freedoms of thought, movement,
creativity, and other freedoms important to a social context.
Liberalism views the individual as the main concern of human
rights, the core of the philosophy of life, and the source of all values
that align thought and behavior altogether. Man steps into life an
individual, free, enjoying rights to live, to think, to believe, and to
exercise conscience; only then can he have the right to choose.
Freedom and choice are, subsequently, the cornerstones of liberal
philosophy.
Liberalism has developed over centuries, and is believed to be
the fruit of the European Renaissance, which emerged in Italy and
spread all over Europe between the 14th and 19th centuries, after the
religious wars of the Middle Ages. The period witnessed major
human revolutions, such as the French and American revolutions,
preceded by The Magna Carta of England, in the 13th century,
which is considered the first human rights document to include the
civic rights of individuals from different social strata, starting with
nobles through the middle class, to the rights of laborers and
Bridging the Gap 07
women. Furthermore, it was the individuals’ variant contributions in
the arts, painting, poetry, philosophy, and science — amongst other
fields of creativity — that played the leading role in modeling the
Renaissance and stabilizing the basic principles of freedom against
despotism and the abuse of power practiced by political and
religious authorities. It is widely believed that such contributions,
alongside the principles of the great revolutions, laid the ground for
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be formulated after
the end of World War II.
That said, liberalism as a school of thought, beyond mere
individuals, played its role in curbing authoritarian power.
Liberalism regarded the consent of subjects as a prerequisite for the
exercise of power, and as the source of its legitimacy. Liberalism in
this context builds upon the philosophy of the social contract, as
formulated by founders Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques
Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, with its core concept that a contract
exists between the ruler and the ruled, and that the contractual terms
requires the individual to waive part of her or his freedoms for the
state to exercise power. Yet the continuance of this contract is reliant
on how the state exercises its powers — in particular that it must do
so in a manner that does not violate the fundamental and natural
freedoms of the individual.
Liberalism, as well, has evolved politically and socio-
economically; that is, it is concerned with combating poverty and
supporting the growth of the middle class — for example, following
the industrial revolution and the Great Depression in the 1930s. At
that time, the theory of Keynesianism emerged, advocating a limited
role for government in support of social services programs, or the
so-called welfare state. Keynesian theory was formulated to counter
the economic crisis of the capital system.
Eventually, democracy — as a governing system — became
linked with liberalism, and by that, democracy has acquired further
dimensions than its mere procedural aspects (i.e., elections and the
rotation of power) to become principally concerned with public and
individual freedoms as well as the rule of law, the separation of
Bridging the Gap 08
powers, and civic-oriented constitutions that guarantee equality
without discrimination in a manner that crystalizes the modern
concept of “citizenship.”
Liberalism in the Western and Arab experiences
The Western experience of liberalism cannot be considered
apart from Western heritage, especially the history of the
Renaissance and the evolution of liberal philosophy in Europe, and
eventually the spread of the values of freedom and human rights and
individualism, and the adoption of liberal values in politics and
economy. Europe also stabilized “the national state,” which runs
deeper than social gaps and is built on the basis of citizenship, equal
rights and equal responsibilities, rule of law, and the supremacy of a
civic constitution to frame these values and principles. Thereby,
liberal values were reflected in institutions, and democracy was
introduced to mirror such ideas. In other words, the axioms upon
which Western experience was built became a reality, cementing a
national consensus.
The Arab-Islamic experience is the complete opposite of the
Western one. This part of the world has known “modernization” far
later than Europe. The Arab “Renaissance” started in the late-19th
century, passing through the 1930s and 1940s. At that time, the
concept of the national state was first introduced in Egypt (1805,
after independence from the Ottoman Empire and under the rule of
Mohammad Ali). Following that, communication opened up with
European civilization on all aspects, such as political, cultural and
religious reform, amid a revival of circles of literature, philosophy,
poetry, and the arts.
It is worth noting, in this regard, two main points. The first is
that the Arab-Islamic renaissance, with the spread of principles of
freedom and liberty, is very much the outcome of individual
contributions, which is why when that era — known as the “first
liberal era” — is mentioned, certain names pop up in one’s mind:
such as Rifa’a Al-Tahtawi, Sheikh Mohammad Abdou, Ali Abdur-
Bridging the Gap 09
Razik, Ahmad Lotfi As-Sayyed, Mohammad Hussein Heikal, and
Qassem Amin, and — more recently — Naguib Mahfouz, Tawfiq
Al-Hakim, and others. Dozens of such figures played a pivotal role
in spreading the values of liberalism. Yet such contributions never
turned into institutionalized values due to incompetent institutional
practices in Arab societies and the incomplete structure of the
national state — let alone affecting the traditional nature of the
dominant culture. Therefore, such contributions remained limited to
elites, with no deep impact on the lower classes of society,
particularly with the deterioration of education and the spread of
illiteracy, and failure to achieve economic or societal developments.
The second point is relevant to attitudes towards Western
civilization. The primary contributions made towards reform emerged
from a genuine desire to communicate with Western civilization,
rather than stand in conflict with it. This was crucial in determining
the direction of the aspired to reform. The result was a distinguished
pluralist constitutional and liberal experience in the first half of the
20th century, embodied in the first liberal and civic Arab constitution
in Egypt, in 1923. That constitution openly adopted human rights
principles among its provisions, with a special focus on individual
rights and freedoms, and guaranteed such rights and freedoms without
discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color or creed.
Liberalism run aground: The 1952 Revolution
The 1952 July Revolution was a significant turning point. With
the adoption of an opposing political agenda, involving a central role
for the state in economy and politics, and a clear orientation towards
socialism and the rule of a single political organization, Egypt’s first
liberal experience came to an end. On the other hand, the 1952
Revolution did lead to the emergence of Arab national liberation
movements and challenged the imperial and colonial powers of the
time. That was reason for the political and cultural rupture with the
West in general. “Mass” culture replaced “individual” culture,
which concerns with the rights and freedoms of the individual. The
Bridging the Gap 21
move beyond the individual is embodied in the rise of Arab
nationalism — an ideology that not only goes beyond the individual,
but also beyond national boundaries.
Though Egypt returned to political and partisan plurality, and
turned its back on socialism and adopted a policy of “economic
openness,” even relinquishing key parts of the Arab nationalism
doctrine, the change remained limited and curbed. The core concept
of the central state and its practices did not change; which means —
in brief — a lack of a liberal aspect in the turn towards pluralism,
democracy and free economy.
Furthermore, that time witnessed the rise of political Islamist
groups — both the so-called “moderates” (referring to those that
were known to be non-violent), and others believed to be fanatical or
extremist (known to have, or used to have, militias). In both cases,
the groups of political Islam have their own ideologies and schools
of thought that counter liberal thought on individual and civic rights.
Such groups did engage in an open conflict with the authorities. But
that conflict did not stop them from bargaining political deals. Such
deals, in principle, were tailored for the authorities to allow political
Islamist groups to work in the social and cultural domains, in
addition to Islamic preaching, and to achieve some electoral and
political gains, especially within the trade and student unions and
syndicates, all in return for keeping their hands off the presidency
and national rule. The regime, moreover, adopted some Islamic
ideas, mirrored in the constitution by establishing Islamic Sharia as a
main source of legislation (1981), or giving up important gains
related to freedoms and women’s rights and minorities. This was
known as “political Islamization.” During the 1980s, it was much
the same. Things changed only with the 25 January Revolution,
followed by Islamists winning the presidency, and ruling.
The Arab Spring
The “Arab Spring” revolutions, headed by the Egyptian
revolution, brought Islamist forces to the fore of the political scene.
Bridging the Gap 20
The Muslim Brothers were in the lead, with their fellow Islamists —
such as the Salafists and the Jihadists, who started to openly practice
politics — close behind. For the first time, Islamist groups had an
opportunity to come out from the shadows of secret work and join
recognized parties. That is, undoubtedly, a dramatic change in the
Egyptian and Arab political map. But while Islamists may accept to
engage in the democratic process in a procedural sense, adopting its
known tools (especially the electoral process), the values and liberal
principles of democracy are a different matter. Islamist views on
civic (both private and public) liberties are far different from those
upheld in liberal democratic systems. Such differences apply, as
well, to the values of plurality, tolerance, equality and non-
discrimination, and attitudes towards women and minorities, among
others. Also, the relationship between religion and politics — or
religion and the state — is still matter of debate, putting in question
the civil, or modern national state.
The reality of such conflicting views on individual and civil
freedoms was clearly illustrated in the 2012 Constitution (voted on
last December). All articles and provisions pertaining to civic and
individual freedoms were left open to interpretation by ruling
Islamic powers, the phrasing ambiguous and hard to legally or
constitutionally enforce. Freedoms were explicitly limited by
provisions on the so-called “protection of ethics.” Examples are not
limited to Article 81, which binds the enjoyment of rights and
freedoms to non-conflict with the “principles pertaining to state and
society,” without mention of what such principles are. Articles 10
and 11 stipulate that the state shall “preserve the genuine character
of the Egyptian family, and its ethics and moral values.” Such
provisions left the door open for the state — or even non-state
groups emerging on the pretext of protecting morals (such as groups
for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice) — to interfere in the
private freedoms of citizens and to evaluate their behavior according
to ideological standards.
Similarly, Article 33 — the fundamental article meant to
guarantee rights of “citizenship” — only referred to “equality
Bridging the Gap 22
between citizens in rights and duties without discrimination.” The
full article from the 1971 Constitution (Article 41) had been cut,
omitting the phrase that stipulates, “No discrimination shall take
place because of sex or race or language or religion or belief.”
The 2012 Constitution in general had shades of sectarianism,
especially in its newly created articles. For instance, Article 2 stated
that “Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principle source of
legislation.” To interpret this, a new article was added, Article 219.
With the phrase, “Credible sources accepted by Sunni doctrines,”
and with established disagreements among Islamic schools of
thoughts and jurisprudence, and their variance in extremism and
moderation, the article put the legislator and the court in grave
confusion. Moreover, for the first time Article 4 set a blunt political
role for the institution of Al-Azhar — the formal religious institution
in Egypt — through its board of senior scholars, stipulating that,
“The Senior Scholars shall be consulted in any matter pertaining to
Islamic Sharia.” This, practically, means that Al-Azhar would be
engaged in all political conflicts and disputes, and that its
distinguished moderate advocacy role would be jeopardized.
Particularly that the board of senior scholars is a rotating board, and
depending on its current members could be characterized by either
moderation, or by extremism.
Finally, considering Article 3, which stipulates that “Egyptian
Christians and Jews shall resort to their canon principles as their
own source of legislation,” versus Article 2 that stipulates that
“Islamic Sharia is the principle source of legislation,” one finds
different sources of legislation based upon different religious
references, all far from the core concept of the democratic civil state
that should be built upon the rule of positive law that applies to all
citizens without discrimination, and upon a unified concept for
citizenship.
Even Turkey is different in this regard. While ruled by Islamists
(the Justice and Development Party), debate over the nature of the
state came to an end following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
and the establishment of the Turkish secular state in 1924. Turkey’s
Bridging the Gap 23
1924 Constitution clearly states that Turkey is “a democratic secular
republic.”
Failure in modernization and development
The “independence” of Arab states emerged in apparent
contradiction with the West, due to the fight against colonialism that
swept the Arab region in the 1940s and 1950s. Soon after, the
political contradiction turned into a cultural one. There has always
been fear of so-called “neo-colonialism” or Western hegemony
through economic instruments and multinational companies, as well
as dominance via international organizations and agencies such as
the World Bank and the United Nations. Values and principles of
both political and economic liberalism, including human rights
charters, have always been regarded as an extension of Western
hegemony — particularly that of the United States and Europe.
All Western-leaning forces and currents have been either
marginalized or completely excluded from decision-making circles,
including liberal economic and political thinking. Accordingly, a
sort of harmony existed between the state and socialist, leftist and
Arab nationalist currents, with the symbols of these currents allowed
to participate — to varying degrees, and with limits — in political
life. That was the situation until the end of the Cold War and the
change of the international system with the victory of the Western
capitalists. That change was accompanied by the pressures of
cultural, political and economic globalization, which put the
“national state” on a defensive footing, at risk of losing its central
powers and classical pillars.
The following decades witnessed a different form of harmony,
between the state and conservative powers — particularly Islamic
ones — despite the recurrent struggle over power. That harmony
aimed at standing up against foreign pressures, such as capitalist
expansion and the spread of democracy and values of freedom (also
known as “the Western model”). The common ground with
Islamists was only about propagating the slogans of “cultural
Bridging the Gap 24
privacy.” It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian state’s signature
on international charters for human rights — including women’s
rights, and freedoms of belief and religion — has always been
conditional, backed with reservations.
What is also important is the state’s failure in implementing any
modernization and development plans, which led to the deterioration
of education and maintaining already high ratios of illiteracy,
poverty and unemployment. Traditional society remained as was,
and the social and cultural environment did not change, despite the
emergence of a new generation and social strata of a more open
culture. The changes occurring to the strata are a result of
globalization and the spread of technology and social media,
channels that the state failed to completely suppress or control.
A critical result of the failure of modernization and development
plans is about the surfacing of sectarianism and polarized belonging
in traditional society, be it religious or tribal or in belief. Such
polarization could very likely jeopardize political and social
homogeneity. It could also sectarianize any electoral process, which
raises questions on its integrity and compliance to established
democratic norms, which should be reliant purely on free political
choice. Polarization also helps explain the ongoing debates on the
identity of the state and its reference points, taking the focus away
from the genuine foundations of the modern civil state.
The fragility of liberal parties
Ongoing exclusion and marginalization of liberal currents by
the authorities — throughout the Arab experience, except for the
first liberal era — had an undeniable impact on the presence of
liberal powers and their ability to spread the culture of freedom
within the layers of a traditional society, a good environment
otherwise for conservative currents and groups, especially those who
combine religious slogans with political action.
In this context, the re-emergence of liberal parties after the
adoption of political plurality was tainted. For instance, Al-Waft
Bridging the Gap 25
Party — the biggest and most popular liberal party in Egypt before
1952 — turned into a hardline rightist party. Many of the recently
founded liberal parties, in turn, failed to live up to expectations, such
as the Democratic Front, the Free Egyptians, Tomorrow of the
Revolution (Ghadd As-Sawra), and the Constitution Party. None
have established a clear liberal agenda, even in cultural and
ideological aspects, and especially regarding civic freedoms,
religious freedoms, minority rights and even women’s rights.
None have prominent women leaders, including the National
Salvation Front. The abovementioned parties avoid controversial
debates, probably in fear of accusations of non-religiousness. In
addition, they are minor and divided, struggling from within over
their leaderships and hence failing to emerge as an influential bloc.
Even worse, they all have more or less the same program. The
reality of these so-called liberal parties has negatively impacted on
perceptions of liberalism in general, let alone their ability to embrace
the new generations within the political arena. The new generations
prefer to work in non-partisan forms, as protest movements, such as
Kefaya and the 6 April Movement, or the Rebel Campaign
(Tamarod) that appeared lately in Egypt.
It appears that the liberal parties have no potential for change in
the near future, especially with their announcement that they are not
going to run in the upcoming parliamentary elections, which opens
the door again to radical rightist groups (including the Salafists and
jihadists) to emerge as the main opposition. This is clearly
happening now in Egypt and Tunisia, the pioneering states of the
Arab Spring.
Bridging the Gap 26
Bridging the Gap 27
Rule of law, individual rights and the
free market in the liberal tradition: The
case of Greece
Aristides N. Hatzis1
I am a liberal because liberalism
does not compel me to think in a
certain manner or seek to forcefully
convince me of a certain idea with the
threat that if I do not embrace it I will
no longer be a liberal.
— Mariam Murad ‘Ali (2010)2
There are many versions of liberalism today. There is modern
liberalism with egalitarian tendencies (egalitarian liberalism; see
Rawls, 1971) and there is libertarianism (Nozick, 1974;
Narveson, 1988), there are liberal conservatives who have
difficulty in accepting a libertarian version of personal freedom,
and social democrats attracted to liberalism without being able to
digest easily economic freedom (Conway, 1995, Ashford and
Davies, 1991). From the center right to the center left people are
1 I wish to thank Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty (FNF) and
particularly Dr. Wolf-Dieter Zumpfort, Hans H. Stein, Dr. Ronald
Meinardus and Markus Kaiser for the kind invitations to present my ideas
at FNF events in Athens and Cairo, as well as Yulie Foka-Kavalieraki and
Dimitris Katsoudas for comments to both preliminary and final texts. I
dedicate this paper to our Egyptian friends, Heba Mahmoud and Islam
Atef. Comments are welcome: [email protected] 2 Excerpt from the award-winning essay written by Egyptian student Mariam
Murad ‘Ali, “He Who Differs From Me is Not Against Me,” published in
Meinardus and Nagui (2010), p. 115.
Bridging the Gap 28
attracted to liberalism for different and sometimes contradictory
reasons (Kelly, 2005). At the same time, liberal political thinking
is still under development. Almost every month something
interesting and very often original (Huemer, 2013) is published
from liberal intellectuals and scholars, including debates about
the fundamentals of liberal political philosophy (Tomasi, 2012)
or intellectual histories (Powell, 2000; Doherty, 2007). A great
number of these writings can be found online.1 This state of flux
is not only desirable; it is also vital for a political way of thinking.
So don’t expect me to present in this short paper a
mainstream liberal view. There is no mainstream and we
shouldn’t look for one (Barry, 1987; Boaz, 1997; Murray, 1997;
Fried, 2007; Hamowy, 2008; Miron, 2010; Brennan, 2012). I am
going to present my own version, or rather my own perception of
what constitutes the basics of a liberal approach to politics,
society, institutions and the economy.
The democratic and liberal principles
For me, there are two overarching ideas connected with the
liberal approach: the priority of personal freedom and the priority
of economic freedom. These two freedoms are prioritized over
collective decisions. They are not absolutes; there is a
presumption of liberty not a dogmatic adherence to principles.
Let me explain.
In democratic societies, decisions are made collectively. The
best way to decide collectively is the democratic way: the majority
wins. When there is a disagreement — and in a democracy there is
always disagreement — decision by a majority ensures
legitimatization, and at the same time is the decision-making process
most compatible with freedom. This is called the democratic
principle, and as is well known, it was devised in ancient Athens
(Schmidtz and Brennan, 2010, pp. 44-50).
1 See e.g. http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com or http://econlog.econlib.org
Bridging the Gap 29
Is it politically desirable for the majority to decide every case
of disagreement? Is the role of majority to decide on everything?
No. There is an area where individuals should be free to decide
for themselves even when their decisions have an impact on
society. This area is protected by rights — the most important
political tools for every liberal (Dworkin, 1978). Rights define
the area of personal freedom where society, the majority, and the
government cannot intervene. What is the extent of this area?
This is still under discussion. John Stuart Mill defined this area
better than anyone else:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the
opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating
him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with
any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him, must be
calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only
part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
(Mill, 1859, Ch. 1)
Bridging the Gap 31
As you can see, Mill not only defines the area of permissible
government interference with private choices (the harm principle)
but he also takes for granted that there must be a presumption of
personal freedom. Decisions by societies, majorities and
governments are residual — not the rule but the exception. There is
of course a rich literature that tries to interpret harm (Stephen, 1873;
Hart, 1963; Devlin, 1968; Feinberg, 1984-1988; Wertheimer, 2002).
Does this include extreme offence? Does it include negative
externalities (Trebilcock, 1993; Hatzis, 2013)? Could we add
collective action problems to the cases where the government should
limit liberty? Is this view compatible with social contract theories?
Independently of the answers to these questions we should
emphasize the essence of this argument: there is a presumption of
personal freedom; the proof of the necessity for restrictions to
personal freedom always lies with the government.
In a liberal democracy there is a personal domain protected by
negative rights. This domain should be shielded not only from an
authoritarian government but also from a democratic majority
(Danford, 2000, pp. 159-172). This domain should be under the
protection of the rule of law and its most powerful institutional
weapon: the constitution. Let’s call this the liberal principle. The
liberal principle was devised and introduced by James Madison1 in
the U.S. Constitution of 1787 and the U.S. Bill of Rights of 1789.2
The controversial3 ninth amendment is illustrative of Madison’s
1 “Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments, the real power lies in the majority of the
Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended,
not from the acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents,
but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the constituents.” (James Madison, “Letter to Thomas
Jefferson,” 17 October 1788). 2 The distinction between the “ancient” conception of liberty (emphasizing
political participation) and the “modern” conception of liberty
(emphasizing rights and the rule of law) was made for the first time by
Benjamin Constant in 1816 (for more see: Holmes, 1984). 3 See Barnett (1993). According to Barnett, the ninth amendment establishes
a “presumption of liberty” (implementing the ninth amendment challenges
Bridging the Gap 30
philosophy for the protection of the domain of personal freedom
from the power of the majority:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.
The most interesting question today is that about the balance
between these two principles: the democratic principle and the
liberal principle. They are apparently contradicting, but at the same
time they complement each other. Make no mistake. There can be
no liberalism without democracy. It’s an oxymoron. On the other
hand, an illiberal democracy is possible and also quite common.
Illiberal is a democracy where there are regular elections, the
majority is supposedly free to pick the winning party, the democratic
principle is generally respected, but not the liberal principle
(Zakaria, 2004). In an illiberal democracy individual rights are not
respected or adequately protected, the institutions of the rule of law
are undermined or underdeveloped, and the constitution is not a
shield against majority excesses but a legal weapon establishing
majority power and stifling minority voices. Civil society is
notoriously absent, and often individual behavior is restrained by
religion and/or conventional morality. These societies are always
characterized by an authoritarian combination of legal paternalism
and legal moralism.
Thus, balance between these two principles is essential for the
quality of a liberal democracy. The better the balance the better the
quality of a democracy.
A society where people are regularly called upon to express
their values, preferences and choices through voting, and where an
extended area of personal liberty is safeguarded by the rule of law, is
us to protect un-enumerated rights without determining a final list of such
rights, and without lending credence to illegitimate claims of right).
Bridging the Gap 32
a liberal society. Individuals in this society are in charge of their
lives — they are personally autonomous.
In such a society, well-being is linked to individual preferences.
It is not determined by society, by a majority or by a committee of
experts. Well-being is achieved by the satisfaction of preferences
through choices and contracts. This is only possible if the choice is
free and contracts are protected and encouraged, provided there is
mutual consent (Foka-Kavalieraki and Hatzis, 2009).
These values (choice, consent and contract) can be compatible
only with a free market. If the market is not free, people are not able
to choose freely; their consent does not matter and their contracts are
not enforced. It is apparent that a free market is a necessary
condition for personal autonomy and freedom. However, a free
market is also indispensable for well-being.
