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The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour
Richard Breen Lynn Prince Cooke Nuffield College Nuffield College
Oxford OX1 1NF, UK Oxford OX1 1NF, UK
+44 (0) 1865 278 538 phone +44 (0) 1865 280 370 phone
+44 (0) 1865 278 621 fax
[email protected] [email protected]
Total word count (excluding this page): 9,385
December 2004
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The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour
Abstract
Why has the gendered division of domestic labour proved so resistant to change
despite the growth in married womens labour force participation? We develop a
game theoretic model of marriage to show that womens individual levels of relative
economic autonomy are not in themselves sufficient to bring about an aggregate shift
in the division of domestic labour. Using data for 22 countries from the 1994
International Social Survey Programme, we show that what is required is that there
be a greater proportion of economically autonomous women within the society as a
whole, together with a sufficiently large proportion of men who, if faced with an
economically autonomous woman, would rather participate in domestic tasks than
endure marital breakdown. These results suggest that until we see greater gender
material equality for the majority of women in a society and an evolution in mens
gender ideology, the gendered division of domestic labour will persist.
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The Persistence of the Gendered Division of Domestic Labour
Introduction
Womens increasing labour force participation was expected to lead to a
revolution in the gendered division of labour under which men are breadwinners and
women spend their time in unpaid domestic activities, depending on their husband
for economic support. Social exchange, bargaining and contract models predicted
that womens greater labour force participation would enable them to negotiate more
equal sharing of unpaid work (Blau, 1960; Blood and Wolfe, 1960; England and
Farkas, 1986). The revolution in the gendered division of labour, however, stalled at
the door of most households (Hochschild, 1989): while womens labour force
participation continues to rise across countries, the increase in mens share of
domestic work and childcare has been modest, remaining about one third of the time
contribution of women (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001; Gershuny, 2000).
Berk (1985) suggests that the persistence of womens responsibility for the
domestic sphere arises because couples do gender. Couples do gender to
legitimate social arrangements based on gender category (West and Zimmerman,
1987). Hochschild (1989) argues that where mens beliefs about relative gender
power are threatened by wives earning power, couples seek a balance by having the
breadwinning wife do more domestic tasks regardless of the logic of the
pocketbook. Empirical support for this conjecture has been found in the United
States (Brines, 1994) and Australia (Bittman et al., 2003): as wives become the
primary breadwinners, they do more of the domestic tasks to reinforce traditional
gender identities.
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The division of labour is part of the on-going negotiation process of marriage
and can affect marital outcomes. Some models of the family contend that increases
in womens labour force participation result in greater marital instability because of
womens decreasing need for mens economic production (Becker, 1981, 1985) or
increasing competition for occupational status (Parsons, 1953). Empirical evidence
of the direct relationship between womens employment and marital instability,
however, is mixed (Brines and Joyner, 1999; Bumpass, Martin, and Sweet, 1991;
Hoffman and Duncan, 1995; Ruggles, 1997; South, 2001), or effects are contingent
on other factors (Aberg, 2003; Schoen et al., 2002; South and Lloyd, 1995).
In contrast, Oppenheimer (1988, 1997) argues that womens employment is
now desirable for family economic flexibility. Sweeney (2002) found evidence that
employed women in the U.S. are more likely to marry than unemployed women.
Similarly, Moffitt (2000) reports that U.S. marriage rates have been declining at a
faster rate among the least-educated women. In contrast, the greater income
associated with more highly-educated, dual-career couples appears to off-set any
negative effects of more educated womens economic independence (Moffitt, 2000).
An oversight in these analyses of the effects of the changing division of paid
labour on marriage is that none of them controls for possible effects of shifts in the
division of unpaid, domestic labour. More than two decades ago, Huber and Spitze
(1980) found that employed wives thoughts of divorce decrease with husbands
increasing housework contribution. More recent evidence reveals that husbands
greater domestic contribution increases the likelihood of second births in Germany
(Cooke, 2004) and Hungary and Sweden (Olh, 2003). Yet if husbands greater
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domestic participation is beneficial for family outcomes, the question remains of why
we do not see a greater shift in the division of domestic labour.
In this paper we use game theory to model the conditions under which the
aggregate gendered division of domestic labour is expected to change through a
process of marriage selection and differential marital stability. To the best of our
knowledge this is the first sociological application of game theory to family
bargaining, although several economists have applied it in this way (Chen and
Wooley, 2001; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, 1994; Manser and Brown, 1980;
McElroy and Horney, 1981). While most of the paper is devoted to development of
the model, we also include a preliminary empirical test of it using data from the 1994
International Social Survey Programme.
Game Theory and the Family
Although applications of formal game theory to the family are absent from
sociology, there is a sociological tradition of viewing family outcomes as a function
of relative bargaining power. Relative bargaining power is determined by resources
that individuals can call upon within marriage and the attractiveness of possible
alternatives to the marriage. Economic resources are a primary source of bargaining
power (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; Weber, 1958), so the gendered division of labour
reinforces superior male bargaining power within the family (England, 1993).
