Pamela Barnett, Pro se Plaintiff 121 5 22" St., Apt. B Sacramento, CA, 9581 6 Telephone: (41 5)846-7 1 70 Pb-realestate@yahoo.com CLERK. U.S. DISTRICTCOURT EASTERN DISTRICTOF CALIFORNIA BY DEPU'Y CLEi i K IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA X PAMELA BARNETT, Plaintiff, Civil CASE: 10-cv-02216-FCD-DAD v. (KJM) DAMON JERRELL DUNN, et al., Defendants. JUDICIAL NOTICE PENDING THE COURT'S DECISION IN RE: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST THAT THEY DO NOT VERIFY CITIZENSHIP OF CALIFORNIA VOTER AFFIANTS, EAC's VOTER REGISTRATION FORM WHICH BREAKS CALIFORNIA ELECTION, HAVA AND NVRA LAWS, MEMORANDUM FROM SOS TO ALL CA COUNTY REGISTRARS WHICH SANCTIONS CA ELECTION LAW BREAKING, FBI FINDINGS OF PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF VOTERIELECTION FRAUD DURING THE 2002 ELECTION FOR THE 3om ASSEMBLY DISTRICT WHICH INCLUDES NON-CITIZEN AND MULTIPLE VOTERS I, Pamela Bamett, declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s1746: 1. Declarant 1 Plaintiff in esse is pro se herein without being an attorney. Based on information and belief the Plaintiff asserts the following for judicial notice. SOS ADMITS AGAINST INTEREST THAT THEY AND THE COUNTY REGISTRARS DO NOT VERIFY THAT VOTER AFFIANTS (APPLICANTS) ARE LEGAL CITIZENS 2. After researching the California Secretary of State's procedures for verifying voter affiant data, plaintiff confirmed that neither the Secretary of State's office Judicial Notice: SOS Failure to Check Voter Citizenship, EAC Voter Application, SOS Memo and FBI Investigation, Page 1 of 9 JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page2of9noranyofthecountryregistrarsverifythatthevoteraffiantisalegalU.S.citizen. 1PlaintiffusedtheBrennanCenterforJustice,MakingtheList:DatabaseMatching 2andVerificationProcessesforVoterRegistration,(California)reportpublishedin 32006forabasisofherdetermination.(seeExhibit1)TheBrennanInstitutefor 4justiceconductedastudyofvoterregistrationdatabaseimplementationunderthe 5newrequirementsofHelpAmericaVoteAct.Brennanalsosentaquestionnaire 6toeachstatesheadelectionofficial.OnMay4,2011,plaintiffverifiedher 7conclusionwithaSecretaryofStateOfficeemployeeCathyIngrahamKelley. 8Sheconfirmedthatneitherthecountyregistrarsnorthesecretaryofstatesoffice 9verifiescitizenshipofvoteraffiants(applicants).ShestatedthattheSOSrelied 10ontheswornstatementoftheaffiantandtreatedtheissueofcitizenshiplikea 11rebuttablepresumption.Afterspendinghundredsofmillionsoffederal(USDOJ 12Source)andCaliforniastatetaxdollarstobuildvoterdatabasestosafeguardthe 13integrityofvoterregistrationsunderHelpAmericaVoteAct,Californiaunderthe 14guidanceofDebraBowenfailedtoensurethatthecitizenshipinformationonthe 15CaliforniaDrivers/Identificationand/orSocialSecurityrecordsdatabaseswas 16cross-checkedwiththestatevoterdatabases.AccordingtotheCaliforniasection 17ofthereportpageCA-2,thestateofCaliforniaonlyverifiesIdentifyingNumber, 18firstname,lastname,anddateofbirth.CaliforniadoesNOTverifycitizenship 19informationorplaceofbirth. 20Directlyfromreport-Whatfieldsfromthevoterregistrationformwillthestate 21seektomatchtomotorvehicleorSocialSecurityrecords?Indentifyingnumber, 22firstname,lastname,anddateofbirth. 23 24JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page3of9Bowenignoresvaluablecitizenverifyinginformationdatafieldsonthe 1CaliforniaDepartmentofMotorVehicles.CaliforniaDMVdoesnotpointedlyask 2whetherornottheyareacitizen(seeExhibit2),buttheyaskinBlock3inthe 3DriverLicenseOrIdentificationCardApplicationtocompletethissectiononlyif 4youARENOTeligibleforaSocialSecurityNumber.Anapplicantattestingthat 5theyARENOTELIGIBLEwouldberuledoutasnon-citizens(becauseallU.S. 6citizensareentitledtoaSocialSecurityNumber).However,somenon-citizens 7likePermanentResidentaliens,receiveSocialSecurityNumbersandSocial 8SecuritybenefitswithouteverbeingaU.S.citizen.Block2asksforStateor 9CountryfortheIDnumber.Thisfieldwouldalsohighlightnon-citizens.Finally, 10intheupperrightcorneroftheformintheForDMVUseOnlybox,theDMV 11employeewritesinanBD/LPCode,LPstandsforlegalproof.Inthisboxis 12alsoasksfortheState/CountryofidentificationPrimaryDocument. 13TheCADMVstatesonitswebsiteTheissueofidentificationreliability, 14integrity,andconfidentialityisofprimconcerntoallcitizens.Eligibilityfor 15governmentservices,issuanceofvariouslicenses,assessmentoftaxes,theright 16tovote,etc.,arealldeterminedthroughevaluationsbasedonidentification 17documents.Itiscriticalthatidentificationdocumentsbeauthenticatedand 18accurateinidentifyingeachindividual.(seeExhibit3)Plaintiffcontinuestolook 19forwhatinformationfieldsareavailableontheotherstateandfederaldatabases 20theSOSandregistrarscoulduseforcross-checks. 21Bowencouldhavecheckedthesefieldswithherdatabasecross-checkbut 22failedtodoso. 23Bowensvoterregistrationprocessanddatabasecrosscheckfailstoeliminate 24non-citizensfromthevoterrollsbynotvalidatingcitizenshipofapplicant.Non- 25citizensobtaindriverslicensesandsocialsecuritynumbers. 26 27Further,thisisanotherexampleoftheElectionAssistanceCommissions 28failuretooverseeandsafeguardtheCaliforniastatevoterregistrationdatabases 29fromfraudulentnon-citizenvoterregistrations.BoththeStateofCaliforniaand 30JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page4of9theEACfailtoprotectcitizensuffragerightsbyallowingaccesstovoter 1registrationbynon-citizens. 2 3CAandEACUSEVOTERREGISTRATIONFORMTHATBREAKSNVRAANDHAVA 4LAWSBYNOTASKINGVOTERAFFIANTFORPLACEOFBIRTHORIFAFFIANTIS 5CURRENTLYREGISTEREDTOVOTE 6 7Anotherexampleofgrossnegligenceorevenworse,theintentionalunderminingof 8onecitizen,onevote,isthestateofCaliforniaandtheEACuseofavoterregistration 9formthatbreaksthelawandencouragesnon-citizenandmultiplevoting.Accordingto 10theNationalVoterRegistrationAct(NVRA)42USC1973gg(3)andHAVAthemeasure 11ofcompliancebyregistrationisthecompellingstateinterestasifanapplicantwerealso 12obtainingadriverslicenseinthedomiciliarystate,andtowhichtheNationalMailVoter 13RegistrationForm(NMVRF)failstorequireanapplicantsplaceofbirth(whichhelps 14electionofficialstoascertaininformationvalidityincludingcitizenshipstatusinkeeping 15withthepreemptorynatureofFederallaw)andwhetherthevoterregistranthas 16registeredbeforeandifsowhere?(whichhelpselectionofficialstoeliminateelection 17fraudthroughduplicateregistrations).CaliforniaSecretaryofStateDebraBowenmakes 18availableonherCASOSwebsitetheNMVRFtobeusedbylegalresidentsofCalifornia 19foractualvoterregistrationsinallcounties.(seeExhibit4)Affiantsstateorcountryof 20birthinformationisrequiredinformationunderCaliforniaElectionCode2150, 21Subsection6andpriorvoterregistrationinformationisrequiredunderCEC2150, 22Subsection10whichstates-Apriorregistrationportionindicatingwhethertheaffiant 23hasbeenregisteredatanotheraddress,underanothername,oraspreferringanother 24party.Iftheaffianthasbeensoregistered,heorsheshallgiveanadditionalstatement 25givingthataddress,name,orparty. 26JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page5of9Leadinguptothe2010CAgeneralelection,theSanDiegoCountyRegistrarsent 1correspondenceaskingforplaceofbirthinformationtoaffiantsthatsubmittedthe 2NMVRFforprocessing.(seeExhibit5CountyRegistrarLetter)ThishascostSan 3DiegoCountyanuntoldamountofmoneytocorrectaproblemthattheEACand 4SecretaryofStateDebraBowenhavecaused.Thishasalsocaused 5disenfranchisementofatleastSanDiegocountyvoters,hasevenworseopenedupthe 6doortonon-citizenvoters,andweakenedthevoteforalllegalcitizenvotersof 7California.Plaintiffdoesnotknowifanyoftheothercountyregistrarsattemptedto 8correcttheproblemthattheEACandBowenhavecaused. 9 10SOSBOWENADMITSINMEMORANDUM#09173THATTHENATIONALMAIL 11VOTERREGISTRATIONFORMBREAKSCALIFORNIALAW,BUTFAILSTO 12ADDRESSTHATITALSOBREAKSFEDERALLAWUNDERTHENVRA 13 14InSOSMemorandum#09173,SOSBowenadmitsthattheNationalMailVoter 15RegistrationFormbreaksCaliforniaElectionCode2150,Subsection6,whichrequires 16applicanttoincludestateorcountryofbirth,butfailstoaddressthatitalsobreaks 17federalNVRAandHAVAlaws.(seeExhibit6)Evenso,Bowensanctionsitsuse. 18AccordingtotheNationalVoterRegistrationAct(NVRA)42USC1973gg(3)andHAVA 19themeasureofcompliancebyregistrationisthecompellingstateinterestasifan 20applicantwerealsoobtainingadriverslicenseinthedomiciliarystate,andtowhichthe 21NationalMailVoterRegistrationForm(NMVRF)failstorequireanapplicantsplaceof 22birth(whichhelpselectionofficialstoascertaininformationvalidityincludingcitizenship 23statusinkeepingwiththepreemptorynatureofFederallaw).Bowenalsofailsto 24acknowledgethattheNationalFormalsobreaksCEC,Subsection10thatrequiresthat 25JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page6of9therebeapriorregistrationportionindicatingwhethertheaffianthasbeenregisteredat 1anotheraddress,underanothername,oraspreferringanotherparty.Iftheaffianthas 2beensoregistered,heorsheshallgiveanadditionalstatementgivingthataddress, 3name,orparty. 4SOSofficestatesthefollowing: 5 6AcceptingtheNationalForm:ElectionOfficialsDoNotNeedtoDetermineRegistrants 7Countryorstateofbirth(ifbornintheU.S.)orcountryofbirth(ifbornoutsideofthe 8U.S.) 9Thisrequirementcanbefoundintwoplaces: 10ElectionsCodesection2150(a)(6),whichstatesinpart: 11(a) Theaffidavitofregistrationshallshow: 12(6)Thestateorcountryoftheaffiantsbirth. 13ElectionsCodesection2157whichstatesinpart: 14(a) Subjecttothischapter,theaffidavitofregistrationshallbeina 15formprescribedbyregulationsadoptedbySecretaryofState. 16Theaffidavitshall: 17(ContaintheinformationprescribedinSection2150. 18However,therequirementthatapersonprovidethisinformationtoregister 19tovoteonlyappliestosomeoneregisteringtovoteusingthestatevoter 20registrationformthatisdevelopedpursuanttostatelawandregulation. 21StatelawdoesnotrequireapersonusingtheNationalFormtoprovide 22anyadditionalinformationbeyondwhatiscontainedonthenationalForm 23inordertoregister. 24 25TherequirementthatstateandlocalelectionsofficialsaccepttheNational 26Formfromanypersonapplyingtoregistertovotecanbefoundinthe 27NationalVoterRegistrationAct(NVRA)42U.S.C.Sec.1973gg-4(a) 28whichreadsinpart: 29JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page7of9(1) EachStateshallacceptandusethemailvoterregistration 1applicationformprescribedbytheFederalElectionCommission 2[nowtheElectionAssistanceCommission]pursuanttosection 31973gg-7(a)(2)ofthistitlefortheregistrationofvotersin 4electionsforFederalOffice. 5(2) Inadditiontoacceptingandusingtheformdescribedin 6paragraph(1),aStatemaydevelopanduseamailvoter 7registrationformthatmeetsallofthecriteriastatedinsection 81973gg-7(b)ofthistitlefortheregistrationofvotersinelections 9forFederalOffice. 10So,while(2)permitsstatestodeveloptheirownvoterregistrationforms,(1)requires 11statesto(unlesstheyhavebeenexemptedundertheNVRA)acceptascompletea 12voterregistrationapplicationsubmittedbyapersonusingtheNationalForm. 13 14FBIINVESTIGATIONDETERMINEDPRIMAFACIEEVIDENCEOFVOTER 15REGISTRATIONFRAUDBYNON-CITIZENVOTERS 16TheharmcausedbyDemocratDebraBowensgrosslylaxvoterregistration 17standardsenforcement(intentionalornot)hasrealconsequences.DeanGardnerof 18Bakersfield,CAlosttheelectionby197votesforthe30thAssemblyDistrictin2002 19becauseofvoterregistrationfraudofnon-citizenvotersandmultiplevoters.