I belong to a liberal current called liberal utilitarianism, which is
closely connected with the work of John Stuart Mill in the 19th
century and the Chicago School of Economics in the 20th century. I
emphasize the instrumental value of the market as the creator of
wealth and the guarantor of well-being, but without dismissing its
moral value. I don’t share the view that the free market is always
self-correcting and efficient. I believe that government intervention
is sometimes necessary to solve the problem of collective action, to
correct market failures and provide an institutional framework that is
essential for a well-functioning market (Foka-Kavalieraki and
Hatzis, 2009). I also believe that a liberal cannot be indifferent to the
fate of a fellow individual in a society, especially where his or her
fate is not the result of choices made but of the natural lottery
(Rawls, 1971). A truly liberal society does its best to ensure equality
of opportunity and to provide a safety net for the less advantaged
(Tomasi, 2012).
Liberalism, thus, doesn’t preclude government intervention. It is
suspicious of it and alert for government failures. It is an exception
worth having if the benefit for liberty and well-being is far greater
than the cost.
Bridging the Gap 33
If we look at the world map of political freedom and compare it
with the world map of economic freedom we will realize there is a
correlation. If we study more closely this correlation we will
discover that there is a two-way causal relationship: political
freedom leads to economic freedom; economic freedom leads
eventually to political freedom. Less political freedom leads to less
economic freedom; less economic freedom leads to less political
freedom (Wu and Davis, 2004; Thies, 2007). What about China?
China is not economically free. It is very lowly ranked on indices of
economic freedom. However, it is freer than North Korea. If China
continues to liberalize its economy the political repercussions are
inevitable. A road towards more economic freedom is a road
towards more political freedom, more political participation, and
more democracy.
I hope that from the above discussion it has become obvious
that if we are trying to find a consensus among liberals we should
base it on these two presumptions: the priority of personal freedom
and the priority of economic freedom.
A liberal society is a democratic society with an emphasis on
rule of law, rights and personal autonomy. The free market is the
only kind of economic organization that is compatible with this
society.
The Greek experience
What about Greece? Greece follows the above recipe for liberty.
It is a liberal democracy with a free market. However, there are so
many black spots in this picture that the picture itself seems black,
especially if you look at it from a near distance.
Unfortunately, liberal thinking is underdeveloped today in
Greece and as a result liberal policies are unpopular, discredited or
unknown. This is the result of many factors, most of all of the
absence of a strong liberal intellectual tradition in Greece during the
20th century. This was not so in the 19th century when Greece had
its national but also democratic and liberal revolution. You could
Bridging the Gap 34
have found then genuine liberal essays, like “Greek Rule of Law”
(Ελληνική Νομαρχία) by an anonymous Greek intellectual declaring
that:
He who ignores Liberty, also ignores the essence of his
existence because Liberty is more essential for man than his
own existence. Liberty makes life pleasant, it produces
guardians for our Motherland, lawmakers, virtuous and wise
people. Only Liberty honors humankind.
You could have found genuine liberal intellectuals like
Adamantios Korais and others who had regular correspondence with
Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Horton,
1976; Rosen, 1992).
When Greece was liberated from the Ottoman Empire in 1821,
the first Greek constitutions were both democratic and liberal (see:
Clogg, 2002; Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2010). The short-lived
Greek constitution of 1827 was the most democratic and liberal of
its era; it was more progressive in many respects than the U.S. or the
French constitutions. Rule of law was established in Greece as early
as 1822 and the rights of life, liberty, property, safety, the freedom
of religion, speech, expression and the press were safeguarded.
Torture was prohibited and slavery was abolished as well as nobility
titles. According to the constitution of 1827, the only source of
political authority is the Greek people. Every political power
originates from the people and exists only to serve the people.
In 1844, Greece becomes the first country in the world with
universal male suffrage. Nine out of 10 Greek adult citizens had the
right to vote in an era where in Great Britain only one out of 12, and
in France one out of 200, had the same right.
Greece, despite political strife had a consistent democratic
political life with broad political participation from the early 19th
century to 1974, with only two relatively short periods of
Bridging the Gap 35
dictatorship, from 1936 to 1940 and from 1967 to 1974. However,
there were several periods where Greece was an illiberal democracy,
the most recent one was the period from 1949 to 1967 when
following a civil war the Communist Party was outlawed and left-
wingers were persecuted and repressed.
For the past 40 years, after the fall of the military junta in 1974,
Greece has become one of the most democratic countries in the
world. Nevertheless, I wouldn’t characterize it a model of liberalism
for several reasons. One is that the Greek economy is not as free as it
should be. Another reason is that the protection of individual rights
is not ideal. A third reason is that despite the prevalence of liberal
ideas in 19th century Greece, the absence of leading liberal
intellectuals in the 20th century was depressing. Only after 1974 and
the return to democracy did a number of scholars, intellectuals,
journalists and politicians come back to Greece, bringing with them
the ideas of what was erroneously called “neo-liberalism.”
These intellectuals had to fight prejudice, ignorance and
political short sightedness. They managed to survive and to inspire
the emergence of a small community of liberal-minded citizens. The
progress since 1974 is more than significant. Nevertheless, it is less
than expected and hoped. This is obvious today. Despite the
bankruptcy of the illiberal policies of the past 40 years and the
degeneration of the Greek political system, the presence of liberals
in Greek political life is marginal. There is a paradox in this
phenomenon. The liberal view is adequately expressed in the
traditional media: a number of liberal-minded columnists are very
popular and influential, and in almost every newspaper — including
traditional left-wing newspapers — you can find every day articles
that are very friendly to liberal ideas and causes. This is
unprecedented. At the same time liberal thinking is everywhere to be
found in the new social media, with the added effect of making
possible the creation of strong liberal online communities.
Unfortunately this dynamic is not expressed politically. The results
in the last two election polls were disheartening. One should wonder
Bridging the Gap 36
if this is the result of a lively minority creating too much noise and
little political substance.
But let’s examine the blind spots in Greece’s liberal façade
more closely.
Greece’s ranking on economic freedom is deplorable. In the
latest Index of Economic Freedom, Greece is characterized as
mostly unfree (117th out of 177). You will find similar results if you
look in other indices, like the Economic Freedom of the World
index. According to the annual survey of the World Bank (Doing
Business) for 2013, Greece comes in 78th out of 185 countries
around the world in terms of the overall ease of doing business. It is,
of course, the worst place in both the European Union and the
OECD. This sounds more than outrageous. Greece, a European
Union member for the past 30 years, a member of the Eurozone for
the past 10 years and formerly one of the 25 richest countries on the
planet, ranks far below Kazakhstan, Rwanda, Ghana and Mongolia.
Also below much poorer neighbors like Bulgaria, Turkey and
Romania. This is so because the Greek economy has been for years
hostile to entrepreneurship and the free market in general. You
should also take into consideration that this position is much better
than the one Greece had two to three years ago.
The Greek government during the past three years attempted to
open closed professions and to limit the entitlements of public sector
unions. The result was always — with few notable exceptions — a
crushing defeat for the government by powerful pressure groups
who are determined to continue preying on Greece’s finances,
indifferent for the common good. They manage to wipe out any
vestiges of a free market system, transforming Greece into a model
of corporatism, statism and cronyism.
The institutional deficit
It’s not difficult to imagine what a liberal agenda would look
like in a situation like this:
Bridging the Gap 37
Open markets
Abolish closed professions
Repeal regulations
Make the tax system efficient and just
Reform the welfare system. Transform it from a spoil for
powerful groups to a real safety net
Fight corruption
Fight pressure groups, cartels, and government sustained
businesses
Construct an institutional framework appropriate for
economic development
Liberals, quite often, are so much preoccupied with economic
liberty they forget political liberty, individual rights and the rule of
law.
Greece’s deficit is not only financial. As we have already seen it
is first and foremost an institutional deficit. This institutional deficit
includes deficient protection of individual rights. Economic freedom
is not the only freedom with insufficient protection.
Let us discuss briefly some leading issues where this deficit is
more than obvious. I believe that a liberal policy should address all
these issues:
1. Violence. Greek intellectuals, academics, authors, journalists
are afraid of expressing their opinions in several
circumstances. I don’t mean that there is no freedom of
expression in Greece. However, a lot of people in Greece are
afraid to express themselves, fearing violent retaliation by
extremists of left and right. A liberal agenda should
emphasize protection of every opinion and punishment for
violent acts, especially hate acts.
Bridging the Gap 38
2. Police brutality and torture. There are too many depressing
reports issued by international human rights organizations
and stories published by international newspapers revealing
widespread abuses of fundamental rights and affronts to
human dignity. It’s a disgrace for a civil society.
3. Freedom of expression. There are numerous incidences of
infringement of the rights of free speech by the government,
the courts and independent agencies like the Greek National
Council for Radio and Television. Sometimes these
infringements are outrageous and are almost always
ridiculous, as the banning by a court of a communist student
club in a small provincial town because its activity could
endanger the relations of Greece with its allies!
4. Freedom of the Press. The press is free in Greece and
sometimes not even constrained by a code of ethics.
However, there is a web of laws and regulations creating
obstacles and disincentives for journalists seeking to unravel
the truth. Powerful persons and groups are using this web to
deter journalists quite successfully.
5. Freedom of conscience. The Greek state is an officially Greek
Orthodox state. Greece is in many respects a theocratic
country. The separation of church and state should be one of
the leading causes in any liberal agenda. Athens is still the
only capital in Europe without a mosque!
6. Right of self-determination. Greece has been condemned by
the European Court of Justice numerous times for not
allowing ethnic and religious minorities to express
themselves. The self-proclaimed Turks or Macedonians
should have the right to express their perceived identity
freely. A liberal agenda should give to these minorities the
right (not a collective right, an individual right) to self-
determination.
7. Right to self-ownership. The army in Greece is still
mandatory. A liberal agenda should ask for an abolition of
Bridging the Gap 39
conscription. The decriminalization of drug use is also
crucial if we want to call our society liberal.
8. Political and legal equality. A liberal agenda should also give
priority to political and legal equality. A crucial issue is the
problem of marriage equality. In Greece, gay people cannot
even form civil unions. I believe that a liberal agenda should
include this extremely important right for a civil society.
9. Protection of immigrants and vulnerable minorities. The
Greek state has been embarrassed several times by the
negative reports of international organizations on
immigrants and vulnerable minorities, like Roma. A liberal
agenda should be protective of minorities and immigrants.
10. Academic freedom. In Greece, private universities are
prohibited by the constitution — even non-profit ones.
Article 16 of the Greek constitution is a disgrace for every
liberty-loving person. It should have been amended a decade
ago. At the same time, Greek public universities should be
liberated from the forces of the dark; from professional
occupiers who ensure low quality studies, restrict freedom of
speech, and promote a mafia-style system of corruption and
decadence.
Towards a liberal education
For me the most important mission for liberal intellectuals today
in Greece — but also in Egypt and the Arab world — is education:
education for liberalism. There is no other way to make liberal ideas
popular and liberal policies feasible. Especially young people should
be acquainted with these ideas. I am more than confident that the
encounter with these ideas will make young people appreciate them,
or at least will give them a chance.
Friedrich Naumann (1909), more than a century ago, had the
same insight for Germany: “Education for liberalism is in no way
merely the education of members of parliament; at a much higher
Bridging the Gap 41
level, it is about educating the people for liberal thinking and
action.”
I know how romantic and unrealistic many of these ideas may
sound. These cannot be achieved in a day, in a year or sometimes
not even in a lifetime. It takes a transformation of society for these
goals to be achieved. It takes a liberal education.
Bridging the Gap 40
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Bridging the Gap 45
Liberalism and conspiracy theories:
Greece and Egypt
Asteris Huliaras
Public views in Greece and Egypt are sometimes strikingly
similar. In both countries conspiracy theories are à la mode.
Conflict, instability, foreign intervention and the redrawing of
international boundaries in their respective regions (the Balkans and
the Middle East/Africa) have created feelings of insecurity.
Economic crisis and political transition made uncertainty and fear
widespread. Semi-dormant conspiracy theories came to forefront,
undermining rational debate and political accountability.
Conspiratorial explanations of political events or economic
developments are based on the belief that behind the scenes there is
a deliberate plan, formulated in secret by powerful foreign actors.
For conspiracy theorists, the truth is “out there” and is systematically
concealed by powerful enemies. Conspiracy theories are based on
mistrust and suspicion.
Conspiracy theories are not new. It is believed that Emperor
Nero concocted an elaborate tale to shift the blame to the Christians
for the burning of Rome. But most analysts argue that in their
modern form, conspiracy theories emerged during the French
Revolution of 1789. Then, the enemies of the revolution (royalists,
etc.) promoted the view that the revolution was a machination of
Freemasons, Jewish traders and the Illuminati to “control” France.1
The Tsarist regime in Russia and the Nazis gave a great boost to
conspiratorial thinking. McCarthyism in the United States showed
1 See, for example, Tackett, Timothy, “Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of
Revolution: French Elites and the Origins of the Terror, 1789-1792,” The
American Historical Review, Vol. 105: June (2000), pp. 691-714.
Bridging the Gap 46
that conspiracy theories are a worldwide phenomenon, irrelevant of
space and time, regime type or level of economic development.
There is a wide literature on the causes of conspiracy
theorizing.1 Philosophical approaches focus on information: it is the
low quantity and quality of evidence that drives belief in conspiracy
theories. The claim of this school is that people adhere to
conspiratorial thought because they do not have accurate and
authoritative information. Psychological approaches argue that
conspiracy theories are mental shortcuts. They note that conspiracy
theories meet a basic human need: to balance the magnitude of any
given effect by the magnitude of the cause behind it. After all, a
world in which tiny causes can have huge consequences is scary and
unreliable. Therefore, a grand disaster like a war or a large-scale
terrorist attack, like 11 September 2001, needs a grand conspiracy
behind it. Sociological approaches argue that culture is key in
understanding conspiracy theorizing. The way groups view
themselves in relation to others helps determine how likely they are
to view events as conspiracy-related. By this logic, culture is a filter
that screens out unflattering information and favors complimentary
narratives. Finally, political explanations of conspiracy thinking
focus on power and interests. Political scientists believe that certain
groups benefit from conspiracy theories and, thus, have a real
interest in promoting them. Most political scientists claim that
conspiratorial thought operates symmetrically on both ends of the
political spectrum. People on the right and the left are equally prone
to having less faith in democracy, are equally prone to cynical and
suspicious views, and equally prone to believing that politicians
conceal their true aims and make decisions in secret.
In Greece, the typical conspiracy theory is “the foreign finger”
(xenos daktylos) and in the Arab world “the hidden hand.” On both
shores of the Mediterranean large groups of people tend to adhere to
1 For a brief review see: Uscinski, Joseph E., Joseph M. Parent and Bethany
Torres, “Conspiracy Theories are for Losers,” Unpublished paper presented
at the 2011 American Political Science Association annual conference,
Seattle.
Bridging the Gap 47
conspiracy theories. And these groups of people do not necessarily
consist of the non-educated, the economically marginal or the
politically excluded. For example, a recent study on Greek junior
army officers’ political perceptions found they see Greece as a
“puppet” in the hands of “great powers.” Junior army officers in
Greece support conspiracy theories that present Greece and its rival,
Turkey, as non-sovereign countries whose policies are dictated by
more powerful states and interests, always with a hidden agenda.
Their view is that Greece will never go to war with Turkey unless
the Americans wish it so.1
It has been argued that conspiratorial explanations tend to
flourish in response to unusual, unexpected or traumatic events. In
particular, conspiracy theories gain ground when the population of a
country feels insecure or persecuted.
Indeed, conspiracy theories are rarely created de novo, but
rather draw on a tradition of conspiratorial accounts.2 Sutton claims
that viewing the “foreign finger” as decisive in Greek political and
diplomatic calculations is not “an exception but the consistent
pattern in Greece’s relationship with the West.”3
Greece: Fear and paranoia
In the last three to four years, Greek politicians, intellectuals and
the general public argued that the economic crisis was a plot by dark
foreign forces to subdue proud, independent nations. Political parties
of both left and right promoted several conspiracy theories: the
1 Kirtsoglou, Elisabeth, “Phantom Menace: What Junior Greek Army
Officers Have to Say About Turks and Turkey,” South European Society
and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), p. 169. 2 Lipset, Seymour Martin and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-
wing Extremism in America,
1790-1977 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 3 Sutton, David, “Poked by the ‘Foreign Finger’ in Greece: Conspiracy
Theory or the Hermeneutics of Suspicion?” in Keith S. Brown and Yannis
Hamilakis (Eds.), The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2003), p. 197.
Bridging the Gap 48
“West” is trying to destroy Greece because it is jealous of its past
glories; “foreign interests” have their eyes on the “rich” oil and gas
deposits in the Aegean; and that the relationship with the European
Union is a poker game and the northern Europeans are simply
bluffing.
Of course it is very convenient to blame others for your own
misery or mistakes. Politicians have an interest in pointing to some
outside enemy, real or imagined. This practice enables them to
divert attention from ineffective and inefficient administration. For
example, even the Western-educated, moderate and low profile
former Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, speaking at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, said in 2010:
This is an attack on the Eurozone by certain other
interests, political or financial, and often countries are
being used as the weak link, if you like, of the
Eurozone. We are being targeted, particularly with an
ulterior motive or agenda, and of course there is
speculation in the world markets.1
Mikis Theodorakis, Greece’s most famous composer, expressed
the visceral reaction of many Greeks when he said the crisis was
probably a plot by dark forces in America and other capitalist
countries to subdue proud, independent nations. In an open letter to
the “international community” he claimed:
There is an international conspiracy whose target is
the complete destruction of my country. They began in
1974 aiming at modern Greek civilization, continued
with the distortion of our modern history and our national
identity and they are now trying to eliminate us
1 Cited in Charlemagne, “Just Who Are These Dark Forces Attacking
Greece?” The Economist, 29 January 2010, p. 55.
Bridging the Gap 49
biologically as well through unemployment, hunger and
impoverishment. If Greek people don’t rise as one in
order to prevent them, the danger of Greece becoming
extinct is evident. I place it within the next 10 years …
Indeed, many such perceptions are based on past experiences:
U.S. support for the Greek junta and especially U.S. inaction on the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus that, for many Greeks, was
masterminded by Henry Kissinger. A few years ago, a Greek left-
wing periodical claimed to uncover the secret plan to tame the
Greeks by publishing an alleged statement by Kissinger:
The Greek people are anarchic and difficult to tame.
For this reason we must strike deep into their cultural
roots. Perhaps then we can force them to conform. I
mean, of course, to strike at their language, their religion,
their cultural and historical reserves, so that we can
neutralize their ability to develop, to distinguish
themselves, or to prevail; thereby removing them as an
obstacle to our strategically vital plans in the Balkans, the
Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
It doesn’t appear to matter that Kissinger denies he ever said
that. The paragraph has been reproduced in newspapers, blogs, and
online forums. It is proof of an international conspiracy, according
to an argument constantly repeated, until today. The idea is always
the same: “the foreigners want to destroy us.”
The countless magazines on extra-terrestrial life, the mysteries
of life, etc., confirm the thirst of the Greeks for conspiracies. TV
shows such as those of Mr. Tragas, Mr. Hardavelas (not on any
longer) and Mr. Liakopoulos are proof that conspiracy theories are
widely popular in the country, though hard data on public opinion
Bridging the Gap 51
support for conspiracy theories is largely unavailable. Pollsters,
however, believe it is widespread.
Moreover, sometimes the belief in conspiracy theories becomes
totally paranoiac. Some (though marginal) Greek media claim that
the “masterminds of the world” have decided to control Greeks with
chemicals that they inject in the water supply. They also argue that
fruit and vegetables are “poisoned” with pesticides that limit Greek
citizens’ intelligence and make them easy targets for a bombardment
of propaganda. They even argue that airplanes are spraying the
country with chemicals (to prove their accusations the reproduce
photographs that show planes leaving long lines in the sky — so-
called chem-trails).
Egypt: The Arab Spring conspiracy
In Egypt and other Muslim countries, the Arab Spring was
presented as a “foreign plot” aimed at weakening Arab armies.
Many Arab politicians, activists and journalists argued that the Arab
Spring was an American plan to divide the Middle East into smaller
rival nations, and to plunder their wealth. Recent events in Egypt,
Libya, Yemen and Syria have been explained as a calculated plot to
destroy Arab countries and wipe out their rich heritage and history.
Many of those who believe the Arab Spring is part of a conspiracy
theory have linked their views to the remarks, articles and literature
of non-Arab intellectuals, like Bernard Lewis.
The U.S. military intervention in the Gulf in 1991 gave a great
boost to conspiracy theories. To some conspiracy theorists, Saddam
Hussein was deliberately drawn into a trap of invading Kuwait,
“whether to start a war that would destroy or weaken his military, or
for the West to gain greater access to Iraq’s oil, or to protect Israel
from a perceived threat from an idle Iraqi military.”1 Saddam
himself made similar claims.
1 Gray, Matthew, “Explaining Conspiracy Theories in Modern Arab Middle
Eastern Political Discourse: Some Problems and Limitations of the
Bridging the Gap 50
Terms like the “New Middle East,” coined and promoted by
U.S. officials in relation to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, gave more
credence to conspiratorial explanations. In 2004, the Bush
administration adopted the “Greater Middle East Project” with the
goal of encouraging political, economic and social reforms in the
Arab world and the wider region. Despite that the project did not
bear any fruit and was in several respects a complete fiasco, it
helped to create or strengthen a perception that the United States
was behind the overthrow of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in
Egypt — and also the civil war in Syria.
The view that the Arab Spring is a Western plot was also
promoted by several Arab regimes. Gaddafi in Libya and Al-Assad
in Syria made similar allegations. The truth is that the upheavals in
the Arab world came as a surprise to many Western foreign
ministries. France’s minister of defense offered help with police
training to Ben Ali’s Tunisia at the same time that demonstrations
were gathering momentum. Also, Washington initially signaled
support for Hosni Mubarak during the rallies against him. Hillary
Clinton said she was sure that the Mubarak regime was “stable.”
The U.S. was also reluctant to lose an ally against Al-Qaeda in
Yemen such as Ali Abdullah Saleh. The United States was likewise
unhappy with the uprising in Bahrain. And Obama was very
reluctant to get involved in the French-inspired military intervention
in Libya. The truth is that the uprisings were spontaneous,
indigenous, centered on dissatisfied youth, and there is a lot of
evidence that they took great Western powers completely by
surprise.
A crucial similarity between Greece and Egypt is that there are a
lot of state-sponsored conspiracy theories. It is obvious that
conspiracy theories help divert attention away from the state’s
political or developmental failures and towards a constructed enemy.