Because of persistent gender wage differentials (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Blau et al.,
2002), mens relative economic strength is likely to be maintained even when women
are employed. Confining womens activities to the sphere of the home also reduces
their bargaining strength because it increases their investment in marriage-specific
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capital, such as children, that is not readily transportable to a new relationship
(England and Farkas, 1986; England and Kilbourne, 1990). Consequently, the more
extreme the gendered division of labour, the more important maintaining the
marriage is for women than men. This enables men to negotiate solutions more
favorable to themselves in terms of family expenditures, leisure time, and their
assistance with the amount or type of domestic tasks (Blau et al., 2002).
Game theory makes explicit the interdependency of the players in negotiating
the division of labour. Each player has a set of possible strategies, the payoffs to
which depend on the actions taken by all players. The first economic applications of
game theory to the family modeled marriage as a cooperative game in which binding,
costlessly enforceable agreements are possible (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy
and Horney, 1981). In these models the threat point is divorce and it is assumed that
an individuals threat point can change as exogenous factors change (Manser and
Brown, 1980). The family instability resulting from womens labour force
participation predicted by the neoclassical economic and functionalist sociological
models is one solution within this game: as womens economic independence
increases, they are more likely to quit a marriage. Yet this quit only occurs if a
woman is unable to negotiate her own personal best outcome in the family, a process
not modeled within the neoclassical and functionalist theories.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1994) argue that, because there are mutual
benefits, such as shared living economies and enjoyment of children, the threat point
in non-cooperative games is not divorce but a reversion to traditional gender roles.
Men will focus on the breadwinner role, while women will assume responsibility for
the domestic sphere. Without help from her partner, however, this results in an
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under-production of the family goodeither children or a well-maintained home
since women will only take on what they can manage on their own (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1993). This non-cooperative model accounts for the observed decline in
hours spent in housework (Gershuny, 2000) and in fertility as women increase their
labour force participation (see Lehrer and Nerlove, 1986 for a review).
Applications of game theory to the family have for the most part been
theoretical. Empirical tests have assessed the effect of laws (Gray, 1998) or policies
(Phipps and Burton, 1995) on womens labour force participation, and the effect of
transfers on family expenditures (Lundberg et al., 1997). None of these models or
evidence sheds light on why the gendered division of domestic labour is so resistant
to change as womens labour force participation increases over time. To do so, we
apply game theory to the consequences of partner selection for marital decision-
making.
Courtship and the Marriage Game
The marriage market requires decision-making under uncertainty (Beckeret
al., 1977). The greater diversity of possible female (and to a lesser extent, male)
roles has increased the uncertainty, and new characteristics of men and women
become important in determining the quality of a marriage. Until World War II, the
gendered division of labour was the norm, although at best it was an ideal applicable
to white, middle-class households during specific historical periods. Married black
women in the United States and working class women more generally have
historically had high labour force participation rates (Blau et al., 2002; Goldin,
1990). But these transgressions from the norm did not alter widely held beliefs about
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mens and womens ideal-typical roles. Under the male breadwinner norm a mans
potential earnings were a primary consideration in a womans marriage decision.
There is evidence that the rise in wages following World War II induced
more middle-class married women to enter the labour market, but subsequent
generations of women increasingly expect to work as a matter of right (Goldin,
1990). Oppenheimer (1988, 1997) argues that as mens employment has become
more precarious, the desirability of female employment increases. The increasing
desirability of womens employment should in turn increase the likelihood that men
assume more domestic tasks to facilitate this employment, and that women prefer
men who do. Thus, mens willingness to participate in domestic tasks becomes a
new aspect that needs to be ascertained prior to committing to a marriage. Not only
is this information important to women intending to work throughout marriage and
desiring more egalitarian marital roles, but it now also needs to be explicit among
those women and men desiring the traditional gendered division of labour.
We model this uncertainty by assuming that there are three types of men and
of women, defined by their preferences over outcomes shaped by the actions taken
by each in determining the domestic division of labour. The assumption of three
types is surely a simplification, but it accords with Hochschilds (1989) qualitative
groupings and womens relative distribution of preferences for paid versus domestic
work suggested by Hakim (2000). A players type is private information: each
player knows his or her own type and also the distribution in the population of types
of the other gender, but needs to rely on information provided by the potential
partner to determine that persons type. This greater uncertainty means that there is
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more information to be gleaned during the courtship process, but in the game that we
present it is only aftermarriage that a partners true type is revealed.
Figure 1 illustrates the extended form of the game, which shows the choices
facing each player at each move of the game (represented by squares) and the
outcomes of their actions (represented by nodes). Each outcome has a perceived
payoff for the woman and the man. The woman makes the initial decision of whether
to marry (Yes) or not (No). If the woman chooses not to marry she receives payoff
S, for remaining single, and the man receives payoff B, for remaining a bachelor. If
she marries, it is then the husbands move, in that he can participate in domestic tasks
(cooperate), in which case the couple receives the payoff (C,C), or he chooses not to
participate (defect). If the husband defects, then the woman must decide whether to
remain in the marriage (Remain) and accept payoff R, or Divorce and receive payoff
D. The husbands payoffs here are M and P, respectively.
[Figure 1 about here]
The game is an extension of the trust game (e.g. Gibbons, 1997) in which
women take the role of truster. This reflects the fact that women still retain the
primary responsibility for childcare and domestic work in marriage if the man
decides not to participate. In other words, marriage requires that the woman trusts her
husband to cooperate and this, in turn, gives him (the trustee) the option to defect.