(Information 20previouslysubmittedinFirstAmendedComplaint,thearticlefromthePortervillePost, 21VoterFraudSimple,EasyandUndeniable,Aug.10,2010.DeanGardnerandhiswife 22RuthGardnerresearchedwhyDeanlostwhenDeanwasaheadinthepollsby18%. 23Theymailedout14,000questionnairestoDemocratvotersinthedistrict.Inthatsimple 24questionnaire,amonetaryawardwastobegivenifitwasaccuratelyreturned. 25Completedquestionnairestotaling2,650werereturned.Herearethethreequestions 26thattheyhadtohonestlyanswerandreturn. 27JudicialNotice:SOSFailuretoCheckVoterCitizenship,EACVoterApplication,SOSMemoandFBIInvestigation,Page8of9 11. ) Do you l i ve at such-a-such address, and f i l l i n t he bl ank. 22. ) Are you a ci t i zen of t he U. S. ? 33. ) Are you worki ng on get t i ng your ci t i zenshi p? 4 5AccordingtoRuth,"Afewmorethan700ofthesequestionnaires,accordingtothe 6U.S.PostalService-wereundeliverable,nosuchperson,nosuchaddress,nosuch 7house-and54ofthosepeoplevoted." 8Continuingwiththeresults,Mrs.Gardnerstated,"1,691questionnaireswerereturned 9byelectors.93admitted'inwriting'theywerenotcitizens.273statedthattheywerenot 10registeredtovoteanddidnotliveinthe30thAssemblydistrict.Onewomanwholivesin 11Porterville,CA.votedtwice,while69moreadmittedtheyvotedmorethanonce." 12Summarizingfromthearticle,Mrs.Gardnersaid,"Thebottomlineofallthese2,650 13returnedquestionnaires,1,318hadvotingirregularities.37%ofthedemocratvoteswere 14fraudulentandofthe2,650voteswecanprovethat905wereillegal."Theseresults 15andcompletedquestionnairesweregiventotheBakersfieldFBIofficein2003.Dean 16GardnerconfirmedwithmethattheFBItoldhimtherewasevidenceofprimafacie 17voterfraud.However,theFBIdidnothingtotrytooverturntheelection.TheFBInever 18gavebacktheresearchmaterialsorwritteninvestigationresultstoDeanGardner. 19PlaintiffcalledtheBakersfield,FBIonApril1,2011andrequestedthattheysendto 20Plaintiffacopyoftheirfindingsandacopyoftheoriginalresearchmaterials.Theydid 21notcallbackandPlaintiffcalledthemagainMay20,2011.Thepersonwhoanswered 22thephonetoldplaintiffshewastransferringmetoanagentthatknewofDeanGardners 23file.ThepersonwhoansweredconfirmedthattherewasareportandsaidthatIcould 24NOThaveacopyoftheresearchortheinvestigationfindings,butshewouldcheckwith 25her supervisor to make sure. Plaintiff told her there was a lawsuit against the state for voter fraud and she needed a file copy. Plaintiff asks the court to order the FBI to turn over all materials to the court as it proves that voter and election fraud in California is a huge problem and that Plaintiff's case demands an immediate hearing on the merits as a statewide election is approaching in November and Plaintiff would be asking for a massive audit of California voter registration databases as the state of California is not protecting the civil rights of any of its citizens when it comes to their right to vote and to fair elections.. 3. 1 do solemnly declare under penalty of perjury with 28 USC $1 746 and the laws of the State of California this date May 23, 201 1 in the County of Sacramento, that the facts and circumstances described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. ., sacramento, CA, 9581 6 i i i I Judicial Notice: SOS Failure to Check Voter Citizenship, EAC Voter Application, SOS Memo 1 and FBI Investigation, Page 9 of 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BARNETT V. DUNN ei aL Civil CASE: 10-cv-02216-FCD-DAD CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE o n ~ a y a 201 1, I, p u T c ) . - ~ ~ z , under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 USC 1746, 1. That Declarant is over 18 years of age and not a party herein; Declarant caused the service of four (4) copies of the PLAINTIFF PAMELA BARNETT'S JUDICIAL NOTICE PENDING THE COURT'S DECISION IN RE: THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST THAT THEY DO NOT VERIFY CITIZENSHIP OF CALIFORNIA VOTER AFFIANTS, EAC's VOTER REGISTRATION FORM WHICH BREAKS CALIFORNIA ELECTION, HAVA AND NVRA LAWS, MEMORANDUM FROM SOS TO ALL CA COUNW REGISTRARS WHICH SANCTIONS CA ELECTION LAW BREAKING, FBI FINDINGS OF PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF VOTER/ELECTION FRAUD DURING THE 2002 ELECTION FOR THE 3oM ASSEMBLY DISTRICT WHICH INCLUDES NON-CITIZEN AND MULTIPLE VOTERS 2. May '7 4 , 201 1 with Exhibits annexed, and did place each complete set in a sealed folder properly addressed with proper postage to be served by USPS mail upon: Yoshinori H. T. Himel United States Attorney's Office 501 I Street, Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 958 14 Brian T. Hildreth Bell, McAndrews & HILTACHK, LLP 455 Capitol Mall, Suite 801 Sacramento, CA 95 8 14 Anthony Paul O'Brien Attorney General's Office for the State California Department of Justice 1300 I Street P.O. Box 944255 Sacramento, CA 94244-2550 Nicholas S. Chrisos, NCAED Orange County Counsel 333 West Santa Ana Boulevard Suite 407 Santa Ana, CA 92702- 1379 I do declare and certify under penalty of perjury: Dated: May ,201 1 Sacramento California 0 - -Address: (+l , y~ 3 ~ . 5 \ o q h k ~ ~ ~ ~ ,(-'& .?5G3 EXHIBIT 1 CaliforniaRegistration Deadline M T W Th F Sa SuForms must be received or postmarked 15 days before an election.T1Database Implementation Status California currently maintains a bottom-up registration system: forms processed at the county level are periodically uploaded to the statewide database.2 Anticipating that it would not be able to meet the January 1, 2006, deadline for the creation of a HAVA-compliant system, California entered into a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ MOU) concerning the implementation of the states statewide voter registration system (CalVoter).3Entering Voter Registration Information Who inputs voter registration information? County boards of registrars generally review and enter information from voter registration forms in their jurisdictions into the countysystems.What happens to voter registration forms submitted at state registration agencies?Forms received by the Secretary of State, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), or another voter registration agency are sent to the appropriate county registrar for review and entry.4 If an application is mistakenly delivered to an inappropriate county registrar, it will be forwarded to the correct county registrar, but the application will only be valid for elections occurring at least 29 days after the application is received.5How are most forms submitted? California reported that in 2004, 59% of forms were submitted by mail, 23% were submitted in person to election officials, 8% were submitted at the DMV, 6% were submitted at another voter registration agency, and 5%were submitted by other means.6Voter Registration Form The relevant portions of the voter registration form are included at the end of this section.7Processing of Forms Without Identifying Numbers How will the state treat an application with an affirmative indication that the applicanthas no valid identifying number? The state will attempt to match the applicants information (see below); if an appropriate identifying number can be found through the match process, that number will be applied to the applicants record. Otherwise, theapplicant will be assigned a unique voter registration number. If the applicant is otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have to show identificationat the polls.8Making the List CA - 1 How will the state treat an application without an identifying number and without an affirmative indication that the applicant has no such number? The state will attempt to match the applicants information (see below); if an appropriate identifying number canbe found through the match process, that number will be applied to the applicants record.Otherwise, the applicant will be assigned a unique voter registration number; if the applicant is otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have to showidentification at the polls.9How will the state treat an application listing an identifying number that is eitherincomplete or illegible? Under regulations adopted pursuant to the DOJ MOU, it appears that if uncorrected (see below), the application will be rejected for voters who registerother than by mail; for an applicant registering by mail, if the applicant is otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will have to show identification at the polls.10Matching Against Motor Vehicle and Social Security Records What fields from the voter registration form will the state seek to match to motor vehicleor Social Security records? Identifying number, first name, last name, and date of birth. How precise is the match standard? California intends to use an exact match standard, but has not yet finalized the criteria by which a match will be sought.How much human intervention is involved in determining whether information is matched? California intends to use a fully automated system, but has not yet completedsystem design and has not yet fully determined the extent of human discretion that will be involved.Description of matching process: California has not yet determined the process by which a match will be sought for information on forms listing a drivers license number.Information on forms listing SSN digits will be automatically checked against the SSAdatabase through the standard AAMVA process: the county elections official will submitan entered record to the DMV database, which will automatically submit the appropriatefields to the SSA and return a code indicating whether the record was successfullymatched or not.What are the consequences if the state cannot find a match? Under regulations adopted pursuant to the DOJ MOU, it appears that if uncorrected (see below), the application will be rejected for voters who register other than by mail; for an applicant registering by mail, if the applicant is otherwise eligible, she will be considered registered, but will haveto show identification at the polls.11Notice and Opportunity to Resolve Errors Brennan Center for Justice CA - 2Does the applicant have the opportunity to correct a missing or incomplete identifying number, without submitting a new form? Yes. The applicant may correct missing or incomplete information at any point before the voter registration deadline. Does the applicant have the opportunity to resolve a failed match, without submitting a new form? Yes. The applicant may submit information to resolve a failed match at any point before the voter registration deadline. If information on an otherwise timely application is corrected after the voter registrationdeadline, is the correction timely? No.Description of notice and correction process: The county registrar will contact by telephone if possible, and otherwise by mail an applicant whose