As in the French Revolution, the ancien régime fought back.
Literature,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2
(2008), p. 156.
Bridging the Gap 52
A history of real conspiracies
Very few notions nowadays generate as much academic
resistance and hostility as the belief in the historical importance of
political conspiracies. As Jeffrey M. Bale argues,
the idea that particular groups of people meet
together secretly or in private to plan various courses of
action, and that some of these plans actually exert a
significant influence on particular historical
developments, is typically rejected out of hand and
assumed to be the figment of a paranoid imagination.1
However, the academic literature on negotiations, coup d’état,
espionage, covert action, political corruption, organized crime,
terrorism and revolutionary warfare have analyzed in detail
clandestine and covert political activities on a more or less regular
basis.2
In the recent history of the Balkans and the Middle East, several
real conspiracies have taken place, and great powers have for long
periods manipulated local politics by buying off politicians,
sponsoring political parties, organizing or supporting coups and
propping up minority communities. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of
1916, the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953, the Levon
affair of 1954, the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Iran-Contra affair of
1985-6 are blatant examples of great power secret interventions in
the Middle East. These incidents provide a fertile ground for Middle
Eastern conspiracy theories. In Greece, perceptions of a “foreign
finger” are also warranted. Experiences of betrayal by the West tend
to provide justification for current conspiracy theories. Protagonists
1 Bale, Jeffrey M., “Political Paranoia v. Political Realism: On
Distinguishing Between Bogus
Conspiracy Theories and Genuine Conspiratorial Politics,” Patterns of
Prejudice, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2007), p. 47. 2 Ibid, p. 49.
Bridging the Gap 53
in Greece’s internal quarrels have long invoked external assistance,
while furiously denouncing any foreign help given to their rivals.
During the right-left civil war of 1946-49, each side reserved
particular loathing for its foe’s foreign backers, American or Soviet.
The idea of a manipulating “foreign finger” has in fact dominated
modern Greek history.
Several studies have shown that conspiratorial accounts have a
long history in the Balkans and Middle Eastern countries.1 Recent
developments in the wider region — conflict, foreign intervention
and redrawing of international boundaries — helped to promote
conspiratorial explanations. During the 1999 NATO bombings of
Yugoslavia, the country’s establishment (politicians, official media
and intellectuals) adopted conspiracy theories referring to the secret
plans of the Bilderberg Group, the Council on Foreign Relations and
the Trilateral Commission that were supposedly conspiring to
destroy Serbia.2 Similar views emerged in Greece. The international
intervention was portrayed as an extension of the long history of
Western colonialism. Greeks wove stories of poorly concealed
hidden interests to control the region’s natural resources and
conquer independent-minded nations.3 For many Greeks, the break-
up of Yugoslavia and the redrawing of international boundaries was
a German plot with the support of the Vatican. Similar views
emerged in Egypt. According to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,
South Sudan’s independence “was the fruition of a century-old
Western ecclesiastical plot to close Islam’s gateway into Africa, and
the start of a plan to break other Arab countries into feeble statelets
1 Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy
(Basingstoke: Macmillan
1996). 2 Byford, Jovan and Michael Billig, “The Emergence of Anti-Semitic
Conspiracy Theories in Yugoslavia During the War with NATO,”
Sociologija, Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (2005), pp. 307-322. 3 Brown, Keith and Demetrios Theodossopoulos, “Rearranging Solidarity:
Conspiracy and World Order in Greek and Macedonian Commentaries on
Kosovo,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 5, No. 3
(2003), p. 333.
Bridging the Gap 54
so as to grab their riches.”1 Indeed, there is some truth in both
accounts. Germany pressured its EU partners to recognize the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia. And the US and Israel
strongly supported the independence of South Sudan. For many
years Egypt sought to impede South Sudan’s quest for independence
ostensibly because of fears over the White Nile’s headwaters. Greek
foreign policy-makers shared with Egyptians counterparts the view
that the redrawing of international boundaries would create a
dangerous precedent. Greece favored the status quo in the Balkans,
fearing the disruption of the trade route to Western Europe — its
own Nile. In both countries, war, instability and the changes in
international boundaries in their wider regions created a lot of
uncertainty and promoted conspiracy theories.
However, there are fundamental differences between
“conspiracy theories” and actual covert and clandestine politics,
differences that must be taken into account if one wishes to avoid
serious errors of historical interpretation. It’s one thing to believe
that there are clandestine actions and another to embrace the idea
that everything that is truly significant happens behind the scenes.
We can conclude that conspiracy theories tend to flourish in the
Eastern Mediterranean partly because the region has a long history
of real conspiracies and interventions by great powers. Instability in
the wider region (violent conflict, foreign intervention, redrawing of
international boundaries) is also responsible for feelings of
uncertainty since in both the Balkans and the Middle East national
sovereignty is a “sacred” concept. Finally, political transition (in
Egypt) and economic crisis (in Greece) strengthened conspiracy
thinking as old and new elites searched for legitimacy.
1 “South Sudan and the Arab World: A Plot to do down Islam,” The
Economist, 13 January 2011.
Bridging the Gap 55
Figure 1. Causes of conspiracy theorizing
Greece Egypt
A modern history full of
real conspiracies.
▲ ▲
Conflict in the wider
periphery.
New international
boundaries
▲ ▲
Political and economic
instability
▲ ▲
Epilogue: Say No to international conspiracies
There is nothing in Greek and Egyptian political cultures that
make them more susceptible to conspiracy theories. Conspiracy
theories are present all over the world. Even in the richest Western
countries, belief in conspiracy theories is widespread. In August
2004, a poll by Zogby International showed that 49 percent of New
York City residents, with a margin of error of 3.5 percent, believed
that officials of the U.S. government “knew in advance that attacks
were planned on or around 11 September 2001, and that they
consciously failed to act.”1 In a Scripps-Howard Poll in 2006, with
an error margin of four percent, some 36 percent of respondents
assented to the claim that “federal officials either participated in the
attacks on the World Trade Center or took no action to stop them.”2
However, no conspiracy theory offers a way out of the mess. In
fact, conspiracy theories impede clear thinking and allow political
elites to escape responsibility for their actions. Conspiracies
undermine democratization and economic reform. They lead
citizens to inaction. Their real message is that since a foreign
1 Cited in Sunstein, Cass R. and Adrian Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories,”
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2009), p. 202. 2 Ibid.
Bridging the Gap 56
“Other” is responsible for your problems, you can do nothing to
change your condition.
Only by taking responsibility for ourselves, we the Greeks and
the Egyptians can overcome the current turmoil. In fact, conspiracies
are the enemies of liberalism. If we want to strengthen
representative institutions, promote good governance and empower
the people we have to abandon the belief in international
conspiracies — even if they sometimes prove true.
Bridging the Gap 57
Arab renaissance
and economic freedom
Yusuf Mansur
While there is no single definition for economic freedom,1 the
majority believes the concept to include free markets, free
trade and private property.2 Further, as stated in the Economic
Freedom of the World 2007 Annual Report, the key ingredients of
economic freedom can be understood to include: personal choice,
voluntary exchange coordinated by markets, freedom to enter and
compete in markets, and protection of persons and their property
from aggression by others. An economy is considered free when it
provides secure protection for one’s property (physical and
intellectual), even-handed enforcement of contracts, a stable
monetary environment, low taxes, little to no barriers to market
entry, and rely more on markets than political decisions and
processes in the allocation of resources.
Indeed, the concept of political freedom underpins economic
freedom. In Economic Freedom of the World 2007, we find the
proposition that: “Personal ownership of self is an underlying
postulate of economic freedom. Because of this self-ownership,
individuals have a right to choose — to decide how they will use
their time and talents. On the other hand, they do not have a right to
the time, talents and resources of others. Thus, they do not have a
1 See Bronfenbrenner, Martin, “Two Concepts of Economic
Freedom,” Ethics, Vol. 65, No. 3 (1955), pp. 157-170, and Sen,
Amartya, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2004), p. 9. 2 Friedman, Rose D. and Milton Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 605.
Bridging the Gap 58
right to take things from others or demand that others provide things
for them.” And even if a country were democratic (i.e., people can
vote and elect their own government), if political restrictions inhibit
voluntary actions and personal choice, then political institutions
would be in conflict with economic freedom.1
The most important component of “human well-being,”
according to John Stuart Mill, freedom is to be able to pursue one’s
own good in one’s own way; thus, happiness would accrue only to
“someone who was capable of choosing an independent path and
who had the public sphere available in which to exercise that
capacity.”2 In Capitalism and Freedom (1962), Milton Friedman
argued that economic freedom was a necessary condition for
political freedom,3 and that property rights is the most basic human
right. Friedrich von Hayek added that the certainty of law
contributed to the prosperity of the West more than any other single
aspect.4
Amartya Sen has called for understanding freedom in terms of
capabilities to pursue a range of goals; thus, it is not only freedom of
opportunities, but also of capabilities.5 Sen explains that furthering
human development consists of “advancing the richness of human
life, rather than the richness of the economy in which human beings
live, which is only a part of it.” That is, human development is not
only about improving living standards, but also improving security,
community and prosperity.6
1 Economic Freedom of the World 2007 Annual Report. Accessed at:
http://www.freetheworld.com/release_2007.html 2 http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/contents/2004/part2s1ch1-e.pdf
3 Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 2002), pp. 8-213. 4 Harper, David A., Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic
Development (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007), pp. 66-71. 5 Sen, Amartya K., “Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations
of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms,” Oxford
Economic Papers, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1993), pp. 519-541. 6 Sen, Amartya K., Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
Bridging the Gap 59
In Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that a
nation’s institutions, not geography or resources, are the most
important element in development. The thesis is that political
freedom is far more important than resources, climate, geography or
culture. Inclusive regimes enable innovation and prosperity by
allowing for and encouraging competing interests under the rule of
law and secure property rights. Thus, inclusive democratic states
that have independent judiciary systems thrive. Despotic,
exclusionary, non-democratic regimes thwart development. Such
extractive, totalitarian states put countries in a vicious cycle
of plutocracy, suppression of innovation, and denial of economic
and personal freedom.1
Such regimes, alas, describe the majority of states in the Arab
world where for decades only Lebanon was considered a democratic
state with an elected government and a thriving parliamentary
opposition. Interestingly, the confessional basis of the ruling
democracy, which is based on exclusion and extraction, has
prohibited Lebanon from becoming the most advanced in the Arab
world. Notwithstanding, because of its democracy and the freedoms
enjoyed therein, and in spite of a weak government and the dearth of
natural resources, Lebanon is considered among the best
destinations for work and investment in the region. Iraq, after the
U.S. invasion, can claim an elected government as well, and is thus
another democracy. Sectarian violence and informal institutions,
departure from rentierism to a merit based system, requires more
than a decade, hence Iraq suffers today from the pains of growing
into democracy.
Economic freedom and other factors
Based on the above, democracy, fighting corruption and
freedom of the press are important elements for not only stability,
but also the development of a country. The table below is a
1 Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins
of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012).
Bridging the Gap 61
combination of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index,
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, and
Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index as presented in The
Economist magazine at the outset of the so-called Arab Spring.
Added to the table in the last column is the Economic Freedom of
the World (EFW) rank in 2012 based on 2010 figures and data. Not
all Arab countries were ranked by the EFW index. The democracy
score ranking is out of 167 countries while the corruption ranking is
out of 178.
Table 1. Population, GDP per capita at PPP, democracy,
corruption, freedom
Country Population
(millions)
Population
under 25
GDP/capita,
1000 at PPP
Democracy Corruption Freedom of
Press
Instability
Index
EFW rank
Algeria 35.9 47.5% 8.2 125 105 141 49.7 137
Bahrain 1.2 43.9% 24 122 48 153 36.5 7
Djibouti 0.9 57.2% 2.3 126 91 159 NA
Egypt 84.6 52.3% 5.9 138 98 130 65.7 99
Iraq 31.4 60.6% 4 111 175 144 65.7
Jordan 6.4 54.3% 5.2 117 50 140 48.7 23
Kuwait 3.5 37.7% 40.6 114 54 115 21.7 19
Lebanon 4.3 42.7% 13.4 86 127 115 30.7
Libya 6.5 47.4% 18.7 158 146 192 71
Mauritania 3.4 59.3% 1.9 115 143 118 57.4
Morocco 32.4 47.7% 4.7 116 85 146 46.8 102
Oman 3.3 51.5% 23.3 143 41 153 58.4 20
Palestine 4.1 64.4% 2.9 93 NA 181 NA
Qatar 1.7 33.8% 66.9 137 19 146 20.7
KSA 27.1 50.8% 22.9 160 50 178 52.5
Somalia 10.1 63.5% 0.6 NA 178 181 NA
Sudan 43.2 59% 2.3 151 172 165 NA
Bridging the Gap 60
Country Population
(millions)
Population
under 25
GDP/capita,
1000 at PPP
Democracy Corruption Freedom of
Press
Instability
Index
EFW rank
Syria 22.5 55.3% 4.7 152 127 178 67.3 119
Tunisia 10.4 42.1% 8.6 144 59 186 49.4 80
UAE 6.7 31% 27.2 148 28 153 24.3 11
Yemen 24.3 65.4% 2.9 146 146 173 86.6
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index; Transparency
International, Corruption Perceptions Index; Freedom House, Freedom of
the Press; Economic Freedom of the World, Annual Report 2012 (the lower
the rank, the freer the economy); the Instability Index is compiled by The
Economist, with a value of 100 indicating the most unstable.
Note that most of the Arab countries are young in terms of their
youth population. Interestingly, when queried about economic
integration, the majority of youth was for greater or complete Arab
economic integration and cited that rulers fear such integration as an
infringement on their absolutist authority within their respective
countries.1 As far as democracy is concerned, the Arab countries’
performance is dismal and among the worst in the world — if not
the worst. Concomitantly, freedom of the press and lack of
transparency are other areas of a dreary standing.
Clearly there is a positive correlation between the country’s
corruption, lack of democracy and freedom of the press, and lack of
economic freedom as measured by the EFW index. The strongest
correlation (0.91) exists between corruption and the EFW followed
by the stability index (0.62), which is a composite index. Even
though the points of data are few, and thus this is hardly robust,
corruption that derails the whole system of exchange in an economy
is the single most important contributor to lack of economic
freedom. Corruption, however, is in itself a product of the
1 The Arab Opinion Project: “The Arab Opinion Index”:
http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-
fc91660608b0
Bridging the Gap 62
institutions that espouse and feed it, which also supports the view
expressed in Why Nations Fail.
The link is not apparent in some countries, as some — endowed
with an abundance of natural resources — can compensate for
inefficiency and mediocrity with rent. For instance, Algeria, being
an oil exporter, can compensate for other deficits or ameliorate
hardships through oil revenue. The same can be said for the oil
economies of the Arab Gulf. Non-oil economies, if not aided by
benevolent neighbors and friends from within and outside the
region, could suffer tremendously and be subject to upheavals. The
so-called “oil curse,” while harmful to development according to the
views of some, proved a boon for some regimes as they were able to
nip the Arab Spring in the bud before full bloom, literally with
massive financial bequeaths.
Enter the “Arab Spring Renaissance”1
At the outset it may be of interest to note that while many refer
to the Arab Renaissance as the “Arab Spring,” few know that the
expression was around much earlier. In fact, the expression was not
born with the uprising in Tunisia — it was originally coined after the
U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 to represent and the “blossoming”
of democracy in Iraq and the Arab world upon the toppling of the
Saddam Hussein regime.2 The following is a brief review of Arab
Renaissance reactions in Arab states. The material presented in this
section is collected from various news sources, including
newspapers, media outlets and blogs.
1 This section draws heavily from previous research by the author: Did the
Arab Spring Benefit Economic Freedom in Jordan? Friedrich Naumann
Foundation (forthcoming). 2 http://www.visualthesaurus.com/cm/wordroutes/the-arab-spring-has-
sprung/
Bridging the Gap 63
Tunisia
The events referred to as the “Arab Spring” were ignited by the
frustrations of a Tunisian man, Mohammed Bouazizi, who was
prevented from running a vegetable stand and reportedly humiliated
by a police officer when he requested a permit to operate his stand.1
On 17 December 2010, he self-immolated in dismay at the lack of
economic freedom afforded to him by the Tunisian bureaucracy.
Social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, and satellite TV
stations, which were better trusted than official sources, spread the
image throughout the region of the man burning — an image that
ignited the fervor of Tunisians.
Demonstrations against President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali
erupted on 18 December 2010 and lasted until he relinquished
power on 14 January 2011. The success of the wave of resistance in
Tunisia inspired others throughout the MENA region to march
against corrupt Arab governments.
Egypt
The first demonstrations took place on 25 January 2011,
beginning first with labor strikes and acts of civil disobedience.
Soon President Hosni Mubarak faced millions of protestors from a
variety of socio-economic and religious backgrounds united under
the common goal to overthrow his government. Under pressure
from continued domestic unrest and international scrutiny, Mubarak
resigned as president 11 February 2011, leaving Egypt to be
governed by a military council until a legitimate government could
be established. A 30-year presidency was terminated and the stage
set for democratic reform to take place.2
Mohamed Morsi was elected in July 2012 by a tight margin and
amidst controversy that his contender Ahmed Shafiq had actually
1 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html
2 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-
protest-interactive-timeline
Bridging the Gap 64
won the elections. Reform remains pressing and needs to be taken
forward.
Libya
On 16 February 2011, Libyan protestors clashed with police in
Benghazi after a human rights activist was arrested. From there, the
country plunged into a civil war between rebels and Muammar
Gaddafi’s military. Gaddafi used his stockpile of weapons against
the Libyan population, leading to death tolls in the thousands. On 17
March, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was passed, creating a
no-fly zone over Libya. Two days later a coalition force of France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States began a bombing
campaign against pro-Gaddafi forces. By late August 2011, with
international support, rebel forces stormed Tripoli forcing Gaddafi
to flee. Rebel forces found him soon after, and on 20 October 2011
killed Gaddafi. Libya now has a new government.1
Syria
Gaddafi’s armed response to protests was similar to that of
Syria’s president, Bashar Al-Assad. Protests in Syria first began 26
January 2011 when a police officer assaulted a man in Old
Damascus. However, massive resistance did not begin until 6 March
when Syrian security forces arrested 15 children for writing slogans
against the Baathist regime. Thousands of protestors took to the
streets all over Syria and soon the regime began to take measures to
control the protestors, arresting thousands.
By 31 July 2011, Syrian army tanks were being deployed
against the armed Syrian opposition known as the Free Syrian Army
(FSA). The fighting still continues and in the opinion of the UN,
Syria has entered a period of civil war. As of February 2013, the UN
estimated that 70,000 people had already been killed, many more
1 Ibid.
Bridging the Gap 65
injured, and hundreds of thousands displaced or have become
refugees. Jordan alone hosts over one million Syrians, including
close to 500,000 refugees. The situation continues to look grave for
Syrians as new developments unfold daily.
Yemen
In Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh also faced a large-scale
popular uprising. As unrest was increasing in the spring of 2011, the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) drafted a plan for Saleh to cede
power in exchange for immunity from any legal action. On 3 June
2011, Saleh was badly injured in an assassination attempt and taken
to Saudi Arabia for immediate medical attention while his vice
president, Abd Al-Rab Mansur Al-Hadi, continued Saleh’s response
against demonstrating Yemenis. After returning to Yemen in
September 2011, Saleh signed the GCC initiative, due to
international and domestic pressure, transferring power in
November to his vice-president. Limited presidential elections were
held 21 February 2012, in which Al-Hadi took 99.8 percent of the
vote as the only running candidate. On 27 February, Saleh officially
transferred power to Al-Hadi ending his 33-year reign over the
country.1
Bahrain2
Bahrain was another country where the fervor of the Arab
Spring made itself apparent among the populace. Protests began 14
February 2011 and were meant to achieve greater political freedom
while creating awareness about human rights violations. These
protests were not originally intended to threaten the monarch, until
1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17111755
2 All material on GCC countries is obtained from: Abdullah, Abdulkhaleq,
“Repercussions of the Arab Spring on the GCC States,” Doha Institute, 17
May 2012. http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/050a254b-e013-4060-
9aab-32238f34cf47
Bridging the Gap 66
17 February when a police raid killed four protestors. The next day
army forces opened fire on protestors and the demonstrators soon
sought an end to the monarchy.
Saudi-led GCC forces were sent to Bahrain to quell the
protestors as numbers were reaching 100,000 at Pearl Square in
Manama. On 15 March 2011, King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa issued
a three-month state of emergency and turned to the military to
reassert control over the country. The state of emergency was lifted
in June; however, both protests and human rights violations
continued. Although major demonstrations have ceased, the
government refuses entry to international human rights groups or
news organizations.
Oman
Peaceful demonstrations erupted 17 January 2011 in several
Omani cities. They eventually stopped in May 2011. The
government responded by changing a third of the cabinet, hiring
50,000 young unemployed Omanis, forming a constitutional
committee, and pledging to address unemployment and corruption.
Saudi Arabia
Although several calls for protests were made, Saudi Arabia
avoided mass protests mainly due to several government decisions
made in response to regional and internal demands for reform. Swift
royal decrees costing an estimated $130 billion were issued 18
February 2011 including: an increase in pay in the public sector, a
grant equaling a two-month salary for all civil, military and state
employees, monthly salary disbursements for the unemployed, two-
month salary bonus for all students in public education,
establishment of a minimum wage for the public sector, increasing
the housing loans limit to $130,000, building 500,000 new housing
units across the country, and 60,000 new positions created in the
Ministry of Interior.
Bridging the Gap 67
Kuwait
Although considered to be the most democratic of GCC
countries, several protests took place in Kuwait calling for the
overthrow of the government and demanding a constitutional
monarchy. The government responded by disbursing a grant of
$3,400 to every citizen as well as a food subsidy for all families in
Kuwait for one year. Despite these efforts, the cabinet was forced to
resign in November 2011 and new elections were held that led to a
majority win for the former opposition.
Qatar
Qatar is considered to have gained tremendously from the Arab
Spring. It became a regional political power in the last two years by
increasing its influence across the region through its sovereign
wealth and media. The Doha-based Al-Jazeera news network was
seen by many as the de facto network of the Arab Spring, taking the
side of many revolutions occurring across the region.
United Arab Emirates
The sole reform demand in the UAE came in the form of a
polite letter, signed by 133 national figures, asking the president of
the union to expand the authorities of the appointed National Federal
Council, which has moderate consultative attributions. The UAE
benefited from the onset of the Arab Spring as the Emirates were
viewed as safe havens for corporations and businesses operating in
the region. The Emirate of Dubai’s financial position improved
tremendously in the wake of the Arab Spring, after it was
detrimentally affected by the international financial crisis of
2008/09.