Types differ in their ranking of the payoffs. Female types differ in the
relative traditionalism of their gender ideology and their ability to be economically
autonomous. Economic autonomy is shaped by policies affecting womens access to
education and employment, her relative earnings within waged work, public and
private transfers in the event of divorce, and other policies that affect womens
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ability to establish autonomous households (Orloff, 1993). Because of mens
historical high level of labour market participation, their types differ mainly in
gender ideology, although they are also responsive to variations in the costs of
divorce, as shown by Nixons (1997) evidence for the United States that stronger
child support enforcement reduces the incidence of marital breakup.
The first type of woman, Traditional, has the most traditional gender
ideology and would expect to assume the majority of domestic tasks even under
those economic circumstances when she might have to work. She has not invested
heavily in human capital and thus has poor economic alternatives to marriage. Her
payoffs are ranked C>R>S>D: that is, she prefers to remain married to being
divorced or to not marrying regardless of her husbands participation in domestic
tasks.1
The second type of woman, Transitional, has payoffs ordered C>S>R>D. She
has an alternative to marriage but has no outside option once in one. The typical
example of the Transitionaltype, represented by the majority of women since World
War II, is someone who works full-time when single, but after marriage stays at
home with pre-school children, returning to employment, often on a part-time basis,
as the children grow up (Blau et al., 2002; England and Farkas, 1986; Hakim, 2000).
Part-time employment allows a woman to balance family and economic demands
(Blossfeld and Hakim, 1997; Hakim, 2000), but this entails lower investment in
human capital, leaving a woman economically vulnerable in the event of a divorce.
Consequently, once married, if she is employed, she will work the double-shift of
paid and unpaid labour if her husband chooses not to participate because the
alternative of divorce is not economically feasible.
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The third type of woman,Autonomous, has payoffs ranked C>S>D>R. She
has both an alternative to marriage and viable outside options after she marries. She
has the most egalitarian gender ideology and either a career or access to other means
of support that minimize the importance of her partners relative earnings. In
economic termsAutonomous women have the greatest bargaining power among the
three types of women.
Considered as players in an extended trust game, Traditionalwomen must
always trust; Transitionalwomen have the option of not trusting; andAutonomous
women have both this option and an outside option, which can force two of the three
male types discussed below to honour her trust.
The three male types are as follows.Hardliners have preferences ordered
M>B>P>C. They would prefer to see their marriage end in divorce or separation
rather than contribute in any substantive way to domestic work and childcare,
although they prefer not to marry than to marry and separate. They prefer the
traditional division of labour in terms of their own role as sole breadwinner and will
not alter their behaviour even if their female partners find it necessary to work.
Adjusterspreferences are ordered M>C>B>P. They prefer not to do unpaid
domestic work but would rather do so than lose the marital family through divorce.
Thus they will contribute to domestic tasks if the womans outside alternatives to
marriage are sufficiently attractive to threaten divorce. But, as withHardliners, they
prefer not to marry than to marry and ultimately divorce. The third male type,
Cooperator, is comprised of that small proportion whom Hochschild (1989) found
willingly participate fully in unpaid domestic tasks; their preferences are C>M>B>P.
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Given the three types of each gender, if couples knew each others type
before marrying, there would be nine possible subgame perfect equilibria of the
game (shown in Table 1). Traditionalwomen would always marry and remain
married regardless of the mans type; Transitionalwomen would marry
Cooperators, but decline to marryHardliners orAdjusters because both these types
of men defect when paired with a Transitionalwoman; andAutonomous women
have sufficient bargaining power to have cooperative marriages with eitherAdjusters
orCooperators and would never marry aHardliner, because no matter who a
Hardlinermarries, he will always defect.
[Table 1 about here]
Under these subgame perfect equilibria, becauseAutonomous women always
enjoy marriages in which the husband cooperates, an increase in the proportion of
women of this type should lead to an increase in the proportion of all marriages that
are cooperative. This is what the bargaining models predict because they implicitly
assume womens greater economic autonomy results in mens greater participation in
domestic tasks. As the proportion of employed married women continues to
increase, male Cooperators,being preferred by both Transitionaland Autonomous
women, would be more likely to marry than any other type. As noted by Hochschild
(1989), the first child creates a crisis in the division of domestic labour, so it could be
expected that TransitionalandAutonomous women married to Cooperators would
be willing to have more children. If we were to assume that a mans type is inherited
or modeled by his male children (see Chodorow, 1978 or Cunningham, 2001), then
the proportion ofCooperators should be steadily increasing over generations as all
female types would marry and have more children with such men, assuming no other
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differences in fertility among the different pairings. Recent evidence from several
countries suggests that mens greater participation in domestic tasks increases the
likelihood of higher parity births (Cooke, 2004; Olh, 2003). In contrast, as women
gain more economic autonomy and more non-traditional gender ideology, marital
probabilities are lower in pairings with the first two types of men:Hardliners would
marry only Traditionalwomen, who, as Hakim (2000) reports, are only a small
proportion of women in modern industrialized societies, andAdjusters would marry
only TraditionalandAutonomous women.