identifying number is missing, incomplete, or unverified.12 The applicant may correct any errors until the voter registration deadline, by submitting verifiable identifying numbers or a copy of valid identification by mail or in person. Under regulations adopted pursuant to the DOJ MOU, it appears that an applicant without identifying numbers that have been verified by the voter registration deadline may still vote if she applied by mail and providesidentification at the polls, but that she may not vote any ballot that will count if she didnot apply by mail.13Identification Requirements at the Polls Making the List CA - 3 Forms of ID:1st-time voters current and valid photo IDregistering by mail current utility bill w/ name, address without verified bank statement w/ name, addressidentifying number: government check w/ name, addressgovernment paycheck w/ name, addressother govt document w/ name, addressWho must provide identification at the polls? A first-time voter registering by mail whose identifying numbershave not been verified must show ID at the polls.What forms of identification are accepted? A current and valid photo ID provided by a third party in the ordinary course of business (including a state drivers license or ID card, passport, employee photo ID card, commercial establishments photo ID card, credit or debit card with photo, militaryphoto ID card, student photo ID card, health club photo ID card, insurance plan photo ID card, or public housing photo ID card), or a current utility bill, bank statement,government check, government paycheck, or other government document that shows the voters name and address.14What are the consequences of failing to show identification? The voter may cast a provisional ballot.15 The ballot will be counted if the signature on the provisional ballot matches the signature on the appropriate voter registration form.16Statutes and RegulationsCAL. ELEC. CODE 2000 et seq. generally concern registration of voters. CAL. ELEC.CODE 2168 directs the Secretary of State to establish and maintain a statewide voter registration system. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, 19001 et seq. comprise the applicable regulations.End NotesNote: Pursuant to the recommendation of state officials, county officials were also interviewed for this summary.1 CAL. ELEC. CODE 2102. New California residents may register up to seven days before a general election, in the county elections office; these new residents must also vote in the county elections office. CAL. ELEC. CODE 3400. 2 electionline.org, Assorted Rolls: Statewide Voter Registration Databases Under HAVA,June 2005, available at http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/EB11.FINAL1.pdf, at 15; CAL. ELEC. CODE 2168. 3 Memorandum of Agreement (Nov. 2, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/ca_moa.htm; Help America Vote Act: The Endgame, electionline Weekly (Dec. 8, 2005), available athttp://www.electionline.org/Newsletters/tabid/87/ctl/Detail/mid/643/xmid/166/xmfid/3/Default.aspx.4 The Secretary of State is required to forward application forms to the appropriate county within one working day of receipt. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, 19050.8(b). 5 CAL. ELEC. CODE 2114. 6 Election Assistance Commission, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office 2003-2004, June 30, 2005, tbl. 2, available at http://www.eac.gov/NVR_Spreadsheets/NVRA_table_2.html. Due to rounding, the percentages listed may exceed 100%.7 The voter registration form that California has made available online is the federal form.8 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, 20108.65, 20108.70. 9Id. 20108.65, 20108.70; see also CAL. ELEC. CODE 2150(7) (No person shall be denied the right to register because of her or her failure to furnish one of these numbers,and shall be so advised on the voter registration card.). Before the DOJ MOU, someCalifornia counties indicated that they followed a different procedure. One county explained that the voter would be notified of the need to supply the appropriate information before the close of registration; if the voter did not correct the omission, she would only be able to vote a provisional ballot, to count only if the signature on the ballot matched the signature on the registration application form.10 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, 20108.37(b), 20108.38. Section 20108.37(b) appears to state that an applicant with an unverified identifying number is to be designated pending, and may not be entered into the statewide voter registration system to vote a regular ballot; section 20108.38 appears to state that an applicant submitting her form by mail with an unverified identifying number must be entered into the statewide voter registration system with a notation that she may only vote a regular ballot if she shows identification before Election Day or at the polls. Neither section acknowledges any potential conflict with the other. 11 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, 20108.37(b), 20108.38. Section 20108.37(b) appears to state that an applicant with an unverified identifying number is to be designated pending, and may not be entered into the statewide voter registration system to vote a regular ballot; section 20108.38 appears to state that an applicant submitting her form by Brennan Center for Justice CA - 4Making the List CA - 5 mail with an unverified identifying number must be entered into the statewide voter registration system with a notation that she may only vote a regular ballot if she shows identification before Election Day or at the polls. Neither section acknowledges any potential conflict with the other. 12 CAL. ELEC. CODE 2153. 13 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, 20108.37(b), 20108.38 determine who may be entered intothe statewide voter registration system; section 20108.18(b) of the same title requires that the statewide system be used to determine whether a provisional ballot will be counted.Therefore, a voter who is not entered into the statewide system will not be able to cast a regular ballot, and also will not be able to cast a provisional ballot that will be counted.14Id. 20107 lists particular forms of identification that qualify, but while HAVApermits the use of a paycheck with the individuals name and address, the California regulation specifies that the paycheck must be issued by the government. However, the same regulation also states that [t]her section shall be liberally construed to permitvoters and new registrants to cast a regular ballot. Any doubt as to the sufficiency of proof or a document presented shall be resolved in favor of permitting the voter or newregistrant to cast a regular ballot. Id.15Id. 20107(c). 16 CAL. ELEC. CODE 14310(c)(1). 1 Revised 10/29/2003GeneraI InstructionsWho Can Use th|s App||cat|onIf you are a !.S. cIfIzen vho IIves or has an address vIfhIn fhe !nIfed Sfafes, you can use fhe appIIcafIon In fhIs bookIef fo:Q RegIsfer fo vofe In your Sfafe,Q Reporf a change of name fo your vofer regIsfrafIon ofhce,Q Reporf a change of address fo your vofer regIsfrafIon ofhce, orQ RegIsfer vIfh a poIIfIcaI parfy.Except|onsPIease do nof use fhIs appIIcafIon If you IIve oufsIde fhe !nIfed Sfafes and Ifs ferrIforIes and have no home |IegaI) address In fhIs counfry, or If you are In fhe mIIIfary sfafIoned avay from home. !se fhe IederaI Posfcard Ap-pIIcafIon avaIIabIe fo you from mIIIfary bases, AmerIcan embassIes, or consuIar ofhces.New Humpshre fovn and cIfy cIerks vIII accepf fhIs appIIcafIon onIy as a requesf for fheIr ovn absenfee vofer maII-In regIsfrafIon form.North Dukotu does nof have vofer regIsfrafIon.Wyomng Iav does nof permIf maII regIsfrafIon.How to F|nd Out If You Are E||g|b|e to Reg|ster to Vote |n Your Stateach Sfafe has Ifs ovn Iavs abouf vho may regIsfer and vofe. Check fhe InformafIon under your Sfafe In fhe Sfafe InsfrucfIons. Notc. AII Sfafes requIre fhaf you be a !nIfed Sfafes cIfIzen by bIrfh or nafuraIIzafIon fo regIsfer fo vofe In federaI and Sfafe eIecfIons. IederaI Iav makes If IIIegaI fo faIseIy cIaIm !.S. cIfIzenshIp fo regIsfer fo vofe In any federaI, Sfafe, or IocaI eIecfIon. A/so Notc. You cunnot be regIsfered fo vofe In more fhan one pIace af a fIme.How to F||| Out th|s App||cat|on!se bofh fhe AppIIcafIon InsfrucfIons and Sfafe Insfruc-fIons fo guIde you In hIIIng ouf fhe appIIcafIon.IIrsf, read fhe AppIIcafIon InsfrucfIons. These Insfruc-fIons vIII gIve you Imporfanf InformafIon fhaf appIIes fo everyone usIng fhIs appIIcafIon.Nexf, hnd your Sfafe under fhe Sfafe InsfrucfIons. !se fhese InsfrucfIons fo hII ouf oxes 6, 7, and 8. AIso refer fo fhese InsfrucfIons for InformafIon abouf vofer eIIgI-bIIIfy and any oafh requIred for ox 9. If you have been gIven fhIs appIIcafIon In a Sfafe agency or pubIIc ofhce, If Is your choIce fo use fhe appIIcafIon or nof.If you decIde fo use fhIs appIIcafIon fo regIsfer fo vofe, you can hII If ouf and Ieave If vIfh fhe Sfafe agency or pubIIc ofhce. The appIIcafIon vIII be submIffed for you. Or, you can fake If vIfh you fo maII fo fhe address IIsfed under your Sfafe In fhe Sfafe InsfrucfIons. You aIso may fake If vIfh you fo deIIver In person fo your IocaI vofer regIsfrafIon ofhce. Nofe: The name and IocafIon of fhe Sfafe agency or pubIIc ofhce vhere you receIved fhe appIIcafIon vIII remaIn conhdenfIaI. If vIII nof appear on your appIIcafIon. AIso, If you decIde nof fo use fhIs appII-cafIon fo regIsfer fo vofe, fhaf decIsIon vIII remaIn conhdenfIaI. If vIII nof affecf fhe servIce you receIve from fhe agency or ofhce.If You Were Given this AppIicationin a State Agency or PubIic OfceWhen to Reg|ster to Voteach Sfafe has Ifs ovn deadIIne for regIsferIng fo vofe. Check fhe deadIIne for your Sfafe on fhe Iasf page of fhIs bookIef.How to Subm|t Your App||cat|onMaII your appIIcafIon fo fhe address IIsfed under your Sfafe In fhe Sfafe InsfrucfIons. Or, deIIver fhe appIIcafIon In person fo your IocaI vofer regIsfrafIon ofhce.The remaInIng Sfafes fhaf accepf fhe nafIonaI form vIII accepf copIes of fhe appIIcafIon prInfed from fhe compufer Image on reguIar paper sfock, sIgned by fhe appIIcanf, and maIIed In an enveIope vIfh fhe correcf posfage.F|rst T|me Voters Who Reg|ster by Ma||If you are regIsferIng fo vofe for fhe hrsf fIme In your jurIsdIcfIon and are maIIIng fhIs regIsfrafIon appIIcafIon, you may be requIred fo provIde proof of IdenfIhcafIon fhe hrsf fIme you vofe.ependIng on fhe specIhc requIremenfs of your Sfafe, you may avoId provIdIng IdenfIhcafIon af fhe poIIs vhen you vofe for fhe hrsf fIme by maIIIng a copy of an IdenfIhca-fIon documenf fogefher vIfh fhIs appIIcafIon. The IIsf of accepfabIe documenfs Is IncIuded In fhe Sfafe Insfruc-fIons. Do not nclude orgnul documents wth ths upplcuton.Pleuse reud the uccompunyng Stute nstructons to determne the voter dentbcuton requrements Ior your Stute.er vIfh cept|onsease do no!nIfed Sfaaddress