Bridging the Gap 68
Morocco1
Morocco faced its first demonstration on 20 February 2011, in
which between 150,000-200,000 took part. This demonstration was
organized through the social network Facebook by a youth group
calling itself “February 20th.” Many of those partaking in the
demonstrations were young, urban middle class and educated;
interestingly, many of the political parties refrained from
participating. Demonstrations continued for months but began to
wane in strength and numbers after a constitutional referendum was
introduced and parliamentary elections were expedited. The king
vowed to give up powers to appoint government cabinets, but kept
control of the army and security forces.
Jordan
Jordanians, having witnessed the change in Tunisia and Egypt,
desired democratic political reform as well, and so took to the streets
14 January 2011, demanding the removal of Prime Minister Samir
Rifai.2 On 1 February 2011, King Abdullah II announced the
dismissal of Rifai and replaced him with Marouf Al-Bakhit, a
former prime minister and army general.3 The king in 2011 also
announced a $500 million package of price cuts in fuel and
necessary goods and gave civil servants and military employees a
salary increase.4 In June 2011, commemorating 12 years on the
throne, the king said he would relinquish his right to appoint prime
ministers and cabinets and would leave it to the elected
parliamentary majority to form future governments. He also
announced that there would be more reform in the future, including
new election and political party laws.
1 Barany, Zoltan, “The ‘Arab Spring’ in the Kingdoms,” Arab Center for
Research and Policy Studies, September 2012. 2 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12257894
3 Index of Economic Freedom, 2012.
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/jordan. 4 Zoltan, “The ‘Arab Spring’ in the Kingdoms.”
Bridging the Gap 69
On 24 October 2011, the king appointed Awn Khasawneh to
head his new government and introduced 30 new cabinet members
that were considered moderates, tribal politicians, and technocrats.
Demonstrations remained constant. The slow pace of reform by the
Khasawneh government was viewed as the cause for popular
criticism. On 26 April 2012, Khasawneh submitted his resignation,
after only six months in office. The king announced Fayez
Tarawneh as the new premier, the fourth prime minister since the
beginning of 2011. Aid from countries like Saudi Arabia (amounting
to $1.4 billion in 2011), which helped to alleviate the budget deficit,
was not offered again in 2012.1
On 10 October 2012, Tarawneh resigned and Abdullah Nsour
was appointed as prime minister. Jordan conducted national
elections on 23 January 2013, under a new elections law that
allowed voters two votes: one vote for the local district and the other
at a national level, given to a list/party.2 Only 36 percent of all
eligible voters participated.3
Economic freedom and the Arab Spring
Table 2 below summarizes Arab countries rankings in economic
freedom and reactions to the Arab Renaissance. “Nothing” indicates
that very little happened within the country; “High” means regime
change.
1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/20/jordan-budget-austerity-
idUSL5E8GK03120120520 2 Al Ra’i newspaper, 1518 candidates for elections 2013, 25 December 2013.
http://www.alrai.com/article/559277.html 3 Alarab Alyawm newspaper, national team’s report on the course of the
2013 parliamentary elections.
http://alarabalyawm.net/Public_News/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=61640&
Lang=1&Site_ID=2
Bridging the Gap 71
Table 2. Economic freedom: Arab world ranking
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Reaction
Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Medium-High
Egypt 13 13 11 10 10 10 10 12 12 High
Jordan 7 7 7 5 5 4 3 8 3 Medium
Kuwait 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 4 Medium
Morocco 10 11 10 11 12 12 15 14 14 Mild
Oman 4 3 3 6 3 7 3 4 5 Nothing
Syria 14 14 14 15 15 14 16 16 15 High
Tunisia 10 11 13 11 10 11 10 10 10 High
UAE 4 3 5 3 2 3 2 2 1 Nothing
Algeria 15 14 15 14 14 15 17 17 17 Nothing
Lebanon 6 6 5 7 7 4 7 6 5 Med
Qatar 2 1 1 1 5 4 3 4 7 Nothing
Saudi
Arabia 8 8 8 8 9 9 7 8 8
Mild
Yemen 9 8 9 8 7 8 7 6 9 High
Source: Economic Freedom of the Arab World, Annual Report 2012 (Note:
the lower the number, the more free).
Note that ranking alone does not provide a strong correlation to
the impact of the Arab Renaissance on a given country. Several other
factors come into play, such as natural resource endowments and
whether the country borders Israel or not (which highly affects how
the international community perceives the turmoil), among others.
Consequences
It is too early to determine whether the Arab Renaissance
brought with it economic freedom or not. However, empirically,
several indicative observations can be made.
Bridging the Gap 70
1. One can easily observe that in the case of the oil rich
countries, the response was greater spending by the government
with extremely mild overtures towards better governance. In such a
case, one could argue that increasing the size of government in itself
is indication that economic freedom was being derogated.
In non-oil economies, such as Jordan, aid poured in. In 2012,
with a GDP of $30 billion, Jordan received $3 billion in aid. Still,
the aid helped calm the situation and averted turmoil.
2. There is a sharing of power with the Muslim Brotherhood in
some cases. Many Arab countries are facing a combination of output
contractions, severe fiscal constraints and almost collapsed monetary
systems. Iraq is witnessing rising sectarian strife and, together with
Yemen, possible state disintegration. In Libya, the south is lawless,
and Syria remains a winless bloody match that could culminate in
state dismantlement. In Jordan, fear of neighbor-like violence and
instability has quelled outcries for reform, but this is only temporary.
And Bahrain is still fragile as social demands are recognized to have
been only temporarily suppressed.1
3. There are short-term pains everywhere, some due to
adjustments that are thrust upon systems with weak institutional set
ups, and some because exiting from rentierism into merit-based, free
market systems will require time. The majority of Arab states are
classified as rentier states, where the rent seeker extracts value from
the labor and activities of others not necessarily for being the best or
most competent at what he or she does, or provides, but because of a
certain status or privilege such as birthright (clan, tribe, place of
birth, family name, title, etc.), affiliation with an autocratic ruler or
government (cronyism), or having access to resources (such as
1 Obaid, Nawaf, “The Long Hot Arab Summer: Viability of the Nation-State
System in the Arab World,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center,
March 2013.
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/The%20Long%20Hot%20Arab%2
0Summer.pdf
Bridging the Gap 72
permits and licenses) that otherwise could not normally be achieved
or acquired due to limitations or controls.1
Note that a rentier state does not need to be endowed with
natural resources but instead leverages political or positional rights
to seek rent from other states or institutions.2 Thus rentier states, like
individuals, need not be holders of oil resources to be labeled as rent
seekers. They can trade certain location-associated advantages or
political positions for aid and external resources, which become their
rent. Rentier states, in their search for rent, become dependent on aid
and can barter certain privileges and rights for aid, just as the
resource-rich sell the wealth of the land for external rent.
4. Arab countries that are heavily dependent on aid are rentier
states.3 Such rentierism enables the state to hinder or disregard the
development of civil society and democracy; not because it is
necessarily opposed to such developmental processes, but simply
because it does not require such aspects to survive. This is due to
government deficits being supplemented by donors. In turn, this
leads to such states ignoring issues such as competitiveness, or
working wholeheartedly to achieve competitiveness, simply because
it is not necessary.
It is possible that such states — dependent on external flows
that emerge not from what they do but because of who or where
they are — seek foreign direct investment (FDI) as another source of
rentierism. Yet rentier economies are vulnerable as they are
dependent on foreign aid, which could decrease or be disrupted.
However, not all FDI will benefit such states: some FDI inflows will
increase income disparities and create in a rent seeking economy
even greater income and wealth inequity, which may lead to an
increase in the risk of civil strife. Hence, states must ensure that FDI
and aid inflows are equitably distributed. However, it is doubtful
1 Beblawi, Hazem, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in Giacomo
Luciani (Ed.) The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990). 2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Bridging the Gap 73
that given the nature of governance found throughout the region
equity will ever be achieved.
Finally, it took Europe several centuries from the day of the
Magna Carta in 1215 to emerge in its present form. Exiting present
doldrums and entering into a new democratic Arab world will be
painful and not without peril; borders may be redrawn, and states
may collapse.1 It seems that with some rulers holding unto their
fiefdoms with all their military might, the road will be travelled at
full cost.
1 http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-road-to-arab-
democracy#RqlJsd8Zeg7qaCJT.99
Bridging the Gap 74
Bridging the Gap 75
Economic freedom and institutional
change: European experiences and
Arab realities
Andrzej Kondratowicz
In this article I will concentrate on some basic ideas and
concepts related to economic freedom, rather than on measures and
resulting international rankings. Measures are important. In
explaining the importance of economic freedom it is crucial to be
able to use quantitative evidence on top of qualitative analysis. As
we know, measures of economic freedom exist. They were created
after a series of academic conferences organized by the Fraser
Institute of Vancouver, Canada, in the second part of the 1980s. As a
result of academic discussions among several top world scholars,
including contributions from Nobel Prize winners in economics
Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Douglass North and Gary
Becker, an aggregate measure of economic freedom was developed.
Today, after over 30 years, this measure — known as the
Economic Freedom Index — is widely used by academics and
laymen alike. Actually, we have now two somewhat competing
measures: one is published by the Fraser Institute, the other by the
Heritage Foundation. Due to some methodological arguments, the
academic world generally prefers the former, while the media and
laymen often stick to the latter. The resulting rankings do not differ
much. Nevertheless, our research shows that there is a statistically
significant difference between the two sets of data. This becomes
important if one conducts more sophisticated formal econometric
studies, using the indices as inputs, and this is why I lean towards
using the Fraser Institute dataset.
Bridging the Gap 76
The Economic Freedom Index: What it really
measures
It is good to know the data. Much of it is included in Yusuf
Mansur’s paper, published in this volume. Therefore, here, we will
offer only a brief look at the overall levels of economic freedom in
Arab countries over the past 25 years, as well as an outlook for the
next 10 years (see below). For an easy comparison we will also
present Economic Freedom Index (EFI) values for some other
countries and their groupings, as they stand now.
But before we turn to the numbers, it is important to clearly
explain what they really measure. EFI is a generalized index of
characteristics of the institutional matrix, as Douglass North, the
father of the New Institutional Economics, puts it.1 In simple terms,
economic freedom reflects the institutional setup of an economy.
Changes in EFI values reflect institutional changes — those that are
slow, spontaneous and evolutionary in character, and those that can
be described as “man made” or designed reforms. In a word, EFI
rankings are not just “beauty contests” in which countries want to
gain the highest possible position; they are a much more serious
matter, telling us how robust the institutional skeleton of the
economy is. As we know from modern economic literature,
institutions are one of the principal factors accounting for
differences in economic growth and prosperity among the nations.
1 North defines institutions as “rules, enforcement characteristics of rules,
and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction” (1990).
Although there are many other definitions around, this one seems to be the
most popular. Its appeal also lies in its compactness.
Bridging the Gap 77
Table 1. EFI (Fraser), unadjusted summary index values for
selected countries or country groupings in 2010*
* EU27 = European Union (without Croatia); EU15 = “old Union,” pre-2004 East-
European accessions; exCE14 = 14 ex-Communist European countries without
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia;
A11 = Arab countries without Mauretania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan — omissions
due to lack of reliable data. Shaded area gives ranks and percentiles of a suppository
country with the EFI value equal to the group’s average.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Gwartney, Hall and Lawson (2012).
As you can see from Table 1, the Arab countries average (A11)
in 2010 was equal to the world’s average and was not much lower
than the ex-Communist Europe average. Nevertheless, the A11
average is highly influenced by high scores of the Arab Gulf
countries — positions of the other Arab countries are much lower.
Egypt’s scoring of 6.49 was in the 99th position (31 percent percent
of countries had a lower or equal score). It is worth observing that
old Europe (EU15), which is frequently accused of being overly-
bureaucratic and statist, still has a EFI score higher than the ex-
Communist countries, although some of the latter are catching up
(e.g., Poland’s score).
Country/group of countries EFI
value Rank (of 144) Percentile
Hong Kong (world’s leader) 8.90 1 100%
United States 7.69 18 88%
G7 average 7.52 31 79%
Old EU average (EU15) 7.42 35 76%
European Union average (EU27) 7.38 40 73%
Poland 7.31 48 67%
Ex-Communist Europe average (ex-CE14) 7.10 62 57%
Arab countries average (A11) 6.84 79 45%
World’s average (W144) 6.82 80 45%
Egypt 6.49 99 31%
Bridging the Gap 78
Table 2 and Graph 1 depict dynamics of the EFI1 for the period
1985-2010. Generally, the historical trends have been somewhat
encouraging, but it should be remembered that on average economic
freedom was on the rise in the whole world, as well. Also added is a
10-year forecast. As is known, forecasting macroeconomic parameters
is a tricky business — in this case it is even more so, since we are trying
to foresee changes in the institutional setup of economies that in other
forecasts is frequently held constant. Our forecasts are purely data-
driven and do not model any exogenous shocks to institutions —
especially abrupt political ones, like the Arab Spring upheavals. It will
be interesting to verify these forecasts in due time. This subject brings
us to the point where we should look more thoroughly at the changes in
institutional setup, be they revolutionary or evolutionary.
Table 2. EFI (Fraser), chained summary index values for 11 Arab
countries, 1985-2010 (Data: D) and 2015-2020 (Forecasts: F).
Countries ordered from left to right by their 2010 EFI values
(shaded).
Year Om
an
Bah
rain
Kuw
ait
UA
E
Jord
an
Egypt
Moro
cco
Tunis
ia
Chad
Syri
a
Alg
eria
1985 D 6 .78 6 .92 6 .85 6 .83 5 .71 4 .86 5 .20 4 .60 5 .00 3 .07 3 .60
1990 D 6 .34 6 .91 5 .46 7 .20 5 .81 4 .60 5 .18 5 .32 5 .00 3 .53 3 .43
1995 D 6 .99 7 .21 6 .93 6 .95 6 .45 5 .99 6 .28 5 .73 4 .96 4 .23 4 .06
2000 D 7 .53 7 .74 7 .07 7 .28 7 .40 6 .81 6 .14 6 .08 5 .40 4 .92 4 .66
2005 D 7 .39 7 .39 7 .46 7 .50 7 .61 6 .59 6 .37 6 .02 5 .30 5 .46 5 .25
2010 D 8 .00 7 .89 7 .75 7 .61 7 .61 6 .78 6 .36 6 .21 5 .64 5 .53 4 .88
2015 F 8 .46 7 .96 7 .81 7 .64 7 .44 6 .91 6 .41 6 .10 5 .76 5 .68 4 .90
2020 F 8 .63 7 .96 7 .82 7 .67 7 .44 6 .95 6 .44 6 .06 5 .76 5 .78 4 .90
Source: Data from the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom database
(www.freetheworld.com); forecasts calculated by the author using EFI data and
applying an exponential smoothing model with a damped trend, without
seasonality, with a 10-year perspective.
1 Here we use the so-called chained index, which is why the EFI values for
2010 for Egypt differ from the values given in Table 2 (unadjusted). The latter is used for static cross-sectional comparisons; the former for time-series analysis. Values may differ, though they do not have to.
Bridging the Gap 79
Graph 1. EFI (Fraser), chained summary index values for 11 Arab
countries, 1985-2010 (Data\: D) and 2015-2020 (Forecasts: F) on a <0;
10> continuous scale. The legend shows countries in descending order
by their 2010 EFI values.
Source: Table 2.
Spontaneous, incremental change versus fast,
designed reform
Spontaneous changes in human institutions were the center of
attention of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Today,
many economists and game theorists follow that path — e.g.,
Masahiko Aoki or Samuel Bowles. On the other hand, the “reform-
by-design” approach may be to a large extent attributed to the
German economist Walter Eucken, the father of the Ordoliberal
School. Although we cherish the Hayek-Friedman approach very
much, Eucken’s approach has a lot of appeal as well. Why? Because
in social and political reality sometimes we cannot wait long and we
Bridging the Gap 81
have to design reforms — and institutions — quickly. This is
exactly the present day reality of Egypt and many other Arab
countries.
It must be added that the realities and exigencies of the East and
Central European countries were the same when the communist
system started to collapse — first in Poland in 1989 and soon after
in other countries of the region, including the Soviet Union itself.
The old system and its institutions were ceasing to function and new
ones had to designed and quickly implemented. In Poland, they took
the shape of the so-called Balcerowicz Plan — a comprehensive
package of bold economic reforms named after the then-deputy
prime minister who was a leading force behind the plan. Not
everybody at that time agreed that the changes should be so deep
and quick. Many preferred a gradual reform approach. History
proved that the hard Polish landing — though risky — was a good
choice.
Incidentally, two things must be mentioned in the context of the
East European experience in the 1990s. First, the successful peaceful
transition of power in 1989 between the communists and the
Solidarity movement in Poland was not the first attempt to change
the oppressive regime in Poland. But for the first time it was
complete. Poles rebelled against the government before: in 1956,
1968, 1970-71, 1976 and in 1981 (when martial law was introduced
and Solidarity crashed). So did some other nations in the region
under Soviet domination. Many of those previous rebellions ended
with bloodshed. Thus, the success of 1989 may be seen as a result of
cumulative historical changes, and it was the ultimate fruit of a long
struggle. As much as it may sound pessimistic, not always is “once
enough” to change the face of an oppressive regime, a country, its
society and its economy.
Second, as the British historian Timothy Garton-Ash has
pointed out, the changes in Eastern Europe were “refolutions” rather
than “revolutions” modeled after the French one (1789). A
“refolution” is a reform plus evolution and, most often, includes an
element of peaceful transfer of power between the ancien régime
Bridging the Gap 80
and the new one. But, as we have already observed, in Poland and
some other countries the changes were quick rather than
evolutionary. So was Garton-Ash right? And also: Is it possible to
have a “refolution” in Arab countries? In Syria, as we see, not.
Perhaps in Egypt?
Formal and informal institutions: societal
values and religion
This brings us to the point of differentiating between so-called
formal and informal institutions. The former are rules and
enforcement mechanisms of rules in North’s definition. The latter
are norms — the ways we do things because of tradition, religion
and culture. There is a tension between the two kinds of institutions;
sometimes they are competing, sometimes complementary,
accommodating or substitutive.1 Most scholars are of the opinion
that informal institutions are slow to change and they lag behind
reform or spontaneous changes of formal ones. This is not always
true. At times informal institutions change fast, as well. This is a
point of crucial importance. If informal institutions are not catching
up with reform, then social tensions grow and reforms become
endangered. Were informal institutions in Poland and other East
European countries changing fast? How was it possible? Is it
possible in Egypt and in other Arab countries now?
As I explained above, informal institutions are a reflection of the
culture and social values predominant in society. What are the
popularly supported values in Europe and in the Arab world? Are
they conducive to economic development through markets? Are
they supportive of capitalist institutions? How was it possible that
Polish society embraced market-oriented, pro-capitalist reforms after
almost half a century of the collectivist state with its anti-market
institutions and communist propaganda? Are the cultural, social and
religious values and norms the same in the whole of Europe?
1 Those four types of relations between formal and informal institutions are
thoroughly analyzed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 728).
Bridging the Gap 82
Let us begin with the differences in values underlying informal
institutions. These values are the subject of a broad-based study
called the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted since 1981 in
cooperation with the European Values Study (EVS) and supported
by an international network of research institutes. All in all, they
have encompassed 97 countries and 88 percent of the world’s
population. WVS and EVS measure societal values in 10 areas:
religion, gender, work motivation, democracy, governance, social
capital, political participation, tolerance vis-à-vis others,
environmental protection, and subjectively felt well-being.
Many of these traits turn out to be pairwise correlated, thus it is
possible to collapse them into two dimensions — 1)
traditional/secular-rational; and 2) survival/self-expression — and to
portray them on one two-dimensional graph. It has been done by the
two leading researchers of the WVS: the product is called — from
their names — the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world (see
Graph 2 below). The first dimension gives us the contrast between
societies where religion is very important and those in which it is
not. The second one reflects the contrast between survival and self-
expression values, which becomes profound when industrial
societies transform into post-industrial ones. In these societies,
priorities shift from emphasis on economic and physical security
towards an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-
expression and quality of life.1
Societal values (informal institutions) drift over time, as showed
on two maps characterizing the years 1994-2004 and 2005-2008.
They are to a large extent self-explanatory, thus a very short note
will suffice. On the first panel, the ex-communist countries are
showed as a group — they were coming out of the same Soviet-
dominated past, but the official collectivist values were not shared
by society (informal institutions did not conform with them). As a
result, shortly after the old regime collapse not much was left of this
seeming commonality, and on the second panel the authors do not
1 Description based on Inglehart and Welzel (2010), where you can find
more details.
Bridging the Gap 83
even show it: a much deeper historical heritage came back to the
surface. Often it means that deeply embedded religious
fundamentals become a visible determinant of the country’s position
on the map. On the second panel, the authors show two new
“continents”: Islam (25 percent of the world’s population) and
Eastern-Orthodox Christianity. Somewhat paradoxically,
modernization and economic progress generate two divergent
outcomes: higher living standards decrease religiosity, while
increasing cultural diversity and societies’ openness increases it.
The Arab countries are located in the left bottom corner of the
map; interestingly, Poland is also very traditional in terms of values.
It is culturally close to India, Malaysia and Turkey, and not that far
from the Arab countries. Yet the Polish economy is a symbol of a
successful transition and lasting success in recent years. Thus,
traditional values are not in opposition to economic growth. The
Irish and the U.S. societies are strongly traditional, too. If you
consider Protestant societies, their present position is in the northeast
corner of the map, but when they were growing the most — during
the industrial revolution and after — they were at times extremely
traditional. Sadly, tolerance and cultural openness often come late
on the historical journey to prosperity. And it does not come easily
and by itself. The Europeans know it well.
Bridging the Gap 84
Graph 2. Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world: 1999-2004 (left-
hand panel); 2005-2008 (right-hand panel).
Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2005), p. 63; (2010) p. 554.
Bridging the Gap 85
Let us also note that religion-based traditional values may differ.
After all, different religions and their sub-varieties may have varying
influence on the economic and social behavior of the faithful. Let us
look at the European Christian tradition. Indeed, it has long been
noticed and recognized — especially since the seminal work of
German sociologist Max Weber (1904/5) — that the “Protestant
ethic” is conducive to economic growth under capitalism. Catholic
tradition less, and Eastern Orthodox much less. Delving deeper into
this subject would go beyond the limits of this paper, thus I will give
only one example.