These outcomes can only occur, however, if there is complete information
about each partners type during courtship. The assumption of complete information
also rules out any possibility of divorce (shown by the absence of any equilibria in
which the womans second move is Quit in response to a mans move of Defect)
because women and men would know which pairings led to divorce and so avoid
them. Consequently, it is more plausible to proceed under the supposition that
information about the other is incomplete at the time of marriage. Thus, the
equilibrium outcomes of the game with incomplete information will depend on the
players mutual beliefs about the others type and the actions they take in the light of
these.
One might argue that couples can discern their partners true type during
courtship, but evidence suggests that considerations of social desirability lead people
to claim a more non-traditional gender ideology that does not translate into more
non-traditional behaviour once married (Press and Townsley, 1998).2 In addition,
Hochschild (1989) noted that the crisis in the family division of labour occurs after
the birth of the first child, regardless of what each partner believed about the extent
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of the others egalitarian gender ideology beforehand. Cohabitation also does not
appear to provide reliable information as to true types: evidence suggests that the
division of domestic tasks is different among cohabitors than among married couples
(Brines and Joyner, 1999), and that persons who cohabit prior to marriage are more
likely to divorce (Berrington and Diamond, 1999; Lillard et al., 1995; Santow and
Bracher, 1994). Consequently, the model we develop assumes that neither men nor
women know the true type of the person they are playing against at the time of the
decision to marry. 3
The distribution of male types,Hardliner, Adjusterand Cooperator, in the
population is indexed by 1, 2, 3 and female types (Traditional, Transitionaland
Autonomous) by 1, 2, 3. These distributions, and, are known to individuals
because they reflect the normative gender role behaviours within the culture,
reinforced through media representations and the shared experiences of others.
Consequently, when a woman meets a man, she assigns an initial probability of
1that he is aHardliner, 2 that he is anAdjusterand 3 (=112) that he is a
Cooperator. The man similarly assigns initial probabilities 1, 2, 3 as to which type
of woman he is facing.
To find the games equilibria we make two assumptions: the first is that the
probability of a Transitionalwoman marrying is never greater than the probability
for anAutonomous woman. A Transitionalwoman will prefer to marry (play Yes
rather than No) given thatAdjustermen Cooperate rather than Defect, and that the
expected payoff from Yes exceeds the payoff from No: that is,
SCR >++ )( 321 . (1a)
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Likewise, anAutonomous woman will prefer Yes to No given thatAdjustermen
Cooperate rather than Defect and that
SCD >++ )( 321 . (1b)
So our first assumption could be interpreted as saying that the payoff to an
Autonomous woman from divorce is as big or bigger than the payoff to a
Transitionalwoman from remaining in an uncooperative marriage, given that all
other payoffs do not differ between them.
The second assumption is that, as reported by Hochschild (1989), the
proportion ofCooperatormen is sufficiently small so that neitherTransitionalnor
Autonomous women will marry if noAdjustermen will cooperate. The assumption is
that the equivalent conditions to 1a and 1b that arise when allAdjusters defect are
never met. For example, forAutonomous women this means that the expected payoff
to Yes when anAdjusterdefects is less than the payoff to No:
SCD .
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The actions ofTransitionalandAutonomous women will depend upon the
actions of the maleAdjusters and their share in the male population, while the actions
ofAdjusters depend on the proportion ofAutonomous women and on the actions of
Autonomous and Transitionalwomen. AnAdjusterwill prefer to cooperate when
faced with anAutonomous woman but defect when faced by any other female type,
but his beliefs about the distribution of possible types he is facing will depend on the
initial belief distribution, , and on the actions taken by women, in the light of which
he updates his beliefs using Bayess rule. These updated beliefs concern the
probability distribution of female types who have played Yes in other words, the
distribution of possible types a man has married (we denote this distribution Y).
AnAdjusterwill cooperate ifY3 is sufficiently large and defect otherwise.
But given that, in equilibrium, men know the actions taken by all types of woman, Y
is wholly determined by the initial distribution, . In particular, Y
3 > 3 when
Autonomous women marry but Transitionals do not; Y3 = 3 when both marry; and
Y3 =0 when neither marry. Thus when onlyAutonomous (and Traditional) women
marry, anAdjusterwill prefer to cooperate if ~
3 . If all women marry he will
prefer to cooperate if 3 . If only Traditionalwomen marry thenAdjustermen
will always defect. The two threshold beliefs forAdjusters are thus~
, the minimum
proportion ofAutonomous women in the population sufficient to makeAdjustermen
cooperate when onlyAutonomous (and Traditional) women marry; and , the
minimum proportion ofAutonomous women in the population sufficient to make
Adjustermen cooperate whenAutonomous and Transitional(and Traditional)
women marry. It follows that ~ > .
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The resulting equilibria of the marriage game are shown in Figure 2. Which
equilibria can be reached depends on the initial distributions ofAdjustermen and
Autonomous women.
(1) For all combinations of and there is an equilibrium in which only
Traditionalwomen will marry andAdjustermen will defect (this is the N,N;d
equilibrium shown in Figure 2).