fIof use fhIs afes and IfIn fhIs coued avay fron avaIIaorappIIcafIs ferrIforInfry r If yom home. bIe fo you fonsuIar ore fovn Is and hyou are In!se fhe Ifrom mIfhces.n anrequn fheIederaI Ifary basfy cIerksfor fheIrPoes, AvIII ovner remaIIaccepf fhn absenfee gIsfrafIoegIsfrafIos voferon. depenmay vofefI fogocumennclude pplcutuse reud tructonntbcurgnun.the uccons to detuton reqGdocmpunyng Srmne the urements ivenencStutvoter Ior yourppIIcais Aor PubStuafIon In ahoIce fo pIicatioIic OfcvIfh apt|onsse do noSfass fafIoercept|oIease do!nIfed ad fhIs s and IfsfhIs counavay fron avaIIa, orof use fhafes andIn fhIsned avavafIrIeun f ye. !u fr offovaps fnfrombIonre n Ifd haIne fhe ImIandqus ayou a!frofhces.n rery,m hfoerrIfy romyon fhe I Pasksr fheIrveIeIfary bafy cIefoyPosAII vnregmaIIsesvr oerhIbsenfee rafIofIoaccepfn agIsegs fer voon h epeny aofefIodmavfogeenude oupplcutreud onbcudocnluse retructntrgnun.the uccons to detuton reqe Gidocmpunyng Sermne the urements IivenencStutvoter Ior yourppIIcafis Aor PubStuafIon In ahoIce fo upIicatioIic Ofce uco dr y2 Revised 10/29/2003Box 1 - NamePuf In fhIs box your fuII name In fhIs order Iasf, IIrsf, MIddIe. o nof use nIcknames or InIfIaIs. Notc. If fhIs appIIcafIon Is for a change of name, pIease feII us In Box A (on tbc bottom ba// o/ tbc /orm your fuII name before you changed If.Box 2 - Home AddressPuf In fhIs box your home address |IegaI address). o not puf your maIIIng address here If If Is dIfferenf from your home address. o not use a posf ofhce box or ruraI roufe vIfhouf a box number. Refer fo sfafe-specIhc InsfrucfIons for ruIes regardIng use of roufe numbers. Notc. If you vere regIsfered before but fhIs Is fhe hrsf fIme you are regIsferIng from fhe address In ox 2, pIease feII us In Box B (on tbc bottom ba// o/ tbc /orm fhe ad-dress vhere you vere regIsfered before. PIease gIve us as much of fhe address as you can remember. A/so Notc. If you IIve In a ruraI area buf do nof have a sfreef address, or If you have no address, pIease shov vhere you IIve usIng fhe map In Box C (at tbc bottom o/ tbc /orm.Box 3 - MaiIing AddressIf you gef your maII af an address fhaf Is dIfferenf from fhe address In ox 2, puf your maIIIng address In fhIs box. Notc. If you have no address In ox 2, you must vrIfe In ox 3 an address vhere you can be reached by maII.Box 4 - Date of BirthPuf In fhIs box your dafe of bIrfh In fhIs order Monfh, ay, Year. Bc carc/u/ not to usc toJays Jatc!Box 5 - TeIephone NumberMosf Sfafes ask for your feIephone number In case fhere are quesfIons abouf your appIIcafIon. Hovever, you do not have fo hII In fhIs box.Box 6 - ID NumberIederaI Iav requIres fhaf sfafes coIIecf from each regIs-franf an IdenfIhcafIon number. You musf refer fo your sfafe's specIhc InsfrucfIons for Ifem 6 regardIng Informa-fIon on vhaf number Is accepfabIe for your sfafe. If you have neIfher a drIvers IIcense nor a socIaI securIfy num-ber, pIease IndIcafe fhIs on fhe form and a number vIII be assIgned fo you by your sfafe.Box 7 - Choice of PartyIn some Sfafes, you musf regIsfer vIfh a parfy If you vanf fo fake parf In fhaf parfy's prImary eIecfIon, caucus, or convenfIon. To hnd ouf If your Sfafe requIres fhIs, see Ifem 7 In fhe InsfrucfIons under your Sfafe.AppIication InstructionsIf you vanf fo regIsfer vIfh a parfy, prInf In fhe box fhe fuII name of fhe parfy of your choIce.If you do not vanf fo regIsfer vIfh a parfy, vrIfe no parfy or Ieave fhe box bIank. o not vrIfe In fhe vord Independenf If you mean no parfy, because fhIs mIghf be confused vIfh fhe name of a poIIfIcaI parfy In your Sfafe. Notc. If you do nof regIsfer vIfh a parfy, you can sfIII vofe In generaI eIecfIons and nonparfIsan |nonparfy) prImary eIecfIons. Box 8 - Race or Ethnic GroupA fev Sfafes ask for your race or efhnIc group, In order fo admInIsfer fhe IederaI VofIng RIghfs Acf. To hnd ouf If your Sfafe asks for fhIs InformafIon, see Ifem 8 In fhe In-sfrucfIons under your Sfafe. If so, puf In ox 8 fhe choIce fhaf besf descrIbes you from fhe IIsf beIov: AmerIcan IndIan or AIaskan NafIve AsIan or PacIhc IsIander Iack, not o/ HIspanIc OrIgIn HIspanIc MuIfI-racIaI WhIfe, not o/ HIspanIc OrIgIn OfherBox 9 - SignatureRevIev fhe InformafIon In Ifem 9 In fhe InsfrucfIons un-der your Sfafe. efore you sIgn or make your mark, make sure fhaf:|1) You meef your Sfafe's requIremenfs, and|2) You undersfand ull of ox 9.IInaIIy, sIgn your Iull name or make your mark, and prInf foday's dafe In fhIs order Monfh, ay, Year.If fhe appIIcanf Is unabIe fo sIgn, puf In Box D fhe name, address, and feIephone number |opfIonaI) of fhe person vho heIped fhe appIIcanf. efore hIIIng ouf fhe body of fhe form, pIease ansver fhe quesfIons on fhe fop of fhe form as fo vhefher you are a !nIfed Sfafes cIfIzen and vhefher you vIII be 18 years oId on or before eIecfIon day. If you ansver no fo eIfher of fhese ques-fIons, you may nof use fhIs form fo regIsfer fo vofe. Hovever, sfafe specIhc InsfrucfIons may provIde addIfIonaI Informa-fIon on eIIgIbIIIfy fo regIsfer fo vofe prIor fo age 18.ore you 2 - HomIn fhIs boxf your maIome addrevIfhouf aor ruIeme Adyour homIIng address. o nobox numbs regardIng. If you vre raddss here t use a pober. Refer fg use of rouere regIsfegIsferIng f(on tbcf ofhco sfafe-spufe numbered beffrom fhe bottom regIs ypecbers.re but fhaddress ba// o/ tbed beforcan ra ruIs IsIn bc /ore. PImbearea o addox 2, pIm fhe aease gIve r.buf do nress, pIeaC (at tbcus ashavse shc bottov om o/ rom AsIaIaInot o/ HIs /x 9 - SIev fhe Iyour SnIc OignatuInformafSfafe. eff:youreon In Ifem 9 ore you sIgnur Sfafe's red ull of In fhe Ior make quIremenox amesfyournfs, amake Monfn, puf r mark, ah, ay, YIn BoxonaI) of foyou - HomfhIs boxour maIdref aor ruIeore2 - HIn fhIs bf your mome advAdr homeaddreso noox numbegardIng If you vre remx your hoIIng addess. a box nums regar. yoaddrIt pober. Refer foufeg fB tbcss huerg uergIofhcspnumbbefheottom gIs ysf o sufeerefrom c be r Rrse fese of egIIpecIfhdress / tbbeforn ra ruberre buabaredcas o/orPIbera ddIsInbc e. emaro pIadse gIve r.f do neatbcox 2,rmIease gIburess, pICasaveshottusf hsec bromovomsIaImAo/ aIo/ Is /9 - Se Iyour Sno Hx 9 -IeanIc OignatuInformafISfafe. eff:youreon In Ifem 9 fore you sIgnur Sfafe's rend ull of In fhe Inor make quIremenox 9ame sfryournfs, amake Monfn, puf IfIr mark, ah, ay, YIn BoxIonaI) of fnarmmaAre you a citizen of the United States of America? Yes NoWill you be 18 years old on or before election day? Yes NoVoter Registration AppIicationBefore compIeting this form, review the GeneraI, AppIication, and State specific instructions.This space for office use only.Last Name First Name Middle Name(s) (Circle one)Jr Sr ll lll lV Mr. Mrs. Miss Ms.Home AddressAddress Where You Get Your Mail lf Different From AboveApt. or Lot # City/TownCity/TownState Zip CodeState Zip CodelD Number - (See ltem 6 in the instructions for your state) Date of BirthMonth Day YearTelephone Number (optional)Choice of Party(see item 7 in the instructions for your State)l have reviewed my state's instructions and l swear/affirm that:l am a United States citizenl meet the eligibility requirements of my state andsubscribe to any oath required.The information l have provided is true to the best of myknowledge under penalty of perjury. lf l have provided falseinformation, l may be fined, imprisoned, or (if not a U.S.citizen) deported from or refused entry to the United States. Date:Month Day YearPlease sign full name (or put mark)lf the applicant is unable to sign, who helped the applicant fill out this application? Give name, address and phone number (phone number optional).1234 5 68 79DABCMr.Mrs.MissMs. Jr Sr ll lll lVLast Name First Name Middle Name(s) (Circle one)Street (or route and box number) Apt. or Lot # City/Town/County State Zip Codelf this application is for a change of name, what was your name before you changed it?lf you live in a rural area but do not have a street number, or if you have no address, please show on the map where you live.lf you were registered before but this is the first time you are registering from the address in Box 2, what was your address where you were registered before?Write in the names of the crossroads (or streets) nearest to where you live.Draw an X to show where you live.Use a dot to show any schools, churches, stores, or other landmarksnear where you live, and write the name of the landmark.PIease fiII out the sections beIow if they appIy to you.NORTHExampleGrocery StoreWoodchuck RoadPublic SchoolRoute#2 XMaiI this appIication to the address provided for your State.If you checked "No" in response to either of these questions, do not compIete form.(Please see state-specific instructions for rules regarding eligibility to register prior to age 18.)If you are registering to vote for the first time: please refer to the application instructions for information on submittingcopies of valid identification documents with this form.Race or Ethnic Group(see item 8 in the instructions for your State)(Circle one)rthMooice Parte item 7 in thenth Daynstructions for yv wediteYeaour State)my st te's iStates citbility rnstructiozenquireh req8ns and l sts of myd.dedf peweastatee tolf lonedntfirandthe bhave por ( noto the Umyded fa U SnitedeasseStates.e refe f r to tDathe apd it?pp pp Iy to tuctions fo younfo fMiddle Name(s)s youStateess wJ(Cyou were riooi o ye 7 irtMP rtm n en Dyn c s yviedt ays t nw ditYeaomieus iS citb y rn oq eh qp8sz nu retatatee n n st ydd ies a d lsdf pas eu.s dwt te olo eentff f irt b th e p( f onah fvnt Ud f.Snismyedat deasSts hee efe f r th pate ae t spp II or fd ?p y ttu tioo unfo ffMid e Namames y u es wJ(Cyo ryo yRevised 10/29/2003State InstructionsCa||forn|aRegstruton Deudlne 15 days before fhe eIecfIon.6. D Number When you regIs-fer fo vofe, you musf provIde your CaIIfornIa drIver's IIcense or CaII-fornIa IdenfIhcafIon card number, If you have one. If you do nof have a drIver's IIcense or I card, you musf provIde fhe Iasf four dIgIfs of your SocIaI SecurIfy Number |SSN). If you do nof IncIude fhIs InformafIon, you vIII be requIred fo provIde Iden-fIhcafIon vhen you vofe.?. Choce oI Purty. PIease enfer fhe name of fhe poIIfIcaI parfy vIfh vhIch you vIsh fo regIsfer. If you do nof vIsh fo regIsfer vIfh any parfy, enfer ecIIne fo Sfafe In fhe space provIded. CaIIfornIa Iav aIIovs vofers vho decIIne fo sfafe an afhIIafIon vIfh a quaIIhed poIIfIcaI parfy or vho afhIIafe vIfh a nonquaIIhed poIIfIcaI parfy fo vofe In fhe prImary eIecfIon of any quaIIhed poIIfIcaI parfy fhaf hIes a nofIce vIfh fhe Secrefary of Sfafe aIIovIng fhem fo do so. You can caII 1-800-345-VOT or vIsIf vvv.ss.ca.gov fo Iearn vhIch poIIfI-caI parfIes are aIIovIng nonafhIIafed vofers fo parfIcIpafe In fheIr prImary eIecfIon.8. Ruce or Kthnc Group. Ieave bIank.9. Sgnuture. To regIsfer In CaIIfor-nIa you musf: be a cIfIzen of fhe !nIfed Sfafes be a resIdenf of CaIIfornIa be af Ieasf 18 years of age af fhe fIme of fhe nexf eIecfIon nof be ImprIsoned or on paroIe for