Upload
damp1r
View
220
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
7/27/2019 Brazil Argentine
1/4
From the Indian Bomb to the Establishment of theFirst Brazil-Argentina Nuclear Agreement (1974-
1980)By
Rodrigo Mallea
Indias first nuclear explosive test in May 1974 had deep consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975 added to the safeguards requirements that were
imposed on countries seeking nuclear technologyeven those that were outside the NPT. This tightening of the
nuclear technology transfer regime as a result of Indias 1974 test would have a considerable effect on the
Brazilian and Argentine programs.
Argentina was the first to suffer immediate effects, however, because of its cooperation with Canada. Feeling
responsible for having contributed to the Indian test by virtue of its nuclear collaboration with that country, the
Ottawa government decided to tighten its nuclear cooperation policies. This decision effected agreements that
Argentina had signed with Canada before the Indian explosion for the transfer of technology and construction of
its second nuclear plant, Embalse.
7/27/2019 Brazil Argentine
2/4
In this context, in June 1974one month after the Indian testthe director of the Argentine nuclear plant Atucha,
Jorge Cosentino, visited Brazil and expressed the Argentine interest in exchanging experiences" in the nuclear
field with its neighbor. In the next month, taking advantage of a visit by the Superior War College of Brazil to the
Atucha plant, Cosentino once again insisted on the Argentine interest in having a nuclear understanding with
Brazil. [Document 1]
In Brazil, the National Security Council (CSN) was charged with analyzing the Argentine initiative following
previous, failed attempts at nuclear cooperation between the two countries. On September 8, 1974, the
conclusions of a study by the CSN were favorable to nuclear cooperation with Argentina. The members of the
Council believed that the agreement could help Brazil to achieve three objectives: (1) reduce mutual mistrust
between Argentina and Brazil; (2) neutralize third-party concerns about an eventual Argentina-Brazil nuclear race
and (3) take advantage of the exchange of experiences between both countries in the technical field since they
pursued two different technologies (heavy water reactors, in case of Argentina and enriched uranium, in Brazil).
[Document 2]
Even having a favorable disposition toward the Argentine initiative, President Geisel vetoed the possibility of
deepening the conversations in the nuclear field with Argentina with a view to arriving at an agreement. The
Brazilian President was of the view that before the signature of an agreement with Buenos Aires, "several
pending issues under negotiation" between the two countries should be resolved, making explicit mention to the
question of the massive Itaipu hydroelectric dam. Geisel ended by suggesting that Brazil should wait for the
solution of the conflict over shared resources in the Plata River basin before negotiating on nuclear cooperation,
and at the same time requested that the Brazilian foreign ministry in Itamaraty prepare a draft of the proposed
agreement. [Document 3]
As the Argentine-Brazilian dialogue on the harmonization of the hydroelectric projects on the Paran River
deteriorated, the separate bilateral nuclear dialogues between both Argentina and Brazil and the United States
also soured. In South America, the nuclear policy of the Carter Administration (1977-1980) aimed at leading
Argentina towards the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and preventing the full implementation of the
Brazilian-German nuclear cooperation agreement which envisaged the transfer of proliferation-sensitive
technologies such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
Although the United States failed to meet with success in these efforts, a new American proposal was received in
a different manner. The initiative came from Republican Congressman Paul Findley, who suggested that
Argentina and Brazil, although not members of the NPT, adopt a common safeguards regime and make a public
declaration that they would renounce peaceful nuclear explosions. These principles would eventually become the
central elements in the ulterior establishment of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency of Accounting and Control of
Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in 1991. [Document 4]
Findley's initiative was conveyed to Argentine President Jorge Videla and Brazilian Vice-President Adalberto
Pereira dos Santos on the occasion of both men's presence in Washington for the signature of the Torrijos-Carter
agreements on the Panama Canal in September 1977. Although Argentina received the idea favorably, Brazil
whose relationship with the United States was at the time going through one of its worst periodsrejected it.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/1168597/27/2019 Brazil Argentine
3/4
With the March 1979 change of government in Braslia, the Brazilian attitude toward Argentina changed markedly.