(2) Given a share ofAdjustermen,TA
222
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ofAutonomous women for which anAdjusteris indifferent between cooperating and
defecting, and, given an initial belief ~
3
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An increasing proportion of Autonomous women will be associated withgreater male participation in domestic tasks only given a sufficiently large
proportion of Adjuster men. This implies a significant interaction effectbetween the proportion of Autonomous women and the proportion of Adjuster
men in a society.
This hypothesis will be tested using data from the 1994 International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP).4
Data and Measures
We use data from the module on Family and Changing Gender Roles that
was fielded in the 1994 ISSP.5 Because our hypothesis concerns observed country
differences in the division of domestic tasks, the individual data reported by married
or cohabiting6
women and men in each of 22 countries are used to construct national
aggregated measures. A scale of who in the household is responsible for domestic
tasks is regressed on the distribution of gender types within the country using
ordinary least squares regression.
Dependent Variable: A Scale of Domestic Responsibility
The scale measuring couples relative responsibility for domestic tasks is
derived from questions on who is normally responsible for: 1) caring for the sick, 2)
doing laundry, 3) doing the grocery shopping, 4) deciding what to have for dinner,
and 5) doing small repairs (reverse coded). In a traditional division of domestic
labour, the women would always do the first four tasks and the man would always do
small repairs.7
Factor analysis (results available from authors) reveals high loadings
on a single factor for all but the fifth item. Consequently, the domestic responsibility
scale is created by summing responses across the four dominantly female tasks and
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dividing by four, resulting in a scale ranging from 1, a traditional division of unpaid
labour where the woman is always responsible for the tasks, to 5, a non-traditional
division where the man is always responsible. Cronbachs (1951) alpha is between
0.50 and 0.59 in Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Israel, Russia and Slovenia;
between 0.60 and 0.69 in Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland,
Sweden and West Germany; and 0.70 and above in Australia, Canada, Great Britain,
Ireland and Northern Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States.
Womens rather than mens, reports of the division of domestic responsibility are
used because they have been found to be more accurate given that women tend to
perform most of the tasks (Berk and Shih, 1980; Press and Townsley, 1998).
Independent Variables
The ISSP survey contains numerous questions on gender and family attitudes
with which to construct female and male types based on ideology (see Table 2). We
first attempted to construct a factor score for gender types, but the same questions did
not always load on the same factors across the countries. Further, as argued in detail
by Braun et al. (1994), the interpretation of individual questions pertaining to
children also varies across cultural contexts. One question, however, assesses the
extent to which respondents support a normative notion of a gendered division of
labour: A mans job is to earn money; a womans job is to look after the home and
family. Possible responses are on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, strongly
agree, reflecting the most traditional gender ideology, to 5, strongly disagree.
[Table 2 about here]
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We categorize individuals based on their responses to this question.
Hardlinermen and Traditionalwomen either agree or strongly agree with the
statement;Adjustermen and Transitionalwomen are either neutral or somewhat
disagree; andAutonomous women and Cooperatormen strongly disagree with the
statement. The grouping of disagreement with traditional norms together with neutral
responses reflects that reported attitudes might shift ahead of behaviour (Press and
Townsley, 1998). An interaction term is computed by multiplying the percentage of
Autonomous women in a country by the percentage ofAdjustermen. This
interaction is expected to predict the greatest shift in the division of domestic
responsibility.
The marriage game dynamics are predicted to hold across capitalist countries,
but there is ambiguity as to whether they hold within transitional economies. In
formerly state socialist economies all adults were expected to be part of the labour
force, yet the wage structure was such that it is doubtful whether either gender could
be economically autonomous. This could affect marital bargaining and so we include
a control variable for formerly state socialist countries.
Results
The distribution of gender types by country is presented in Table 3. On
average, in each country a third of men areHardliners, less than a third of women
are Traditional; roughly half areAdjustermen orTransitionalwomen; and the mean
percentage ofCooperatormen is just 17 percent, similar to Hochschilds (1989)
estimate based on her qualitative data. The mean proportion ofAutonomous women
is one-quarter.
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[Table 3 about here]
Regression results are presented in Table 4. The top panel presents results of
the tests of our hypothesis; the bottom panel presents the same analyses but replacing
Adjusters with Cooperatormen. According to our model, the size of this group
should be unrelated to the distribution of the division of domestic responsibility. The
first model predicts womens reports of the division of domestic labour as a function
of the control variable for former state socialist economies and the percentage of
Autonomous women. It explains very little variance in the reported division of
domestic tasks and the coefficient for the percentage ofAutonomous women, while
statistically significant, is substantively quite small, with a single percentage point
change predicting just a 0.01 shift along the five-point scale of domestic
responsibility.
The second model in the top panel includes the percentage ofAdjustermen
and explains substantially more variation in mens domestic responsibility. As
expected, increases in both the percentage ofAutonomous women and ofAdjuster
men are associated with a more equal division of domestic work, though the
coefficient for the former is now even smaller and does not reach statistical
significance.