Analyzing various causes of success of the early phases of post-
communist transformation in some countries of Eastern Europe, and
the defeats in others, the Polish economist Jan Winiecki (Winiecki,
Benacek and Laki, 2004, pp. 39-77) pointed to the role of newly
created small and medium-sized private enterprises (SMEs). In
those countries where there was a massive wave of start-ups, the
transition from so-called transformational recession to
transformation recovery was rather fast. The necessary (though not
sufficient) condition for that was the widespread presence of an
entrepreneurial spirit in society. It was more often encountered in the
Baltic States, Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary and
Slovenia than in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania,
Moldova or Serbia. But this divide coincides with the historical
divide between the Western and Eastern Christendom. Graph 3
shows a map of this division in the 16th century, but many would
argue it could be traced back to the 6th century as well. Winiecki
argues that these divisions are still reflected in today’s
entrepreneurial spirit and work ethics, thus they influence economic
outcomes. In the context of the Arab world, the question is to what
extent Islam and its particular schools and branches are conducive to
— or at least compatible with — exigencies of modern economic
organization and international cooperation in the era of
globalization? This is a question to be considered by other papers in
the volume.
Bridging the Gap 86
Graph 3. East-Central Europe: Countries embarking on economic
transformation in the 1990s and the continental division into Western
and Eastern Christendom in the 16the century (maps show
contemporary national boundaries).
Source: Winiecki, Benacek and Laki (2004), pp. 66-67.
Bridging the Gap 87
The above may be considered bad news for those economies
where predominant religion is not conducive to hard work ethics and
discipline, along with entrepreneurial behavior. The good news is,
though, that societies learn from others and adopt new ways of
behavior — which may speed up the process of social change
substantially.
Apart from that, there are two other mechanisms that may
substantially speed up the process of adopting new (economic)
institutions. One is when a powerful shock is hitting society and its
source is internal. It may take a form of a revolution or a
“refolution” — like those in Eastern Europe in the 1990s or in the
Arab world nowadays. The old rules are abolished and since society
cannot live in an institutional vacuum, new laws are quickly drawn
up. Thus, new formal institutions are designed and implemented.
Two paramount questions are: What will these new institutions be?
And will society at large accept them as being in accord with
prevailing values?
Here we return to the Polish example: after the collapse of the
communist regime, society quickly adopted new pro-market (in
essence capitalist) economic institutions. The reforms were fast and
deep. By adopting them, Poles were coming back to their old values
that remained dormant during the long communist night. But these
values were there. And although many Poles later on became
disenchanted with capitalism and its not always easy ways, at the
moment of change, and immediately thereafter, support for pro-
market reforms and the willingness to incur short and medium run
sacrifices was predominant. And the Church was supporting it, as
well.
In terms of the formal-informal institutions connection, all this
means that informal institutions were by-and-large in accord with
new formal institutions. This was crucial to get things rolling in the
direction of economic growth and prosperity. There were countries,
though, where the reforms stopped short of achieving this critical
mass and momentum. Russia itself, Ukraine, Belarus and a score of
former Asian Soviet republics. Their new institutions turned into
Bridging the Gap 88
Olsonian redistributive coalitions (Olson, 1982), and state
institutions were captured by interest groups. There is always a
threat of that.
There is another possibility that I will mention only briefly. An
external force is imposing new sets of political and economic
institutions on a nation. This happens after wars or foreign military
interventions. To some extent, it happened in the aftermath of World
War II in Bizonia (West Germany) and Japan. It repeated in South
Korea. It did not repeat in Iraq. There are other, less known
examples of both successes and failures of this mechanism of
institutional change. Generally it seems that successes are coupled
ether with unchaining old and dormant societal values or with so-
called “tipping-over” mechanism. An informal institution continues
to exist, but the way people perceive it undergoes a slow change.
The change of attitude towards this informal institution remains
latent until some particular fact or phenomenon — not necessarily
powerful in itself — tips the equilibrium over. As a result a new
informal institution gains a dominant position and quickly replaces
the old one. But this, again, is based on “new” values that a society
is ready to accept.
This brings us back to the cultural values of particular societies.
What to do when society is split on core values ?
All the above arguments implicitly assume that values may
differ among societies, but that each society is internally
homogenous. One society, one set of coherent values — at least in
crucial moments of history, when the future fate of the nation is
decided upon. But what if a society is split on the issue of values to
adhere to? Different segments of society may have different
internalized sets of values and — as a consequence — differing
views on the institutional order that should be implemented.
One unpleasant possibility is a growing social conflict with all
the known negative consequences, including overall economic
decline. Another is an effort at mitigating conflict by negotiations.
Bridging the Gap 89
What could be the basis for negotiations if values are different? An
interesting proposal comes from a not widely known American
political scientist, legal scholar and philosopher, Bruce Ackerman
(1980). He argues that social and political discourse cannot be based
on values and sentiments. If the parties start negotiations from
positions of being the only depositories of truth, and exponents of
the only genuine values in society (especially if based on religious
beliefs), then there is no room for compromise. Thus, the parties
should start from agreeing on procedural rules. These rules should
be based on the adoption of the principles of rationalism and
neutralism in discussion. This pertains to parliamentary debates and
to any other political forums.
We can only add that this all remains within the tradition of
Western liberal democracy, in which rights of minorities — in terms
of any of the values mentioned in the context of the Inglehart-
Welzel cultural map of the world — are recognized and protected.
One can only hope that this is the path that will be chosen in Egypt
and other Arab nations. Otherwise these countries may fall into the
trap named by some political scientists as an “anocratic” political
regime, or just anocracy.1 This is a regime that exhibits mixed
features of democracy and autocracy — a combination that makes it
virtually impossible to “run’ the country efficiently, both in political
and economic terms.
Democracies have their problems, but some of their features
may be highly relevant to solving important problems that may arise
in Egypt and other Arab countries in the short and medium run. For
lack of space, I will just briefly enumerate them.
Democracy as a reasonable insurance against a malevolent
despot possibility.
1 This is the term used in the POLITY IV Project measuring democratic and
autocratic features of countries. See: Marshall and Cole (2011) and
Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011). Dimitrios Katsoudas indicated to me
the inappropriateness of the term: it should be acracy (Greek akratia).
Bridging the Gap 91
Democracies are never at war with one another (for evidence,
see: Weart, 2000)
Democracies provide mechanisms of limiting violence, and for
internal conflict resolution, within society.
North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) talk in this context about so-
called open versus limited access societies. In limited access
societies, privileged groups act as violence limiting agents, but at the
same time they hinder economic and political development. Like in
Egypt under Mubarak, or in Libya under Gaddafi. Open access
societies create popular access to institutions/organizations that
control violence and at the same time foster economic and political
development. The relevance to the Arab world is obvious.
One final question: Can economic freedom contribute to
adopting such liberal-democratic and political freedom-oriented
solutions? There is a lot of evidence to support an affirmative
answer. This is what is known as the Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis.
In light of the above on the relevance of Eucken’s Ordoliberal
thinking on issues of institutional change, I would suggest calling it
the Eucken-Hayek-Friedman Hypothesis. It states that in the long
run economic freedom enhances political freedom. That is why it is
worth studying, and measuring as well.
Bridging the Gap 90
References
- Ackerman, Bruce, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1980).
- Aoki, Masahiko, “Endogenizing Institutions and Institutional
Changes,” Journal of Institutional Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1
(2007), pp. 1-31. Accessed 3 March 2013:
http://www.stanford.edu/~aoki/papers/JOIE(Final).pdf
- Bowles, Samuel, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and
Evolution (New York and Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation and
Princeton University Press, 2004).
- Eucken, Walter, Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie (Jena:
Gustav Fischer, 1940). [English translation: Eucken, Walter, The
Foundations of Economics: History and Theory in the Analysis of
Economic Reality (London: William Hodge & Company, 1950)]
- Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1962).
- Garton Ash, Timothy, The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ‘89
witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York:
Vintage Books/Random House, 1993).
- Garton Ash, Timothy, “Velvet Revolution: The Prospects,” The
New York Review of Books, 3 December 2009. Accessed 9 June
2012:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/dec/03/velvet-
revolution-the-prospects/?pagination=false.
- Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson and Joshua Hall, Economic
Freedom of the World: 2012 Annual Report (Vancouver: Fraser
Institute, 2012).
- Hayek, Friedrich von, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume II:
The Mirage of Social Justice (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1976).
- Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and
Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” Perspectives on
Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2004), pp. 725-740.
Bridging the Gap 92
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural
Change and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
- Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, “Changing Mass Priorities:
The Link Between Modernization and Democracy,” Perspectives
on Politics, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2010).
- Marshall, Monty and Benjamin Cole, Global Report 2011:
Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna, US: Center for
Systemic Peace, 2011).
- Marshall, Monty, Keith Jaggers and Ted Gurr, “POLITY IV
Project. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-
2010. Dataset Users’ Manual,” (Vienna, US: Center for Systemic
Peace, 2011). Accessed 22 October 2012:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2010.pdf
- North, Douglass, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- North, Douglass, John Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding
Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
- Olson, Mancur, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982).
- Weart, Spencer, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight
One Another (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- Weber, Max, Die protestantische Ethik und der „Geist“ des
Kapitalismus, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 20:
1-54 and 21 (1904/05), pp. 1-110. [English translation: Weber,
Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London:
Routledge Classics, 1930, 2001)]
- Winiecki, Jan, Vladimir Benacek and Mihaly Laki, The Private
Sector After Communism: New Entrepreneurial Firms in
Transition Economies (London and New York: Routledge, 2004).
Bridging the Gap 93
The role of religion in Arab politics
and society
Mohammed Tamaldou
In order to effectively address the role of religion in politics and
society in Arab countries it is necessary to clarify some concepts and
clear up some confusion at the outset.
Religion in the Arab world is Islam. Though there are number
of other religions in the Arab world, with varying degrees of
importance, all share a belonging to the Arab world — and
sometimes to Islamic civilization — along with an Islamic
component. All share in the political and social repercussions
resulting from the nature of the relationship between Islam and
politics, and between Islam and society, in addition to the
relationship between Muslims and religious minorities. While
questions on the rights of religious minorities have been raised, and
solutions recommended so minorities are not governed by the
religion of the majority, it is worth noting that the religious rights of
non-Muslims have been always preserved. The Islamic state, for
example, has recognized the rights of Jews, or the Sabians. Yet in
trying to explain the concept of religion in the Arab world and the
relationship between Islam and politics and Islam and society (and
within this article there will not be enough room to discuss all
aspects, despite the deep impact of religion-related concepts and
visions on behavioral conduct), dilemmas remain.
Among such dilemmas, one is the relationship between the
religion of the majority and freedom of belief; another is raised
when trying to formulate unified concepts of secularism and
citizenship as two concepts that do not fundamentally encounter the
tolerant values of Islam, besides being cornerstones for the
comprehensive establishment of democracy. Add to that side
Bridging the Gap 94
dilemmas emerging from polarized mentalities, which can only
interpret secularism as elimination of religion, citizenship as a threat
to religious values, and liberalism as non-believing and moral decay
— let alone regarding anything that belongs to the West in an
antagonizing manner, as the Arab’s archenemy. Finally, we also
have the dilemma of extremism and fundamentalism and conflicting
Islamic currents — a dilemma that impacts the destiny and being of
the Arab and Islamic world, and greatly influences life inside Arab
societies, given the highly respected status of the religious institution
and the considerable role afforded to the religious jurist (or Fakih),
the Guide, and the Imam of the mosque.
Therefore, the struggle of today seems not only centered on the
duality of modernism versus conservatism, but rather goes beyond
this, including the struggle within and between Islamic currents —
whether moderates, radicals, jihadists, Salafists, or Sharia advocates
— in order to maintain their predominance in both the social and
political scenes. It is no surprise that the question of credibility in
handling democracy arises, particularly with groups that emerged
recently as new players in this part of the world after the Arab
Spring uprisings, and amid demands for dignity, democracy and
freedom.
The complex nested structure of Arab society
In discussing Arab society, other, non-Arab components are
necessarily involved, along with all the interactions related to their
different and diverse belongings, be it belonging to ethnic or
religious affiliations, or any other minority, and the relationship
between such belongings and ensuring full rights for all Arab
citizens. Indeed, the Arab world comprises a complex structure,
where elements are nested, components overlapping, and ethnicities,
sects and races are interwoven. Arab society is a dispersed entity, as
if it emerged from a vast historical and demographic explosion,
scattered in its parts everywhere. Tribes and clans are widespread
throughout the whole Arab space, religious sects and groups pitted
Bridging the Gap 95
here and there, and ethnicities are everywhere — whether Amazigh
or Kurds or others. It is also unfortunate to face the utter lack of
interest, whether by intellectuals and social analysts, or by
politicians, in this exceptional structure of Arab society that can be
regarded as an obstacle in the path to a modernized society unless
the phenomenon is addressed and citizenship becomes the wider
space that encompasses all particular belongings.
Debates today are ongoing and heated on the civic state, or as
some prefer to call it, the national democratic state. Again, one
encounters political Islam and the necessity of understanding its
meaning and functionality, and the degree of closeness or otherwise
to universal human values — the links between Islam as a divine
message, and earthly matters of individuals enjoying free choices,
and how far guarantees exist that engagement with establishing a
modern state within the boundaries of the Arab world can comply
with the principles of democracy, freedom and rotation of power
amid attempts to Islamize the concepts and terms of modernism in
general. Such attempts can be seen and understood as a part of a
protectionist atmosphere that is no different in its results from
economic protectionism. It is no surprise, then, that the Arab world
is unique in its affiliation with its Arab origins or the Islamic
religion, in comparison to the other worlds (especially the West) that
define their affiliation to a greater extent geographically. Such
affiliation on the part of the Arab world is not haphazard. It is
structural, and it is a defensive, protectionist reaction that needs to
be psychologically analyzed in depth in order to reveal its
underlying causes.
Islam, politics and society: Are they inseparable ?
A question poses itself: Are Islam and politics and society
necessarily inseparable elements? Considering politics the
mechanism that regulates the relationship between the ruler and the
ruled, according to agreed-upon positive (or man made) norms that
help individuals to crystalize their own form of society as they wish
Bridging the Gap 96
it to be, and prefer to live within, and to contribute to its growth,
what exactly is the role of Islam? Why is the Islamic world living in
such polarization? And what is the reason for the insistence on
making inseparable the relationship between religion and politics?
At the outset, it is worth mentioning that the duality of religion and
politics was registered as a phenomenon since the early times of the
civilized experience of Islam. Politics, or power, has always tried to
derive legitimacy from religion. Interpretation played the biggest
role in this regard, with each group trying to manipulate the
interpretation of religious text to find proper justifications for their
political tendencies, and to enhance their own legitimacy.
Islam, however, never legitimized, imposed or even
recommended any particular form of governance or a certain
regime, throughout the successive forms of governance known
during the rule of the orthodox Caliphs after the death of the Prophet
Mohammad (peace be upon him). Islamic society has always been
preparing — through the sequence of events — to become an
exemplary in coexistence and conformity with the updates of life
and requirements of reality. Abu Bakr As-Seddiq received the
pledge of allegiance after a long intense dispute at Saqifat Beni
Sa’eida. The dispute ended with an agreement on two main
principles: the first was weighing a balance of powers among the
factions and tribes of society; the other was prioritizing the public
interest. These two principles are part and parcel of the modern
culture of democracy. Omar Ibn Al-Khattab was appointed through
a different method, coming to power after a consultation made by
the Caliph — then Abu Bakr — resulted in agreement to appoint
Omar as Caliph. Omar, in turn, chose a different path when he
decided to name six candidates from whom one would be picked as
his successor. Thus, we have three models and three cases for
coming to power and rotation of power, each of which adopts — in
one way or another — the principle of consultation or Shura.
Something different happened during the Caliphate of Othman
Ibn Affan, which followed Omar Ibn Al-Khattab. This time witnessed
the events of “The Great Rebellion,” regarded as the first political
Bridging the Gap 97
uprising in the history of Islamic rule. Caliph Othman — who was
advanced in age — failed to respond to his people’s demands for
reform. His hands were tied by a lobby that manipulated and directed
him to fulfill their own interests. When people realized that Othman’s
kin had full control over their money, they demanded they be
replaced, but Othman refused to respond. The agitation soared and the
people demanded Othman step down. He refused and was murdered.
At that time, there was no document or contract between the ruler and
the ruled to define the term of the Caliph in office, the responsibilities
of the Caliph, and the mechanisms for a transfer of power. Muslims
recognized this problem early in the Islamic regime, yet they failed to
anticipate its impact.
This brief review of historical events suggests at least one
conclusion: any attempt to bind religion and state, or religion and
politics, or religion and governance in an inseparable duality should
not — by any means — go beyond “Islamic ethics.” This term, as
defined by the intellectual Mohammad Abed Al-Jabri in his book
Religion, The State, and the Enforcement of Sharia, can be
interpreted in three elements: consultation, or Shura, responsibility,
and a third element that can be read in the Prophet Mohammad’s
saying, “You know better about your earthly matters.” This Hadith
provides that a space must exist between earthly matters and
heavenly matters, or between the religion that governs the
relationship between man and his or her God, and the earthly affairs
that govern relations among people. Therefore, it is clear that
earthly, civic and societal matters should be managed according to
intellectual convictions and ethical tendencies. Management of such
manners should also take place according to the priorities set by
institutions and through representatives elected by the people to
manage their public affairs, with legally binding terms and
mechanisms that should produce representative and executive
institutions through democracy and freedom of choice.
This, simply, is the conclusion of all successive experiences in
Arab countries’ governing systems since the death of the Prophet
Mohammad (peace be upon him).
Bridging the Gap 98
The question remains: Why did the Arab Islamic state not find
ways to achieve a modern renaissance in a way that guarantees
conditions for sustainability and stability?
In search of an Arab renaissance
Has the Arab Islamic state ever undergone renaissance? Has it
ever followed the modernism curve, at any given time? To answer
the question, two principle points should be made. The first pertains
to the meaning of “the Arab Islamic state,” and whether it applies to
country borderlines, as defined by the classical definition of the
state, or to imperial expansion, as was the case of the Ottoman
Empire, for example. If applying the limited country concept, a very
limited number underwent comprehensive and integrated
renaissance. But applying the concept of imperial expansion, a
genuine renaissance can be found in the history of Andalusia during
the Abbasid Era, more exactly between the 9th and 13th centuries.
At that time, the state expanded to reach the East Mediterranean,
Africa, and central Asia. The economy boomed, trade flourished,
and fleets grounded at all maritime ports. Simultaneously,
enlightening intellectual movements emerged, based on individual
initiative and creativity in general. Science evolved, philosophy
flourished, dialectic theology appeared.
The full creative, intellectual and scientific wealth produced by
Arab minds during this short period has not, until even now, been
properly recorded or evaluated. It calls for a second reading, to
ascertain the points of connection to modern human thought in
general, and liberal thought in particular. It is enough, in this
context, to mention some of the many names who have enlightened
free Arab thought: Alpharabius (Al-Farabi), Averroes (Ibn Rushd)
and Al-Jahiz. The last is worth a short pause, as he believed —
centuries prior to Descartes — in the power of the mind, and said: “I
swear to my life, eyes make mistakes, the senses lie; true judgment
can only be attained through the mind.” Al-Jahiz is among the
pioneering founders of what is now understood as critical thinking
Bridging the Gap 99
— the use of reason to acquire truth — and laid the ground for the
skepticism, or methodological doubt, later advocated by Descartes.
The second point is that a renaissance can only flourish in an
environment that is suitable for freedom and protective of human
dignity. Such freedom and human dignity have been achieved —
relatively speaking — only when the grip of central power loosened
in the Arab empires. This loosening resulted in a genuine desire in
the Arab individual to promote his or her reality and, subsequently,
to revive movements of creativity and innovation, and to get in
touch with other cultures through translating works in foreign
languages — particularly Greek, Syriac, Persian and Hebrew into
Arabic. That created an enabling environment, also, for a boom in
science and the arts, and improved the quality of living quality. This
leap often took place through pure individual initiatives, diverse and
various, flourishing only because the dominant eye of the state
blinked and looked to other matters. Arab Islamic society at that
time was close to modernist society, if compared to prior and post
periods. Moreover, Arab society could achieve religious
enlightenment, which helped in the reform and purification of belief
systems and religious behavior. The religious enlightenment also led
to intellectual, cultural and philosophical enlightenment, which
contributed to the expansion of the space of the rational. This
religious-intellectual enlightenment duality had been curbed by
despotism and authoritarianism sheltering behind armies; an
overestimation of physical powers along with an underestimation of
the power of intellect.
Apparently, the expansion of reason and influence of intellect
started to annoy existing rulers, especially when intellectual
braveness replaced classical, physical or military braveness. Rulers
could feel the threat to the pillars of their empires, and their decision
was to quash the elements of the renaissance. A campaign was
launched to persecute free thinkers in general, and mu’tazilah
(religious rationalists) in particular. Books were burned and sources
of freedoms and intellectual plurality dried up altogether. Even the
door to diligence (or ijtihad) was closed to jurists and scholars,
Bridging the Gap 011
accelerating the plunge of the Arab and Islamic world into the dark
ages. This paved the way to the Wahhabi movement, succeeded
much later by the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical Islamist
currents. Grounds were laid for the stabilization of despotism in the
Arab world, enabling rulers to control people’s lives and livelihoods.
As a result, the Arab individual stopped all attempts to move
forward and became preoccupied with immediate concerns. The
conservative tendency deepened, promoting backwardness and
satisfaction with less, and a reluctance to aspire for another kind of
life. This is the reality in the Arab world — a disabling reality
nonetheless enabling for radical movements. Thus continued the
Arab world until the Arab Spring revolutions, by which time
conservative, political Islamist movements had become widespread.
Political Islam in the Arab world today
A deep conflict is unfolding at present between aspirations for
the establishment of a modern secular civic state and another
tendency towards the establishment of an Islamic state. That was
clearly apparent after the first electoral results in some Arab Spring
countries. As a matter of fact, both tendencies are still immature in
their visions and understandings, let alone the ulterior agenda of
reviving the Islamic Caliphate state, which is not bluntly
pronounced, yet is widely-believed to be the ultimate goal for all
currents of political Islam. Although that model was never achieved
—whatsoever, at any given time — and remained a pure utopian
aspiration, it is important to reflect on concept of the Islamic state
within the reality of political Islam in the Arab world today.
In his book, Concept of State, Abdellah Laroui says that the
concept of the Islamic state remains incomplete,
... unless we realize the raw material of politics,
namely the psychology of the individual and his or her
ideas about the state and rule. All of which are results
of education — neither exclusively nor mostly
Bridging the Gap 010
conducted by the state. Education that is mainly the
responsibility of parents at home, the Imam at the
mosque, or sheikh at praying corners, who are all
influenced by Sharia writings and … what we call
Islamic utopia.