During the new administration of Joo Batista Figueiredo, Brazil tried to revive nuclear discussions with Buenos
Aires. In that sense, in August 1979 Itamaraty established a series of contacts with Argentine diplomatic
authorities in order to express Brazils interest. [Document 5]
The Argentine Foreign Ministry believed that the Brazilian initiative had three causes: (1) the deceleration of the
Brazilian nuclear program; (2) internal criticism of the project by the Brazilian scientific community, and (3)
pressure from the United States connected with the Brazil-Germany nuclear agreement. Argentine authorities
saw benefits in the establishment of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil, but also suggested that the
discussions be postponed until the problem of the hydroelectric projects had been resolved. [Document 6]
Finally, after the resolution of the Plata River basin conflict in October 1979 with the signature of the Tripartite
Agreement between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, it was possible to resume nuclear conversations between
Buenos Aires and Brasilia. During Brazilian President Figueiredos visit to Buenos Aires in May 1980, the first
nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed, thus closing a twelve-year effort to arrive
at a nuclear understanding. The agreement made possible the establishment of a common front against the
critics of the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programs and at the same time permitted concrete nuclear
cooperation in several fields.
Document 1: Visit of an officer from the Embassy of Brazil to the Atuchanuclear plant, July 1 1974, secret.
PNB Paulo Nogueira Batista/CPDOC Archives. PNB pn a 1974.07.01
This document is a detailed report from the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires about the visit of Brazils Superior
War College to the Atucha nuclear plant. There its director, Jorge Cosentino, explained the Argentine nuclear
program in detail and expressed interest in finding formulas for cooperation with Brazil in the nuclear field.
Document 2: Exposio de Motivos from the National Security Council tothe President of the Republic*, September 8 1974, secret.
Antonio Azeredo da Silveira/CPDOC Archives. PNB pn a 1974.07.01
The document is a report on the several attempts at establishing nuclear cooperation in the period 1968-1974. In
July 1974, on the occasion of the visit of a delegation from the Superior War College to the Argentine Atucha
nuclear plant, its director, engineer Cosentino, proposed a cooperation agreement between the two countries with
the objective of defusing concerns of the international community about a possible Brazil-Argentina rivalry.
Despite the cautious reception of the Argentine proposal by the National Security Council, which also pointed outits possible advantages, President Geisel, in a manuscript note, said that there were several pending issues to be
resolved before the establishment of nuclear cooperation between Braslia and Buenos Aires would become
possible.
Document 3: Geisel grounds for the nuclear cooperation with Argentinainitiative, 11 September 1974, secret.
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974#_ftn1http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116856http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974#_ftn1http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116853http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116858http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/1168587/27/2019 Brazil Argentine
4/4
Antonio Azeredo da Silveira/CPDOC Archives. PNB pn a 1974.07.01.
The document contains President Geisel's response to the opinion of the National Security Council about nuclear
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. It concludes that the solution of pending issues with Buenos Aires
should come before advancing in the nuclear field.
Document 4: Report from the Vice-President to the President of theRepublic on the occasion of the signature of the new treaties withPanama, September 7 1977.
Antonio Azeredo da Silveira/CPDOC Archives. AAS 1974.04/23.
Vice-President Adalberto Pereira dos Santos reports on his meeting with Republican Congressman Paul Findley,
who proposed on a personal basis the creation of a mutual nuclear surveillance system between Brazil and
Argentina with a view to allay doubts about a possible arms race. Findley had already presented the proposal to
Ambassador Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti (aide to Minister Silveira) on the occasion of his visit to Braslia on
August 23 1977. According to his proposed agreement, Brazil and Argentina would renounce the intention to
develop a nuclear explosive device and would accept mutual inspections in their respective nuclear facilities.
Document 5: Brazil-Argentina. Possibilities for nuclear cooperation, 20August 1979, secret.
Source: AHMRE.
This document deals with the conversations between Counselor Raul Estrada Oyuela, from the Argentine
Embassy in Brasilia, and Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves, Deputy Chief of the Energy and Mineral Resources
Division of Itamaraty, on the possibility of nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina.
Document 6: Note from the Head of the Latin American department of the
Argentine Foreign Ministry, August 23 1979Source: AMRECIC
In this memo, the Latin American department of the Argentine Foreign Ministry conveys its opinion on the
Brazilian interest in including the nuclear issue in the agenda of the Special Brazilian-Argentine Committee on
Cooperation (CEBAC), that the issue should be subordinated to the solution of the question of Itaipu.
Disclaimer: This dossier is the result of an ongoing research on the international history of Brazil's nuclear
program. The above historical narrative and selection of documents and oral history interviews might be updated
as new and relevant evidence is uncovered.
*"Exposio de Motivos" is the official designation of a formal written communication addressed to the President
of the Republic (Translator's note).
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-
first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974#_ftnref1http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974#_ftnref1http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116859http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116860http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116861http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974#_ftnref1http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-indian-bomb-to-the-establishment-the-first-brazil-argentina-nuclear-agreement-1974