fhe convIcfIon of a feIony nof currenfIy be judged menfaIIy Incompefenf by a courf of IavSIgnafure Is requIred. If you meef fhe requIremenfs IIsfed above, pIease sIgn and dafe fhe regIsfrafIon card In fhe space provIded.Attent|on: Proof of Voter Ident|ca-t|on (Pursuant to tbc Hc/p Amcrtca Votc Act o/ 2002Votng n person: A hrsf-fIme vofer vho regIsfers by maII musf presenf fo fhe approprI-afe sfafe or IocaI eIecfIon ofhcIaI:1) a currenf and vaIId phofo Iden-fIhcafIon; or2) a currenf ufIIIfy bIII, bank sfafemenf, governmenf check, paycheck, or ofher governmenf documenf fhaf shovs fhe name and address of fhe vofer.Votng by mul: A hrsf-fIme vofer vho regIsfers by maII musf submIf a COPY of one of fhe foIIovIng documenfs vIfh hIs or her absenfee baIIof: 1) currenf and vaIId phofo IdenfIh-cafIon; OR2) currenf ufIIIfy bIII, bank sfafe-menf, governmenf check, paycheck, or ofher governmenf documenf fhaf shovs fhe name and address of fhe vofer.For Those Who Reg|ster by Ma||:Persons vho regIsfer fo vofe by maII and submIf a drIver's IIcense number fhaf fhe sfafe or IocaI eIecfIon ofhcIaI can mafch vIfh an exIsfIng sfafe IdenfIhcafIon record vIII nof be re-quIred fo provIde IdenfIhcafIon vhen fhey vofe. AddIfIonaIIy, vofers vIII nof be requIred fo provIde IdenfIhca-fIon vhen fhey vofe If fhey are: |I) provIded fhe rIghf fo vofe ofhervIse fhan In person under fhe VofIng AccessIbIIIfy for fhe IderIy and HandIcapped Acf; or |II) enfIfIed fo vofe ofhervIse fhan In person under any ofher IederaI Iav.These IdenfIhcafIon requIremenfs onIy appIy fo eIecfIons In vhIch fhere Is a federaI ofhce on fhe baIIof. If you do nof provIde proof of IdenfIh-cafIon, you may casf a provIsIonaI baIIof.Mulng uddress:Secrefary of SfafeIecfIons IvIsIon1500 11fh SfreefSacramenfo, CA 95814urIfyof IncIudeII be requIrfIon vhen Choce oIhe name ofvhIch youof vIsred fo pyou vofe.Purty. PIef fhe poIIfIcu vIsh fo reh fo regIsfeecIIne fodase enfcaI parfy egIsfer. If r vIfh any Sfafe In faIIovs vo anIfhyou doparfy, he spafers vhfhIIaarfyo vIfhvho d poIForPeaI on afersonand fhacubmIf f fhe sfaan mafch IdenfIhcafquIrefhey nof bfIoe orvIfh fIon ro proofe. be ren vhrovId excord vIde IdeAddIfIonquIred fohen fhey vded fhe rIgIn personIIfyfIhcaIIy, vprovIofe Ifghf fon undy for fhe d Acf; ohvIseg ndnfIfIed forson undeIremeer enfs ch fhereIfy NIncIudebe requIrn vhen oce oI name ofyouvIshurnof IncIuII be reqafIon vhChoce he namevhnof ffo pvty PIepoIIfIcIsh fo reo regIsfeecIIne fodredyou vofe.Pf fhe poIu vIsh foh fo regecIInnfy egIsfer. If ny n fvo anasecaIeger SaIIfhspacers vhoafarfyyoparfy,fheofefhsfeIfafpr. vIfh a Io oIIIForPevIfhvho d pIaI ond shacaIonaferan If amafch enfIhcafquIrevof bfIoubmaf fan mafIdfheye or h n rroe. reqvhrovIdvIfIofo vofben n exvdeonfovrIgn In personIIfycorvIdAdquIhenIded fherca, vvIIf fonde ; ohfIhaIIyprofeghn uy fd AcdIfredIfednfIfIn undeIremevIsengnded fo rson u er enfs ch fherMaking the List:Database Matching andVerification Processesfor Voter Registrationby Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana MuozVOTING RIGHTS &ELECTIONS SERIESMarch 24, 2006reportcoverPMS377 3/24/06 12:59 PM Page 4The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law unites thinkers andadvocates in pursuit of a vision of inclusive and effective democracy. The organizationsmission is to develop and implement an innovative, nonpartisan agenda of scholarship,public education, and legal action in the areas of Democracy, Poverty, Criminal Justice,and Liberty and National Security, promoting equality and human dignity while safe-guarding fundamental freedoms. The Centers Democracy Program supports practical andadministrable election reforms that foster full and equal political participation. For moreinformation, please see www.brennancenter.org or call 212-998-6730.About the Brennan Center161 Avenue of the Americas12th FloorNew York NY 10013 212 998-6730 tel 212 995-4550 faxwww.brennancenter.orgreportcoverPMS377 3/24/06 12:59 PM Page 1Making the List:Database Matching andVerification Processesfor Voter Registrationby Justin Levitt, Wendy R. Weiser, and Ana MuozVOTING RIGHTS &ELECTIONS SERIESMarch 24, 2006AcknowledgmentsThe Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law sincerely appreciatesthe time of the election officials in 46 states and the District of Columbia who respondedto this survey. The Brennan Center acknowledges the assistance and cooperation receivedfrom these offices, and gratefully extends its thanks.The Brennan Center also extends special thanks to Sam Munger, who provided substantialresearch vital to the production of this report, to Rene Paradis, who provided substantialstatutory analysis, and to Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, which con-tributed further significant research assistance.This report was prepared under the auspices of the Brennan Centers Democracy Program.The Center is grateful for the generous support provided for the Democracy Program byan anonymous donor, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Knight Foundation, theOpen Society Institute, and the Rockefeller Family Fund. The statements made and viewsexpressed in this report are the responsibility solely of the Brennan Center. About the AuthorsJustin Levitt is an Associate Counsel with the Brennan Center, working on electionadministration and voting rights concerns. Before joining the Brennan Center, he was in-house counsel to a national voter registration and mobilization organization and theDirector of Strategic Targeting for a national presidential campaign. A graduate ofHarvard Law School and the Kennedy School of Government, he clerked for JudgeStephen Reinhardt of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He may be contacted at justin.levitt@nyu.edu.Wendy R. Weiser is a Deputy Director of the Democracy Program at the Brennan Centerand coordinates the Centers work on voting rights and election reform and its fair courtsproject. Prior to joining the Brennan Center, she was a senior staff attorney at NOW LegalDefense and Education Fund and a litigation associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton& Garrison. After receiving her J.D. from Yale Law School and her B.A. from YaleCollege, she clerked for Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of the U.S. District Court for theEastern District of New York. She can be reached at wendy.weiser@nyu.edu.Ana Muoz is a Research Associate with the Brennan Center, working primarily on election administration and voting rights concerns. Prior to joining the Brennan Center,she worked on voter registration and turnout campaigns in Arizona and Oregon, andserved as a coordinator of 2004ward, a group which trained and organized college studentsto work on voter registration initiatives across the country. She received a B.A. in Historyfrom Yale College in 2004. 2006. This paper is covered by the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivs-NonCommercial license(see http://creativecommons.org). It may be reproduced in its entirety as long as the Brennan Center forJustice at NYU School of Law is credited, a link to the Centers web page is provided, and no charge isimposed. The paper may not be reproduced in part or in altered form, or if a fee is charged, without theCenters permission. Please let the Center know if you reprint.Table of ContentsIntroduction iExecutive Summary iiBackground 1The new databases 1Duplicate entries and unique identifiers 1Verifying identity of selected voters 2The new process from the voters perspective 2The limits of databases 4Findings 7Four key categories of state policy 7Criteria for matching 8Consequences of a failed match 16Incomplete information 18Opportunity to correct errors 19Recommendations 23Recommendations for match criteria 23Recommendations for addressing failed matches 24Recommendations for addressing forms with incomplete information 24Recommendations for correcting errors 25Other recommendations for databases and the registration process 26Recommendations for databases and continuing list maintenance 28Methodology 31Scope of State Summaries in Appendix 33Report Glossary 34This report is the first comprehensive summary of critically important new voter registrationprocedures effective in most states at the beginning of 2006. Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewidedatabases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens abilityto get on the rollsand thus their ability to vote and have their votes countedwill nowdepend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voterregistration process. Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices couldresult in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting toregister to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registrationprocess, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.This report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (andin some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls. Thereport covers each states voter registration process, from the application form up throughElection Dayincluding the intake of registration forms, the manner in which informa-tion from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of thematch process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of theprocess has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 andbeyond. Making the List is the result of an extensive national survey of state election officials, supplemented by a review and analysis of the relevant state statutes and regulations. It isthe best available summary of current and anticipated state practices employed to placenew registrants on the rolls, using the new voter registration databases. In addition tostate-by-state summaries, this report includes detailed policy recommendations regardingthe registration process, based on the best practices in the states and comparative researchfrom other fields. These recommendations are intended to ensure that computerized voterregistration lists are compiled and maintained as accurately as possible, in a manner thatminimizes the risk that eligible voters will be unintentionally or unfairly disenfranchised.This report is intended to serve as a resource for election officials, legislators, citizens, andadvocates interested in safeguarding access to the franchise and making effective use of thenew statewide databases. We hope that the information in this report will contribute togreater understanding of the policies states are currently contemplating to govern the voterregistration process, as well as the best policy options available. Making the List:Database Matching and Verification Processesfor Voter Registrationi Making the ListIn 2006, virtually every state will experience serious changes in its voter registrationprocess. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (known as HAVA) now requires that statescreate and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registrationinformation. Citizens ability to get on the rollsand thus their ability to vote and havetheir votes countednow depend on the policies governing the use of these databases inthe voter registration process. While good policy choices could help the voter registrationprocess run more smoothly than ever, poor policy choices could result in the unwarranteddisenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. After an extensive national survey, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Lawpresents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices thatwill now govern how individuals get onto the voter rolls. Our survey found that: A few statesNebraska and Oregon, for exampleplan to implement voter registra-tion databases for their intended purposes: to help clean the registration rolls, to providethose new voters who are subject to identification requirements with a convenientalternative means to confirm their identity, and to promote the smooth administra-tion of a process that enables every eligible citizen to vote. States like Minnesota andWisconsin go further, offering Election Day registration as an additional safeguard forcitizens who have encountered unforeseen problems in the registration process. In contrast, a few states have adopted database policies that create unwarranted barriers to the franchise. Iowa, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, for example,report that they will reject the application of citizens whose information cannot bematched to the states motor vehicles database or the database of the Social SecurityAdministration, barring the applicant entirely from the polls. And Maryland willreject such applicants unless they provide certain identification documents by the registration deadline. A 2004 trial run in New York City showed that up to 20% ofeligible new applicants could have been rejected under such a rule solely because ofdata entry errors by election officials, and the Social Security Administration is nowshowing a 28.5% failed match rate nationwide. In the rest of the country, implementation of HAVAs database provisions seems tobe mixed: some state policies are good, fulfilling the intent of the law while mini-mizing the burdens on eligible citizens, and others create unnecessary hurdles foreligible voters. Fortunately, most state policies are not yet either codified or hard-wired. Indeed, some mayhave changed since this report was issued. This report is intended not only to shed light onstates plans, but also to encourage them to bring their policies in line with best practice.To that end, the Brennan Center offers recommendations for the proper implementationof HAVAs database provisions. These include recommendations that states enact:Executive SummaryBrennan Center for Justice iiiii Making the List Policies to account for the wide variety of common database matching errors byensuring that the match process will not bar registration of an eligible voter. Reasonable guidelines for matching voter information to other government databases, with built-in flexibility and ample opportunity to correct the mistakes thatarise. Standards for clarifying registration forms, for ensuring accurate data entry from theforms into registration databases, and for keeping database information updated. Clear, transparent, and voter-protective procedures for database maintenance andpurging, to ensure that eligible voters are able to get onand stay onthe voterrolls.Brennan Center staff are available to discuss these recommendations in more detail, andto assist officials, advocates, and interested citizens more generally in implementing thenew statewide voter registration databases in a voter-protective manner. For additionalmaterials, including the state-by-state analyses of the policies and procedures summarizedhere, please see www.brennancenter.org. Brennan Center for Justice 1In the 2000 elections, the states varying systems of election administration were testedunder a national spotlight. Many longstanding problems in the administration of federaland state elections suddenly became salient. In the aftermath of the elections, policymakersturned their attention to some of these problems. The Help America Vote Act of 2002(HAVA) was the federal governments first attempt to devise some solutions.The new databasesOne of HAVAs centerpieces is its requirement that each state create and use a single com-puterized statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2006. Previously, in moststates, each county was responsible for its own list. This resulted in spotty and inconsistentstandards for keeping the lists up to date, and little practical ability to keep track of voterswho moved across county lines. As of January 1, however, each state is now required tomaintain a single official database of registered voters, subject to uniform state standards.This requirement is intended to ensure that voter registration lists are as complete and accu-rate as possible.Duplicate entries and unique identifiersThe HAVA drafters also recognized that existing state voter lists were plagued by duplicateentries, representing individuals who had moved within the state or who for other reasonshad registered multiple times. These duplicatespart of the registration lists dead-woodclutter the rolls, create confusion, and artificially depress turnout estimates byinflating the apparent number of registered voters. In mandating statewide databases,Congress sought to mitigate the duplicate problem. Michigan, one of the models forHAVAs database provisions, had managed to cut its deadwood by 600,000 to 1 millionafter implementing a statewide voter registration database in which each voters entry wasassociated with a unique identifying number. Consequently, to help resolve duplicateentries, HAVA requires that each voters statewide database entry contain a numerical keyused to uniquely identify each voter.To supply this numerical key, HAVA requires that most applicants provide, on the voter registration form, a current and valid drivers license number to be used as a unique identi-fying number. If the applicant does not have a current and valid drivers license, HAVArequires that she provide the last four digits of her Social Security number. (The full numberis not required in most states, for privacy reasons.) Although these four digits alone will not be unique within a state (there are only 10,000 possible combinations of four digits), incombination with an individuals name and birth date, they should uniquely identify anygiven voter. Finally, if the applicant has neither a current and valid drivers license nor a SocialSecurity number, the state must create and assign her a unique identifying number.HAVA also created an additional step to ensure that the unique identifying numbers arecorrect, so that individuals are not mismatched in the databases. HAVA requires electionBackground2 Making the Listofficials to try to match information from the registration form with information in thestates motor vehicles database (for forms with drivers license numbers) or the SocialSecurity Administration database (for forms with Social Security digits), to verify that theidentifying number is correct. Without this step, a mistake or typographical error mightcause states to wrongly presume two individuals to be the same because they appear toshare the same unique identifying numberand mistakenly overwrite the valid informa-tion of an eligible voter. Verifying identity of selected votersThis match process also serves another purpose in HAVAs statutory scheme. HAVA represents a compromise between legislators who wished to subject many voters to iden-tification requirements and those who believed that ID requirements exclude legitimatevoters. For one class of registrations in which fraud was seen as more likely to be an issuethose submitted by voters registering for the first time in a given jurisdiction, and doingso by mailHAVA requires that states attempt to verify the registrants identities beforevoting. The statute recognizes, however, that there are several ways in which the identity of a first-time voter registering by mail can be verified. First, the voter may presenteither atregistration, at the polls, or in betweena form of documentary identification, includinga current photo ID, utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or anothergovernment document listing the voters name and address. Second, and in the alternative, if the registrants information matches information in thestates motor vehicles database or the Social Security administrations database, HAVAalso recognizes this match as a verification of the applicants identity. HAVA thereforeexempts individuals whose information is matched in this way from its ID requirementsfor first-time voters who register by mail. This is the only consequence of the matchprocess that is specifically mentioned in HAVA. Third, HAVA leaves states the discretion to use alternate means to verify a voters identity. Ifa first-time voter who registered by mail neither matches nor provides ID, HAVA entitlesher to cast a provisional ballot that will be counted if the state determines that she is eligibleunder state law to vote. States use a variety of means to verify a provisional voters eligibility,including signature matches, verification mailings, and sworn affirmations.The new process from the voters perspectiveFrom the voters point of view, a states implementation of HAVAs database provisionschanges the registration process in a few significant ways. Before HAVA, in most states, avoter would submit a voter registration formdirectly or indirectlyto a county ormunicipal official, and information on that form would be entered directly into a local list,for transfer to the pollbook. Now, when a voter submits her form to the local official, anumber of steps intervene on the way from form to pollbook:Brennan Center for Justice 3 First, the official reviews the form for a drivers license number or Social Security dig-its. If no number appears on the form (or if the entry is illegible), the state may pre-sume that the applicant lacks such a number,1and a unique identifier will beassigned. Or the state or local entity may presume that the applicant has made anerror, decide whether the error is material or immaterial, and decide how it may beresolved. Second, for forms with a complete drivers license number or Social Security digits,the state will attempt to match the information on the application form with infor-mation in the motor vehicle or Social Security databases. Different states will havedifferent criteria for determining when information is deemed to match, and dif-ferent abilities to account for typos and similar errors. Third, in the event that the state cannot find a match, the state will notify the voterand may provide an opportunity to resolve the problem. States vary, of course, in theprocesses used to resolve mismatches. Fourth, in some states, the result of the match process will affect whether the voteris put on the pollbooks, and if so, under what conditions she may vote. In a fewstates, the voter will be kept off of the rolls entirely if no match is found; in most oth-ers, the match process will not be an absolute barrier to registration. Most states willflag entries in the pollbooks if no match is found, at least for first-time voters regis-tering by mail, to indicate that the voter must show ID in order to vote a regular ballot. Conversely, if a match is found, some states will note that the voter (atleast, a first-time voter registering by mail) need not show ID.1Some, but not all, statesforms include some space forthe voter to indicate that shehas neither a drivers licensenumber nor a Social Securitynumber..:lCUQ"4E4)EO+C-m&=H+O-.