[Table 4 about here]
The interaction term ofAdjuster*Autonomous in the third model in the top
half of the table predicts a significant shift in the division of domestic responsibility,
providing clear support for our hypothesis. Furthermore, once the interaction term is
included, the main effect of the percentage ofAutonomous women becomes
significantly negative. The results imply that if the share ofAdjustermen is greater
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than about 47 percent (slightly below the mean for our sample), an increase in the
percentage ofAutonomous women will lead to a more egalitarian domestic division
of labour, but below this threshold an increase in the percentage ofAutonomous
women results in a reporting of a more traditional division of domestic labour. By
contrast, the models reported in the lower part of Table 4, in which the share of
Cooperatormen is used in place of the share ofAdjusters, fare very poorly, with
none of the explanatory variables reaching statistical significance.
Conclusion
We have proposed a game theoretic model of marriage to explain the slow
observed reduction in the gendered division of domestic labour despite womens
rising labour force participation. As argued by Oppenheimer (1988, 1997), gender
specialization is no longer an optimal family strategy in an era of flexible labour
markets. As a result, employment, not domesticity, is an increasingly desired female
attribute in the marriage market (Sweeney, 2002). But the shift away from a rigid
gendered division of labour adds additional uncertainty into the marriage market
because women and men no longer possess common knowledge about expected roles
in marriage. We capture this new uncertainty in the marriage game by mens and
womens lack of knowledge about the type of partner they are facing during
courtship.
Under the resulting model, the proportion of marriages in which men
contribute to domestic work may increase as the proportion ofAutonomous women
increases, but this effect is contingent on the share of maleAdjusters in the
population. Thus, to realize an aggregate change in the division of domestic labour,
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23
both a greater proportion of women within a society must beAutonomous so that
they can credibly threaten divorce in the face of a non-cooperating man, and a greater
proportion of men must have a sufficiently non-traditional gender ideology to prefer
domestic participation over divorce.
We have not investigated the mechanisms by which the distributions of types
of men and women in a country change, or whether individuals change their type
during their lifetime, although these are both areas worthy of future investigation. It
is reasonable to assume that an increase inAutonomous women is driven by
exogenous processes that will be reflected in their gender ideology. This is evident
here in that women in all countries, on average, report more non-traditional gender
attitudes than men. But possible mechanisms for change among men is less obvious,
particularly since the opportunities and constraints on mens labour force
participation have changed much less than those on womens. Bianchi and her
colleagues (2000) found that womens declining time contribution to domestic tasks
since the 1960s was in large part due to compositional changes brought on by
employment outside the home, delayed marriage and reduced fertility. In contrast,
only a small proportion of mens modest increase in domestic time contribution can
be attributed to similar factors.
Future research might also explore under what circumstances Lundberg and
Pollaks (1993) assertion holds regarding reduced fertility as the initial threat point in
family bargaining. It is possible that policy shapes whether divorce or fertility is the
viable threat point for women. When faced with a non-cooperating partner, women
in countries with strong policy support for the male breadwinner model can only
reduce fertility within marriage, compared with women in countries with better
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24
access to market or state resources that enable greater economic autonomy and give
credibility to a threat of divorce. Analyzing these dynamics requires having panel
data for a wide range of countries representing a range of policy contexts.
Appendix
Here we discuss other equilibria that arise when some degree of separation of
signals of type is possible. We assume that men and women try to signal their type
(truthfully or not) to their potential partner before the marriage game begins and we
model their attempts to do so by simultaneous signaling, after which they update
their beliefs and the woman then makes the decision of whether to marry or not.
Which types have an incentive to signal falsely? Among men, Cooperators
have no such incentive. They have a dominant strategy of always cooperating in the
marriage game and so women of all three types would play Yes when faced with a
Cooperator.Adjusters always have an incentive to try to appear to be Cooperators
because this will induce Transitionalwomen (who would not knowingly marry an
Adjuster) to marry them.Hardliners will have an incentive to pose as Cooperators
(though not asAdjusters) under certain conditions. They always defect, and this will
yield them their most-preferred outcome ifTraditionalorTransitionalwomen play
Yes, but, when faced with anAutonomous woman, they would do better if she played
No. TransitionalandAutonomous women will not marry aHardlinerbut will marry
a Cooperator, and so aHardlinershould signal that he is a Cooperatorif
BM
PB
>
)(32
In words, he should signal that he is a Cooperatorprovided that the share of
Transitionalwomen is large enough to induce him to take the risk of sending the
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25
wrong signal to anAutonomous woman. Among women, Transitionals have an
incentive to appear to beAutonomous, since this would yield them cooperative
marriages withAdjustermen (which they otherwise would not have). Traditional
women also have an incentive to signal that they areAutonomous for the same
reason, provided that we take their payoffs as C>R>S>D. However if, as noted in an
earlier footnote, their payoffs were R>C>S>D then they would have no such
incentive.
Fortunately, whether or not Traditionalwomen andHardlinermen signal
that they are, respectively,Autonomous and Cooperators, makes no difference to the
qualitative features of the equilibria of the marriage game. If men can discern
Traditionalwomen and women can spotHardlinermen, this simply shifts downward
the threshold initial beliefs shown in Figure 2 which determine the actions of the
other four types. Since beliefs are updated after signaling using Bayess rule, a signal
that distinguishes Traditionalwomen (but not the other types) will lead a man to the
belief that the non-Traditionalwoman he is facing isAutonomous with probability
3/(2+3), compared with 3 in the absence of signaling. Likewise, a womans belief
about the probability that she is facing anAdjusterwill be higher than her initial
belief if, after signaling, she knows for certain that she is not facing aHardliner.8
The upshot of this is that the thresholds shown in Figure 2 can be reached with lower
initial beliefs, 2 and 3.