Hence, the battle around modernism in the Arab and Islamic
worlds centers on the human being. The “gains” made by political
Islamic movements in the Arab world will never distract such
movements from their preoccupation with man — the raw material
for the desired model and classical mentality. The role of religion in
general, and Islam in particular, is undeniable — especially in
establishing values and ethics, and regulating relationships. It is true
that absorption of religious values in general, and Islamic tolerant
values in particular, should result in an Arab society raised on norms
of justice, mercy, truthfulness, coexistence, and peace. However,
such a relationship between religion and society needs to be based
upon the principle of respect for human personality and individual
freedom, rather than upon superiority and guardianship over
individuals and the whole society.
Such superiority and guardianship are exercised in order and
only to gain recognition that the source of legislation and power is
heavenly and sacred, instead of man made, revisable and
challengeable. In this way, the function of state is understood as
coercive, socially and doctrinally, and does not tolerate free choice
or independent opinion, or even a rotation of power, still less a
purely rotating and social function responsible for fulfilling the Arab
individual’s need for security, stability, education, healthcare,
dignity, welfare, and other common interests that should be
established by consensus. In a religious state, there is no room for
negotiations or bargaining with religion or its consequences.
The real struggle in the Arab world now is purely educational
and cultural. It is not limited to direct political practice, but rather
extends to the entire social arena — particularly education. Political
change cannot be successful unless solidly based on religious reform
Bridging the Gap 012
first, then cultural and philosophical reform. Islamists understand
that approach, and have dedicated their full capacities to fulfilling
their desired outcomes. At-Tarbiyyah, or education, is in the
literature of the Muslim Brotherhood the core of doctrine. The
Muslim Brothers developed certain steps and stages for their work
on education, starting with advocacy, then preparing supporters and
soldiers, and then implementing their vision in practical work. Their
main objective in that educational approach is to separate
themselves from the non-Muslim society — as they like to call it —
in order to make a radical change in the general society and politics.
A change that would take place through religion, and by hands of
the “rightly elected group.”
It is unfortunate indeed that a counter-strategy does not exist.
Neither at level of reforming religion and developing a better
understanding of Sharia, nor at level of improving formal
educational curricula in the Arab world. Instead, cultural and
societal structures in Arab world are still governed by traditional and
classical tendencies. Educational curricula are still full of
superstition, instead of educating enlightened generations to fight
superstition.
Dilemmas of tradition and religion
To anticipate what it might be like if traditional education,
which dictates obedience and submissiveness and discourages
critical reasoning and free opinion, continues to prevail, here are
some statistical results from studies conducted by specialized think
tanks on levels of adherence to religion within certain peoples. In
May 2013, a survey was conducted by the Pew Research Center —
an American think tank — of 39 countries around the world,
showing that considerable percentages of Muslims support
enforcement of Sharia as their local law. Furthermore, the survey
showed that Muslims differ on how they interpret Sharia, even
among highly educated elites. The study indicated that outspoken
adherence to religion by the vast majority does not negate the fact
Bridging the Gap 013
that huge disparities exists when it comes to understanding religion
and how it should be practiced. Moreover, the study referred to signs
of silent conflict inside society between inherited traditions and
modernist values.
It is unnecessary here to elaborate on these dilemmas, such as
combining majority adherence to religion with variant
understandings of the practice of the same religion. It is also
unnecessary to recall the eras of Western colonization in the Arab
world, when adherence to Arabism and Islam were matters of
survival, with the identity, religion, civilization, and history of Arab
society a focus of colonial concern. Ultimately, interaction among
human societies obliged the Arab world to follow different patterns
of intellectual and societal development. Women, in particular, and
the family in general, played the biggest role in accelerating that
development. Changes related to the family, its components,
relations among its members, the status of women, the way it deals
with both inherited and modern values, the decrease in the size of
Arab families in some countries (from seven or more, to lower
averages), and the spread and development of education, alongside
broadening of spaces of communication in all its forms — all these
elements contributed to opening the way for practicing democracy
and freedom, and questioning old ideas.
Arab families have become more of a club, where discussion,
debate and an exchange of views occurs in a frank and open manner,
compared to past times when norms and customs imposed a
separation of boys and girls, even inside the family, and banned
children from expressing their opinions before their parents or older
relatives. Furthermore, the engagement of women in ever more
aspects of life is a crucial turning point in terms of the great Arab
societal revolution. Now, one can confidently say that the more
liberal women are in an Arab society, the more qualified this society
should be to move towards modernism and to greater universal
values. Where women’s issues are recognized and addressed in
Arab societies, traditional sets of values are increasingly questioned.
Bridging the Gap 014
Liberal approaches and the Arab world
Modernizing the Arab Islamic world is becoming, today, a more
urgent need than ever, in order to empower this part of the world to
benefit from the innovations of mankind and the development of
human civilization. One may say that the trigger of modernization
has already been pulled across the Arab world. In some parts of the
Arab world, modernization is still fresh; while in other parts it is
reaching a peak. In all cases, modernization has been unleashed. It
is, then, our duty as Arab liberal forces to set proper strategies to
accelerate it, and to put into our consideration that concerted efforts
on both sides of the Mediterranean are needed to achieve positive
outcomes.
Bertrand Badie writes: “Thinking that other cultures could fully
accept Western values is pure fantasy.” He also believes that the
“project for the globalization of Western values will always be hit
by the truth that these values have been tailored by one history: the
history of the Western people.” In this regard, he is mistaken. The
West is not homogenous in its thinking. Neither are Western peoples
unique and different from others. The human being is the same
everywhere, regardless of the contexts and conditions he is subject
to. Similar to the current situation in Arab societies, Western
societies had — as well — experience of religious rigidity and
corruption within Christianity. The reform revolution finally started
under the leadership of Martin Luther, who succeeded in renewing
and changing Christianity to match the developing era where
printing was promising in spreading knowledge, which in turn was
an incentive to accelerate religious reform.
The events of the Arab Spring witnessed unprecedented
participation by all segments of Arab society, and proved Badie
mistaken, rather revealing that such sentiments were simply being
used by despotic rulers as a pretext to block change. The history of
universal values is a history shared by human groups both East and
West, because man is very much the same whether Arab or
otherwise. However, I do agree with Badie that, “not all values can
be generalized, unless established equally by everyone.” Indeed. We
Bridging the Gap 015
have seen the Arab masses uprising in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to
establish values of freedoms, human dignity and democracy, and
this process is still ongoing and will be stamped by their trademark:
“Made in Arab countries.”
A common mistake occurs when researchers and specialists in
Arab and Islamic affairs address these affairs with a preset vision of
a geographically limited Arab and Islamic world. The reality is that
it goes even further than its real borders, up to the furthest point of
the Western world itself. The Arab and Islamic world is even very
likely to further penetrate the Western world, thanks to the values
we advocate as liberals — such as freedom of movement for people
and goods and thoughts. It is certain that such penetration, when it
happens, will carry negative qualities along with positive ones. We
need, therefore, to launch a joint program for mutual understanding
of our common reality in the Arab and Western worlds, and to start
developing common solutions for the issues emerging from that
reality.
The Western world did try, through a number of intellectuals, to
reflect deeply on Islamic affairs and social and cultural phenomena
experienced in this part of the world. Orientalists, who flourished as
a movement in a certain time, produced important works that helped
in better understanding Islam and the psychological and ethical
components of Arab societies. However, some dishonest approaches
destroyed the trust others had built up, replacing it with question
marks as to the real intentions of the producers of knowledge.
Liberals today need to work on reviving noble and genuine
Orientalist practices, such as the dialogue of civilizations and
cultures, and must encourage common and regular intellectual
exchange on the means to give root to modernist thought and liberal
values, giving ground for that genuine dialogue of civilizations.
Bridging the Gap 016
Rebuilding Arab foundations: Islam, citizenship
and development
It is evident that religious reform can lead to enlightening
cultural reform, and subsequently to political reform. For us, the
gateway to comprehensive reform in Arab states depends on
updating Islamic jurisprudence and modifying Sharia to become
more enabling and harmonious with the times, and therefore more
applicable. That requires internal corrective movements to work on
reconsidering Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia. It also necessitates
better utilization of contemporary concepts, and this can only be
achieved if those who are open and capable of diligence start
renewing existing thinking in all fields according to the necessities
of the time. This should link religious reform to intellectual
enlightenment, and should pave the way for developing
contemporary knowledge and methodologies.
The Arab world suffers a mass schizophrenia. If one asks an
Arab citizen, “Who are you?” the same citizen gets confused.
Should he say Arab, non-Arab, Kurd, Amazigh, Druze? Or should
he say Muslim, non-Muslim, Arab Copt, Arab Christian, or even
Shia Muslim, or Sunni Muslim — let alone his clan, or tribe, or
other sect. Add to that plurality of belonging a lack in the sense of
citizenship, which should encompass all these belongings and return
them in the form of rights and duties, the rule of law and equal
opportunities. Arab societies need also to revisit understandings on
more institutionalized liberal principles, including the right of
ownership. Ownership is generated from acknowledgement of Arab
citizen’s right to own his or herself in whatever variances of that
self, starting with a gender approach. Women in our Arab world are
still in urgent need of having their rights of full ownership
acknowledged and recognized, in order to fully enjoy other rights.
Moreover, the Arab citizen needs to completely get rid of the
“privacy” complex, and to get engaged in added human value. Arab
societies also need to move forward towards levels of full respect for
the unique character of Arab citizens, which should be interpreted as
the faculties enjoyed by every person if equal opportunity, freedom
Bridging the Gap 017
and dignity safeguards are provided. In such a case, the Arab citizen
would be, indeed, an added value to the development of his or her
society. Only such a citizen is capable of making a new modernist
society.
It is strange that all the successes achieved by the liberal model
in economics, based on market economy and economic freedoms,
failed to translate to adequate studies of the poor, or to properly
promote successful liberal models and experiences in eradicating
poverty all over the world. The Arab world is in dire need of that.
Studies such as those of Professor Hernando De Soto may prove
useful. He analyzes the obstacles that may hinder the poor in
benefiting from the market economy and economic freedoms, in
addition to enjoying full rights of ownership. The Arab world needs
a serious and humane approach to help the Arab citizen get out of
the vicious cycle of need and poverty — a cycle many try to sustain
because their narrow electoral interests lie in its continuance. This is
a point of difference between a liberal and a non-liberal: the liberal
seeks to build the citizen, so he or she is able to make free choices,
independently and freely, with no ulterior considerations.
Poverty alleviation is another field for potential cooperation
between Arab liberals and their Western friends, where all may
share in its study, to come up with better recommendations.
Bridging the Gap 018
Bridging the Gap 019
The role of religion in society and
politics in Europe, or: three myths of
secularity in Europe
Sven Speer
Nine out of 10 people will mention secularity as a defining
characteristic of contemporary societies when asked about the
relationship between religion, society and politics in European
countries. Only few will note that the notion of a secular Europe has
been from the very beginning a case of abstract normative theorizing
rather than a state of lived political reality. The myth of secularism
has been told as follows: economy, science and state would be
increasingly separated and independent from religious influence;
this would result in the privatization of religion, its removal from the
public sphere and in the most extreme vision, in the disappearance
of religion as known thus far (Casanova, 2004, pp. 19-39).
During my time at the Cluster of Excellence “Religion and
Politics” at the University of Münster, a colleague of mine — a
philosopher — once gave a presentation on Jürgen Habermas’s
concept of the secular state. I was next in giving a presentation that
discussed the relationship between the state and religion in
Germany. My colleague was the first to raise his hand and asked:
“Sven, has there never been a secular state in Germany?” My
response was straightforward: “No, there hasn’t — at least not in
Western Germany.” The philosopher was puzzled. Indeed, the
majority of people in Europe adhere to what I refer to as the three
myths of secularity. In this paper I would like to disprove: 1) the
myth of secular societies in Europe; 2) the myth of secular states in
Europe, and; 3) the myth of the superiority of secular states. Finally,
as a political activist, I would like to introduce an alternative to the
secular state, namely my vision of “Open Religious Policy.”
Bridging the Gap 001
The myth of secular societies in Europe
To what extent are European societies secular in reality? In
2010, Eurobarometer conducted a representative study that included
27,000 participants from across Europe (this amounts to
approximately 1,000 participants from each of the 27 member
states). The participants were asked whether they believe in God, in
some sort of spirit or life force, or in neither of the given options.
Only 20 percent of Europeans do not believe that there is a sort of
spirit, God or life force; 26 percent believe in some sort of spirit or
life force, and 51 percent believe in God. Although supposed to be
secular, a thin majority of European citizens believe in God. When
evaluating the results from individual countries the responses are
more complex. Religious beliefs differ starkly amongst European
societies. In Cyprus and Romania, more than 90 percent believe in
God, whereas in the Czech Republic and in Sweden less than 20
percent do. But as a rule, in countries where believe in God is weak,
believe in some sort of spirit or life force is stronger than disbelief.
Only in France are the “strict nonbelievers” the largest of the three
groups, with 40 percent of the population (TNS Opinion & Social,
2010).
Nonetheless, European societies are becoming more secular
(Norris and Inglehart, 2011, pp. 85-89). However, this trend does
not result in homogenous but in increasingly pluralistic societies.
Many European societies are home to strong secular minorities and
it cannot be taken for granted anymore that European citizens
belong to the Christian faith. In many societies, affiliation to
traditional churches has become but one option amongst many (Roy,
2011, p. 43). Not despite but precisely because religious
participation rates are declining among Europeans, religious
differences are becoming more important and more disputed (Roy,
2011, pp. 275-277). One major impact on the religious landscapes of
European societies is the immigration of Muslims. However, one
would be mistaken to overemphasize the impact of immigration.
Many of today’s immigrants and their descendants are agnostics or
atheists; at the same time Europeans without any past ties to Islam
Bridging the Gap 000
have become Muslims. Religious diversity in Europe cannot and
must not be reduced to mere cultural diversity. We are not observing
a clash of civilizations but a new dimension of individual religious
choice. The same is true for societies around the globe. In former
Confucian South Korea, the majority of the population is Christian
now; there are growing numbers of atheists in the United States,
atheistic Russians re-discover their Orthodox tradition, Pentecostal
Christians proselytize successfully in Arab states, and Europeans
convert to Islam.
To sum up: European societies are not secular. They may
become more secular but more importantly, there is a trend towards
a new diversity.
The myth of secular states in Europe
The continental European branches of liberalism and socialism
relentlessly criticize the entanglement of state and religion in their
own countries. To the outside world they continue to promote the
model of the secular state as a European invention and reality.
However, the United Kingdom, Malta, Greece and most of
Scandinavia have state churches — Finland has even two. With the
Vatican State, Europe is de facto home to a theocracy. The heads of
state in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway are
simultaneously the leaders of state churches (Fox, 2008, pp. 111-
118). In continental Europe, parties of religious defense, such as
Christian Democratic parties, have gained about 30 percent of votes
in national elections and held government positions for an average
of 43.5 years in the time from 1945 to 1999 (Manow, 2008, p. 69).
One can even trace the differences between European welfare states
back to religious differences: the Social Democratic welfare state is
predominant in Northern Europe with its tradition of Lutheran state
churches; the corporatist approach dominates Catholic countries,
and the liberal welfare state characterizes those countries where
Calvinism and other free Protestant churches have been strong
(Manow, 2008, pp. 11-31).
Bridging the Gap 002
Today, state churches and the impact of religion on society may
be seen as historic relics of the past. However, even the present
European states are strongly intertwined with at least some of their
respective churches. In Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and
the United Kingdom some members of the clergy are appointed by
state officials. In most European countries optional religious
education is offered at public schools, and schools run by religious
entities are state funded. In many of them, the state funds religious
charities as well. The state collects church taxes in Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Italy and others. In at least every second European state,
religious entities have to register with the state to gain some form of
privileges. Some states maintain a strict “sect monitoring” policy
against new religious movements (Fox, 2008, pp. 112-113, pp. 144-
145). Even the officially laicistic France that has banned
headscarves from schools — even pupils are prohibited from
wearing them — has no strict separation of state and religion. The
state funds religious schools (mainly Catholic) up to 80 percent;
these are attended by every fifth French pupil. Catholic, Protestant,
Jewish and Muslim chaplains serve in the military. Some areas of
France are characterized by an even stronger entanglement between
state and religion. In Alsace-Moselle, the laicistic laws have never
been applied as the area was part of Germany at the time of their
commencement. Today, there is four officially recognized religions
in Alsace-Moselle: Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism and
Judaism. The salaries of their clergy stems in part from public funds,
there are crucifixes and mandatory religious education in public
schools, and the University of Strasbourg hosts a theology
department (Kuru, 2009, pp. 109-111).
In the whole of Europe, state and religion are far from
separated; instead they are intertwined in various different ways.
Even France, the ideal of laicism in theory lacks a strict separation in
practice.
Bridging the Gap 003
The myth of the superiority of the secular state
For many continental European liberals (and socialists), a
secular state, strictly separated from religious influence, embodies
the perfection of neutrality. However, there is no factual evidence to
prove such claims — quite the contrary, throughout history secular
states have been far from neutral. Revolutionary France in the 1790s
was one of the first secular states. The French Republic confiscated
church property, dissolved ecclesiastic orders and congregations,
removed iconography from places of worship, destroyed crosses and
bells, introduced a non-Christian Cult of Reason and killed reluctant
clergy. Antireligious regimes in the former Soviet Union and other
socialist states attempted something similar.
The theoretical foundations of secularism are found in streams
of liberal thought that emerged predominately in countries with
overly powerful religious institutions, such as France and Turkey.
Non-liberal statesmen like Aristide Briand (1862-1932) and Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) proponed the idea of a popular
supremacy against the real or fictional supremacy of the church or
religion. The means of the state were thereby exploited, and
marginalized religious influence (Kuru, 2009, pp. 14). Instead of
confining the expanding state, liberals supported state expansion at
the cost of religion. This had a negative impact of public freedom in
general (Raico, 1999, p. 37).
Today the bloody wars of secularizing the state are over.
Paradoxically, it is the secularization of European societies that
undermines the neutrality of the secular state. As the number of
European citizens who adhere to secular ideas becomes greater,
these citizens seize the opportunity to advocate and lobby for
policies that maintain and/or support the secular state. This is a fairly
recent development — at no point in the “religious past” has the
secular state had a “party” made up of its stakeholders in society
(Willems, 2001, p. 231). This is even more problematic in
combination with the expansion of the state into areas dominated by
religion in the past, especially education and welfare. When a state
only provides or funds secular supplies in these areas, it
Bridging the Gap 004
marginalizes its religious citizens (Monsma and Soper, 1998, pp.
5-7). While governments supported specific religious traditions in
the past — and many still do — the expansion of the secular state
often equals a hostile takeover of religious activities (Reuter, 2007,
p. 184).
A strictly secular state with no attachments to religion is not
neutral as it has its own stakeholder party among citizens. The more
extensive the secular state is, the more it interferes with the personal
belief and non-belief of its citizens.
The alternative to the secular state: Open
Religious Policy
There are alternative approaches other than secularism that
allow the liberal state to organize diverse societies. Such approaches
are found within the liberal thought of John Stuart Mill and Isaiah
Berlin. Both authors warned against the monopolization of state
policy by one group or another – even when such measures are
considered to enhance “the good of all” (Mill, 2010, p. 29, p. 24).
Berlin measured the freedom of a society by the number of choices
it allows its members. In order to guarantee a variety of choices, the
power of the state has to be limited (Berlin, 2006, p. 249). However,
this does not imply a reduction or even an abolition of the state. As
Mill stated, the critique against public education is not that there is
public education, but that the state is the executive of public
education (Mill, 2010, p. 151, p. 153). The state has no right to
influence its citizens to become adherents of religious traditions, nor
has it the right to influence them in such ways that may result in an
abolition of religious practices. But it has the right, and I would
argue the duty, to guarantee the availability of services to all of its
citizens. This entails that the state must provide the policy
framework and the funding for such services.
These arguments are central to the development of what I have
termed “Open Religious Policy.” The concept of Open Religious
Policy aims to establish a relationship between the state and religion
Bridging the Gap 005
that provides all religious and secular entities with the same access
to the public sphere and state funding, whilst safeguarding the right
of religious choice for the individual citizen. I thereby define Open
Religious Policy through four core principles: 1) the unbiased state;
2) public expression; 3) guaranteed individual freedom; 4) free
choice. Allow me to introduce these principles briefly.
1. The unbiased state
If we accept that every person is a freely thinking and acting
being, the state must not shape its citizens according to the ideas of
others (Berlin, 2006, pp. 245-255). The state has to respect the free
choice of its citizens when it comes to religious matters. It must
neither privilege nor proselytize individual religions, religion in
general or non-belief. Open Religious Policy does not homogenize
citizens; instead it fosters the practice of tolerance so that the
acceptance of diversity is socialized (Willems, 2003, pp. 107-108).
This process is as challenging for individual citizens as it is for the
societies they form. Nonetheless, citizens have to learn that there
must be a difference between legitimate public indignation and
illegitimate interference of the state (Mill, 2010, pp. 16-17).
2. Public expression
While the state must be impartial in the religious sphere, citizens
are free to express their belief or non-belief in public (Willems,
2003, p. 108). Religion is a private matter, but at the same time,
citizens have the right to show their faith in public life. Neither the
public nor the state are reserved primarily for one group of religious
or secular beliefs (Willems, 2003, p. 106). However, the public
sphere must not be a place of state-imposed harmony. The state
must allow for conflicting views to be expressed publicly (Mill,
2010, p. 109, p. 121). Different opinions of religious traditions and
nonreligious systems can therefore be articulated peacefully as the
public visibility of differences is the only way to learn to deal with
them.
Bridging the Gap 006
3. Guaranteed individual freedom
The state must respect the freedom of choice of each individual
citizen. But the same is true for religious and secular congregations.
The right to freedom of each individual citizen is unalienable: no
individual can permanently relinquish his or her freedom in favor of
a congregation. There is no right not to be free (Mill, 2010, p. 147).
The individual citizen, therefore, has the right to leave his or her
congregation, but also has to live with the consequences that stem
from this decision, such as termination of contact by the former
community. Nonetheless, the state has to prohibit physical harm by
the former community against the breakaway by all means.
4. Free choice
The state has to provide access to public funds for services and
initiatives of all groups in society, be they faith-based, secular or
indifferent. Any such services, whether organized by the state or
groups, are equivalent in what they offer the members of society and
therefore equally worthy of funding. Every group has the right to
receive state funding to provide healthcare, childcare, care for the
elderly, shelter for the homeless and so on, according to their belief.