-~W1^+4="=e->L+`V`e>+OO=OO_+R*E*_7^O+--OuOCCOOO^+l=TN*7+*^ C+R7EN=^-4 -EC'u^NO VOTE!VOTE!OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECTIs there a deadline for voters to resolve any errors?DANGER ZONES: Stages at which eligible voters' attempts to register may be rejectedINTAKEIs a form accepted and entered?MATCHING & VERIFICATIONIs matching used to help or hinder registration?Can an applicant correct her information?AT THE POLLSIs a voter without identification prevented from voting?DANGER ZONES: Stages at which eligible voters attempts to register may be rejected4 Making the ListThese additional intervening steps can be usedas HAVA intendedto foster more efficient election administration, orcontrary to HAVAs intentto impose additionalhurdles on voter registration. As noted above, most states plan to use the verification andmatching process to try to ensure that the most accurate unique identifying numbers areassociated with each registrants record, so that the record can be identified should the registrant move or re-register. And many states also plan to use the verification and match-ing process to provide an alternate means of confirming the identity of first-time voterswho register by mail. In contrast, a handful of states plan to use the matching process asa barrier or screen: only those for whom a successful match can be found may proceedthrough registration. This is a dramatic change from established registration practice, isnot warranted byindeed, is contrary toHAVA, and creates significant problems forthe eligible voter. The limits of databasesUsing the match process as a barrier to registration creates problems for eligible votersbecause of the inherent limitations of databases. All large databases have errorsglitcheslike typos, transposed names, and omitted information. Such errors could prevent a legitimate match for two records that in fact reflect the same individual. Also, databasescompiled at different times and for different purposes record information differently,which makes it even more difficult to find proper matches: William may not matchWill or Billy; a maiden name may not match a married name. A sample of these problems are outlined in the following table:Such errors occur quite frequently in large databases, and could create enormous problemsfor new registrants if additional hurdlesor absolute barsare imposed in the event thestate cannot successfully find a match. A sample run in New York City in late 2004, forexample, foreshadowed the scope of the problem: an audit conducted after attempting toThe Problem(s) with Matching: Examples of Potential Database ErrorsName of RegistrantSource of Error On Voter Registration Form In DatabaseTypos Pierce Peirce or Pearce or Perce or PierrceTransliteration Mohammad MuhammedMarriage Mary Pierce (ne Owens) Mary Owens or Mrs. Martin PierceNickname Sam Pierce Samuel PierceTransposed field Bao Lu Lu BaoDouble names Mary Ann (first) Pierce (last) Mary (first) Ann (middle) Pierce (last)Hyphenated name Mary (first) Owens-Pierce (last) Mary (first) Owens (middle) Pierce (last)Punctuation al-Amin al AminDate of BirthSource of Error On Voter Registration Form In Database (Voter, DMV and/or SSA)Typos 01/03/05 02/03/05 or 1/00/05 or 1/03/05 or 11/03/05Transposed field 01/03/05 03/01/05 or 05/01/03Invented default 01/03/05 01/01/05 (submitted only as January 2005)Brennan Center for Justice 5match 15,000 records in the voter registration database against those in the state motorvehicle database revealed that almost 20% of those records did not match because of typosby election officials. If the right to vote were conditioned on a proper match, up to 20%of new voter registrations would have been rejected solely because of data entry errors completely unrelated to eligibility. There are protocols and programs available to reducethis error rate, but even the most sophisticated matching technologieswhich are notbeing used in most stateswill leave many eligible voters unmatched. Depending on thestates policies and procedures, these eligible voters may end up disenfranchised, throughno fault of their own.Despite these limitations, databases can and should be used as tools to improve the voterregistration and record-keeping process for both voters and election officials. But statesmust account for, and avoid compounding, the unavoidable limitations of databases andrecord matching procedures. Many states have recognized these limitations and adoptedpolicies accordingly, as this report shows below. Unfortunately, in a few outlier cases, atool meant to smooth the road to accurate registration has instead been used to create asignificant pothole.6 Making the ListBrennan Center for Justice 7Four key categories of state policyThis report catalogs states policies and procedures with respect to the new voter registra-tion process under HAVA, paying particular attention to the policy choices that may affectan eligible citizens voting rights. As a result of HAVA, when a citizen now attempts to register to vote, she must (in moststates) submit her drivers license number or state identification card number, if she hasone; if not, she must submit the last four digits of her Social Security number. (If she hasneither number, the state must assign her a unique identifying number.) Most states thenattempt to match information on the voter registration formincluding this identifyingnumberto information in other government databases, including the drivers licensedatabase of the state motor vehicles department or the database maintained by theCommissioner of Social Security. State practices regarding this matching processand its effect on a citizens voter registra-tionvary widely. The survey reveals that there are four primary ways in which these statepractices differ:1. Match criteria: First, states vary in the criteria they use to determine whether the information on a voter registration form matches information in another govern-ment database. Some states use a fairly flexible standard, to account for typos andother mistakes; other states use a very exacting standard that does not compensate forthese kinds of errors. The more exacting the standard, the more likely that a minorerror prevents an eligible matchdecreasing the chance that the states database stays clean. 2. Failed match: Second, states vary in the consequences they impose when they areunable to find a match between information on a citizens application for voter reg-istration and information in another government database. Some states implementthe limited identification procedure required by HAVA for first-time voters who reg-ister by mail; other states place additional burdens on the voter or reject the applica-tion outright. The more burdensome the consequences, the more likely that eligiblecitizens will be barred from the polls because of errors in the process.3. Incomplete information: Third, states vary in the way in which they treat applica-tions submitted with a missing, illegible, or incomplete identifying number. Somestates check whether the right number can be located in another database, or assigna new unique identifier and then register the applicant; other states immediatelyreject the application. The more rigid the response, the more likely that an eligiblecitizen will not be registered due to a minor and immaterial mistake.Findings8 Making the List2Neither Hawaii nor NorthDakota is reflected in the tallies of individual state prac-tices below. Hawaii did notrespond to this survey, and norelevant policies were reflectedin its state statutes or regula-tions. North Dakota has nosystem of voter registration atall, and does not collect any ofthe information described inthis report.4. Correcting errors: Finally, states vary in the opportunities they provide to resolveerrors in the matching process. All states notify the voter when a problem occurs, butthey differ in the form such notice takes and the process by which errors can beresolved. The greater the opportunity for correction, the less likely it is that errors willremain unresolved and create problems at the polls for eligible voters.Each of these categories reflects a different opportunity for states to address the errors thatinevitably arise in the registration process, including common errors that have no bearing ona citizens eligibility to vote. There are many ways in which errors arise: the applicant maymake an honest mistake on the form, transposing a number or omitting a digit; an electionsclerk may make an honest mistake in data entry, such as a typo or a mistake in reading hand-writing; there may be a mistake in other government databases, such as in those maintainedby a state department of motor vehicles or the Social Security Administration; or there mightsimply be a mismatch between two correct sources of information, such as a woman listedwith a maiden name in one database and a married name in another. None of these mistakes mean that the applicant is ineligible to vote, but any of them maykeep eligible citizens from the polls, depending on a states practices. In general, the moreaccommodating the states approach in each area, the more likely it is that eligible voterswill retain the opportunity to vote; conversely, the less accommodating the approach, themore likely it is that eligible voters will be barred from the polls. We now discuss the states intended practices in relation to each category. This followingdiscussion represents a snapshot of state intentions in early 2006; state policies are, inmany cases, still developing as election officials develop experience with the statewidevoter registration databases.21. Criteria for matching: state practicesStates employ different criteria to determine whether information on a voter registrationapplication matches information in another government database. Some states use a flexible match standard, requiring that fields match substantially, but not exactly: forexample, under such a substantial match standard, Michael would match Michael,but might also match Mike, Micheal, M., or