In the text we showed the equilibria of the game under two assumptions
about signaling: mutual separation (MS) in which everyone knows the type of the
person they face (the results of which are shown in Table 1) and mutual pooling
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26
(MP) in which there are no reliable signals of type. Now we turn to equilibria of the
game under two other assumptions about signaling.
(i) Male Pooling Female Separating (MPFS). Here the man knows the womans type
but not vice versa (with the possible exception thatHardlinermen can be identified).
In this case, a Transitionalwoman will always play No and anAutonomous woman
will play Yes ifA
22 . So in this case there are two equilibria: in one (which
holds for any values ofand) only Traditionalwomen marry,Hardliners and
Adjusters defect and Cooperators cooperate; in the other equilibrium, (which can
occur when A22 ) TraditionalandAutonomous women marry,Hardliners
always defect, Cooperators always cooperate andAdjusters defect or cooperate
depending on whether they marry a Traditionalor anAutonomous woman.
(ii) Female Pooling Male Separating (FPMS). Here the woman knows the mans type
but not vice versa (with the possible exception that Traditionalwomen can be
identified). The equilibria here are those shown on the top row of Figure 2. They
depend on mens beliefs about the proportion ofAutonomous women because this
determines the actions ofAdjustermen.
These different signaling scenarios carry consequences for the proportion of
cooperative marriages and the trend in the domestic division of labor that differ from
those arising from our preferred scenario, MP. Under MPFS the proportion of
cooperative marriages is increasing in the share ofAdjustermen, while under FPMS
it is increasing in the share ofAutonomous women. But in our analyses we saw that
there is a significant interaction effect between these two which is not predicted by
either MPFS or FPMS but which does follow from MP.
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27
Notes
1. A Traditionalwomans preferences might be ordered R ~C>S>D or even
R>C>S>D inasmuch as she actively prefers to have greater responsibility for
domestic duties as shown by Greensteins (1996) evidence that women with the most
traditional gender ideology perform more domestic tasks regardless of their
husbands gender ideology, and Allen and Hawkinss (1999) evidence that a
proportion of women act as gatekeepers to their husbands involvement in domestic
tasks.
2. One might also argue that it is easier for men to assess a womans type since
policies and her education and employment are known early in courtship, whereas a
woman can only infer a mans ideology. Yet as Hakim (2000) has argued, highly
educated women with the potential for high earnings may in fact prefer to remain at
home. In this circumstance, the man may incorrectly conclude that a highly-
educated woman isAutonomous when she is in fact Traditionalin her preferences.
3. But in the appendix we investigate the equilibria of the game under the
assumptions that one sex knows the type of members of the other.
4. Given the multiple equilibria in some of the cells of Figure 2 it is possible that, in
a given country, we would observe no change in the proportion of marriages in
which men co-operate, even if the shares ofAdjusters andAutonomous women
increased: but provided that this does not hold true of all countries, then a cross-
sectional comparison of the type we perform here should demonstrate the
relationships described in the hypothesis.
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28
5. More information on the ISSP, including codebooks, is available at
http://www.issp.org. A module on this same topic was also fielded in the 1988 ISSP
but it did not include questions about responsibility for domestic tasks.
6. The ISSP does not distinguish between whether people are legally married or
living as married.
7. One response category was tasks done by third person, although it was unclear
if this was hired assistance or other family members. Further, only 1 percent of
respondents answered in this way, so this category was recoded as missing.
8. By Bayess rule we have that the probability that the man is anAdjuster(adj for
short) given that he does not signal that he is aHardliner(ns for short) is equal to:
2
32
2
)(~)|~()()|(
)()|(
>
+=
+
adjpradjnspradjpradjnspr
adjpradjnspr
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Diego Gambetta, Shelly Lundberg, Valerie Kincaid
Oppenheimer, Daniel Verdier, participants at a seminar at the Centro de Estudios
Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March, Madrid on October 30, 2002,
and, particularly, Margaret Meyer for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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29
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Figure 1
The Marriage Game
marry?W
(S,B)
H
(C,C)
W
(D,P)
(R,M)W= wife's moveH= husband's move
Cooperate
Defect Divorce
No
Yes
Remain
Male Types:
1:Hardliner: M > B > P > C -- always defects
2:Adjuster: M > C > B > P
3: Cooperator: C > M > B > P -- always cooperates
Female Types:
1: Traditional: C > R > S >D -- always plays Yes; remains in marriage
2: Transitional: C > S > R >D -- always remains in marriage
3:Autonomous: C > S > D >R -- always plays Yes
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Table 1
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, with Complete Information
Player Movesa
(Wifes First/Wifes Second; Husbands)
Male types and probabilitiesFemale types and
probabilities Hardliner1 Adjuster2 Cooperator3
Traditional1 YS;d YS;d YS;c
Transitional2 NS;d NS;d YS;c
Autonomous 3 NQ;d YQ;c YQ;c
Notation:
Womens Possible Moves:Move 1 Move 2Y= Marry S=Stay in the marriage N= Not Marry Q=Quit the marriage
Mens Possible Moves:d= Defect (no help)
c=Cooperate (help)
a. The notation includes both the expected moves and moves off the equilibrium path. For example,
anAutonomous
woman is not expected to marry aHardliner
man (N). Were she to go off theequilibrium path, however, and do so, he would defect (d) and she would subsequently quit (Q)
the marriage.