Precisely because the services of the state cannot be neutral, the state
has to make funding available for private initiatives (Monsma and
Soper, 1998, p. 1). This, however, does not mean that the state gives
up its coordinating function. For example, the state sets the amount
of funding allocated to certain services. It cannot decide, however,
how and by whom services should be provided. To guarantee the
freedom of choice for everyone and to avoid monopolies of
individual faith groups in the provision of certain services, the state
has to provide its own services that should accommodate all
traditions and try to be as neutral as possible.
Bridging the Gap 007
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to disprove the perception of
European secularity. Large sections of European societies remain
religious. Part secularization has resulted in an even greater diversity
in society. The secular state is dominant in European thought, but
not in practice. As I have argued, in times of religious diversity it is
not even preferable to organize society through secularism. A better
approach to guarantee individual freedom regardless of religious
belief or non-belief may be found through what I have termed
“Open Religious Policy.” Crucially, this concept requires the state to
be open to all religions and secular traditions.
In essence, Open Religious Policy is based upon four key ideas:
1) the state must be unbiased towards religious and secular ideas; 2)
citizens have the right to practice their religious and secular ideas in
the private as well as public sphere; 3) the state guarantees the rights
of its citizens to leave their congregations; and 4) the state has to
fund faith-based services in education and welfare besides providing
its own.
Bridging the Gap 008
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Bridging the Gap 009
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Trennung von Politik und Religion,” in Minkenberg, Michael and
Ulrich Willems (Eds.), Politik und Religion (Wiesbaden: VS
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2003), pp. 88-112.
Bridging the Gap 021
Bridging the Gap 020
Blueprints for the future of liberalism in
the Arab world
Alexandra Thein
In case this has ever been in doubt, there is a future for
liberalism in the Arab world. Revolutions in the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) region have created a “point of no return” for
democratic institutions in post-revolutionary countries of the region,
creating a similar “point of no return” for liberalism. There are risks,
however, that a more fundamental entrenchment of liberalism in the
Arab world may not follow. The process of promoting liberalism in
the Arab world requires acceptance of past mistakes and disregard
of short-term interests, a hurdle that will be difficult to surmount for
actors on both sides of the Mediterranean, to ensure that the
revolutions will not merely remain a transitory process down the
path of future authoritarianism. The European Union (EU),1
including the European Parliament (EP),2 and the Alliance of
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)3 group in the EP, can
play a crucial role in this transition process.
1 For reasons of simplicity, the EU’s main institutions — the European
Parliament, the EU Commission and the Council of the European Union —
are referred to in this article as the EU. Where relevant, note will be made
of the institution in question. 2 The European Parliament currently has 754 members, elected through EU-
wide elections in all 27 — soon to be 28 — Member States of the EU for a
period of five years. The current mandate runs from 2009-2014. 3 The liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe is the third
largest group in the European Parliament with 86 members. There are six
other groups in the EP.
Bridging the Gap 022
Contemporary context in the framework of past
experiences
Clarifying the concept of liberalism, and especially liberal
values, is a necessary first step in order to ascertain the future of
liberalism in the Arab world, and how liberal parties in Europe can
facilitate this process. Fundamental liberal values encompass
individual and civic rights, respect and implementation of the rule of
law, equal rights for all, including minorities, political and cultural
pluralism, free economic enterprise and democracy based on these
liberal principles. A further aspect, which bears particular relevance
in the Middle East, is the notion of individual responsibility, which
is currently incompatible with the structure of Middle Eastern
societies and families. In Europe and the Middle East, liberalism
developed along very different historical lines. However, there are
striking similarities between the two regions and their interpretation
of liberalism, and this has proven to be one key building block upon
which to encourage a process of dialogue, mutual assistance and
common strategies.
Despite the revolutions of the Arab Spring, which in themselves
were an expression of the popular demand for democracy based on
the respect of the rule of law, and human and individual rights,
liberal parties in the Arab world have not enjoyed electoral success,
except and for its own individual reasons in the recent elections in
Libya. There are several reasons for this, both domestic and
international. The scope of this article does not include a detailed
analysis of these reasons, but rather focuses on the EU and EU
member states’ roles in this electoral reality and what steps can be
undertaken by both international and national actors to overcome
this problem in the future.
In the past, the EU and its member states engaged with the
region on the basis of interest-based policymaking. The bilateral
Association Agreements laid out paths to reform in the political —
including human rights — economic and social sectors, but
engagement has largely focused on energy, security and
immigration policies. In some regards, the EU did pursue reform in
Bridging the Gap 023
the three mentioned policy areas, but its member states individually
pursued different strategies, in some cases even contrary to the EU’s
stated policy goals, particularly in the advancement of human rights.
Instead, violations of human rights were, and still are, widespread,
the principle of rule of law is not universally applied, and individual
rights have not been achieved. Despite this, European countries have
not been consequential in their approach to the region, continuing to
pursue deep economic, political and security ties with countries that
in some cases violate these principles. This begs the question as to
what can be done to reverse this trend and how liberalism can
reclaim lost ground in a region of vast potential.
The future of liberalism in the Arab world
These patterns of engagement explain some of the current
problems for liberal reform in the region. There are distinct
approaches that can help alleviate these issues and further steps
would not only mitigate the challenges liberalism faces in the
region, but also lay the foundation upon which to build institutions
that would enable the growth of liberalism as a defining ideological
force in the region. The EU and the relevant actors in the region —
including politicians, activists, NGOs and other stakeholders —
need to rethink their strategies for the region if liberalism is to
succeed. These measures are very different in their scope but are of
equal importance and all of these processes and reforms must go
hand-in-hand if they are to fully succeed. These measures range
from policymaking, political campaigning and dialogue, institutional
reform to boosting economic entrepreneurship.
The EU, comprising several actors and stakeholders in itself,
must also take certain paths to achieve this aim. It is necessary to
note, however, that due to the different historical contexts within
which liberalism developed in the Middle East and Europe, Europe
cannot not export its own form of liberalism as a blueprint for
liberalism in the Arab world. Despite this slightly disparate
development, the EU, and more specifically liberal parties, activists
Bridging the Gap 024
and other stakeholders, can use past experiences with the Eastern
neighborhood and policymaking in the Middle East to assist the
liberal reform process in the Arab world. These steps, briefly
outlined below, would give the necessary impetus for long-term
establishment of liberalism in the Arab world. The steps must be
applied at different levels and involve different actors on the local,
national and international levels.
An entrepreneurial middle class
and economic reform
The driving force of liberalism in Europe is and has been the
entrepreneurial middle class, not only in terms of economic growth
and progress, but also as a bulwark against extremism. A strong
middle class has always been a guarantor of liberal democracy. In
the Arab world, this entrepreneurial middle class plays a slightly
different role with regard to the European entrepreneurial middle
class in terms of the societal, political and economic structure within
which it operates. The role of the middle class within countries of
the Arab world had thus far been mitigated and limited by the
bureaucratic structure of the state within an authoritarian political
system. This middle class has to develop and grow beyond the limits
of the previously existent authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus, to
drive economic growth forward, thereby strengthening and
solidifying itself and playing a similar role to that which its
counterpart played in Europe.
The development of strong economic and institutional
foundations is necessary for the solidification of liberal democracy
in the states in question. However, it is equally important to
ascertain that economic reform and rapid privatization to encourage
free enterprise in itself is not the answer to entrenching liberalism in
countries in transition — rather the opposite. In states in transition,
especially where institutions were and continue to be weak, rapid
economic liberalization will not entrench liberalism in a lasting
manner. The case of Iraq is an example worthy of note. The current
Bridging the Gap 025
political and economic instability stem from the implementation of
the idea that unfettered economic liberalization will inevitably lead
to economic growth, which in turn will lead to the development of a
free society, respect for the rule of law, and individual rights for all.
The case of Iraq provides a particularly useful example because the
political conditions in the country before the fall of an authoritarian
regime and after the establishment of a weak political system in a
state in transition bears some resemblance to the conditions existent
in other now post-revolutionary countries of the region. This one-
sided policy approach will, by virtue of the fact that in the Arab
context this will most likely fail to achieve the stated goals, only
serve to deepen mistrust towards European and more generally
Western ideals, thus achieving the opposite effect of the stated goals,
leading to the alienation of the region’s peoples from liberalism as a
set of values. Hence, economic development for a sound and
politically educated middle class must include a particular role for
the state and state institutions.
Role of the state and its institutions
One of the fundamental requirements for the further
development and entrenchment of liberalism in the Arab world
concerns the role of the state and its institutions. Despite one of the
fundamental liberal ideals espousing a reduced role of the state, a
facilitating actor or vehicle is nevertheless required in the initial
phases of the reform process in post-revolutionary political contexts.
Setting up effective, functioning and facilitating institutions in turn
requires a sound, efficient and functioning bureaucracy able to
contribute to the societal, infrastructural and economic development
of the country — all necessities for the further development of an
entrepreneurial middle class, the core building block of a liberal
democracy. This would necessarily need to include a democratic
system of checks and balances to ensure no one institution has more
power than another. Paradoxically, the current problems observed in
Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon highlight the need for a functioning
Bridging the Gap 026
institutional structure in order to develop the necessary framework
for liberalism to thrive.
The forces and actors of the old regimes cannot be excluded in
this process of reform. Lasting and thorough reform of political and
institutional systems consists of inclusionary approaches.
Disenfranchisement and exclusion are potent forces that lead to
elements of former regimes becoming alienated, leading to
instability and in some cases prolonged violence, either on behalf of
one group towards another or versus the state. This can severely
damage the potential for reform. Previous experiences highlight this,
with the current crisis in Iraq serving as the starkest example.
Consequentially, institution-building mechanisms must be at the
forefront of the EU’s engagement in the region, which encompass
reform of the administration, judiciary and other institutions that
make up a liberal democracy. Separately, police and security forces
must also be reformed to uphold the rule of law, whilst respecting
human and individual rights. Once the relevant infrastructural,
institutional and political structures are in place, the bureaucratic
structures would provide a slender and efficient structure ensuring
economic growth based on an entrepreneurial middle class whilst
preserving individual and human rights, respect for the rule of law,
and equal rights for all.
The role of liberal political parties
Currently, in some MENA countries, liberal political parties
remain fragmented. This is especially true in Egypt. To some
degree, this is the result of the prevailing system of political
tribalism, but other factors also play a role. Liberalism cannot thrive
and develop in a context of intense personal political rivalry,
especially if these parties are linked with a particular personality,
rather than a party program. Further, infighting within a party’s
leadership and between parties severely dents public opinion of the
party or parties in question. Credibility can be restored if the
leadership of an individual party stands united and fights for a
Bridging the Gap 027
common goal. Liberal parties in the Arab world must find a way to
work together on a common platform and must unite if they are to
succeed. Fragmentation in most cases translates to electoral defeat.
In order to avoid this, sacrifices and difficult choices must be made,
as facing elections in unison bears more chances of success.
Additionally, it remains paramount that liberal parties
continuously engage with other stakeholders and actors. Complete
boycott of political proceedings may not always be the answer to a
situation in which liberal parties are in the opposition. Especially in
a state in transition, influencing the policymaking process is of vital
importance.
Placing liberal values and a liberal programmatic platform at the
center of its political work is a further necessity for continuous
success of liberal parties in the Arab region. Connecting political
ideals with the work of political parties not only serves to ensure
continuity, but also generates trust in a party. In this sense, parties
need be founded on a solid base of membership from which its
leaders emerge, as opposed to individual politicians creating parties
from a set of followers. This process must be accompanied by
cooperation and dialogue between liberal parties; otherwise the
dismal election results in Egypt will repeat themselves not only in
Egypt, but also in other Arab countries. In essence, liberal political
parties face a painful choice: succumb alone or thrive together.
Liberal parties and liberal politicians in the Arab world can
achieve this by reengaging with the street and with common voters.
In a context where several liberal parties exist on the political
landscape, this is particularly important. Liberal European political
parties also need this fundamental, long-term reengagement with the
street in a context of shifting party landscapes with swing voters.
Political campaigning and programing
Political campaigning and party programs is a factor that is
closely related, yet distinct from political parties. The fundamental
method to engage with voters is direct contact on the street, in
Bridging the Gap 028
educational establishments, and in public space in general. Most
recently, this was forcefully brought forward in the ALDE council
meeting in Pula, Croatia, in May 2013, especially for those
European liberal parties struggling on the national level.
This process of political campaigning needs to be decoupled
from electoral cycles. Campaigning outside electoral cycles
increases credibility and inspires more trust from voters in the
electoral program, as well as increasing their exposure to liberal
values in general. Over time, the rewards of this type of direct
engagement serve to establish liberalism as a particular brand of
values and ideals distinct from other parties.
Shared experiences and best practices are but two ways that
European liberal parties, specifically through the ALDE group in the
EP and the ALDE party, can assist Arab liberal parties, and vice
versa. Political campaigning is an activity that needs to be tailored to
specific circumstances, but techniques and methods could be
developed together. Established links, constant dialogue and
cooperation between parties on both sides of the Mediterranean can
help to create this culture of direct engagement by fostering long-
term partnerships, which could serve as an exchange mechanism to
share best practices and lessons learnt. Even if the electorate is
slightly different, electoral techniques are similar. Additionally, this
would provide a potent means to break the hindrance to liberalism
— and especially individual rights and responsibility — in the Arab
world: political tribalism. Cooperation through regional liberal
networks is one method of achieving this, as well as the liberal
ALDE group’s active engagement with regional actors.
Facilitating actors — such as liberal foundations — that also
have vast experience in dealing with countries in transition play a
crucial role as facilitators, connectors and communicators. A
successful model for engagement would thus consist of liberal
parties on both sides of the Mediterranean being connected through
organizational vehicles such as the Friedrich Naumann Foundation
for Freedom, using this vehicle to further expand and grow in their
respective political space.
Bridging the Gap 029
Demography: including the entire populace
Institutional reform, as mentioned earlier, together with political
campaigning, plays a central role in other relevant reform processes.
Demographic realities in Europe and the Arab world vary to a large
degree, yet measures and steps that need to be undertaken are very
similar for both regions, bearing more relevance in the MENA
region, as the demographic structure shows a younger population on
average.
The vast majority of the MENA region’s population is under the
age of 30. This demographic context provides for an immense
opportunity for liberal political parties to engage with the age group
that will define the region’s future for the coming decades. This
engagement needs to be of a continuous nature as opposed to being
sporadic and linked to electoral cycles, as already mentioned,
comprising youth in all geographic areas, both urban and the youth
in rural areas. This requires work with and through youth
movements and youth wings of liberal political parties in an
organized and coherent manner. Concrete strategies are required that
set out work plans that take into account geographic specificities,
and link these youth organizations together on a national level
through regular intra-party dialogue and exchange. A sense of
togetherness, cooperation and the notion of working for a common,
attainable future are strong motivational factors for young people to
join national liberal political movements.
Youth wings and youth organizations are feeder organizations
for national political parties, and are imperative for generational
change to occur, whilst ensuring generational continuity for political
parties. At the same time, this will guarantee that within the
framework of generational change, liberal values are entrenched in
the political and social landscape. Especially after decades of
authoritarianism, planting the seeds of liberalism in a region fraught
with turmoil is a key factor in ensuring the success of liberalism in a
context where the social and political make up has been dominated
by tribal structures.
Bridging the Gap 031
Lastly, the role of women in public and political life must be
supported. Through our dialogue with parties and activists in the
region we see alarming signs concerning the deterioration of
women’s rights. Having initially played a fundamental role in the
revolutionary processes, in some countries their rights are being
systematically violated. Especially in Europe, women have proven
to play a key role in positive societal change, and incorporating
women in the Arab world in this process is essential in instilling
liberal values in the region. Since women face certain restrictions in
daily life in most societies, they could prove to be more receptive to
the ideals of freedom. The same holds true for minorities — their
rights must be respected and they must be included.
The EU and liberal European actors
The EU, in particular the European External Action Service
(EEAS), knows of the historic opportunity in the MENA region.
They are equally aware of — and in part bound by — the different
geopolitical interests of member states, other allies in the region,
such as the US, and financially important players such as the Arab
Gulf countries. The latter play a key financial and cultural role in the
region in terms of exporting their brand of Sunni Islam, supporting
state budgets, such as the Palestinian Authority’s budget, as well as
financing some of the rebel groups in Syria and other organizations
in the region, to name a select few. The long-standing influence of
some Arab Gulf countries in spreading conservative interpretations
of Sunni Islam has further expanded through regional revolutions
that have swept to power conservative governments, consequentially
increasing their influence even further.
In this setting, the EU finds itself competing with other external
players in each MENA country, thus impeding its ability to
manoeuver. As much as the EU should remain coherent with regard
to the values it is seeks to uphold, the measures it applies and the
value system it seeks to export, the institutional set up of the Union
can also play a hindering role. In part, the arising problem of policy
Bridging the Gap 030
consistency is related to the institutional structure of the EU. The
distribution of decision-making powers in the field of foreign policy
hinders the development of a unified and common approach in
response to the Arab Spring. In this respect, it must also be
mentioned that the EU’s engagement is also negatively affected by
the ongoing financial crisis of the Eurozone, which shifts resources
and attention away from the Arab world.
Therefore, increasing calls have been made for the use of
conditionality1 as a tool to achieve greater coherence in EU
policymaking in the region, as has been mentioned on numerous
occasions in plenary discussions of the EP, especially in the context
of discussions on the situation in Egypt. This is a particularly
sensitive matter, with some EU stakeholders fearing that the use of
conditionality will have an exclusionary effect for the EU as an actor
in the Arab world. The reasoning follows the idea that placing
conditionality on governments in a region where a plethora of
international actors are actively involved, the EU will risk excluding
itself and thus losing influence in its immediate neighborhood. Yet,
clear red lines should be established in order for the EU to be able to
continue to influence the reform process through policy initiatives,
such as the support of individual NGOs, whilst retaining its
credibility within the region. Losing credibility will have a negative
effect on the EU’s ability to project its values, not only in the Arab
world but towards all external actors it engages with. For reasons
mentioned above, the EEAS remains slightly reluctant to apply
1 To explain this concept, the definition used by Rosa Balfour will be
applied: “Conditionality refers to a complex set of issues including the
ability to attach strings to demands, the linkages between political demands
and economic incentives, the attraction and credibility of these incentives
for them to be effective, the ability of the EU system, including its member
states, to coordinate and deliver such incentives, and the relation between
establishing general principles to govern conditionality and the need to
devise tailor-made policies towards individual countries.” Rosa Balfour,
“EU Conditionality after the Arab Spring,” Papers Euromesco (2012) 16,
IEMed. Retrieved on 5 June 2013 from:
http://www.iemed.org/publicacions/historic-de-publicacions/papersiemed-
euromesco/16.-eu-conditionality-after-the-arab-spring/
Bridging the Gap 032
conditionality to its assistance programs, instead preferring to
additionally address these issues and promoting peace, stability and
the rule of law through the EU’s special representatives for the
Southern Mediterranean region and for human rights.1
The EU can also retain influence through its use of other soft
power tools. The projects supported through human rights
instruments, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights (EIDHR) and funding to civil society actors, are tools
that can serve to promote its value system as it has done over several
years. Continued engagement between civil society and state and
non-state actors is useful in cementing liberal values. Success
remains limited, however, precisely because of the competing
policymaking between the EU, on the one hand, and member states
on the other.
The EP can continue to play a role by continuing to set up
political linkages through regular dialogue via inter-parliamentary
meetings that the European Parliament’s Delegations2 hold twice
annually, as well as through other channels. As the EU’s only
democratically elected body, the EP can also hold other institutions
to account through particular legislative measures regarding the
EU’s budget, debates with the EEAS in the plenary of the EP on
matters of current importance, questions to individual institutions,
1 See: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/eu-special-representatives/index_en.htm
for more information on the EU’s special representatives. The EU special
representative for the Southern Mediterranean region is Bernardino León.
The EU special representative for human rights is Stavros Lambrinidis (as
of June 2013). 2 The European Parliament upholds its bilateral and regional relations with
countries through its so-called Delegations. Delegations meet once per
month in the European Parliament to discuss current affairs in the country
or region in question. Twice annually it holds inter-parliamentary meetings
with parliamentarians and other stakeholders, such as NGO representatives
and members of the government, to continue bilateral dialogue and to
address issues of mutual concern. I am personally member of the
Delegation for relations with Mashreq countries — Egypt, Jordan, Syria
and Lebanon — and Iraq, the Palestinian Legislative Council and Israel.
Bridging the Gap 033
adoption of resolutions by the plenary, and pushing for democratic
accountability regarding the work of other EU institutions.
Furthermore, the ALDE group in the EP has also promoted
liberal values through dialogue with liberal political parties,
engaging with NGOs and political activists, as well as regularly
hosting liberal leaders in the EP to facilitate an exchange of
information between MEP’s and liberal stakeholders in the region.
Conclusion
This article sought to address current problems facing liberalism
in the Arab world in a post-revolutionary context in order to explore
ways to further promote liberalism through the vehicle of liberal
political parties and actors in the region.
The measures outlined above provide a solid basis upon which
to promote liberalism in the Arab world, through creating
functioning and efficient institutions to establish a basis for the
development of an entrepreneurial middle class, which in turn will
provide a solid anchor for the development of liberalism under the
right conditions. However, the political reform process must include
reform based on the respect of all liberal values, not only of
economic liberalism. Further, political engagement with voters on
all levels through active campaigning and with a clear electoral
program ensures necessary exposure, which will serve to establish
liberal party programs in the political arena.
This political activity must particularly include engagement
with the youth in light of the demographic realities in the region,
which will be crucial for the entrenchment of liberalism in the Arab
world. Liberal parties in the region must unite and work towards a
common goal, otherwise they will continue to be sidelined in
political processes and risk complete political marginalization.
Lessons learnt by European liberal parties can serve as useful
experiences in moving forward. The EU itself must find a coherent
method of engagement with the region, and the EP and the ALDE
Bridging the Gap 034
group in particular can and must keep up its active engagement
through the help of local liberal facilitators.
If these steps are undertaken, then success in the promotion of
liberalism in the Arab world lies firmly in our hands.
Bridging the Gap 035
A liberal program for the future:
Guidelines for Arab and European
countries
Mounir Rached
The concept of economic freedom was propagated as early as
the mid-1800s, and in particular by economist and liberal thinker
John Stuart Mill in his famous book, The Principles of Political
Economy. There, he clearly stated that aside from internal and
external security and law and justice, governments have failed in
any other function. Then, he was calling for limiting the size of
governments. In the Middle East, many voices have similarly called
for economic freedom and limiting state intervention in economic
activity, including as early as 1912, when well-known liberal thinker
Ahmad Lutfi Alsayed defined the role of government and limited it
to three basic functions. These liberal thinkers were not well heard
by their respective governments.