even Michaela. Some states requireeach character of each field to be the same: under such an exact match standard,Michael would match only Michael, and would not match any of the other variantsabove. Some states criteria fall in between. The more exacting the match criteria, the greater the likelihood of a false negative, inwhich a match between two records will not be found when the records in fact belong tothe same person. The possibility for error is exacerbated as the number of compared fields(name, date of birth, etc.) increases, because of the increased opportunity for typos or similar mistakes. Conversely, the more flexible the match criteria, the greater the likelihoodof a false positive, in which two records are deemed to match when they do not belong tothe same person. This effect, however, is mitigated as the number of compared fields (name,Brennan Center for Justice 9date of birth, etc.) increases, because each field acts as a double-check on the others. Other industriesincluding the security, insurance, and health care industriescompareinformation from multiple sources all the time. Standard practice in these industriesaccounts for the balance between false negatives and false positives by comparingmultiple fields using sophisticated and flexible matching protocols. The flexibility of theprotocol is tuned to the application: more flexible when it is more important to err onthe side of catching every true match (e.g., when comparing an airline manifest to awatch list for terrorists, it is more important to make sure that no name that should bematched slips off of the listthat is, it is more important to minimize false negatives);less flexible when it is more important to err on the side of catching every true mismatch(e.g., when comparing a class list to a list of kids who are exempt from an immunizationshot, it is more important to make sure that no name gets on the exemption list thatshouldnt bethat is, it is more important to minimize false positives). In the voter registration context, most states appear to have built some flexibility into theirmatch criteria, at least when comparing records based on drivers license numbers.Unfortunately, our survey found that when comparing records submitted with SocialSecurity digits, contrary to standard industry practice, many states may not be using themost appropriate matching criteria for the job.Records with drivers license numbersConsider first the attempt to match records of applicants submitting a drivers license or stateidentification card number. Eleven states3use or plan to use some form of a substantialmatch standard to seek matching records. In these states, motor vehicle records are culledeither by an automated process or by manual reviewto produce a list of possible matches.An election official reviews this list of possible matches, to determine whether any of theserecords represents the applicant. An example will help demonstrate the substantial match systems used by these 11 states.Consider a voter registration record application submitted by Jane Elizabeth Smith, bornFebruary 5, 1975, ID #123456789. The motor vehicle records might include any of thefollowing potential matches: 1. #123456789 Jane Elizabeth Smith 02/05/1975 (all fields identical)2. #123456889 Jane Elizabeth Smith 02/05/1975 (typo in ID)3. #123456789 Jane Elizabeth Smith 05/02/1975 (swapped month/date of birth)4. #123456789 Joan Elizabeth Smith 02/05/1975 (mistake in first name)5. #123456789 Jane S. Martin 02/05/1975 (married name)6. #123456789 Martin Brown 11/08/1955 (ID typo for different person)The culling algorithm used in the particular state will determine which possible matchrecords are returned; each algorithm has a different capacity to accommodate typos orother common errors. Some algorithms, for example, will find example #6 (where the IDnumbers appear to match) but not #2 (where they do not). Others will find #2 (where the3AK, AR, CO, FL, IL, IN,NC, NH, OR, VT, and WY.10 Making the List4AR, CO, IL, IN, NC, NH,OR, and WY. Oregon will notonly use a substantial matchprotocol, but if the state canfind a match despite a scriven-ers error in the identifyingnumber, it will correct theidentifying number on theapplicants behalf. Coloradohas indicated that it will con-sider nicknames and commonname variants a match, andwill account for minor errors(e.g., omission, transposition)in the identifying number, buthas not determined preciselyhow the match will be carriedout.5When Florida produces a realdrivers license number, it addsunique digits to this basic setto distinguish a Tim Johnsonfrom a Tom Jensen.6AZ, DE, IA, ID, MI, MN,MT, NE, NJ, NY, PA, RI, UT,WA, and WI.7 DE, ID, NE, NJ, RI, UT,and WI.names are the same) but not #6 (where they are not). An official will then review the possible matches to determine whether any represent the same individual. At the time of this survey, 8 of the 11 states using a substantial match standard had notdetermined precisely how they would select a list of possible match records, but intendedto employ flexible criteria to do so.4Floridas substantial match system is based on the way in which it generates driverslicense numbers. Florida generates a test number for a would-be voter in the same way thatit would generate a driver's license number for a driver: it derives a basic set of charactersfrom the applicants name, date of birth, and gender such that individuals with similarnames and birthdates (like Tim Johnson and Tom Jensen) end up with the same basiccharacter set.5It then produces its possible match list by returning all motor vehiclerecords which match either this generated test number or the license number listed on thevoter registration form.Vermonts substantial match system is even more dependent on human intervention.Vermont election officials regularly receive a duplicate copy of the full state drivers licensedatabase. The officials search this copy of the drivers license database for the individual onthe voter registration form, looking first for an exact match of the drivers license number,name, address, and date of birth. If no exact match is found, the officials will keep check-ing for variants and typos, searching manually through the database for partial matches ifneed be. Alaskas system is similar, but officials directly access the drivers license database,looking for a match based on either the identifying number or the name.Fifteen states plan to use a sort of hybrid system, requiring an exact match of every character in one field, but permitting substantial matches of one or more other fields.6These systems are designed to be somewhat flexible, but are still susceptible to failure in theevent of typos. Montanas system is among the most flexible of the hybrids. To generate itspossible match list, the system returns records that exactly match either identifying num-ber, first name, or date of birth; the returned records are then ranked by the number offields that match exactly.Seven of the 15 states7with this sort of hybrid system will generate possible match recordsfor election official review by returning records for which the identifying number matchesexactly. Pennsylvania similarly returns for official review records matching the identifyingnumber and the first two letters of the last name. Because each of these 8 states make theidentifying number the keystone of a match, if there is an error in the identifying number,as in example #2 aboveon the application form, as entered by election officials, or in themotor vehicles databasea match will not be found. If the identifying number is correct,however, other errors in the record, such as typos in the spelling of the name, will be subjectto human judgment. Minnesota uses a slight variation of the above scheme, returningrecords matching either the identifying number or the last name, first initial, and date ofbirth. This gives some flexibility in the event of an error in the identifying number;Minnesota would find example #2 above, where the other hybrids would not.Brennan Center for Justice 11In contrast, 5 of the 15 states use or plan to use hybrid systems that are dangerously closevariants of an overall exact match standard. These systems leave a little flexibility toaccount for a limited range of data errors, but only in certain circumstances. Iowa andWashington will seek an exact match of the identifying number, last name, and date ofbirth, but will accept variations of the applicants first namethey would find example#4 above, but not #2, #3, or #5. Arizona will seek exact matches of the number and dateof birth, and find substantial matches of the name8it would find example #4, andmight find example #5, but would not find examples #2 or #3 above. Michigan will seekexact matches of the number, last name, and first initial of the first name, but will findall other substantial matches it would find examples #1, #3, and #4 above, but notexamples #2 or #5. New York will seek an exact match of the identifying number; for allsuch records, the system will return a code stating whether the name, date of birth, oraddress match exactly (in examples #4 and #5 above, the official would see only a codestating that date of birth matches but name does not). The official then has the discre-tion to determine whether enough fields match to constitute a matching record. Finally, 9 states9use or plan to use an exact match standard likely to lead to many falsenegatives. In these states, certain fields are selected (usually the identifying number, firstname, last name, and date of birth; some states include the applicants middle initial or current address), and records are deemed to match only if each and every character of eachselected field matches exactly. Using this method, only example #1 above would be returnedas a match; all other examples would be rejected. Records with Social Security digitsThere is a similar division in how states approach the records of an applicant submittingthe last four digits of her Social Security numberexcept that even more states plan to usea rigid exact match standard. Eleven states10use or plan to use the same system notedabove that they will use for drivers license or identification card numbers (3 substantialmatches,114 hybrid,124 exact matches13).14Twenty-four states15instead use or plan touse a common exact match procedure developed by the Social Security Admininstrationand the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, which is likely to lead tomany false negatives.16Under this procedure, an automated system will seek an exactmatch of the applicants last four SSN digits, first name, last name, month of birth, andyear of birth. A code will then be returned indicating only whether or not an exact matchwas found. Using the examples above, only example #1 would be returned as a match; allothers would be rejected.17Tennessee and Virginiaboth of which collect a full SSN (all nine digits), and do n