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35
A2 = minimum proportion ofAdjustermen in the population sufficient to make
Autonomous women prefer to marry, when allAdjusters cooperate
T2 = minimum proportion ofAdjustermen in the population sufficient to makeTransitionalwomen prefer to marry, when allAdjusters cooperate
~
= The minimum proportion ofAutonomous women in the population sufficient
tomakeAdjusters cooperate when just TraditionalandAutonomous women
marry.^
= The minimum proportion ofAutonomous women in the population sufficient
tomakeAdjusters cooperate when all three female types marry.
Figure 2
Equilibria of the Marriage Game
For Transitional and Autonomous Women and Adjuster Men
N,N;d
N,N,:d
p,Y;r
N,q:r
N,N,d
Y,Y;c
N,q;r
N,N;dN,N;d
N,Y;c
N,q:r
N,N;d
N,Y;c
N,q;r
N,N;d N,N;d N,N;d
~
^
Womans
initial belief
about
proportion
of
Adjuster
men
Mans initial belief
about proportion of
Autonomous women
Note: The equilibria are Transitionalwomans First Move,Autonomous WomansFirst Move;AdjusterMans Move.
The moves ofTraditionalWomen and ofHardlinerand Cooperatormen arenot reported (these are always Y, d, c, respectively).
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, p is the probability than a Transitionalwoman plays Y, q is the probability that anAutonomous woman plays Y, and
r is the probability than anAdjusterplays c.
2
2
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36
Table 2
1994 ISSP Attitude Questions Pertaining to the Gendered Division of Labour
1. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship withher children as a mother who does not work. (R)2. A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.3. All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.4. A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children.5. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.6. Most women have to work these days to support their families. (R)7. Both the man and woman should contribute to the household income. (R)8. A mans job is to earn money; a womans job is to look after the home and
family.
9. It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for and the woman goes outto work.
10.Women should stay at home full-time when there is a child under school age(3-point scale: home full-time, work part-time, work full-time).
11.Work is best for womens independence. (R)Note: (R) indicates reverse coding so that a higher score reflects more non-traditional
attitudes.
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37
Table3
PercentageDistrib
utionofGenderTypesAcrossCountries
MarriedorC
ohabitingIndividuals,Age1
8-65
WOMENSTYPES
MENSTYPES
Traditional
Transitional
Autonomous
Hardliner
Adjuster
Cooperator
Australia
17%
51%
31%
25%
57%
18%
Austria
35
37
27
39
45
16
Bulgaria
62
26
11
62
27
11
Canada
7
48
45
9
55
36
CzechRepublic
48
42
9
54
40
6
EastGermany
8
52
40
9
63
28
GreatBritain
17
59
23
22
61
17
Hungary
47
44
9
55
38
7
Ireland
23
52
25
31
51
17
Israel
19
54
27
27
54
20
Italy
25
50
25
34
50
16
Japan
29
36
35
40
35
26
Netherlands
12
62
26
17
63
20
NewZealand
16
55
28
20
60
20
NorthernIreland
20
57
23
16
67
16
Norway
10
49
41
13
61
26
Poland
55
42
3
69
28
2
Russia
64
34
2
68
30
1
Slovenia
33
53
14
39
54
8
Sweden
8
46
46
10
59
30
USA
12
58
29
23
58
17
WestGermany
25
48
26
36
50
14
Note:Percentagesmay
nottotalto100duetorounding.
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38
Table4
OLSUnsta
ndardizedCoefficientsPredicting(WomensReportsof)M
ensParticipationinDomes
ticTasks
(1,womanalway
sresponsible,to5,manalwaysresponsible)
22Countries1994
MODEL1
MODE
L2
MODE
L3
b
SE
b
SE
b
SE
Constant
1.673***0.147
1.267***
0.216
2.302***
0.318
Formersocialistcountry
0.185
0.119
0.253*
0.111
0.061
0.098
PercentAutonom
ouswomen
0.010*
0.005
0.005
0.005
-0.044**
0.013
PercentAdjustermen
0.010*
0.004
-0.011
0.006
Autonomous*Ad
juster
0.094***
0.025
Fchange
2.3
1
5.6
0*
14.3
4***
AdjustedR2
0.1
1
0.2
8
0.5
9
MODE
L2
MODE
L3
b
SE
b
SE
Constant
1.662***
0.153
1.818***
0.257
Formersocialistcountry
0.194
0.124
0.130
0.152
PercentAutonom
ouswomen
0.015
0.015
0.011
0.017
PercentCooperatormen
-0.007
0.020
-0.019
0.026
Autonomous*Cooperator
0.032
0.043
Fchange
1.5
1
1.2
5
AdjustedR2
0.0
7
0.0
5
*p