In the Middle East as well as in many other parts of the world,
economic freedom has not — and until now — been very well
comprehended. Freedom is not anarchy, and for freedom to be
effective and real, it needs to be constituted. Government — or
“civil government,” to use John Locke’s phrase — is necessary.
There is no real freedom without the state. The question then is:
How much state, and how is it to be organized?
Middle Eastern countries in particular have regressed over the
years since independence. We have seen massive government
economic intervention and takeovers that swept many countries,
particularly Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and nearly full
ownership of natural resources in oil rich Arab countries. Although
state intervention in ownership and pricing proved ineffective and
deleterious in all cases, reform was partial, and in many ways acted
Bridging the Gap 036
as a placebo in order to convince not only their own public but
donor countries (in the case of some) that reform is ongoing.
In addition, governments feared the social implications of
reform. In most cases, this was a hoax, as there was only damage
from the unwarranted interference of such governments in every
aspect of economic activity, including state monopolies in power
production, transportation, strategic industries, banking and credit,
capital flows, and labor movement. Larger government gave upper
civil service echelons more power and wealth.
Misconceptions about the role of the public sector have
rendered the population in Middle Eastern countries passive. Even
today, after the uprisings in many Middle East countries, the benefits
of economic freedom are not well understood. The uprising was
driven by tyranny, a quest for freedom, dire economic conditions,
high unemployment among the youth, but didn’t help define a new
economic agenda.
The Middle Eastern countries score very low on global freedom
in almost all the five key indexes: size of government, legal
framework, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally,
and regulation (FNF, 2012).
These classifications, following the Fraser Institute, have been
studied carefully and proven to provide a good measure of
unnecessary government intervention. Without delving into the
detail, I would like to provide some interpretation of these concepts,
as they are extremely important and not well understood by both the
public and governments in the region.
Middle East misconceptions
Often we hear that the public is exerting demands on the
government in many areas, such as health, education, transportation,
jobs, etc., with a strong belief that it is the government’s obligation
to provide such services. This perception has become a deflector as
Bridging the Gap 037
governments created dependence on them through mismanagement
that inhibited growth development and employment.
The interventionist policies of governments have been
excessively damaging, which is why the Middle East draws wealth
mainly from its natural resources. A typical quotation often heard
from critics is that the exports of Singapore alone exceed those of
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region combined, with
oil exports excluded.
With regard to the size of government, in all Middle Eastern
countries, public enterprises are numerous, even in countries that are
considered to enjoy relatively more freedom. For instance, public
enterprises provide 22 percent of state revenues and at the same time
absorb 20 percent of expenditure in Lebanon. In order to allow the
public sector to operate in a non-competitive market almost all state
enterprises in the Middle East are granted monopolies.
It is believed that state enterprises can produce at a lower cost
and a lower price since they are not profit motivated. To the
contrary, nearly all of them operate at a higher cost. And in the case
they charge lower prices than average costs, they eventually end up
dependent on subsidies that are covered by taxes or government
borrowing. Therefore, instead of the higher price, consumers pay
taxes to cover the subsidy emerging from the higher operating cost
of public enterprises, or pay in the form of higher inflation created
by liquidity generated through borrowing.
The critical issue is whether governments can use income in a
better way than the private sector? Often it’s the private sector that
can make the right decision to maximize its utility function.
Taxes as well pose another serious problem. How much taxes
should governments collect and in what form? Often Middle Eastern
countries rely on regressive taxes that are applied to consumer
products and imports. Such taxes deprive governments from using
tax policies in order to attain better income distribution. What even
more serious is that such taxes raise prices directly almost by the
magnitude of the tax (depending on the elasticity of demand for the
Bridging the Gap 038
product), which in turn reduces real incomes and renders the
economy less competitive in other products and services.
Until today, we have governments calling for protection of
domestic industry in order to preserve employment, but such
policies breed inefficiencies in production and result in a dis-benefit
for millions of consumers in order, supposedly, to protect a limited
number of producers.
Other misconceptions prevail, in particular towards the role of
the banking system. Subsidizing credit creates several distortions; in
particular, it creates a distribution issue of credit, it artificially
reduces interest rates and instead of promoting investment — as is
generally believed — to the contrary it suppresses investment as low
interest rates don’t encourage savings, thus creating a shortage of
capital that is needed for investment. A suppressed credit market,
therefore, achieves opposite results from those that are originally
intended. Subsidized credit also distorts production and encourages
allocation of resources to uncompetitive products, and creates a
mismatch between demand and supply.
Some governments in the region have been promulgating
Islamic banking as a solution. Islamic banking is different from
conventional banking and is being guided by Islamic principles,
prohibiting interest charges that are perceived as usury. In Islamic
banking, a depositor becomes a shareholder without a predetermined
rate of return as in conventional banking.
An Islamic bank also lends money, but it is a business
agreement between the bank and the borrower. The borrower will
run the business while the profit of that business will be shared
between the bank and the borrower in a prefixed rate, documented in
the original agreement. Islamic banks also provide services and
charge money. Therefore, when agents deposit money in an Islamic
bank, they become shareholders of the bank’s overall business.
Islamic banking can coexist with traditional banking, but each plays
a different role — never mind that businesses should not be guided
by religious principles. Without having a clear distinction between
Bridging the Gap 039
risk and return, capital markets become less efficient and banks’
global integration becomes constricted.
Allowing competition in the banking sector is key to advancing
intermediation. This includes countries opening their doors to
foreign banking and to liberalize ownership of banks. Laws
regarding proper auditing and misuse of funds that apply to
corporations shouldn’t be different from those that apply to banks.
Banking is a service industry that matches savers with investors and
with each bearing his own risk.
Governments in the Middle East, meanwhile, have failed to
provide full protection for property rights. Security of property
rights protected by law is an unwaverable right. Enforcement of
contracts by a properly running legal system is indispensable for the
promotion of a liberal economic system.
Another cornerstone of economic freedom is the freedom to
trade internationally. Freedom of exchange across boundaries is a
key ingredient of economic freedom. High tariffs, exchange rate
distortions and capital controls inhibit trade and growth. The
reasoning supporting free trade is very simple. As domestic trade
and internal specialization promotes wealth and standards of living,
so does international trade. If each household produces all its needs
(which is impossible, given all the skills needed), the standard of
living will remain low. It’s not true that countries need to protect
their markets from those foreign markets that have cheap labor.
India has cheap labor but it is a net importer country, whereas
Germany has one of the highest average wages in the world and it’s
the largest net exporter in the world, exceeding that of China.
A common misconception is that capital controls preserve
capital from being taken abroad to benefit other countries. This is a
fallacy, as when a country institutes controls on capital outflow,
foreign capital will not flow in as well. It limits inflow of capital.
Such a policy deprives a country of much needed capital (that
normally is accompanied with advanced knowhow) otherwise not
available in the country.
Bridging the Gap 041
Most countries that have restrictive labor regulations suffer from
high unemployment. Minimum wage regulation is such an example
of regulatory restraint that limits freedom in the labor market. It
raises labor costs, renders an economy less competitive, and creates
unemployment. Many types of labor market regulations infringe
upon the economic freedom of both employers and employees.
Employers should have the freedom to employ whomever they
want, and have the freedom to agree on a wage with the employee.
Rigidity in working hours and dismissal regulations and costs has
hampered business initiatives and growth (Ben Nasser Al Ismaily et
al., 2012).
Governments should be concerned only with the production of
public goods and provide government services related to law and
order, and protecting property rights and providing security. These
services and goods, in turn, determine public expenditure levels.
Governments can have social protection programs; however, not at
the expense of the performance of the economy and by suppressing
job creation opportunities. Social programs should be targeted and
not based on broad-based subsidies.
The outcome of existing misconceptions
These prevailing impediments in the Middle East have had a
visible impact on the growth of private investment, with the region
less successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) than
other regions, except in the hydrocarbon sector. This by itself signals
the lack of opportunities for foreigners to invest, the unattractiveness
of local business, ineffective bureaucracy, and the perception of
higher risk. And most FDI outside the energy sector has been
directed to non-tradables: typically tourism, telecommunications,
and real estate, with a little to export-oriented manufacturing. Even
domestic investment has flowed predominantly into non-traded
sectors (World Bank, 2009).
These trends weakened growth and employment opportunities,
especially for the educated youth. They also suggest that the
Bridging the Gap 040
region’s countries may be suffering from “Dutch” disease, with
investment flowing to non-tradables due to low and declining
competitiveness of tradable manufacturing sectors. Among all
indicators, weak exports are a strong reflection of the potential of the
Middle East countries’ private sectors to sustain economic growth.
Based on research, it is beyond doubt that diversified exports
were evidence of sustained and strong growth in fast growing
economies. Nearly every episode of long-term sustained growth has
had exports as a prime driver. Middle East countries don’t show yet
strong signs of non-oil export growth and diversification that
increases competitiveness in global markets. Even in Middle East
countries that improved their exports, the technological structure of
their exports weighed towards resource-based and low technology
products.
This unfavorable performance is a reflection of the following
key factors embedded in economic freedom indicators:
The macroeconomic environment: inflation, interest
rates, and terms of trade
The degree of market openness: trade openness, the
regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms from the
market
The protection of property rights: the judiciary and the
enforcement of court decisions
The nature of factor markets: labor markets and skills,
capital, land, infrastructure and information
These factors affect a firm’s performance and behavior through
different channels. They affect the cost of doing business, the
uncertainty investors face, and the competition and the market
structure firms face.
Bridging the Gap 042
Guidelines for a corrective blueprint
A principal indicator of freedom is freedom from government.
A reform plan to liberalize an economy should have a clear vision of
the size of government. If the function of government is not well
defined and understood, then a liberal reform program can’t be
designed and achieved. As stated previously, government function
should be limited to the provision of the following: law and order,
property rights, and public goods, and external security.
The government should make enough room for the private
sector to use its resources effectively, both capital and labor,
dependent on freely operating markets for the distribution and
allocation of goods and services. Evidence supporting the benefits of
this approach is outline in nearly in all relevant research; numerous
studies that have proven the effectiveness of free markets. Once the
role of government is well defined, along with what public goods
should be produced, the share of government in economic activity
can be easily determined. This means that the consumption share of
government can be quantified. A country can draw on many cases in
order to be able to define the size of its activities. For instance, what
is the optimal size of the police force per, say, 1,000 residents?
Similarly, the size of the court system can be determined. Recent
economic research on the size of governments has not taken fully
into account the concept of optimality.
The concept of government size has to determine the size of
governments’ current spending/consumption of goods and services.
In most Middle Eastern countries, public consumption constitutes a
larger than optimal magnitude and its effective level is often
concealed through suppressed wages and salaries, or controlled
prices.
Another expenditure item, transfers and subsidies, is not well
managed in almost all countries in the region, both in terms of its
size and allocation. Subsidies have been used in two forms and both
are equally harmful. Price subsidies, especially in utilities (power
and water) and transportation, are widespread. Their negative
implications have been researched and compared to their relative
Bridging the Gap 043
benefits. In many countries, Lebanon for instance, subsidies to
electricity are 18 percent of the budget; yet Lebanon’s consumer
cost of power production, and capital spending, is one of the highest
in the world. The other form of subsidy consists of direct transfers
that often has not been well managed and has been applied in a
discretionary manner, in providing health services, in aiding certain
industries and farm products, etc. Substantial savings can be realized
by targeting subsidies and cutting spending in general.
Most governments don’t have a proper wage policy and public
sector wages are not linked to market indicators. Focus should be on
effectiveness and efficient return versus cost. Governments should
weigh the cost-benefit of fewer civil servants with higher wages
compared to the current situation where most governments have an
excess of employment combined with significantly lower salaries
than the private sector.
Countries should develop their social programs, such as
pensions and health insurance. These protective instruments should
be self-financed rather than being a burden on the budget.
Employees should carry most of the cost of these security schemes,
instead of employers. Wage compensation should be transparent and
fully monetized (International Labour Organisation, 2012).
Once the role and size of government is properly determined, a
government then has a guideline that allows it to determine the size
of taxes to be collected to cover spending. The tax issue will then
have two components to be determined: size and composition. The
latter implies how best to collect taxes and from what bases. Should
it be income based or consumption based? Each type of tax has its
advantages and disadvantages. Income taxes can be progressive and
aid a government in reducing inequality among its citizens, while
consumption based taxes are regressive but more effective in
collection.
The decision process and optimal taxation has been researched
extensively and governments can be aided by these principles to
determine how best to collect taxes and which tax is more efficient,
including cost of collection relative to total revenues. In principal,
Bridging the Gap 044
taxes should be balanced and few, based on broad tax bases. Today,
most governments, including many European countries, have
numerous and overlapping taxes with extensive exemptions.
Property rights and a modern efficient legal system are an
indispensable component for an economy to move forward and to
attract foreign investment. These are not difficult to design and
apply.
Free trade has proven to benefit all countries, and as we realize
that domestic trade provides efficiency in the use and allocation of
resources, so does international trade. The classical economist David
Ricardo introduced the theory of comparative advantage over two
centuries ago, concluding that a country can benefit from trade even
if it has an absolute advantage (relative to other countries) in the
production of all of its goods. He refuted Mercantilist thinking that a
country should export more and import less.
A country can easily reform its trade (and trade taxes) policies;
China, Asia, and Latin American are moving on a fast track with
open trade being the main ingredient in their modern policies.
Ricardo had another important theoretical contribution to add,
which is referred to as the “Ricardian equivalence” — which is
inter-temporal optimization by taxpayers. If deficits are financed by
borrowing, taxes are expected to rise, to pay for debt. Governments
have to have sound monetary policies, as debt can be monetized and
reduces a country’s competitiveness and hinders trade and growth.
Finally, an effective regulatory system in financial (credit)
markets, labor and capital markets, as well as an effective system of
business regulations, are highly essential to move forward.
Monopolies are created by governments and don’t evolve on their
own; the minimum needed is:
Credit should be available without discrimination
Interest rates should be market-determined only
Wages and prices have to be market-determined
Apply nondiscretionary licensing
Bridging the Gap 045
Reform is not an impossible task. Eastern Europe dismantled a
complex controlled economy and today it is moving forward in just
less than two decades. In the Middle East region, we have countries
hold to bad polices year after year (like bread subsidies in Egypt),
and still believe it’s optimal.
What is needed is full comprehension of reform, determination,
and a transition mechanism that may take many forms. Countries
should seriously consider smooth transmission processes. The
alternative, through revolution, may be very costly and will take
much longer to bear fruit.
Eliminating discretionary practices
Rules, policies and regulations and the way they are applied and
enforced by the relevant public institutions matter for investors, and
subsequently for growth. Expectations about the future and the
credibility of governments in reforming the rules and implementing
them are also taken into consideration. It is not surprising that many
growth acceleration measures followed changes in the political
regime, such as in the case of Eastern Europe.
In Middle Eastern countries, as well as in other countries, it may
not necessarily be the rules and regulations that only matter, but also
how they are applied. For many of the region’s countries (and
according to the World Bank), the diagnostic evidence points to a
gap between the rules and how they are implemented, which in turn
has made the private sector reluctant to respond positively to
reforms that were considered as promoting private sector growth.
Private investment, for instance, has been less responsive to reforms
in the Middle East than elsewhere. Symptoms show that the
business environment is not the same for all investors and firms.
Barriers to competition are advantageous to older firms and more
seasoned businesses in general. The business sector and the business
environment have not improved to a degree commensurate with the
reforms measures taken during the past two decades.
Bridging the Gap 046
In many countries, a central problem is the unpredictability of
laws and regulations affecting enterprise investment, operations and
employment. Improved policies may not overcome inept or
discretionary application of reforms. There are countless examples
in many if not all Middle Eastern countries of administrative
weaknesses, ranging from inconsistent to unpredictable
interpretation of rules and regulations. For instance, in Algeria,
Morocco and Lebanon, more than 50 percent of investors complain
that the regulations are interpreted inconsistently or unpredictably.
Unequal implementation of policies has taken place in all areas of
the business environment, including: trade, entry and exit,
regulations, product market regulations, and factor and labor
markets.
Therefore, what is needed is good policies and good
implementation. A prelude to that is full comprehension of the
relevant economic factors and how they operate, and strong
determination in order to be able to institute transition.
Bridging the Gap 047
References
- Ben Nasser Al Ismaily, Salem, Azzan Al-Busaidi, Miguel
Cervantes and Fred McMahon, Economic Freedom of the Arab
World: 2012 Annual Report (Cairo: Fraser Institute, 2012).
- The World Bank, “From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking
Private-Led Growth in the Middle East and North Africa,”
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).
- International Labour Organization, “Rethinking Economic Growth:
Towards Productive and Inclusive Arab Societies,” (Beirut: ILO
Regional Office for the Arab States, 2012).
Bridging the Gap 048
Bridging the Gap 049
Giulio Ercolessi
Giulio Ercolessi is a member of the Board of Directors
of the European Liberal Forum and the author of the
book L’Europa verso il suicidio? Senza Unione federale il destino degli europei è segnato (Europe
towards Suicide? Without a Federal Union the Fate of
Europeans is Inescapable) and other published essays. As a member of the board of LibMov (a newly-born
organization aimed at reassembling Italian liberals), he
is one of the initiators of italialaica.it and represents the major umbrella organization of Italian advocates of
separation of state and religion in the board of the
European Humanist Federation.
Dr. Hala Mostafa
Hala Mostafa is a liberal political commentator with the
Al-Ahram Foundation and the former Editor-in Chief of Al-Ahram’s (Egypt’s largest newspaper) political
quarterly Democracy Review, issued from 2000 to the
present. In her professional career, Dr. Mostafa has held many positions, including director of the Political
Department at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and
Strategic Studies. She is a Member of Casa Arab (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Madrid, Spain),
the Arab Thought Forum (Amman, Jordan), and the
Advisory Board of Al-Ahram International Political Journal Relations. She is the author of many books,
policy papers and articles and received her academic
honors including a PhD in comparative politics from Cairo University.
Prof. Dr. Aristides N. Hatzis
Aristides Hatzis is professor at the University of Athens and the National School of Judges and is a renowned
expert in the fields of law and economics. Professor
Hatzis has taught in excellent institutions, among them Chicago University, Yale and Witten/Herdecke
University in Germany. He established “The Greek
Crisis Blog” and is a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Hellenic Foundation for
European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and of the
Advisory Board of the Society of European Contract Law. He is a fellow of the European Law Institute in
Vienna and a member of the Steering Committee of the
European Network for Better Regulation. Additionally, he is a practicing attorney in Greece.
Bridging the Gap 051
Prof. Dr. Asteris Huliars
Asteris Huliaras is professor of comparative politics and international relations at the Department of
Political Science and International Relations of the
University of the Peloponnese, Greece. He specializes in North-South relations, international development
assistance, African politics and foreign policy analysis.
His research agenda is interdisciplinary, combining politics, international relations and development
economics, and focuses on Africa and Southeast
Europe. His work on these issues can be found in several peer-reviewed publications (books, articles,
research reports and conference papers). He has a
record of advising the Greek government and other major institutions (NATO, Human Security Network)
on public policy and other subjects. He is the editor of
the Hellenic Political Science Review and vice president of the Governing Board of the Hellenic
Political Science Association.
Dr. Yusuf Mansur
Yusuf Mansur is an advisory committee member at AIESEC and the CEO of EnConsult in Amman,
Jordan. He is specialized in economic consulting in the
areas of policy, trade, antitrust, competitiveness and strategy. In his career, he worked as a CEO for the
Jordan Agency for Economic Development and the
Jordan Investment Board. Within the Jordan Upgrading and Modernization Program, Dr. Mansur worked as an
international industrial upgrading adviser. He has also
engaged with the UNDP where he supervised and coordinated all UNDP activities in Kuwait, and held
the position of DR with the Jordan Telecom Regulatory
Commission. Dr. Mansur received his MBA with honors from the United States International University
and his PhD from the University of Oklahoma.
Prof. Dr. Andrzej Kondratowicz
Andrzej Kondratowicz holds a Ph.D in economics from Warsaw University and an M.A. from State University
of New York. Currently he teaches economics at the
SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw and is a member of the Forecasting Committee
of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He sits on the
boards of the Society of Polish Economists and the
Adam Smith Research Centre in Warsaw. He is a
Polish representative to the World Economic Freedom
Network. His recent research concentrates on theory and measurement of economic freedom, selected
aspects of institutional economics and the public sector,
including good governance, and the SME sector.
Bridging the Gap 050
Mohamed Tamaldou
Mohamed Tamaldou is a member of the Union Constitutionelle from Morocco and a founding member
and former president of the Arab Alliance for Freedom
and Democracy (AAFD, formerly “Network of Arab Liberals”), which comprises of Arab liberal parties and
organizations. Mr. Tamaldou currently serves as vice
president of Liberal International and treasurer of the Arab Center for Scientific Research and Human
Studies in Morocco. He is author of several studies on
the Arab world and has translated a variety of books from French to Arabic.
Sven Speer
Sven Speer is the founding chairman of the Forum Open Religious Policy, an advocacy network
campaigning for the opening of the state to all religions
and secular outlooks. He is a scientific staff member at the German Bundestag focusing on integration and
Islam. He has worked at the Institute for Migration
Research and Intercultural Studies at the University of Osnabrück and the Cluster of Excellence ‘Religion and
Politics’ at the University of Münster. He was a fellow
with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty and with the German Marshall Fund of the United
States in Washington, D.C.
Alexandra Thein, MEP
Alexandra Thein is a German politician and member of
the European Parliament with the Free Democratic
Party of Germany, and a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe parliamentary
faction. She entered politics with her first run for public
office in 2009, when she was elected to the European Parliament. She sits on the European Parliament's
Committee on Legal Affairs as a member, and in the
Committee on Constitutional Affairs as a substitute member. She is a member of the Delegations for
relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council and
with Iraq, and a substitute member of the Delegation for relations with Afghanistan.
Bridging the Gap 052
Dr. Mounir Rached
Mounir Rached is the vice president and a founding member of the Lebanese Economic Association (LEA)
since 2007. Recently he was an economic advisor to
the Ministry of Finance of Lebanon and worked primarily on budgeting and tax evaluation. At LEA he
worked on several projects, including evaluation of the
Paris III reform plan, tax reform, debt management, pension reform, privatization and public sector reform,
trade agreements (WTO in particular). He is a
consultant to several financial institutions as well as regional and international organizations, primarily in
public financial management, policy evaluation, and
financial programming. Between 1983 and 2007, he served at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) where
he focused on the Middle East, Africa and the
Caribbean. He was primarily engaged in country economic analysis, policy evaluation and design of
IMF conditionality. He spent several years at the IMF
Institute for Capacity Building where he was engaged in training and designing training programs in
economic and financial analysis. He also served as IMF
resident representative for Africa and the Caribbean.